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CARF Working Paper


Derivative Pricing under Asymmetric and Imperfect

Collateralization and CVA

Masaaki Fujii
The University of Tokyo
Akihiko Takahashi
The University of Tokyo

First Version: November 2010

Current Version: February 2011

CARF is presently supported by Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd., Citigroup, Dai-ichi

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Company, Nomura Holdings, Inc. and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (in alphabetical
order). This financial support enables us to issue CARF Working Papers.

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not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author.
Derivative Pricing under Asymmetric and Imperfect
Collateralization and CVA ∗
Masaaki Fujii†, Akihiko Takahashi‡

First version: November 30, 2010

Current version: February 15, 2011

The importance of collateralization through the change of funding cost is now well
recognized among practitioners. In this article, we have extended the previous stud-
ies of collateralized derivative pricing to more generic situation, that is asymmetric
and imperfect collateralization as well as the associated CVA. We have presented ap-
proximate expressions for various cases using Gateaux derivative which allow straight-
forward numerical analysis. Numerical examples for CCS (cross currency swap) and
IRS (interest rate swap) with asymmetric collateralization were also provided. They
clearly show the practical relevance of sophisticated collateral management for finan-
cial firms. The valuation and the associated issue of collateral cost under the one-way
CSA (unilateral collateralization), which is common when SSA (sovereign, suprana-
tional and agency) entities are involved, have been also studied. We have also discussed
some generic implications of asymmetric collateralization for netting and resolution of

Keywords : swap, collateral, derivatives, Libor, currency, OIS, EONIA, Fed-Fund, CCS,
basis, risk management, HJM, FX option, CSA, CVA, term structure, SSA, one-way CSA

This research is supported by CARF (Center for Advanced Research in Finance) and the global
COE program “The research and training center for new development in mathematics.” All the contents
expressed in this research are solely those of the authors and do not represent any views or opinions of
any institutions. The authors are not responsible or liable in any manner for any losses and/or damages
caused by the use of any contents in this research.

Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo

Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo

1 Introduction
In the last decade, collateralization has experienced dramatic increase in the derivative
market. According to the ISDA survey [11], the percentage of trade volume subject to
collateral agreements in the OTC (over-the-counter) market has now become 70%, which
was merely 30% in 2003. If we focus on large broker-dealers and the fixed income market,
the coverage goes up even higher to 84%. Stringent collateral management is also a crucial
issue for successful installation of CCP (central clearing parties).
Despite its long history in the financial market as well as its critical role in the risk
management, it is only after the explosion of Libor-OIS spread following the collapse of
Lehman Brothers that the effects of collateralization on derivative pricing have started to
gather strong attention among practitioners. In most of the existing literatures, collat-
eral cost has been neglected, and only its reduction of counterparty exposure have been
considered. The work of Johannes & Sundaresan (2007) [12] was the first focusing on the
cost of collateral, which studied its effects on swap rates based on empirical analysis. As
a more recent work, Piterbarg (2010) [13] discussed the general option pricing using the
similar formula to take the collateral cost into account.
In a series of works of Fujii, Shimada & Takahashi (2009) [7, 8] and Fujii & Takahashi
(2010,2011) [9, 10], modeling of interest rate term structures under collateralization has
been studied, where cash collateral is assumed to be posted continuously and hence the
remaining counterparty credit risk is negligibly small. In these works, it was found that
there exists a direct link between the cost of collateral and CCS (cross currency swap)
spreads. In fact, one cannot neglect the cost of collateral to make the whole system
consistent with CCS markets, or equivalently with FX forwards. Making use of this
relation, we have also shown the significance of a ”cheapest-to-deliver” (CTD) option
implicitly embedded in a collateral agreement in Fujii & Takahashi (2011) [10].
The previous works have assumed bilateral and symmetric collateralization, where the
two parties post the same currency or choose the optimal one from the same set of eligible
currencies. Although symmetric collateral agreement is widely used, asymmetric situation
can also arise in the actual market. If there is significant difference in credit qualities
between two parties, the relevant CSA (credit support annex, specifying all the details
of collateral agreements) may specify asymmetric collateral treatments, such as unilateral
collateralization and asymmetric collateral thresholds. Especially, when SSA(sovereign,
supranational and agency) clients are involved, one-way CSA is quite common: SSA enti-
ties refuse to post collateral but require it from the counterpart financial firms. One-way
CSA is now becoming a hot issue among practitioners [14]. Since the financial firm needs
to enter two-way CSA (or bilateral collateralization) to hedge the position in financial
market, there appears a significant cash-flow mismatch. In addition, as we will see later,
the financial firm may suffer from the significant loss of mark-to-market value due to the
rising cost of collateral.
Asymmetric collateralization, even if the details specified in CSA are symmetric, may
also arise effectively due to the different level of sophistication of collateral management
between the two parties. For example, one party can only post single currency due to
the lack of easy access to foreign currency pools or flexible operational system while the
other chooses the cheapest currency each time it posts collateral. It should be also impor-
tant to understand the change of CVA (credit value adjustment) under collateralization.

Although, it is reasonable in normal situations to assume most of the credit exposure is
eliminated by collateralization for standard products, such as interest rate swaps, preparing
for credit exposure arising from the deviation from the perfect collateral coverage should
be very important for the risk management, particularly for complex path-dependent con-
tracts, for which it is unlikely to achieve complete price agreements between the two
This work has extended the previous research to the more generic situations, that is
asymmetric and imperfect collateralization. The formula for the associated CVA is also
derived. We have examined a generic framework which allows asymmetry in a collateral
agreement and also imperfect collateralization, and then shown that the resultant pricing
formula is quite similar to the one appearing in the work of Duffie & Huang (1996) [3]. Al-
though the exact solution is difficult to obtain, Gateaux derivative allows us to get approx-
imate pricing formula for all the cases in the unified way. In order to see the quantitative
impacts, we have studied IRS (interest rate swap) and CCS with an asymmetric collateral
agreement. We have shown the practical significance for both cases, which clearly shows
the relevance of sophisticated collateral management for all the financial firms. Those
carrying out optimal collateral strategy can enjoy significant funding benefit, while the
others incapable of doing so will have to pay unnecessary expensive cost. We also found
the importance of cost of collateral for the evaluation of CVA. The present value of future
credit exposure can be meaningfully modified due to the change of effective discounting
rate, and can be also affected by the possible dependency between the collateral coverage
ratio and the counter party exposure. There also appear a new contribution called CCA
(collateral cost adjustment) that purely represents the adjustment of collateral cost due
to the deviation from the perfect collateralization.
After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, investors have been suffering from the loss of
transparency of prices provided by broker-dealers, each of them quotes quite different bids
and offers. This is mainly because the financial firms started to pay more attention to
counter party credit risk and also because there was no consensus for the proper method
of discounting of future cash flows for secured contracts with collateral agreements. How-
ever, the situation is now changing. Recently, SwapClear of LCH.Clearnet group, which
is one of the largest clearing house in the world, started to use OIS (overnight index
swap) curve to discount the future cash flows of swaps. This is one of the examples that
the market benchmark quotes for the standardized products are converging to the per-
fectly collateralized ones with standard symmetric CSA. We also think that this should be
the only possible way to achieve enough price transparency, since otherwise we need the
portfolio and counterparty specific adjustment. Our formulation is based on the above un-
derstanding and derives CCA and CVA as a deviation from the collateralized benchmark
price, which should be useful for practitioners who are required clear explanation for each
additional charge to their clients.
We have also discussed some interesting implications for financial firm’s behavior under
(almost) perfect collateralization. One observes that the strong incentives for advanced
financial firms to exploit funding benefit may reduce overall netting opportunities in the
market, which can be a worrisome issue for the reduction of the systemic risk in the market.

2 Generic Formulation
In this section, we consider the generic pricing formula. As an extension from the previous
works, we allow asymmetric and/or imperfect collateralization with bilateral default risk.
We basically follow the setup in Duffie & Huang (1996) [3] and extend it so that we can
deal with cost of collateral explicitly. The approximate pricing formulas that allow simple
analytic treatment are derived by Gateaux derivatives.

2.1 Fundamental Pricing Formula

2.1.1 Setup
We consider a filtered probability space (Ω, F, F, Q), where F = {Ft : t ≥ 0} is sub-σ-
algebra of F satisfying the usual conditions. Here, Q is the spot martingale measure, where
the money market account is being used as the numeraire. We consider two counterparties,
which are denoted by party 1 and party 2. We model the stochastic default time of party i
(i ∈ {1, 2}) as an F-stopping time τ i ∈ [0, ∞], which are assumed to be totally inaccessible.
We introduce, for each i, the default indicator function, Hti = 1{τ i ≤t} , a stochastic process
that is equal to one if party i has defaulted, and zero otherwise. The default time of
any financial contract between the two parties is defined as τ = τ 1 ∧ τ 2 , the minimum
of τ 1 and τ 2 . The corresponding default indicator function of the contract is denoted by
Ht = 1{τ ≤t} . The Doob-Meyer theorem implies the existence of the unique decomposition
as H i = Ai + M i , where Ai is a predictable and right-continuous (it is continuous indeed,
since we assume total inaccessibility of default time), increasing process with Ai0 = 0,
and M i is a Q-martingale. In the following, we also assume the absolute continuity of Ai
and the existence of progressively measurable non-negative process hi , usually called the
hazard rate of counterparty i, such that
∫ t
At = his 1{τ i >s} ds, t≥0. (2.1)

For simplicity we also assume that there is no simultaneous default with positive proba-
bility and hence the hazard rate for Ht is given by ht = h1t + h2t on the set of {τ > t}.
We assume collateralization by cash which works in the following way: if the party
i (∈ {1, 2}) has negative mark-to-market, it has to post the cash collateral 1 to the counter
party j (̸= i), where the coverage ratio of the exposure is denoted by δti ∈ R+ . We assume
the margin call and settlement occur instantly. Party j is then a collateral receiver and
has to pay collateral rate cit on the posted amount of collateral, which is δti × (|mark-
to-market|), to the party i. This is done continuously until the end of the contract. A
common practice in the market is to set cit as the time-t value of overnight (ON) rate of
the collateral currency used by the party i. We emphasize that it is crucially important
to distinguish the ON rate ci from the theoretical risk-free rate of the same currency ri ,
where both of them are progressively measurable. The distinction is necessarily for the
unified treatment of different collaterals and for the consistency with cross currency basis
spreads, or equivalently FX forwards in the market (See, Sec. 6.4 and Ref. [10] for details.).
According to the ISDA survey [11], more than 80% of collateral being used is cash. If there is a liquid
repo or security-lending market, we may also carry out similar formulation with proper adjustments of its
funding cost.

We consider the assumption of continuous collateralization is a reasonable proxy of
the current market where daily (even intra-day) margin call is becoming popular. We
are mainly interested in well-collateralized situation where δti ≃ 1, however, we do also
include the under- as well as over-collateralized cases, in which we have δti < 1 and δti > 1,
respectively. Although it may look slightly odd to include the δti ̸= 1 case under the con-
tinuous assumption at first sight, we think that allowing under- and over-collateralization
makes the model more realistic considering the possible price dispute between the rele-
vant parties, which is particularly the case for exotic derivatives. Most of the long dated
exotics, such as PRDC and CMS-related products, contain path-dependent knock-out or
early redemption triggers, which makes the sizable price disagreements between the two
parties almost inevitable. Because of the model uncertainty, the price reconciliation is
usually done in ad-hoc way, say taking an average of each party’s quote. As a result,
even after the each margin settlement, there always remains sizable discrepancy between
the collateral value and the model implied fair value of the portfolio. Therefore, even in
the presence of timely margining, the inclusion of generic collateral coverage ration taking
value bigger or smaller than 1 should be important for portfolios containing exotics.
Under the assumption, the remaining credit exposure of the party i to the party j at
time t is given by

max(1 − δtj , 0) max(Vti , 0) + max(δti − 1, 0) max(−Vti , 0) ,

where Vti denotes the mark-to-market value of the contract from the view point of party
i. The second term corresponds to the over-collateralization, where the party i can only
recover the fraction of overly posted collateral when party j defaults. We denote the
recovery rate of the party j, when it defaults at time t, by the progressively measurable
process Rtj ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, the recovery value that the party i receives can be written as
( )
Rtj max(1 − δtj , 0) max(Vti , 0) + max(δti − 1, 0) max(−Vti , 0) . (2.2)

As for notations, we will use a bracket ”( )” when we specify type of currency, such as
(i) (i)
rt and ct , the risk-free and the collateral rates of currency (i), in order to distinguish it
from that of counter party. We also denote a spot FX at time t by fxt that is the price
of a unit amount of currency (j) in terms of currency (i). We assume all the technical
conditions for integrability are satisfied throughout this paper.

2.1.2 Pricing Formula

We consider the ex-dividend price at time t of a generic financial contract made between
the party 1 and 2, whose maturity is set as T (> t). We consider the valuation from the
view point of party 1, and define the cumulative dividend Dt that is the total receipt from
party 2 subtracted by the total payment from party 1. We denote the contract value as
St and define St = 0 for τ ≤ t. See Ref.[3] for the technical details about the regularity
conditions which guarantee the existence and uniqueness of St . Under these assumptions

and the setup give in Sec.2.1.1, one obtains
{ ( ) }
St = βt E Q βu−1 1{τ >u} dDu + yu1 δu1 1{Su <0} + yu2 δu2 1{Su ≥0} Su du
]t,T ]
∫ ]
( )

+ βu−1 1{τ ≥u} Z 1 (u, Su− )dHu1 + Z 2 (u, Su− )dHu2 Ft , (2.3)
]t,T ]

on the set of {τ > t}. Here, y i = ri − ci denotes a spread between the risk-free and
collateral rates of the currency used by party i, which represents the instantaneous return
from the collateral being posted, i i
(∫ i.e. it)earns r but subtracted by c as the payment to
the collateral payer. βt = exp 0 ru du is a money market account for the currency on
which St is defined. Z i is the recovery payment from the view point of the party 1 at the
time of default of party i (∈ {1, 2}):
( ) ( )
Z 1 (t, v) = 1 − (1 − Rt1 )(1 − δt1 )+ v1{v<0} + 1 + (1 − Rt1 )(δt2 − 1)+ v1{v≥0} (2.4)
( ) ( )
Z 2 (t, v) = 1 − (1 − Rt2 )(1 − δt2 )+ v1{v≥0} + 1 + (1 − Rt2 )(δt1 − 1)+ v1{v<0} , (2.5)

where X + denotes max(X, 0). Note that the above definition is consistent with the setup
in Sec.2.1.1. The surviving party loses money if the received collateral from the defaulted
party is not enough or if the posted collateral to the defaulted party exceeds the fair
contract value.
Even if we explicitly take the cost of collateral into account, it is possible to prove the
following proposition about the pre-default value of the contract in completely parallel
fashion with the one given in [3]:
Proposition 1 Suppose a generic financial contract between the party 1 and 2, of which
cumulative dividend at time t is denoted by Dt from the view point of the party 1. Assume
that the contract is continuously collateralized by cash where the coverage ratio of the party
i (∈ {1, 2})’s exposure is denoted by δti ∈ R+ . The collateral receiver has to pay collateral
rate denoted by cit on the amount of collateral posted by party i, which is not necessarily
equal to the risk-free rate of the same currency, rti . The fractional recovery rate Rti ∈ [0, 1]
is assumed for the under- as well as over-collateralized exposure. For the both parties,
totally inaccessible default is assumed, and the hazard rate process of party i is denoted by
hit . We assume there is no simultaneous default of the party 1 and 2, almost surely. Then,
the pre-default value Vt of the contract from the view point of party 1 is given by
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( )

Vt = E Q exp − ru − µ(u, Vu ) du dDs Ft , t ≤ T (2.6)
]t,T ] t

( )
µ(t, v) = yt1 δt1 − (1 − Rt1 )(1 − δt1 )+ h1t + (1 − Rt2 )(δt1 − 1)+ h2t 1{v<0}
( )
+ yt2 δt2 − (1 − Rt2 )(1 − δt2 )+ h2t + (1 − Rt1 )(δt2 − 1)+ h1t 1{v≥0} (2.7)

if the jump of V at the time of default (= τ ) is zero almost surely, and then satisfies
St = Vt 1{τ >t} for all t. Here, St is defined in Eq. (2.3).

See Appendix A for proof. One important point regarding to this result is the fact
that we can actually determine y i almost uniquely from the information of cross currency
market. This point will be discussed in Sec. 6.4. In the reminder of the paper, we assume
that there is no price jump in V at the time of default, which seems reasonable assumption
at least for standard derivatives on interest rates and foreign exchange rates. Notice that,
since we assume totally inaccessible default time, there is no contribution from pre-fixed
lump-sum coupon payments to ∆Vτ .

3 Symmetric Collateralization
Let us define
ỹti = δti yti − (1 − Rti )(1 − δti )+ hit + (1 − Rtj )(δti − 1)+ hjt , (3.1)
where i, j ∈ {1, 2} and j ̸= i. In the case of ỹt1 = ỹt2 = ỹt , we have µ(t, Vt ) = ỹt that is
independent from the contract value Vt . Therefore, from Proposition 1, we have
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]

Vt = E Q
exp − (ru − ỹu )du dDs Ft . (3.2)
]t,T ] t

It is clear that simple redefinition of discounting rate allows us to evaluate a contract

value in a standard way. Now, let us consider some important examples of symmetric and
perfect collateralization where (y 1 = y 2 ) and (δ 1 = δ 2 = 1). One can easily confirm that
all the following results are consistent with those given in Refs. [7, 8, 10, 9].

Case 1: Situation where both parties use the same collateral currency ”(i)”, which is the
same as the payment currency. In this case, the pre-default value of the contract in terms
of currency (i) is given by
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]

(i) Q(i)
Vt = E exp − cu du dDs Ft ,
]t,T ] t

where Q(i) is the spot-martingale measure of currency (i).

Case 2: Situation where both parties use the same collateral currency ”(k)”, which is
the different from the payment currency ”(i)”. In this case, the pre-default value of the
contract in terms of currency (i) is given by
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( )
(i) (i)
Vt = E Q exp − c(i) + y (i,k)
du dD s Ft , (3.4)
]t,T ] t
u u

where we have defined

yu(i,k) = yu(i) − yu(k) (3.5)

( ) ( (k) )
= ru(i) − c(i)
u − ru − c(k)
u . (3.6)

Case 3: Situation where the payment currency is (i) and both parties optimally choose
a currency from a common set of eligible collaterals denoted by C in each time they post

collateral. In this case,
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( (i) )
(i) Q(i)
Vt =E exp − cu + max yu(i,k) du dDs Ft (3.7)
]t,T ] t k∈C

gives the pre-default value of the contract in terms of currency (i). Note that collateral
payer chooses currency (k) that maximizes the effective discounting rate in order to reduce
the mark-to-market loss. This is also the currency with the cheapest funding cost. See
Sec. 6.4 and its Remark for details.

Remark: Notice that we have recovered linearity of each payment on the pre-default value
for all these cases. In fact, in the case of symmetric collateralization, we can value the
portfolio by adding the contribution from each trade/payment separately. This point can
be considered as a good advantage of symmetric collateralization for practical use, since it
makes agreement among financial firms easier as the transparent benchmark price in the

4 Marginal Impact of Asymmetry

We now consider more generic cases. When ỹt1 ̸= ỹt2 , we have non-linearity (called semi-
linear in particular) in effective discounting rate R(t, Vt ) = rt − µ(t, Vt ). Although it is
possible to get solution by solving PDE in principle, it will soon become infeasible as the
underlying dimension increases. Even if we adopt a very simple dynamic model, usual
”reset advance pay arrear” conventions easily make the issue very complicated to handle.
For practical and feasible analysis, we use Gateaux derivative that was introduced in
Duffie & Huang [3] to study the effects of default-spread asymmetry. We can follow the
same procedure by appropriately redefining the variables. Since evaluation is straightfor-
ward in a symmetric case, the expansion of the pre-default value around the symmetric
limit allows us simple analytic and/or numerical treatment. Firstly, let us define the
spread process:
η̃ti,j = ỹti − ỹtj . (4.1)
Then, under an assumption that ỹ i and ỹ j do not depend on V directly, the first-order
effect on the pre-default value due to the non-zero spread appears as the following Gateaux
derivative (See, Ref. [5] for details.):
[∫ T ]
∫ ( ) 2,1
− ts (ru −ỹu
max −Vs (0), 0 η̃s ds Ft ,
2 )du
∇Vt (0; η̃ ) = E
2,1 Q
e (4.2)

where Vt (0) is the pre-default value of contract at time t with the limit of η̃ 2,1 ≡ 0 and
given by [∫ ]
( ∫ s )

Vt (0) = E Q
exp − (ru − ỹu )du dDs Ft .
]t,T ] t
Then the original pre-default value is approximated as

Vt ≃ Vt (0) + ∇Vt (0; η̃ 2,1 ) . (4.4)

4.1 Asymmetric Collateralization
We now consider two special cases under perfect collateralization δ 1 = δ 2 = 1 using the
previous result.
Case 1: The situation where the party 2 can only use the single collateral currency (j) but
party 1 chooses the optimal currency from the eligible set denoted by C. The evaluation
currency is (i). In this case, the Gateaux derivative is given by
[∫ T ( ∫ s ) ]
( ) Q(i)
( (i) )
∇Vt 0; max y (j,k)
=E exp − cu + yu(i,j)
du max(−Vs (0), 0) max ys Ft ,
k∈C t t k∈C
where [∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( (i) )
Vt (0) = E exp − (i,j)
cu + yu du dDs Ft , (4.6)
]t,T ] t
which is straightforward to calculate. This case is particularly interesting since the situa-
tion can naturally arise if the sophistication of collateral management of one of the parties
is not enough to carry out optimal strategy, even when the relevant CSA is actually sym-
metric. We will carry out numerical study for this example in Sec. 7.

Case 2: The case of unilateral collateralization, where the party 2 is default-free and
do not post collateral. The party 1 needs to post collateral in currency (j) to fully
cover the exposure, or δ 1 = 1. The evaluation currency is (i). We expand the pre-
default value around the symmetric collateralization with currency (j). In this case,
(i) (j) (i) (i,j) (j)
R(t, Vt ) = rt − yt 1{Vt <0} = ct + yt + yt 1{Vt ≥0} .
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( ) T ( (i) ) ( ) (j)
du max Vs (0), 0 ys ds Ft ,
∇Vt 0; yt 1{Vt ≥0} = −E exp − (i,j)
cu + yu
t t
where [∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( (i) )
Vt (0) = E Q exp − cu + yu(i,j) du dDs Ft (4.8)
]t,T ] t
is the value in symmetric limit. Detailed implications for the one-way CSA will be dis-
cussed in a later section after considering remaining credit risk.

In both cases, the correction term seems a weighted average of European option on the
underlying contract. If we have analytic formula for Vt (0), it is straightforward to carry
out numerical calculation. The important factors determining the correction term are the
dynamics of y and V itself, and their interdependence. This point will be studied in later

5 CVA as a Deviation from Perfect Collateralization

As another important application of Gateaux derivative, we can consider CVA as a devi-
ation from the perfect collateralization. Most of the existing literature is neglecting the

cost of collateral for the calculation of CVA, which seems inappropriate considering the
significant size and volatility of y, pointed out in our work [10] 2 .

5.1 Derivation of CVA

Let us suppose yt1 = yt2 = yt for simplicity. In this case, we have
( )
µ(t, Vt ) = yt − (1 − δt1 )yt + (1 − Rt1 )(1 − δt1 )+ h1t − (1 − Rt2 )(δt1 − 1)+ h2t 1{Vt <0}
( )
− (1 − δt2 )yt + (1 − Rt2 )(1 − δt2 )+ h2t − (1 − Rt1 )(δt2 − 1)+ h1t 1{Vt ≥0} (5.1)

and consider the Gateaux derivative around the point of δ 1 = δ 2 = 1. The result can be
interpreted as a bilateral CVA that takes into account the cost of collateral and its coverage
ratio explicitly. There also appears a new term ”CCA” (collateral cost adjustment) that is
purely the adjustment of collateral cost totally independent from the counterparty credit
Following the method given in Ref. [5], one obtains
∇Vt = E Q e− t (ru −yu )du
(−Vs (0))×
]t,T ]
[{ }
(1 − δs1 )ys + (1 − Rs1 )(1 − δs1 )+ h1s − (1 − Rs2 )(δs1 − 1)+ h2s 1{Vs (0)<0}
{ } ] ]

+ (1 − δs2 )ys + (1 − Rs2 )(1 − δs2 )+ h2s − (1 − Rs1 )(δs2 − 1)+ h1s 1{Vs (0)≥0} Ft , (5.2)

where [∫ ( ∫ s ) ]

Vt (0) = E Q exp − (ru − yu )du dDs Ft , (5.3)
]t,T ] t
which represents the contract value under the perfect collateralization. Using the above
result, the contract value can be decomposed into three parts, one is the value under the
perfect collateralization, CCA (collateral cost adjustment) and CVA 3 .

Vt ≃ Vt (0) + CCA + CVA . (5.4)

This decomposition would be useful for practitioners who know that most of their exposure
is collateralized, but still care about the remaining small counter party exposure and
adjustment of collateral cost due to the deviation from the perfect collateralization 4 . It
is natural to expand around the perfectly collateralized limit, since it would be the only
choice that can achieve the required transparency as the benchmark price in the market.
By expanding Eq.(5.2), we have
[∫ T [ ]
∫ [ ]+ [ ]+ ]
e− ts (ru −yu )du
ys (1 − δs ) −Vs (0) − (1 − δs ) Vs (0)
1 2
ds Ft
For general treatment of CVA and related references, see Ref. [1], for example.
Our convention of CVA is different from other literatures by sign where it is defined as the ”charge”
to the clients. Thus, CVAours = −CVA.
One can perform the same procedures even if there exist asymmetry in collateralization. Since we
expand around symmetric limit, there also appears correction terms for asymmetry.

which is a pure adjustment of collateral cost due to the deviation from the perfect collat-
eralization, and independent from the credit risk.
For credit sensitive part, we have

CVA[ = ]

(ru −yu )du
{ [ ]+ [ ]+ }
e t (1 − Rs1 )h1s (1 − δs1 )+−Vs (0) + (δs − 1) Vs (0)
2 +
ds Ft
]t,T ]
[∫ ]
∫s { [ [ ] }

e− t (ru −yu )du (1 − Rs2 )h2s (1 − δs2 )+ Vs (0)]+ + (δs1 − 1)+ −Vs (0)
−E Q ds Ft .
]t,T ]

Note that we have assumed ∆Vτ = 0 to derive Proposition 1. For those trades which
exhibit price jump at the time of default, such as CDS, we need to handle it separately.
The effects of stochastic coverage ratio as well as non-zero jump at the time of default are
our ongoing research topics.

5.2 Implications of Collateralization to Price Adjustment

Although we leave detailed numerical study of CVA under collateralization for a separate
paper, let us make several qualitative observations here. Firstly, although the terms in
CVA are pretty similar to the usual result of bilateral CVA, the discounting rate is now
different from the risk-free rate and reflects the funding cost of collateral. If there is no
dependency between y and other variables, such as hazard rate, the effects of collateral-
ization would mainly appear through the modification of discounting factor. As we have
studied in Ref. [10], the change of effective discounting factor due to the choice of collateral
currency or optimal collateral strategy can be as big as several tens of percentage points.
This itself can modify the resultant CVA meaningfully. In the case of correlated y and
other variables, particularly the hazard rates, there may appear new type of ”wrong way”
risk. As we will see later, y is closely related to the CCS basis spread that reflects the
relative funding cost difference between the two currencies involved. Hence, y is expected
to be highly sensitive to the market liquidity, and hence is also strongly affected by the
overall market credit conditions. Therefore, although the efficient collateral management
significantly reduce the credit risk, one needs to carefully estimate the remaining credit
exposures when there exists a meaningful deviation from the perfect collateralization.
Secondly, we can also expect important effects from the stochastic coverage ratios.
If the main reason for the imperfectness of collateralization comes from price disputes
over exotic products, δ i may be well regressed by market skewness, volatility level, Libor-
OIS and CCS basis spreads, etc. This may create non-trivial dependence among the
collateral coverage ratio, the credit exposure, and also on the funding cost of collateral. By
monitoring the price disagreements, financial firms should be able to construct a realistic
model of δ i for each counter party. It will be also useful for stress testing allowing higher
dependence among them.
Thirdly, as we have seen, there appears a new term called ”CCA” which adjusts the cost
of collateral from the perfect collateralization case. Dependent on the details of contracts
and correlation among the underlying variables, CCA can be as important as CVA. As can
be seen from Eq. (5.5), it will be particularly the case when there is significant correlation

between the collateral cost y and the underlying contract value. A typical examples of the
products highly correlated with y are cross currency basis swap and probably sovereign
risk sensitive products.
As the last remark, the valuation of CVA is critically depend on the recovery or closeout
scheme in general, and the result may sometimes be counterintuitive and/or inappropriate,
as clearly demonstrated by the recent work of Brigo & Morini (2010) [2]. However, in the
case of a collateralized contract, the dependency on the closeout conventions is expected
to be quite small. This is because, the creditworthiness of both parties which enter the
substitution trade is largely flattened by collateralization.

5.3 Several special cases for CVA

Let us consider several important examples:
Case 1: Consider the situation where the both parties use collateral currency (i), which
is the same as the payment currency. We also assume a common constant coverage ratio
δ 1 = δ 2 = δ (< 1), and also constant recovery rates. In this case, CCA and CVA are given
[∫ T ]
∫ (i)
CCA = −(1 − δ)E Q(i)
e ys Vs (0)ds Ft
− ts cu du (i)
[∫ T ]
∫ (i) ( )
CVA = (1 − R )(1 − δ)E
1 Q(i)
e − ts ci du 1
hs max −Vs (0), 0 ds Ft
[∫ T ]
∫ s (i) ( )
e− t cu du h2s max Vs (0), 0 ds Ft , (5.8)
−(1 − R2 )(1 − δ)E Q

where [∫ ( ∫ ) ]
Vt (0) = E exp − c(i)
u du dDs Ft (5.9)
]t,T ] t
is a value under perfect collateralization by domestic currency.

Case 2: Consider the situation where the both parties optimally choose collateral currency
(k) from the eligible collateral set C. The payments are done by currency (i). We assume
the common constant coverage ration δ (< 1) and constant recovery rates. In this case,
CCA and CVA are given by
[∫ T ]

ys Vs (0)ds Ft
(i) (i,k)
Q(i) − ts (cu +maxk∈C yu )du (k)
CCA = −(1 − δ)E e (5.10)
[∫ T ]
∫ s (i) ( )
e− t (cu +maxk∈C yu )du h1s max −Vs (0), 0 ds Ft
(i) (i,k)
CVA = +(1 − R1 )(1 − δ)E Q
[∫ T ]
∫ ( )
hs max Vs (0), 0 ds Ft ,
(i) (i,k)
(i) − ts (cu +maxk∈C yu )du 2
−(1 − R )(1 − δ)E
2 Q

where [∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( (i) )
Vt (0) = E exp − (i,k)
cu + max yu dDs Ft . (5.12)
]t,T ] t k∈C

An interesting point is that the optimal choice of collateral currency may significantly
change the size of CVA relative to the single currency case due to the increase of effective
discounting rates as discovered in Ref. [10].

Case 3: Let us consider another important situation, which is the unilateral collateraliza-
tion with bilateral default risk. Suppose the situation where only the party 2 is required to
post collateral due to its high credit risk relative to the party 1. We have δ 1 = 0, δ 2 ≃ 1,
and write yt2 = yt . In this case we have
[ ]
µ(t, Vt ) = yt − yt 1{Vt <0} + (1 − δt2 )yt 1{Vt ≥0}
( )
−(1 − Rt1 )h1t 1{Vt <0} − (δt2 − 1)+ 1{Vt ≥0} − (1 − Rt2 )(1 − δt2 )+ h2t 1{Vt ≥0} . (5.13)

Taking Gateaux derivative around the point of µ(t, Vt ) = yt , we have

[∫ T ∫s ( )
∇Vt = E Q e− t (ru −yu )du −Vs (0) ×
[ ( )
ys 1{Vs <0} + (1 − δs2 )ys 1{Vs ≥0} + (1 − Rs1 )h1s 1{Vs <0} − (δs2 − 1)+ 1{Vs ≥0}
] ]

+ (1 − Rs2 )(1 − δs2 )+ h2s 1{Vs ≥0} Ft . (5.14)

More specifically, if we assume the same collateral and payment currency (i), we have

Vt ≃ Vt (0) + CCA + CVA, (5.15)

[∫ ( ∫ ) ]
Vt (0) = E exp − c(i)
u du dDs Ft (5.16)
]t,T ] t

[∫ {[ ]
T ∫s ]+ [ ]+ }
ds Ft
Q(i) −
CCA = E e t cu du (i)
ys −Vs (0) − (1 − δs ) Vs (0)
[∫ {[ } ]
T ∫ s (i) ]+ [ ]+
e− t cu du (1 − Rs1 )hs −Vs (0) + (δs2 − 1)+ Vs (0) ds Ft
CVA = E Q 1
[∫ T ]
∫ (i) [ ]+
− ts cu du
(1 − Rs )(1 − δs ) hs Vs (0) ds Ft
−E Q
e 2 2 + 2

If party 1 receives ”strong” currency (that is the currency with high value of y (i) ), such
as USD (See, Ref. [10]), and also imposes stringent collateral management δ 2 ≃ 1 on the
counter party, it can enjoy significant funding benefit from CCA. The CVA terms are usual
bilateral credit risk adjustment except that the discounting is now given by the collateral
Note that, this example is particularly common when SSA (sovereign, supranational
and agency) is involved (as party 1). For example, when the party 1 is a central bank, it

does not post collateral but receives it. From the view point of the counterpart financial
firm (party 2), this is a real headache. As we have explained in the introduction, since
party 2 has to enter bilateral collateralization when it tries to hedge the position in the
market, there clearly exists a significant risk of cash-flow mismatch. In addition, although
the contribution from the CVA will be negligible, there exists a big mark-to-market issue
from the CCA term. Even if it is not a critical matter at the current low-interest rate
market, once the market interest rate starts to go up while the overnight rate c is kept
low by the central bank to support economy, the resultant mark-to-market loss for the
party 2 can be quite significant due to the rising cost of collateral ”y” (Remember that
y (i) = r(i) − c(i) ).

Case 4: Finally, let us consider the situation where there exist collateral thresholds. A
threshold is a level of exposure below which collateral will not be called, and hence it
represents an amount of uncollateralized exposure. If the exposure is above the threshold,
only the incremental exposure will be collateralized. Usually, the collateral thresholds are
set according to the credit standing of each counter party. They are often asymmetric,
with lower-rated counter party having a lower threshold than the higher-rated counter
party. It may be adjusted according to the ”triggers” linked to the credit rating during
the contract. We assume that the threshold of counter party i is set by Γit > 0, and that
the exceeding exposure is perfectly collateralized continuously.
In this case, Eq. (2.3) is modified in the following way:
St = βt E Q βu−1 1{τ >u} {dDu + q(u, Su )Su du}
]t,T ]
∫ ]
{ }

+ βu−1 1{τ ≥u} Z 1 (u, Su− )dHu1 + Z 2 (u, Su− )dHu2 Ft , (5.19)
]t,T ]

( ) ( )
Γ1 Γ2
q(t, St ) = yt1 1+ t 1{St <−Γ1t } + yt2 1− t 1{St ≥Γ2t } , (5.20)
St St

[( ) ]
Z (t, St ) = St 1 + (1 − Rt1 ) t 1{St <−Γ1t } + Rt1 1{−Γ1t ≤St <0} + 1{St ≥0}
[( 2
) ]
2 Γt
Z (t, St ) = St 1 − (1 − Rt ) 2
1{St ≥Γ2t } + Rt 1{0≤St <Γ2t } + 1{St <0} .

Here, we have assumed the same recovery rate for the uncollateralized exposure regardless
of whether the contract value is above or below the threshold.
Following the same procedures given in Appendix A, one can show that the pre-default
value of the contract Vt is given by
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( )

Vt = E Q
exp − ru − µ(u, Vu ) du dDs Ft , t ≤ T (5.21)
]t,T ] t


µ(t, Vt ) = yt1 1{Vt <0} + yt2 1{Vt ≥0}

[ ]
( 1 ) Γ1t
− yt + ht (1 − Rt ) 1{−Γ1t ≤Vt <0} − 1{Vt <−Γ1t }
1 1
[ ]
( 2 ) Γ 2
− yt + h2t (1 − Rt2 ) 1{0≤Vt <Γ2t } + t 1{Vt ≥Γ2t } . (5.22)

Now, consider the case where the both parties use the same collateral currency (i),
which is equal to the evaluation currency of the contract. Then, we have
(i) (i)
µ(t, Vt ) = yt − yt 1{−Γ1t ≤Vt <Γ2t }
[ 1 ]
(i) Γt Γ2t
+yt 1 1 − 1
Vt {Vt <−Γt } Vt {Vt ≥Γt }

[ ]
−ht (1 − Rt ) 1{−Γ1t ≤Vt <0} − 1{Vt <−Γ1t }
1 1
[ ]}
−h2t (1 − Rt2 ) 1{0≤Vt <Γ2t } + t 1{Vt ≥Γ2t } . (5.23)

Hence, if we apply Gateaux derivative around the symmetric perfect collateralization with
currency (i) that is µ(t, Vt ) = yt , we obtain

Vt ≃ Vt (0) + CCA + CVA, (5.24)

where [∫ ( ∫ ) ]
Vt (0) = E exp − c(i) du dD s Ft , (5.25)
]t,T ] t

[∫ ]
T ∫s
ys Vs (0)1{−Γ1s ≤Vs (0)<Γ2s } ds Ft
Q(i) −
CCA = −E e t cu du (i)
[∫ ]
T ∫s [ 1 ]
Γs 1{Vs (0)<−Γ1s } − Γs 1{Vs (0)≥Γ2s } ds Ft
Q(i) − cu du (i) 2
+E e t ys (5.26)
[∫ ∫ (i) [
T ( )]
CVA = −E Q(i)
e hs (1 − Rs ) Vs (0)1{−Γ1s ≤Vs (0)<0} − Γs 1{Vs (0)<−Γ1s } ds Ft
− ts cu du 1 1 1
[∫ ∫ (i) [
T ( )]
−E Q(i)
e hs (1 − Rs ) Vs (0)1{0<Vs (0)≤Γ2s } + Γs 1{Vs (0)>Γ2s } ds Ft .
− ts cu du 2 2 2

It is easy to see that the terms in CCA are reflecting the fact that no collateral is being
posted in the range {−Γ1t ≤ Vt ≤ Γ2t }, and that the posted amount of collateral is smaller
than |V | by the size of threshold. The terms in CVA represent bilateral uncollateralized
credit exposure, which is capped by each threshold.

6 Fundamental Instruments
In order to study the quantitative effects of collateralization and its implications on CVA,
we need to understand the pricing of fundamental instruments under symmetric collateral-
ization. It is also necessary for the calibration of the model in the first place. One obtains
detailed discussion in Refs [7, 8, 10], but we extend the results for stochastic y spread and
summarize in this section. We also introduce a slightly simpler cross currency swap, which
is actually tradable in the market, in order to show the direct link of CCS with the cost
of collateral in much simpler fashion. All the results easily follow from Sec. 3.
Throughout this section, we assume that the market quotes of standard products
are the values under symmetric and perfect collateralization, which should be reasonable
considering dominant role of major broker-dealers for these products and their stringent
collateral management. If it is not the case, value of any contract becomes dependent on
the portfolio to a specific counter party, which makes it impossible for financial firms to
agree on the market prices. In fact, to achieve enough transparency in the market quotes,
the broker-dealers should specify the details of CSA to avoid contamination from contracts
with non-standard collateral agreements.

6.1 Collateralized Zero Coupon Bond

A collateralized zero coupon bond is the most fundamental asset for the valuation of all
the contracts with collateral agreements. We denote a zero coupon bond collateralized by
the domestic currency (i) as
[ ∫ T (i) ]

e− t cs ds Ft
D(i) (t, T ) = E Q (6.1)

If payment and collateralized currencies are different, (i) and (j) respectively, a foreign
collateralized zero coupon bond D(i,j) is given by
[ ∫ T (i) ( ∫ T (i,j) ) ]

e− t cs ds e− t ys ds Ft .
D(i,j) (t, T ) = E Q (6.2)

In particular, if c(i) and y (i,j) are independent, we have

D(i,j) (t, T ) = D(i) (t, T )e− t y (i,j) (t,s)ds
, (6.3)

where [ ∫ s (i,j) ]
e− t yu du Ft
y (i,j) (t, s) = − ln E Q (6.4)
denotes the forward y (i,j) spread.

6.2 Collateralized FX Forward

Because of the existence of collateral, FX forward transaction now becomes non-trivial.
The precise understanding of the collateralized FX forward is crucial to deal with generic
collateralized products.

The definition of currency-(k) collateralized FX forward contract for the currency pair

(i, j) is as follows:
• At the time of trade inception t, both parties agree to exchange K unit of currency (i)
with the one unit of currency (j) at the maturity T . Throughout the contract period, the
continuous collateralization by currency (k) is performed, i.e. the party who has negative
mark-to-market value need to post the equivalent amount of cash in currency (k) to the
counter party as collateral, and this adjustment is made continuously. FX forward rate
fx (t, T ; k) is defined as the value of K that makes the value of contract at the inception
time zero.

By using the results of Sec. 3, K needs to satisfy the following relation:

[ ∫ T ( (i) (i,k) ) ] [ ∫ T ( (j) (j,k) ) ]

Q(i) − cs +ys ds (j) − cs +ys ds
KE e Ft − fx(i,j) (t)E Q Ft = 0
e t

and hence the FX forward is given by

[ ∫ T ( (j) (j,k) ) ]
(j) − cs +ys ds
EQ e Ft

fx(i,j) (t, T ; k) = fx(i,j) (t) [ ∫ ( (i) (i,k) ) ] (6.6)

− tT cs +ys ds
EQ e

D(j,k) (t, T )
= fx(i,j) (t) , (6.7)
D(i,k) (t, T )

which becomes a martingale under the (k)-collateralized forward measure. In particular,

we have
[ ∫ ( ) ] [ ]
(i) (i,k)
− tT cs +ys

fx (T ) Ft = D(i,k) (t, T )E T
ds (i,j) (i,k)
E e fx(i,j) (T, T ; k) Ft

= D(i,k) (t, T )fx(i,j) (t, T ; k) . (6.8)

Here, we have defined the (k)-collateralized (i) forward measure T (i,k) , where D(i,k) (·, T )
is used as the numeraire. E T [·] denotes expectation under this measure.

6.3 Overnight Index Swap

The overnight index swap (OIS) is a fixed-vs-floating swap which is the same as the usual
IRS except that the floating leg pays periodically, say quarterly, daily compounded ON
rate instead of Libors. Let us consider T0 -start TN -maturing OIS of currency (j) with
fixed rate SN , where T0 ≥ t. If the party 1 takes a receiver position, we have
[ (∫ )]
∑N Tn
dDs = δTn (s) ∆n SN + 1 − exp c(j)
u du (6.9)
n=1 Tn−1

where ∆ is day-count fraction of the fixed leg, and δT (·) denotes Dirac delta function at

Using the results of Sec. 3, in the case of currency (k) collateralization, we have
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( )
(j) (j)
Vt = EQ exp − c(j) + y (j,k)
du dD s Ft (6.10)
]T0 ,TN ] t
u u

∑ [ ∫ ( ) ( ∫ Tn ) ]
cu du
N (j)
Tn (j) (j,k)
= EQ
e− t cu +yu du
∆n SN + 1 − e Tn−1 Ft . (6.11)


In particular, if OIS is collateralized by its domestic currency (j), we have

N ( )
Vt = ∆n D(j) (t, Tn )SN − D(j) (t, T0 ) − D(j) (t, TN ) , (6.12)

and hence the par rate is given by

D(j) (t, T0 ) − D(j) (t, TN )

SN = ∑N (j)
. (6.13)
n=1 ∆n D (t, Tn )

6.4 Cross Currency Swap

Cross currency swap (CCS) is one of the most fundamental products in FX market. Espe-
cially, for maturities longer than a few years, CCS is much more liquid than FX forward
contract, which gives CCS a special role for model calibrations. The current market is
dominated by USD crosses where 3m USD Libor flat is exchanged by 3m Libor of a dif-
ferent currency with additional (negative in many cases) basis spread. The most popular
type of CCS is called MtMCCS (Mark-to-Market CCS) in which the notional of USD leg
is rest at the start of every calculation period of Libor, while the notional of the other leg
is kept constant throughout the contract period. For model calibration, MtMCCS should
be used as we have done in Ref. [10] considering its liquidity. However, in this paper, we
study a different type of CCS, which is actually tradable in the market, to make the link
between y and CCS much clearer.
We study the Mark-to-Market cross currency overnight index swap (MtMCCOIS),
which is exactly the same as the usual MtMCCS except that it pays a compounded ON
rate, instead of the Libor, of each currency periodically. Let us consider (i, j)-MtMCCOIS
where currency (i) intended to be USD and needs notional refreshments, and currency (j)
is the one in which the basis spread is to be paid. Let us suppose the party 1 is the spread
receiver and consider T0 -start TN -maturing (i, j)-MtMCCOIS. For the (j)-leg, we have

N [( ∫ Tn (j)
) ]
cu du
dDs(j) = −δT0 (s) + δTN (s) + δTn (s) e Tn−1
− 1 + δ n BN , (6.14)

where BN is the basis spread of the contract. For (i)-leg, in terms of currency (i), we have
N [
∑ ∫ Tn (i)
cu du
dDs(i) = δTn−1 (s)fx(i,j) (Tn−1 ) − δTn (s)fx(i,j) (Tn−1 )e Tn−1 . (6.15)

In total, in terms of currency (j), we have

dDs = dDs(j) + fx(j,i) (s)dDs(i) (6.16)

[ ]
(T n )
∫ Tn
= dDs(j) + δTn−1 (s) − δTn (s) (j,i)
e Tn−1 (6.17)
n=1 fx (Tn−1 )
[ ]
∑N ∫ Tn
du f
x (Tn )
∫ Tn
+ δn BN − (j,i)
u u
= δTn (s) e Tn−1 e Tn−1 . (6.18)
n=1 f x (T n−1 )

If the collateralization is done by currency (k), then the value for the party 1 is given
[ { } ]

N ∫ Tn ∫ Tn (j,i) ∫ Tn
(j) (j,k) (j)
cu du fx (Tn ) (i)
cu du
Vt = E Q(j)
e− t (cu +yu )du
e Tn−1 + δn BN − (j,i) e Tn−1 Ft ,
fx (Tn−1 )
where T0 ≥ t. In particular, let us consider the case where the swap is collateralized by
currency (i) (or USD), which looks popular in the market.

N ∫ Tn
Vt = δn BN D(j) (t, Tn )e− t y (j,i) (t,u)du


N ∫ Tn−1
( ∫ Tn )
− y (j,i) (t,u)du − y (j,i) (t,u)du
− D (j)
(t, Tn−1 )e t 1−e Tn−1

N [
∑ ( ∫ Tn )]
− y (j,i) (t,u)du
= δ n BN D (j,i)
(t, Tn ) − D (j,i)
(t, Tn−1 ) 1 − e Tn−1
. (6.20)

Here, we have assumed the independence of c(j) and y (j,i) . In fact, the assumption seems
reasonable according to the recent historical data studied in Ref. [10]. In this case, we
obtain the par MtMCCOIS basis spread as
( ∫ )
∑N − TTn y (j,i) (t,u)du
n=1 D
(j,i) (t, Tn−1 ) 1 − e n−1
BN = ∑N (j,i) (t, T )
. (6.21)
n=1 δn D n

Thus, it is easy to see that

∫ TN
BN ∼ y (j,i) (t, u)du, (6.22)
TN − T0 T0

which gives us the relation between the relative difference of collateral cost y (j,i) and the
observed cross currency basis. Therefore, the cost of collateral y is directly linked to the
dynamics of CCS markets.

Remark: Origin of y (i,j) in Pricing Formula

Here, let us comment about the origin of y spread in our pricing formula in Proposition 1.
Consider the following hypothetical but plausible situation to get a clear image:

(1): An interest rate swap market where the participants are discounting future cash flows
by domestic OIS rate, regardless of the collateral currency, and assume there is no price
dispute among them. (2): Party 1 enters two opposite trades with party 2 and 3, and they
are agree to have CSA which forces party 2 and 3 to always post a domestic currency U
as collateral, but party 1 is allowed to use a foreign currency E as well as U . (3): There
is very liquid CCOIS market which allows firms to enter arbitrary length of swap. The
spread y is negative for CCOIS between U and E, where U is a base currency (such as
USD in the above explanation).

In this example, the party 1 can definitely make money. Suppose, at a certain point, the
party 1 receives N unit amount of U from the party 2 as collateral. Party 1 enters a
CCOIS as spread payer, exchanging N unit amount of U and the corresponding amount
of E, by which it can finance the foreign currency E by the rate of (E’s OIS +y). Party
1 also receives U ’s OIS rate from the CCOIS counter party, which is going to be paid
as the collateral margin to the party 2. Party 1 also posts E to the party 3 since it has
opposite position, it receives E’s OIS rate as the collateral margin from the party 3. As
a result, the party 1 earns −y (> 0) on the notional amount of collateral. It can rollover
the CCOIS, or unwind it if y’s sign flips.
Of course, in the real world, CCS can only be traded with certain terms which makes
the issue not so simple. However, considering significant size of CCS spread (a several tens
of bps) it still seems possible to arrange appropriate CCS contracts to achieve cheaper
funding. For a very short term, it may be easier to use FX forward contracts for the same
purpose. In order to prohibit this type of arbitrage, party 1 should pay extra premium
to make advantageous CSA contracts. This is exactly the reason why our pricing formula
contains the spread y.

6.5 Calibration to swap markets

For the details of calibration procedures, the numerical results and recent historical behav-
ior of underlyings are available in Refs. [7, 10]. The procedures can be briefly summarized
as follows: (1) Calibrate the forward collateral rate c(i) (0, t) for each currency using OIS
market. (2) Calibrate the forward Libor curves by using the result of (1), IRS and tenor
swap markets. (3) Calibrate the forward y (i,j) (0, t) spread for each relevant currency pair
by using the results of (1),(2) and CCS markets.
Although we can directly obtains the set of y (i,j) from CCS, we cannot uniquely deter-
mine each y (i) , which is necessary for the evaluation of Gateaux derivative when we deal
with unilateral collateralization and CCA (collateral cost adjustment). For these cases,
we need to make an assumption on the risk-free rate for one and only one currency. For
example, if we assume that ON rate and the risk-free rate of currency (j) are the same,
and hence y (j) = 0, then the forward curve of y USD is fixed by y USD (0, t) = −y (j,USD) (0, t).
Then using the result of y USD , we obtains {y (k) } for all the other currencies by making
use of {y (k,USD) } obtained from CCS markets. More ideally, each financial firm may carry
out some analysis on the risk-free profit rate of cash pool or more advanced econometric
analysis on the risk-free rate, such as those given in Feldhütter & Lando (2008) [6].

7 Numerical Studies for Asymmetric Collateralization
In this section, we study the effects of asymmetric collateralization on the two fundamental
products, MtMCCOIS and OIS, using Gateaux derivative. For both cases, we use the
following dynamics in Monte Carlo simulation:
( )
(j) (j)
dct = θ(j) (t) − κ(j) ct dt + σc(j) dWt1 (7.1)
( )
(i) (i)
dct = θ(i) (t) − ρ2,4 σc(i) σx(j,i) − κ(i) ct dt + σc(i) dWt2 (7.2)
( )
(j,i) (j,i)
dyt = θ(j,i) (t) − κ(j,i) yt dt + σy(j,i) dWt3 (7.3)
( )
(j,i) (j) (i) (j,i) 1
d ln fx t = ct − ct + yt − (σx(j,i) )2 dt + σx(j,i) dWt4 (7.4)

where {W i , i = 1 · · · 4} are Brownian motions under the spot martingale measure of cur-
rency (j). Every θ(t) is a deterministic function of time, and is adjusted in such a way that
we can recover the initial term structures of the relevant variable. We assume every κ and
σ are constants. We allow general correlation structure (d[W i , W j ]t = ρi,j dt) except that
ρ3,j = 0 for all j ̸= 3. The above dynamics is chosen just for simplicity and demonstrative
purpose, and generic HJM framework can also be applied to the evaluation of Gateaux
derivative. For details of more general dynamics in HJM framework, see Refs. [8, 9]. In
the following, we use the term structure for the (i, j) pair taken from the typical data of
(USD, JPY) in early 2010 for presentation. In Appendix E, we have provided the term
structures and other parameters used in calculation.
The discussed form of asymmetry is particularly interesting, since even if the relevant
CSA is actually symmetric, the asymmetry arises effectively if there is difference in the
level of sophistication of collateral management. From the following two examples, one
can see that the efficient collateral management is practically relevant and the firms who
are incapable of doing so will have to pay quite expensive cost to the counter party, and
vice versa.

7.1 Asymmetric Collateralization for MtMCCOIS

We now implement Gateaux derivative using Monte Carlo simulation based on the model
we have just explained. To see the reliability of Gateaux derivative, we have compared it
with a numerical result directly obtained from PDE using a simplified setup in Appendix D.
Firstly, we consider MtMCCOIS explained in Sec. 6.4. We consider a spot-start, TN -
maturing (i, j)-MtMCCOIS, where the leg of currency (i) (intended to be USD) needs
notional refreshments. Let us assume perfect but asymmetric collateralization as follows:
(1) Party 1 is the basis spread payer and can use either the currency (i) or (j) as collateral.
(2) Party 2 is the basis spread receiver and can only use the currency (i) as collateral.

In this case, the price of the contract at time 0 from the view point of party 1 is given
by [∫ ]
( ∫ s )
V0 = E exp − R(u, Vu )du dDs (7.5)
]0,TN ] 0

where ( (j,i) )
(j) (j,i)
R(t, Vt ) = ct + yt + max −yt , 0 1{Vt <0} , (7.6)
{ [ ]}

N ∫ Tn (j)
cu du fx
(Tn )
∫ Tn (i)
cu du
dDs = δTn (s) −e Tn−1
− δn B + (j,i)
e Tn−1
. (7.7)
n=1 fx (Tn−1 )

Using Gateaux derivative, we can approximate the contract price as

( )
V0 ≃ V0 (0) + ∇V0 0; max(−y (j,i) , 0) , (7.8)

( )
∇V0 0; max(−y (j,i) , 0)
[∫ TN ]
∫ (j) (j,i)
− 0s (cu +yu )du
( ) ( (j,i) )
=E e max −Vs (0), 0 max −ys , 0 ds . (7.9)

Although Vt (0) is simply a price under symmetric collateralization using currency (i), we
need to be careful about the advance reset conventions. One can show that
[ { } ]
∑N ∫ ∫ Tn (j,i) ∫ Tn
(j) (j,i)
− tTn (cu +yu )du c
du f x (T n ) c
−e − δn B + (j,i) Ft
Tn−1 u Tn−1 u
Vt (0) = E e e
fx (Tn−1 )
  ( ) ∫t  

∫ Tγ(t) (j)  ∫t ∫ Tγ(t) (j)
e Tγ(t)−1 cu du ∫ T
Tγ(t)−1 + t cu du
fx (Tγ(t) ) Ft  ,
(j,i) γ(t) (i)
Q(j)  − t
+E e (cu +yu )du
−e − δγ(t) B + (j,i) e t cu du (j,i)
 fx (T ) 


where γ(t) = min{n; Tn > t, n = 1 · · · N }. Note that Tγ(t)−1 < t since we are considering
spot-start swap (or T0 = 0). Assuming the independence of y (j,i) and other variables, we
can simplify Vt (0) and obtains

N ∑
N ( )
Vt (0) = − D (j)
(t, Tn )Y (j,i)
(t, Tn )δn B + D(j) (t, Tn−1 ) Y (j,i) (t, Tn−1 ) − Y (j,i) (t, Tn )
n=γ(t) n=γ(t)+1
∫t (j) (j,i) ∫t (i)
cs ds fx (t) Tγ(t)−1 cs ds
−Y (j,i) (t, Tγ(t) )e Tγ(t)−1
+ (j,i)
e , (7.11)
fx (Tγ(t)−1 )
[ ∫ T (j,i) ]

e− t ys ds Ft .
where we have defined Y (j,i) (t, T ) = E Q
In Figs. 1 and 2, we have shown the numerical result of Gateaux derivative, which is
the price difference from the symmetric limit, for 10y and 20y MtMCCOIS, respectively.
The spread B was chosen in such way that the value in symmetric limit, V0 (0), becomes
zero. In both cases, the horizontal axis is the annualized volatility of y (j,i) , and the vertical
one is the price difference in terms of bps of notional of currency (j). When the party 1
is the spread receiver, we have used the right axis. The results are rather insensitive to
the FX volatility due to the notional refreshments of currency-(i) leg. From the historical

analysis performed in Ref. [10], we know that annualized volatility of y (j,i) tends to be
50bps or so in a calm market, but it can be (100 ∼ 200)bps or more in a volatile market
for major currency pairs, such as (EUR,USD) and (USD, JPY). Therefore, the impact of
asymmetric collateralization in this example can be practically very significant when party
1 is the spread payer. When the party 1 is the spread receiver, one sees that the impact of
asymmetry is very small, only a few bps of notional. This can be easily understood in the
following way: When the party 1 has a negative mark-to-market value and has the option
to change the collateral currency, y (j,i) tends to be large and hence the optimal currency
remains the same currency (i).
Finally, let us briefly mention about the standard MtMCCS with Libor payments. As
discussed in Ref. [10], the contribution from Libor-OIS spread to CCS is not significant rel-
ative to that of y (j,i) . Therefore, the numerical significance of asymmetric collateralization
is expected to be quite similar in the standard case, too.

7.2 Asymmetric Collateralization for OIS

Now we study the impact of asymmetric collateralization on OIS. We consider OIS of
currency (j), and assume the following asymmetry in collateralization:
(1) Party 1 is the fixed receiver and can use either the currency (i) or (j) as collateral.
(2) Party 2 is the fixed payer can only use the currency (j) (domestic currency) as collateral.

For spot-start, TN -maturing OIS, we have

[∫ ]
Q(j) − R(u,Vu )du
V0 = E e 0 dDs , (7.12)
]0,TN ]


N [ ( ∫T (j)
n cu du
dDs = δTn (s) δn S − e Tn−1 −1 , (7.13)
(j) (j,i)
R(t, Vt ) = ct + max(yt , 0)1{Vt <0} . (7.14)
Using Gateaux derivative, the above swap value can be approximated as
( ( (j,i) ))
V0 ≃ V0 (0) + ∇Vt 0; max yt , 0 , (7.15)

( [∫ ]
( (j,i) )) Q(j)

∫s (j) ( ) ( (j,i) )
∇V0 0; max y , 0 = E e 0 cu du
max −Vs (0), 0 max ys , 0 ds , (7.16)

 
∑ { ( ∫T )}
N ∫ Tn n (j)
− 1 Ft 
Vt (0) = E Q
 e− t cu du
δn S − e Tn−1
cu du


N (j)
cu du
= D (j)
(t, Tn )δn S − e Tγ(t)−1
+ D(j) (t, TN ) . (7.17)

Here, S is the fixed OIS rate.
In Figs. 3, 4, and 5, we have shown the numerical results Gateaux derivative for 10y
(j) (j,i)
and 20y OIS. In the first two figures, we have fixed σc = 1% and changed σy to
see the sensitivity against CCS. In the last figure, we have fixed the y (j,i) volatility as
σy = 0.75% and changed the volatility of collateral rate c(j) . Since the term structure
of OIS rate is upward sloping, the mark-to-market value of a receiver tends to be negative
in the long end of the contract, which makes the optionality of collateral currency choice
larger and hence bigger price difference relative to the payer case.

8 General Implications of Asymmetric Collateralization

From the results of section 7, we have seen the practical significance of asymmetric collat-
eralization. It is now clear that sophisticated financial firms may obtain significant funding
benefit from the less-sophisticated counter parties by carrying out clever collateral strate-
Before concluding the paper, let us explain two generic implications of collateralization
one for netting and the other for resolution of information, which is closely related to the
observation just explained. Although derivation itself can be done in exactly the same
way as Ref. [3] after the reinterpretation of several variables, we get new insights for
collateralization that can be important for the appropriate design and regulations for the
financial market.

8.1 An implication for Netting

Proposition 2 5 Assume perfect collateralization. Suppose that, for each party i, yti
is bounded and does not depend on the contract value directly. Let V a , V b , and V ab
be, respectively, the value processes (from the view point of party 1) of contracts with
cumulative dividend processes Da , Db , and Da + Db . If y 1 ≥ y 2 , then V ab ≥ V a + V b ,
and if y 1 ≤ y 2 , then V ab ≤ V a + V b .

Proof is available in Appendix B. The interpretation of the proposition is very clear:

The party who has the higher funding cost y due to asymmetric CSA or lack of sophistica-
tion in collateral management prefer to have netting agreements to decrease funding cost.
On the other hand, an advanced financial firm who has capability to carry out optimal
collateral strategy to achieve the lowest possible value of y tries to avoid netting to exploit
funding benefit. For example, an advanced firm may prefer to enter an opposite trade
with a different counterparty rather than to unwind the original trade. For standardized
products traded through CCPs, such a firm may prefer to use several clearing houses
cleverly to avoid netting.
The above finding seems slightly worrisome for the healthy development of CCPs. Ad-
vanced financial firms that have sophisticated financial technology and operational system
are usually primary members of CCPs, and some of them are trying to set up their own
clearing service facility. If those firms try to exploit funding benefit, they avoid concentra-
tion of their contracts to major CCPs and may create very disperse interconnected trade
We assume perfect collateralization just for clearer interpretation. The results will not change quali-
tatively as long as δ i yti > (1 − Rti )(1 − δti )+ hit − (1 − Rtj )(δti − 1)+ hjt .

networks and may reduce overall netting opportunity in the market. Although remaining
credit exposure is very small as long as collateral is successfully being managed, the dis-
persed use of CCPs may worsen the systemic risk once it fails. In the work of Duffie &
Huang [3], the corresponding proposition is derived in the context of bilateral CVA. We
emphasize that one important practical difference is the strength of incentives provided
to financial firms. Although it is somewhat obscure how to realize profit/loss reflected in
CVA, it is rather straightforward in the case of collateralization by making use of CCS
market as we have explained in the remarks of Sec. 6.4.

8.2 An implication for Resolution of Information

We once again follow the setup given in Ref [3]. We assume the existence of two markets:
One is market F , which has filtration F, that is the one we have been studying. The other
one is market G with filtration G = {Gt : t ∈ [0, T ]}. The market G is identical to the
market F except that it has earlier resolution of uncertainty, or in other words, Ft ⊆ Gt
for all t ∈ [0, T ] while F0 = G0 . The spot marting measure Q is assumed to apply to the
both markets.

Proposition 3 6 Assume perfect collateralization. Suppose that, for each party i, y i is

bounded and does not depend on the contract value directly. Suppose that r, y 1 and y 2 are
adapted to both the filtrations F and G. The contract has cumulative dividend process D,
which is a semimartingale of integrable variation with respect to filtrations F and G. Let
V F and V G denote, respectively, the values of the contract in markets F and G from the
view point of party 1. If y 1 ≥ y 2 , then V0F ≥ V0G , and if y 1 ≤ y 2 , then V0F ≤ V0G .

Proof is available in Appendix C. The proposition implies that the party who has the
higher effective funding cost y either from the lack of sophisticated collateral management
technique or from asymmetric CSA would like to delay the information resolution to avoid
timely margin call from the counterparty. The opposite is true for advanced financial firms
which are likely to have advantageous CSA and sophisticated system. The incentives
to obtain funding benefit will urge these firms to provide mark-to-market information
of contracts to counter parties in timely manner, and seek early resolution of valuation
dispute to achieve significant funding benefit. Considering the privileged status of these
firms, the latter effects will probably be dominant in the market.

9 Conclusions
This article develops the methodology to deal with asymmetric and imperfect collateral-
ization as well as remaining counterparty credit risk. It was shown that all of the issues
are able to be handled in an unified way by making use of Gateaux derivative. We have
shown that the resulting formula contains CCA that represents adjustment of collateral
cost due to the deviation from the perfect collateralization, and the terms corresponding
CVA, which now contains the possible dependency among cost of collaterals, hazard rates,
collateral coverage ratio and the underlying contract value. Even if we assume that the
We assume perfect collateralization just for clearer interpretation. The results will not change quali-
tatively as long as δ i yti > (1 − Rti )(1 − δti )+ hit − (1 − Rtj )(δti − 1)+ hjt .

collateral coverage ratio and recovery rate are constant, the change of effective discount-
ing rate induced by collateral cost and its correlation to other variables may significantly
change the value of CVA.
Direct link of CCS spread and collateral cost allows us to study the numerical signif-
icance of asymmetric collateralization. From the numerical analysis using CCS and OIS,
the relevance of sophisticated collateral management is now clear. If a financial firm is
incapable of choosing the cheapest collateral currency, it has to pay very expensive funding
cost to the counter party. We also explained the issue of one-way CSA, which is common
when SSA entities are involved. If the funding cost of collateral (or ”y”) rises, the financial
firm that is the counterparty of SSA may suffer from significant loss of mark-to-market
value as well as the huge cash-flow mismatch.
The article also discussed some generic implications of collateralization. In particular,
it was shown that the sophisticated financial firms are likely to avoid netting of trades
if they try to exploit funding benefit as much as possible, which may reduce the overall
netting opportunity and potentially increase the systemic risk in the financial market.

A Proof of Proposition 1
Firstly, we consider the SDE for St . Let us define Lt = 1 − Ht . One can show that
∫ ∫
−1 −1
( ) ( )
βt St + βu Lu dDu + q(u, Su )Su du + βu−1 Lu− Z 1 (u, Su− )dHu1 + Z 2 (u, Su− )dHu2
]0,t] ]0,t]
{ ( ) }
= EQ βu−1 1{τ >u} dDu + yu1 δu1 1{Su <0} + yu2 δu2 1{Su ≥0} Su du
]0,T ]
∫ ]
( )

+ βu−1 Lu− Z 1 (u, Su− )dHu1 + Z 2 (u, Su− )dHu2 Ft = mt (A.1)
]0,T ]

q(t, v) = yt1 δt1 1{v<0} + yt2 δt2 1{v≥0} (A.2)
and {mt }t≥0 is a Q-martingale. Thus we obtain the following SDE:
( ) ( )
dSt − rt St dt + Lt dDt + q(t, St )St dt + Lt− Z 1 (t, St− )dHt1 + Z 2 (t, St− )dHt2 = βt dmt .
Using the decomposition of Hti , we get
( ) ( )
dSt − rt St dt + Lt dDt + q(t, St )St dt + Lt Z 1 (t, St )h1t + Z 2 (t, St )h2t dt = dnt , (A.4)

where we have defined

( )
dnt = βt dmt − Lt− Z 1 (t, St− )dMt1 + Z 2 (t, St− )dMt2 (A.5)

and {nt }t≥0 is also a some Q-martingale. Using the fact that
( )
q(t, St )St + Z 1 (t, St )h1t + Z 2 (t, St )h2t = St µ(t, St ) + ht , (A.6)

one can show that the SDE for St is given by

( )
dSt = −Lt dDt + Lt rt − µ(t, St ) − ht St dt + dnt . (A.7)

Secondly, let us consider the SDE for Vt . By following the similar procedures, one can
easily see that
∫ ( ) ∫ ∫ ( )
− 0t ru −µ(u,Vu ) du − 0s ru −µ(u,Vu ) du
e Vt + e dDs
[∫ ( ∫ s ) ]
( )

=E Q
exp − ru − µ(u, Vu ) du dDu Ft = m̃t , (A.8)
]0,T ] 0

where {m̃t }t≥0 is a Q-martingale. Thus we have

( )
dVt = −dDt + rt − µ(t, Vt ) Vt dt + dñt , (A.9)

where ∫ t( )
ru −µ(u,Vu ) du
dñt = e 0 dm̃t , (A.10)
and hence {ñt }t≥0 is also a Q-martingale. As a result we have

d(1{τ >t} Vt ) = d(Lt Vt )

= Lt− dVt − Vt− dHt − ∆Vτ ∆Hτ
( )
= −Lt− dDt + Lt rt − µ(t, Vt ) Vt dt − Lt Vt ht dt − ∆Vτ ∆Hτ
( )
+Lt− dñt − Vt− (dMt1 + dMt2 )
( )
= −Lt dDt + Lt rt − µ(t, Vt ) − ht Vt dt − ∆Vτ ∆Hτ + dÑt , (A.11)

where {Ñt }t≥0 is a Q-martingale such that

( )
dÑt = Lt− dñt − Vt− (dMt1 + dMt2 ) . (A.12)

Therefore, by comparing Eqs. (A.7) and (A.11) and also the fact that ST = 1{τ >T } VT = 0,
we cannot distinguish 1{τ >t} Vt from St if there is no jump at the time of default ∆Vτ = 0. 

B Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the case of y 1 ≥ y 2 . From Eq. (2.6), one can show that the pre-default value V
can also be written in the following recursive form:
[ ∫ ∫ ]
( )

Vt = E Q
− rs − µ(s, Vs ) Vs ds + dDs Ft . (B.1)
]t,T ] ]t,T ]

Let us define the following variables:

Ṽt = e− 0 (rs −ys )ds
Vt (B.2)
∫ ∫s
e− (ru −yu
1 )du
D̃t = 0 dDs . (B.3)

Note that

rt − µ(t, Vt ) = (rt − yt1 ) + (yt1 − yt2 )1{Vt ≥0}

= (rt − yt1 ) + ηt1,2 1{Vt ≥0} , (B.4)

where we have defined η i,j = y i − y j . Using new variables, Eq. (B.1) can be rewritten as
[ ∫ ∫ ]

Ṽt = E Q
− 1,2
ηs 1{Ṽs ≥0} Ṽs ds + dD̃s Ft . (B.5)
]t,T ] ]t,T ]

And hence we have,

[ ∫ ]
( ( ) ( ) ( ) )

Ṽtab − Ṽta − Ṽtb = E Q − ηs1,2 max Ṽsab , 0 − max Ṽsa , 0 − max Ṽsb , 0 ds Ft .
]t,T ]
Let us denote the upper bound of η 1,2 as α, and also define Y = Ṽ ab − Ṽ a − Ṽ b and
( ( ) ( ) ( ))
Gs = −ηs1,2 max Ṽsab , 0 − max Ṽsa , 0 − max Ṽsb , 0 . Then, we have YT = 0 and
[∫ ]

Y = EQ Gs ds Ft . (B.7)
]t,T ]

( ab ) ( a ) ( b ))
Gs = −ηs1,2
max Ṽs , 0 − max Ṽs , 0 − max Ṽs , 0
( )
≥ −ηs1,2 max(Ṽsab , 0) − max(Ṽsa + Ṽsb , 0)
( )
≥ −ηs1,2 max Ṽsab − Ṽsa − Ṽsb , 0
≥ −α|Ys | . (B.8)

Applying the consequence of the Stochastic Gronwall-Bellman Inequality in Lemma B2 of

Ref. [4] to Y and G, we can conclude Yt ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ], and hence V ab ≥ V a + V b .

C Proof of Proposition 3
Consider the case of y 1 ≥ y 2 . Let us define
= e− 0 (rs −ys )ds
ṼtF VtF (C.1)
− 0 (rs −ys )ds
ṼtG = e VtG , (C.2)

as well as ∫ ∫s
e− (ru −yu
1 )du
D̃t = 0 dDs (C.3)

as in the previous section. Then, we have

[ ∫ ∫ ]

= E Q
− ηs1,2 max(ṼsG , 0)ds + dD̃s Gt (C.4)
]t,T ] ]t,T ]
[ ∫ ∫ ]

ṼtF = E Q
− 1,2 F
ηs max(Ṽs , 0)ds + dD̃s Ft . (C.5)
]t,T ] ]t,T ]

Now, let us define [ ]

Ut = E Q ṼtG Ft . (C.6)

Then, using Jensen’s inequality, we have
[ ∫ ∫ ]

Ut ≤ E Q
− 1,2
ηs max(Us , 0)ds + dD̃s Ft . (C.7)
]t,T ] ]t,T ]

Therefore, we obtain
[ ∫ ]
( )

ṼtF − Ut ≥ E Q
− ηs1,2 max(ṼsF , 0)− max(Us , 0) ds Ft (C.8)
]t,T ]
[ ∫ ]

≥ E Q
− ηs1,2 ṼsF − Us ds Ft . (C.9)
]t,T ]

Using the stochastic Gronwall-Bellman Inequality as before, one can conclude that ṼtF ≥
Ut for all t ∈ [0, T ], and in particular, V0F ≥ V0G .

D Comparison of Gateaux Derivative with PDE

In order to get clear image for the reliability of Gateaux derivative, we compare it with the
numerical result directly obtained from PDE. We consider a simplified setup where MtM-
CCOIS exchanges the coupons continuously, and the only stochastic variable is a spread
y. Consider continuous payment (i, j)-MtMCCOIS where the leg of currency (i) needs
notional refreshments. We assume following situation as the asymmetric collateralization:
(1) Party 1 is the basis spread payer and can use either the currency (i) or (j) as collateral.
(2) Party 2 is the basis spread receiver and can only use the currency (i) as collateral.

In this case, one can see that the value of t-start T -maturing contract from the view
point of party 1 is given by (See, Eq. (6.19).)
[∫ T ( ∫ s )( ) ]
Vt = E Q(j)
exp − R(u, Vu )du ys − B ds Ft ,
t t

where ( )
(j,i) (j,i)
R(t, Vt ) = c(j) (t) + yt + max −yt , 0 1{Vt <0} (D.2)

and B is a fixed spread for the contract. y (j,i) is the only stochastic variable and its
dynamics is assumed to be given by the following Hull-White model:
( ) (j)
(j,i) (j,i)
dyt = θ(j,i) (t) − κ(j,i) yt dt + σy(j,i) dWtQ . (D.3)

Here, θ(j,i) (t) is a deterministic function specified by the initial term structure of y (j,i) ,
(j,i) (j)
κ(j,i) and σy are constants. W Q is a Brownian motion under the spot martingale
measure of currency (j).
The PDE for Vt is given by
( ( (j,i) )2 )
∂ ∂V (t, y) σy ∂2 ( )
V (t, y) + γ(t, y) + 2
V (t, y) − R t, V (t, y) V (t, y) + y − B = 0 ,
∂t ∂y 2 ∂y

γ(t, y) = θ(j,i) (t) − κ(j,i) y . (D.5)
If party 1 is a spread receiver, we need to change y − B to B − y, of course.
Terminal boundary condition is trivially given by V (T, ·) = 0. On the lower boundary
of y or when y = −M (= ymin ) ≪ 0, we have Vt < 0 for all t. Thus, we have R(s, V (s, y)) =
c(j) (s) for all s ≥ t, if y = −M at time t. Therefore, on the lower boundary, the value of
MtMCCOIS is given by
[∫ T ]
∫ (j) (j,i)
V (t, −M ) = E Q(j)
e− ts cu du (j,i)
(ys − B)ds yt = −M
∫ T ( )

= D (t, s) −B −
ln Y (j,i)
(t, s) ds . (D.6)
t ∂s

Since c(j) (t) is a deterministic function, D(j) (t, s) = D(j) (0, s)/D(j) (0, t) is simply given
by the forward.
On the other hand, when y = M (= ymax ) ≫ 0, we have Vt > 0 for all t. Thus we
have R(s, V (s, y)) = c(j) (s) + y (j,i) (s) for all s ≥ t, if y = M at time t. Thus, on the upper
boundary, the value of the contract becomes
[∫ T ∫ ( (j) (j,i) ) ( ) ]
Q(j) − ts cu +yu du (j,i)
V (t, M ) = E e ys − B yt = M
∫ T{ }
∂ (j,i)
= −BD (t, s)Y
(j) (j,i)
(t, s) − D (t, s) Y
(t, s) ds . (D.7)
t ∂s

Now let us compare the numerical result between Gateaux derivative and PDE. In the
case of Gateaux derivative, the contract value is approximated as
( )
Vt ≃ Vt (0) + ∇Vt 0; max(−y (j,i) , 0) , (D.8)

[∫ ) ]
T ∫s (
ys − B ds Ft ,
(j) (j,i)
Q(j) − (cu +yu )du (j,i)
Vt (0) = E e t (D.9)
( )
∇Vt 0; max(−y (j,i) , 0)
[∫ T ]
∫ ( ) ( (j,i) )
max −Vs (0), 0 max −ys , 0 ds Ft . (D.10)
(j) (j,i)
Q(j) − ts (cu +yu )du
=E e

Vt (0) is the value of the contract under symmetric collateralization where both parties
post currency (i) as collateral, and ∇Vt is a deviation from it.
In Fig. 6, we plot the price difference of continuous 10y-MtMCCOIS from its symmetric
limit obtained by PDE and Gateaux derivative with various volatility of y (j,i) . Term
structures of y (j,i) and other curves are given in Appendix E. Here, the spread B is chosen
in such a way that the swap price is zero in the case where both parties can only use
currency (i) as collateral, or B is a market par spread. The price difference is Vt − Vt (0)
and expressed as basis points of notional. From our analysis using the recent historical

data in Ref. [10], we know that the annualized volatility of y is around 50 bps for a calm
market but it can be more than (100 ∼ 200) bps when CCS market is volatile (We have
used EUR/USD and USD/JPY pairs.). One observes that Gateaux derivative provides
reasonable approximation for wide range of volatility. If the party 1 is a spread receiver,
both of the methods give very small price differences, less than 1bp of notional.

E Data used in Numerical Studies

The parameter we have used in simulation are

κ(j) = κ(i) = 1.5% (E.1)

σc(j) = σc(i) = 1% (E.2)
σx(j,i) = 12% . (E.3)

All of them are defined in annualized term. The volatility of y (j,i) is specified in the main
text in each numerical analysis.
Term structures and correlation used in simulation are given in Fig. 7. There we have
1 [ ∫ T (k) ]
e− 0 cs ds
(k) (k)
ROIS (T ) = − ln E Q
1 [ ∫ T (j,i) ]
e− 0 ys ds .
Ry(j,i) (T ) = − ln E Q
The curve data is based on the calibration result of typical JPY and USD market data
of early 2010. In Monte Carlo simulation, in order to reduce simulation error, we have
adjusted drift terms θ(t) to achieve exact match to the relevant forwards in each time step.

Figure 1: Price difference from symmetric limit for 10y MtMCCOIS

Figure 2: Price difference from symmetric limit for 20y MtMCCOIS

Figure 3: Price difference from symmetric limit for 10y OIS

Figure 4: Price difference from symmetric limit for 20y OIS

Figure 5: Price difference from symmetric limit for 20y OIS for the change of σc

Figure 6: Price difference from symmetric limit for 10y continuous MtMCCOIS

Figure 7: Term structures and correlation used for simulation

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