By Zlost Darvas
Wednesday, 29 October 2008
Hungary came to be regarded as one of the most prosperous emerging European countries after the fall
of communism in 1989 ‐ a far cry from its satirical description as the "happiest barrack" in the Soviet
bloc.
It attracted a large influx of foreign direct investment and embarked on a rapid and stable growth path.
It was barely affected by the Asian and Russian crises in 1997‐1998.
But the current financial crisis has hit Hungary hardest of all among the EU newcomers and forced it to
go cap in hand to the International Monetary Fund. Just how did the forerunner become the most
vulnerable?
Massive government debt
Part of the problem can be pinned on the large government debt that Hungary inherited from the
communists. The situation was exacerbated because Hungary, unlike Poland, did not receive partial debt
forgiveness at the time of transition.
But blaming the communists only goes so far since Hungary successfully reduced its debt from a peak of
90% of GDP in 1993 to 52% in 2001 ‐ it has since gone back up to 66%.
Since 2002 the government deficit has ballooned. In 2006, an election year, the deficit would have been
12% of GDP without the fiscal adjustment package launched after the election that brought it down to
9.6%, still an incredibly large number.
©2008 Bruegel– 33, rue de la charité, 1210 Brussels‐ Tel: +32 2 227 4210, Fax: +32 2 227 4219
Since then, Hungary has followed an EU‐approved convergence plan that has cut the budget deficit to an
estimated 3.4% in 2008, at the expense of tax hikes, spending cuts, falls in real wages and slowing
growth. Despite this action, Hungarian government debt increased to 66% in 2007 and is projected to
rise further. Other countries in the region have much smaller debts ‐ the figure is 29% in both the Czech
Republic and Slovakia and 45% in Poland.
While high government debt is undoubtedly a problem for Hungary, there are other serious structural
weaknesses in the public sector. Government spending is more than 50% of GDP, compared with less
than 40% in most other central European countries. In order to finance this high level of expenditure,
taxes and other duties are extremely high in Hungary; the employment rate is one of the lowest in
Europe and the potential rate of growth has slowed in recent years.
Consumers switched to foreign currency loans
The popularity of foreign currency loans has caused further problems. Since Hungarian inflation was far
higher than that in the eurozone, interest rates charged on loans in the Hungarian forint were also much
higher.
So, to get lower rates, many consumers and businesses switched to foreign currency loans ‐ 90% of new
mortgage loans are now made in foreign currencies. In the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where interest
rates were close to the eurozone rate, foreign currency loans only account for less than 2% of
households' total.
The Hungarian forint reached its highest level against the euro in July this year, as other countries in
central and eastern Europe also peaked.
The financial crisis arrived at high speed
The global financial crisis arrived at high speed in late September this year. Many economists, including
this writer, thought that the effects of the crisis on central and eastern European EU countries would not
be dramatic. Our banks were not exposed to US sub‐prime losses and were well capitalised.
But it soon became clear that no country can isolate itself from the effects of this global financial crisis.
With rising risk aversion and fear of contagion, investors started to sell and pull out of investments in
emerging economies.
Hungary was the hardest hit of the central European EU
members because so much of its massive government debt
Hungary was the hardest hit of the
was foreign‐owned. These foreigners wanted to sell their
central European EU members because Hungarian forint‐denominated bonds but no new buyers
so much of its massive government appeared on the market. Long maturity interest rates
debt was foreign‐owned. jumped from the already high 8% to around 12% and the
government bond market dried up. Auctions to issue new
government bonds were unsuccessful. Hungarian blue‐
chips on the equity market were also heavily sold.
©2008 Bruegel– 33, rue de la charité, 1210 Brussels‐ Tel: +32 2 227 4210, Fax: +32 2 227 4219
Pressure on the forint intensified and last week the central bank hiked interest rates by three
percentage points. The rate rise helped strengthen the forint but the situation remained fragile and the
government bond market was still frozen.
Cap in hand to the IMF
It became clear that without outside help the government could face serious problems in financing its
spending. It was forced to turn to the IMF and has accepted conditions that, despite a shrinking
economy, it must cut expenditure and target a 2.6% deficit for 2009. So, while major economies discuss
expensive plans to boost growth, Hungary has to tighten its belt.
Hungary needed the IMF agreement to gain credibility. Since the talks concluded successfully, the forint
has gained more than 8% compared to its weakest level last week. Without the agreement the forint
would likely fall further, consumers with foreign currency debts would suffer, and the government
would not be able to issue new debt securities.
But what Hungary needs more than it needs the IMF are
comprehensive structural reforms in its public finances But what Hungary needs more than it
that include drastic cuts in spending and tax rates. This is needs the IMF are comprehensive
the only way to increase the potential rate of growth and structural reforms in its public finances
to avoid the risks of a similar crisis in the future while that include drastic cuts in spending
outside the eurozone. My fear, however, is that there and tax rates.
could come a time when the impetus for structural
reforms will fade. As a side effect of the IMF program
Hungary will likely meet the Maastricht criteria much sooner than previously thought. The deficit
criterion will be met next year, government debt might start to fall in a few years from now, inflation
will likely fall in an amplified economic downturn, and the interest rate will fall as markets would regard
the euro strategy of the country credible.
Consequently, Hungary could be in a position to introduce the euro in a few years from now. The euro
would offer a shelter against contagion from possible future crises, but the joy of joining the eurozone
could diminish incentives to reform. I just hope that the current crisis shakes up Hungarian politicians to
think hard about the deeper structural problems of the country's economy.
Zsolt Darvas is visiting research fellow at Bruegel, Brussels
©2008 Bruegel– 33, rue de la charité, 1210 Brussels‐ Tel: +32 2 227 4210, Fax: +32 2 227 4219