Accountability in Higher Education: Bridge over Troubled Water?

Author(s): Jeroen Huisman and Jan Currie

Source: Higher Education, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 2004), pp. 529-551
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 Higher Education 48: 529-551, 2004. 529
? 2004 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin the Netherlands.

Accountability in higher education: Bridge over troubled water?

JEROENHUISMAN1& JAN CURRIE2

1Centerfor Higher EducationPolicy Studies, Universityof Twente,P.O.Box 217, 7500 AE
Enschede, TheNetherlands(E-mail:j.huisman@cheps.utwente.nl);2Schoolof Education,
MurdochUniversity,SouthStreet,Murdoch,WesternAustralia6150, Australia(E-mail:
currie@murdoch.edu.au)

Abstract. This article discusses the impact of accountabilityon higher education policies
in Europe and the United States. We describe how the accountabilitymovement relates to
other policy trendsin higher education,providingempirical data on how accountabilitywas
implementedand how academics and managersin four universitiesperceivedthese policies.
We close the article with a reflection on the observed shift from professional to political
accountabilitythat uses 'soft' mechanisms that seem to offer little change in the quality of
educationin these countries.

Keywords: academics,accountability,higher educationpolicy, universitymanagement

Introduction

Accountabilityis on the higher education policy agenda in many systems.

In a numberof countries accountabilityis institutionalizedand commonly
accepted, in others it is a recentphenomenon,and in others it is a contested
issue on the higher education agenda. Some analysts think that govern-
ments and other stakeholdersdo not have the right to make academics
formally accountablefor their performance.To supporttheir view most of
these analysts refer to the concepts of academic freedom and professional
autonomy.Othersbelieve that the increasingattentionto public, measurable
accountabilityis the logical consequence of governmentsretreatingfrom
closely monitoringhighereducationand allowing an increasein institutional
autonomy. Moreover, others are preoccupied with the intended and unin-
tended consequencesof the growing attentionto accountability.Given these
concernsmany interestingquestionsarise regardingaccountability.
This article has five aims. First, we present a conceptual explorationof
the concept of accountability.Second, we investigate the rise of accounta-
bility: why and how has accountabilityenteredhigher education?Third,we
review what has happenedat the national policy level regardingaccounta-
bility in France, the Netherlands,the United States and Norway. Fourth,
we reporton how accountabilityis actually implementedand perceived by
530 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

staff members and managers in four universities in France (University of

Avignon), the Netherlands (University of Twente), Norway (University of
Oslo) and the United States (Boston College). Fifth, we discuss the paradox
emergingfromthe empiricaldata:despite growingattentionto accountability
at the nationallevel, at the shop-floorlevel staff membersare to some extent
cynical about the ability of currentaccountabilitymechanisms to improve
quality. Although some of our respondentsstated that accountabilitycould
lead to greaterimprovements,they felt thatthe currentmechanismswere not
very beneficial. At the extreme end there were those who disliked external
forms of accountabilitypreferringinstead to rely on internalmotivationto
improvetheirteachingand who countedon the professionalintegrityof their
colleagues for quality improvement.There was a noticeable gap between
policy rhetoricdemandingharsher,managerialforms of accountabilityand
the lack of its implementationin our four case studies. This is exploredin the
conclusion.

Conceptualexploration
Analysts of accountabilitygenerally agree that it is the "answerabilityfor
performance"(Romzek 2000, p. 22) or "the obligationto reportto others,to
explain, to justify, to answer questionsabout how resourceshave been used,
and to what effect" (Trow 1996, p. 310). Both Romzek and Trow supple-
ment these definitionswith the question:who is to be held accountable,for
what, to whom, and through what means? Trow (1996) also questions the
consequences (see Wagner(1989) for a similarapproach,and Kogan (1986)
for a slightly differentmethod).
Romzek (2000) offers the most comprehensiveframeworkfor analyzing
types of accountabilityrelationships.She identifies four basic types: hier-
archical,legal, professionaland political. The last two are the types that are
more often found in higher educationcurrently.In some countriesthere has
been a movement from professional to political accountabilityas national
governmentsbegin to 'steer from a distance' (Kickert 1991; Marceau 1993),
allowing institutionsgreaterautonomyat the same time as makingthem more
accountable.
Professionaland political accountabilitysystems reflect situations"where
the individualor agency has substantiallymore discretionto pursuerelevant
tasks than underlegal or hierarchicaltypes. And the review standards,when
they are invoked, are much broader"(Romzek 2000, p. 25). Romzek notes
that the difference between professional and political accountability is the
source of the standard for performance. "Professional accountability systems
are reflected in work arrangements that afford high degrees of autonomy to
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 531

individualswho base their decision-makingon internalizednorms of appro-

priate practice" (2000, p. 26). Political accountabilityrelationshipsafford
managersthe discretion or choice to be responsive to the concerns of key
interest groups, such as elected officials, clientele groups, and the general
public.
Trow (1996) adds to Romzek's frameworkby more explicitly pointing
to the functions of accountabilityand more specifically focusing on the
higher education context. Regardingthe functions, he first maintains that
accountabilityis a constrainton arbitrarypower, therebydiscouragingfraud
and manipulation,and strengtheningthe legitimacy of institutionsthat are
obligated to reportto appropriategroups. Second, accountabilityis claimed
to sustain or raise the quality of performanceby forcing those involved to
examinetheiroperationscriticallyand to subjectthem to criticalreview from
outside. Third,accountabilitycan be used as a regulatorydevice throughthe
kind of reportsandthe explicit and implicitcriteriato be met by the reporting
institutions.

Accountability in higher education: Where does it come from?

Why has there been an increasedemphasis on accountabilityin the 1980s

and 1990s in both Europe and the United States? Here we explore some
globalizing practices which have led to this increase and the shift towards
more public, political accountability.A number of writers (Henry et al.
2001; Rhoades and Sporn 2002; Vidovich 2002) have argued that a global
model of qualitypolicy in highereducationhas emergedthroughprofessional
mechanisms, such as annual conferences and the internationalcirculation
of professionals, as well as throughthe influence of internationalorganiza-
tions, such as the Organisationfor Economic Cooperationand Development
(OECD) and the InternationalNetwork of Quality Assurance Agencies in
Higher Education (INQAAHE). Rhoades and Sporn convincingly demon-
stratethe diffusion of quality assurancemodels between two 'core' regions,
the USA and Europe. Quality assurancein Europe as in most parts of the
world emerged in the 1990s whereas it existed in a variety of forms in the
USA since the late 1800s. However,the global model that is emerging and
influencing most countries differs to some extent from the accreditationof
institutionscommon in the USA. It resembles more the quality issues intro-
duced at the state level by state boardsand legislaturesemphasizing"quality
reviewprocesses ... in the contextof strategicmanagementeffortsto refocus
institutions"(Rhoades and Sporn 2002, p. 361). These forms of quality
managementhave been taken from business and the federal governmentin
the USA and are relatedto the efficient and effective use of public resources.
532 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

Similartrendswhich had alreadyexisted in the USA for at least two decades

priorto the 1990s began impactingon highereducationin Europe.However,
as much as it is clear that "the cross-Atlanticand intra-Europeanpatterns
of influence are evident in the professional discourse of higher education"
(Rhoadesand Sporn2002, p. 369), there are also local differencesand resist-
ance on the partof some Europeanpolicy makersto following the American
model. Furthermore,there are countries that are taking the lead in Europe,
such as England and the Netherlands,and developing their unique brands
of quality assurancesystems. In coining the term 'glonacal' Marginsonand
Rhoades state that "at every level - global, national and local - elements
and influences of other levels are present"(2002, p. 289). There are policy
networks at every level that are influencing the creation of quality agendas
that are similar to each other, yet have unique attributesthat significantly
relateto their geographicand historicalcontexts. At the same time, there are
overridinginfluencesthatdeterminemajorshifts in highereducationpolicies.
The ideological shift towardsthe New Right led to greaterprivatizationof
higher education and was a major influence bringing marketforces to bear
on universities. In addition, the following global trends influencing higher
education systems from the 1980s to the present have affected the type of
qualityassuranceprograms(andthus accountabilitymechanisms)established
in differentnationalsystems (see also e.g., De Boer et al. 2002; WorldBank
2002).
* Changing relationshipsbetweengovernmentsand universities:In most
systems there was a relatively strong bond between government and
higher education institutions through funding, legislation, and plan-
ning mechanisms. However, governments have retreatedand opened
the arena for greaterautonomy and marketmechanisms (Gornitzkaet
al. 1999). In this context, Neave's (1988, 1998) analysis of develop-
ments in WesternEuropeis revealing.He points to the strikingchange
from ex ante governmentalcontrol by legislation and proceduresto ex
post justificationby qualityassuranceand accountabilitymeasures.This
developmentwas particularlyvisible in WesternEuropein the 1980s and
in Centraland EasternEuropein the 1990s. The change occurredearlier
in the United States wherepublic policies combined with marketmech-
anisms particularlyin the 1970s and 1980s when political accountability
overtook professional judgment in universities as the quality mech-
anism. According to Trow (1996), accountabilitybegan to replace trust
in professionalintegrityin the USA duringthis period.
* Efficiencyand valuefor money:A related,yet autonomousdevelopment
is the growing trendof governmentsto documentvalue for money. This
is partly due to the massificationof higher educationaroundthe world
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 533

pressuringgovernmentbudgets.Withincreasingstudentnumbersthe cry
for efficiency and effectivenessbecame louder,for instance parentsand
tax-payersbegan to challengethe presumedqualityof highereducation.
Duringthe pastdecade in manycountries,a specificelement of the value
for money issue shiftedfromconsideringhighereducationas a public or
quasi-publicgood towards consideringhigher education as more of a
privategood. Within this context debates occurredregardingthe intro-
duction of tuition fees and student grant systems or interest-bearing
loans. Understandablysuch debatesinfluencedthe accountabilityissue.
Students confrontedwith increasedprivate costs for higher education
became more criticalof the services deliveredin exchange.
* Internationalizationof higher education and globalization: National
borderswere once evident;howevertoday,globalizationof the economy,
the free flow of goods, services, ideas, and people, blurs these bound-
aries. Globalization facilitates the entrance of foreign higher educa-
tion institutions and business organizationsinto national arenas and
alters the previouslyhomogeneousculturaland normativeexpectations
concerningthe natureof higher education.This culturalchange, which
may only be a gradual long-term change, raises questions related to
accountability.Should foreigninstitutionsbe treatedin a similarmanner
to national institutionsor should they be treateddifferentlyaccording
to their position, possibilities, and duties within the higher education
landscape?Additionally,should foreign institutionsbe accountableto
the government in their home country or to the government in the
countrywherethey preside?In this contextthe currentdebatesregarding
the inclusion of education in the General Agreement on Trades and
Services (GATS)are also relevant(see Altbach 2001). If higher educa-
tion is included in the WTO agreement, does this imply that such
global arrangementssupersedenational or supra-national,for instance
European,agreementson accountability?
I* nformation and communication technology developments: The
increasing technological possibilities particularly in the context of
informationand communicationtechnologyhave hastenedglobalization
processes. This adds to the previouspoint in two ways. First,the actual
location of a higher education institution becomes less relevant as
technologies allow institutions to work globally and easily across
national boundaries. Second, questions regarding legal and political
controlover less tangibleor virtualinstitutionsbecome more urgentand
complex.
In sum, variousinterrelatedtrendsare affecting higher educationand the
role and instrumentsof accountabilityin higher education.However,its role
534 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

will differ depending on the historicalcontext and the way national govern-
ments decide to implement accountabilitymechanisms and how they are
approachingglobalizationas a neo-liberaleconomic ideology.

Accountability in national contexts

On the basis of an analysisof developmentsin the fourcountries(see Currieet
al. 2003 for more details), we observedthat accountabilityand globalization
were particularlyvisible in policies that stressed the importanceof higher
educationin its competitiverole, that is, supportingthe nation in the global
economy. This challenges nationalgovernmentsto keep a close watch on the
effectiveness and efficiency of higher educationinstitutionsand make them
more accountable.
Our conclusions for universitiesare rathersimilar to those of Leithwood
et al. regardingaccountabilityat the school level: "Thecurrentpreoccupation
with educational accountabilityappears to have begun in most developed
countriesin the 1960s, acquiringsignificantnew energy during the mid-to-
late 1980s. The reasonsfor these calls for greateraccountability,furthermore,
are to be found in the wider economic, political, and social context of which
schools are a part.These contexts are not uniformacross all countries"(1999,
p. 11).
Therearesomenoteworthy amongthecountries
differences weexamined.
In Norway,new publicmanagement ideasand the country'spositionin
the Europeanpoliticallandscape,thatis partof Europe,but not of the
European Community, weretriggersforintroducinggreateraccountability.
The governmentintended to introduceaccountabilitymechanisms, such as
activity planning and quality assurance;however, concurrentlythe govern-
mentdecentralized
a numberof activities,thusinitiatinggreaterinstitutional
a
autonomy. result,theaccountability
As policieswerestrippedof theirthorns
the
during implementationprocess and in practicebecameless effectualthan
the governmentplanned
Dutchuniversitiesalso gainedgreaterautonomyin a numberof areas.
This general trend requirestwo qualifications.First, the governmentmain-
tainedits powerovera numberof aspectsof highereducation.Second,in
some areasit was not so mucha questionof more or less autonomybut
of shifting responsibilities and accountabilitymechanisms, in other words,
'steeringfrom a distance'. The most importantdevelopmentin practice was
the introductionof a national quality assurancesystem. The original inten-
tions of the governmentseemed far-reaching.But, similar to the Norwegian
case and due to the Dutch corporatistmodel of policy making, the actual
of accountability
implementation turnedoutto be moremodest.
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 535
The face of accountabilityin the United Stateschangedovertime. Broadly
speaking, there was a shift from an internally-orientedsystem of accounta-
bility aimed at improvementtowardsan explicit, externally-orientedone. The
reasons for the change lie significantlyin the fact that the costs of higher
educationgrew enormouslywith consequencesfor nationaland statebudgets
and the generalpublic's view that highereducationwas not deliveringvalue
for money.These changesclearlysaw a movementfromprofessiornal to polit-
ical accountabilityas universitiessought to gain greaterpublic approvalfor
theirquality.
The French higher education system is still largely controlled by the
Ministry,despite some developments towards deregulationand decentrali-
zation. The efforts of the governmentto implement formal accountability
mechanisms were not accepted wholeheartedly and turned out to focus
mainly on monitoringdevelopmentsin higher education.The quality assur-
ance throughthe ComitwNational d'Evaluation (CNE) was introducedas a
voluntaryscheme and there have been few consequences for the institutions
involved, otherthan increasingtheirprestigeand reputation.

Accountability in institutional contexts

We now take a furtherstep in ourinvestigationof accountabilityby looking at
how it was implementedwithinfour universities.We describethe impactthat
nationaldebatesandpolicies actuallyhad on daily practicesand on the views
of academics and administrators,summarizingthe main findings according
to three central themes/questionswe discussed with the interviewees: the
accountabilitymeasuresat the governmentanduniversitylevels, the measures
at the individuallevel, and the effectiveness of these measures.

Sample
We gatheredqualitativedatathroughin-depthinterviewswith academicsand
managersfrom four diverse universitiesin France,the Netherlands,Norway,
and the United States. It is importantto emphasize that this research was
not a strictly comparativestudy because we did not control the sample of
institutionsor the interviewrespondentsto enable a statisticalor explanatory
comparisonof our findings.However,we chose a similarset of participantsin
each of the universitiesand they were asked a similarset of twenty questions
aboutgovernance,accountability,competitionand generatingfunds, and new
technologies, ending with a few questions regardingthe role of tenure and
the futureof the university.Thus, this allowed us to observe the similarities
and differences in the trends that existed during 1998 and 1999 across the
536 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

four universities.In this article, we focus on the three questions asked about
accountability.
There were 131 interviews with a small numberof senior managersand
an approximatelyequal numberof academic staff from professional schools
(education, applied languages, and/or law), sciences, and social sciences
(arts). The interviews were conducted face-to-face, almost entirely by one
of the authors,ensuringconsistency in questioningand depthof probing.The
sampleincluded37 individualsfromBoston, 32 fromAvignon, 31 from Oslo,
and 31 from Twente. The academics interviewed ranged from professors
to assistantprofessors,consisting of more men than women, particularlyat
Avignon andTwente,with a more equal representationat Boston College and
Oslo. The senior managersinterviewedincludedpresidents,vice rectors/vice
presidents,provosts,and universitysecretaries/registrars.
We chose particularuniversities that were not representativeof univer-
sities in their countries but were chosen to represent different types of
universities (large/small; capital-based/provincial;public/private;research-
oriented/teaching-oriented;managerial/collegial). Boston College is a
medium-sized (12,500 students), private, Jesuit university located in the
United States,which became highly manageddue to a brushwith bankruptcy
in the early 1970s. The University of Avignon is a small (7,100 students),
provincial,liberalartsuniversitylocated in southernFranceand is mainly an
undergraduate institution.The Universityof Oslo is a large (34,400 students)
universitylocated in the capital of Norway and is mainly researchfocused.
The Universityof Twenteis a small (5,500 students),entrepreneurialuniver-
sity located in the easternpart of the Netherlandsand combines technology
and social sciences. Oslo and Twentedeterminetheir futures,having greater
autonomy than Avignon, yet not as much as Boston College with its need
and capacity to garnerprivatefunds. However,Twenteis less dependenton
governmentfunding, becoming an 'entrepreneurial'universityby building
up money from researchand consulting contracts.Avignon and Oslo staff
members are beginning to embrace and serve local community economic
interests, yet their traditionalnature and reliance on government funding
remainsintactmore thanBoston College or Twente.Studentsat Oslo did not
pay tuitionfees; at Avignon,they paid a few hundreddollarsin administrative
costs; at Twentethey paid about$1,500; and at Boston tuitionfees were about
$21,500 (US dollarequivalentsin 1999).

Accountabilitymeasuresinforce at universityand departmentlevel

Here respondents were asked to mention the accountabilitymeasures, for

example research indices, quality reviews, and teaching evaluations that
were introducedby the governmentto monitoruniversitiesand departments.
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 537

The Universityof Avignon seems the least preoccupiedwith accountability

requirementsby the government.A small number(16 percent)of responses
indicatedthat there is no control or monitoringin place and a little less than
a third (29 percent) of the responses stated that there is no change or only
debatestakingplace on the issue of accountability.In sum, almost half of the
responsesstatedthattherewas a lack of accountabilitymechanismsor a lack
of change otherthanthe monitoringof studentnumberswhich was seen as a
traditionalform of accountability.
I would say that the structures of evaluation haven't really changed
much.Asfor your examples,I am not really convincedthat the Minister
takes muchnotice of the pass rates; howeverthe percentage of students
enrolled,yes, evidently.But the only thing that this is usedfor is so that
the Ministercan establish a budgetarynotationto allocate creditsto the
university,butafter this has been done, we are the ones who decide what
we are going to do with thefunds and whetheror not we are going to cut
certain courses or keep them. So the Minister in a way rids himself of
this responsibility.OtherwiseI would say that in this area, nothing has
really changed. Therehas been a change in the Minister's discourse, a
change of methods, but not a change in the procedures of evaluation.
(Avignon,Junior,Male, Academic, ProfessionalSchool)
About half (47 percent) of the responses indicatedthat accountabilityexists
'out there' but no immediateeffect was noticeable. Most of the elements of
accountability,for instancemonitoringof studentchoice, pass rates,required
qualificationsof academics, and performancerelatedfundingfor small parts
of the university budget seemed relatively harmless. Whereas the general
tendency in the responses was that accountabilitymechanisms were not
necessary,a few responses (8 percent)mentionedthat there should be some
externalscrutinyfrom the government.The following quote identifies that
the evaluationshouldbe on the contentof the course, not on the performance
of the professor,which seems to be an importantdistinctionthat the French
would want to maintain.
We are in the middle of an importanttransformationat the moment,
which is based on the English and Americansystems. Up until now, we
had no studentcourse evaluationsat all, and I feel that this was missing
from our system.Thestudentsshouldbe allowed to evaluatethe contents
of their courses, (as opposed to evaluatingor makingcriticisms of the
actualprofessors)and to makean evaluationof the overall way in which
theirchoice of subjecthas beenpresentedto them- theyshould be given
an opportunityto say which areas of the course could be improved,
or what needs to be added, etc. I think that this is a very good idea,
538 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

howeversome of my more traditionalistcolleagues have a very negative

attitudetowardsthis kind of thing, saying that it would underminetheir
authority and prestige, which may I add, I think is quitefar from the
truth.(Avignon, Senior,Male, Academic, Social Sciences)

Boston College could be positioned at the other end of the spectrum.It

must be stressedthat althoughthe university,being private,is not monitored
by the state legislature,74 percentof the responses indicatedthat accounta-
bility is all around the place, mainly by external reviews. Nevertheless, a
numberof responsesindicatedthatexternalreviewswere a fairlyrecentmoni-
toring device, introducedto improve the performanceof some departments
and used to rewardothers.
Theuniversityputs togetheran evaluationfor the departmentas a whole.
Thereare sticks and carrots with respect to monitoring.The university
hasjust come out withan awardfor teachingfor faculty witha little cash
prize of $4000, not much.It's more recognitionthan a monetaryreward.
Ourperformanceis measuredindividuallybut also departmentalwise.
In the university'sopinion, are we allocating too many resourcesto the
graduateprogramversus undergraduate?Do we have enough electives
on the book?(Boston College, Senior,Male, Academic, Social Sciences)

In additionto the externalreview mechanisms, 15 percent of the responses

named explicitly the internalscrutiny of class sizes and other elements of
the educationalprocess. The attentionpaid to accountabilitydoes not always
mean thatrespondentsare seriously 'bothered'by accountability.
The academic vice presidentand deans do not seem to monitordepart-
ments all that directly. There is an annual report that's put in, but I
don't know exactly what happens to these. It goes up to the dean, and I
have neverhad anyfeedback. (Boston College, Senior,Male, Academic,
ProfessionalSchool)

Most of the responses in this category,however, accepted external reviews

and stated that these were helpful for improvingtheir programsand proce-
dures.Also a numberof responsesindicatedthatthere were departmentsthat
were hardlyevaluatedor held accountableto managementat a higher level.
In additionto the accountabilitymeasuresdescribedabove, some responses
(6 percent)relatedto nationalrankingsof theiruniversity.This should not be
literally taken as a direct accountabilitymeasure,for externalorganizations
use universitydatato rankinstitutions,indirectlyimplying thatthe university
could be asked to explain or justify its performancevis-&-visits regulatory
bodies (in this case, its Board of Trustees). Others (5 percent) mentioned
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 539

directactionby the departmentchair(exhortationsto do better)or dismissing

a departmentchairif reportswere very negative.
The Universityof Twente and the University of Oslo took middle posi-
tions between Boston College and the University of Avignon. At Twente
almost all respondents(78 percent)referredto externalreviews of different
aspects, teaching and research separately,by national visiting committees.
The compulsoryparticipationin these quality assuranceprocesses implies
that each study program for education and each department/facultyfor
researchwould write a self-evaluationand a peer review committee would
visit the programto assess the reportsand makes recommendationson areas
thatmay need improvement.
The universityis fairly well set up in terms of quality assuranceproce-
dures and accountabilityprocedures. Thefaculties are reviewedtwice
yearly, and all that is done in termsof performanceindicators,reviews,
student evaluations - everything you can imagine. (Twente, Senior,
Male, Academic, Social Sciences)

A number of responses (15 percent) mentioned the funding mechanisms

that partlytook into accountthe performanceof the universitybased on the
number of graduatesat the Masters level, time to complete a degree, and
numberof PhDs granted.A small number(7 percent)of the responsesrelated
to the internalmonitoringpractices of the university,partly as a prepara-
tion for the national quality assurance system, and partly as a preparation
for obtaining accreditation.At the time of the survey, this was a voluntary
activity,soon to become partof the obligatoryaccreditationmechanisms.
At the University of Oslo, most responses (57 percent) reported the
role of completionrates in accountabilityproceduresand about a third (31
percent) mentionedthe annualproductivityforms. A minority of responses
(7 percent) mentioneddiscipline reviews. It was clear from responses that
completion rates and annualproductivityreportingpractices did not lead to
severe consequences in terms of the budget, as these indicatorsdetermine
only a small partof the budget.
Completionrates of studentswere introducedseveral years ago by the
government,so part of the funding is related to creditpoints. It is still
not a major element, but it is there. Research indices are still rather
primitive. It is essentially a question of publications and the number
of doctoral candidates we produce. It's not sophisticated,and so far it
is not specifically linked to the budgets or any rewardsor punishment.
Quality reviews are done not on an extensive, regular basis, but the
governmentasks the Research Council to conductperiodic reviewson
the state of a discipline. It is done on a national basis. And teaching
540 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

evaluations, again there has been a consistentpush I would say from

the Ministry,even supportedby prizes, for those who do this the way
the former Minister would like it to be done. So yes, again there are
really no heavy sanctions for those who don't use these evaluations.
The pressure so far has been essentially to use course evaluations on
a regular and a fairly systematic basis. The results of the evaluations
havefew consequencesfor those involved.As yet, thereis no mechanism
for translatingthe resultsof these reviewsinto decisions about budgets.
(Oslo, Senior,Male, Academic, Social Sciences)
There is a push to pay attentionto quality monitoringand quality reviews,
but there are no mechanisms for translatingthe results of the reviews into
decisions about budgets. Some parts of the university appear to take the
accountabilitymechanismsseriously.
Thereis a lot of evaluation, and that's new. Wedidn't have that at all
manyyears ago, and of course,I thinkthat it is quite useful. Wehave had
internationalcommitteesevaluating our research.And as to teaching,
this institute has been doing that for a longer time than other insti-
tutes. The studentorganizationpicks out a couple of differentteaching
units every semester to evaluate. Togetherwith the teacher in charge
they choose the questions,and one of the studentsis given some money
to do the statistics. I think it works quite well. (Oslo, Senior, Female,
Academic, Sciences)
Given the fact that many interviewed at the University of Oslo were not
awareof all the mechanismsin place to monitortheir activities,the accounta-
bility practicesseem ratherceremonialwithoutany real sanctionsthat might
threatenthe survivalof departments.

Accountabilitymeasuresinforce at the individuallevel

Although there is some overlapin the responses on accountabilitymeasures
at the organizationaland the individuallevels, we decided to discuss them
separately.
At the University of Oslo, teaching evaluations (43 percent of the
responses) and annualreports(40 percentof the responses) were mentioned
the most as accountabilitymechanisms at the individual level. For many
respondents,thereappearsto be some frustrationexpressedaboutthe amount
of time the variousreportstake and the amountof overlapin demandsfor the
same information.
We have, of course, now an increased amount of reporting: that you
recordyour plans for teachingfor the term, then after each term, then
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 541

after each year, you report what you have been doing. How much
teaching you have done. Whatkind of researchyou have carried out.
Also all sorts of publications and things like that. This is new to the
university.It is not somethingthat happened in thatformat earlier on.
And the head will have a conversationwith each memberof the staff
once a year (Oslo, Senior,Male, Academic, ProfessionalSchool)

Eleven percent of the responses relatedto the internationalpeer reviews of

theirresearch,such as grantapplicationsandjournalarticles.A small number
of responses (7 percent) regardeduniversityprizes and dialogue meetings
between centraladministrationand the faculties as other monitoringmech-
anisms. The latter can easily be interpretedas 'soft' monitoring, that is,
discussing problemsand raisingpossible solutions;the formeris more diffi-
cult to directlyconnect to accountability.One shouldinterpretthe mentionof
prizes, however,as a mechanismthroughwhich individualsare not so much
held accountable,as rewardedon the basis of a comparisonof their merits
or achievements.In sum, the following quote suggests that quality is not so
much the game as quantityat the Universityof Oslo.
Maybe we should call it countability,because it is always a questionof
quantitynot quality.Theyare countingteaching hours, articles written,
conferences attendedand projects planned. Weuse quite a lot of time
to report about what we are doing. (Oslo, Senior, Male, Academic,
ProfessionalSchool)

At Boston College, 62 percent of the responses referredto the annual

reviews, built on the evaluationof each individual'steaching, research,and
communityservice.
Everybodyhas to submitan annual report.In collaboration,the depart-
ment chair;dean and associate dean scrutinizethat annualreport.So we
look at the publications,the teaching evaluations,and the service. And
the assumptionis that everybodywill be given a small raise, and then
on top of that somewherebetween one and maybe up to two percent in
meritpay can be added to that depending on ourjudgment. So faculty
membersare aware that they are expected to be productive.I thinkthe
criteriafor productivityarefairly well known. Wetend to rely on some
quantitativemeasuresacross the board and the chair can add the voice
that looks at qualityas well. (Boston College, Senior,Male, Academic,
ProfessionalSchool)

A minority of responses (13 percent) mentioned mentoring programs and peer

teaching evaluations and another 13 percent mentioned tenure reviews. With
542 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

respect to the latter:those without tenure go through the tenuringprocess,

as has always happenedtraditionally,and those who are going for promotion
to full professorare scrutinizedin great detail. There is now also discussion
of post-tenurereviews at Boston College, which could involve sanctions for
those whose productivityis below the normor whose teachingis evaluatedas
below average. A small proportion(10 percent) identified no formal eval-
uation mechanisms, suggesting some discrepancy between departmentsat
Boston College. Othersare not particularlysatisfied with the feedback they
get as individuals.
I don't think they are very effective at all. The sanction or rewardof a
salary increase is I thinkeffective.It will tell you prettydirectlywhat the
institutionthinksof you, but the lack of any kind offormativeevaluation
I thinkshows and the institutionwould be betteroff if it did a betterjob
of that. (Boston, Senior,Male, Academic, ProfessionalSchool)

At the University of Twente, four direct methods of monitoring the

performanceof academics were mentioned.Over a third (35 percent) of the
responses reportedthat annual individualreviews were used without sanc-
tions, 28 percent of the responses mentioned teaching surveys, 20 percent
mentioned annual reportsgiven to the departmentchair, and 13 percent of
the responses identified annual reviews with bonuses, task reassignments,
or performance assessment plans. Only four percent mentioned indirect
measures,such as countingthe numberof PhD studentsandformulafunding.
We have some system of personal interviews every year linked to the
annual report. Theremay be some sort of task reassignment,and some
departmentsdon't seem to have any system. This is a majorpolicy issue
that the board of the universitywants to deal with, and it is in favor
of a systematic approach of academic managementby the dean and
the departmentchairs. Thiswould enable departmentalchairs or group
leaders to implementa system of interviewsevery half a year and link
these to an assignmentof tasksand resultsof the tasks, lookingbackand
lookingforward. (Twente,Senior,Male, Manager)

The personal interviews were criticized for their lack of usefulness, that is,
they did not resultin salaryincrementsor even promotionunless an academic
asked for specific advice in this regard. Thus the annual review meetings
were not usually used to discuss career development. Regarding the teaching
surveys, respondentsindicated that these were mostly applied to first year
courses and that the focus was to a larger extent on the courses and the
programsratherthanon the individualacademicparticipatingin a program.A
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 543

good example of a rathereffective methodof evaluatinga course is described

by a female academicin the sciences.
Our favourite type of evaluation is the oral method, evaluating the
course witha small groupof students.Wehave representativesof each of
the studentproject groups,say aboutfive or six students,and one of my
colleagues and I meet with themabout once everymonthor so. Because
this way when somethingis going wrong you can immediatelychange
things. Weprefer that to having the writtenevaluation after the course
because then the changes can only be made the next year. (Twente,
Senior,Female, Academic, Sciences)

At the Universityof Avignon, the patternwas similarto that of accounta-

bility at the organizationallevel. Altogether 68 percent said there was no
evaluation;although out of this percentage, 20 percent reportedthat there
were discussions on this issue and evaluationsmay occur in the future.This
latterresponseis expressedin the following quote:
For the moment,there are none at all, but I know that there is talk of
establishing accountabilitymeasures during the new reformand that
these measures will include student evaluation of courses. This has
been planned for sometime this year; but up until now, nothing has
materialized.(Avignon, Senior,Male, Academic, Sciences)

Some felt there was a need for indirect and/or informal evaluations
(15 percent), and clearly some actually felt that some type of individual
accountabilitymeasures(17 percent)would be of benefitto the university.
I would very much like to show the inspectors a piece of paper with a
list of all my accomplishments,all the things thatI am proudof, because
nobody takes into account what actually happened during the year.
Qualitygoes unnoticedin this system/qualityis sacrificedfor quantity.
Figures are used as an indication of quality. (Avignon, Senior, Male,
Manager,ProfessionalSchool)

How effectiveare these measures?

Here the respondents were asked to react to the question of whether

the accountability mechanisms in place were effective in either moni-
toring quality or improvingthe quality of teaching and researchwithin the
university.Do accountabilitymeasures improvethe quality of teaching and
research?
544 JEROENHUISMANAND JAN CURRIE

Almost half (44 percent) of the responses at the University of Oslo

indicatedthat accountabilitymeasuresdo not improvethe quality.
In lots of instances, you can see that this has been a major source of
stress and resulted in somewhatunproductiveadjustments.Whenyou
rewarda specific kind of activityand not somethingelse, which may be
equally important,you can see unintendedconsequences.(Oslo, Senior,
Male, Academic, Social Sciences)
About a similar percentage (47 percent) thought that they improved as a
result of accountability,although a fair share of this percentage qualified
theircomments.Examplesof these commentsinclude thatthe improvements
in quality were mainly a result of a person's internal motivation or that it
was necessary to encouragebut not to punish staff to improvequality.There
were a few responses (8 percent)suggestingthatthey were not sureaboutthe
impactor found it difficultto assess.
At Boston College the responses were in general more negative than
positive. About 56 percent of the responses stated that the measures were
not effective.
The annual review in which the dean sends you a letter about your
strengthsand weaknesses,I don't get a sense that this is used to improve
the quality of teaching or research.I have never heard of people acting
on these things. I don't have a sense that this method has been used
to create new ways or better ways to teach. (Boston College, Junior,
Female, Academic, ProfessionalSchool)

They described the kind of evaluation that they thought would be more
effective. It appearsthat most want more formative ratherthan summative
evaluations, more collaborative and peer-review types of evaluations and
more one-on-one feedback, in a developmental,supportiveatmosphere.A
few respondentsfelt thatthe currentmechanismswere not harshenough.Also
some commented on the fact that formalmechanismswere not as important
as having a culturein which teaching was taken seriously.About 44 percent
of the responses saw the currentmechanismsas effective. They felt that the
teaching surveys gave good feedback and the rewards and sanctions may
make people more productive,also that the tenure and promotionprocesses
helped to focus attentionon teachingand research.
I felt the effortsto do internalteaching observationsand meetings with
faculty were really good. I really enjoyed those. At the suggestion of
the chair I have gone to the Academic Development Center and had
thatperson observe my class and make suggestions.Actually she came
back twice and that was very helpful. I find fewer avenues with regard
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 545

to researchfor mentorshipbut there are some good teaching avenues.

(Boston College, Senior,Female, Academic, Sciences)

No one felt thatthe salaryincrementswere enough to really changebehavior,

but receiving a negative incrementor even just an averageincrementwould
signal disapprovalof performanceand may effect a change. Teaching and
researchawardswere also seen as beneficial.Only one responseindicatedthat
tryingto judge the effectivenessof these measureswas really too difficult.
At the Universityof Twentethere is a more positive pictureof the impact
of accountabilitymeasures.Slightly over half (54 percent) of the responses
indicatedthatthe measureswere effective.
Yes,I think they do have positive influences in the long run. I've been
working at the universityfor twentyyears, and in the beginning there
were few monitoringactivities in research or in teaching. And now I
would say that these monitoring activities have improvedthe quality
of teaching and research. (Twente, Junior, Male, Academic, Social
Sciences)

A little over a third (38 percent) of the responses showed that there were
doubts about the effectiveness of accountabilitymeasures. The comments
made were aboutthe lack of effectivenessof the currentmechanisms,because
they did not think that these mechanismsreally changed the motivationto
research,and they believed thatthere might be other mechanismsthat could
have greaterimpact.
It is a difficultquestionto because the quality of educationhas
answer,
for sure improved in the last decade and research the same. But I'm
not sure if the major impactof this improvementis due to the measures
we have been discussing or pressurefrom outside, such as international
competitionfor funding, national competitionfor students and so on.
(Twente,Senior,Male, Manager)

A few responsesin this categoryalso doubtedwhetherthe qualityof research

or the effectivenessof teachingcould be assessed. A small number(8 percent)
of the responses explicitly indicatedthat the mechanismsin force needed to
be changed. They suggested introducingmore collaborative,non-individual
measures,peer reviews, and more formativeevaluations.
Giventhe lack of accountabilitymechanismsat the Universityof Avignon,
people responded to a general question of whether they thought these
measures could potentially be effective in improving the quality of teaching
and research in their university. About a fifth (22 percent) of the responses
implied a positive response. They argued that the university needed to be
546 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

more efficient and open-mindedto the scrutinyof externaldemands.Over a

half (56 percent)of the responseswere doubtful,but in a positive sense. They
qualifiedtheirresponsesby saying thatinternalmotivationwas also necessary
and thattherewas a risk if assessmentwould only take into accountquantita-
tive indicators..In this category of responses, there were also academicsand
administratorsindicatingthat it would be difficult to develop accountability
mechanisms.
I believe that academics should have the responsibilityfor evaluating
their own work; it is part of theirjob. But it is difficultto know exactly
which mechanisms should be put into place to make sure that this
procedure is put to use effectively,and that it actually does become
part and parcel of their role in the university.(Avignon,Junior,Female,
Academic, ProfessionalSchool)
Some argumentsrelatedto the choice of criteriaor what specificallyshouldbe
evaluated.A minorityof responses (14 percent)indicatedthat accountability
would not improveacademicperformance.A further8 percentfelt that they
did not know enough to comment.In sum, some might suggest thatthereis an
anarchistictendencyat the Universityof Avignon. If this is more widespread
thanjust this university,then it will make it difficult for the governmentto
impose 'hard'accountabilitymechanismson academics.The solutionmay be
to implement'softer' mechanismsthataremore formative,usingpeer reviews
and voluntaryteachingevaluations.

Discussion

When we look at the type of mechanismsin use, both at the organizational

andthe individuallevel, it is strikingthatmost mechanismswould be categor-
ized as 'soft' measures: monitoring and explanation, and a few of them
would be described as strong measures:justification.Regardingthe effects
of accountabilitymechanisms,many academics in this study were skeptical
aboutthe effectivenessof currentmeasures.Therewas some oppositionto the
bureaucraticprocedures,the amountof work involvedandthe focus on quan-
tifiable indicators.Many respondentsdoubtedwhetherthe procedureswould
indeed have the presumedimpact.Across the four countries,many respond-
ents argued for less formal, more individualisticprocedures, and pleaded
for a culture in which informal procedures were accepted as part of the
working environment.On the other hand, there were also argumentsfrom a
minorityof respondentswho wantedto introduceaccountabilitymechanisms
thatrewardedgood practicesand punishedlow qualityperformance.
The responses clearly were influenced by the contexts in which the
accountabilitydebate took place and the experiences gained with accounta-
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 547

bility. The four universities apparentlywere in different stages of develop-

ment. Boston College and the University of Twente seemed to be the two
institutionsin which accountabilitymeasureswere to an extent institutional-
ized, althoughthe Boston case showed considerablevarietyby department.
Anotherdifferencewas the fact thatin the Dutch case, the universityfollowed
the national quality assurance requirements,whereas in the United States
case, there was much more variety in proceduresused by the departments.
Aside from regional accreditationagencies in the United States, there is no
national body to monitor accountabilitymechanisms and most universities
set up theirown accountabilityprocedures.The Universityof Oslo seemedto
be representativeof universitiesin which accountabilitywas to some extent
implemented,but at the same time practiceswere mostly ceremonial.At the
Universityof Avignon accountabilitywas least visible, debates were taking
place, but in practicenot many mechanismswere implemented.In particular,
the practicesat the Europeaninstitutionswere reflectionsof developmentsat
the nationallevels.
Connecting the findings at the case study level to those at the national
levels and the theoretical framework,there are some interesting relation-
ships. Romzek's (2000) types of accountabilitymost found in professional
organizationswere true of these universitieswith a slight movementtowards
greaterpolitical accountability.The use of performanceindicatorsby state
level authoritiesin the United States - to show 'value for money' illus-
tratesthis shift towardspolitical accountability.Anothertype of dynamismis
shown in most nationalcases thatillustratelegitimateauthorities'shift from
invoking one type of accountability,proactiveby legislative requirements,
towards other output-orientedforms, such as accreditation,performance-
based funding and reporting performanceindicators. Most accountability
mechanismsbelonged to the category of 'soft' mechanisms.They were not
set up to sanctionindividualsor theiractivities.
The national and institutional case studies seem to indicate that the
changing relationship between government and universities is the most
importantfactor affecting the rise of accountability.The shift in types of
steering relationships towards more institutional autonomy and to some
extent increasing market mechanisms invoked accountabilitymechanisms
or new types of accountability mechanisms. Neither administratorsnor
academicswholeheartedlywelcomed many of these.

Conclusion: Are accountability policies failing universities?

One of the striking findings was that 'soft' accountabilitymeasures were

favouredover 'hard'measuresthatwould involve rewardsand sanctions.This
implies a deviationfrom the contentsof most of the policy proposals(either
548 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

at the national or institutionallevel). How is it possible that strong cries for

moreaccountabilityfromhighereducation'sstakeholdersin variouscountries
have - seemingly - no direct, severe impact on the day-to-daypractices of
academics?There are differentexplanationsfor this paradox;some of these
were evident in our empiricaldata.We addressthese briefly.

Shiftfrom professional to political accountability

One could maintainthat despite the governments' attempts to bring about
change by implementingaccountabilitymechanisms, the academic profes-
sionals within the organizationswere able to resist - and possibly subvert
- these policies because they saw them as a sort of 'window dressing'. The
shift from professionalto political accountabilityhas allowed universitiesto
satisfy the accountabilityrequirementsdemandedby theirpublic stakeholders
and legislaturesby introducingaccountabilitymechanismsthat for the most
partcount existing activities. Sometimesthey introducenew measureswhich
take the time of academics but they do not necessarily exact new activities
upon them. They generally use.those measuresthat are alreadyin existence,
such as teaching evaluations and annual reviews which count grants and
publicationsof academics. These do not change the day-to-daybehaviourof
academicsand do not necessarilylead to any increasedqualityfor the clients
of the universities,namely the students.
Within universities, as highly professionalized sites, there is internal
controloverthe processes of educationandresearchas in most public bureau-
cracies. Governmentsat a greatdistancefrom these processes are not able to
get a grip on the internalworkingsof universities.For one reason, they lack
the specialized knowledge or the ability to judge the quality of education
given to students.For anotherreason the cost of gaining such knowledge is
usually consideredto be too great.
This argumentexplains why even in cases where the government has
been able to implement some elements of accountabilitymechanisms (e.g.,
in the Netherlandsand Norway), the ultimate impact is less than expected.
Researchon the impact of quality assurancemechanismsand activity plan-
ning in Norway seems to be in line with this contention; for example,
activityplanningwas merely experiencedas a ritualwith hardlyany harmful
effects (Bleiklie et al. 2000) and the universitiesmerely turnedthe quality
assessmentproceduresinto processesthatsuitedtheirstrongbottom-uptradi-
tions (Stensaker1997). The Dutch experience seems to be a case where the
academicsand theirrepresentativebodies have been able to stripthe intended
accountabilitymechanismsof their thorns.Already in the corporatistpolicy
process, specific universityorganisationswere able to influence the debate.
For example, the Association of Dutch Universities(VSNU) was able to gain
 ACCOUNTABILITYIN HIGHEREDUCATION 549

control over the quality assurancesystem and to 'convince' the government

not to collect performanceindicatorsto gain insight into the quality of the
universities(Huisman2003).

Policy rhetoric

One interpretationof the subversionof accountabilitymechanismscould be

thatthe governmentpolicies simply failed to implementmore severepolicies.
This would not be surprising,for there are many examples of policy failures
or partlysuccessful policies in highereducation(Cerychand Sabatier1986).
On the other hand, it would be surprising,given the variety of contexts in
which the policies were formulatedand the varietyof instrumentssuggested,
that all attemptsacross the countries and institutionsto implement harsher
forms of accountability.
Another explanation could be that most attention to accountability in
(government)policy papersis merelyrhetoric.Thatis, governmentsplead for
accountabilitymeasuresbut actually refrainfrom enforcing specific policy
instruments.It is actuallydifficultfor them to monitorwhetherhighereduca-
tion institutionsreally accountfor theirperformance.Thereis also usually an
emphasison processes ratherthan outcomesand rarelyare sanctionsapplied.

Valueof 'soft' mechanismsand professional accountability

A thirdline of reasoningpoints to the managementof highereducationinsti-

tutionsas the weakestlink in the accountabilitychain.Governmentsmay have
been successful in puttingforwardaccountabilitypolicies, but if institutional
leaders do not 'translate' the policies into institutionalmechanisms, then
nothing changes. There are some indications in the empirical materialthat
indeed institutionalmanagementwas hesitantto implement such measures.
An importantexplanation- at least in the Europeancontinentalcontext - is
that universitymanagementis still in its infancy.That is, only recently have
institutionalleaders been grantedthe power to really manage their institu-
tions. Before the mid-1980s (in some countriesearlieror later) institutional
leadershipto a considerableextent implied ceremonialbehaviorand routine
leadership.Since the 1990s, the roles and functions of these leaders became
much strongerand from the late 1990s on, we began to see a new generation
of leadersin power (again:thereare importantdifferencesbetween the coun-
tries).These new leadersstill have to get used to theirnew roles, which could
imply that strongerleadershipis emerging,but only gradually.Some leaders
have grasped the opportunity to lead and implemented far-reaching changes
in their institutions. Others have tended to stay in a more traditional role and
decided against managing in an overt and aggressive way. This could explain
550 JEROENHUISMAN AND JAN CURRIE

the ratherweak implementationof accountabilitymeasuresin the European

countries.
Anotherexplanationof the hesitancyof universityleaders is not so much
based on a lack of managerialskills, but based on a positive readingof their
currentleadership:purposively the managers side-step stronger accounta-
bility measures for softer ones which they believe are more effective in
leadingin a collegial and collaborativemanner.Thusthey gain greaterprofes-
sional integrityfrom their staff. In the case of Boston College, which has a
strong managerialculture and where a range of accountabilitymechanisms
exist, theremay be good reasonswhy the case for more punitivemeasureshas
not been made. The managerstheremay have recognizedthat 'soft' mechan-
isms are more effective in a professional environment.Based on Romzek's
types, universitiesare places of high autonomywhere the kind of monitoring
that would suit them best is one based on professional expertise. This is
why qualitativejudgmentsmade by one's peers are preferableto hierarchical
assessments based on efficiency and hard quantitativeindicatorsthat often
eschew qualitativejudgments.
There is already considerablejudgment exercised in universities that is
dependentuponpeer expertise,for examplein peerreviews of grants,articles,
promotionapplications, and teaching awards. There are limits to the type
of managerialaccountabilityimposed from above. It may be effective for
some type of workers, but for university scholars 'soft' monitoring may
be better because they are more often motivated by intrinsic rather than
extrinsicrewards.Managersin these four case studies may be intuitively in
touch with this idea and have avoided the worst excesses of hierarchicalor
managerialaccountabilityor 'hard' monitoring,which would use quantifi-
able performanceindicators and sanctions that may not produce the most
effective results in a universityenvironment.If this explanationholds, the
universitymanagershave been able to build a bridgeover troubled(accounta-
bility) water,easing the minds of their academics. If the managers'strategy
seems effective, policy makersat nationallevels may want to heed the advice
of university managers and especially academic researcherswho may be
best placed to assess the type of accountabilitymechanisms most suited to
universities.

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