Introduction
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ruling African National Congress (ANC) as the eminent National liberation
movement is putative and beyond contest. However the narrative of
South Africa’s ‘patriotic history’ is a tapestry of coalescing organisations
and movements which pivoted chiefly on the defeat of Apartheid,
notwithstanding their varying interests and methods.
The aim of this essay is to offer an analysis of the Labour movement’s role
in South Africa’s liberation to democratic rule and it’s contradictions as a
partner in the tripartite alliance with the party in government, the ANC. In
drawing out the labour movement’s account, I will consider some analysis
of South Africa’s historical economic development as a motivation for
racial segregation and the post –apartheid economic realities.
2
Capitalism and Segregation
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The Native Lands Act 27/1913 (wolpe: 436.4. 1972) classified certain
areas as African Reserves and laid down that no African could purchase or
occupy land outside the Reserves and prohibited whites from acquiring or
occupying land in the Reserves. Wolpe argues that this was done to
remedy the shortage of African labour on White farms and to prevent
Africans from re-purchasing European owned land which had been
acquired by conquest. The Reserve economy provided a major portion of
African labour employed in capitalist production in the early periods of
industrialisation in South Africa, thus the function of the policy of
segregation was to maintain the productive capacity of the pre-capitalist
economies in order to supplement the means of production for the
migrant workers, yet not high enough to negate the imperatives of
migration, thus ensuring a constant supply of cheap labour.
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which had Africans, Indians and Coloureds such as Thibedi and Kadalie
(Ness I (ed) 3091. 2009).
In 1948, the National Party of DF Malan won the whites only general
election, with Apartheid as its official policy. Significantly, as Wolpe points
out, the defeated United Party had included reforms of the racial,
economic – political structure as its policy in the 1948 election, as a
response to the growing militancy by Africans. Thus the National Party’s
apartheid institutionalised and legitimised racial oppression in a coercive
state through the introduction of repressive laws which criminalised
militant organised opposition and the establishment of security apparatus
to enforce these laws. These changes however were considered rearguard
to protect the economic interests of the white minority population. The
National government introduced other laws to maintain access to cheap
African labour and contain the pressure on wage levels, by making it
illegal for Africans to strike for higher wages and working conditions. The
geographical mobility of Africans was curtailed by pass laws in order to
limit excess Africans from areas where their labour was not required thus
effectively controlling the migrant worker system. Apartheid further
developed ideological mechanisms which entrenched racial divisions in
education and social life, such as the introduction of Bantu Education and
the immorality act. As a consequence of the expanding apartheid
capitalist economy, especially in manufacturing, there was a demand for
semi-skilled and skilled African labour with concomitant higher wages.
Wolpe suggests that the employment of Africans in these occupations led
to the expansion of African education albeit Bantu education, which
indoctrinated the subjugation of Africans.
In 1955, the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was formed.
(Ness I (ed) 3094. 2009). SACTU was aligned to with both the African
National Congress (ANC)-an African nationalist group formed in 1912 as
the South African Native National Congress, which transformed from a
moderate and elite party into a mass-based party in the 1950’s (Ness I
(ed) 3094. 2009)-and the mSouth African Communist Party (SACP) which
was the reconstituted CPSA, after the latter’s banning. SACTU was
responsible for some of the civil disobedience campaigns and a general
strike in the 1950’s led by activists such as Elias Motsoaledi and Elijah
Barayi. During this time the ANC was becoming more vocal and
confrontational as it became more mass based; in 1952 it was involved in
the Defiance Campaign to protest the pass laws and other apartheid
legislation with Chief Albert Luthuli at its helm. Emerging young leaders of
the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu
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agitated for more militant approaches believing in African nationalism and
eschewing cooperation with other racial groups. This view was however
changed by veteran communist ANC leaders such as Moses Kotane and JB
Marks, who also made the case for an alliance with the militant Natal and
Transvaal Indian Congress under Dr GM Naicker and Dr Yusuf Dadoo. The
ANC and other groups –The South African Coloured People’s Organisation,
the South African Indian Congress and the Congress of democrats- formed
the Congress Alliance in order to coordinate the struggle against
apartheid which culminated in a congress of the people in Kliptown
SOWETO, in 1955 to adopt the Freedom Charter, an essentially social
democratic document with socialist assertions (YN Seleti. (ed) 170. 2004)
By the late 1960’s, White supremacy and Apartheid rule seemed absolute,
the economy grew rapidly at 9.3% between 1963 and 1968. Local
conglomerates expanded, manufacturing increased and Direct Foreign
Investment enlarged. (Ness I. 3094. 2009). This led to a further growth in
the employment of Africans in semi-skilled positions and the rise in real
wages for Africans, although the ratio to white wages worsened. In the
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early 1970’s at the onset of a global recession, unemployment increased
especially amongst unskilled migrant workers, as did inflation.
Subsequent to the Soweto uprising was the rapid growth of trade unions
that emerged from the labour unrest during this time. Black union
membership jumped from 40000 in 1975 to 247000 in 1981, and to 1.5
million in 1985 (Seleti YN(ed) 178.2004). An issue which confronted the
Unions at this time whether to participate in the Industrial council system,
with other unions opposing the move as a ploy by the state for greater
control, and other’s arguing that the new laws are the site of the struggle,
where unions could engage the state to win worker’s rights. By the early
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1980’s the participation of unions in the broader political discourse was at
issue, as political turmoil spread in black communities. With political
movements banned and with them a coherent organisation for political
rights for Africans, trade unions pressed for economic as well as political
rights. Sharp differences arose between unions who believed that the
primary focus should be on the shop floor and building strong unions. The
notion of a working class movement was articulated by the Federation of
South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). Fosatu general secretary Joe
Forster declared that “it is, therefore, essential that workers must strive to
build their own powerful and effective organisation even whilst they are
part of the wider popular struggle. This organisation is necessary to
protect and further worker interests and to ensure that the popular
movement is not hijacked by elements that will in the end have no option
but to turn against their worker supporters”.(Welsh D. 318. 2009). This
statement reflects the anticipation of nationalist elites who dominated
political movements who would adapt to capitalist interests once in
power. On 21 March 1983, United Democratic Front (UDF) was launched,
in Mitchells plain. The UDF represented continuity in the struggle against
apartheid, sharing the broad aims of the ANC in exile, this was made
explicit by making Nelson Mandela and other ANC veterans patrons of the
UDF. Black Consciousness supporters formed the National Forum
Committee, which opposed the involvement of anti-apartheid whites,
rejected the freedom charter and emphasised anti-capitalist over anti-
apartheid aims (Seleti YN (ed) 180. 2004).
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racialism and would not affiliate to COSATU; in 1986, they amalgamated
to form the National Council of Trade Unions (Nactu) and insisted on the
requirement that the leadership be drawn from the African working class.
There were few whites in Cosatu, though more coloured and Indian
workers were members, with an overwhelming number of Africans, it
committed itself to building a non-racial working class movement and to
restructure the economy in the interest of the working class. Despite its
resolve to participate in the broader political struggle, was still not
affiliated to the UDF. In 1985, Cosatu general secretary, Jay Naidoo met
ANC leaders in Harare, which caused tensions among affiliates, because
they were not consulted. However, the Cosatu leadership understood that
the ANC was the most popular national liberation movement among
Africans and an association with them could not be delayed indefinitely In
1987 at its second annual Congress, Cosatu adopted the Freedom
Charter. Cosatu embarked on further political campaigns, calling for the
release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners and the unbanning
of political organisations. The state responded by attacking Cosatu offices
around the country, detaining scores of union leaders, and in 1987,
Cosatu’s Johannesburg headquarters were bombed. With a membership of
1.5 million workers by 1985 in 43500 workplaces, Workers demonstrated
the strength of organised labour power. With the South African economy
declining, the number of strikes and work-stoppages increased, occurring
around retrenchments, wages and dismissals. The most significant strike
was the mineworkers strike in 1987, which lasted for three weeks. In
1988, around the same time as the banning of the UDF, restrictions were
imposed on Cosatu to confine its activities to trade union work. Cosatu
was limped but unfazed, with the banning of the UDF, Cosatu became the
major column of internal resistance. Between 1988 and 1989 an
amorphous grouping, consisting of Cosatu and UDF leaders, called the
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) emerged, calling for mass stay-aways
and general strikes. During 1989 the MDM was emboldened by the release
of some ANC leaders, including, Walter Sisulu and Govan Mbeki. As early
as 1985, the ANC had started negotiating with white business people and
other interest groups from inside South Africa, and Nelson Mandela had
started informal talks with the state while in prison. In August 1989, the
ANC established the Harare declaration conditionally supporting talks with
the National Party government. In 1989 the Berlin Wall was collapsed,
heralding the collapse of the Soviet Union and ending the Cold War. In the
same year, following a stroke, the South African president PW Botha was
replaced by FW de Klerk. Realising an untenable situation, the new
president announced the unbanning of the ANC and other liberation
movements and the release of Nelson Mandela. With political parties re-
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establishing themselves legally in the country, the UDF disbanded in
deference to the ANC, SACTU was dissolved into Cosatu.
On august 1990, the ANC and the government signed the Pretoria minute
as a step towards negotiations that culminated in the formal talks of the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) in December 1991. In
May 1990 Cosatu joined the SACP and ANC to form the Tri-partite alliance;
however the Soviet influenced democratic centralism as practiced by the
SACP and ANC members with a top-down leadership style, clashed with
the consultative structure of Cosatu and former UDF members as
practiced in the MDM.
John Saul argues that, by the early 90’s democracy was placed on the
agenda by peoples in Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia
through their popular struggles. However, the initiative was seized by
western intellectuals to direct the process along liberal concepts and a
“recycling of the modernisation theory”. The result was the collapsing of
democracy into liberal democracy as practiced in the west and with them
neo-liberal economic policies (Saul J 175. 2005). South Africa’s transition
was not immune to this process; there is a significant measure in which
the national party through the state president FW de Klerk sought to
safeguard features of white minority rule and the establishment of liberal
capitalist democracy. While the ANC maintained a Socialist agenda and
articulated the two-stage theory in its proposed National Democratic
Revolution (NDR), it harboured petit-bourgeoisie nationalistic elements. To
be fair, the South African economy was battered curtailing the possibility
of the ANC to manoeuvre as various international forces, such as the IMF
and the World Bank; the corporate sector and international aid community
mounted pressure. As leader of the alliance, the broad church of the ANC
still faced dissenting voices with regards to the methods and outcomes of
the negotiations, within the ANC itself, caution was raised with regards to
the compromises being made which would make it impossible for a post-
apartheid government to tackle the socio-economic disparities that
characterised the South African society.
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were unabated. This was evident in the proposal for a worker’s party at
the National Union of Metalworkers’ 1993 congress. Nonetheless most
trade unions preferred to direct their energies within the ANC led alliance.
This has led to conflicts within the labour movement itself and with the
ANC in the alliance. With South Africa having entered the global economy
and embracing neo-liberal economic policies, Cosatu’s commitment to a
broadly socialist ideal was usurped by the ANC’s liberal agenda. It had not
taken long for the fissures to emerge, with Cosatu, expressing criticism of
its alliance partner. There were complaints about Mandela’s imperialist
style of leadership and growing resentment of Cosatu being treated as
junior partner. Apart from these misgivings and Cosatu’s opposition to the
government’s economic policies particularly the Growth Employment and
Redistribution strategy (GEAR) - considered a shift away from the
Reconstruction and Development Strategy (RDP) which Cosatu
participated in its formation-which the government made clear was a non-
negotiable policy, the tripartite alliance remains intact, though highly
fractious.
Conclusion
The 2007 52nd ANC national congress, which saw the defeat Thabo Mbeki
as the president of the ANC by incumbent ANC and state president Jacob
Zuma was considered a victory for the labour movement in its attempt to
wrest control of the ANC and expressly change the economic trajectory of
the country-which was not without controversy, as the factionalism
became evident within Cosatu, leading to the expulsion of Cosatu
president, Willie Madisha. Nevertheless, since the 2009 general elections,
where Cosatu were considered an important column in the tripartite
alliance, the sincerity of Cosatu to the worker’s and popular struggles
have been tested and found wanting. The ANC still maintains its
commitment to neo-liberal economic policies. Despite the laments of its
general secretary, Zwelinzima Vavi who regularly speaks out against
government corruption and the system of patronage; and extols virtues of
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a people centred government, Cosatu leader’s are still co-opted into
government leading many to decry the entrenchment of labour aristocrats
and careerist unionist rather than activists. Indeed Vavi himself declared
his intentions to join government after the 2012 government elections.
With the contradictions that the labour movement finds itself in, and a
growing sentiment amongst workers and other communities that the ANC
is moving away from the masses, Cosatu straddles a precarious divide
between a champion of the working class or a collaborating vassal of the
ANC.
References
Ulrich Nicole ;Van der Walt Lucien 2009 South Africa, Labor Movement in
International Encyclopaedia of Revolution and Protest, Immanuel Ness
(ed). Blackwell Publishing, 2009
Welsh, David. 2009 The Rise and Fall of Apartheid Jonathan Ball Publishers
2009
Saul John. 2005 The post Apartheid denoument, in his The Next liberation
struggle: Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy in South Africa. (Scottsville:
UKZN Press) 195-228
Wolpe Harold; 1972 Capitalism and Cheap labour-power in South Africa: from
segregation to apartheid from Economy and Society, vol I. No. 4 pg 425-456
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