Introduction:

I. The Distinction Between Pure and Empirical Knowledge:

Kant's opening sentence here has the potential to be somewhat confusing to the reader. "There
can be no doubt that all of our knowledge begins with experience." suggests to the reader a
thesis which is exactly opposite one of the fundamental claims of the Kantian epistemology.
Kant asserts that we have *a priori* knowledge, knowledge which is independent of experience,
but this sentence gives the impression of a contrary claim. The answer is, of course, in the
details.
In this opening sentence, Kant is stating that , in terms of causation ("in order of time"), the
event of someone's having knowledge is always preceeded by an event of being stimulated by
the outside world. No one can know anything unless they've experineced.
But the causal priority of stimulus must not be confused with justification, and it must not be
taken to prove that justification must involve stimulus from the outside world. In the process of
creating knowledge, we may need to apply internal faculties to the expernal stimuli we recieve
from the world. If this is the case, then these internal faculties may themselves be subject to
philosophical investigation. Furthermore, we may be able to prove certain truths through
nothing but an appeal to these faculties. If this is indeed the case, then such justification might
carry a level of certainty which we can never obtain from a proof involving an appeal to
experieicne. Kant calls this form of justification *a priori*, and knowledge so justified is a priori
knowledge. The other sort of proof, which involves an appeal to experience, is a posteriori
justification.
- Example: A baby may come to understand the rule that the shortest path beteen two points is
a straight line by trial and error, and so knows this fact through an a posteriori justification.
Once older, he can prove it to himself a priori. So here the experience preceeded the
knowledge in order of time, but the justification is independent of any experinece.
II:
Kant provides two different tests for the a priority of a claim. The first is the neccesity test; the
only neccesary truths are the a priori ones. The second is that the proposition applies with
*strict universality*. Universal propositions are rules that are asserted for all cases; "If
something is a circle, then it has no corners" is a proposition with universality, "the book is on
the table" isn't one. "All bodies are heavy" is a universal claim ("all gases have mass" is another
example), but Kant doesn't think that it is a strictly universal one, as he thinks it's possible for it
not to be true, and that we've justified it only empirically. A proposition has empirical
universality if we have justified it by virtue of an inference from many cases in which it is seen to
be true to every case (including the cases we haven't seen); we applied *induction*.
The only way to prove something is strictly universal, or otherwise neccesary, is a priori[1]. All
strictly universal claims are neccesary claims. Why does Kant think neccesary claims must be a
priori? The answer lies in the limits of a posteriori justifications; all knowledge deriving from
experience either applies to only to the limited examples of objects we've seen ("the socks I'm
wearing are white"), or involves an inference from examples to all cases ("Every sock I've seen
is white, therefore all socks are white"). Both types of justification produce claims which could
possibly be false (and therefore not neccesary). In the first case, it's entirley possible that I
could put on a different sock this morning. The part of the world described by these cases
never *have to be* the way they are and such claims don't rule out the possibility that the world
could have been another way.
The second case, induction, has its own limits. A rule derived using induction always has a
chance of being false. There might always be, after all, a case that we havn't seen yet that
contradicts it (maybe there are black socks....). This of course means that the rule could
possibly be false.
Why might Kant think that a claim demonstrated to have unlimited universaility must be a priori?
Kant argues that to have successfully proved a proposition to have unlimited universality, we
must not only have proof that the cases we've seen confirm the proposition, but that every case
confirms the proposition. We can't prove the cases we havn't seen a posteriori, as there might
always be a case we havn't seen which contradict our inference (this is the risk we take when
we induce). It would follow then that we have proven it a priori [2].
Kant thinks that many truth of mathematics, the laws of cause and effect, and our notion of
substance are all concepts which we posses a priori. Mathematical truths are neccesary, the
law of cause and effect can't be proved through any appeal which involves induction because of
its universality, and that there's no experience which could suggest the notion of substance to
us that isn't only possible because we already had the notion. The proof of the third is a very
interesting one, and is a transcendental argument.
- [1]: Unlimited Universality (not the same thing as Strict Universality!) applies for everything,
and not just for some special situation; "All the cookies are chocolate chip" is a universal claim
("all") that might be true in a limited enviroment (say, in "Mac's Only Chocolate Chip Cookie"
Bakery) but isn't true in all, but the claim "All the cookies in Mac's are Chocolate Chip" really
seems like it should have unlimited universality (at least if "All circles don't have corners" does).
If this is the case, then Kant would be wrong in claiming that this sort of universal proposition
are always demonstrated a priori (we only have to ask Mac to find out!). How might Kant draw a
distinction between propositions only about things in Mac's, and the propositions only applying
to circles?
- [2]: If this is indeed Kant's argument, then he's made a bad one. It seems silly to think we
can't rely on induction for knowledge if there's the possibility of a counter example we havn't
considered. For if this was the case, then since there is always the possibilty of one of the rules
involved in an inductive inference having a counter example (I could have an oreo in my bakc
pocket when I ask Mac), then induction never produces knowledge. This would mean that
scientific isn't knowledge, which is something Kant does not want to claim. I think it's unlikely
Kant would make the argument I've tried to give him here. It's probably more likely that he's
overlooked the problem raised by [1], and thinks that claims with unlimited universality are a
priori because he thinks empirical claims always have a scope because they only apply to the
way things are as opposed to all of the possible ways the world could be. Nevermind that we
could simply produce a posteriori claims with unlimited universality by simply saying "If the world
is the way it is..." before a case like in [1]. Of course, this claim wouldn't be true other possible
worlds (so it wouldn't be neccesary) but that's beside the point.
III:
*Metaphysics* attempts to use a priori means to expand our knowledge beyond the limits of
experience, and answer the questions of god, freedom, and immortality. But this science is
easily corrupted by drama. It is only after a careful understanding of the nature of the a priori is
obtained that an informative study of metaphysics is possible. The critique of pure reason aims
to provide this understanding.
IV. The Distinction Between Analytic and Synthetic Judgements:
A *judgment* is an *inference* thought by a person. Judgments take us from the idea of one
proposition to another, and are part of the minds of a thinking person; they are how we think.[3]
Every judgement a person makes can fit into one of two types. In the first, the *analytic*, the
idea derived is already contained in the thought it was derived from (at least obliquely). We
merely break-up or reduce from one idea to another; we do this by reflecting on the concept
already in our mind. In the other sort, the *synthetic*, the idea derived is not a part of the idea it
is derived from, although it might be associated in some way or another. The derived concept is
not already part of our concept of what we derriving from. Whether or not the judgement was an
application of the rule of *identity* is another test; if so, then the judgment was analytic. An
excellent example of an analytic judgment would be logic (although Kant uses the term 'logic' far
differently); an analytic judgment takes us from A and A -> B to B, and from A & B to A. But
such applications of logic are not the only sort of analytic judgments; we don't have to explicitly
state the part ('A') in stating the whole ('A & B') to then analyticaly derive the part ("It's a horse,
then it has 4 legs").[4]
Analytic judgments, in a certain sense, are unable to expand our knowledge. While they can
allow us to derive new truths from only ideas, they are unable to give us any ideas not already in
our mind or part of an idea in our mind. Synthetic judgements are different, and expand our
library of concepts.
All judgments of experience are synthetic; everytime we learn something by making an
observation about the world, we are making a synthetic judgment. This is because the
judgement consults more than just an idea we already had, but also consults our experiecne
Kant thinks we derive the idea that bodies have weight in this way; we consult all of our past
experiences of bodies, and discover that all of those bodies had weight, and so add the idea of
weight to our idea of body. So all a posteriori judgments are synthitic according to Kant.
But he thinks there are also a priori synthictic judgments. Kant thinks the proposition
"Everything which happens has a cause" is one of these.
- [3] Do judgements have to always be correct inferences, or do they only have to be attepts at
correct inferences?
- [4] This idea, that we can dervie analytic truths by breaking down the composition of ideas, is a
somewhat problematic one, because it relies on the terms involved having a definite meaning.
And there are good reasons for suspecting that terms don't have defintie meanings most of the
time we're reasoning with them. This also goes for a capacity to understand the meanings of
our words by consulting the concepts in our mind. Certainly, something like analytic judgments
are possible, and we do something like them very often. But things might get more messy and
complicated than Kant might realize.
V. Examples of A Priori Synthetic Judgments:
Kants first example is mathematics. He points out that although mathematic obeys the principle
of non-contradiction (it's logical), mathematical proofs cannot be arrived at merely through the
application of this principle. He thinks that human reasoning about math doesn't merely
proceede through the application of logic to known rules; it employs intellectual leaps that Kant
thinks are synthetic. Yes, Kant says, all the propositions of mathematic are logically consistent
with one another, but we certainly can't find new ones just by applying analytic reasoning to the
ones we already have.[5]
Natural science involves some principles which are synthetic a priori. The two examples he
gives are the conservation of mass, and the laws of motion. He thinks these are neccesary[6],
and are therefore a priori.
Metaphysics is the third case. If any correct metaphysics is possible, it will involve synthetic a
priori judgments.
- [5] Interesting challnge here for Kant's notion of analysis: Is there an argument to be made for
the concepts in math to already contain all of the related truths; does our concept of two
dimensional space already contain the idea of the proposition "the shortest distance between
two points is a straight line" in the same sense that the concept of a horse contains the idea of
"having four legs"? Yes, I can think about space without thinking about that proposition, but the
same goes for horses and numbers of legs. It could be the case that the apparent difference
between these two types of inference is simply a matter of degree rather than type; that there's
no "special" difference between the analytic and the synthetic. Can someone suggest a way of
fleshing out Kant's notion of conceptual containment that could make this distinction? One
possible way is of taking Kant's notion of containment is as an understanding condition; you
only know what a horse is if you understand that a horse has all the properties with are
"contianed" in your concept of it; you don't know what a horse is if you don't know they have four
legs. Is such an interpretation plausibly canonical? I think this is unlikely, and that when Kant
says that a concept is contained within another one, he is clearly being more literal. If you have
a conept in mind, you have all of it's contained concepts in mind, albeit perhaps in an opaque
manner. How exactly this works is still somewhat unclear from the introduction; he likely thinks
it's somewhat obvious on reflection that some concepts contain one another.
- [6] That these are neccesary seems a bit hard to believe, at least without extensive argument.
He could try to claim that they're universal instead, but that might not be much better. As I point
out in the notes in the first section, there are problems with Kant's universality criterion for a
priority (namely, that there probably are universal propositions that can be known a posteriori).
VI. The General Problem of Pure Reason:
It is clear from the examples that the synthetic a priori is an essential component of
mathematics and science, and is essential in the creation of any metaphysics which evolves
beyond mere dogma. As a result, a formal study of the principles of human reasoning, *critique
of pure reason*, is a pretty cool idea.
VII. What a Critique of Pure Reason is and Accomplishes:
A study of the principles by which we know things a priori. It is a critique because it studies the
sources and limits of rure reason, as oppossed to an organnon, which would list all of the a
priori principles (this would either be a very large or infinite list). In application to metaphysiccs,
science and math, it's limitation is only negative; it will only allow us to diagnose and avoid
errors. Either will make a non-dogmatic metaphysics possible or prove that none can exist.
The critique will have to explore and justify the very methods used to create it.
Vocabulary:
- A priori
A form of proof that doesn't rely on experience
- A posteriori
Proof that relies in part on experience
- A prirori knowledge
Knowledge which is justified independently of experience. Truths in geometry are a good
example.
- A posteriori knowledge
Knowledge justified at least partially by experience. That water and ice are the same substance
is a good example. Note, however, that the same proposition can be justifed either a priori or a
posteriori. This means that there can be both a priori and a posteriori knowledge of one
proposition, which in turn implies that knowledge of one fact isn't always the same knowledge
(though it is knowledge *of* the same fact).
- Empirical

- Induction

- Universality
Applies for everything.
- Neccesary
A neccesary proposition is true, and can't possibly be false; things which are neccesary must
be. A true proposition might not have to be that way, but it has to be possible for it to be true. A
proposition that is true in any possible arrangement of the world is neccesary.
- Strict universality
Applies for everything, and it is impossible for it not to.
- Unlimited universality
Applies for everythign, with no limitation of scope.
- Proposition
A statement that can be either true or false; "Atoms of hydrogen always have one proton" and
"Helium sometimes has 28 protons" are both propositions. Note that nobody has to believe
about the statement for it to be a proposition (unlike beliefs); "Atoms of hydrogen always have
one proton" would be a proposition even if humans never existed (even if this means english
never existed!).
- Knowledge
Justified, true belief. So the type of knowledge (a priori or a posterori) is determined by what
sort of justification we appeal to in justifying it.
- Analytic

- Synthetic

- Judgement

- Concept

- Inference

- Metaphysics
- Critique
A study of the sources and limits of something.
- Critique of Pure Reason
A study of the sources and limits of a priori knowledge
- Organon of Pure Reason
A listing of all of the principles of a priori knowledge
- Transcendental
Knowledge about the knowledge of objects; only the a priori parts of our knowledge of objects,
the things we use to justify and expand our understanding without appeal to objects.
- Sensibility
Faculties which enable us to perceive an object; they are what we use to experience.
- Understanding
Faculties which allow us to conceive of an object; they are what we use to think.