1
Lisa S. Martin, “An Institutionalist View: International Institutions and State Strategies” in T.V. Paul & John A. Hall, ed., International
Order and the Future of World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.78
institutions i.e. international regimes and international organizations, and these concepts are not to be
misunderstood as international institutions.
Regimes emphasize the normative and often informal nature of institutions. International
organizations are, on the other hand, formal structures that embody and sustain many international
institutions. Although some institutions persist without an organization attached to them, states find
that they work most efficiently in the form of international organizations.
These points are missing in Onuf’s passage. Although he works hard upon giving evidences to
show that institutions are neither natural nor designed, the writer believes it would be better if he
commences his assessment by providing basic, fundamental information about institutions.
Lisa sheds a light upon institutions in a realist view. Realist theories seek for the instrumental
role of institutions from the perspective of states. The interests of states are given, and it is analysts’
quest to answer how institutions can help states achieve their goals. This approach generally goes by
the label of “functionalist” theories of institutions. States as the central actors in world politics are
assumed rational, thus when they face problems like the Prisoners’ Dilemma, their behavior will give
rise to outcomes that leave all unhappy.
According to Keohane, institution may help states overcome collective action and market failure
dilemmas, which is, when states can maintain mutually beneficial agreements. Unfortunately, this
stage is not very easy to achieve, since—in realist theory—states act opportunistically and one is
unable to adequately watch over another. Institutions can handle this obstacle by providing information
about others’ preferences, intentions, behavior, as well as its standards. Unfortunately, other than
collaboration problems, states should also face distributional, coordination, or bargaining problems.
These problems are not seen in the view of liberal institutionalists in John Mearsheimer’s “The
False Promise of International Institution”. The article mentioned the Western institutionalists’ ‘belief’
that institution is always a key means in promoting world peace. Any institution that served a party
well in one particular time should also serve others with the same benefits. This view is later
challenged by Mearsheimer’s realist thoughts.2
Differs from Onuf’s philosophical and Lisa’s theoretical writings, Mearsheimer’s provides us
practical case studies. Since the Cold War is set to be his main stage, the examples he brings on are the
European Community (EC), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as well as the Western European Union (WEU). These institutions are
2
John Mearsheimer, “The False Promise in International Institutions” in International Security, Vol.19, No.3 (Winter, 1994-1994), from
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199424%2919%3A3%3C5%3ATFPOII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C, page.7
told to be the successful example of Western institutions. The continuous pattern of institutionalized
cooperation, Keohane said, will determine the avoiding of military conflict after the Cold War.
An interesting cohesiveness then emerges between Onuf, Lisa, and Mearsheimer’s assessment
upon the liberal institutionalism view.
Nicholas Onuf, still focusing on the answer of whether an institution is deliberate or natural,
argues that liberal institutionalism features both spontaneous and calculated institutional development.
Customary international law, movement to freer trade, and emergence of international finance are
instances for the former while codification of international law, the turn to arbitration, and a series of
multilateral conferences are those for the latter assumption.
Lisa, on the other hand, argues that the entire point of institutions is to embody norms and rules,
thus to induce more certainty and predictability in patterns of international interactions. In other words,
the main aim for the liberal institutionalist is to reduce uncertainty in the most effective way. In doing
this, there are two types of distribution that matter in an institution: among the members, and between
the members and non-members.3
In Mearsheimer’s argument, the main blunder caused by liberal institutionalism was their
assumption that the world is divided into realm of security and realm of politics & economy.
Institutions, they argue, is a solution to the latter but not to the former. When there is a ‘mixed interest’
between states, both sides should have equal incentives to either join the institutions or not. By
enhancing an economic cooperation, then the steps to avoid war can be started.4
The writer may then conclude that liberal institutionalism holds a much more optimistic view of human
nature and share the view that growing interdependence will strengthen the institutions of cooperation and open
up greater opportunities for developing mechanisms of world governance.5 As Onuf said, if liberal scholars in
IR are to have a better theory of institutions, then it must take common purpose into account. This means
accounting for organizations as institutions designed for specific purposes, whatever their unintended effects.
3
Lisa S. Martin, Op. Cit, page.78
4
John Mearsheimer, Op.Cit, page.9
5
Paul Wilkinson, International Relations: A Very Short Introduction, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), page.19