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The Core and Periphery of Emergency Management Networks: A Multi-Modal Assessment of Two Evacuation Hosting Networks from 2000-2009

Scott E. Robinson - Texas A&M University Warren S. Eller - University of North Carolina - Pembroke Melanie Gall - Louisiana State University Brian J. Gerber - University of Colorado - Denver

April 4, 2012

Please direct communication to srobinson@bushschool.tamu.edu

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Abstract

Emergency management is a field in which collaborative activities are inescapable. Emergency planning and response increasingly in- volve close interactions between a diverse array of actors across fields (emergency management,public health, law enforcement, etc.), sector (government, nonprofit,and for-profit), and level of government (local, state, and federal). The necessity of collaboration is built into the logic of escalation in the Stafford Act and the nature of emergency events as boundary spanning threats. While the necessity of collaboration is clear, the dynamics of this collaboration are less well understood. This article assesses the temporal dynamics of emergency manage- ment networks in two moderately sized communities that have served as large-scale disaster evacuation hosting sites in the past decade. The paper uses two strategies for tracking the evolution of these networks across time. First, we develop an network roster using newspaper and newswire data sources across a decade. Second, we develop a view of the evolution of the networks by analyzing emergency operations plans for each community. Analysis of data from these two strategies reveal a contrast be- tween a core set of consistent (mostly governmental) actors and a peripheral set of rapidly turning (mostly non-governmental) over ac- tors – though the account depends on the mode of data on which one focuses. The article concludes with a discussion of the advantage pre- sented by having a two-tier network for evacuation hosting that mixes core and periphery across multiple sectors.

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Introduction

Public administration and political science are currently focusing quite a bit of attention on issues related to political and administrative networks. The Public Administration Review devoted an entire special issue to the subject in 2005 and the American Political Science Association created a specialized organized section on the subject of political networks. While attention to collaborative public management and policy networks is high right now, this is by no means a new subject. The classic argument of the dominance of iron triangles or policy whirlpools is a network argument - albeit of a small network (Redford 1969). The counterargument that policy tends to involve broad and fluid participation in issue networks is also rather obviously a network construct (Heclo 1978). More recent integrations of the literature positing changing levels of participation over time and across policy areas suggest that these networks can evolve over time as characteristics of individual policy domains change (McCool 1998, Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith

1993).

While attention to issues of administrative and policy networks has been a component of the policy literature for decades, the dynamics of the networks across time has proven to be a difficult subject to study – especially in the area of emergency management. Given the inherently collaborative nature of emergency management networks, as we discuss below, understanding change in this domain is especially important. Due to extraordinary demands on data and the necessity of novel inferential techniques for data involving networks, very little work has engaged issues related to network change. This article represents an initial step toward assessing the evolution of emergency management networks across time - in this case over a decade involving two major events. The next section (Section 2)will discuss some of the existing literature on issues related to the incorporation of new actors into a policy network and the evolution of network characteristics over time. The result will be a series of propositions about the nature of emergency management network change – with particular attention to the differences in volatility between sectors (government, nonprofit, private). Section 3 will in- troduce two approaches to measuring membership 1 and relationships within

1 Here membership only means co-participation in a community effort. It does not imply formal membership of acknowledgment. Given our interest in organizations that may act in the periphery of the network, a restriction to formal or self-acknowledged membership would exclude potentially interesting actors.

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policy networks. Sections 4 and 5 report on the roster of emergency man- agement networks in two communities for each of the two measurements

strategies discussed in 3. Finally, Sections 6 and 7 discuss the implications

of these results for the management of evacuation networks and the admin-

istrative / policy networks generally. Section 8 concludes with a summary and discussion potential avenues for future research.

2 The Evolution of Emergency Management Networks

A central question of research into policy and administrative networks is the

scope and fluidity of participation. The key characteristic of policy subsystem

approaches to networks was the emphasis on closed and limited participation

by predictable actors (e.g. congressional subcommittees, interest groups, and agencies). The principal critique of the argument was that participation in actual policy domains tends to be much more broad and fluid. It was argued that a large variety of actors may participate within any policy network including those envisioned by subsystem theories as well as representatives

of other levels of government and even public interest groups. Furthermore,

the participation level of various actors is thought to change over time with some actors dropping out of active participation while new actors emerge at different time. An issue network represents an extreme version of this open and fluid network (Heclo 1978). A key question, then, is the scope and fluidity of participation in actual policy networks. The next subsection will discuss the issue of participation in emergency management networks specifically. Following that discussion, we present specific propositions from the literature regarding the evolution of emergency management networks.

2.1 Networks and Emergency Management

Over the past two decades, the importance of collaborative networks has be- come clear to scholars specializing in emergency management(Comfort 2006, Kapucu 2009). Emergency management represents a classic wicked problem (O’Toole Jr 1997). Emergencies tend to cross jurisdictional boundaries due to the geographic scope and the broad range of consequences they present. For example, Hurricane Katrina devastated communities across multiple states and mobilizing reactions from a variety of government agencies (emergency

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management, law enforcement, transportation, public health, housing and welfare, etc.) and nongovernmental agencies (the American Red Cross, Wal- mart, local religious institutions, etc.) (Simo & Bies 2007). Among the most prominent voices for research into collaboration and networking activities in emergency management has been Louise Comfort. Comfort has argued that emergency management networks are best under- stood as self-organizing systems (Comfort 1994). The emphasis in her ac- count is fluidity of participation and the inability to predict mobilizations ex ante. Rather than following documented plans or stable expectations, mo- bilization tend to involve an unpredictable set of actors that vary greatly in terms of prior disaster experience, organizational sector, and other charac- teristics. This can be seen as a radical extension of Heclo’s characterization of policy issue networks as involving fluid participation. Concluding that mobilization is unpredictable is unsatisfying in a number of ways. First, it suggests that efforts to plan mobilizations are doomed to failure. If one can not predict who will be involved - at least in terms of some core players - then one can not know whom to involve in emergency planning. Second, to the extent that exercises and other simulations are key preparatory (and possibly even evaluative) elements of emergency management, if one can not predict who will mobilize following an emergency event then one will not know who to include in an exercise. The limited composition of exercises preceding Hurricane Katrina has been identified as a key cause of the eventual problems in evacuating residents of New Orleans with limited access to transportation (Kiefer & Montjoy 2006). Some level of stability is essential for the inclusion of actors in pre-event exercises (Kapucu 2008). However, the difficulty in predicting which organizations will mobilize in an emergency may have been overstated. In a study of the mobilization of evacuation hosting activities in the Dallas/Fort Worth, TX area follow- ing Hurricane Katrina, Robinson, Berrett & Stone (2006) found that the mobilization of many organizations was predictable given a series of prior relationships. Relationships that sometimes had little to do with emergency management and evacuation hosting activities served as a basis for the emer- gence of a series of response networks. While there was also evidence of spontaneous mobilization of organization with no prior membership in emer- gency management networks, a good part of the network - particularly the network leadership - involved prior relationships that could easily escape the attention of emergency management scholars. The case studies collected in this article provided some hope that relationships can be managed and that

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mobilizations can be predicted (within some bounds). The complexity of the mobilization and management process of emer- gency management networks has raised important questions about the man- agement and leadership of these networks. Waugh & Streib (2006) argued that coordination is difficult within emergency management networks despite recent attempts to provide structure to the networks through such devices as the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the Integrated Command System (ICS). The difficulties in leadership are accentuated given the diversity of these networks. Recent studies of emergency management from Florida and Louisiana have served to illustrate the scope of this com- plexity – including diversity across private, public, and nonprofit sectors (Kapucu 2006, Kapucu 2007, Kapucu, Augustin & Garayev 2009) Actors from diverse sectors and policy areas bring with them a variety of assump- tions about the nature of emergencies and appropriate forms of coordination and communication(Comfort 2007).

2.2 Propositions for Network Evolution

Given the importance of network collaboration to issues of emergency man- agement, research into the development and evolution of these networks is essential to the improvement of management of emergency preparedness and response networks. This places our research in the tradition of “whole net- work” analysis (Provan, Fish & Sydow 2007). The topic of interest is the character of the entire network rather than the actions of specific individu- als (or pairs/dyads) within it. While there is valuable research at the dyadic level – investigating issues like the relationship between network membership and performance (Meier & O’Toole 2001) – we seek to investigate questions at the level of the network itself. This article will focus on expectations surrounding the key characteris- tics that distinguish subsystem models from issue network models of policy networks: volatility in network participation (Heclo 1978). Volatility can take on a number of meanings. In its simplest form, volatility can involve the change in the size of a network (that is, the number of members it has). Assessing the aggregate size of networks would yield literature information, though. If one only knew network size, one could not tell whether a constant size was the result of the lack of change or additions and subtractions of members that offset. For this reason, we are interested in volatility as mea- sured by the number actors at time (t) that are not present in the network

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at time (t + 1). Given the strength of prior research suggesting that there is volatility in emergency management networks, we start with the proposition that:

Proposition 1 Emergency management network membership will experi- ence significant change from t to t + 1.

This proposition contrasts with the expectations of iron triangle theories that suggest that policy systems involve only a small number of unchanging participants. In its strongest form, it could suggest essential unpredictabil- ity of network members – along the lines of Comfort’s arguments regarding spontaneous or emergent networks. However, the size of a network may be less important than the resources and knowledge contained within that network. As a result, involving different organizations may not be as important as increasing representation from di- verse types of organizations. Diversity within a network engages a key trade- off in network studies between brokerage and closure (Burt 2005). Linkages between a particular clique and the rest of the network (like an emergency management network embedded within its broader political community) pro- vide informational advantages to members of the network. Connections to local law enforcement, for example, could provide support during emergency situations. Similarly, a connection to a local nonprofit food kitchen may pro- vide an important resource during an emergency event. These are advantages to brokerage – connections across cliques or clusters of organizations. There are advantages also in having a tightly knit group. A tightly knit group expands the opportunities for repeated interaction and trust building. Having the members of a network consistent participants in, say, emergency exercises provides for community building within the emergency management clique. In Burt’s terms, these are advantages to closure (Burt 2005). The art of effective building of collaborative groups is to balance the advantages of broad brokerage with the advantages of focused closure. We will focus on representation of policy sectors (e.g. emergency man- agement, law enforcement, education, public health, etc.) and nonprofit / private sector organizations (Kapucu 2007). A network will experience bro- kerage to the extent it represents a broad range of policy issues sectors and organizational sectors. A network will experience closure to the extent that the network experiences stability in membership.

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We propose that these two strategies are not entirely inconsistent. Net- works can develop a core of stable actors supplemented by a brokered ex- tended group of actors whose presence in the network is transient. In an ap- proach similar to the hierarchal networks advocated by Moynihan Moynihan (2008), emergency management networks may experience closure among its core while taking advantage of access to resources present within a transient periphery of organizations where members change based on the particular nature of the event. The question remains as to why members are in the core or the periph- ery. Traditionally, emergency management research has focused almost ex- clusively on the role of government organizations. Given the central role given to governmental organizations 2 , we anticipate that the stable core of the networks will be dominated by government organizations with private and nonprofit organizations most often found in the periphery. The result are two more specific propositions.

Proposition 2 There will be an identifiable core of government organiza- tions in emergency management networks.

Proposition 3 There will be an identifiable periphery of non-governmental organizations in emergency management networks.

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Data

Disaster evacuations offer an opportunity to understand these networks be- cause they typically represent community-scale and often inter-jurisdictional activations of collaborative management effort. In each of the communities we studied, evacuation activities lasted past the basic planning assumption of 48-72 hours of hosting. These activities then illustrate to whom (if anyone) emergency managers turn when forced to support activities beyond routines. Evacuation hosting is also an activity that can call upon diverse support from the community. The activities needed to support evacuation hosting are built into the host communities themselves – ranging from nutrition and feeding to entertainment to basic retail sales. In a test of the variability of government and nongovernmental actors within emergency management

2 But see Robinson (2007) and Kapucu (2007).

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networks, this specific activity that engages a wide variety of actors is an appropriate starting point. Disaster evacuation represent one type of disaster response activity – rather than the totality of disaster response. Evacuation hosting provides a useful domain of investigation in that it has historically existed at the inter- section of nonprofit and government organizational activities. This specific domain of disaster response allowed us to focus attention on practical ac- tivities within a narrowly defined domain, analyze a specific set of relevant planning documents (core and mass care plans), while providing a measure of comparability across the communities under study. Testing these propositions requires data with a particular set of character- istics. The dataset must record participation within emergency management networks. Furthermore, the observations must be ordered so that a time path is clear. Ideally, the time path should record participation over a number of years – preferably at least a decade (Sabatier 1993). Hypothetically, one could conduct interviews or surveys annually over a decade but such efforts are incredibly expensive and, predictably, rare. The twin needs of compara- ble measurement and available data across time are best (or at least, most feasibly) served by documentary analysis. This paper will focus on two types of documentary sources: media reports of evacuation related activity and formal emergency operations plans related to evacuation. To collect these data, we located six comparable communities. We were interested in evacuation hosting activities so we identified communities that had recent (within the last decade) experiences with evacuation hosting activ- ities. These communities need to be similar in terms of population size. For this reason we chose moderately sized communities rather than the largest cities where the variances in size are large in absolute terms. The six commu- nities have populations between 200,000 and 1 million residents (when not hosting evacuees) and include four communities from Gulf Coast states and two from non-Gulf Coast states. In the interest of space, this paper will focus on two Gulf Coast communities: Brazos County, Texas and Caddo/Bossier Parishes, Louisiana.

3.1 Media Reported Networks

For our first data source, we have elected to use newspaper searches to gen- erate a database of media documents. Our goal was to create a single system for collecting journalistic coverage of emergency management networks that

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could be used for a variety of communities across time. For purposes of this study, we are focusing attention on evacuation related activities (within the entire realm of emergency management). We elected to search within the Westlaw database using the substantive search term evac!. This will cap- ture all words that begin with the letters evac including evacuation, evacuate, evacuee, and the like. The Westlaw database allowed us to search all newspa- pers and news wires - to ensure we captured local as well as national media sources. We added geographic limiters to the substantive search term in- cluding the major cities and the county in which the community resides. For example, we looked for articles that included a term starting with evac and also included either College Station, Bryan, or Brazos County. Given the varying roles that county and city official play in emergency management, we felt it was essential to search based on city and county. This paper re- ports the results of document searches related to Brazos County, TX (which includes the cities of College Station and Bryan – about 1.5 hours north- west of Houston) and Caddo and Bossier Parishes, LA (including the city of Shreveport). The use of media reports to reconstruct networks was inspired by Comfort’s (2006) study of response networks to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. These searches of the Westlaw database resulted in hundreds of hits for each year of our sample (2000-2009). For the purpose of this analysis, we aggregated the media reports into two periods: 2000-2005 (up to and in- cluding Hurricane Katrina) and 2006-2009 (post-Hurricane Katrina through Hurricanes Gustav and Ike). Each of these articles were then read individ- ually to ensure that the article was germane to issues of evacuation. This eliminated many articles. Some articles included references to entertainment or sporting events in the target community (such as Texas A&M University sports teams) and coverage of something having to do with an evacuation in a different community. We only selected articles that involved an evacuation or evacuation hosting activity within the target community. We then read each of the selected articles to identify all organizations mentioned.

3.2 Plan Based Networks

To complement the media reports, we have also collected formal emergency operations plans from each of these communities. The emergency operations plan serves as a primary coordinating documents for a variety of actors in emergency management within each community. The document lays out the

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structure of authority and responsibility as well as providing an assessment of locally prominent hazards and specific annex documents for a variety of detailed functions. We have coded each formal emergency operation plan to create a roster of formally included members of the emergency management network within each community. While the media reported network is a permissive sample that includes a wide variety of actors, the formal plans tend to have much smaller rosters and focus on organizational with legally defined responsibili- ties within emergency management. Where possible, we have collected his- torical plans as well as the currently operations emergency operations plan. Interestingly, few of the emergency management offices within our communi- ties kept historical plans. When a new plan was formally approved, the old one were often discarded without a copy being kept in the office. Where we have found historical plans, it has been through the use of the web archive service “The Wayback Machine” at web.archive.org. The collection of these two sources of data is not novel (e.g. Comfort, Oh & Ertan 2009). However, many studies aggregate the two data sources to create an inclusive list (cf. Kapucu & Demiroz 2011). We will maintain the separation of the data sources to better contrast their strengths and weaknesses 3 .

4 Brazos County, TX Results

Brazos County lies approximately 1.5 hours (by car) Northwest of the Hous- ton metroplex and has been involved in two major evacuation efforts: one in 2005 (including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita) and one in 2008 (including Hurricane Ike). Additionally, there was a notable local evacuation in 2009 stemming from a release from a chemical plant. This local evacuation was limited in duration but resulted in an evacuation order for most of the city

3 Even with the combination of these two sources, measurement error is possible. The media and plan roles were confirmed individually through the context of each document to ensure that actors had a specific role in emergency management. This process is not infallible, though. It is possible that an actor has escaped coverage by the media or inclusion in the plans. The justification for combining modes of measurement is to address this measurement error through the adoption of contrasting methods where the likely sources of error also contrast. The combination of the methods, then, should provide a strong basis for inference – if, still, not perfect. Any roster method (surveys, interviews, field research, etc.) encounters the same issue.

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of Bryan.

4.1 Media Reported Networks

The media reported networks for Brazos County are diverse and extensive – with the active involvement of units of the Texas A&M System. We will look at each of these rosters in turn. For each roster, the members in red uniquely appear in that particular time period. Actors who persist across both time periods are in bold. For example, the EPA was mentioned in media accounts of evacuation efforts in Brazos County in the 2000-2005 but not in the later window. By comparing the organizations listed in bold to those listed in red, you can see the types of organizations that persist through the period and those that do not.

4.1.1 2000-2005

The media reported network roster for 2000-2005 is reported in Figures 1 and 2. Here, as in the later rosters, the members appearing only on the current list are in a red font while members appearing on the roster for each time period are in bold.

[[Insert Figures 1 and 2 About Here]]

The diversity of policy domains and organization types is remarkable. Within the government organization roster, public health, transportation, environmental quality, and housing oriented organizations are all part of the media-reported networks. Among the actors who persist in the network, there are many educational and health care organizations (e.g. Texas A&M University and the Texas A&M School of Rural Public Health) along with transportation (e.g. Texas Department of Transportation (DOT)) and tradi- tional emergency management organizations (e.g. FEMA). Among the actors who do not persist, there is a wider array of policy areas including law en- forcement (e.g. FBI and the Department of Justice), environmental (e.g. Texas Natural Resources Conservation Committee and the EPA), and hous- ing (e.g. HUD), among other policy areas. This roster represents a broad range of participants with significant change over time – in support of propo- sition 1. While there is a set of actors present in both time period (which represent candidates for core actors in the network), there is a great deal of

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change across time – even among government actors, challenging proposition

2.

The roster of non-governmental organization experiences even more change over time. While there is a diverse set of nongovernmental actors, all but one of these actors is missing on the later roster. While there was significant turnover among governmental organizations, there was almost total turnover among the non-governmental organizations with the notable exception of the American Red Cross. The difference in the turnover rate between government and nongovernmental actors supports proposition 3. It is also interesting that emergency management organizations, while present, are not particularly prominent on the list. Curiously missing are the county and city emergency management organizations. State and federal emergency management organizations are present, but not the local offices. It is hasty to conclude from this exclusion that the county and city emergency management offices were not active and important. However, their operations were missing from media accounts of the activities.

4.1.2 2006-2009

The second time period covers the post-Katrina/Rita period that included another major hurricane evacuation (related to Hurricane Ike in the East Texas area) and a local evacuation related to a chemical release (at the El Dorado Chemical Plant). The media reported network roster is presented in Figures 3 and 4.

[[Insert Figures 3 and 4 About Here]]

In the government organization roster, university units are again promi- nent and persistent along with a handful of other organizations. In this later period, local fire and emergency management organizations make it into the media reported network. The diversity of policy domains is still remarkable - though, often, the specific representatives changes. For example, the EPA drops out during this time period but the TCEQ (the state equivalent to the EPA) enters. This raises an interesting question for studies of policy networks. How important is persistence of specific organizations within a network to ensure that a specific perspective (like, say, the importance of environmental issues) to be present within that network? The specific members of the non-governmental organization roster changed considerably in this period. We already saw that only one non-governmental

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actor is on both rosters. The new non-governmental actors include a number of private sector companies specific to the context of the chemical release event – mirroring Comfort’s argument for spontaneous networks. The ag- gregation of the media networks to 5-6 year increments masks a great deal of annual variation. Within this time period, the number of organizations varied from 3 (in 2000) to dozens (in 2005 and 2008). This represents clear volatility in network size on an annual basis. In reference to our propositions, the media reported networks provide evidence for volatility in network size and diversity. In the media reported networks, various sectors and policy fields are consistently represented but by different organizations.

4.2 Plan Based Networks

We also collected rosters for the emergency management and mass care / sheltering from official emergency plans. This data source, while also docu- mentary, provides a quite different view of the relevant policy networks. The emergency plans include those who are formally responsible for emergency management and a variety of tasks related to evacuee sheltering. For each plan, we identified all of the actors named as responsible parties in the gen- eral emergency management network within the core emergency operations plan. For the Brazos County community, we were able to locate two general (core) emergency operations plans that covered the sample time period. The first plan is from 2004 while the second was approved in 2009. These plans provide a pre-Katrina view and an update following the lessons of the various hurricanes. As in the media reported networks, we have highlighted elements in red that are unique to that plan (that is, not present in the other plan).

4.2.1 2004

Figures 5 and 6 presents the network roster from the perspective of the emergency plan.

[[Insert Figures 5 and 6 About Here]]

The emergency operations plans provide a starkly different view of the local emergency management networks. Most obviously, the roster of the net- work is much shorter than the media reported network rosters. The rosters

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are focused almost entirely on governmental organizations (with the notable exception of the Red Cross) and the actors are largely persistent across the plans. This view of the emergency management network supports proposi- tions 2 and 3.

4.2.2 2009

The roster looks largely similar in the more recent emergency plans – as represented in Figures 7 and 8.

[[Insert Figures 7 and 8 About Here]]

Here again the roster is stable and focused almost exclusively on govern- mental organizations. From the perspective of the emergency operations plans, the network includes little volatility over time. There was some consolidation between the two time periods, but most of the actors involved through the decade were in both plans. The actors stay largely the same – contradicting 1. A few actors drop out (e.g. Radiological Officer) and a couple of actors emerge (notably, the Salvation Army). A diversity of policy domains are represented but the range is not as large or the membership as diverse as in the media reported networks. There is some turnover (in support of proposition 1) but not as much as seen in the media data – particularly among the non- governmental actors. Instead there seems to be a core of persistent actors within the plan consisting of government (notably, emergency management organizations) with the persistent addition of the American Red Cross and utility companies. If one had looked at only this data source, one could reach a different conclusion regarding our propositions related to network evolution – certainly about the strength of proposition 2 and little support for proposition 3.

5 Caddo-Bossier Parishes, LA Results

The second community in our study is Caddo-Bossier Parishes in Northwest Louisiana. These twin parishes include Shreveport and were a major evacu- ation site during Hurricane Katrina (and for months afterward). The key is to compare the networks for these two communities.

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5.1 Media Reported Networks

Caddo and Bossier Parishes experienced a tremendous influx of evacuees – including tens of thousands of residents for their shelters. These parishes are located far enough away from the coast to miss most of the extreme elements of incoming hurricanes. It is a natural location for intra-state evacuee hosting for Louisiana.

5.1.1 2000-2005

Figures 9 and 10 present the rosters of the media reported network for Caddo- Bossier Parishes from 2000-2005.

[[Insert Figure 9 and 10 About Here]]

As in the case of Brazos County, there is tremendous instability in the participants in the media reported network. In the government organiza- tion roster, the persistent components include local fire and law enforcement organizations along with state and federal emergency management organiza- tions. About half of the governmental actors are persistent. This represents evidence for proposition 1 and mixed evidence regarding proposition 2. Some nongovernmental are persistent while most organizations intermit- tent participants from nonprofit and religious organizations. The American Red Cross is again a persistent actor. This is not a surprise given its role in sheltering activities in most communities. However, it is one of a small num- ber of persistent non-governmental organizations. Here we see more support for proposition 3. As to policy domain representation, we see a similar array in this commu- nity as in the last. Transportation and health care organizations are present and persistent. There are other policy areas present (e.g. nutrition support, parks and recreation, and agriculture) but in a more intermittent way.

5.1.2 2006-2009

Figures 11 and 12 presents the media reported network for Caddo-Bossier Parishes from 2006-2009.

[[Insert Figures 11 and 12 About Here]]

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As in the previous community, there is diversity in terms of policy domain and organization sector. Some of the instability is an artifact of name changes through the period (the state shifted to the title “Office for Homeland Secu- rity and Emergency Preparedness”). However, representation by local and state emergency preparedness offices seems light compared to what one might expect. Propositions 1 and 3 find strong evidence in the media-reported net- works for the Caddo-Bossier Parishes. There is inconclusive evidence related to proposition 2.

5.2 Plan Based Network

Again we will contrast the media reported network with the official emergency plan for the jurisdiction. In the case of the Caddo-Bossier Parishes, we were not able to collect a historical plan. We only have access to the current plan from 2009. In seeking older versions of the plan, we were assured that the previous versions of the plan operative from 2000 were largely the same as the current plan. When we explained that we were most interested in the actors present and the relationships between actors within the plan, one representative of the emergency management office said that there would be very few changes. Given the few changes in the Brazos County plans discussed previously, this seems credible though we were unable to confirm it with an old version of the document. For this reason, the color comparisons change for the Caddo-Bossier plan rosters. Here bold indicates a match between the rosters of Caddo-Bossier and the persistent actors in Brazos County. Red indicates an actor present only in the Caddo-Bossier plan – and not in the Brazos County plan.

5.2.1 2009

Figures 13 and 14 presents the roster for the Caddo-Bossier Parishes emer- gency plan.

[[Insert Figures 13 and 14 About Here]]

The place rosters for this community is larger than the plan-based roster for Brazos County and includes a broader range of organizations. This plan includes a broader range of government actors (including code enforcement and agriculture extension offices). Even with this diversity, though, the diver- sity of the plan network is still quite limited compared to the media-reported

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networks. We can not directly evaluate the propositions in the absence of a formal plan from the earlier time period. However, given the similarities be- tween the Caddo-Bossier plan and the Brazos County plan, we are confident that the plans experienced similar changes over time. The Caddo-Bossier plan represents the plan after the dramatic evacuation hosting events asso- ciated with Hurricane Katrina. It still represents only a small number of sectors and policy domains. Again, the conclusion one would draw in relation to our network evolution propositions would be quite different if you looked only at the formal plan. From the perspective of the formal plans, there is little evidence of variability or diversity. A small number of closely nit actors dominate the network from the perspective of the formal plan. In this regard, the network looks more like a narrow policy subsystem than a broad and volatile issue network. The government actors are similar to those in the persistent core in the Brazos County plans but the few nongovernmental actors are also the persistent actors in the Brazos County plan. The transient actors seen in the media data are absent from the plan-based data. Based on the Caddo-Bossier plan, we have support for proposition 2 but mixed evidence for proposition 3. We are unable to directly assess proposition 1 given the absence of an earlier plan.

6 Lessons for Evacuation Hosting and Emer- gency Management

These data confirm that evacuation hosting is a complex and evolving enter- prise. The media networks identify a larger and ever changing networks of participants representing a broad range of policy domains and sectors. The formal plans do not indicate the same level of diversity. There is not con- vergence on a single image of the respective networks. Instead, the different data sources tell somewhat different stories. One could look at the data in an effort to declare one method more reliable or otherwise better than the other. A pessimistic reading of the discrepancy between the results, for example, is that the plans are ignorant of, or unrelated to, the volume and nature of activities within the community. We are not convinced that this is the case. Instead, we see the plans as serving a quite specific service. The plans provide for a framework of formal

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responsibilities. They do not prevent the emergence of new participants. The media reports are consistent with this interpretations. The limited networks represented in the formal plans coexisted with large and diverse networks within the community. What is not clear is whether the plans would be better off with a more inclusive vision of their communities. Including a broad range of actors runs the risk of diluting and confusing the core plan with references to participants who may come and go over time. The broadly inclusive media networks also included a great deal of volatility with partners dropping out in the sec- ond time period. Some of the actors who dropped out may have stayed if included in the core plan; but some may have dropped out anyway leaving vestigial references to clot up the formal plan. The inclusion of the brokerage components of the periphery directly completes with the closure of the core network. While further research is needed on the balance of inclusiveness and focus in formal plans, we encourage great care in creating formalized rela- tionships between non-traditional actors within the core emergency plan. It may be ideal to balance the vision advantage of brokerage with the reliability advantage of closure by bifurcating the network into core actors (identified within the formal plans) and peripheral actors (identified within the media coverage – but absent from the formal plans). The results may be a hierar- chical network (Moynihan 2008). Engagement of non-traditional actors can work without including those actors in the formal plans themselves. One theme that emerges clearly from the data is that evacuation hosting is a community event that calls upon the resources of a broad range of actors. Emergency management professionals (including the consistent participants like the American Red Cross) do not manage this process by themselves. Communities, not just agencies, host evacuees. Whether the formal plans include the broad range of actors engaged in evacuation hosting activities, emergency management professionals must be aware of the range of organi- zations that one may potentially recruit to assist in hosting activities.

7 Lessons for Network Dynamics

The lessons for network dynamics, more generally, depend entirely on which approach to network measurement one prefers. The formal plans provide an image of the networks as limited in scope and stable over time. The small number of participants in these networks tend to stay in the network.

17

The network provides little evidence of permeability to changes – even in what may be seen as a remarkable challenge to the network. These were networks that operated below the radar of public media attention. Despite the high salience, there is little evidence of change in the participants as viewed through the formal plans. The media reported networks tell quite a different story. Within these two communities, we see dynamic networks that change size and membership. Each network includes participants from diverse policy domains and sectors. This view suggests participation by the broad civil society in issues of evac- uation hosting. Religious organizations provide a broad range of services as well as serving as evacuee hosts. Similarly, private sector organizations are involved in services ranging from providing supplies and meals (sometimes at a remarkable discount). Government organizations from a broad range of policy domain, including – most obviously, public health and transportation; but also social services, education, and environmental quality. This equivocation within the data do not help to resolve the fundamental question related to policy networks. Whether networks are diverse (as issue networks) or limited (as iron triangles) depends to a great extent on the data one uses to view the network. The formal plans provide an image of limited participation that is larger than the most strict iron triangle models, but still limited largely to a steady group of government organizations. Our conclusion is that neither data source is accurate – and both are accurate. Each data source views the networks in different ways and from different perspectives. The formal plans focus on participants with specific legal authority and responsibility. This is a narrow range of participation – but an important one. The number of actors with legal authority and respon- sibilities related specifically to emergency management activities is small and there is little variation in this network. At the same time, there is a larger networks of actors without specific authority and responsibilities who may (or may not) participate in evacuation hosting. These informal participants are important but they play a different role. The informal actors are more likely to disappear from the network (or appear only in the later time pe- riod). They are the component of the network that is volatile and diverse. The data suggest that we need to move away from looking for a single net- work – even within a single policy areas. Policy networks involve overlapping memberships in various networks including core and periphery actors, those with and those without formal authority, and those whose presence is con- sistent and those who are not. Narrow and broad versions are both correct

18

images of networks; though of different networks within a policy area. In the end, the networks are both diverse and homogeneous – both steady and volatile. There is an inner-core of actors whose membership is steady over time. Interestingly, this group operates largely beneath the notice of the media. There is an outer-periphery of actors who enter and leave the network quickly, represent a broad range of interests, and draw the attention of the media. This combination may prove to be a strength of emergency management networks. This may create the potential for both reliable op- erations from a formalized core and rapid reorganization of the supporting informal ring (Moynihan 2008). From the standpoint of the measurement of networks, this leaves an im- portant question. The pooling of these two methods of actor identification presume that they contribute to a vision of a single network. It may be more telling to avoid such pooling and instead talk about the subnetworks sepa- rately. This is especially the case with the nongovernmental actors and the media networks. In volume, the media network members outnumber those actors only present in the formal plans. If one pooled the rosters and then performed statistical tests or summaries on the aggregate pool, the dynamics of the media pool would drive the results. Separate analysis of the formal rosters might be appropriate if one’s theoretical interest involved the core set of actors. Based on the lack of a convergent image of the networks in this study, we recommend choosing a pooling strategy carefully depending on the theoretical interest of one’s own study.

8

Conclusion

Network analysis is an emerging and potentially powerful perspective for the study of policy implementation generally and emergency management networks specifically. The results of studies of two emergency and shelter management networks here provide some insight into the dynamics of these networks over time – but raise substantial questions about the nature of data collection for network analysis. Two different methods of data collection provide contrasting portraits of the emergency and shelter management networks. The media reported net- works provide a vision of a broad issue network including an ever-changing roster representative of various policy domains and organizational sectors. The plan-based networks are much smaller and focus almost exclusively on

19

government partners and a handful of longstanding nonprofit partners. The resulting image of the networks is of an inner-core of players surrounded by a volatile periphery of actors. This raises important questions for the study of emergency management networks. Is the division of actors into such tiers efficient? Does it effectively focus attention on the most important actors without distractingly cluttering the formal plan? Does the informal role played by so many actors create a disincentive for those actors to continue to participate or to contribute as much as they could to the hosting effort? How many domains within emergency management or in other policy ar- eas deliberately create and formalized such core and periphery distinctions? There is clearly a great deal still to learn about the structure and dynamics of emergency management networks.

20

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23

9 Appendix: Figures

Figure 1: Brazos County 2000-2005 Media Report Government Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

Army

TAMU

AF

School

TX

Agg.

Camp

TX

Serv

Eng

Instr.

Youth

Ext

FEMA

TAM HRRC

TX DOT

TAM SRPH

EPA

TX

Nat.

Res.

Cons. Comm.

TX Department of Health

TX General Land

FBI

TX DPS

Office

Parks

Texas

and

Wildlife

Nat.

Coun.

on

Rad. Prot.

TTI

Em. Prep. Inst.

Coop.

Appl.

DHS

DoJ

TAMU

Inst.

for

Mtrlgcl Stud.

Offshore

Tech.

Ntnl Svr Strm Lab

Ntnl Wthr Srvc

Bryan

School

Tulane

sity

High

Univer-

Real Estate Cen- ter at TAMU

TAM

Cntr

SBA

HUD

UNO

Hlth

Sci

Aggie Guide Dogs and Service Dogs

 

Research Center

Board

TX

of

NOAA

Health

 

National

TX

Ntnl Hur Cntr

Guard

TAM Galveston

Figure 2: Brazos County 2000-2005 Media Report Non-governmental Mem- bership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

Lake

Jackson

Civic Center

American

Red

Cross

Exxon

Mobil’s

Fire School

Mthdst

Lakeview

Cnf Cntr

La Quinta

S. TX Cncl – Boy Scouts

for

Habitat

Hu-

manity

Texas City Prairie Preserve

Chroni-

Houston

cle

Southeastern

Li-

brary Network

TX

Oil

and Gas

Association

TX Tank Carriers Association

TX Petro. Mar- keters and Con- ven. Stores

Exxon Mobil

Association

of

Former Students

Figure 3: Brazos County 2006-2009 Media Report Government Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

TX Engineering

TAMU

Extension

Ser-

vice

National Hurri- cane Center

Univer-

Tulane

sity

TAMU

ston

Galve-

Center for Retail- ing Studies

Station

College

Fire Department

University

Department

Health and

Safety Depart- ment

Police

Env.

Community

EOC

Hazard Reduc- tion and Recov- ery Center

TAM HSC Of- fice of HS

TAM

for

Homeland Secu- rity

Center

Texas

Home-

land Security

FEMA

TX DOT

TTI

National

TX

Guard

National

TAM HSC

US Public Health

Services

Teaching,

Learn-

ing,

and

Cul-

ture

Department

- TAMU

County

Brazos

Council

of

Gov-

ernment

Texas Task Force

1

Bryan

Fire

De-

partment

Roberston County

EMS

Bryan Police De-

partment

TAMU

Physical

Weather

Ser-

Plant

vice

TCEQ

Figure 4: Brazos County 2006-2009 Media Report Non-governmental Mem- bership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

Atmos Energy

American

Cross

Red

A&M

United

Methodist Church

CS Medical Cen- ter

Valley

Brazos

Physician’s Orga-

nization

Carter Blood Care

Plaza Hotel

Christ

United

Methodist Church

Blood

Center

of

Brazos Valley

Cen-

BCS Conv.

ter

County

Brazos

Food Bank

Texas

Hotel

and

Texas

Public

Power Association

Bryan HEB

CS Wal-Mart

El Dorado Chemi- cal Company

Grace

Church

Bible

St.

Joseph Reg.

Lodging

Associa-

Bryan Police De-

Health Center

tion

partment

Figure 5:

Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

Brazos County 2004 Emergency Operations Plan Government

County Judge/CM

Asst. County Judge/CM

EMC

Law Enforcement

Fire Services

Public Works

Health Services

Human Resources

Community Development

Human Services

Tax Assessors

Transportation/ISD

City/County Attorney

Radiological Officer

Public Information Officer

Parks and Recreation

Treasurer

Justice of the Peace

Figure 6: Brazos County 2004 Emergency Operations Plan Non- governmental Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent el- ements are in bold.

Utilities

Red Cross

Figure 7: Brazos County 2009 Emergency Operations Plan Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

County Judge/CM

Asst. County Judge/CM

EMC

Law Enforcement

Fire Services

Public Works

Health Services

Human Resources

Community Development

Human Services

Tax Assessors

Transportation/ISD

City/County Attorney

Search and Rescue

Figure 8: Brazos County 2009 Emergency Operations Plan Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

Salvation Army

Utilities

Red Cross

Figure 9:

Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

Caddo-Bossier Parishes 2000-2005 Media Report Governmental

S Police Dept.

C Sheriff Dept.

National Guard

DHHS

LA DOT

FEMA

US PH Service

S Fire Dept.

NWS

Dept VA

LSU

LA Rec. Auth.

FBI

LSU Hospital

LSU HSC

LA DHH

US Army

LA Dept of PH

US Coast Guard

US

Nat.

Cntr.

Hurr.

VA Hospital

Sthn. University

Calcasieu

OHSEP

Parish

England AFB

LA Dept. of Ag.

Barksdale AFB

US Forest Service

 

LA

Wild.

and

US DHS

Fish.

LA Do Labor

Figure 10: Caddo-Bossier Parishes 2000-2005 Media Report Non- governmental Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent el- ements are in bold.

American

Red

Cross

St. Mary Place

LA

HS

Athl.

Ass.

NO Bus. Council

Shreve Human So- ciety

LA

Rec.

Dis.

Found.

Hab. for Human.

S-B

Com.

Re-

newal

LA IA Found.

Fuller Center

LA Oo Tourism

LA

soc.

Hospital

As-

Goodwill

ORU

St.

Ch.

Luke’s Meth.

Unity in Prayer

Boffier Civic Cen- ter

Fam. Rec. Corps

US Humane Soc.

Hibernia Corp.

NPR

S Expo Hall

Hirsch

Mem.

Col.

Salvation Army

Grace

United

Meth. Ch.

Natnl.

Low Inc.

Hous. Coal.

Prof. CLN Assoc.

Indep. Stadium

Cham. of Comm.

NAACP

SW

Assoc.

of

Epis. Sch.

S Fabricators

Food Bank of S

 

Brammer

Engi-

Coca-Cola

neering

S Charity Hospital

Figure 11:

Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

Caddo-Bossier Parishes 2006-2009 Media Report Government

Shreveport Po- lice

FEMA

LSU

LA

Poison

Con-

trol Center

Texas

Southern

University

LA Education De-

LA Recovery

LSU Health Sci- ence Center

LA Tech

LA Dept. of Envi- ronmental Quality

LA Public Service Commission

LA GOHSEP

partment

LA DHH

Caddo

Parish

Sheriff

Depart-

ment

LSU

LSU Hospital

Desoto

Parish

Sheriff

Depart-

ment

Southwood

High

School

LA

National

Guard

LA DOT

Shreveport Fire

Department

Department of So-

cial Services

LA

Animal

Re-

sponse Team

Caddo OHSEP

Figure 12: Caddo-Bossier Parishes 2006-2009 Media Report Non- governmental Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent el- ements are in bold.

LA

Hight

School Athletic Association

LA Association of Business and In- dustry

Fuller Center

Hal Sutton Foun- dation

NAACP

LA Nursing Home Association

American

Red

Cross

Salvation Army

Sam’s

Club

in

Shreveport, LA

Earl

K.

Long

Medical Center

LA Vet Med. As- sociation

Assoc.

of Comm.

United Methodist

Orgs.

for Reform

Committee on Re-

Hirsch

Memo-

Now

lief

rial Coliseum

Figure 13: Caddo-Bossier Parish 2009 Emergency Operations Plan Govern- ment Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent elements are in bold.

Caddo-Bossier OHSEP

Law Enforcement

Fire Service

Emergency

Medical

vices

Ser-

Caddo and Bossier Health Units

Coroner’s Office

Public Works Departments

Water and Sewer Depart- ment

Parks and Recreation Depart- ments

Caddo and Bossier School Systems

Shreveport Airport Authority

SPORTRAN

City and Parish Legal Depart- ment

City and Parish Planning Department

Building Inspection/Code En- forcement

City

and

Parish

Department

Finance

City and Parish Fleet Ser- vices

County Agents, Ag Extension Services, and Soil Conservation Services

Caddo and Bossier Offices of Family Support, Coun- cils on Aging, and Commu- nity Action Agencies

Military Units

Figure 14: Caddo-Bossier Parish 2009 Emergency Operations Plan Non- governmental Membership – unique elements are in red and persistent ele- ments are in bold.

Hospital and Medical Cen- ters

Private utility Companies (Natural Gas, Electric, and

Telephone)

American Red Cross

Salvation Army – present only in the later Brazos County plan