Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

www.elsevier.com/locate/trc

Intelligent transportation system and trac safety ± drivers

perception and acceptance of electronic speed checkers
A. Marell a,b,*, K. Westin 1,a,c
a
Transportation Research Unit, Ume a University, Umea, Sweden
b
Department of Business Administration, Umea University, Umea, Sweden
c
Department of Economic and Social Geography, Ume a University, Umea, Sweden

Abstract
Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) can play an important role in reducing risks and increasing
trac safety. Discussion as to whether a technological approach or a behavioral approach is the right way
to achieve a safer trac environment forms a point of departure for this paper. On the one hand, there are
the technicians who emphasize technology as the way towards safer trac. Behaviorists, on the other hand,
view the driversÕ behavior as fundamental and argue that education and incentive-oriented policies are
essential in order to in¯uence the driver and therefore increase trac safety. Independent of the approach
advocated a successful outcome of either a technological improvement, or an information campaign, has to
be based on a high level of acceptance among potential users. In order to increase trac safety, it is
therefore essential to recognize driver motivation and attitudes. In this paper we focus on driversÕ attitudes
towards risk, trac safety and safety measures. A study of driversÕ attitudes and acceptance of an electronic
device for speed checking (which the drivers tested for nine months) indicated a high acceptance level. The
drivers perceived that they had both become more aware of trac regulations and behaved in accordance
with safety regulations. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Intelligent transportation system; Electronic speed checker; Trac safety; Risk; Attitudes

1. Introduction

Increasing and greater concentration of trac is a large problem in many residential areas in
Sweden. More cars and faster trac pose risks to the inhabitants. Despite pedestrians and chil-
dren playing, and in spite of limited vision, trac is very fast in urban areas. About 20% of the

*
Corresponding author. Tel.: +46-90-7865511; fax: +46-90-7866674.
E-mail addresses: agneta.marell@fek.umu.se (A. Marell), kerstin.westin@geography.umu.se (K. Westin)
1
Tel.: +46-90-7869634.

0968-090X/99/$ - see front matter Ó 1999 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
PII: S 0 9 6 8 - 0 9 0 X ( 9 9 ) 0 0 0 1 6 - 9
132 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

total number of reported accidents in Sweden are caused by road trac. In 1997, approximately
550 people were killed in trac in Sweden, and about 21 000 injured. Considering a total
population of 8.6 million, this means that 2 out of 1000 people were involved in trac accidents
reported (Statistics Sweden, 1998). The number of accidents has decreased slightly over the past
15 years, but is (still) considered to be unsatisfactorily high. For example, for children, aged 0±14,
road trac is the major cause of accidental death, almost 60% of accidents being the result of road
trac. In order to increase safety for unprotected road-users such as children, pedestrians, and
cyclists, speed limits have often been reduced to 30 km/h in trac environments where many road-
users are exposed to high risks (e.g., by schools, day-care centers and old peopleÕs homes).
Nevertheless, approximately 170 accidents occur annually on these road segments and of these 30
lead to death (Statistics Sweden, 1998).
The general goal of the Swedish trac safety policy is to eliminate the number of deaths and
casualties in trac. This goal, known as Vision-0 (meaning 0 injuries and 0 deaths), forms the
background for the present trac safety program. The program is partly based on the as-
sumption that high speed contributes to accidents. Many researchers support the idea of a
positive correlation between speed and trac accidents (see for instance Blomquist, 1986;
Fowles and Loeb, 1995; Graham and Garber, 1984). One way to reduce the number of acci-
dents is to reduce average speeds. Speed reduction can be accomplished by police surveillance,
but also through physical obstacles on the roads. Obstacles such as ¯ower pots, road humps,
small circulation points and elevated pedestrian crossings are frequently found in many resi-
dential areas around Sweden. However, physical measures are not always appreciated by
drivers. These obstacles can cause damages to cars, they can cause diculties for emergency
vehicles (ambulance, ®re brigade, etc.), and in winter these obstacles can reduce access for snow-
clearing vehicles. An alternative to these physical measures is di€erent applications of Intelligent
Transportation Systems (ITS). The major objectives with ITS are to achieve trac eciency, by
for instance redirecting trac, and to increase safety for drivers, pedestrians, cyclists and other
trac groups.
Even if it is sometimes argued that the trac authorities can rely on laws and regulations in
order to achieve desirable trac behavior among drivers, and that the understanding of indi-
vidualsÕ motives and behavior can be overlooked, it is argued here that an understanding of the
driver is crucial for a successful implementation of laws and regulations (cf. Ohlander  and
Thorgesen, 1995). If measures such as laws and regulations are taken with the purpose of
changing trac behavior but are not based on thorough understanding of driversÕ motives, the
e€ects might be far from those desired. For instance, if the road authority aims to reduce trac
accidents, one common measure is to lower speed limits. Yet, even if speed limits are set lower to
reduce the risk of accidents, the e€ect of such a measure is dependent on decisions made by the
driver and is therefore a€ected by the driverÕs acceptance and motivation. He/she can still drive at
a speed higher than that allowed by the regulations.
One important aspect when planning and implementing trac safety programs is therefore
drivers' acceptance of di€erent safety measures aimed at speed reduction. Another aspect is
whether the individualÕs acceptance, when there is a certain degree of freedom of choice, might
also be re¯ected in a higher acceptance of other measures, and whether acceptance of safety
measures is also re¯ected in their perception of road trac, and might reduce dangerous behavior
in trac.
 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147 133

The purpose of this paper is to describe driversÕ perception and acceptance of an electronic
device for checking speed, and how they perceive that their own behavior in trac is a€ected by
the equipment. The results are based on a ®eld study conducted in Ume a, a medium-sized Swedish
city, in 1996. A number of drivers tested an electronic equipment for speed checking ± an Elec-
tronic Speed Checker (ESC). The device was installed in the driversÕ vehicles, and with sound and
a ¯ashing light it warned the driver when he was exceeding the speed limit (as opposed to
physically reducing speed).
The ®rst section of this paper contains a brief review of some of the literature on driver be-
havior in relation to theories on attitude. In the next section results of the ®eld-study are pre-
sented. Finally, the results are discussed and the most important ®ndings are interpreted.

2. Theoretical framework

The e€ectiveness of safety policies is in¯uenced by technology and human behavior. In the area
of trac safety, two di€erent approaches to reduce risks and increase safety are dominant. On the
one hand, there is the technological approach that advocates that mortality and accidents can be
reduced by improving environmental conditions in and/or outside of the vehicle. On the other
hand, there is the rational-choice approach arguing that more or improved automobile safety
results in increased risk taking.
In a number of studies it is argued that the e€ect of a technological improvement is reduced by
the driversÕ change in behavior, a compensatory change towards a more risk-taking behavior,
eliminating the safety increased by technology. Researchers dispute the extent to which this
phenomenon exists. Some argue that the phenomenon of Ôo€-settingÕ behavior does not exist (e.g.,
Graham, 1984; Houston et al., 1995; Lindgren and Stuart 1980). Others argue that o€-setting
behavior does exist, but that it is exceeded by the bene®ts of technological improvements, thus
resulting in increased safety (e.g., Crandall and Graham, 1984; Evans and Graham, 1991;
Peltzman, 1977). Finally, some researchers acknowledge the increase in safety due to techno-
logical improvements, but argue that sometimes o€-setting behavior reduces the increase in safety
implemented by technological improvements (e.g., Risa, 1994).
The technological approach is supported for instance by Graham (1984). In a study that ex-
plored the behavioral-response hypothesis in a context of car-vintage models, he found that the
US crashworthiness standard reduced the car-occupant death rate by approximately 30%. Ar-
guments in favor of the technological approach are also found in Lindgren and Stuart (1980),
who, in a study of the adoption of Swedish vehicle safety standards and lower speed limits, found
no evidence of o€-setting driver behavior. Findings by Houston et al. (1995) also support the
technological approach. In a study of the safety e€ects of mandatory seat belts, raised minimum
legal drinking age and a 55-mph maximum speed limit, they found that these measures were
important in reducing vehicle accidents. Their conclusion was that direct e€orts to regulate driver
behavior resulted in improved trac safety.
On the other hand, several studies also favor the rational-choice approach. A study by Pelzman
(1975) indicated that o€-setting behavior is a reality. He argued that predictions made in tech-
nological studies that highway deaths would be 20% higher without a number of mandatory
safety devices in automobiles were not correct. He argued that calculations on the reduced
134 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

highway death-rate were merely an extrapolation from samples of literature. PelzmanÕs study
showed that the o€-setting e€ects had occurred to such extent that the regulation had not de-
creased highway mortality. Time-series data showed that there was some saving of car-occupantsÕ
lives, but that this e€ect was negated by the increased number of pedestrian deaths and more non-
fatal accidents.
Findings for example by Crandall and Graham (1986) also support the idea of o€-setting be-
havior. Crandall and Graham found that improvements in vehicle safety reduced fatality rates for
car-occupants, but had a deleterious e€ect on the fatality rates of non-occupants. The direct e€ects
of safety improvement for occupants were swamped by any indirect e€ects. However, the indirect
e€ects of safety improvements on speed decisions played a larger role on non-occupant safety (see
also Garbacz, 1992).
In a study of the e€ect on trac fatality of mandatory seat-belt laws by Evans and Graham
(1991) the results were more ambiguous. Evans and Graham found that the enforcement of such
laws in the US reduced mortality among car occupants to a degree that was in close accordance to
the predictions made by technologists. At the same time there was some evidence of increased
mortality amongst some non-occupants, which favored the predictions made by risk-compensa-
tion theorists. The authors argued that o€-setting behavior seemed to exist but to such low extent
that it is by large exceeded by its life-saving e€ects, and it may take several years for any com-
pensatory behavior to achieve a new equilibrium. However, Evans and GrahamÕs study related to
the short-term e€ects and, they argue, if compensatory behavior is not immediate then the long-
term e€ects will di€er from the short-term. The probability that it may take a long time for
compensatory e€ects to emerge is also discussed by Pelzman (1977). Pelzman also observed that
the issue of behavioral response is an empirical one, and he does not totally close the door on
technology approach. The possibility that behavioral responses could be swamped by the intrinsic
e€ects of technology is recognized (Crandall and Graham, 1984; Pelzman, 1977).
Moreover, Risa (1994) analyzed trac accidents for car drivers, motorcyclists and pedestrians
in Norway. The data set consisted of a pooled cross section and yearly time series data for the
period 1980±1986. An interesting aspect of RisaÕs study is that not only did he establish that
adverse incentive e€ects may occur, but he also highlighted the importance of addressing the
question of when they are likely to occur. Empirical results indicated adverse incentive e€ects of
technical and legal regulation. One ®nding was that increased seat belt usage by drivers had an
adverse e€ect on several groups of non-occupants. The theoretical analysis showed that the level
of individual prevention activities is sensitive to di€erent attitudes towards risk, and di€erent types
of hazardous situations.
Despite the lack of correspondence between the di€erent studies and approaches, there seems to
be a common denominator. Independent of the approach taken, the e€ects of any measure
(technological or behaviorist) is dependent on the individual driverÕs acceptance of the measure,
and their understanding of its intention, in order to be successful.
Risa (1994) emphasized the question of why and when o€-setting behavior might occur. The
majority of earlier studies on o€-setting behavior are based on time-series data on fatality sta-
tistics, sometimes in combination with present regulation or implementation of a certain law.
Changes in fatality rates are explained in these studies by the aggregated data of, for instance, seat
belt use, technical standards of automobiles, the technical standards of roads and the density of
automobiles in the area. In order to understand how and why and under what circumstances o€-
 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147 135

setting behavior might occur, such aggregated data might not always be sucient. Perceptions,
attitudes and behavior form a dynamic and complex system in which all components are inter-
related. This implies that a change in one of the components (perception, attitude, or behavior)
should address the possibility that additional changes will occur in the other components. Hence,
we argue that a change in risk-taking behavior can be a result of an individualÕs altered perception
of, and attitudes to, risk. This means that o€-setting behavior occurs as a consequence of a change
in attitudes. This will, in turn, highlight the importance of individual attitude data in order to
address the issue of whether or not o€ setting behavior is a signi®cant factor in trac safety
improvements.
The basis for arguing that a change in behavior is related to change in attitude and risk per-
ception is found in literature on attitudes and attitude-behavior relation. Extensive research has
focused on the correlation between attitudes and behavior (i.e. Wicker, 1969; Ajzen and Fishbein,
1977, 1980; Fazio et al., 1989; Foxall, 1984). Results indicate that there are several factors in-
¯uencing the relationship, social norms, level of speci®city, (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977; Bentler and
Speckart, 1981), accessibility of attitude (Fazio and Zanna, 1978), prototypicality of behavior
(Lord et al., 1984). For instance, social norms might sometimes produce an answer that is the
socially correct answer rather than a ÔtrueÕ picture of the individualÕs attitude. In the same vein,
direct experience might evoke attitudes held with more con®dence than indirect experience does
and therefore result in better correspondence with behavior. If these factors are taken into con-
sideration, measures of attitude and behavior have shown to correlate signi®cantly.
Studies on the relation between attitude and behavior reveal that a decision to behave in a
certain way is often guided by the individualÕs attitude towards that particular behavior (e.g.
G arling, 1994). For instance, a driverÕs decision to exceed a speed limit is to some extent guided by
his/her attitude towards speeding. Likewise, an individualÕs decision to behave in a risk-com-
pensating way might be guided by their attitude towards risk under certain circumstances. Hence,
a ®rst step for an increased understanding of whether Ôo€-settingÕ behavior exists, and then when
and why the phenomenon occurs, would bene®t from studies where driversÕ perception and at-
titudes are addressed.
In order to understand how and why certain behavior occurs, we argue that it is important to
conduct studies on attitudes to, and acceptance of, trac safety and trac behavior with data on
an individual level. It is, of course, also acknowledged that these studies will and should be
complemented by studies on actual individual behavior when testing new technical devices de-
veloped to increase trac safety. The micro-perspective, as well as including studies on attitudes,
can provide essential knowledge about what e€ects di€erent trac safety measures might have,
and provide knowledge on why and under what circumstances such e€ects might surface. A better
understanding of driver attitude and behavior can serve as a base for a more successful imple-
mentation of new safety measures.

3. Empirical study

In order to test speed-reducing measures which are alternatives to physical obstacles, drivers in
a residential area in Ume a, Sweden, were asked to test an ESC. The ESC was an in-vehicle,
electronic, speed surveillance device mounted on the vehicle dashboard. The ESC was activated
136 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

on two particular road segments with a 30 km/h speed limit. The speed checker was activated by
road-side radio transmitters, and was linked with the vehicle speed metering system. When the
measured speed exceeded the value received from the road-side transmitters, the speed-checker
signaled with a ¯ashing red light and loud beep.
In the period between August 1996 and May 1997, a group of 65 private drivers and 27 pro-
fessional drivers were engaged in a project to test the ESC. The objectives of the project were to
empirically test the ESC in daily trac, and to investigate driversÕ attitudes to, and acceptance of,
an ESC. Two groups of drivers were chosen to participate; private drivers, and professional
drivers such as taxi and bus drivers. The reason to include these two groups was to test whether
drivers professionally involved in trac assessed trac safety and safety measures di€erently than
the private driver. A possible di€erence in attitudes between these groups is empirically interesting
since it might imply di€erent strategies in implementing safety measures.
The drivers participating in the test were interviewed on three occasions. The ®rst interview
series was conducted in August 1996, prior to installment of the ESC. The ®rst part of the
interview consisted of questions on car usage and travel behavior. The second part of the in-
terview contained questions on safety and risk, and the respondents were asked what they
thought caused the most serious trac accidents, and if they considered there was a correlation
between trac and risk. The third part consisted of questions on speed, and in the fourth part
the respondentsÕ views on safety was in focus. The questions in the ®fth part concerned attitudes
towards di€erent speed-reducing measures and an ESC in particular. In November, after having
tested the ESC for three months, the participants were interviewed again. They were asked the
same questions as in August, and in addition questions directly related to the function of the
ESC. In May, after a test period of nine months, the ESC was disconnected and the participants
were interviewed for the third time. The interview consisted of the same questions as in
November.
The participants consisted of 92 drivers, aged between 25 and 75. The group of 65 private
drivers was randomly sampled from registered car owners, and since cars in Sweden are registered
to a large extent in the husbandÕs name in a household, men were over-represented in the test.
About half of the respondents lived in households with resident children. This is a slight over-
representation, and other studies on safety regulations (Cedersund, 1996) have revealed that re-
spondents with children tend to be more sympathetic towards lower speed limits and trac
surveillance. The group of professional drivers consisted of 12 taxi drivers and 15 bus drivers. The
taxi drivers were randomly sampled from the radio-dispatch service that participated, and the bus
drivers were randomly sampled from the local bus companyÕs list of employees. When the par-
ticipants were recruited for the ®eld study, they were contacted by telephone and a short interview
was conducted. This recruiting interview included questions on the respondentÕs age, household
composition, driving habits and general attitudes to trac safety and regulation. All contacted
drivers were interviewed, including those who declined to participate in the ®eld study, or who
were rejected as they did not drive past the test-roads frequently. The reason to include all re-
spondents that had been contacted was to test the participating group for bias. The three series of
interviews held in August 1996, November 1996, and May 1997 were conducted by mail-back
questionnaires.
In this paper the results of the interviews in August 1996 and in May 1997 are reported, and in
particular these speci®c questions are addressed:
 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147 137

· Do the participants perceive a correlation between speed and risk, and between trac and risk?
· How do the participants perceive trac safety measures in general, and an ESC in particular?
· How do the participants perceive the e€ects of an ESC?
The point of departure in the paper is the driversÕ perception of risk, attitudes to trac safety
and their self-reported behavior. There is a discrepancy between what people say they do and
what they actually do, and people often tend to describe their behavior in relation to what they
expect the social norm to be (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). It would have been valuable to compare
perceived behavior with actual behavior, however this was not possible within the ®eld study.
There are studies showing that there is a correlation between self-reported behavior and actual
behavior.

4. Results

4.1. Perception of risk

Speed and risk. A majority of participants believed that speed was the major reason for acci-
dents, both in urban trac and on highways. Lack of attention and other driversÕ bad driving
were also rated as high risk factors.
The respondents were also asked if they perceived a correlation between speed and di€erent
kinds of risks (risk to the environment, risk of accidents, and personal risk). The perceived cor-
relation between speed and risk to the environment increased during the test period. In August
approximately 35% recognized a strong connection between speed and risk to the environment,
and this connection had increased to 43% in May …p < 0:05†. Also the connection between speed
and personal risk increased from 35% in August to 40% in May …p < 0:001†. These results are in
line with theories of attitude accessibility (Fazio et al., 1989). If the ESC makes drivers more
aware of speed, and therefore of risks connected with speed, the perception of risk connected to
speed can be expected to increase.
However, a contrasting result is that the perceived connection between speed and risk of ac-
cidents decreased during the test period. In August, 75% of the respondents recognized a strong
correlation between speed and the risk of accident, and in May this share had decreased to 60%
…p < 0:001†. The participants were divided into two groups based on their change in perception of
the relationship between speed and risk. The ®rst group consisted of those who perceived that the
relationship became stronger and the other group consisted of those who perceived a weaker, or
unchanged, relationship after having tested the ESC for nine months.
A higher awareness of the relationship between speed and risk could again be explained by the
notion that attitudes that are more accessible (i.e. activated quickly) are presumed to be more
powerful determinants of behavior, compared to attitudes that are less accessible (Fazio et al.,
1989). Having an ESC installed in the automobile for nine months might therefore be a powerful
tool in creating a greater awareness of the connection between speed, risk and safety. The second
group, where no change in perception of the relationship, or a weaker relationship, occurred,
cannot however be explained here.
Trac and risk. Do drivers make di€erent assessments of the connection between trac in
general and risk on the one hand, and private motoring and risk on the other? The respondents
138 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

were asked how they assessed the connection between trac in general and risk of accidents, risk
to the public, personal risk, and risk for the environmental. Further, they were asked to assess the
connection between these aspects of risk and their private driving.
Most respondents connected car trac in urban areas with a small, or neither small nor big,
risk of accidents, risk to the public, or personal risk (see Table 1). However, to a larger extent they
connected car trac with major risk to the environment, and more than half of the participants
agreed that car trac entailed major risk to the environment. The respondents perceived that their
own driving generated less risk than did car trac in general. An example is that only 5% con-
nected their own driving to a high risk of accidents, while approximately 25% agreed that car
trac in general entailed a large element of risks …p < 0:001†. These results correspond to previous
studies in which it was found that a majority of car drivers perceived themselves to be better
drivers than others. This self-image is important to realize when implementing trac safety
measures since it might a€ect peoples attitude and acceptance (Solomon, 1996). If people do not
see themselves as ÔbadÕ drivers or they perceive that they obey regulations, it might be dicult to
gain acceptance for safety measures.
A di€erent view was taken when the respondents assessed their private motoring in relation to
environmental impact. Almost every third respondent perceived that their own driving posed
great risks for the environment.
Trac safety. The respondentsÕ view of trac safety in general in Ume a was that safety is
higher for car drivers and pedestrians then it is for cyclists. As indicated in Table 2, almost 35%
stated that trac safety was bad or even very bad for cyclists, as opposed to only 15% who
perceived the trac safety for car drivers and pedestrians to be bad. There was a signi®cant
di€erence between private drivers and professional drivers. The private drives regarded trac
safety for cyclists to be better than professional drivers did; 55% of the private drivers perceived
trac safety to be good or very good compared to 41% of the professional drivers …p < 0:001†.
However, the respondents pointed out that it was the behavior of the cyclists, rather than the
physical trac environment, that posed the danger.

Table 1
Perception of connection between trac in general in urban areas and personal driving respectively, with risk for
accidents, personal risk, risk for the public and environmental risk (Distribution in percent)
Risk for Personal Risk for Risk for the
accidentsa risk the public environment
Aug May Aug May Aug May Aug May
Car trac in general and. . .
Small risk (1, 2) 51 41 66 70 36 45 14 14
Neither nor (3) 27 30 20 26 42 39 35 30
Large risk (4, 5) 22 29 14 4 22 16 51 56
Private driving and. . .
Small risk (1, 2) 79 80 73 77 70 75 42 42
Neither nor (3) 15 15 20 15 20 17 32 26
Large risk (4, 5) 6 5 7 7 10 7 26 32
a
Answers were given on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 ˆ do not agree at all and 5 ˆ fully agree.
 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147 139

Table 2
The respondents perception of trac safety for car drivers, bicyclists and pedestrians in Ume
a in August 1996 (Dis-
tribution in percent)
Trac safety for
Car drivers Bicyclists Pedestrians
Very good 3 10 9
Good 62 39 53
Neither good nor bad 19 16 23
Bad 8 24 12
Very bad 8 11 3

4.2. Perception of the ESC

Acceptance of an ESC. The participants had a positive attitude towards an ESC. In August,
over 70% indicated that they thought an ESC would be good or very good. In May, after having
tested the ESC, the positive voices had increased to 87% …p < 0:001†.
The participants can be grouped according to their change in level of acceptance for the ESC.
In one group no change in attitude towards the ESC was noted, and in the other group a greater
acceptance for the ESC was noted after the test period. As can be seen in Table 3, a majority of the
participants (69%) had a high acceptance for the ESC both before they had tested the equipment
and in May after nine months of testing. Only one person stated that he became more negative
towards the ESC after having tested it.
Who, then, accepted the ESC and who did not? Those who indicated a high level of acceptance
in May (87%) and those who indicated a low level (13%) were tested to see whether there were any
signi®cant di€erences in attitude towards having a ESC on 30 and 50 km/h roads, respectively.
The participants with a high level of acceptance were more positive than those with a low level of
acceptance towards having an ESC on 30 and 50 km/h roads and they were also more favorable
towards an ESC that could be activated in all urban trac …p < 0:05†.
Perception of di€erent trac safety measures. The positive attitude towards the ESC is not
surprising, when the participantsÕ attitudes to trac safety measures in general are taken into

Table 3
The respondents acceptance of the ESC, acceptance measured as answer to the question ``How do you perceive the
Dynamic Speed Adjuster?'' (Distribution in percent)
Level of acceptance in August Level of acceptance in May
Low High Total
a
Low 10 18 28
Highb 3 69 72
Total 13 87 100
a
Indicated values 1, 2 or 3 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 indicated not good at all and 5 indicated very good.
b
Indicated values 4 or 5 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 indicated not good at all and 5 indicated very good.
140 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

account. Prior to the actual testing of the ESC, the participants were asked how ecient they
regarded information, legislation, and physical modi®cations of the trac environment as tools to
increase trac safety. It was clear that information was regarded as the most ecient tool in this
respect. Over 90% of the participants were in favor of information, while only a third of the
respondents were in favor of legislation, and a third also positive towards physical modi®cations
…p < 0:001†. The voluntary nature of the ESC, where the decision to act is the driverÕs and their
actions are not registered, corresponds well with a preference for information instead of legisla-
tion.
This is accentuated by the participantsÕ perception of a number of speed-reducing measures,
and the temporal changes of this perception. As is shown in Table 4, police surveillance was more
accepted in August than in May, while the attitude towards an ESC in urban trac was more
positive in May. The perception of physical obstacles, such as elevated pedestrian crossings and
trac circles, was more favorable in May than in August. These results are important since the
implementation of a new device or safety measure might have consequences for attitudes on
existing measures, and therefore result in unexpected behavior.
E€ects of an ESC. The participants seem to have a belief in the positive e€ects of the ESC.
Table 5 shows that even before the equipment was installed, 66% of the participants indicated that
they thought that speed in urban trac would decrease if an ESC was active on road segments

Table 4
Perception of di€erent speed reducing measures in August 1996 (before testing a ESC) and in May 1997
Measurea August (mean) May (mean) signi®cance
Speed control by police surveillance

In urban trac 4.0 3.6

On highways 3.4 3.1
Surveillance cameras

In urban trac 3.0 2.1

On highways 2.5 1.8
Physical modi®cations
Flower pots on the road 2.4 2.4
Road bumps 2.0 2.2
Elevated pedestrian crossings 2.5 2.8

Trac circles 2.2 2.7
Electronic speed control

In urban trac 3.9 4.3
On highways 3.1 3.1
Electronic speed reducer

In urban trac 2.7 2.4

On highways 2.3 2.0
a
Mean value indicated on a 5-point scale, where 1 indicated Ônot goodÕ and 5 indicated Ôvery goodÕ.
*
p < 0:05.
**
p < 0:01.
***
p < 0:001.
 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147 141

Table 5
Attitude to the ESC in August 1996 (before testing a ESC) and in May 1997
Statementa August May signi®cance
(mean) (mean)
If all cars had electronic speed checkers activated on 30 km/h roads, the 3.9 3.6 ±
average speed in urban trac would decrease.
If all cars had electronic speed checkers activated on 50 km/h roads, the 3.5 3.5 ±
average speed in urban trac would decrease.
The electronic speed checker should be connected to the trac police for 1.4 1.4 ±
automatic surveillance and ®ning when exceeding the speed.
If all cars had electronic speed checkers activated on 30 and 50 km/h 3.1 3.0 ±
roads, fuel consumption in urban trac would decrease.
If all cars had electronic speed checkers activated on 30 and 50 km/h 3.2 3.1 ±
roads, air pollution in urban trac would decrease.

There should be electronic speed checkers in all cities. 3.0 3.4
Electronic speed checkers should only be activated on roads limited to 2.9 2.9 ±
30 km/h.

It should be mandatory that all cars were equipped with electronic speed 2.5 2.9
checkers.
Electronic speed checkers should be connected to trac police so that 1.5 1.5 ±
surveillance can take place without having a patrol on the road.
a
Mean value indicated on a 5-point scale, where 1 indicated Ônot goodÕ, and 5 indicated Ôvery goodÕ.
*
p < 0:05.
**
p < 0:01.

limited to 30 km/h. The acceptance level for an ESC that would be active also on roads limited to
50 km/h was high, and in August every second respondent believed that the average speed would
decrease if the ESC was installed on roads limited to 50 km/h.
In August, approximately 40% of the respondents also believed that both fuel consumption and
air pollution would decrease if all cars had an ESC that was to be activated on all roads limited to
30 and 50 km/h. However, the participants were not in favor of connecting the ESC to the trac
police for surveillance and ®nes.
The positive belief in the ESC remained after the equipment had been tested for nine months.
The number of participants who stated that there should be ESCs in all cities had increased from
34% to 57% …p < 0:01†, and 35% in May, as opposed to 24% in August who indicated that it
should be mandatory with ESCs in all cars …p < 0:05†.
ESC ± helpful tool or Ôbig brotherÕ? Almost half the participants perceived that they had become
more aware of speed limits after having tested the ESC. There was nevertheless a di€erence be-
tween private drivers and professional drivers. In May almost 40% of the professional drivers
indicated that they have become more aware of speed limits, compared to 20% of the private
drivers …p < 0:05†. Only two persons stated that they had become less aware of speed limits after
having used the ESC.
Approximately 70% of the respondents preferred the ESC to physical obstacles such as road
humps, elevated pedestrian crossings, and ¯ower pots on the road. The respondents were also
asked how they perceived a kind of speed adjustment that physically reduced the speed when the
driver exceeded set speed limits. It is evident that the respondents were not as sympathetic to this
142 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

kind of speed-reducing equipment. In May, after having tested the ESC for nine months, over
50% repudiated such measures on roads limited to 30 km/h, and 70% of the respondents repu-
diated it on roads limited to 50 km/h.
The ESC, with the design and function tested in Ume a, was regarded as a helpful tool and
safety device, rather than an uncomfortable and irritating control device. Only a couple of
respondents took exception to the ESC, and regarded it as an uncomfortable control or an
irritating device. For three out of four private drivers, and for every second professional
driver, this perception of the ESC as a safety device had strengthened during the test-period
…p < 0:05†.

4.3. Perceived e€ects of the ESC

E€ects on trac behavior and perception of risk. The general speed limit in urban trac is
50 km/h. In the city of Ume a local authorities have a policy to limit the speed to 30 km/h outside
primarily schools, daycare centers and old peopleÕs homes. These segments are usually very short,
and the argument for keeping the segments short (not more than 300 meters) is to encourage
law abiding. It is believed to be easier to motivate drivers to keep to the 30 km/h limits if they are
short and in visible connection with special trac situations. The relatively limited length of
the 30-km/h roads might make it dicult for drivers with speed cruisers in their cars to adjust to
the speed limit. The ESC can function as an alerter in such situation.
Many respondents indicated that it was dicult to keep to the speed limit on roads with
30 km/h, and approximately 30% stated that they never kept to such a speed limit. Very few
respondents indicated that they always kept to the speed limit on 30 km/h roads. There was no
observed change in this respect between August and May. The diculty of keeping to the speed
limit, in addition to the respondentsÕ claim that it is important to keep the 30 km speed limit,
might to some extent explain why so many were sympathetic towards having an ESC that can
be activated on all roads limited to 30 km/h; 85% were in favor while only 10% were clearly
negative.
Table 6 shows that many respondents perceived that it was easier to keep the speed limit on
30 km/h roads when they had an ESC that is activated, compared to not having an ESC. Almost
60% of the participants indicated, when interviewed in May, that they always kept to the
30 km-limit on the test roads when having an ESC. There is, consequently, a big perceived dif-
ference between always keeping the 30 km-speed limit and keeping it when having an ESC, since

Table 6
How often the participants keep the 30 km/h speed limit with and without an ESC ± self-reported behavior in May
(Distribution in percent)
Without the ESC With the ESC
Never 30 12
Sometimes 40 9
Often 16 20
Always 14 59
 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147 143

only 14% indicated that they always kept to the 30 km limit on roads without an ESC …p < 0:001†.
These results are emphasized by the fact that the number of respondents who indicated that they
never keep to the 30 km speed limit decreases with an ESC in the car.
A di€erence in the results between November and May can be noticed. The respondents seem to
have become more aware of 30 km speed limits as time has gone by. The number of respondents
who indicated that they always keep to the 30 km-speed limit on roads where the ESC is not
activated increased from 6% in November to 15% in May …p < 0:001†.
The participants also stated that they had become more observant of keeping the speed limit on
30 km/h roads where the ESC could be activated. Approximately 75% stated that their attention
had increased, and for the others it had not changed. Nobody said that they had become less
observant of the speed limit on the two test roads.
A majority of the drivers perceived that they had become more observant of the speed limit
even on 30 km/h roads where the ESC could not be activated …p < 0:001†. Approximately 65%
stated that their attention on these roads had increased, while the rest stated that they had not
changed their awareness. Again, nobody had become less attentive of the speed limits on 30 km/h
roads. However, the participants were more observant of the speed limit on roads where the ESC
should be activated, and the use of an ESC seems to contribute to keeping the speed limits on
30 km/h roads.
The usage of an ESC also seemed to result in an increased awareness of what happens on, and
at the side of the road where the ESC could be activated. In May nearly every third respondent
perceived that they had become more observant of what happened on, and at the side of the road.
Approximately 28% perceived that they had also become more observant of what happened on
and at the side of roads where the ESC could not be activated, and the rest indicated that their
attention had not changed.
These results, that the participants have become more observant of keeping to the 30 km/h
speed limit, and have partly increased their attention to what happens on, and by the road, is
interesting as these unexpected behavior e€ects (given driversÕ perception of their behavior cor-
responds to actual behavior) could result in a decrease in number of accidents. A possible in-
terpretation is that acceptance of the ESC also is related to behavior in adjacent areas, e.g.,
keeping speed-limits on other roads.
E€ects of an ESC on other roads. It is perceived as somewhat more dicult to keep to the speed
limits on 50 km/h roads. As can be seen in Table 7 the participants believed that they would obey
the 50 km/h-limits more often if they had an ESC activated. Close to half of the respondents

Table 7
How often the participants keep the 50 km/h speed limit with and without an ESC ± self-reported behavior in May
(Distribution in percent)
Without the ESC With the ESC
Never 28 9
Sometimes 57 18
Often 12 25
Always 3 48
144 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

perceived that they would be able to always keep to the speed limit with the help of an ESC, which
can be compared to that only 3% stating that they always keep to the 50 km/h speed limit without
an ESC …p < 0:01†. This positive belief is partly accentuated by the circumstance that 43% were in
favor of having an ESC that could be activated on all 50 km/h roads- on the on the hand 27% were
negative. There was a signi®cant di€erence between private drivers and professional drivers in
attitude towards the ESC, and the private drivers were more positive ± 67% compared to 22% of
the professional drivers …p < 0:001†.

5. Conclusion

The participants were sympathetic towards an ESC. They were positive even before they had
tested the ESC, and this favorable attitude was strengthened during the test-period. The ESC was
also perceived as a safety-device and as a helpful tool as an aid to keeping to the speed limit.
The issue of why the ESC strengthened its position among the drivers during the test period,
might be explained in di€erent ways. One explanation is found in the literature of familiarity
(Zajonc, 1968). It can be argued, on the basis of the familiarity hypothesis (i.e., that mere exposure
to a stimulus is a sucient condition to enhance an observerÕs attitude towards that stimuli) that
testing the electronic device will make individual more positive then he/she was before testing the
product.
Another explanation is the individualÕs drive towards consistency. The power of consistency
in directing human behavior has been evoked for instance by Festinger (1957) and Heider
(1958). If the results from the study presented here are interpreted from the constancy principle,
it would mean that drivers ± who initially agreed to participate, and thereafter spent time in-
stalling the ESC and also spent three times 30 min being interviewed ± in order not to be
perceived as inconsistent are likely to acknowledge that the device is valuable. Hence, these
drivers will have a favorable attitude towards the ESC. If the drivers were to say they did not
like the ESC, after putting in all the e€ort, they would perceive their own behaviors as in-
consistent.
Yet another explanation is that drivers really perceive the ESC to be a good alternative to other
speed-reducing measures. As mentioned earlier, a decision to choose one among other actions is
often made on the basis of the attitude the decision-maker has towards these behaviors. Yet, an
intention is not sucient to secure a corresponding implementation. Often individuals face ob-
stacles. For instance Kuhl (1987) discusses the problem individuals have in maintaining an in-
tention when facing an obstacle. He argues that such obstacles are more frequent when
individuals have to pertain an action over time (Garling, 1994). In this study the ESC is perceived
as a helpful tool and a safety device, and agreeing with Kuhl it can be argued that the ESC helps
individuals to keep an intention. The intention is to follow the speed limits, which results in a
good evaluation of the ESC. On the other hand, it can also be argued that initiating behavior of
accepting, purchasing and installing an ESC is more easily done, than maintaining the behavior of
following the speed limit.
The positive attitude is an interesting ®nding, since a positive attitude will improve the likeli-
hood that the speed checker will work as intended, helping drivers to reduce the speed. This is to
say that a positive attitude towards a speci®c measure, such as an ESC, is thought to be a major
 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147 145

requirement for individuals to adjust and behave accordingly (Ajzen and Fishbein 1977; Ajzen
1985). The favorable attitude is reinforced at the end of the test period, which further supports the
idea of a positive consequence in actual driving behavior, a reduction of the actual speed. This
argument is based on for instance, theories about attitude. Fazio and Zanna (1978) found a better
correlation between attitude and behavior when the attitude was based on direct experience. Fazio
and Zanna also found support for the notion that attitudes based on direct experience were held
with more con®dence than attitudes based on indirect experience.
The results in this study show that the attitudes towards an ESC and self-reported behavior are
positive. Would these results be valid also in the long term? Evans and Graham (1991) pointed out
that if compensatory behavior is not immediate, long-term e€ects will di€er from short-term ef-
fects. It may take several years for compensatory e€ects to emerge. In our study the participants
stated that they had become more aware of speed limits, but they did not state any behavior that
would negate this increased awareness. An example of long-term e€ects can be the law on
mandatory seat-belts which was implemented in Sweden in 1986. Despite certain ¯uctuations, belt
usage was initially high and is still approximately 90% for drivers and front seat passengers
(Cedersund, 1996). There is no evidence today as to whether or not seat-belt usage has led to
compensatory behavior (e.g., faster or more reckless driving). In this case the short-term e€ects
seem to be the same as the long-term e€ects.
The positive results from this study should be interpreted with some caution. One should bear
in mind that only two road segments past schools were included in the test, and that people seem
to be more inclined to agree with a speed limits and speed surveillance outside day-care centers
and schools. To be alerted on a few occasions is not necessarily perceived as a restriction or an
unpleasant control. The restricted design of the test might contribute to a favorable attitude to-
wards the ESC. In addition, participating in the test was voluntary. It can be presumed that those
with a critical attitude to trac safety measures and speed reduction are not adequately repre-
sented in the sample, which might be re¯ected in the positive results. Further, in future research,
observing actual behavior would shed light on the extent to which positive attitudes are matched
by a positive behavior.
In summary, independent of a technological or a behaviorist approach, we argue that accep-
tance plays an important role in increasing trac safety. High levels of acceptance for a safety
measure or a regulation, followed by a change in behavior, can be partly derived from positive
attitudes. It is also interesting to note that the implementation of a new device also has e€ects on
the attitudes to existing measures. This might correspond with unexpected change in behavior.
Another ®nding is the perceived change in self-reported behavior in situations indirectly related to
the ESC (greater observance of speed-limits on roads not a€ected by the ESC). More research on
attitudes and perceived behavior connected to observed behavior is needed to fully understand
e€ects of safety measures.

Acknowledgements

This study was ®nancially supported by a grant from the Swedish National Road Adminis-
tration. The authors are indebted to Fredrik Garling for assistance with collecting and entering
data.
146 A. Marell, K. Westin / Transportation Research Part C 7 (1999) 131±147

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