Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No.

L-48488 April 25, 1980 GLORIA D. MENEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE), respondents. Gloria D. Menez in her own behalf. Manuel M. Lazaro for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.: Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title II the New Labor Code) and dismissing said claim. The records disclose that petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education & Culture as a school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32 years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek. On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance System (p. 1, ECC rec.). On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved:
Upon evaluation based on general accepted medical authorities, your ailments are found to be the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We believe that our ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-connected. Moreover, the evidences you have, submitted have not shown that the said ailments

directly resulted from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja Soliman High School, Manila (Letter-Resolution, p. 4, ECC Case No. 0462).

On November 24, 1976, petitioner filed a letter-request for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial of her claim, which request was denied by the GSIS in its letterresolution of November 28, 1976 therein reiterating that on the basis of the evidence on record, it appears that petitioner has not established that her employment had any causal relationship with the contraction of the ailments (p. 6, ECC rec.). On March 7, 1977, petitioner again requested for reconsideration of the second denial of said claim, still alleging that her ailments arose out of and in the course of employment (p. 11, ECC rec.). On March 11, 1977, respondent GSIS reaffirmed its stand on the case and elevated the entire records thereof to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review (p. 12, ECC rec.). On March 1, 1978, respondent Commission issued a decision en banc thus stating:
... Despite assertions to the contrary by herein appellant, this Commission fully agrees with the respondent system that appellant's employment has nothing to do with the development of her disabling illnesses. Appellant's ailments are not listed as occupational diseases for the employment she was engaged in as to merit compensation under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (p. 13, rec.).

On July 7, 1978, petitioner filed this petition seeking a review of aforesaid decision of respondent Commission (p. 2, rec.). Petitioner claims she contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after wetting and chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected (p. 2, rec.). She specifically alleged that
... said sickness and/or disabilities arose out of or in the course of employment and is aggravated by the condition and nature of the work in school, that appellant belonged to the afternoon and night shifts as shown by her time record, Annex D, subjecting her to varying climatic (sic) temperature at noon and night time; and that the place of work, Raja Soliman High School, is surrounded by the Divisoria market at the north, Sta. Helena Bridge and Creek which is heavily polluted; in the Northeast, is the presence of many squatter houses too, and in the south gasoline stations, bakery, Textile market as stated before and a fact. That as a teacher of social studies handling 250 students more or less a day, she is subjected to infections from students who have flu, colds and other respiratory infections which aggravated her ailments (p. 3, rec.).

Petitioner now maintains that her ailments arose in the course of employment and were aggravated by the condition and nature of her work. Specifically, she asserts that "pneumonitis or baby pneumonia which has become chronic that led to bronchiectasis

which is irreversible and permanent in nature is compensable under No. 21 of compensable diseases (Resolution No. 432 dated July 20, 1977) as conditions were present as attested to by doctor's affidavits and certifications." Respondents Commission and System contend that petitioner's ailments of rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not among the occupational diseases listed as compensable under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, or under Annex "A" of the Rules on Employees' Compensation; and, that respondent Commission's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the form of accepted medical findings thus making said decision final and conclusive on the matter (p. 33 & 68, rec.). Article 167 (1) of the new Labor Code provides that
(1) 'Sickness' means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. ...

Rule 111, Section 1 (b) of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation thus provides:
xx xx xx (b) For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions.

Rule III, Section 1 (c) of said Rules states:

(c) Only inquiry or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules.

The aforequoted provisions clearly establish that for an illness to be compensable, it must either be: 1. An illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease; or 2. An illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions. An occupational disease is one "which results from the nature of the employment, and by nature is meant conditions to which all employees of a class are subject and which produce the disease as a natural incident of a particular occupation, and attach to that occupation a hazard which distinguishes it from the usual run of occupations and is in excess of the hazard attending the employment in general" (Goldberg vs. 954 Mancy Corp., 12 N. E. 2d 311; Emphasis supplied).

To be occupational, the disease must be one "due wholly to causes and conditions which are normal and constantly present and characteristic of the particular occupation; that is, those things which science and industry have not yet learned how to eliminate. Every worker in every plant of the same industry is alike constantly exposed to the danger of contracting a particular occupational disease" (Seattle Can Co. vs. Dept. of Labor, 265, p. 741; Emphasis supplied). An occupational disease is one which develops as a result of hazards peculiar to certain occupations, due to toxic substances (as in the organic solvents industry), radiation (as in television repairmen), repeated mechanical injury, emotional strain, etc. (Schmidts Attorneys' Dictionary of Medicine, p. 561). From the foregoing definitions of occupational diseases or ailments, rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis can be considered as such occupational diseases. All public high school teachers, like herein petitioner, admittedly the most underpaid but overworked employees of the government, are subject to emotional strains and stresses, dealing as they do with intractable teenagers especially young boys, and harassed as they are by various extra-curricular or non- academic assignments, aside from preparing lesson plans until late at night, if they are not badgered by very demanding superiors. In the case of the petitioner, her emotional tension is heightened by the fact that the high school in which she teaches is situated in a tough area - Binondo district, which is inhabited by thugs and other criminal elements and further aggravated by the heavy pollution and congestion therein as well as the stinking smell of the dirty Estero de la Reina nearby. Women, like herein petitioner, are most vulnerable to such unhealthy conditions. The pitiful situation of all public school teachers is further accentuated by poor diet for they can ill-afford nutritious food. In her work, petitioner also has to contend with the natural elements, like the inclement weather heavy rains, typhoons as well as dust and disease-ridden surroundings peculiar to an insanitary slum area. These unwholesome conditions are "normal and consistently present in" or are the "hazards peculiar to" the occupation of a public high school teacher. It is therefore evident that rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are the "natural incidents" of petitioner's occupation as such public high school teacher. But even if rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis are not occupational diseases, there is ample proof that petitioner contracted such ailments by reason of her occupation as a public high school teacher due to her exposure to the adverse working conditions above-mentioned. Indisputably, petitioner contracted pneumonitis and/or bronchiectasis with hemoptysis and rheumatoid arthritis on January 27, 1975 after being drenched and the consequent "chilling during the course of employment which are permanent and recurring in nature and work-connected." Undoubtedly, petitioner's ailments thus become compensable under the New Labor Code since under Rule 111, Section 1 (c) of its Implementing

Rules, "only sickness or injury which occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules." It must be borne in mind that petitioner was a teacher of the Raja Soliman High School which is located in the heart of Binondo District. She was constantly exposed to the heavily polluted air and congestion (squatter's area) characteristic of the area. She was not only exposed to the elements - varying degrees of temperature throughout the day and night - but also had to withstand long hours of standing while performing her teaching job. Likewise, she had to regularly negotiate long trips from her home in Project 2, Quirino District, Quezon City (her residence) to said high school in Binondo, scampering from one ride to another, rain or shine, and sweating in the process. Furthermore, judicial notice should be taken of the fact that our country is in a typhoon belt and that yearly we experience torrential rains and storms. Needless to say, in her daily rides from Quezon City to Binondo and back, she had to go through the ordeal of perspiring and getting wet from downpours or heavy rains, thus making her susceptible to contracting her ailments. Moreover, petitioner was always in contact with 250 students who might have been carriers of contagious respiratory diseases like flu and colds and who were themselves inadequately nourished, residing as they do in a depressed and congested area. And adding to the unhygienic working atmosphere was her malnutrition or undernourishment. More often than not, a teacher who has no other source of income takes to aside from the poor man's staple diet of tuyo, daing and rice legumes like mongo, vegetables and fruits with edible seeds which contain much uric and. Acute arthritis is inflammation of a joint marked by pain, swelling, heat and redness; the result of rheumatism or gout (p. 56, The Simplified Medical Dictionary for Lawyers). Gout is a disease characterized by painful inflammation of the joints, in excessive amount of uric acid in the blood Poor man's gout is caused by hard work, poor food and exposure (p. 268, supra). It may thus be seen that uric acid eventually causes arthritis, aside from excessive mental and physical stresses to which teachers are subject of reason of their duties. Consequently, this Court finds petitioner to have substantially shown that the risk of contracting her ailments had been increased by unfavorable working conditions. In Dimaano vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (78 SCRA 510 [1977]), WE ruled that illnesses of rheumatic arthritis with sub-acute exacerbation and hypertension of therein petitioner, who was herself a teacher, as service-connected, after WE considered her working conditions and nature of employment which are substantially the same as those of herein petitioner. Significantly, also, the Employees' Compensation Commission, in its Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977, adopted a more realistic construction of the provisions of the New Labor Code by including in the list of compensable ailments and diseases, cardiovascular disease which comprehends

myocardial infarction, pneumonitis and bronchial asthma (Sepulveda vs. WCC, et al., L46290, Aug. 25,1978). Furthermore, it must be stressed that "the approval of petitioner's application for retirement is a clear indication that she was physically incapacitated to render efficient service (Sudario vs. Republic, L-44088, Oct. 6, 1977; Dimaano vs. WCC, et al., supra). Petitioner was allowed to retire under the disability retirement plan on August 31, 1975 at the age of 54 which is way below the compulsory retirement age of 65. Under Memorandum Circular No. 133 issued by the retirement shall be recommended for approval only when "the employee applicant is below 65 years of age and is physically incapacitated to render further efficient service." Obviously, petitioner thus retired by reason of her ailments. Finally, Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the physical and nervous strain on the teachers health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al.. L-43317, December 29, 1978).
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND CULTURE IS HEREBY ORDERED 1) TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SIX THOUSAND [P 6,000.00] PESOS AS DISABILITY INCOME BENEFITS; AND 2) TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY RECEIPTS. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-44063 March 15, 1982 VICTORIA F. CORALES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Lands), respondents. G.R. No. L-46200 March 15, 1982

FELIXBERTO VILLONES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Department, now Ministry of Education & Culture), respondents. G.R. No. L-46992 March 15, 1982 FRANCISCO CAEJA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents. G.R. No. L-49227 March 15, 1982 BUENAVENTURA J. BARGA, JR., petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.: For consideration are the motions for clarification and/or reconsideration filed by respondents Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) and Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) in Corales on March 28 and April 17, 1979; in Villones on September 6 and 7, 1978; in Barga on June 5 and July 1, 1980; and in Caeja on May 10 and 22, 1980. The main issue common to all these cases revolves on the entity liable to pay the compensation claims of petitioners ailments initially suffered before the Government Service Insurance System or the government offices and agencies which are the employers of petitioners which are filed with the Government Service Insurance System under the provisions of the New Labor Code, adversely decided by the System and affirmed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, but on appeal to this Court, were favorably considered; because WE applied the more favorable and compassionate provisions of the old workmen's compensation law (Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended), instead of the provisions of the New Labor Code on employees' compensation which have been criticized as retrogressive. The social justice impact of the new compensation law as compared to the prior compensation law has been deeply noted and lamented in a resolution of this Court, through the Second division, in the case of Ibaez vs. ECC, et al., L-47008, March 8, 1978, before Corales, thus: "Upon consideration of the allegations of the petitioner and comments thereon of respondent Employee's Compensation Commission, and the Government Service Insurance System, the Court resolved to DENY the petition, noting that since the current

Labor Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 626, has indeed reduced the broad instances of compensability under the former Workmen's Compensation Act, the Court is powerless to apply the doctrines laid down under said Act to petitioner's case, even as it feels that perhaps a legislative remedy may be worthy of study by those concerned to the end that what was conceded to be humane attitude inspired by the social justice precepts of the Constitution may be reconciled with the new or additional benefits, if any, that the Labor Code provides in compensation cases and thereby avoid the impression that in regard to the security aspect of public or private employment, so worthy of compassionate approach, there has been an intentional backward step in the policies of the New Society." The mother case is Corales vs. ECC, et al., wherein petitioner, who started his career in the government in 1932 and retired on March 26, 1975 under Republic Act No. 660, as amended by Republic Act No. 4968, filed on August 4, 1975 a compensation claim with the Government Service Insurance System for his tuberculosis which was traceable to 1965 when he was downed by a high fever. In OUR February 27, 1979 extended resolution, WE stressed that the substantive provisions applicable to his claim are those of the old workmen's compensation law and not those of the New Labor Code on employees' compensation, because of the following considerations: (1) the cause of action accrued as early as September, 1965, hence during the effectivity of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended: (2) the time limitation in Article 292 of the Labor Code which requires that workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to the New Labor Code shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of Labor not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise, they shall forever be barred does not apply to petitioner who filed his claim on August 4, 1975 with the Government Service Insurance System; because of the controlling jurisprudence under the old law that the prescriptive period for claims which accrued under the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended, is ten [10] years, it being a right founded on statute and, as such, is considered a vested right; (3) the provisions of the New Labor Code on Employees; Compensation, Book IV, Title II, apply only to injury, sickness, disability or death accruing on or after January 1, 1975 (Art. 208); and more precise is Section 1 (c) of Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which declares that only injury or sickness that accrued on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under the rules; and (4) the filing by petitioner of the claim with the GSIS, instead of with the appropriate regional office of the Deparment of Labor does not militate against the claim; because the filing of a claim in an office that has no authority to act on it can be treated as having been filed with the appropriate agency as long as it is filed within the period allowed by law [Pobre vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 315-320, May 31, 1977]; and Art. 294, Title II (Transitory and Final Provisions) of the New Labor Code provides that all actions and claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual and under the third paragraph of Article 292, Title II [Prescription of Offenses and Claims], workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code and during the period

from November 1, 1974 up to December 31, 1974 shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the laws and rules at the time their causes of action arose. Because WE declared the aforesaid resolution as final and executory, respondents resorted to this present motion for clarification. Thus respondent Employees' Compensation Commission submitted on March 28, 1979 the following points for clarification;
A. Payment by the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) of compensation/medical benefits for claims filed under the New Labor Code with said office which it finds to be non-compensable under said code but may be considered compensable under the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended; B. Legal implications of the application by this Honorable Court of ten (10) year prescriptive period to the claim filed in the present case on claims filed under similar circumstances in relation to the provision in the New Labor Code on prescription of actions whereby all workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to January 1, 1975 are required to be filed not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise, they shall be forever barred; C. Legal basis for the Employees' Compensation Commission to assume jurisdiction over and apply the provisions of the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act to compensation cases involving causes of action accruing prior to January 1, 1975.

Likewise, respondent GSIS filed on April 17, 1979 its own motion for clarification with respect to the following points:
I. Whether or not the GSIS has a right of reimbursement from the employer of petitioner, considering that the employer was originally liable to pay the claim and payment by the GSIS for the employee rewards for his failure to pay the claim. II. To whom should the GSIS pay the administrative costs and whether or not the GSIS should, at the very least, have a right to recover the administrative costs from the employer of petitioner.

Petitioner was required to comment on the aforesaid motions and he filed one on August 28, 1979. Meanwhile, several cases were decided by this Court applying the doctrine in the aforesaid Corales case. Thus, the cases of Villones (G.R. No. L-46200, July 30, 1979); Caeja (G.R. No. L-46992, March 31, 1980), and Barga (G.R. No. L-49227, April 25, 1980), were all favorably decided in favor of petitioner workers as their ailments were all traced to dates prior to the effectivity of the new compensation scheme under the New Labor Code. In Villones, a government teach died on September 2, 1975 or more than three (3) years from his initial service on July 3, 1972. His death was traced to an ailment he contracted way back on December 4, 1972. His dependent filed a claim on December 23, 1975.

In Barga, petitioner began working for the government on August 10, 1959 and in 1969, he began to feel the symptoms of duodenal ulcer; was hospitalized by reason thereof on February 22, 1975, discharged on March 4, 1975 and was readmitted to be subjected to exploratory laparotomy and drainage of pelvic abscess. He was discharged on March 30, 1975 and resumed working on May 5, 1975. He thereafter filed his claim for compensation. And in Caeja, petitioner, who entered the government service on July 5, 1950, filed his claim on July 30, 1976 for schizophrenia, for which he was confined at the National Mental Hospital during the periods from December 6, 1961 to February 15, 1962, from July 9, 1966 to January 10, 1967, and from January 2, 1973 to May 15, 1975 and had been under treatment for the same illness as an out-patient for the periods from July 30 to November 11, 1968, and on May 2, 1974, August 26, 1974, December 22, 1975, April 26, and June 8, 1976. Invariably, herein respondents filed motions for reconsideration and/or motions for clarification along the same points raised in the Corales case. Hence, this consolidated disposition. The question raised by respondent Employees' Compensation Commission under its first point of clarification is: what entity is liable to pay the compensation benefits of herein petitioners. It maintains that the respective employers of the petitioners should be the one to pay the benefits a mandated by the Workmen's Compensation Act, which was the law applied to their compensation claims. On the other hand, the respondent GSIS under its initial point of clarification manifests its willingness to pay the aforesaid benefits provided its right to seek reimbursement from the respective employers of the petitioners will be assured in this resolution. The respondent Employees' Compensation Commission in its motion, states:
I. the State Insurance Fund as administered by the GSIS for the government sector is liable only for the payment of benefits due under the new Employees' Compensation Program. Under the new Employees' Compensation Program as provided for in Title II, Book IV of the New Labor Code of the Philippines, the GSIS administers the State Insurance Fund for the government sector (Art. 175, Labor Code). And in the disposition of said Fund, the GSIS is guided by the following provisions of the New Labor Code: Art. 179. Investment of funds. All revenues as are not needed to meet current operational expenses under this Title shall be known as the State Insurance Fund which shall be used exclusively for the payment of the benefits under this Title, and no amount thereof shall be used for any other purpose. ..." (emphasis supplied). The State Insurance Fund operates on the basis of actuarial computations, which did not include payment of claims found compensable under the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act. For under the provisions of the New Labor Code regarding

workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to January 1, 1975, such claims shall be processed and adjudicated in accordance with the law and rules at the time their causes of action accrued. (Art. 292, Labor Code). The following provisions of the WCA make the employer or insurance carrier liable for payment of compensation/medical benefits to a disabled employee: Sec. 2. Grounds for compensation. When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sum and to the person hereinafter specified. ... (emphasis supplied). Sec. 13. Services, appliances and supplies. Immediately after an employee has suffered an injury or contracted sickness and during the subsequent period of disability, the employer or insurance carrier shall provide the employee with such services, appliances and supplies as the process of his recovery may require; and that which will promote his early restoration to the maximum level of his physical capacity (emphasis supplied). The GSIS was not the employer of herein petitioner. Neither was the GSIS the insurance carrier for the actual employer of the petitioner. The petitioner is a compulsory retired employee of the Bureau of Lands against which no claim for compensation was ever filed by herein petitioner even impliedly by the filing of a sick leave of absence. The claim filed by petitioner with the GSIS is against the State Insurance Fund and the Bureau of Lands is not a party in the determination of the compensability of petitioner's claim either by the GSIS or the ECC. Under the foregoing circumstances, may the payment of the award to the petitioner be made by petitioner's previous employer the Bureau of Lands?

The above stand of the respondent Employee's Compensation Commission was recast and expanded in its subsequent pleading in Caeja, thus:
Under the WCA, as amended, the employer or the insurance carrier pays the compensation benefits. In the case of government employees, the employer is the Republic of the Philippines and payment is made from the savings of the particular office or agency where the claimant employee is employed. In the present case, while the petitioner's claim was found compensable under the old WCA, the GSIS, which makes payment to public employees under the new law, is being ordered to make payment of the benefits thus found due the herein petitioner by this Honorable Court. Under the new employees' compensation program provided in PD 626 amending the New Labor Code, claims settlement was made the sole responsibility of the Social Security System (SSS) of the private sector and the GSIS for public employees. Payment is made from the State Insurance Fund (SIF) to which the employer pays premiums contributions for and in behalf of its employees. The SIF was established after an exhaustive study was made of the workmen's compensation system by a distinguished actuary of the International Labor Organization (ILO), Mr. Albert Robertson, to determine the rate of premium contributions to be paid by the employers. The study showed that if the adjudication and settlement of claims under the old workmen's scheme would still be followed under the new employees' compensation program in PD 626, it would require a premium contribution of between two (2) to three (3) percent of the employee's monthly wages or

salary, to be paid for and in his behalf by employer and not one (1) percent, as embodied in the proposed PD 626. The framers of PD 626 agreed upon an assessment of one (1) percent contribution only from the employers considering that at the time there was a sort of recession in business. It was further provided that the principle of integration of benefits is adopted and redefinition of the coverage formula be made in the new law. Thus, the State Insurance Fund was created on the basis of actuarial computation which did not include payment of claims found compensable under the repealed WCA, and to insure its long-term stability and liquidity, the Code specifically provided for the disposition of said Fund, as follows: Art. 179. Investment of funds. Provisions of existing laws to the contrary notwithstanding, all revenues as are not needed to meet current operational expenses under this Title shall be accumulated in a fund to be known as the State Insurance Fund, which shall be used exclusively for payment of the benefits under this Title, and no amount thereof shall be used for any other purpose. All amounts accruing to the State Insurance Fund, which is hereby established in the SSS and GSIS, respectively, shall be deposited with any authorized depository bank approved by the Commission, or invested with due and prudent regard for the liquidity of the System" (emphasis supplied). The SIF is inherently self-operating and self-sustaining. Premium contributions of employers in the private sector and the public service constitute the sole financing source for its operations. Aside from financing payment of employees' compensation benefits and medical treatment under PD 626, as amended, it also makes possible other related services like physical, psychological and vocational rehabilitation, and placement of the disabled employee in gainful jobs which are all provided for under the new employees' compensation program. If allowed to operate as originally conceived, the SIF can generate greater benefits for workers which make for a more meaningful return for employer's premium contributions. In the light of the above circumstances, we respectfully submit that the order of this Honorable Court to the GSIS to pay the herein petitioner the benefits awarded under the provisions of the WCA may not be complied with without violating the above-quoted provision of Article 179 of the Labor Code and creating a threat to the stability of the Fund and the purpose for its creation considering the basis for its foundation and the number of claims that may yet be filed which were not contemplated by the framers of PD 626 following these precedent setting decisions of this Honorable Court regarding the application of the provisions of the old and the new law on workmen's compensation. ... (pp. 88-92, G.R. No. L-46992).

The respondent GSIS in support of its motion, pleads:

While there is no intention for evading at all the decision of this Honorable Court in this case where the old Workmen's Compensation Act was held applicable to a claim filed with the GSIS had decided to file the present Motion for Clarification in order to request his Honorable Court for a crystallization of the exact legal impact of the decision. It has occurred to us that if the old Workmen's Compensation Act is applicable since petitioner's illness of pulmonary tuberculosis was contracted as early as 1965, then the employer of petitioner should have paid petitioner's claim, especially if the employer has apparently failed to controvert the same within the terms of the old law. If the GSIS will now pay the claim which the employer should have paid in the first place and which it did

not pay, the, we shall be practically rewarding the employer with its gross failure to pay the claim. Stated differently, the GSIS is now held liable for a claim that should have been paid by the employer in the first place. Thus, in justice and in equity, the GSIS should have a right of reimbursement against petitioner's employer, which right, for purposes of expediency and to avoid multiplicity of suits and unnecessary expenses, could be enforced by the ECC. This Honorable Court stressed that the applicable law to petitioner's claim are the provisions of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, and not the provisions of the present Labor Code, upon the holding that petitioner's illness of pulmonary tuberculosis was contracted as early as September, 1965 and hence, his cause of action accrued as of that time, clearly prior to the effectivity, of the Labor Code. Petitioner's employer had long been liable to pay his claim If petitioner had a cause of action as early as September 1965, then, his employer, the Bureau of Lands was duty-bound to pay him at that time under the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which was applied in this case. There is no suggestion in the record that the Bureau of Lands ever controverter its liability to petitioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The rule is that such controversion must be made within fourteen (14) days from disability or ten (10) days from knowledge of the accident (Section 45, Workmen's Compensation Act).

xxx xxx xxx

It is thus crystal clear that the Bureau of Lands, as employer of petitioner, was liable to the petitioner long before the effectivity of the present Labor Code. More specifically, the Bureau of Lands was liable to the petitioner from September, 1965 to September, 1975. The Labor Code only took effect on January 1, 1975 and the filing of Workmen's Compensation claims was barred only on March 31, 1975. The GSIS should have a right of reimbursement from petitioner's employer. If the Bureau of Lands as employer of petitioner did not pay petitioner's claim without any legal justification, which is the compelling implication of the present decision, then the GSIS who now pays petitioner from the State Insurance Fund that it administers should have a right of reimbursement from the Bureau of Lands as to any amount that the GSIS may pay on account of petitioner's claim. It cannot be denied that under the old Workmen's Compensation Act, which was held to be controlling in this case, the GSIS and the State Insurance Fund are not at all liable. It is the employer who is liable to the petitioner under the old law. The present ECC contributions of the employers do not cover cases accruing prior to January 1, 1975, the date of the effectivity of the present Labor Code. If it does, there will be a deprivation of property without due process of law. Crystal clear, then, should be the right of the GSIS to recover payments made by it for and in behalf of an employer. The right of reimbursement of the GSIS from petitioner's employer is, therefore, but just, logical and reasonable because if the Bureau of Lands is not made to pay, then we will

be rewarding the Bureau of Lands for its unlawful failure to pay petitioner to the prejudice of the State Insurance Fund from which petitioner's claim will be paid. A basic principle is that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. The Bureau of Lands will be unjustly enriched at the expense of the State Insurance Fund. We believe that the right of reimbursement of the GSIS in this case finds parallelism with the recent ruling of this Honorable Court in B.F. Goodrich Inc. vs. WCC, L-42319, July 29, 1978, where this Honorable Court held that while a company may be held liable for the workmen's compensation claim of a security guard as his statutory employer, said company has a right of reimbursement from the security agency as the direct employer of the security guard under the terms of the security service contract between the company and the security agency. The ECC should have the power, after hearing, to direct petitioner's employer to reimburse the GSIS. For purposes of expediency and to avoid multiplicity for suits, it should be enough for the ECC to direct the employer, the Bureau of Lands, to pay the GSIS after hearing the employer as to any defenses that the employer may set up against the right of reimbursement, in order to serve the ends of due process. The ECC, it bears stressing, has full power and authority to proceed against an employer with the power to issue writs of execution. Article 181 (b) of the Labor Code provides as follows: "(b) In all other cases, decisions, orders and resolutions of the Commission which have become final and executory shall be enforced and executed in the same manner as decisions of the Court of First Instance, and the Commission shall have the power to issue to the city or provincial sheriff or to the sheriff whom it may appoint such writs for execution, as may be necessary for the enforcement of such decisions, orders or resolutions, and any person who shall fail or refuse to comply therewith shall, upon application by the Commission, be punished by the proper court for contempt." On the other hand, Sections 3 and 4 of Rule XVIII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, provide as follows: "Sec. 3. Other decisions. In all other cases involving payments to be made by the employer, decisions, orders and resolutions of the Commission en banc which have become final and executory shall be enforced and executed in the same manner as decisions for the court of First Instance and the Commission shall have the power to issue to the City or Provincial Sheriff or to the Sheriff it may appoint, such writs of execution as may be necessary for the enforcement of such decisions, order or resolutions" (emphasis supplied). "Sec. 4. Failure to comply. Any person or persons who fail or refuse to comply with the writ of execution issued by the Commission shall be punished for contempt by the proper court. In the case of corporation, trust, firm, partnership, association or any other entity, the manager or

officer-in-charge when the offense was committed, shall be held responsible." There is really no legal obstacle then for the ECC itself after due hearing to order petitioner's employer to reimburse to the GSIS whatever amounts the latter may pay petitioner on account of his claim. We may find juridical strength for this procedure in another recent ruling of this Honorable Court in Pajarito vs. Seeris, L-44627, December 14, 1978, where this Honorable Court held that the subsidiary liability of an employer may be enforced in the execution proceedings in the criminal case for reckless imprudence against the employee. This Honorable Court pronounced, speaking through Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio that the judgment in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, in the absence of any collusion, is conclusive upon the employer; that to require a separate action would prolong litigation and would mean unnecessary expenses; that the alleged employer's claim that he is no longer the employer could be conveniently litigated in the same criminal case, and that the rules should be liberally construed. Mr. Justice Antonio P. Barredo, in a concurring opinion in that case, declared that the only issues open are whether or not the alleged employer is still the employer and whether or not the driver is insolvent. So with this case. The only issue open is whether or not the GSIS has a right of reimbursement from the Bureau of Lands under the given circumstances. As in any other case where the cause of action is based on a right of reimbursement, the only defense that can be set up is that such right of reimbursement under the given circumstances does not exist. The employer can be given the necessary hearing by the ECC before any judgment is rendered by the latter against the employer. This is the most expedient procedure in the situation which does away with a separate action that will merely foment unnecessary litigation and expenses" (pp. 173-179, G.R. No. L-44061.).

In its motion in Caeja (G.R. No. L-46992), respondent GSIS further stated
It may, of course, be argued that the State Insurance Fund and the funds of the government employers are both government funds and it would not matter where the payment of ECC claims would come from. However, we submit that out government operates on much more complicated terms than what the Idea suggests. The government has numerous entities with their own distinct funds. It is not in line with sound management practice if the State Insurance Fund will be sacrificed to the benefit of other funds. The ability for the State Insurance Fund to meet rightful claims would be jeopardized by the indiscriminate payments. The Fund is newly created. Their reserve for payment of claims is actuarially determined on the basis of claims arising after January 1, 1975. As a fledging fund it deserves great concern and careful screening of claims in order to protect rightful claimants (p. 113, rec.).

By way of summation, respondent ECC casts doubt on the legality as the same is allegedly without legal basis to order respondent GSIS to pay the compensation benefits of the herein petitioners; on the other hand, respondent GSIS expresses its willingness to directly pay the benefits conditioned however on the affirmation by this Court in this resolution of its right to seek reimbursement from the herein employers of the petitioners.

All of the petitioners, except petitioner Felixberto Villones, conceded that the stand of the respondent GSIS best suits their predicament. Thus the comment in Corales submits that "the respondent GSIS is the proper government agency to make proper reimbursement, without prejudice to asking reimbursement from the employer, the Bureau of Lands. It is, therefore, a matter of inter-governmental official actions to carry into effect the corresponding reimbursement to the petitioners as directed by the Honorable Court. The delay would only work injustice to the petitioner who should be compensated at the earliest possible date" (pp. 218-220, rec., G.R. No. L-44063). In Barga, petitioner states in his February 14, 1981 comment that
... the main thrust of the motion for reconsideration is to shift the burden to the Commission on Audit altogether or at leas to obtain reimbursement from the latter. Respondent GSIS maintains that the Commission on Audit (COA), which is the petitioner's employer, should be held liable and not the GSIS since the cause of action arose prior to January 1, 1975. The issue is raised for the first time in the Motion for Reconsideration and has not been brought into play at the very beginning. It is akin to a question raised for the first time on appeal constituting a change in theory which is no longer permissible (Toribio vs. Decasa, 55 Phil. 561; Jimenez vs. Bucoy, 54 O.G. 7560; Agoncillo vs. Javier, 38 Phil. 481). In fact, respondent GSIS took cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the claim from its inception. It denied the claim not the COA but on the substantive ground of non-compensability. Surely, respondent is estopped from raising this issue for the first time on a motion for reconsideration after the lapse of more than five years. Assuming for argument's sake that the party liable is indeed the Commission on Audit, petitioner submits that in the interest of justice and equity, the remedy sought by GSIS to be granted the right of reimbursement is the most equitable and expedient solution instead of absolving GSIS from liability outright. This plea is based on equitable considerations. A finding that only the Commission on Audit is liable cannot be incorporated into an enforceable judgment herein since the COA is not party to this case. Such an eventuality will result in total negation of the decision of this Honorable Court declaring petitioner entitled to compensation. It will compel him to file a claim anew, go through the entirely new proceedings with all its concomitant delays and inconvenience. Petitioner originally filed his hospitalization, a substantial portion of which was borrowed from relatives. Almost six years have already lapsed and petitioner has not yet received the compensation rightfully due him. A further delay would render the reason and purpose of employee's compensation inutile. Thus the alternative offered by the respondent GSIS is, to petitioner's mind the most equitable and expedient. ... (pp., 143-144, rec., G.R. No. L-49227).

However, petitioner Felixberto Villones (G.R. No. L-46200) presents a different view:
Re: ECC'S Motion 1. Legal effect of the payment by GSIS of compensation and related benefits, etc. The point of clarification raised by respondent ECC is in itself vague and ambiguous. Petitioner, however, construes such query to mean whether or not GSIS will be violating

the Labor Code in effecting payment of benefits to petitioner on a claim based on a cause of action that accrued before the effectivity of the Labor Code. The negative resolution of this query cannot be over-emphasized. Petitioner's entitlement to benefits can be based on either the Workmen's Compensation Act or the Labor Code. As will be discussed herein presently, the sickness of petitioner's son falls within the scope of the definition of 'sickness' under both the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Labor Code. It is true that the Labor Code, as amended, does not give the concept of sickness as defined therein, the same meaning as it had under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Code restricts the kind of sickness that is compensable by the State Insurance Fund to include only sickness which is either (a) illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the ECC, or (b) any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions (Art. 167 [1] Labor Code, as amended). The ECC contends that only these kinds of sickness will serve as bases for the payment of income benefits (disability and/or death benefits) specified in the Labor Code. This was not under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there the concept of 'sickness' had a wider scope and included: (a) sickness that an employee incurred arising out of an in the course of employment, or (b) other illness directly caused by such employment, or (c) sickness aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment [Section 2]. What is clear from definitions set forth in Article 167 (1) is that the rules which had been given definitive meaning by jurisprudence under the Workmen's Compensation Act are now, according to ECC, no longer applicable. Thus, the presumption of compensability and the rule of the compensability of workaggravated sickness were replaced with the rule requiring proof of the increased risk of contracting sickness posed by employment as a prerequisite to compensation. The restricted meaning given to sickness considered compensable under the Labor Code does not, however, authorize the assertion that the concept of sickness delineated under the Code is totally different from the concept of sickness used and applied by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Indeed these two statures are similar in that both provide for the payment of benefits in respect of sickness caused by employment. It is in this area where the two statutes overlap. The Decision states, and the respondents accept, that the properly applicable governing law with respect to petitioner's cause of action is the Workmen's Compensation Act, based on the rule that "all acts or claims accruing prior to the effectivity of this Code shall be determined in accordance with the laws in force at the time of their accrual" (Section 294, Labor Code). The fact that the Workmen's Compensation Act is made applicable does not, however, deprive petitioner's claim of any basis for compensability under the Labor Code. The doctrine considered well-settled by the Decision holds the disease of tuberculosis as an occupational disease or as work-connected in such occupations as that of teacher, laborer, driver, land inspector, and hence compensable. This doctrine is supported by medical science as recognized by this Honorable Court in the Decision (citing Coralez vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, No. L-44063, August 25, 1978), thus: "Medical science has it that tuberculosis as an ailment is latent in man regardless of his age, sex and occupation. When given favorable conditions, this disease becomes active and prominent. Some of those favorable conditions are: too much physical exertion without the corresponding rest; exposure to excessive heat and cold; lack of good

food as to weaken the body constituents and contact with people suffering from tuberculoses ..." (Corales vs. ECC, supra). These factual conditions were present with respect to petitioner's son. The Decision succinctly states: "Considering, therefore, the undisputed nature of the deceased's employment as certified by the principal of Bongabon (South District), and in addition, the fact that he had plenty of homework to do after his regular working hours such as preparing the lesson plans for the next day's classes, correcting test papers and making various school reports and in doing all these, he would usually stay up late at night; that with a meager monthly pay of P297.60, with his parents, a sister, and two (2) brothers depending on him for support, he could barely afford to buy and eat good food; and that as such teacher, it becomes inevitable for him to be in constant contact with students and other types of people who may be afflicted with PTB, which is a highly communicable disease, it is not surprising that he should contract tuberculosis, so that from December 4 to 20, 1972, only five (5) months after he was employed as a teacher, he was forced to go on sick leave by reason of the foretasted illness. When he was able to resume work, he was again exposed to the same working conditions thus aggravating his illness until he suddenly died on September 2, 1975 of severe hemoptysis due to PTB as certified by Dr. Fernando B. Viloria" (emphasis supplied). And respondents in respecting the findings of facts as set forth in the Decision must therefore be bound by them as evidence of the "increased risk" of contracting tuberculoses as posed by the employment of petitioner's son. In Corales, supra, this Honorable Court found that petitioner's employment therein as a classroom teacher and later as a land investigator posed an increased risk of contracting tuberculosis, so must it be also in this case with respect to the employment of petitioner's son. There can be no question that when judged by the standards used in the Workmen's Compensation Act and its accompanying jurisprudence establishing the presumption of compensability when the sickness arose out of or in the course of employment, the sickness of petitioner's son is compensable. However, it ought to be just as unquestionable, that even judged by the standards imposed by the Labor Code, as earlier discussed, the sickness of petitioner's son is also compensable. Since the sickness of petitioner's son falls within the scope of the definitions of "sickness" under both the Workmen's Compensation Act and the Code, legal bases exist for the payment of benefits by respondent GSIS. And execution of the Decision by GSIS will not violate the stated policy in the Labor Code which enjoins the use of the funds accumulated in the State Insurance Fund for the exclusive purpose of paying the benefits under Title II, Book IV of the Code and not for any other purpose (Section 179, Labor Code ). Payment of the benefits specified in the Decision will therefore only effectuate the policy stated in Section 179, since the claim which the benefits seek to compensate comes within the scope of Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code in law and in fact. In a case squarely in point (Corales vs. Employees' Compensation Commission and Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. L-44063, February 27, 1979) where the Solicitor General (representing ECC) and the GSIS posited that tuberculosis is not an occupational disease with respect to Corales' employment, that presumption of compensability and the aggravation rule no longer exist under the Labor Code, that

payment of attorney's fees and administrative costs are not provided for under said Code, this Honorable Court declared, in unmistakably clear language, thus: "Petitioner's claim having accrued prior to the New Labor Code, the presumption of compensability, the principle of aggravation, the award of attorney's fees and the payment of administrative fees must be observed and applied. And the Employees Compensation Commission as the successor of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission is duty bound to observe and apply the foregoing principles in passing upon workmen's compensation. Moreover, as an agency of the State, the Employees' Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the workingmen, more specifically the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely a lot of meaningless patter" (emphasis supplied).

I As already noted, the stand of the respondent ECC is that the respective employers of the petitioners are the ones liable to pay the awarded benefits in these compensation claims; respondent GSIS, however, is willing to pay the awarded compensation benefits on the conditions that its right of reimbursement from the aforesaid employers of petitioners is recognized. Only petitioner Felixberto Villones does not entirely agree with the concession offered by the respondent GSIS. Respondent ECC is silent on the basis offer of respondent GSIS. Under the New Labor Code, it is the ECC which is empowered to initiate, rationalize and coordinate the policies of the employees' compensation program (Article 176 [a]), while the general conduct of operations and management functions of the GSIS is vested in its chief executive officer, who shall be responsible for carrying out the policies of the Commission [Art. 176(c)]. Under Article 177, the Commission approves rules and regulations governing the processing of claims and other settlement of disputes arising wherefrom as prescribed by the System (paragraph c); and may perform such other acts as it may deem appropriate for the attainment of the provisions of this Title (paragraph L). And Article 178 provides that all revenues collected by the System under this Title shall be deposited, invested, administered and disbursed in the same manner and under the same conditions, requirements, and safeguards as provided by Republic Act Numbered Eleven Hundred Sixty-One, as amended, with regard to such other funds as are thereunder being paid to or collected by the SSS and GSIS, respectively: Provided, That the Commission, SSS and GSIS may disburse each year not more than twelve percent (12%) of the contributions and investments earnings collected for operational expenses, including occupational health and safety programs, incidental to the carrying out of this Title. Respondent ECC's silence on the posture of respondent GSIS could be construed as acquiescence thereto.

It must be noted that GSIS seeks to pursue its claims for reimbursement against the employers of petitioners before the respondent ECC which, according to respondent GSIS, may take cognizance thereof by ordering the respective employers of the petitioners to reimburse whatever payments may be made by the respondent GSIS to the petitioners, but only after the employers are afforded a hearing, in which they may plead any defense to defeat the right of reimbursement of respondent GSIS. Under the premises, respondent GSIS' offered solution merits OUR approval. The reimbursement aspect will not be tainted with arbitrariness as due process is assured by affording the respective employers of petitioners; in these case opportunities to be heard. II With respect to the second and third points of clarification of the respondent ECC on the legal implications of the application by this Honorable Court of the ten (10) year prescriptive period to the claim filed in the present case (Corales) on claims filed under similar circumstances in relation to the provision in the New Labor Code on prescription of actions whereby all workmen's compensation claims accruing prior to January 1, 1975 are required to be filed not later than March 31, 1975, otherwise they shall be forever barred; and the legal basis for the Employees' Compensation Commission to assume jurisdiction over and apply the provisions of the repealed Workmen's Compensation Act to compensation cases involving causes of action accruing prior to January 1, 1975, the subject points of clarification sought for are clear from OUR pronouncement that the vested rights of claimants, whose cause of action accrued before the regime of the new compensation scheme, over the more favorable and compassionate provisions of the previous compensation statute, including the right to file their claims during the ten-year prescriptive period, should be recognized and respected. Consequently, respondents GSIS and ECC have jurisdiction over claims the causes of action of which arose during the effectivity of the old workmen's compensation law, which must be resolved by them on the basis of the provisions of the old workmen's compensation law which is more sympathetic to the plight of the working man as it is more expressive of the social justice guarantee of the supreme law of the land. As delineated above, petitioners whose causes of action accrued during the effectivity of the old compensation law and continued even after its repeal unto the regime of the new employees' compensation law, filed their respective claims for compensation only after the deadline set forth under the new law; but which deadline was ruled by this Court as not barring the claims of the petitioners as filed with the GSIS which under the new law is mandated to take cognizance of compensation claims, the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission and its regional branches being then in the process of folding up. Relevant to state at this point is the fact that herein petitioners (except petitioner Barga, who resumed working after his temporary disability), like claimant in the Romero case,

[77 SCRA 482, 489 (1977)], despite their medical disability, persisted in working by their sheer determination and ingenuity until their compulsory retirement (Corales), death (Villones), and mental incapacity (Caeja). It must also be noted that the new compensation law in fixing the March 31, 1975 deadline of filing claims accruing during the effectivity of the old compensation law with the regional offices (WCC) of the Department of Labor, overlooked the vested rights of claimants to file their claims within the ten-year prescriptive period recognized under the previous compensation law and jurisprudence. Hence, respondents GSIS and ECC as the only existing agencies presently entrusted by law with the processing of claims for compensation benefits have jurisdiction over the claims herein involved and over all claims of claimants similarly situated. (While P.D. 954, issued on July 6, 1976, empowered the Secretary [now Minister] of Labor to assume and exercise effective jurisdiction over workmen's compensation cases, this was however expressly limited to the power and authority to determine, dispose of and to take final action on workmen's compensation cases pending as of March 31, 1976 before the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the Workmen's Compensation Units in the regional offices of the Department [now Ministry] of Labor, and those case remanded or to be remanded by the Supreme Court for further proceedings). On this point, the views of counsel for petitioner Felixberto Villones is worth quoting, thus:
Obviously precipitated by this Honorable Court's decision in the present case, respondent ECC now, however, alleged that it is without jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's claims since "Workmen's compensation cases pending before the regional office of the then Department of Labor and the Workmen's Compensation Commission are to be adjudged by the Secretary (now Minister) of Labor and no one else." However, the fact that the claim was filed in the GSIS and then appealed to the ECC "does not militate against petitioner's claim for the filing of a claim in an office that has no authority to act on it can be treated as having been filed with the appropriate agency as long as it is filed within the period allowed by law" (Pobre vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 77 SCRA 315-320, May 31, 1977; Corales v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 88 SCRA 547, February 27, 1979). The rule ubi jus, ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy) can be properly applied to petitioner's claim. Based upon this rule, the creation of a new duty or obligation carried with it by implication a corresponding remedy to assure its observance since it is presumed that the law-making authority in enacting the statute intended that it become operative and effectual. If no particular procedure is prescribed it is implied that the right could be enforced through the appropriate or usual procedure already provided (Black, Statutory Construction, pp. 85-87). The repeal of the Workmen's Compensation Act neither abrogated petitioner's right nor deprived him of the remedy in vindication thereof. To disallow petitioner from enforcing his right through resort to the procedure established and to the entity made liable for payment of claims, under the Labor Code, would make illusory petitioner's right to

compensation arising from the loss of his son due to cause directly attributable to the latter's employment. As successor to the Workmen's Compensation Commission the ECC is made responsible for effectuating the same basic policies that the Workmen's Compensation Commission had been made to apply in respect of workers' welfare. In terminating the Workmen's Compensation program (Article 297, Labor Code) what the law effected was the transfer of liability from the employers under the Workmen's Compensation Act to either the GSIS or Social Security System as administrator of the State Insurance Fund which is funded by the employers themselves through the compulsory contributions, and not the extinguishment of liability under the Code. But it would seem that respondent ECC would have this Honorable Court interpret the Code so as to leave petitioner without remedy and thereby make the constitutional guarantees of social justice and protection of labor which justify the liberal construction of labor laws (Article 4, Labor Code; Article 1702, Civil Code) meaningless. xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, to sustain the stand of respondent ECC on this matter would result into a situation wherein herein claimants and others similarly circumstanced would have a bare right without any forum to enforce the same. A vested right rooted from a social legislation enacted pursuant to the social justice provision of the Constitution may not be rendered worthless by a literal construction of the pertinent provisions of the New Labor Code, which would thus inflict upon the petitioners and those equally situated the harshness of the arbitrary and constricted time limitation set forth in its Article 292. The President-Prime Minister, in promulgating the New Labor Code, did not deliverately intend to inflict such injustice on claimant employees and thereby deny them the social justice guaranteed by the Constitution he swore to uphold and defend. As long as this Supreme Tribunal exists and functions as the vital instrument of social justice, the aforesaid situation, will never be countenanced. III Respondent GSIS likewise pleads for the deletion of that portion of the Corales resolution which reads as follows:
It is rather disheartening to observe that the officials and agencies designated by the law to implement the social justice guarantee in the Constitution and the social legislation in favor of the working man lack the heart and compassion to accord a liberal interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Law and to resolve all doubts in favor of the employee as mandated by both the New Labor Code, the New Civil Code, and relevant jurisprudence.

Subsequently, however, this Court in the case of Felixberto Villones stated that
It is heartening to note that the ECC, in its Resolutions Nos. 233 and 432, respectively dated March 16, 1977 and July 20, 1977, adopted a more compassionate construction of the otherwise restrictive provisions of the New Labor Code ... by including in the list of

compensable ailments and diseases, cardiovascular disease which comprehends myocardial infarction, pneumonia and bronchial asthma.

Now, we add with enthusiasm our fulsome praise for the offer noble as it is magnanimous of Mr. Justice Manuel Lazaro as counsel of the Government Service Insurance System which certainly will alleviate the suffering of these destitute and needy claimants. WHEREFORE, THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY THE CLAIMANTS THE DECREED AWARDS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CASES, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM TO REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE RESPECTIVE EMPLOYERS OF THE CLAIMANTS OR OF THE DECEASED EMPLOYEE AFTER DUE HEARING. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-52254 January 30, 1982 MERCEDES ABADIANO, for and in behalf of the minors, Josephine, Rodolfo, Jose, Honorio, & Catalino, all surnamed Buenvenida, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM & EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC-Case No. 1334 entitled "Mercedes Abadiano etc., Appellant, vs. Government Service Insurance System, Respondent," dated December 6, 1979 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for income benefits for the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida resulting from cancer of the liver contracted by the decease during her employment. 1 The petitioner, Mercedes Abadiano, is the judicial guardian of the minor legitimate children of the deceased Catalina B. Buenvenida, namely, Josephine, Rodolfo, Jose, Honorio and Catalino, all surnamed Buenvenida.

On account of the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida, the petitioner filed a claim for compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended, with the Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim on the ground that the ailment that caused the death of Catalina B. Buenvenida is neither an occupational disease nor workrelated. From the adverse decision of the Government Service Insurance System, the petitioner appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which also denied the claim for death benefits and affirmed the ruling of the Government Service Insurance System in a decision rendered dated December 6, 1979. The facts, as found by the Employees' Compensation Commission, are:
The record shows that for about twenty four (24) years, the late Catalina Buenvenida was employed at the Department of Education (now Ministry of Education and Culture) as elementary grades teacher. Her last assignment as such teacher when her above-named ailment supervened was in Catbalogan III Elementary School in Catbalogan, Samar. Per certification of the deceased's attending physician Dr. Damaso J. Salinas Jr., of the Samar Provincial Hospital in Catbalogan, Saniar, the deceased's liver cancer started in September of 1978 as gradual weight loss, nausea and vomiting. These symptoms were later on accompanied by emaciation and gradual enlargement of the upper abdomen. The decedent was confined at the abovesaid hospital starting December 5, 1978, but apparently the deceased's ailment at that time could have already reached its terminal stage for on December 13, 1978, the decedent died. She was then 51 years of age and her death was attributed to her affliction of cancer of the liver. 2

The Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim on the following ground:
Carcinoma of the liver or liver cancer is definitely not accepted as an occupational disease in decedent's employment. The cause of cancer of the liver is not known, but medical authorities have observed that most cases are associated with However cirrhosis a form of liver pathology the basic lesion of which is diffuse liver cell death and the major cause of which is chronic alcohol ingestion plus impaired nutrition. 3

The petitioner contends that the claim is compensable because:

In implementing the aforesaid definition, the Rule implementing PD 626, as amended provides that For the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions" (Rule III, Section 1 [b]). Clearly, from the above Rule, where the ailment is not an occupational disease, it could still be considered a compensable ailment if it could be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by working conditions. Consequently, decedent ailment comes within the compensable coverage of the law for the simple reason that the risk of contracting decedent's fatal ailment, Cancer of the Liver, is increased by the working conditions. Admittedly, a teacher's work is very demanding, not only was decent subjected to the rigors of physical and mental stress and strain but also exposed to the vagaries of nature, She was overworked and underpaid and because of this she was unusually undernourished the latter being accepted by the Commission as one of the contributing factor in the irritation of the liver cell and eventually the development of cancer of the liver (p. 3, Decision). The fact that Cancer of the Liver is caused by some other etiological factors is of no moment in the face of what this Honorable Court stressing in the oft-quoted case of Abana vs. Quisumbing, 1968, which we quote:

While there is that possibility that factors other than the employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation of his illness, this is not a drawback to its compensability. For, under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that Ms Employment had contributed, even in a small degree, to the development of the disease. 4 The duties of the public school teacher are not confined to the classroom During the 24 years that Catalina B. Buenvenida worked as a teacher; she must have been exposed to the elements while attending to the outdoor projects which were part of the curriculum and extracurricular activities connected with her school work. The deceased, Cataline B. Buenvenida, was exposed to the elements, like inclement weather, heavy rains, typhoon as well as dust. These natural elements and unwholesome conditions are occupational hazards of a public school teacher. During the 24 years that the deceased served as public school teacher she must have gone hungry many times resulting in the weakened condition of her body.

In Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 5 this Court declared rectal cancer as compensable for the following reasons:
In the instant case, it is evident that rectal cancer is one of those borderline cases. Like, it is clear that the purpose of the resolution is to extend the applicability of the provisions of P.D. 626, thereby affording a greater number of employees the opportunity to avail of the benefits under the law. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State, as mandated by the Constitution and embodied in the New Labor Code, to give maximum aid and protection to labor. The Employees' Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man, more specially, the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely 'a lot of meaningless patter. (Santos vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 371 [1977]) As pointed out by no less than the respondent ECC itself in its Comment dated January 5, 1978 It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the list of occupational diseases. This comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC. Indeed, cancer has already been included as a qualified occupational disease in certain cases Occupational Diseases l. Cancer of the pitelial lining of the bladder (Papilloma of the bladder) 2. Cancer epithellomatoma or ulceration of the skin of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar, pitch, bitumem, mineral oil or paraffinor any compound product or residue of any of Nature of Employment Work involving exposure to alphanaphtylamine betanapthy lamine or. benzidine or any part of the salts; and auramine magenta. The use or handling of, exposure to tar, pitch, bitumen mineral oil (include paraffin) soot or any compound product or residue of any of these

these substances xxx 16. Cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses 17. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain

substances xxx Vinyl chloride workers, plastic workers Vinyl chloride workers, plastic workers

Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known etiology Yet, they are regarded as occupational. The clear implication is that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection (pp. 59-60, rec., emphasis supplied). From the foregoing statements, it is palpable that the respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford maximum aid and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual causes or factors which led to the decedent's rectal malignancy would not be consistent with this liberal interpretation. It is of universal acceptance that practically all kinds of cancer belong to the class of clinical diseases whose exact etiology cause or origin, is unknown. It is in this regard that the evidence submitted by the petitioner deserves serious consideration. 6

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby directed: (1) To pay the petitioner the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) as death benefits; and (2) To reimburse the petitioner of medical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-57416 January 30, 1982 BAYANI DATOR, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1458, entitled "Bayani Dator, Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System, (Municipal Government of Lopez, Quezon), Respondent", affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim for benefits under PD No. 626, as amended, for the death of Wenifreda Dator. 1 The petitioner, Bayani Dator, is the surviving spouse of the late Wenifreda Dator who was a municipal librarian of the Municipality of Lopez, Quezon when she died of Bronchogenic Carcinoma with Pleural Effusion on December 2, 1972. The facts, as found by the Employees' Compensation Commission, are:
The deceased was a municipal librarian of Lopez, Quezon from 1963 up to November 11, 1978 when she was forced to seek disability retirement due to her ailment. She sought treatment from the Magsaysay Memorial Hospital in Lopez, Quezon and the Quezon Institute in Quezon City but her condition did not improve. Subsequently, she was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital where she finally succumbed to her illness of February 2, 1979. Blaming the decedent's employment as librarian for her death, the appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626, as amended, with the respondent System. Respondent, however, denied appellant's claim on the ground that the decedent's illness is not an occupational disease considering her particular work. 2

The Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim because:

Bronchogenic carcinoma is the most common form of malignancy in males, reaching a peak between the fifth and seventh decades and accounting for 1 in 4 male cancer deaths. The sex incidence is at least 5 to 1, male to female. Extensive statistical analysis by medical authorities has confirmed the relationship between lung cancer and heavy cigarette smoking. It has been demonstrated that the more cigarettes a person smokes, the greater is his risk of developing lung cancer. Other factors that may have potential roles are air pollution, exposure to ionizing radiation, exposure to chromates, metallic iron and iron oxides, arsenic, nickel, berylluim and asbestos. There is no conclusive evidence, however, that community air pollution is a causal factor. On the other hand, pleural effusion is the presence of fluid in the pleural cavity and when present in a patient with a lung cancer is an indication that, the pleural is already affected. (Ref.: Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine by Wintrobe et al, 7th ed., pp. 1323-1324) 3

Until now the cause of cancer is not known. Despite this fact, however, the Employees' Compensation Commission has listed some kinds of cancer as compensable. There is no reason why cancer of the lungs should not be considered as a compensable disease. The deceased worked as a librarian for about 15 years. During all that period she was exposed to dusty books and other deleterious substances in the library under unsanitary conditions. In the case of Cristobal vs. ECC (Ibid.) cited earlier, this Court ruled:

xxx xxx xxx ... As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work- connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. All these factual and legal grounds were considered in relation to each other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing US to resolve that rectal cancer is compensable.

Although, Wenifreda Dator died only on December 2, 1979, it is possible that the disease must have supervened before the Amended Labor Code took effect. Even if the illness occurred after the Amended Labor Code had taken effect, the illness of the deceased should be considered compensable. In the same case of Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, supra, this Court said:
To establish compensability of the claim under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion" (Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. Respondents however insist on evidence which would establish direct causal relation between the disease rectal cancer and the employment of the deceased. Such a strict requirement which even medical experts in the field cannot support considering the uncertainty of the nature of the disease would negate the principle of liberality in the matter of evidence. Apparently, what the law merely requires is a reasonable work-connection and not a direct causal relation. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the new Labor Code which states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor." In urging that the disease rectal cancer is not compensable since its nature or cause is unknown and petitioner was not able to show proof of direct causal relation, respondents would instruct us to ignore the above provision of law and the policy of the State of giving maximum aid and protection to labor as We have stated earlier in the main decision. As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general still subsists. All these factual and legal relation to each other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing Us to resolve that rectal cancer 5 is compensable.

Under the established facts of the case, the death of Wenifreda Dator caused by bronchogenic carcinoma with pleural effusion is compensable. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered: (1) To pay the petitioner the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00) as death benefits. (2) To reimburse the petitioner medical and hospital expenses duly supported by proper receipts; and (3) To pay petitioner the sum of ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P1,200.00) as funeral expenses. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and Plana JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: For the reason that bronchogenic carcinoma is not an occupational disease considering the deceased's particular work as municipal librarian, nor has tile claimant shown proof of work-connection, I vote to affirm the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission.

Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: For the reason that bronchogenic carcinoma is not an occupational disease considering the deceased's particular work as municipal librarian, nor has tile claimant shown proof of work-connection, I vote to affirm the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-52058 February 25, 1982 PERFECTO JARILLO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Department of Engineering, Quezon City), respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated September 27, 1979 of respondent Employees' Compensation Commission, which affirmed the decision of respondent Government Service Insurance System denying the claim of herein petitioner for disability benefits on the ground that his ailment-senile cataract-is not an occupational disease taking into consideration the nature of his particular work (p. 25, rec.). The following facts are not disputed: Petitioner Perfecto Jarilloborn on February 27, 1916entered government service on January 1, 1955 as a temporary laborer in the Department of Engineering, Quezon City. On July 1, he was designated as construction worker in the same office, and it was the same position held until his retirement on August 31, 1977 (pp. 61-62, rec.). He received pension benefits under Republic Act No. 660 in the total sum of P5,229.97 (p. 3, NLRC rec.). On January 24, 1975, he was admitted to the UST Hospital under the care of Dr. Jose L. Duran, who performed a cataract operation on his right eye on January 30, 1979 (p. 23, rec.). On September 13 to 28, 1977, petitioner was again hospitalized at the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital where he was operated on for lens extraction, intracapsular with peripheral iridectomy, this time on his left eye (p. 24, rec.). Prior to this second operation or on April 15, 1977 (p. 9, ECC rec.), petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under P.D. No. 626. This claim was denied on April 18,1977 by means of a letter signed by Daniel N. Mijares Manager of the Employees' Compensation Department of respondent GSIS. Said letter-denial is quoted hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx

Please be advised that the same cannot be given due course on the ground that your ailment, Senile Cataract, is not an occupational disease taking into consideration the nature of your particular work. An occupational disease is one which is characteristic of or peculiar to a particular grade, occupation, process or employment and to exclude all diseases of life to which the general public is exposed. Senile Cataract is opacity of the leds resulting from degenerative changes, an aging process. Under the aforesaid decree, only the following types are considered occupational: (a) Cataract produced by frequent exposure to the glare of, or rays from molten glass or red hot metal (b) Cataract due to ionizing radiations, and (c) Cataract due to trauma. Upon evaluation based on generally accepted medical authorities, your ailment is found not to be in the least causally related to your duties and conditions of work. We believe that your ailment is principally traceable to factors which are definitely not workconnected. Moreover, the evidences you have submitted are not sufficient for us to establish that this ailment is the direct result of your occupation or employment as a Construction Helper in the Department of Engineering, Diliman, Quezon City ... (p. 25, rec.).

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above letter-denial on November 14,1978, which was likewise denied by the respondent GSIS on December 14,1978 (p. 12, ECC rec.). On appeal to respondent ECC, the latter rendered a decision dated September 27, 1979, affirming the opinion of Manager Mijares, pertinent portions of which read as follows:
Senile cataract does not fall under the list of occupational diseases. Only the following types of cataract are considered occupational: (1) cataract produced by frequent exposure to the glare of, or rays from molten glass or red hot metal (2) cataract due to ionizing radiation and (3) cataract due to trauma. There is no proof presented by claimant to show that a direct causal relationship exists between the above disease and the employee's occupation as Construction helper in the Department of Engineering, Diliman, Quezon City. This case is not compensable and it is therefore recommended that the decision of the GSIS denying the claim be affirmed. Environmental facts of the case considered, we find no cogent reason to disturb the conclusion arrived at by the respondent System that appellant's senile cataract, although it supervened in the course of his employment, developed independently from his employment and therefore the disability arising from the same falls outside the scope of the compensatory purview of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended (pp. 31-32, rec.).

Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner argues that the possible cause of his illness is the condition of the place of his work and the construction material he is exposed to while working as a construction worker, such as the hot asphalt and the heat of the sun. He also claims that the blurring

of his vision started when, on one occasion in January 1975-while he was lifting a bag of cement-the bag gave way and particles of cement lodged in his two eyes; that after such incident, his right eye was operated on for acute glaucoma or cataract; and that since then, he felt that his left eye had a gradual blurring of vision which became severe prior to his confinement and operation in September 1977 (pp. 15-16, rec.). On the other hand, respondent insists that petitioner's plaintiff is not compensable because it is neither an occupational disease listed by the commission nor workconnected. "Under the Labor Code, cataract to be compensable must result from frequent and prolonged exposure to the glare of, or rays from molten glass or red hot metal (Please see p. 3 of respondent's quoting paragraph 3 of the listing of Occupational Disease, p. 63, rec.). Respondent further argues:
Senile cataract ,which petitioner's ailment is not a listed occupational disease pursuant to Annex A' of the Rules on Employees' Compensation. Senile cataract, as defined, is the most common form of cataract occurring after the age of fifty (50) due to aging or degenerative changes [Adlers Textbook of Ophthalmology by Schele and Albert 8th Edition, 1968, pp. 281-282]. It is a risk or hazard to which all persons are exposed regardless of whether they are employed or not, the same (Senile Cataract) being attributed to degenerative changes or to aging process. Petitioner makes an attempt to show that his illness is 'Traumatic Cataract' and, therefore, compensable by claiming that on one occasion, a bag of cement broke and his face and eyes were covered with cement that the cement-that got into his eyes was the cause of his cataract. Petitioner's posture, however, is belied by the finding of his physician that petitioner's cataract ailment is "senile and mature" which by its terms, implies that the same is due to degenerative process (p. 64, rec.).

The only issue presented for resolution is whether or not petitioner's illness cataract is compensable under the provisions of P.D. No. 626, as amended. The Rules on Employees' Compensation, Annex A Listing of Occupational Diseases mentions only one kind of cataract as compensable, i.e., cataract produced by exposure to the glare of, or rays from molten or red hot metal (par. 3, Occupational Diseases, Annex "A" to Rules on Employees) Compensation which took effect on January 1, 1975). The said list is, however, not exclusive, as borne by the provisions of 167(l) of I.D. No. 442, as amended by P.D. 626 [amendment as of August 31, 1977, the date of disability retirement of petitioner], which reads: "Sickness means any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or my illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions."

The administrative officer of the Department of Engineering of Quezon City, Mr. Paterno S. Lopez, has issued a certification (p. 13,ECC rec.) to the effect that petitioner's actual duties as construction helper are as follows:
(a) asphalting of roads 40%; (b) spot patching of roads 30%; (c) cutting grass 15%; (d) cleaning of clogged canals 10%; (e) other duties 57%;

As found by respondent Commission, petitioner's medical records reveal that his ailment of mature senile cataract, bilateral, started as bluring of vision of both eyes. This blurring of vision subsequently became progressive accompanied by occasional lacrimination, and on June 30, 1975, petitioner underwent "cataract operation O.D. at the UST Hospital under the professional care of Dr. Jose L. Duran. After about two years, on September 13, 1977, petitioner's left eye also underwent cataract operation medically known as "lens extraction intracapsular with peripheral iridectomy, O.S." at the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital under the able hands of Dr. Herbert Barrios (p. 27, rec.). From the nature of petitioner's duties, there is no doubt that the risk of contracting cataract was increased by his working conditions. His duties as construction worker keeps him on the road seventy percent (70%) of his working time, and ninety-five percent (95%) outdoors. This must have exposed him to the sun's glare and heat, as well as to excessive dirt and dust. The appealed decision of respondent Commission presents an etiological classification of cataract, as follows:
... (1) Congenital cataract the most common cause of which is heredity (2) Secondary or after cataract [one which occurs after certain forms of cataract extractions]; (3) complicated cataract one caused by disease of the uveal tract, pigmentery retinal degeneration, absolute glaucoma. retinal detachment and old injuries; (4) traumatic cataract - caused by blunt or penetrating injuries to the eye, introcular foreign bodies, radiation and high voltage electricity; (5) toxic cataract- brought about by certain drugs such as ergot, dinetrophenol, naphalene, phenothriazines, and triparanol; (6) senile cataract- the most common form of cataract occuring after the age of fifty due to aging or degenerative changes (p.5 of Decision citing Adlers's Textbook of Opthalmology by H. Shele and Albert, 8th edition,1968,pp. 281-282; emphasis supplied [p.30,rec.].

Lighting electric and heat ray cataracts are explained in a medivcal manual, as follows:
Lighting, electric and heat ray cataracts-Persons struck by lighting or shocked by a high voltage electric current may develop bilateral lens opacities beginning in the posterior and anterior cortex of the lens. These opacities become visible more rapidly than those of radiation cataract. Operation is indicated by linear extraction in young individuals and combined extraction in persons over thirty-five years of age. Long continued exposure to high temperatures in the glass-blowing and iron-puddling industries may give rise to slow progressing posterior cortical lens opacities which require the same treatment (Charles A. Perrera, Diseases of the Eye, 1953, p. 272).

Petitioner's cataract could also be traumatic cataract caused by cement that entered his eyes when a bag of cement broke. Cement is so caustic that it can easily irritate the skin and even destroy rubber or leather. In the case of Cerezo vs. ECC, et al. (93 SCRA 680, 684 [1979]), this Court through Mr. Justice Vicente Abad Santos upheld the claim of Alberto Cerezo whose illness osteoarthritiswas likewise not listed as an occupational disease in Annex "A" [of the Rules on Employees' Compensation, as ammended, under theory of increased risk.
Petitioners work experience as narrated above justifies the same conclusion which was reached in ECC Case No. 0571 (Fortunata Cadangog vs. GSIS, decided on May 10, 1978). In making this conclusion, We have kept in mind that the social and humane character of the law leans towards compassion and compensability. Advancing age, as in this case, may have caused or contributed to the development of the ailment but it is not a drawback for what is material and decisive is that the employment contributed even in a small degree in aggravating the ailment (see Natividad vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, No. L-42340, August 31, 1978, 85 SCRA 115).

In the light of the foregoing, petitioner is entitled to income benefits for disability pursuant to Section 192 of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. Since he as not represented by a private counsel, no award for attorney's fees is made herein. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY REVERSED AND THE RESPONDENT GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED. 1. TO PAY HEREIN PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS INCOME BENEFITS; AND 2. TO REFUND PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS. SO ORDERED. Fernandez, Guerrero and Plana, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: Consistent with my dissent in other cases, my view is that the present claim is not compensable. The ailment of petitioner-"senile cataract"-not being causally connected with his work as a construction worker in the Department of Engineering, Diliman, Quezon City, nor was the risk of contracting it aggravated by the nature of his duties, I vote to affirm the Decision of respondent Commission. "Hot asphalt" and the "heat of the sun" can by no means be likened to the "glare of, or rays from molten glass or red hot metal," cataract due to which is considered as an occupational disease. The claim that petitioner's cataract may be considered as "traumatic cataract," and, therefore, legally compensable, because it was caused by particles of cement, which is caustic in nature, that entered his eyes when a bag of cement he was carrying broke, has not been proven. His own physician characterized his cataract as "senile and mature". Besides, particles of cement entering the eye would cause "corneal opacity" rather than lens injury or cataract development. In other words, whether as a construction worker or not, petitioner would have developed "senile cataract", due to aging. The ailment is not labor connected. Until "senile cataract" is included in the list of occupational diseases, I firmly believe that we should not substitute our judgment for that of respondent Commission, which acted within the purview of its jurisdiction.

Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: Consistent with my dissent in other cases, my view is that the present claim is not compensable. The ailment of petitioner-"senile cataract"-not being causally connected with his work as a construction worker in the Department of Engineering, Diliman, Quezon City, nor was the risk of contracting it aggravated by the nature of his duties, I vote to affirm the Decision of respondent Commission. "Hot asphalt" and the "heat of the sun" can by no means be likened to the "glare of, or rays from molten glass or red hot metal," cataract due to which is considered as an occupational disease. The claim that petitioner's cataract may be considered as "traumatic cataract," and, therefore, legally compensable, because it was caused by particles of cement, which is caustic in nature, that entered his eyes when a bag of cement he was carrying broke, has not been proven. His own physician characterized

his cataract as "senile and mature". Besides, particles of cement entering the eye would cause "corneal opacity" rather than lens injury or cataract development. In other words, whether as a construction worker or not, petitioner would have developed "senile cataract", due to aging. The ailment is not labor connected. Until "senile cataract" is included in the list of occupational diseases, I firmly believe that we should not substitute our judgment for that of respondent Commission, which Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-52363 March 30, 1982 OFELIA G. DURAN, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.: This is a petition to review the October 31, 1979 decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1190 affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits under P.D. No. 626, as amended (pp. 8 and 17, rec., and p. 99, ECC rec.). Petitioner Ofelia G. Duran is the widow of Municipal Judge Restituto Duran, who died on April 28, 1977 at the age of 63 years after more than 33 years of service in the government, almost 25 years of which were spent in the Judiciary (p. 71, ECC rec. and per attached service record). The records show that petitioner's late husband entered the government service on October 15, 1941 as an employee in the Department of Finance. He joined the Judiciary on May 31, 1952 as justice of the peace of the municipalities of Basay Sta. Rita and Marabut, province of Samar (pp. 8 and 72, rec.). He was the municipal judge of Sta. Rita, Samar when, after prolonged (5 years) ailments, he succumbed to acute monocytic leukemia on April 28, 1977 (p. 71, ECC rec. and p. 10, rec.). The medical history of the deceased judge reveals that from March, 1972 to April, 1977 he was treated and hospitalized for castralgia, angina pectoris, gouty arthritis, myofascitis, coronary insufficiency, hypocalcenia with cramps and monocytic leukemia.

He also underwent an operation of his left big toe termed as tophectomy. Specifically, Judge Duran's medical history is thus traced:
1. Initially treated for castralgia at the Regional Health Office No. 1 in Catbalogan, Samar (date not determined) [p. 17, rec]. 2. March 14-18, 1972 confined at Bethany Hospital, Tacloban City, for treatment of angina pectoris ASHD, gout arthritis, myofascitis (back) and labile hypertension (pp. 32 and 33, rec.). 3. April 11-14, 1973 hospitalized in aforenamed hospital for arthritis (gouty, with tophie), coronary insufficiency and hypocalcenia with cramps [p. 25, rec.]. 4. October 8-18, 1973 confined for treatment of arthritis (gouty, with tophaceous deposits ear, big toes), coronary insufficiency; underwent tophectomy [p. 26, rec.]. 5. November 10-17, 1976 hospitalized for gouty arthritis (multiple, severe, knee joints, wrist, metacarpophalangeal, metatarsophalangeal knee and ankle joints) [p. 27, rec.]. 6. March 1-8, 1977 confined for treatment of gouty arthritis (multiple, severe, wrist, metacarpophalangeal, metatarsophalangeal, knee and ankle joints, recurrent) wound [infected, terminal end, 4th digit, foot, left] and coronary insufficiency (mild, acute) [p. 28, rec.]. 7. April 11-14, 1977 hospitalized for gouty arthritis (chronic, recurrent) and monocytic leukemia [p. 29, rec.], and 8. April 28, 1977 death due to acute monocytic leukemia (p. 18, rec. and p. 71, ECC rec.).

On March 14, 1978, petitioner filed her claim with the GSIS for income (death) benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, which claim was denied on March 28, 1978 [pp. 80 and 83, ECC rec.]. Petitioner filed her letter requesting reconsideration of aforesaid denial on June 23, 1978 (p. 85, ECC rec.). In its letter of June 30, 1978, the GSIS denied reconsideration of its previous action (p. 86, ECC rec.). On January 19, 1979, petitioner appealed to respondent Commission. Respondent Commission, in its decision dated October 31, 1979 affirmed the denial of the claim by the GSIS. The Commission thus ruled:
We find the respondent System's ruling to be in accord with the law and therefore find no cogent reason to disturb the same. Under the present Employees' Compensation Program, in order that a sickness and its resulting disability or death is deemed compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules with the conditions therein satisfied; otherwise, it must be proven that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions. Definitely, leukemia is not an occupational disease considering the decedent's work. It is therefore farfetched to attribute said ailment to the nature and conditions of his work, considering that it is medically accepted that such ailment is caused by external factors unrelated to employment (pp. 21 and 22, rec. and pp. 93 and 94, ECC rec.).

The aforequoted ruling on non-compensability was anchored on the report of the ECC medical officer which states that
The cause of death in the instant case is acute monocytic leukemia. There are no indications from the records of the instant case that the deceased, a former Municipal Judge, in the course of his work had been exposed to factors listed above that may have caused the disease. It has been alleged that the disease could have resulted from the prolonged treatment that he underwent for gouty arthritis. Granting, however that this is true, the same still could not be considered compensable since the disease for which the treatment was given is not occupational nor work- connected" (p. 91, ECC rec.).

Hence, this petition. Petitioner alleges that as a municipal judge, Restituto Duran conducted hearings, went on ocular inspections, settled disputes between parties by amicable settlement or by mediation outside of the courtroom, and accepted speaking engagements at conferences and seminars. In the performance of his duties as a judge, it was not unusual for him to wade through brooks and streams in an effort to implement the government policy of bringing the courts closer to the people. As a consequence of this work schedule of Judge Duran which continued for a period of more than 20 years of dedicated service, he developed arthritis and simultaneously, he began to show symptoms of a heart disease. At one time, he collapsed while holding session and he was rushed by means of a pumpboat to the Bethany Hospital in Tacloban City where he was medically found "to be suffering from coronary insufficiency which was aggravated by his arthritis" (pp. 9, 95 and 96, rec.). In ruling out compensability of this claim, respondent Commission, through the Solicitor General, contends that "while Restituto Duran contracted his illness (coronary insufficiency) during his employment, his death for which his wife seeks compensation was not due to this sickness but to leukemia. This rules out the recovery of death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act, for coronary insufficiency. Neither may recovery be had under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Article 166 thereof is explicit that employees and their dependents may secure income benefits and medical or related benefits, in case of work-connected disability or death" (pp. 76-77, rec.). WE fully agree with petitioner. And WE find respondent Commission's affirmance of the denial of the claim by the GSIS as a refusal to adhere to OUR previous pronouncements on compensation cases and recognize certain established medical findings on the matter. The decision of respondent Commission reflects its stereotyped handling of compensation claims long recognized as predicated on the social justice clause of our Constitution. The deceased judge started working as justice of the peace in 1952. His station covered the towns of Basay, Sta. Rita and Marabut. He became the municipal judge of Sta. Rita on April 1, 1964. He was afflicted with and initially treated for angina pectoris on March 14 to 18, 1972. During the succeeding years 1973-1977 he was treated and hospitalized for gouty arthritis, coronary insufficiency, myofascitis and labile hypertension. He finally died of acute monocytic leukemia on April 28, 1977.

Petitioner has sufficiently established and respondent Commission has in fact admitted that as justice of the peace and judge, deceased served in three municipalities which did not have adequate transportation facilities. Sta. Rita alone where Judge Duran spent his last 13 years as municipal judge has 31 barrios. Obviously, land transportation was not then developed nor easily available since Judge Duran travelled mostly by foot or banca. It has also been shown and admitted that aside from his regular duties of conducting hearings and making ocular inspections, he went beyond his courtroom to settle disputes between parties by amicable settlement or mediation and to speak at conferences and seminars. And in the performance of such duties, it was normal to see him wade through streams or ride in bancas. It requires simple imagination to picture the experience that the deceased judge had gone through just so he could dispense justice even if it meant giving more of himself than what was normally expected of him. He walked long distances and forged streams under variable weather conditions. He was literally exposed to the elements the sun, rain, water and rough roads. He worked as if he were a fieldman; he was a roving judge. The tedious work coupled with unhealthy exposure bore down on him after 20 years. He must have been a strong, healthy person when he first joined the Judiciary because it took all of 20 years before he suffered from angina pectoris, gouty arthritis, coronary insufficiency and monocytic leukemia. Needless to say, the human body can only take so much physical and mental pressures. Some courts of the United States have ruled that an illness caused by unusual exposure may be a disease resulting from accidental injury (Idaho-Hoffman v. Consumers Water Co., 99 P. 2d 919, 920, 61 Idaho 226), as where it was caused by working with portions of deceased's body under water under unusual conditions [Ala.Pow v. Southern Const. Co., 180 So, 288, 235 Ala. 580], or by undue exposure to extreme cold, or to sudden changes in temperature, or by an unexpected exposure to cold drafts (p. 549, Vol. 99, C.J.S.). Thus, in Lao vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., L- 50918, May 17, 1980, 97 SCRA 780, WE enunciated:
It should be stressed that as early as 1960, this Court, in the case of MRR vs. WCC & Pineda, ruled that compensability is not affected by the pressure of extraneous factors causing or accelerating a claimant's illness. In reiteration, it further stated that "while there is that possibility that factors other than the employment of the claimant may also have contributed to the aggravation of his illness is not a drawback to its compensability. For, under the law, it is not required that the employment be the sole factor in the growth, development or acceleration of claimant's illness to entitle him to the benefits provided for. It is enough that his employment had contributed, even if a small degree, to the development of the disease". ...

Respondent Commission drastically ruled that "leukemia is not an occupational disease considering the decedent's work" and that "it is therefore farfetched to attribute said ailment to the nature and conditions of his work, considering that it is medically accepted that such ailment is caused by external factors unrelated to employment." While aforesaid averment may be given weight, the same is not altogether accurate

considering that respondent Commission miserably failed to consider the established medical finding that leukemia could be a complication or an after-effect of prolonged treatment of coronary insufficiency and gouty arthritis. The following medical findings must have been overlooked or simply ignored by respondent Commission:
Cause. The precise cause of leukemia is unknown. Much research has been directed toward exploring the possibility of a virus or a genetic defect as the cause. Experiments have produced findings that support viral origin in animals. Evidence of possible viral origin in humans is inconclusive (p. 532, Encyclopedia & Dictionary of Medicine & Nursing, Miller-Keane, 1972 ed, emphasis supplied). In acute leukemia unregulated accumulation of immature leukocytes results in a compromise of organ function most marked in the bone marrow but also occurring in other tissues that become infiltrated with the immature cells. The cause of acute leukemia is unknown, but both genetic and environmental factors are important. Acute leukemia is a complication of irradiation, benzene exposure, and marrow aplasia due to chloramphenical, arsenic, and phenylbutazone (p. 269, Manual of Clinical Problems in Internal Medicine, Annotated with Key References, Second Edition by Jerry L. Spivak, M.D. & H. Verdain Barnes, M.D., emphasis supplied). Chemical agents. The leukemia which follow exposure to chemical agents are unusually of the varieties of acute or chronic myelogenous leukemia rather than the lymphocytic type. Occupational exposure to benzol and possibly other chemicals is associated with an increased incidence of leukemia. Certain drugs, such as chloramphenicol and phenybultazone which are known to cause bone marrow depression, are probably also leukemogenic, although the risk is not great. ... (Harrison's Principles of Internal Medicine, p. 1768, Eighth Edition, emphasis supplied).

It must be borne in mind that from March, 1972 to April 28, 1977, decedent was treated and hospitalized for angina pectoris, coronary insufficiency, gouty arthritis and finally, acute monocytic leukemia. As part of his treatment, he was continuously given analgesics and antibiotics. As shown by the aforequoted medical findings, chloramphenicol is the technical name for antibiotics and phenybultazone for antirheumatic drugs. It has also been found that such medicines, when taken consistently for a long period of time, can be leukemogenic or can cause monocytic leukemia as a complication. There is an element of certainty in aforesaid findings; otherwise, medical authorities will not attest the same. Very significantly, respondent Commission has somehow provided an opening through which petitioner can pursue and did pursue her assertion that there is all the possibility that the fatal disease of monocytic leukemia could have been directly caused by the prolonged medication for gouty arthritis and coronary insufficiency. The following portion of the report of the ECC Medical Division which has been quoted by said Commission thus reveals:
xxx xxx xxx It has been alleged that the disease could have resulted from the prolonged treatment that he underwent for gouty arthritis. Granting, however, that this is true, the same still could not be considered compensable since the disease for which the treatment was given is not occupational nor work-connected (p. 22, rec.).

Since the work-connection or causal relationship upon which the above assumption would be based has been sufficiently established, cause of the fatal ailment of decedent now becomes a fact. Thus, in Enriquez vs. WCC, et al. (L-42640, September 28, 1979, 93 SCRA 366), WE stated:
Where the primary injury is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant's own negligence or misconduct (1 Larson Workmen's Compensation Law 3 279 [1972]). Simply stated, all the medical consequences and sequelae that flow from the primary injury are compensable (ibid).

It has been also held that "where, without the fault of the employee, his original compensable injury is aggravated by medical or surgical treatment, there is such a causal connection between the original injury and the resulting disability or death as to make them compensable" (Cal. Corpus Juris cited in Heaton v. Karland, 166 P. 2d, 857, 859, 27 C. 2d 716) "even though the treatment was skillful" (Ala-Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Shelby, 106 So. 499, 214 Ala. 87] and "regardless of whether the doctor was furnished by th employer, insurer, or was selected by the employee" (Cal.Fitzpatrick v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 60 P. 2d 267, 7 C2d 230) [p. 670, C.J.S. Vol. 99] Thus, too, it has been ruled that "if the employee suffers a compensable injury and thereafter suffers further disability which is the proximate result of the original injury received, such further disability is compensable" (U.S.-Cyr v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co., C.A. Cal. 211 F. 2d 454) [p. 607, Vol. 99, C.J.S.]. In deciding on the compensability of petitioner's claim for death benefits, WE reiterated in LaO vs. ECC, et al. (supra):
In the Abana case, this Court further stated that the mere opinion of doctors regarding the non-causality of unknown illnesses cannot prevail over the presumption established by law. It is, therefore, clear, as in the instant case, that where the cause of the illness of the claimant or of the death of the deceased is not definitely determinable, the medical report of the findings presented by respondent employer (the ECC or GSIS) does not or cannot constitute substantial evidence to prevail over the presumptions of compensability and aggravation and thus defeat the compensability of the claim. xxx xxx xxx Furthermore, in the case of Flores vs. WCC, et al., (L-43540, March 14, 1979), this Court emphatically ruled that the exact medical cause of the illness of an employee is not significant, for, granted for argument's sake, that the evidence of the claimant is sufficient to show a causal link between the nature of his employment and his ailment, it is to be presumed that the claimant's illness which supervened at the time of his employment, either arose out of, or was at least aggravated by, said employment, and that with this legal presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the employer, and the employee is relieved of the burden to show causation.

Evidently, petitioner's claim for death benefits falls within the coverage of the Workman's Compensation Act since decedent's original ailments were contracted in March, 1972 when the cause of action accrued and before the effectivity of the New Labor Code (Corales vs. ECC, et al., 88 SCRA 547, 1979). WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM IS HEREBY ORDERED 1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS; 2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER'S MEDICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3. TO PAY PETITIONER ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS AS FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND 4. TO PAY PETITIONER A SUM EQUIVALENT TO FIVE (5%) PERCENT OF THE CLAIM AS ATTORNEY'S FEES. SO ORDERED. Fernandez, Guerrero and Plana, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: I am constrained to dissent. "Acute monocytic leukemia" can by no means be considered an occupational disease. Nor was the risk of contracting it increased by the working conditions of petitioner's husband, a Municipal Judge. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission in applying the law as is. It is our judicial pronouncements that, in my opinion, have strayed beyond the reaches of the law.

Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: I am constrained to dissent. "Acute monocytic leukemia" can by no means be considered an occupational disease. Nor was the risk of contracting it increased by the working conditions of petitioner's husband, a Municipal Judge. There was no abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission in applying the law as is. It is our judicial pronouncements that, in my opinion, have stra Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-57341 January 18, 1982 LOUELLA G. JIMENEZ, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS), respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the decision 1 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 1450 entitled "Louella G. Jimenez, Appellant, versus Government Service Insurance System (Philippine National Railways), Respondent", affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim for income benefits for death of Leonardo G. Jimenez, aformer employee of the Philippine National Railways. The petitioner, "Louella G. Jimenez, is the widow of the deceased, Leonardo J. Jimenez. The facts, as found by the Employees' Compensation Commission, are:
The late Leonardo J. Jimenez, whose death is the subject matter of this claim, was formerly employed by the Philippine National Railways. His stint thereat consisted of a temporary appointment as a police in 1961, assigned as a security guard in 1962, and promoted to the post of researcher-analyst on December 31, 1975. Among his duties as embodied in his application for income benefits were as follows: 'acts as personnel/document and physical security that are assigned for investigation, conducts surveillance that may be assigned by the chief cso/pcs; and attends to hearing in court from time to time.'

Sometime in 1975, the subject decedent was subjected to radioactive iodine treatment at the Philippine General Hospital to arrest a follicular carcinoma of his thyroid gland. Subsequently, he sought admission at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center due to easy fatigability, shortness of breath and on and off high grade fever. His ailment was confirmed to be apapillo follicular ca of the thyroid gland, pulmonary and neck metastasis He died on June 23, 1978. Following his death, a claim for death benefit was filed by his widow, appellant herein, Louella G. Jimenez. Said claim was denied by the respondent Government Service Insurance System based on its finding that the cause of death is not an occupational disease and no evidence could show that the decedent's risk of contraction of the ailment was increased by the nature of his employment. 2

The Employees' Compensation Commission denied the claim because:

The cause of death is carcinoma of the thyroid gland. Although the etiology of subject disease is unknown, it is generally accepted that it may develop in patients with toxic goiter who are under prolonged thiouracil therapy and from in-take of antithyroid drugs in large doses. (Textbook of Surgery, 3rd Edition, Mosely, p. 398). In the instant case, there is no indication that the late Leonardo Jimenez was predisposed to carcinogenic elements in his employment at the Philippine National Railways. In most cases, one is predisposed to the disease by frequent exposure to drugs, which does not apply to this case as can be gleaned from the records. P.D. 626, as amended, dictates that the ailment must be an occupational disease listed in Annex "A" of the implementing rules and regulations; otherwise there must be proof that the employee's risk of contracting the disease was increased by his working condition. 3

According to the respondent, Government Service Insurance System, the background facts are:
Petitioner's husband, the late Leonardo J. Jimenez, was employed by the Philippine National Railways, first as a temporary policeman in 1961, then as security guard in 1962, and finally as researcher-analyst on December 31, 1975. Relative to his last position his duties included documentation, investigative and surveillance work and attendance at court hearings from time to time. On January 7, 1975, he was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital where he received radioactive iodine treatment to arrest a follicular carcinoma of his thyroid gland. Later, he sought admission at the Veterans Memorial Medical Center on complaint of easy fatigability, shortness of breath, and on-and-off high-grade fever. His ailment was confirmed to be apapillo follicular Ca of the thyroid gland, pulmonary and neck metastasis 4 On June 23, 1978, he died on account of his ailment.

It is clear from the undisputed facts that the disease of the deceased, Leonardo J. Jimenez, supervened prior to January 1, 1975 when the Workmen's Compensation Act was still the law governing claims for compensation. Indeed the Government Corporate Counsel, in his Comment for the Goverment Service Insurance System, said:
It is undisputed that petitioner's husband was admitted at the Philippine General Hospital on January 7, 1975 where he was subjected to radioactive iodine treatment to arrest his

follicular carcinoma of the thyroid gland. Undoubtedly, the diagnosis of the ailment of petitioner's husband as carcinoma was made prior to undergoing the treatment on January 7, 1975 and the symptoms thereof could only have developed or appeared even earlier. Thus, the onset of the ailment of the deceased occurred prior to January 1, 1975 when the new employees' compensation scheme under the State Insurance Fund became effective, hence, prior to the repeal of the old Workmen's Compensation law. Thus, the case accrued under the Workmen's Compensation Law. What should then apply in the case at bar are the provisions of the old Workmen's Compensation Act, and assuming the compensability of the claim under said law, the liability should be imposed upon the employer of the deceased, the Philippine National Railways, and not upon the State I Fund. The body or agency which assumed the functions of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission is, therefore, the proper forum to entertain the instant claim The claim should have been filed with the Workmen's 5 Appeal and Review Staff of the Ministry of Labor.

Under the Workmen's Compensation Act there is a disputable presumption that the death of Leonardo J. Jimenez is compensable because his illness occurred during his employment with the Philippine National Railways. In G. B. Francisco, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission 6 this Court held:
The Workmen's Compensation Act which governs the present situation expressly provides in its Section 44 that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary it is presumed that a claim comes within the provisions of this Act. Time and again this Court stated that under this declaration of a benign and sound public politic, an employee is freed from the burden of proving that his or injury was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work. In fact, the cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment and disabled the workman from pursuing his ordinary occupation.

It does not appear that the employer, Philippine National Railways, adduced any evidence to rebut the presumption that the death of the deceased employee was compensable. The contention of the Government Corporate Counsel that the compensation should be paid by the employer, Philippine National Railways, and not by the State Insurance Fund has no merit. The State Insurance Fund and the funds of government employers are both government funds and it would not matter where the payment of employees' compensation case would come from. In fact in Corales vs. Employees' Compensation 7 this Court ordered the Government Service Insurance System to pay the case which accrued under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Whether or not the Government Service Insurance System is entitled to reimbursement from the employer, Philippine National Railways, is a matter to be threshed out between the employer and the System. It cannot affect the payment of the claim to the petitioner. The petitioner is entitled to reimbursement of medical and funeral expenses and attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered: a. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) as death benefits; b. To reimburse the petitioner medical and funeral expenses supported by proper receipts; c. To pay the petitioner the amount of SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P600.00) as attorney's fees; and d. To pay the Ministry of Labor the amount of P61.00 as administrative costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-64802 September 23, 1985 VENUSTO PANOTES, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Ministry of Education and Culture), respondents. RESOLUTION

MAKASIAR, C.J.: On March 29, 1984, WE rendered a decision in this case granting compensation benefits (pursuant to P.D. 626, as amended) to petitioner Venusto Panotes for the death of his wife, Agustina Garfin Panotes. The fatal disease, colonic malignancy or cancer of the colon, was considered by this Court as having been contracted due to or at least the risk of contracting the same had been increased by the working conditions to which the deceased had been subjected as a public school teacher, and accordingly, ordered respondent Government Service Insurance System: 1) to pay petitioner the sum of P12,000.00 as death benefits;

2) to reimburse the petitioner's medical and hospital expenses, duly supported by proper receipts; 3) to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,200.00 as funeral expenses; and 4) to pay the petitioner the sum of P1,200.00 as attorney's fees. On May 2, 1984, respondent GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds: 1) reasonable work-connection is required by the law for an employees compensation claims, the alleged fact of impossibility of proof notwithstanding; 2) the legal requirement of work-connection should prevail upon the general liberality of the law; 3) award of attorney's fees is not within the contemplation of the law and which this Court had previously reduced to 5% (p. 82, rec.). WE find the motion of respondent GSIS devoid of merit. In this motion before US, respondent GSIS brings up the issue of the relation between the standard of reasonable work connection established by this Court in compensation cases and the Court's statement in the case at bar that the cause of the fatal disease is unknown (Emphasis supplied). Respondent's theory that, by granting petitioner's claim, the standard of reasonable work-connection for compensation cases was rendered meaningless because this Court's findings in the present case that the cause of the fatal disease cancer of the colon is still unknown, belies the finding that said fatal disease was caused by the nature of the work and/or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the working conditions of the deceased. Respondent further submits the proposition that "if the cause of the ailment is unknown, then it cannot also be said that the ailment is work-connected under the increased risk doctrine" (p. 73, rec., italics supplied). "To declare as compensable all ailments whose causes are unknown would be to place the claimants with such types of ailments in a far better or superior position than those whose causes are known but cannot be proved as work-connected", respondent adds (p. 71, rec.). WE ruled in the case of Cristobal vs. Employees' Compensation Commission (L-49280, Feb. 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 329, 335336), thus:
The deceased died of rectal cancer on May 27, 1977. Concededly the exact cause or etiology of this disease is still unknown. Even respondent ECC's own medical officer, Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, certified that the cause of rectal carcinoma as of any other malignancies is still unknown' (p. 9, ECC rec.). Its cause and development are insidious, imperceptible to the naked eye, and defies expert analysis. Therefore, whether or not the disease rectal cancer was caused or the risk of contracting the same was increased by the decedent's working conditions remains uncertain This uncertainty, of course, cannot eliminate the probability that the ailment was work- connected as it had been established

that the deceased was exposed to unhygienic working conditions, various chemicals and intense heat which are generally considered as predisposing factors of cancer. At this point, there is need to reiterate that when the deceased started working in 1964, he was free from any kind of disease. In ruling on this claim, this Court also applied the theory of increased risk under Section 1 (b) Rule III of PD 626 which states that: For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied; otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions (Emphasis supplied). aside from the possibility that the disease might have been contracted prior to the effectivity of the new Labor Code. To establish compensability of the claim under the said theory, the claimant must show proof of work-connection. Impliedly, the degree of proof required is merely substantial evidence, which means 'such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion' (Ang Tibay vs. The Court of Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc., 69 Phil. 635) or clear and convincing evidence. In this connection, it must be pointed out that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation. ... (Emphasis supplied).

Under the employees' compensation law, there are two categories of occupational illness or disease deemed compensation; a) those listed as occupational disease by the Commission, and b) any illness caused by the employment, subject to a showing by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by the working conditions (Jarillo vs. ECC, L52058, February 25, 1982). In defining the increased risk doctrine, Larson states: "the distinctiveness of the employment risk can be contributed by the increased quantity of a risk that is qualitatively not peculiar to the employment" (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, Vol. I, S 6.30, pp. 3- 4 [1978]). An occupational disease is thus discussed further as follows:
An occupational disease generally providing compensation therefor, is a disease which is caused by, or especially incident to, or the natural consequence of, the particular employment in which the workman is engaged, which results from exposure therein to hazards greater or different than those involved in ordinary living, which generally develops gradually over a considerable period of time in the employment, and which industry has not learned to fend against or eliminate. xxx xxx xxx In determining the cause of disability, and whether the cause was an occupational disease within the provisions of the statute, all factors must be taken into consideration; and whether a disease is compensable must be determined on the basis of the particular facts involved in each case and the peculiar characteristics of each employment. Thus, while an occupational disease is generally one which from common experience is recognized to be necessarily incidental to the usual and ordinary course of the employment it has also been held that if the disease is one that results from employment it is an occupational disease, even though the risk of disease was not generally known.

Accordingly, the disease need not be a natural and common result rather than an unexpected one. While there is some authority to the effect that ordinary diseases of life are not compensable unless they follow as an incident of an occupational disease, a disease, to be compensable as occupational, is generally not required to be an extraordinary disease, and one to which the general public is not exposed, and it is not essential that the disabling occupational disease should arise solely out of the occupation in which the employee is engaged, in order to make it compensable. Moreover, the fact that an employee's disease may be of a class or nature which members of the general public may acquire under ordinary and usual conditions and circumstances will not exclude it from the benefits of the act if the disease was in fact occasioned as a result of being subjected to the risks afforded by the unusual conditions of work in his employment (99 CJS Workmen's Compensation, S 169, pp. 566-569 [1958], (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent GSIS further alleges that the evidences presented tended to prove a mere case of aggravation and not reasonable work-connection, thus, the following allegations:
In the case at bar, this Honorable Court went on to describe in detail the physical, mental and emotional pressures undergone by the deceased public school teacher who entered the service in perfect health was not confined in the classroom but engaged in other school activities, was exposed to the elements, missed her meals because of workloads, etc.all of which factors weakened her body resistance and made her susceptible to diseases. These conditions are invariably present in different types of employment. In fact, even among teachers, these conditions are unavoidably present but there has been no showing that many teachers have succumbed to cancer of the colon. Thus, we humbly ask for clarification as to whether aggravating conditions unconnected to the ailment contracted, are enough to establish reasonable work connection, though the doctrine of aggravation, as stated by this Honorable Court, has already been removed under the present law (Ibaez vs. ECC, L-47008, March 8, 1978) [p. 73, rec.].

Assuming arguendo that the evidences cited in the case at bar were mere aggravating conditions, this Court, in the case of Acosta vs. ECC (109 SCRA 210) had occasion to discuss the matter as follows:
The GSIS itself was inclined to believe that the ailment of the deceased was aggravated by the nature of her work when it stated in the comment that it has no relation at all to the work of the deceased as a public school teacher except by way of aggravation.' if this is so, there would be no consistency in respondent denying the claim for compensation on the ground that the risk of contracting the disease was not increased by her working conditions. It is more in keeping with reason to hold that once a situation of aggravation arises, there exists a causal relation between her work and her ailment which caused her death, as shown respondent GSIS has conceded the possibility of aggravation being present. (Emphasis supplied).

It is apparent from respondent's arguments that what it seeks is a direct, actual proof of the causal connection between the fatal disease and the working conditions of the deceased. WE, however, rule in this case as WE did in the other cases that actual proof of causation is not necessary to justify compensability. The degree of proof required to

establish proof of work-connection between ailment and the deceased's employment is only substantial evidence or reasonable work connection (Cristobal vs. ECC, L-49280, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 329; Neri vs. ECC 127, SCRA 672). Where cause of the employee's death is unknown, the right to compensation subsists (Najera vs. ECC, 122 SCRA 697). Proof of causal connection between claimant's disease of tumor and his employment as a condition of compensability, the causes of which disease cannot be explained, would render nugatory the constitutional principles of social justice and protection to labor (Poral vs. ECC, 131 SCRA 602; Mercado Jr. vs. ECC 127 SCRA 664). In the case of Cristobal vs. ECC (Ibid.) cited earlier, this Court ruled:
xxx xxx xxx ... As the agents charged by the law to implement the social justice guarantee secured by both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, respondents should adopt a more liberal attitude in deciding claims for compensation especially when there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work- connection. This should not be confused with the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. While these doctrines may have been abandoned under the new Labor Code (the constitutionality of such abrogation may still be challenged), it is significant that the liberality of the law, in general, still subsists. All these factual and legal grounds were considered in relation to each other constituting substantial evidence clearly convincing US to resolve that rectal cancer is compensable.

Let it be pointed out too that the deceased's ailment was one of those falling under the borderline cases and in connection therewith, this Court has ruled in the case of Sepulveda vs. ECC (84 SCRA 771) as cited in the case of San Valentin vs. ECC (118 SCRA 160), that:
... (T)he respondent Commission under Resolution No. 223, dated March 16, 1977, adopted, as a policy, the institution of a more compassionate interpretation of the restrictive provisions of P.D. 626, as amended, by its administering agencies, the SSS and the GSIS, with respect to, among others, Myocardial Infarction and other borderline cases. ... (Emphasis supplied).

Thus, the following diseases were deemed compensable: rheumatic heart disease (Panangui vs. ECC 121 SCRA 65), lung cancer (Dator vs. ECC, G.R. No. 57416, January 30, 1982), senile cataract (Jarillo vs. ECC, L-52058, February 25, 1982), liver cancer (Abadiano vs. GSIS, L-52254, January 30, 1982), pancreatitis (Villavert vs. ECC 110 SCRA 274), rectal cancer (Cristobal vs. ECC, L-49280, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 29). The very fact that the cause of a disease is unknown, creates the probability that the working conditions could have increased the risk of contracting the disease, if not caused by it, thus, the increased risk doctrine was applied in the present case. The situation obtaining in the case at bar generates doubts, which by principle and in keeping with the law, should be resolved in favor of labor. To warrant the arguments of

respondent would render futile the provision of Article 4 of the New Labor Code, expressly providing that:
All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of this Code, its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor (Emphasis supplied).

The preceding law is a direct implementation of the constitutional mandate on social justice and protection to labor as embodied in Article II, Sections 6 and 9, herein quoted as follows:
Sec. 6. The State shall promote social justice to ensure ... the dignity, welfare, and security of all the people ... . Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers. The State shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may provide for compulsory arbitration (Emphasis supplied).

Social justice in workmen's compensation cases is not equality but protection of the laborer as against the employer (De los Santos vs. WCC 120 SCRA 730). Respondent GSIS refuses to appreciate the evidence substantiating the claim of petitioner. It cited the evidences in the decision which allegedly are, at most, aggravating conditions only. Respondent, however, failed to take these evidences in the light of other equally compelling factors. The deceased worked as an elementary school teacher from 1949 until she contracted the fatal disease in 1979. She was in perfect health when she entered the government service. She was not only teaching and confined within the protection of the classroom, but she was saddled as well with other outdoor activities. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that public school teachers are made to take up the burden of attending to various activities, both for the school and the community, aside from and in addition to their duties as a teacher. This is a fact obvious and known to everyone familiar with our public school system and yet, ironically, we close our eyes to it. Finally, with respect to the award of attorney's fees, respondent argues that the award is not proper or should have been reduced to only 5% of the compensation claim. The argument is devoid of merit. There is no prohibition against imposing attorney's fees on the employer, for the benefit of the counsel for the claimant (Marte vs. ECC, L-46362, January 30,1982). In Cristobal vs. ECC (supra), this Court has ruled that:
xxx xxx xxx A close examination of the aforequoted provision reveals that the intent of the law is to free the award from any liability or charge so that the claimant may enjoy and use it to the

fullest. It is the claimant who is exempt from liability for attorney's fees. The defaulting employer or government agency remains liable for attorney's fees; because it compelled the claimant to employ the services of counsel by unjustly refusing to recognize the validity of the claim of petitioner. This actually is the rationale behind the prohibition. Nothing is wrong with the court's award of attorney's fees which is separate and distinct from the other benefits awarded. Besides, in the instant case, the participation of petitioner's counsel was not limited to the preparation or filing of the claim but in appealing petitioner's case before this Court necessitating submission of pleadings to establish his cause of action and to rebut or refute the arguments of herein respondents. Fairness dictates that the counsel should receive compensation for his services, otherwise, it would be entirely difficult for claimants, majority of whom are not teamed in the intricacies of the law, to get good legal service. To deny counsel compensation for his professional services, would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law ( Emphasis supplied).

There is a clear difference, from the standpoint of legal policy, between attorney's fees to be paid by the laborer and fees awarded by the court to be paid by the employer. The plain intent of the statute is that the compensation to be received by the injured workman should not be reduced by more than 10% on account of lawyer's fees. This purpose is attained where the fees are to be paid by the employer, since the compensation receivable by the workman is then in no way diminished. In the latter eventuality, all that the law requires is that the counsel's fees should be reasonable (NDC vs. WCC, L-19863, April 29, 1964, 10 SCRA 696). Thus, the award of 10% attorney's fees is proper. There is no prohibition in the law as to such an award nor as to the proper amount that should be awarded. The amount is actually discretionary upon the Court so long as it passes the test of reasonableness. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION DATED MARCH 29, 1984 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS HEREBY DENIED FOR LACK OF MERIT, AND THIS DENIAL IS FINAL AND EXCUTORY LET ENTRY OF JUDGMENT BE MADE. SO ORDERED. Concepcion, Jr., Plana, Escolin, De la Fuente, Cuevas, Alampay and Patajo, JJ., concur. Teehankee, Aquino and Abad Santos, JJ., took no part. Melencio-Herrera, J., I join with Justice Gutierrez. Relova, J., I join Justice Gutierrez in his dissent. GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting: I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent GSIS. The risk of contracting cancer of the colon is common to all mankind. Whether a person is employed or not makes no difference. The risk remains the same. There is nothing in the records of this case which indicates in the least bit how the employment of the

petitioner's wife could have contributed to the risk of contracting colonic malignancy. As I have stated in earlier cases, employees' compensation benefits are not life insurance benefits. Death by itself does not automatically entitle the heirs to employees' compensation. This Court is enacting its own employment compensation law, contrary to the existing law passed by the proper lawmaking authority, when it rules that any and all causes of death or disability are valid grounds for the Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-49280 April 30, 1980 LUZ G. CRISTOBAL, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Science Development Board); respondents. Luz G. Cristobal in her own behalf. Manuel M. Lazaro for respondent GSIS. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent ECC.

MAKASIAR, J.: Petition for review on certiorari of the June 21, 1978 decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission filed by petitioner in forma pauperis. The deceased, Fortunato S. Cristobal was employed as Supervising Information Officer 11 of the National Science Development Board (NSDB for short) based in Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal. His original appointment was dated February 26, 1964 (p. 16, ECC rec.). On April 8, 1976, he developed loose bowel movement which later worsened and his excrement was marked with fresh blood. Self-administered medications were made but symptoms persisted until April 22, 1976 when he was brought to the Hospital of Infant Jesus and was there treated by Dr. Willie Lagdameo, who diagnosed his illness as rectal malignancy. On May 28, 1976, he was discharged with improved conditions but just one year thereafter, he was again confined at the UST Hospital for the same ailment. A second operation became necessary because of the recurrence of malignancy in the pelvis. Despite earnest medical efforts, he succumbed to his illness on May 27, 1977 (p. 6, rec.).

The petitioner herein, as the decedent's widow and beneficiary, filed with the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS for short), a claim for income (death) benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. The said claim was denied by the GSIS and in a subsequent request for reconsideration, the System reiterated its decision stating that
Under the present law on compensation, the listed occupational diseases are compensable when the conditions set therein are satisfied. It also allows certain diseases to be compensable whenever the claimant is able to prove that the risks of contracting such diseases were increased by the working conditions attendant to the deceased's employment. This is provided under Sec. l (b) Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 626 which took effect on January 1, 1975. As far as the degree of proof is concerned, the claimant must be able to show at least by substantial evidence that the development of the ailment was brought largely by the working conditions present in the nature of employment. In the case of your husband, it will be noted that the ailment which resulted in his death on May 27, 1977 was Rectal Malignancy. This ailment, not being fisted as an occupational disease, therefore, required such degree of proof as mentioned above. On the basis, however, of the papers and evidence on record which you have submitted, it appears that you have not established that the deceased's employment has any direct causal relationship with the contraction of the ailment. While it is admitted that the aforementioned ailment supervened in the course of the deceased's employment as Supervising Information Officer II in the National Science Development Board, Bicutan, Taguig, Rizal, there has not been any showing that the same directly arose therefrom or resulted from the nature thereof (GSIS letter dated February 20, 1978 denying the request of petitioner for reconsideration).

The petitioner appealed to the ECC, which affirmed the decision of the GSIS. Hence, this petition. In resolving the issue of compensability, the respondents herein failed to consider these outstanding facts patent from the records. The deceased, as Supervising Officer II of the NSDB, was actually assigned to the Printing Department of the said agency where he was exposed to various chemicals and intense heat. This fact was corroborated by the affidavit of one Angel Peres, a co-employee of the deceased, to the effect that
I know personally Fortunato Cristobal because he was my Supervisor in the Bureau of Printing; During the employment of Fortunato Cristobal at the Bureau of Printing, he contracted sickness which was later diagnosed as anorectal cancer which caused his death; Fortunato Cristobal continued working at the aforementioned Bureau of Printing even when he was already suffering from a rectal illness and he had been complaining to me that said illness became more painful whenever he performs his job in the Bureau; I also noticed that he oftentimes eat food in the Bureau without washing his hands; The place where Fortunato Cristobal was assigned in the Bureau of Printing is very unhygienic and polluted with chemicals and he oftentimes complain to me that the odor of the chemicals make him feel dizzy always;

Fortunato Cristobal always handles chemicals in the Bureau of Printing while in the performance of his duties (Annex C, Petition).

These statements find relevance in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Rufo A. Guzman stating that "the illness may be aggravated by the unhygienic conditions in the Bureau of Printing where he works. Handling of chemicals for printing, eating without proper washing of hands, tension due to the pressure of work, plus neglected personal necessity which may be attributed to the inadequate facilities in the Bureau of Printing" (Annex D, Petition). Undisputed is the fact that the deceased entered the government free from any kind of disease. Likewise, it is admitted that the deceased husband's ailment supervened in the course of his employment with the NSDB. The ECC, however, failed to appreciate the evidence submitted by the petitioner to substantiate her claim. In denying the claim, it merely relied on the fact that the certification issued by the physician of the deceased failed to indicate the actual causes or factors which led to the decedent's rectal malignancy. This Court, however, is of the opinion that the affidavit of Angel Peres substantiated by the medical certificate issued by Dr. Rufo A. Guzman (in relation to the medical findings of Dr. Willie Lagdameo of the Hospital of Infant Jesus [p. 17, ECC rec.] and Dr. Mercia C. Abrenica, its own medical officer [p. 9, ECC rec.]) sufficiently establish proof that the risk of contracting the disease is increased, if not caused, by the working conditions prevailing in the respondent's (NSDB) premises. In the case of Eliseo vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission (84 SCRA 188), this Court held:
We cannot agree with the private respondent that the claim of the petitioner is without any factual or legal basis nor with the respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission that there is no evidence substantial enough to show that this leukemia which caused the death of Isabel Eliseo has a causal relation to the nature of her work with the respondent G & S Manufacturing Corp. It may be true that the job of a reviser or quality controller, which was the work of claimant Isabel Eliseo, does not entail physical exertion. It may also be true that all that is required is alertness of the eye to see and detect any defect or flaw in a garment being and to point out those defects for correction or repair before a garment can pass for distribution and use. However, it must be admitted that the nature of the work of the claimant required her to deal with textiles or fabrics which involved chemicals of various kinds and composition and this exposure of the deceased to these chemicals in private respondent's establishment probably led to the development of the disease of leukemia or at least aggravated the illness of the claimant from which she died as a result. In Laron vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 73 SCRA 84, We held that in testing the evidence or the relation between the injury or disease and the employment, probability and not certainty, is the touchstone, reiterated in National Housing Corp. vs. WCC, 79 SCRA 281.

Section l(b), Rule III of the Implementing Rules and regulations of P.D. 626 provides
For sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the sickness must be the result of an occupational disease fisted under Annex 'A' of these Rules with the conditions set therein satisfied- otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.

This Court is convinced that the petitioner, by clear and convincing evidence, has adequately satisfied the second part of the aforequoted provision, following the theory of increased risk as laid down in the case of Amparo vs. GSIS, ECC Case No. 0046 (August 18, 1976) and reiterated in Corales vs. ECC, 84 SCRA 762 (August 25,1978). Furthermore, in the case of Sepulveda vs. Employees'Compensation Commission (84 SCRA 771 [August 25, 1978]), this Court stated that
... the respondent Commission, under Resolution No. 223 dated March 16, 1977, adopted, as a policy, the institution of a more compassionate interpretation of the restrictive provisions of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, by its administering agencies, the Social Security System and the Government Service Insurance System, with respect to, among others, Myocardial Infarction and other borderline cases. ...

In the instant case, it is evident that rectal cancer is one of those borderline cases. Like, it is clear that the purpose of the resolution is to extend the applicability of the provisions of P.D. 626, thereby affording a greater number of employees the opportunity to avail of the benefits under the law. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State, as mandated by the Constitution and embodied in the New Labor Code, to give maximum aid and protection to labor. The Employees' Compensation Commission, like the defunct Court of Industrial Relations and the Workmen's Compensation Commission, is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to the constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man, more specially, the social justice guarantee; for otherwise, these guarantees would be merely "a lot of meaningless patter." (Santos vs. WCC, 75 SCRA 371 [1977]).] As pointed out by no less than the respondent ECC itself in its Comment dated January 5, 1978
It may not be amiss to mention that the ECC has time and again expanded the list of occupational diseases. This comes about after continuing studies made by the ECC. Indeed, cancer has already been included as a qualified occupational disease in certain cases Occupational Disease 1. Cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder (Papilloma of the bladder) Nature of Employment Work involving exposure to alphnaphtylamine, betanapthylamine or benzidine or any part of the salts; and auramine or magenta 2. Cancer epithellomatoma or ulceration of the skin of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil or The use or handling of, ex posure to tar, pitch, bitumen, mineral oil (include paraffin) soot or any compound product or

paraffin or any compound product or residue of any of these substances xxx 7. Cancer of the stomach and other lymphatic and blood forming vessels; nasal cavity and sinuses 16. Cancer of the lungs, liver and brain

residue of any of these substances

xxx Woodworkers; wood products industry carpenters, loggers and employees in pulp and paper mills and plywood mills Vinyl chloride workers, plastic workers Worth noting is the fact that the above types of cancer have no known etiology. Yet, they are regarded as occupational. The clear implication is that the law merely requires a reasonable work connection (pp. 59-60, rec., Empahasis supplied).

From the foregoing statements, it is palpable that the respondent ECC recognizes, as it is duty bound to, the policy of the State to afford maximum aid and protection to labor. Therefore, to require the petitioner to show the actual causes or factors which led to the decedents rectal malignancy would not be consistent with this liberal interpretation. It is of universal acceptance that practically all kinds of cancer belong to the class of clinical diseases whose exact etiology, cause or origin, is unknown. It is in this regard that the evidence submitted by the petitioner deserves serious consideration. As persuasively pointed out by the petitioner in her memorandum addressed to this Court dated April 6, 1979
xxx xxx xxx The respondent GSIS said, 'It is unfortunate that despite the relatively fast pace in the march of progress, science to this day has not given us the cause of cancer' (p. 11, GSIS Comment). Hence medical scientists are still venturing into the unknown, so to speak. ... xxx xxx xxx Evidently, GSIS has trodden the grounds on an unsure foot. It would seem to insinuate that petitioner must blame science for having not yet discovered the actual cause of her husband's fatal illness. Why it is then that petitioner must be required to prove causation-that her husband's cancer was caused by his employment - if science itself is ignorant of the cause of cancer?

WE give due consideration to the respondent's application of P.D. 626 in ruling on the claim since petitioner's husband died on May 27, 1977, after the effectivity of the provisions of the New Labor Code on Employees' Compensation. Moreover, medical records did not disclose the date when the deceased employee actually contracted the disease, rectal malignancy having been discovered only on April 22, 1976 when the deceased sought hospital confinement. From the above discussion, it is undeniable that the petitioner is entitled to her claim. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF RESPONDENT EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT GSIS IS HEREBY DIRECTED
1. TO PAY THE PETITIONER THE SUM OF TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS AS DEATH BENEFITS; 2. TO REIMBURSE PETITIONER MEDICAL, SURGICAL AND HOSPITAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; 3. TO PAY PETITIONER THE SUM OF SEVEN HUNDRED (P700.00) PESOS AS FUNERAL EXPENSES; AND 4. TO PAY THE PETITIONER ATTORNEY'S FEES EQUIVALENT TO TEN (10%) PERCENT OF THE DEATH BENEFITS.

SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: The cause of death of petitioner's husband was rectal malignancy. It is not listed as an occupational disease (Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation). Hence, it is not compensable (Section 1(b), Rule 111, Ibid.).

Even assuming that rectal malignancy may be classified as a borderline case under cancer diseases, it is evident from the list that not all cancer ailments are considered occupational diseases. Until it is so listed, I believe that we should not substitute our judgment for that of respondent Commission, which should be deemed to have the necessary expertise to decide on the matter. The dreaded disease of cancer of the rectum can develop irrespective of the conditions of work. That petitioner's husband was exposed to various chemicals, intense heat and unhygienic working conditions does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the deceased became more prone to rectal malignancy. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-42731 February 28, 1985 BETTER BUILDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs. SEVERO M. PUCAN, DIOSCORA C. ARELLANO and ROGELIO FERNANDO, respondents. Esperanza Doroja for petitioner. Ernesto H. Cruz and Enrique V. Espaol for respondent WCC.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission which affirmed a letter- award issued by Regional Office No. 4 of the Department of Labor, awarding compensation benefits to private respondent Rogelio Fernando pursuant to Section 14 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Rogelio Fernando was hired by the petitioner as janitor in 1971 and subsequently was promoted as maintenance supervisor receiving P8.00 per day with P1.25 per hour of overtime work, working six (6) days a week. On April 18, 1974, he stopped working due to his illness diagnosed as "Hansen's Disease Lepromatous positive with claw hands on both." Consequently, he filed a notice of claim for workmen's compensation benefits. The petitioner submitted its controversion upon the ground that the alleged ailment did not arise out of employment, was not the direct result thereof, nor was it aggravated by the same, but was caused by factors not related to private respondent's employment.

To prove its allegation, the petitioner presented a certification of the Officer-In-Charge of the Leprosy Research and Training Center, Bureau of Disease Control, San Lazaro Hospital, showing that private respondent had been suffering from advanced Lepromatous (positive) since 1963. The petitioner claims further that Hansen's Disease is not an occupational disease and is not among those which have been held compensable. The private respondent countered that when he joined the company in 1971, he was assigned as a janitor in Funeraria Paz, Claro M. Recto Street, Manila, and then at Funeraria Paz, Quezon City, and later on at the Manila Banking Corporation. As janitor of the two funeral parlors, the nature of work he performed was to sweep, scrub, and clean the parlors where cadavers lay in state. He also helped in dressing up the dead after they were embalmed; he gathered and disposed of the trash and garbage after the embalmer had done his job. He further averred that when he joined the company he was negative of Hansen's disease. He admits that he was found positive of the disease in 1963 but he underwent treatment in the Central Luzon Sanitarium and on July 10, 1969, was declared negative of the disease and released from said hospital. To support his allegation, he submitted a certification (p. 47, Rollo) of the Medical Specialist, Chief, O.P.D. Central Luzon Sanitarium, to the effect that he was declared negative of the disease and eventually released on July 10, 1969. On April 15, 1974, he noticed his hands beginning to cripple like that of a claw, so he stopped working. Thereafter, he began to have facial disfigurement, claw hands on both hands, resulting in permanent disability for labor. When he submitted himself for examination he was declared by Dr. Vicente Noblejas, a leprologist, positive of Hansen's Disease Lepromatous with claw hands on both. Therefore, according to him, his ailment reappeared in a more aggravated form during the period he worked with the company and as a result of the performance of his duties as janitor. We find the petition to be without merit. While it is true that the private respondent was found to be suffering from Hansen's Disease in 1963, there is likewise evidence that after undergoing treatment in the Central Luzon Sanitarium he was declared negative of the disease and released from the said hospital. Obviously, private respondent's illness was either non-existent or dormant prior to his employment in 1971 and its reappearance and aggravation may be traced to his weakened resistance to the disease due to his exposure to germs and bacteria and other stresses and infections while performing his duties as janit r in the two funeral parlors. Moreover, this case falls under the provisions of the former Workmen's Compensation Act. It is already settled under that law that when an ailment is contracted and/or aggravated in the course of one's employment the burden of refuting the same by substantial evidence is upon the employer. In refuting the claim that the ailment of the private respondent was contracted and/or aggravated in the course of his employment, the petitioner relied on the physician's report of Dr. Vicente H. Noblejas of the Tala Leprosarium. The petitioner states that it is not categorically stated in the statement that the disease was due to the private respondent's employment with the petitioner.

The Physician's Report reads:

9. (a) Was the injury or illness caused by accident due to and in pursuance of the employment? Maybe (b) Or the result of the nature of such employment? Maybe (c) Or aggravated by the employment most probably. 10. (a) Was the illness or injury contracted directly cause by the workmen's employment? Maybe (b) Or the result of the nature of such employment? Maybe (c) Or aggravated by the employment most? probably 11. Give your findings to support items 9 and 10. Please see attached result of Blood Smear.

It is likewise settled that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation (Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 336; De Vera v. Employees' Compensation Commission, et al., G.R. No. L48669, promulgated, December 26, 1984). Probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is test of proof in compensation proceedings (National Housing Corp., v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 79 SCRA 281). The very evidence of the petitioner shows probability of causation by the employment. With respect to the contention of the petitioner that Hansen's Disease is not among the ailments which have been declared compensable, this Court in the case of Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (99 SCRA 710) said:
The contention that the Workmen's Compensation Commission erred in considering Hansen's disease (leprosy) compensable is without merit. It appears from the evidence of the claimant that his illness is traceable to his employment. Dr. Amado Ramos, as specialist on skin disease who diagnosed the illness of Leonardo Kalaw, testified that leprosy, like tuberculosis, is a system disease; that the specific cause is bacteria and the same can be acquired through body contact with a person harboring the germs; and that some of the participating factors leading to the development of the disease are the exposure to sudden changes of environment and temperature and the lessening of the body resistance of the person affected. (Rollo, p. 24). xxx xxx xxx In G.B. Francisco, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (87 SCRA 22, 30) this Court held:

The Workmen's Compensation Act which governs the present situation expressly provides in its Section 44 that in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that a claim comes within the provisions of this Act. Time and again this Court stated that under this declaration of a benign and sound public policy, an employee is freed from the burden of proving that his illness or injury was caused or aggravated by the nature of his work. In fact, the cause of the ailment is immaterial; what is important is that it occurred or was aggravated in the course of employment and disabled the workman from pursuing his ordinary occupation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED to read as follows: The petitioner is hereby ordered 1. To pay the private respondent the sum of SIX THOUSAND (P6,000.00) PESOS as disability compensation benefits; 2. To pay SIX HUNDRED (P600.00) PESOS as attorney's fees; and 3. To pay SIXTY-ONE (P61.00) PESOS as administrative costs to the Ministry of Labor and Employment. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., concur. The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-42627 February 21, 1980 EXALTACION VDA. DE TORBELA, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Bureau of Public Schools), respondents. Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela in her own behalf.

Romulo P. Untalan for respondents.

FERNANDEZ, J.: This is a petition to review the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 0009 (Jose P. Torbela, Deceased) entitled "Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela, Appellant, versus, Government Service Insurance System" affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System which denied the claim of Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela on the ground that the death of her husband, Jose P. Torbela, Sr., is not compensable." 1 The petitioner, Exaltacion Vda. de Torbela, filed a claim for compensation dated March 20,1975 with Regional Office VII, Workmen's Compensation Unit, Iloilo City, for the death of her husband, Jose P. Torbela, Sr., who was a secondary school principal of the Bureau of Public Schools in Hinigaran, Negros Occidental when he died in a vehicular accident on March 3, 1975. The petitioner also filed an application for compensation dated April 4, 1975 with the Government Service Insurance System. The claim was denied by the Government Service Insurance System on the ground that the death of Jose P. Torbela, Sr. was not the result of an employment accident. The claimant, petitioner herein, appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System . The facts, as found by the Employees' Compensation Commission, are:
Jose P. Torbela, Sr. in his lifetime, was employed as a Secondary School Principal of the Bureau of Public Schools. He died on March 3. 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock a.m. due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal is located. In his possession at the time of the accident were official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. 2

The Employees' Compensation Commission affirmed the decision denying the claim because:
The appealed decision denying the instant claim for compensation is hereby affirms Under Presidential Decree No. 626 and its implementing rules, for the injury and the resulting death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) the employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) the employee must have been injured at the place where his work required him to be; and (3) the employee must have been performing his official functions. The evidence on record unerringly points to the fact that not even one of these conditions, which must all concur, has been satisfied. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the deceased was merely engaged in ordinary travel from home to work, during which time he was not even doing something related or incidental to his duties as secondary School Principal; that the accident occurred at a time not incompassed by his official working hours; and that the place of the accident is not where

his work required him to be or so proximate thereto as to be deemed a part of his workplace, he being not on special errand for his employer at the time he met his death, his possession of official papers notwithstanding. Thus, we find that there is sufficient factual and legal bases for the GSIS conclusion at the death in question is not the result of an injury from an employment accident and, therefore, such findings should not be disturbed. 3

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran. Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment. 4 WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby set aside and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the petitioner the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) as funeral expenses pursuant to Section 19, P.D. No. 1146, and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero, De Castro, concur.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: I am constrained to dissent. Petitioner's husband died in a vehicular accident on March 3, 1975. The provisions of the new Labor Code PI No. 442), as amended), and its implementing Rules, therefore, are applicable.
ART. 208. Applicability. This Title (Title II, Book IV) shall apply to injury sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975 (New Labor Code).

xxx xxx xxx (c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules on Employee's Compensation.

Section I, Rule III, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work require 9 him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions.

In the light of the foregoing provision, petitioner's claim was correctly denied by the Government Service Insurance System on the ground that the death of Jose P. Torbela, Sr. was not the result of an employment accident satisfying all the conditions enumerated. He died due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident at 5:45 A.M. while he was on his way to school. The general rule is that an employee is not entitled to recover for personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment because such an accident does not arise out of and in the course of his employment (Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 58 Phil. 39). The case of Ollero vs. Workmen's Compensation, et al., (84 SCRA 695 [1978]) also held that:
Under American Jurisprudence, the general rule is that the hazards encountered by employees while going to or returning from their regular place of work, before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises, are not ordinarily incident to the employment. and for this reason injuries resulting from such hazards are in most instances held not to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment (82 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 255, p. 43, citing: Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 US 162, 77 L Ed 676 53 S Ct 380, 81 ALR 245, and a host of cases). The aforementioned general rule however admits various ex. exceptions in most of the States of the Union, and among these are: where the employer provides transportation or remunerates the employee for the time or expense involved, where the employee performs some task in connection with his employment at home or en-route, or is on a special mission at his employer's behest, and so on (p. 44, Ibid.).

The present case does not fall under any of the exceptions thus enumerated. Nor under any of the following circumstances, which may well be considered as exceptions to the general rule that injuries sustained by an employee outside the premises of the employer, while going to or returning from work, are not compensable. Thus, where an employee was accidentally injured while he was running to his place of work to avoid

rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate the ditch in itself being an obvious hazard owing to its proximity to the gate and the employer's inaction to remove the same had contributed in a special way to the occurrence of the accident (Philippine Fiber Processing Co. vs. Fermina Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050 [1956]): where injuries are sustained by a workman who is provided with transportation while going to or coming from his work, they are considered as arising out of and in the course of his employment and therefore, are compensable (Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366, 367 [1967]); where the employer remunerates the employee for transportation expenses and agreed to shoulder 75% of her transportation expenses when employer assigned her to take the place of another teacher in a different place not her regular place of work, said employee was entitled to a disability compensation for she was injured while performing an act-travelling home from school, which was a necessary incident to her employment (Ollero vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 84 SCRA 696 [1978]); or where a school teacher was on her way home from school and would continue to perform other school work in connection with her employment as school teacher, her taking the ride in that fatal vehicle can be treated as a necessary incident to her school work, thus her heirs were entitled to the benefits arising from her death as having occurred in connection with her duty Bael vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 75 SCRA 181, 182 [1977]); or where the employee is on a special mission (Unite vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 289, 313 [1979]). To determine whether or not an injury is sustained either "in the course of employment" or "out of employment", the case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz, 16 SCRA 785-786 [1966], citing In re Mc Nicol (102 NE [1913] 697), held:
... It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of employment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It arises 'out of' the employment when there is apparent in the rational mind ... causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury... But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event, it must appear to have had its origin on a risk connected with the employment, to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence. An injury or accident 'befalls a man in the course of' his employment, if it occurs while he is doing what a man may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time. 13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 2829. And it "arises out of" the work of the employer, when it results from a risk or hazard which is necessarily or ordinarily or reasonably inherent in or incident to the conduct of such work or business. (Emphasis supplied).

Evidently, the injuries and the resulting death suffered by the petitioner's spouse caused by a vehicular accident, could not be distinctly attributed to the peculiarities of his employment as a school principal. A vehicular accident during or ordinary travel to and

from an employee's place of work is a street peril or hazard common to the public. The deceased, apart from his employment, would have been equally exposed to the same hazard as anybody commuting from one place to another. Thus, as in Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz, supra, the injury sustained by petitioner's husband is not compensable. Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going to-and-coming-from rule", among them, Bael vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 182 (1977); Unite vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 293 (1979); Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366 (1967); Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050 (1956); Onero vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 84 SCRA 695 (1978), were all decided under the regime of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428), section 2 of which provided as a ground for compensation "any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment", a clause that is elastic and is susceptible of interpretation. In contrast, not only has the Workmen's Compensation Act been expressly repealed by the new Labor Code, but also, the grounds of compensability in Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation (based on PD No. 626, as amended by PD 850, PD 865A and PD 891) are specific and enumerate the conditions that must be satisfied in order that an injury and the resulting disability or death can be compensable. The province of the Courts is to apply the statutes and not to construe them beyond the intendment of the legislative. The cases heretofore decided, therefore, must be viewed in the light of present, extant legislation enacted despite full cognizance of doctrinal jurisprudence which has emanated from this Court. By this, there need be no fear of violation of the Constitutional mandate of affording protection to labor and promoting social justice. It is merely applying the clear provisions of the new Labor Laws. Moreover, enough leeway should be given to administrative agencies applying the law within their competence. Their opinions and rulings are entitled to great respect (Regalado vs. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 [1935]; Grapilon vs.Municipal Council of Carigara, 2 SCRA 103 [1961]; Tan vs, Municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon, 7 SCRA 887, 892 [1963]).
This contemporaneous construction is highly persuasive: The practice and interpretive regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental heads and other officials charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute will carry great weight in determining the operation of a statute. (2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 516).

Separate Opinions MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent. Petitioner's husband died in a vehicular accident on March 3, 1975. The provisions of the new Labor Code PI No. 442), as amended), and its implementing Rules, therefore, are applicable.
ART. 208. Applicability. This Title (Title II, Book IV) shall apply to injury sickness, disability or death occurring on or after January 1, 1975 (New Labor Code). xxx xxx xxx (c) Only injury or sickness that occurred on or after January 1, 1975 and the resulting disability or death shall be compensable under these Rules on Employee's Compensation.

Section I, Rule III, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation provides:

SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work require 9 him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions.

In the light of the foregoing provision, petitioner's claim was correctly denied by the Government Service Insurance System on the ground that the death of Jose P. Torbela, Sr. was not the result of an employment accident satisfying all the conditions enumerated. He died due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident at 5:45 A.M. while he was on his way to school. The general rule is that an employee is not entitled to recover for personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment because such an accident does not arise out of and in the course of his employment (Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co., 58 Phil. 39). The case of Ollero vs. Workmen's Compensation, et al., (84 SCRA 695 [1978]) also held that:
Under American Jurisprudence, the general rule is that the hazards encountered by employees while going to or returning from their regular place of work, before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises, are not ordinarily incident to the employment. and for this reason injuries resulting from such hazards are in most instances held not to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment (82 Am Jur 2d, Sec. 255, p. 43, citing: Voehl v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 288 US 162, 77 L Ed 676 53 S Ct 380, 81 ALR 245, and a host of cases). The aforementioned general rule however admits various ex. exceptions in most of the States of the Union, and among these are: where the employer provides transportation or

remunerates the employee for the time or expense involved, where the employee performs some task in connection with his employment at home or en-route, or is on a special mission at his employer's behest, and so on (p. 44, Ibid.).

The present case does not fall under any of the exceptions thus enumerated. Nor under any of the following circumstances, which may well be considered as exceptions to the general rule that injuries sustained by an employee outside the premises of the employer, while going to or returning from work, are not compensable. Thus, where an employee was accidentally injured while he was running to his place of work to avoid rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate the ditch in itself being an obvious hazard owing to its proximity to the gate and the employer's inaction to remove the same had contributed in a special way to the occurrence of the accident (Philippine Fiber Processing Co. vs. Fermina Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050 [1956]): where injuries are sustained by a workman who is provided with transportation while going to or coming from his work, they are considered as arising out of and in the course of his employment and therefore, are compensable (Talisay-Silay Milling Co. Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366, 367 [1967]); where the employer remunerates the employee for transportation expenses and agreed to shoulder 75% of her transportation expenses when employer assigned her to take the place of another teacher in a different place not her regular place of work, said employee was entitled to a disability compensation for she was injured while performing an act-travelling home from school, which was a necessary incident to her employment (Ollero vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 84 SCRA 696 [1978]); or where a school teacher was on her way home from school and would continue to perform other school work in connection with her employment as school teacher, her taking the ride in that fatal vehicle can be treated as a necessary incident to her school work, thus her heirs were entitled to the benefits arising from her death as having occurred in connection with her duty Bael vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 75 SCRA 181, 182 [1977]); or where the employee is on a special mission (Unite vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 289, 313 [1979]). To determine whether or not an injury is sustained either "in the course of employment" or "out of employment", the case of Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz, 16 SCRA 785-786 [1966], citing In re McNicol (102 NE [1913] 697), held:
... It is sufficient to say that an injury is received 'in the course of employment when it comes while the workman is doing the duty which he is employed to perform. It arises 'out of' the employment when there is apparent in the rational mind ... causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury... But it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be traced to the employment as a contributing proximate cause and which comes from a hazard to which the workman would have been equally exposed apart from the employment. The causative danger must be peculiar to the work, and not common to the neighborhood. It must be incidental to the character of the business, and not independent of the relation of master and servant. It need not have been foreseen or expected, but after the event, it must appear to have had its origin on a risk connected with the employment, to have flowed from that source as a rational consequence.

An injury or accident 'befalls a man in the course of' his employment, if it occurs while he is doing what a man may reasonably do within a time during which he is employed, and at a place where he may reasonably be during that time. 13 NACCA LAW JOURNAL 2829. And it "arises out of" the work of the employer, when it results from a risk or hazard which is necessarily or ordinarily or reasonably inherent in or incident to the conduct of such work or business. (Emphasis supplied).

Evidently, the injuries and the resulting death suffered by the petitioner's spouse caused by a vehicular accident, could not be distinctly attributed to the peculiarities of his employment as a school principal. A vehicular accident during or ordinary travel to and from an employee's place of work is a street peril or hazard common to the public. The deceased, apart from his employment, would have been equally exposed to the same hazard as anybody commuting from one place to another. Thus, as in Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz, supra, the injury sustained by petitioner's husband is not compensable. Lastly, the cases granting compensation under the "going to-and-coming-from rule", among them, Bael vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 75 SCRA 182 (1977); Unite vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 90 SCRA 293 (1979); Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 21 SCRA 366 (1967); Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil, 99 Phil. 1050 (1956); Onero vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 84 SCRA 695 (1978), were all decided under the regime of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act No. 3428), section 2 of which provided as a ground for compensation "any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment", a clause that is elastic and is susceptible of interpretation. In contrast, not only has the Workmen's Compensation Act been expressly repealed by the new Labor Code, but also, the grounds of compensability in Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employee's Compensation (based on PD No. 626, as amended by PD 850, PD 865A and PD 891) are specific and enumerate the conditions that must be satisfied in order that an injury and the resulting disability or death can be compensable. The province of the Courts is to apply the statutes and not to construe them beyond the intendment of the legislative. The cases heretofore decided, therefore, must be viewed in the light of present, extant legislation enacted despite full cognizance of doctrinal jurisprudence which has emanated from this Court. By this, there need be no fear of violation of the Constitutional mandate of affording protection to labor and promoting social justice. It is merely applying the clear provisions of the new Labor Laws. Moreover, enough leeway should be given to administrative agencies applying the law within their competence. Their opinions and rulings are entitled to great respect (Regalado vs. Yulo, 61 Phil. 173 [1935]; Grapilon vs.Municipal Council of Carigara, 2 SCRA 103 [1961]; Tan vs, Municipality of Pagbilao, Quezon, 7 SCRA 887, 892 [1963]).
This contemporaneous construction is highly persuasive: The practice and interpretive regulations by officers, administrative agencies, departmental heads and other officials charged with the duty of administering and enforcing a statute will carry great weight in determining the operation of a statute. (2 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 516).

Footnotes Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. L-46046 April 5, 1985 EMELITA ENAO, petitioner, vs. THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent. Vivencio M. Carpio, Jr. for petitioner. Jose G. De Vera for respondent ECC.

ALAMPAY, J.: This is a petition for review of the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission (E.C.C.), dated October 26, 1976, affirming the decision of the Government Service Insurance System, denying petitioner's claim for Compensation of income benefits due to the injuries sustained by her when on August 1, 1975, while on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing supplies and other training and school aids for her office, she, together with others, were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be communist insurgents. The antecedent facts of this case are not disputed and are well stated in the appealed decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission, subject of the petition in this case.
... On August 1, 1975, appellant (Emelita Enao), a Public School Teacher, together with others, was on her way from her official station at Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte to Dipolog City. According to the Acting Administrative Officer of her employer, 'Having held classes on July 26, in lieu of August 1, 1975, as per District Memorandum hereto attached, Miss Enao was on her way home from station when their group was ambushed and fired upon by armed men hitting her on her forearm and abdomen necessitating operation' (Part II, Income Benefits Claim for Payment), and according to appellant's witnesses, who were members of the ambushed party, she was on her way to Dipolog City for the purpose of 'securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for furthering (our) services as a school teacher' (Affidavits of Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, respectively). When the appellant and her group were at barrio de Venta Perla, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte, they were fired upon by a band of armed men believed to be communist insurgents. As a result of the ambush, the appellant sustained gunshot wounds on her left forearm and abdomen which compelled her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6,

1975, for surgical removal of foreign bodies (shrapnel) from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 10 to 12, 1975 for definitive treatment. She also developed interstitial pneumonia as a result. (Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 8-9).

On August 5, 1975, petitioner sent a notice of claim of injury to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Zamboanga City. It is said that this claim was not controverted. On the same date, a claim for income benefits for disability was filed by the herein petitioner with the Government Service Insurance System but this claim was denied by the System in its letter-decision, dated February 27, 1976, on its reasoning that:
It appears that on your way to Dipolog City for the purpose of purchasing your needs, you were ambushed by unidentified men believed to be NPAS. Though this happened on August 1, 1975, a regular working day, this was considered your off day, having held classes in its stead on July 26, 1975, a Saturday, per District Memorandum No. 1, s. 1975, dated June 2, 1975. Under such situation, for purposes of the Employees' Compensation, said accident happened outside your time and place of work, not to mention the fact that you were not in the performance of your official functions when it happened. In view of the foregoing, your claim is hereby denied. (Annex "A", Rollo, p. 7)

Not satisfied with the above ruling of the GSIS and upon denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof, the latter appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission. On October 26, 1976, the ECC affirmed the decision of the GSIS appealed from and dismissed the Petitioner's claim, on the grounds that:
... First. the day when the accident occurred, more particularly August 1, 1975, was an off-day. Perusal of the District Memorandum No. 1, series of 1975 and dated June 2, 1975, win show that August 1, 1975, is not just an isolated off-day, but one of those dates fixed and set in lieu of Saturday. Hence, the injury was incurred not during office hours. Second, appellant incurred injury while en route to Dipolog City; more aptly put, while outside t-he school premises where she normally discharges her official functions. The sworn statement of the Acting Administrative Officer and the appellant's witness all point to the same circumstance. Third, while appellant's witnesses testified in an affidavit that appellant left her official station for Dipolog City on the day in question for the purpose of procurring school supplies and training aids to enhance her teaching efficiency, we find the version of the Acting Administrative Officer more credible-that is, the appellant was on her way home from station-for there is nothing which indicates that it is false, misleading or fabricated. On the other hand, the preponderance of legal opinion holds that affidavits, as those of appellant's witnesses, are only prima facie evidence of weak probative force and are in themselves self-serving declarations where the same have been made in anticipation of a future litigation. It has been said that 'perhaps the most subtle and prolific of au the fallacies of testimony arises out of unconscious partisanship.' In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the companions of the appellant perhaps still sympathetic to her for what befall her, and testifying in an affidavit, are apt to side with her. (Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 9-10)

In the petition for review presented to this Court, Petitioner contends that the Respondent ECC has decided the claim in a way not in accordance with law and applicable decision of the Supreme Court. At the time of the incident in question, the pertinent and governing provisions of law are to be found in Section 1, Rule 11, of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, which provides:
SECTION 1. Grounds.(a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following conditions: (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official function.

The Petitioner, in proceeding to Dipolog City on August 1, 1975, which is a Friday, from her station at the Municipality of Sergio Osmena, Sr., Zamboanga del Norte, intended to procure supplies and other training aids which are needed facilities in connection with her services as a school teacher at the Wilbon Primary School, cannot be at all disputed. The companions of the Petitioner at the time of the ambush and who appear to be co-teachers of the Petitioner, namely: Francisco L. Podol and Juanita Adanza, have attested in their respective affidavits that they and the Petitioner were at that time on their way to Dipolog City "for the purpose of securing supplies and other training and school aids necessary for the furtherance of their services as school teachers." There is no mention at an in the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission that this particular assertion has been at all contradicted or controverted by any evidence whatsoever submitted to the Commission by the GSIS. We find no basis at an for the findings made by the Employees' Compensation Commission in its decision that the statements of Petitioner and her witnesses are merely self-serving declarations because We can discern no circumstance that would indicate or support such a conclusion. As a matter of fact, the decision appealed from accepts the fact that the statements given by Petitioner-Appellant's witnesses constitute prima facie evidence of the matter sought to be established. Uncontroverted and unrefuted by any evidence, then such statements of appellant's witnesses would suffice to establish that the multiple gunshot wounds and injuries sustained by appellant and which caused her confinement at the Zamboanga del Norte Provincial Hospital from August 1 to 6, 1975 for removal of shrapnels from her left arm and later at the Dipolog Medical Center from September 1 to 12, 1975, are definitely work-connected. The conjecture expressed in the decision of the ECC that appellant obtained the referred self-serving declaration of her witnesses "in anticipation of a future litigation" is unfair and untenable. Petitioner could not have even expected that respondent GSIS would resist her claim. Notice of the same claim for the injuries she sustained is said to

have been presented to the Secretary of Education and Culture, through the Division Superintendent of Schools, Division of Zamboanga del Norte at Dipolog City, promptly on August 5, 1975, or four (4) days after the ambush incident and such claim was not controverted by said public school officials. These submissions of Petitioner-Appellant have not at all been contradicted by Respondent. No cause has, therefore, been shown why petitioner would have been to obtain false affidavits from her co-teachers whose sense and probity and righteousness must be presumed until otherwise disproved. Furthermore, the fact that Dipolog City is also the residence of the Petitioner does not at all, by this singular circumstance, render untrue or false the clear evidence submitted in this case that Petitioner and her co-teachers were proceeding to Dipolog City at the time to purchase needed supplies and other training and school aids. That Dipolog City happened to be also the Petitioner's place of residence, in this instance, becomes simply incidental and/or purely coincidental. As it can be rightfully ruled that the Claimant-Petitioner was actually then performing her official functions, it hardly matters then whether such task which Petitioner was then engaged in or discharging, happened outside the regular working hours and not in the Petitioner's place of work. It is rather obvious that in proceeding to purchase school materials in Dipolog City, Petitioner would necessarily have to leave the school premises and her travel need not be during her usual working hours. What is significant and controlling is that the injuries she sustained are work-connected, which the Court finds to be so. The environmental facts in this case are even more compelling than the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, L-42627, February 21, 1980, 96 SCRA 260, where, by a significant majority vote of this Court, it was held that a claim arising from a vehicular accident sustained by a school principal on his way from Bacolod City where he lived to his school at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where he was the school principal of, is compensable. It was therein ruled that "where an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place of work, while she is going to and from her work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of her employment. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE, and the Government Service Insurance System is hereby ordered to grant the Petitioner's claim for loss of income benefits and to process and ascertain the total amount due herein Petitioner and thereafter to pay the same. SO ORDERED. Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990 SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents. Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice. On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986. For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that
It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter that of bringing home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that

resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were 1 not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred.

It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter. Hence, the present recourse. The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court awarded compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus. Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present case. The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court held:
It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

Again in Alano v. ECC, 5 it was reiterated:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ... In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, 6 this Court, applying the above quoted decisions, enunciated:
Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage. We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...." 7 Baldebrin, the Court said:
The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act). In Philippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey. While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the

law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident. This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.' The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9 There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. 10 If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station. We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our society. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision. SO ORDERED. Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., epublic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 115858 June 28, 1996

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AIDA ALVARAN, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:p For purposes of determining compensation to be given their widows and orphans, policemen -- by the nature of their functions -- are deemed to be on 24-hour duty. This Court holds that since the public demands, as it ought to, strict performance of duty by our policemen in maintaining peace and security, the government, in the same measure, must be ready to compensate their heirs who are left without any means of support. This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on April 19, 1994 by the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28487 and the Resolution 3 promulgated on June 10, 1994 denying reconsideration. The Facts The assailed Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals reversed a ruling by petitioner, a government agency organized under P.D. 422, as amended, holding that private respondent, a policeman's widow, is not entitled to compensation. The facts are not disputed and are quoted by the assailed Decision 4 from the reversed judgment of petitioner as follows:
The deceased was a member of the Mandaluyong Police Station, assigned at the Pasig Provincial Jail as 2nd Shift Jailer with tour of duty from 7:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M. He had been serving the Mandaluyong Police Station for more than twenty years, since he first entered the service on April 1, 1964, until his death on November 19, 1988. Records disclosed that on November 19, 1988, at around 11:50 in the evening, the deceased was infront (sic) of the Office of the Criminal Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong Police Station and was talking with another policeman, PFC. Ruben Cruz, when another policeman, Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who had just arrived, immediately got off the car holding his service firearm and approached the deceased and without saying any word, he fired three successive shots at the surprised police sergeant which sent him slumped to the ground. The deceased, however, although critically wounded, drew his side firearm and fired back, twice hitting fatally Pat. Cesar Arcilla, who was still advancing towards him and uttering "ano, ano." Both fell, fatally wounded, and were rushed to the Mandaluyong Medical Center, but Sgt. Alvaran was pronounced dead upon arrival. Pat. Cesar Arcilla, died in the same hospital, the day after. Records further disclosed that previous to that shooting incident, it was learned that the same, stemmed from a family feud, wherein Sgt. Alvaran's son, stabbed the patrolman's nephew, a day before (November 18, 1988). Such quarrel was aggravated when the latter fired shots on (sic) the air and uttered defamatory words before the relatives of the former. The presence of Sgt. Alvaran at the Mandaluyong Police Station, that night of November 19, 1988, (when he was supposed to be in the Pasig Provincial Jail, as 2nd

Shift Jailer), was to accompany his son who was to be interviewed at the same and to shed light with regards (sic) that stabbing incident which he got involved (in) a day before. The appellant subsequent (sic) filed a claim for compensation benefits under PD 626, as amended. The System [GSIS] denied the claim on the ground that at the time of the accident the deceased was supposed to be at the Pasig Provincial Jail as 2nd Shift Jailer and with a specific duty to perform, in a particular place, his presence in the Mandaluyong Police Station, although he was a member of the same, clearly reflects the fact that he was "there merely to accompany his son who was requested to be interviewed by the Officer-in-case Pfc. Carlos Villaruel pertaining to the stabbing incident which ultimately led to a family feud." In the other words according to the System, "he was plainly acting as a father to his son, an act which is purely personal, foreign and unrelated to his employment. His having been killed at the place where he was not required to be and while he was not in the performance of his duty, cannot be considered to have arisen out of and in the course of employment. Appellant requested a reconsideration of the respondent's [GSIS] ruling saying that the contingency happened in the police station where her husband is a member although at that time of the contingency her husband was assigned at the Pasig Provincial Jail. Respondent [GSIS], nonetheless, took a firm stand prompting appellant to elevate her case to this Commission for review. (ECC Decision pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 11-13).

On July 31, 1991, petitioner Commission affirmed the holding of the GSIS that the death of private respondent's husband is not compensable under P.D. 626, as amended. On appeal, respondent Court reversed petitioner Commission via its assailed Decision, the dispositve portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission dated July 31, 1991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one is hereby rendered declaring the petitioner entitled to compensation benefits under P.D. 626, as amended. Respondent ECC is hereby ORDERED to accordingly AWARD the petitioner the benefits under said law.

Respondent Court held that "(b)y the nature of his work, a police officer exercises his official duty on a 24 hour basis" and that his death "came as an incident in the performance of his duties in the police force . . . (and) must be declared compensable under our law." The Issues Before us, petitioner attacks the appellate court's holding and assigns the following "errors":
I The respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the deceased P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran was performing an official function when he accompanied his son for interview at (the) Criminal Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong police station; and II

The respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the private respondent is entitled to the compensation benefit under P.D. 626, as amended, on account of the death of her husband, P/Sgt. Wilfredo Alvaran.

Upon the other hand, private respondent raises the issue of forum-shopping claiming that this Court, in G.R. No. 115040, had already dismissed an earlier petition questioning the very same Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28487. Thus, the issues could be restated as follows: (1) Did petitioner engage in "forum-shopping" in filing this petition? (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the death of Sgt. Alvaran is compensable? The First Issue: Forum-Shopping The herein petition should be denied. In Buan vs. Lopez, 5 this Court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, ruled that forum-shopping exists where the elements of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant. xxx xxx xxx As already observed, there is between the action at bar and RTC Case No. 86-36563, an identity as regards parties, or interests represented, rights asserted and relief sought, as well as basis thereof, to a degree sufficient to give rise to the ground for dismissal known as auter action pendant or lis pendens. That same identity puts into operation the sanction of twin dismissals just mentioned. The application of this sanction will prevent any further delay in the settlement of the controversy which might ensue from attempts to seek reconsideration of or to appeal from the Order of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 86-36563 promulgated on July 15, 1986, which dismissed the petition upon grounds which appear persuasive.

The test therefore in determining the presence of forum-shopping is whether in the two (or more cases) pending there is identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action and (c) reliefs sought. Applying the above test, there is no question that there is identity of cause of action and reliefs sought between this petition and the petition in G.R. No. 115040. The very same decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28487 promulgated by

the same Fifth division and by the same ponente is sought to be set aside in both petitions before this Court. However, the Solicitor General, as counsel for petitioner, insists that there is no identity of parties inasmuch as the petitioner in G.R. No. 115040 is the Government Service Insurance System as represented by the Government Corporate Counsel while the petitioner now before us is the Employees' Compensation Commission. The Solicitor General also avers that he observed Administrative Circular No. 28-91 proscribing forum-shopping, because he attached a certification 6 to the herein petition expressly mentioning the dismissal of the petition in G.R. No. 115040, as follows:
3. Except for the petition for review filed by the Government Service Insurance System in this Court on June 9, 1994 and which was subsequently dismissed per its resolution dated June 27, 1994, I have no knowledge of such other action or proceeding that is pending in this Court, the Court of Appeals or any tribunal or agency; . . .

The Solicitor General misses the point. Forum-shopping does not require a literal identity of parties. It is sufficient that there is identity of interests represented. 7 That there is identity of interests represented in the two cases filed before us 8 is clearly shown by the very allegations of the petition 9 in G.R. No. 115040, as follows:
Petitioner Government Service Insurance System is a government owned and controlled corporation, in charge with (sic) the administration of the Employees' Compensation programs and with office address at the GSIS Headquarters Bldg., Financial Center (Reclamation Area), Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City where it can be served with legal notices and whose decision was affirmed by the ECC but was reversed by the respondent Honorable Court of Appeals which is now the subject of this petition. . . . (Emphasis supplied)

The Solicitor General also argues that the petition in G.R. No. 115040 was dismissed "on the basis of technicality and not on the merits, i.e., GSIS failed to comply with the requirements provided under Circular 1-88 and 19-91." This is an inaccurate statement as the honorable counsel of the Republic conveniently neglected to add that in the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 115040, this Court's resolution had an important last paragraph, which reads:
Besides, even if the petition was filed on time, it would still be dismissed, as petitioner failed to show that a reversible error was committed by the appellate court.

The above holding is an adjudication on the merits, as this Court in effect adopted the questioned Decision as its own. 10 Be that as it may, we should add that to be more accurate, private respondent should have alleged res judicata, and not forum-shopping, as defense because the decision in G.R. No. 115040 had already become final and executory. In fact, it has been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on July 28, 1994. Forum-shopping applies only when the two (or more) cases are still pending. 11 Thus, Circular 28-91, among other things, authorizes their "twin dismissal." The Second Issue: Is Death of Alvaran Compensable?

As above explained, this Court already ruled in G.R. No. 115040 that the Court of Appeals committed "no reversible error" in promulgating the assailed Decision in CAG.R. SP-No. 28487. This Resolution is, to repeat, on the merits and adopts by reference the impugned Decision. But for clarity's sake and as a guide for future cases, we hereby hold that members of the national police, like P/Sgt. Alvaran, are by the nature of their functions technically on duty 24 hours a day. Except when they are on vacation leave, policemen are subject to call at any time and may be asked by their superiors or by any distressed citizen to assist in maintaining the peace and security of the community. In Hinoguin vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 12 we ruled that "a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status . . ." We hold that by analogy and for purposes of granting compensation under P.D. No. 626, as amended, policemen should be treated in the same manner as soldiers. While it is true that, "geographically" speaking, P/Sgt. Alvaran was not actually at his assigned post at the Pasig Provincial Jail when he was attacked and killed, it could not also be denied that in bringing his son -- as a suspect in a case -- to the police station for questioning to shed light on a stabbing incident, he was not merely acting as father but as a peace officer. As explained by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals: 13
When the deceased accompanied his son to the Police Station, he was performing a police function. He brought his son in order to place the latter under the authority and jurisdiction of the police authorities of Mandaluyong. He could have helped his son to hide or to flee, but being honest, he chose instead to fulfill his sworn duty to submit suspected offenders to the authority of the police. Had he not done so, he would have been accused and charged of abetting a suspected felon using his cloak of authority as a police officer, an act contrary to law and to his sworn duty as a police officer. The deceased, therefor, although assigned as jailer at the Pasig Provincial Jail, adjacent to the municipality of Mandaluyong, was not only doing his fatherly duties but also carrying out his sworn duty as a police officer, enforcing the law without favor to anyone including his family. He had not abandoned his duty as Jailer, but was at the same time performing another one of his many duties as a law enforcer.

Finally, in Vicente vs. Employees' Compensation Commission, 14 we held that in case of doubt, "the sympathy of the law on social security is toward its beneficiaries, and the law, by its own terms, requires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor." For this reason, this Court lends a very sympathetic ear to the cries of the poor widows and orphans of police officers. If we must demand -- as we ought to -- strict accountability from our policemen in safeguarding peace and order day and night, we must also to the same extent be ready to compensate their loved ones who, by their untimely death, are left without any means of supporting themselves.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision is again AFFIRMED. No Costs. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 83491 August 27, 1990 MA-AO SUGAR CENTRAL CO., INC. and GUILLERMO ARANETA, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HERMINIA FAMOSO, respondents. Jalandoni, Herrera, Del Castillo & Associates for petitioners. Napoleon Corral for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.: To say the least, the Court views with regret the adamant refusal of petitioner Ma-ao Sugar Central to recompense the private respondent for the death of Julio Famoso, their main source of support, who was killed in line of duty while in its employ. It is not only a matter of law but also of compassion on which we are called upon to rule today. We shall state at the outset that on both counts the petition must fail. On March 22, 1980, Famoso was riding with a co-employee in the caboose or "carbonera" of Plymouth No. 12, a cargo train of the petitioner, when the locomotive was suddenly derailed. He and his companion jumped off to escape injury, but the train fell on its side, caught his legs by its wheels and pinned him down. He was declared dead on the spot. 1 The claims for death and other benefits having been denied by the petitioner, the herein private respondent filed suit in the Regional Trial Court of Bago City. Judge Marietta Hobilla-Alinio ruled in her favor but deducted from the total damages awarded 25% thereof for the decedent's contributory negligence and the total pension of P41,367.60 private respondent and her children would be receiving from the SSS for the next five years. The dispositive portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances present in this case, the Court order, as it does hereby order the defendant Ma-ao Sugar Central thru its Manager Mr. Guillermo Y. Araneta to pay plaintiff the following amount:

P30,000.00 for the death of plaintiff's husband, the late Julio Famoso P30,000.00 for actual, exemplary and moral damages P10,000.00 loss of earnings for twenty (20) years P3,000.00 funeral expenses P73,000.00 Total Damages Less: P18,250.00 25% for the deceased's contributory negligence Less: P41,367.60 pension plaintiff and her minor children would be receiving for five (5) years from the SSS Pl3,382.40 Plus: P3,000.00 Attorney's fees and cost of this suit Pl6,382.40 Total amount payable to the plaintiff. SO ORDERED.

The widow appealed, claiming that the deductions were illegal. So did the petitioner, but on the ground that it was not negligent and therefore not liable at all. In its own decision, the Court of Appeals 2 sustained the rulings of the trial court except as to the contributory negligence of the deceased and disallowed the deductions protested by the private respondent. Thus, the respondent court declared:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED by ordering the defendantappellant to pay the plaintiff-appellee the following amounts: P30,000.00, for the death of Julio Famoso P30,000.00, for actual, exemplary and moral damages P10,000.00, for loss of earnings for twenty (20) years P3,000.00, for funeral expenses

P3,000.00, for attorney's fees P76,000.00 Total Amount ========

In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing the deductions made by the trial court. Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 1/2" thick which are attached to the rails by 4 bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with special equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the scene of the accident. There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose inter alia of preventing derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not discharged. According to Jose Treyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour. 3 The petitioner should therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life was finally lost because of its negligence. The argument that no one had been hurt before because of such derailments is of course not acceptable. And neither are we impressed by the claim that the brakemen and the conductors were required to report any defect in the condition of the railways and to fill out prescribed forms for the purpose. For what is important is that the petitioner should act on these reports and not merely receive and file them. The fact that it is not easy to detect if the fish plates are missing is no excuse either. Indeed, it should stress all the more the need for the responsible employees of the petitioner to make periodic checks and actually go down to the railroad tracks and see if the fish plates were in place. It is argued that the locomotive that was derailed was on its way back and that it had passed the same rails earlier without accident. The suggestion is that the rails were properly aligned then, but that does not necessarily mean they were still aligned afterwards. It is possible that the fish plates were loosened and detached during its first trip and the rails were as a result already mis-aligned during the return trip. But the Court feels that even this was unlikely, for, as earlier noted, the fish plates were supposed to have been bolted to the rails and could be removed only with special tools. The fact that the fish plates were not found later at the scene of the mishap may show they were never there at all to begin with or had been removed long before.

At any rate, the absence of the fish plates whatever the cause or reason is by itself alone proof of the negligence of the petitioner. Res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine was described recently in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 4 thus:
Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.

The petitioner also disclaims liability on the ground of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, contending it has exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. The Court cannot agree. The record shows it was in fact lax in requiring them to exercise the necessary vigilance in maintaining the rails in good condition to prevent the derailments that sometimes happened "every hour." Obviously, merely ordering the brakemen and conductors to fill out prescribed forms reporting derailmentswhich reports have not been acted upon as shown by the hourly derailments is-not the kind of supervision envisioned by the Civil Code. We also do not see how the decedent can be held guilty of contributory negligence from the mere fact that he was not at his assigned station when the train was derailed. That might have been a violation of company rules but could not have directly contributed to his injury, as the petitioner suggests. It is pure speculation to suppose that he would not have been injured if he had stayed in the front car rather than at the back and that he had been killed because he chose to ride in the caboose. Contributory negligence has been defined as "the act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant's negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury." 5 It has been held that "to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or signs of an impending danger to health and body." 6 There is no showing that the caboose where Famoso was riding was a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending danger. The last point raised by the petitioner is easily resolved. Citing the case of Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 7 it argues that the respondent court erred in disauthorizing the deduction from the total damages awarded the private respondent of the amount of P41,367.60, representing the pension to be received by the private respondent from the Social Security System for a period of five years. The argument is that such deduction was quite proper because of Art. 173 of the Labor Code, as amended. This article provides that any amount received by the heirs of a deceased employee from the Employees Compensation Commission, whose funds are administered by the SSS, shall be exclusive of all other amounts that may otherwise be claimed under the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. The amount to be paid by the SSS represents the usual pension received by the heirs of a deceased employee who was a member of the SSS at the time of his death and

had regularly contributed his premiums as required by the System. The pension is the benefit derivable from such contributions. It does not represent the death benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act to an employee who dies as a result of a work-connected injury. Indeed, the certification from the SSS 8 submitted by the petitioner is simply to the effect that:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: This is to certify that Mrs. Herminia Vda. de Famoso is a recipient of a monthly pension from the Social Security System arising from the death of her late husband, Julio Famoso, an SSS member with SSS No. 07-018173-1. This certification is issued to Ma-ao Sugar Central for whatever legal purpose it may serve best. Issued this 8th day of April 1983 in Bacolod City, Philippines. GODOFREDO S. SISON Regional Manager By: (SGD.) COSME Q. BERMEO, JR. Chief, Benefits Branch

It does not indicate that the pension is to be taken from the funds of the ECC. The certification would have said so if the pension represented the death benefits accruing to the heirs under the Workmen's Compensation Act. This conclusion is supported by the express provision of Art. 173 as amended, which categorically states that:
Art. 173. Exclusiveness of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred eighty-six, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four, as amended and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the government. (Emphasis supplied).

Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended, is the Social Security Law.

As observed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Valencia v. Manila Yacht Club, 9 which is still controlling:
. . . By their nature and purpose, the sickness or disability benefits to which a member of the System may be entitled under the Social Security law (Rep. Act No. 1161, as amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 1792 and 2658) are not the same as the compensation that may be claimed against the employer under the Workmen's Compensation Act or the Civil Code, so that payment to the member employee of social security benefits would not wipe out or extinguish the employer's liability for the injury or illness contracted by his employee in the course of or during the employment. It must be realized that, under the Workmen's Compensation Act (or the Civil Code, in a proper case), the employer is required to compensate the employee for the sickness or injury arising in the course of the employment because the industry is supposed to be responsible therefore; whereas, under the Social Security Act, payment is being made because the hazard specifically covered by the membership, and for which the employee had put up his own money, had taken place. As this Court had said: . . . To deny payment of social security benefits because the death or injury or confinement is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act would be to deprive the employees members of the System of the statutory benefits bought and paid for by them, since they contributed their money to the general common fund out of which benefits are paid. In other words, the benefits provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the employees concerned due to the hazards involved in their employment and is made a burden on the employment itself However, social security benefits are paid to the System's members, by reason of their membership therein for which they contribute their money to a general common fund . . . . It may be added that whereas social security benefits are intended to provide insurance or protection against the hazards or risks for which they are established, e.g., disability, sickness, old age or death, irrespective of whether they arose from or in the course of the employment or not, the compensation receivable under the Workmen's Compensation law is in the nature of indemnity for the injury or damage suffered by the employee or his dependents on account of the employment. (Rural Transit Employees Asso. vs. Bachrach Trans. Co., 21 SCRA 1263 [19671])

And according to Justice Jesus G. Barrera in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Social Security System:" 10
The philosophy underlying the Workmen's Compensation Act is to make the payment of the benefits provided for therein as a responsibility of the industry, on the ground that it is industry which should bear the resulting death or injury to employees engaged in the said industry. On the other hand, social security sickness benefits are not paid as a burden on the industry, but are paid to the members of the System as a matter of right, whenever the hazards provided for in the law occurs. To deny payment of social security benefits because the death or injury or confinement is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act would be to deprive the employees-members of the System of the statutory benefits bought and paid for by them, since they contribute their money to the general common fund out of which benefits are paid. In other words, the benefits provided for in the Workmen's Compensation Act accrues to the employees concerned, due to the hazards involved in their employment and is made a burden on the

employment itself However, social security benefits are paid to the System's members, by reason of their membership therein for which they contributed their money to a general common fund.

Famoso's widow and nine minor children have since his death sought to recover the just recompense they need for their support. Instead of lending a sympathetic hand, the petitioner has sought to frustrate their efforts and has even come to this Court to seek our assistance in defeating their claim. That relief-and we are happy to say this must be withheld. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in toto. The petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Narvasa (Chairman), Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 116354 December 4, 1997 HEIRS OF THE LATE R/O REYNALDO ANIBAN represented by BRIGIDA P. ANIBAN, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., NORWEGIAN SHIP MANAGEMENT, INC. A/S, and PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.: BRIGIDA P. ANIBAN representing the heirs of the late Reynaldo Aniban assails the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), 1 reversing that of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which ruled that myocardial infarction was an occupational decease in the case of radio operator Reynaldo Aniban and awarded, aside from attorney's fees of US$6,700.00, a total of US$67,000.00 in death benefits to his heirs: US$13,000.00 for death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract; US$30,000.00 for death benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement; and US$24,000.00 as additional compensation for his three (3) children

under eighteen (18) years of age at US$8,000.00 each, 2 as well as denying the motion for its reconsideration. 3 Reynaldo Aniban was employed by the Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. (TRANSMARINE) acting in behalf of its foreign principal Norwegian Ship Management A/S (NORWEGIAN) 4 as radio operator (R/O) on board the vessel "Kassel" for a contract period of his employment, R/O Aniban died due to myocardial infarction. 5 He was survived by a pregnant wife and three (3) minor children who prayed for death benefits provided under par. (1) of the POEA Standard Employment Contract thus
1. In case of death of the seaman during the term of his contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine currency equivalent to the amount of: . . . . b. US$13,000.00 for other officers including radio operators and master electricians.

A claim was also made for additional death benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed between Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and NORWEGIAN represented by TRANSMARINE, to wit:
Article 11 Compensation for loss of Life Death caused by an Occupational Injury or Disease. In the event of death of an officer due to an occupational injury or disease while serving on board, while travelling to and from the vessel on Company's business or due to marine peril, the Company will pay his beneficiaries compensation in accordance with the POEA's rules and regulations . . . . It is agreed that these beneficiaries will be the following next of kin: The officer's spouse, children or parents in this preferential order. The company will pay an additional compensation to the beneficiaries listed aboved with same preferential order to that compensation provided by the POEA Rules and Regulations. The additional compensation will be US$30,000.00 plus US$8,000.00 to each child under the age of eighteen (18) years, maximum US$24,000.00 (not exceeding 3 children).

The claim was granted only to the extent of US$13,000.00 provided under the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The claim under the CBA was rejected on the ground that myocardial infarction of which R/O Aniban died was not an occupational disease as to entitle his heirs to the additional death benefits provided therein. Consequently, Brigida Aniban and her children filed a formal complaint for non-payment of death compensation benefits under the CBA. 6 On 11 January 1994 the POEA ruled that myocardial infarction was an occupational disease in the case of R/O Aniban and granted the prayer of his heirs for payment of death benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract as well as under the Collective Bargaining Agreement plus attorney's fees of US$6,700.00 equivalent to 10 % of the total award. 7

On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the POEA and denied the claim for additional death benefits on the ground that it was the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) which had original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine the claim for death benefits. 8 A motion to reconsider the decision of the NLRC was denied; hence, this petition by the heirs of R/O Reynaldo Aniban. Two issues are raised before us: (a) whether the POEA has jurisdiction to determine the claim of petitioners for death benefits, and (b) whether myocardial infarction is an occupational disease as to entitle petitioners to the death benefits provided under the CBA. It must be stated at the outset that the proper issue raised before us is that dealing with the jurisdiction of the POEA to resolve the claim for additional death benefits since the NLRC denied the claim on this sole ground. However, we are likewise addressing the second issue, i.e., merits of the claim, to afford the parties the relief they seek and prevent further needless delay in the resolution thereof. On the issue of jurisdiction, it is not disputed that R/O Reynaldo Aniban was a Filipino seaman and that he died on board the vessel of his foreign employer during the existence of his employment contract, hence, this claim for death benefits by his widow and children. The law applicable at the time the complaint was filed on 13 November 1992 was Art. 20 of the Labor Code as amended by E.O. Nos. 797 9 and 247 10 which clearly provided that "original and exclusive jurisdiction over all matters or cases including money claims, involving employer-employee relations, arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino seamen for overseas employment is vested with the POEA. 11 On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the ECC comes into play only when the liability of the State Insurance Fund is in issue, as correctly suggested by the Solicitor General. The ECC was created under Title II, Bk. IV, of the Labor Code with the heading of Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund. In addition to its powers and duties enumerated in Art. 177, Art. 180 explicitly provides that the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction only over decisions rendered by either the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social Security System (SSS) in the exercise of their respective original and exclusive jurisdictions. Hence, the ECC may not be considered as having jurisdiction over money claims, albeit death compensation benefits, of overseas contract workers. Thus, in so ruling, the NLRC clearly committed grave abuse of discretion. As regards the second issue, i.e., whether the death Reynaldo Aniban due to myocardial infarction is compensable, the POEA ruled in the affirmative when it likened the infirmity to a "heart attack" commonly aggravated by pressure and strain. It was observed that R/O Aniban, in addition to undergoing physical exertion while performing his duties as radio operator, was also exposed to undue pressure and strain as he was required to be on call twenty-four (24) hours a day to receive/transmit messages and to

keep track of weather conditions. Such pressure and strain were aggravated by being away from his family, a plight commonly suffered by all seamen. In the case of R/O Aniban, the separation was particularly distressful as his pregnant wife was due to deliver their fourth child. Hence, the POEA ruled that myocardial infarction was an occupational disease. We cannot rule otherwise. Reynaldo Aniban was healthy at the time he boarded the vessel of his foreign employer. His medical records reveal that he had no health problem except for a "defective central vision secondary to injury." 12 Hence, he was certified "fit to work as radio operator" by the examining physician. However, R/O Aniban died three (3) months after he boarded "Kassel" due to myocardial infarction. As aforesaid, the POEA ruled that the cause of death could be considered occupational. Being a factual finding by the administrative agency tasked with its determination, such conclusion deserves respect and must be accorded finality. 13 Besides we have already repeatedly ruled that death due to myocardial infarction is compensable. 14 In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. POEA, 15 although compensability was not the main issue, we upheld the decision of the POEA adjudging as compensable the death of a seaman on board the vessel of his foreign employer due to myocardial infarction. Although it may be conceded in the instant case that the physical exertion involved in carrying out the functions of a radio operator may have been quite minimal, we cannot discount the pressure and strain that went with the position of radio operator. As radio operator, Reynaldo Aniban had to place his full attention in hearing the exact messages received by the vessel and to relay those that needed to be transmitted to the mainland or to other vessels. We have already recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in the wear and tear of the human body. 16 It is not required that the employment contributed even in a small degree to its development. 17 It must be stressed that the strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation considering that probability and not the ultimate degree of certainty is the test of proof in compensation proceedings. 18 It is a matter of judicial notice that an overseas worker, having to ward off homesickness by reason of being physically separate from his family for the entire duration of his contract, bears a great degree of emotional strain while making an effort to perform his work well. The strain is even greater in the case of a seaman who is constantly subjected to the perils of the sea while at work abroad and away from his family. In this case, there is substantial proof that myocardial infarction is an occupational disease for which Aniban's employer obligated itself to pay death benefits and additional compensation under the CBA in the event of the demise of its employee by reason thereof. On the award of attorney's fees which NLRC deleted on the ground that there was no unlawful withholding of wages, suffice it to say that Art. 111 of the Labor Code does not limit the award of attorney's fees to cases of unlawful withholding of wages only. What it

explicitly prohibits is the award of attorney's fees which exceed 10% of the amount of wages recovered. Thus, under the circumstances, attorney's fees are recoverable for the services rendered by petitioner's counsel to compel Aniban's employer to pay its monetary obligations under the CBA. However the amount of P50,000.00 claimed as attorneys' fees in this case is the reasonable compensation based on the records and not the maximum 10% of the total award as granted by POEA. The reduction of unreasonable attorney's fees is within our regulatory powers. 19 WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration dated 10 January 1994 ordering respondents Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., Norwegian Ship Management A/S, and Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation jointly and severally to pay the heirs of the late R/O Reynaldo Aniban represented by his widow Brigida P. Aniban the following amounts in Philippine currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment: (a) US$13,000.00 for death benefits in accordance with POEA Standard Employment Contract; (b) US30,000.00 death benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement; (c) US$24,000.00 additional compensation for the three (3) children under 18 years of age at US$8,000.00 each; and, (d) US$6,700.00 for attorney's fees, is REINSTATED and ADOPTED herein, with the MODIFICATION that the award of US$6,700.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency for attorney's fees is reduced to P50,000.00, with costs against private respondents. SO ORDERED.