Jane Sorensen

Thursday, August 5, 2004

1919 and All That: Economics and Empire

Much is known about how Germany blamed the Treaty of Versailles on their hardships after the World War I, and how this perception contributed to the beginning of World War II. However, terms of the peace treaty were symbolically, not practically, arduous, and so their lack of fulfillment could have contributed the cause of World War II. The primary causes were, in chronological order, economics, guilt, neutrality, and appeasement. However, the feelings that were engendered in the negotiating of the peace treaties have echoed down the times through foreign policies, and in combination with shifting economic needs and social mores, they have changed the world to a very large extent. In particular, the fall of the British Empire and the rise of the informal American empire have had an effect everywhere else, notably former dominions and colonies, the Middle East, and former communist countries.
In 1929 the system of security against Germany, devised in the treaty of Versailles, was still complete. Germany was disarmed; the Rhineland was demilitarised; the victors were ostensibly united; and the system was reinforced by the authority of the League of Nations. Seven years later all this had gone without a blow being struck. (Taylor 89)

Could these events be tied back to the Peace Conference and the Treaty of Versailles, or were they attributable in name only? Well, as MacMillan noted in Paris, 1919, the ensuing World War II had very little to do with the reparations demanded against Germany, as the reparations were hardly enforced. To the Germans, it was fuel for their anger, which through several years of ineffectual minority government, was reaching a critical point. There was massive unemployment and poverty. In 1932 men feared, and rightly feared, the collapse of Germany, not German strength. (Taylor 96) But what was happening to Germany was also happening to the rest of the world. The late 1920s and early 30s was the time of the Great Depression for Europe as well as America, and all

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governments were tightening up their budgets (aggravating the problem1). Dealing with domestic problems at home, nations turned away from international affairs. This turning away as a result of economic problems had more to do with starting the war than the Treaty, though, in theory, Lenin had expected more aggression between the capitalist countries involved:
in 1945 [the late-20th-century triumph of market economies] would have seemed highly unlikely. Capitalism had, after all, crashed badly during the 1930s and a great war quickly followed: had not Lenin predicted just such a result? Even Franklin D. Roosevelt and his advisers attributed the rise of fascism in Europe and of militarism in Japan to the breakdown in international economic cooperation that had accompanied the Great Depression. (Gaddis 190)

This breakdown accompanied (and perhaps was aggravated by) the rise of fascism in Italy and Germany.
Both movements were anti-communist but also anti-democratic and totalitarian.Adolf Hitler, who built his National Socialist Party (Nazis for short), upon the Italian model, sought not only to make Germany supreme in Europe, bringing into the Reich all German populations living under other sovereignties, but also to conquer for Germany Lebenstraum (living space) at the expense of her eastern neighbors, to recover the German colonies lost in World War I, and to elevate Germany to a position of world leadership superior to that which she had held under Kaiser Wilhelm II. Such purposescould be attained only by tearing up the peace settlement of 1919. (Pratt 591)

In order to do that, Hitler made many internal changes that preceding Chancellors were incapable of, such as consolidating the federated states into a unitary state. The former government had done little but foment discontent about the treaty, but Hitlers view of the treaty and stance towards foreign relations were not new. (Taylor 97) The initial hurdle and opportunity for Hitlers goals was at the Disarmament Conference. Here, Germany made demands for equivalent rearmament, and all nations but for France felt that refusal would be unfair.

Everyone understandsthat the way out of a depression is to increase government spending. In 1929 hardly anyone knew it; and the few who did had no influence on policy. It was generally believed that deflation was the only cure. This policy caused hardship and discontent in every country where it was applied. (Taylor 89)
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There is no greater mistake than to suppose that Hitler did not give foreign statesmen plenty of warning. On the contrary he gave them only too much. Germany now had a strong government; and this government would again make Germany a great military power. But what were the Allied statesmen to do?One obvious course was to intervene and to prevent German rearmament by force. This was suggested by the British military representative at the Disarmament conference; it was constantly suggested by the French. The suggestion was repeatedly considered and always turned down. It was unworkable from every aspect. (Taylor 102)

Hitler made no deals, but waited for offers to come to him, instead. He had waited until the opposition to Germany was inwardly demoralised and had then blown it away like thistledown. (Taylor 106) When the stalemate was broken, it was because [t]he French had fired the starting-pistol for the arms race. Characteristically they then failed to run it. (Taylor 107) This first hurdle reignited the arms race, and spelled the end of the Disarmament Conference. Even though England and France had not done much about violations of the treaty under the Disarmament Conference or through the League of Nations, there would be even less that they could do about Hitlers assertion of power now. His, and their, next steps were the following:
In March 1936, when Mussolinis invasion of Ethiopia had driven a wedge between Italy and her former allies, England and France, Hitler seized the occasion to proclaim his repudiation of the entire Treaty of Versailles and also of the Locarno Pact of 1925, by which Germany had joined in guaranteeing the frontiers of her western neighbours. Simultaneously he announced the remilitarization of the Rhineland and occupied it with 200,000 German troops. The League Council and the signers of the Locarno Pact condemned the German action as in violation of treaty obligations. The possibility of sanctions was discussed, but failed to receive adequate support in the Council. Hitler got away with his breach of the peace system as Japan [Manchuria] and Italy [Ethiopia] had been permitted to do with theirs. (Pratt 594-595)

America was not of any help in this matter. America was never part of the League of Nations, and they were bitter about the outcome of the Peace Conference. Congress legislated neutrality to prevent America from being dragged into another European war (Pratt 598). However, this neutrality extended to everyone victims of belligerence could expect no aid in materiel or money, and knowing this, the belligerent (Germany again, even more so than in the Great War) could feel confident in victory practically ushering in the war. Had such laws been on the books in 1914, the Kaisers Germany would have
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won the First World War. President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, at least, were reluctant in accepting this policy. (Pratt 603) In this climate, Chamberlain, Britains Prime Minister, took on the leading role in trying to avert the coming crisis:
Appeasement had played a prominent part in Britains relations with other nations throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Then, Britain had encouraged transfers of territory which reduced tension in Europe and maintained a balance of power.Such arrangements left Britain free to devote her attention and resources to what really mattered, her overseas empire and interests. Both were in jeopardy in 1937, and could be saved only if a measure of stability was restored to Europe. Appeasement offended consciences everywhere[it] also meant an end to collective security and the revival of old-style, cynical power-broking. The left were horrified by this reversion to old methods and the jettisoning of the noble idealism which the League embodied. (James 468)

So while American suspicions of European politics were validated, appeasement was the necessary action to promote stability, while prudently preparing for its failure. In this regard, imperial strategic priorities were adhered to in a way that would have won the approval of any eighteenth- or nineteenth-century statesman, and as it turned out they held the key to the nations deliverance in 1940. (James 469) For example, the expansion of the Royal Air Force and ground preparations for an air force attack against Britain were the top priority. Britains second and third strategic priorities were the protection of the worlds seaways and the defence of the empire; (James 470) In view of this interest, Mussolini railed Italy is washed by the waters of the Mediterranean. Her links with the rest of the world are through the Suez Canal, an artificial channel which could easily be blocked, even by accident, and through the Straits of Gibraltar, commanded by the guns of Britain. (James 475) The Suez Canal had later significance to the British Empire, but not because of Italy, as we will come to later.

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In spite of Britains policy of appeasement, Germany continued its declarations and threats, only now to annex Poland. On the last day of March [1939], [Chamberlain]2 pledged Poland every support if Germany threatened its independence. If Britain went to war, it would be in response to Hitlers aggression. (James 477) By the late autumn of 1940,Roosevelt and his advisers were at last certain that Britain was now Americas first line of defence. (James 485) During the ensuing war, we know that America changed its policy of non-involvement. President Roosevelt remained in power, and Churchill succeeded Chamberlain as Britains Prime Minister.
during 1942, Churchill sailed to America on 15 December prepared to convince Roosevelt that the only viable Allied strategy had to be one in which Germany was overcome first. In reaching this conclusion, he and his advisers had to face the bitter fact that, for the time being, imperial interests in Asia would have to be abandoned.Their efforts would, however, turn out to be futile if Germany was allowed to establish itself in the Middle East, and thereby secure the means to cooperate directly with Japanese forces which, by the turn of the year, were beginning to advance westwards through Burma to the borders of India. By sacrificing one part of the empire, Churchill hoped that he might ultimately secure all of it. No longer able to defend itself, the British empire in the Far East would pass under American protection. (James 495)

This had ramifications for BritishAustralian relations, which

took a severe battering at the beginning of 1942 and, although they improved once the threat of Japans landings receded, sour memories lingered. They surfaced in 1991-2 when the republican Australian prime minister, Paul Keating, repeated allegations that Churchill had left Australia in the lurch so as to concentrate on the war in the Middle East. This charge, like those levelled in 1941-2, was a simplification which failed to take into account the precariousness of Britains position in Egypt and on the north-eastern frontier of India. It was, and clearly still is hard for Australians to stomach the fact that in its direst moment their country was low down the list of British strategic priorities. (James 498)

Chamberlain was never a wholehearted convert to a policy which, in effect, dared Hitler to begin a war. He kept his blind faith in the possibility that further compromises might be contrived which would postpone a general European conflict until Britain was strong enough to deter Hitler. This was a forlorn hope from a statesman whose nostrums had manifestly failed and whose authority was consequently diminished. (James 477)
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But not only did Britain need assistance and protection, it was on the brink of bankruptcy. The result was that America became what Britain had been during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, part banker and part armourer, providing the wherewithal for others to make war. (James 485) And the nature of these transactions had everything to do with Britains status in the world after the war, and with Americas status. Britains freedom of choice was compromised by its financial dependence, and it had to contend with American public opinion. (James 511)
Formillions of Americans the war was a crusade for democracy and human rights throughout the world. Dynamic historical forces were gathering momentum which would create a new world order in which no country could expect the right to rule others without their consent. (James 512)

Though it sounds like high-minded principle, American policy towards Europe and imperialism was rooted in
widespread distrust of colonial powers, which tended to be directed against Britain since its empire was the one most familiar to Americans. Roosevelt was not immune from this anti-imperialism; when, during 1941, the Japanese took over Indo-China, he remarked, Anything must be better than to live under French colonial rule.3 On the other hand, naval and military men regarded the British empire as a source of international stability and therefore not to be tampered with. (James 480)

In any case, Britain necessarily tampered with the Empire, and with a non-sentimental pragmatism.
[The] Atlantic Charter [of 1941, between Britain and the United States4]was a blueprint for a new and just world order. Taken literally, it appears to undermine the moral base for all empires. The President and the Prime Minister had pledged themselves to uphold the rights of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them. (James 513)

However, comment was all Roosevelt did. Fear of a backlash within NATO discouraged Washington from pressing the French to end their debilitating colonial wars in Indochina and Algeria. (Gaddis 202)
4

The Atlantic Charter is available at http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm

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One of the benefits of nationalism and decolonization was already self-evident: parliamentary criticscontrasted the indifference of the natives of Malaya with the fierceness with which the Filipinos were fighting for their American masters, who had promised the Philippines self-government after the war. (James 499) But there was a positive side to imperialism that also shows in the democratization of the world today. In order to counter American prejudice against the humanistic benefits of imperialism, Britain had to go about showing that the British colonial government was unselfish, humane, just and always conducted in the best interests of people who would be lost without it. (James 513-14) For example, while Britain maintained its Middle East core of influence, local rulers were allowed to maintain old customs such as slavery (which exists even today), which elsewhere would have been abandoned at the insistence of British residents. (James 586) Former colonies, including parts of Africa and India, have had fewer difficulties in performing admirably on the worlds stage than the Middle East has.
Henceforward, the empires rulers knew that for the colonies to survive in the post-war world they would have to jettison the maxim Nanny knows best, and instead listen and respond to the aspirations of their subjects. The point was made by Lord Hailey in the Spectator on 17 March 1942, in which he discussed the difficulties of restoring imperial government in the Far East.A new age was imminent and it would be Britains duty to extend to the colonies those fundamental freedoms for which the war was being fought. It was now the moment for the colonies to begin their apprenticeship for home rule. (James 515)

After bombs were exploded over Japan, the war ended.

[The] way was now open for Britain to take back its colonies, and incidentally assist the French and the Dutch to regain theirs. The British empire had survived the war without loss of territory,5 although damage to prestige, sustained since Munich, was impossible to calculate (James 520)

Victories in the Pacific between 1942 and 1945 [made] it possible for Britain to regain its Far Eastern colonies. (James 511)
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At the advent of the Cold War, Russia and America had become, though their industrial and armed strength, superpowers, leaving Britain to occupy a humbler position. (James 521) Germany was divided in two, one half belonging to the Soviet Union, the other half safeguarded by NATO (see Richie). Even after reunification, it is not the country it once was. Speaking of Japan and Germany in 1945, but which may also extrapolate to countries affected by colonialism, Gaddis wrote:
Defeat had left a psychological vacuum from which there had emerged a social frontier. And one characteristic of frontiers is that new cultures injected into them can take hold in ways that replicate, with remarkable fidelity, even distant and alien origins. (Gaddis 199)

France was not a conquerer, but remained a player, and it was about to have many imperial troubles of its own. Britain was not to go silently, or spinning a sad tale of its glorious past and ignoble future; it was going to go forward, be pragmatic, and participate in international affairs as it was expected. But an interesting hiccup occurred: the Suez Crisis. Britain was a key partner in the Baghdad Pact, of which Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan were members. (James 575) Egypts President, Nasser, vilified the Baghdad Pact and everything to do with Britain. (James 576)
In a sense the loss of what was to a large extent Britains unofficial empire in the Middle East seems to have rankled more than the departure from India. At least Britain had parted company from India with dignity and a sense of achievement, whereas the abandonment of old spheres of influence in Iran and Egypt had been retreats in the face of insults and brickbats. And there was always Nasser, denouncing Britain and intriguing against it. Britain appeared powerless and on the run, something which was galling and inexplicable to generations who had grown up in a world in which no one had defied Britain with impunity, certainly not Egypt. (James 577)

Nasser took over and nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. It was a touchy situation, and it needed to be addressed, like Chamberlain did before the War, through diplomacy and advance preparation. If it came to war,
[after h]aving defeated Egypt and presumably overthrown Nasser, [t]he cabinet expected that there might be a brief interim period in which British administrators would assist in the governance of Egypt.

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Such a far-reaching and, given the climate of British and world opinion in 1956, daring reassertion of unofficial empire needed substantial backing at home and abroad. From the start, Britain had the wholehearted support of France, whose animus towards Nasser stemmed from his help to the Algerian nationalists. (James 579)

Weeks passed in preparation, when France and Israel (now an eight-year-old nation) found a way out of the diplomatic deadlock in a sneaky but brilliant plan: Israel attacked Egypt and advanced through Sinai. Britain and France then would have a pretext to seize the Canal on the grounds that they were protecting it, as well as separating the combatants. (James 581) The plan was outlined in the secret Treaty of Svres (not released until 20 years later, and no copy survives) and carried out on October 29, 30, and in November. (James 582) This war was resoundingly unpopular for many reasons:
Since [World War II], the columbines had become more and more optimistic about a world which seemed to be moving in the right direction. Imperialism was in retreat, the United Nations was flourishing despite the Cold War, and Britain seemed to be shedding its old domineering ways. Now all this had been changedWorse still, the invasion of Egypt had coincided with the final stages of the suppression of the Hungarian uprising by the Soviet army. How could moral outrage at this barbarity be expressed, when the thuggish Russian leader, Nikita K[h]ruschev, could turn round and accuse Britain and France of bullying Egypt? This loss of the moral high ground was felt most keenly in the United States whose public exposure of Soviet brutality was diminished by its allies behaviour in Egypt. When the world should have been concentrating its wrath on Russia, some of the fury was diverted to Britain and France. (James 584)

It seems, in retrospect, that the Suez crisis seemed to be both a last hurrah for the Empire, and proof of its ignobilityBritain, France, and Israel were requested to withdraw by the United Nations6. The stakes and the stakeholders were changing. In May, 1957, less than one year later, Britain entered the nuclear arms race (James 593). But so far as its empire went, most colonies gained their independence and joined the Commonwealth within thirteen years of the Suez crisis.

http://65.107.211.208/uk/ishiguro/rodsuez2.html, regarding the backdrop of Kazuo Ishiguros novel The Remains of the Day.
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The trauma, both in Britain and the colonies, was remarkably mild. Outsiders were astonished, the more so since the Algerian war brought about the downfall of the Fourth Republic in 1958, a large-scale mutiny by the French army in 1961 [in protest against decolonisation], tumults in Paris, and a spate of terrorist outrages undertaken by the Algerian settlers movement. (James 588-89)

As alluded to earlier in this paper, the ease of transfer had much to do with British pragmatism, in contrast to nationalistic fervour in other imperial demises. After the international trouncing they received in Suez, Britain carefully avoided being dragged into futile wars. (James 588-89) Nationalism seems to be an increasing problem in the world today, and it is a predictable factor in the beginning of wars. The current social mores and foreign policies dictate that open economic markets and democratic political systems help offset the dangers of nationalism and belligerence. For example,
Obviously what happened in Germany and Japan does not fully explain why democracy spread so widely elsewhere after 1945. Decolonizationa quite separate processalso rooted democratic processes in new territories, especially in regions like India where the British had prepared the way. But the balance of world power was unlikely to tilt in one direction or another according to what took place in former colonial dependencies. Germany and Japan, because of their industrial-military potential, were pivotal:democratizing those countries could not only contain Soviet power but also undermine its justification. They opened up, for the Germans and the Japanese, a path to rapid economic development that did not require authoritarian politics. (Gaddis 200)

Democracy and a good economic situation were not in place for the Soviet Union and other communist countries, and Cuba and North Korea are the last guard standing for Marxism-Leninism today. That politics may have shaped economics more throughout the twentieth century (Gaddis 193) than previously is debatable, but the world economy has been restructured, and the balance of power does not involve the same players as it did at the start. It is unquestionable that the United States is now at the fulcrum, but depending on how the United States behaves, there may be greater balance for a greater number of countries since German, British, and French imperialism ended. One hopes that Britains pragmatic face forward, and relatively graceful exit, is emulated by future nations should belligerence and imperialism rise again.
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Bibliography
Gaddis, John Lewis. We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford University Press, 1997. James, Lawrence. The Rise and Fall of the British Empire. Abacus, 1994. MacMillan, Margaret. 2001. Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World. New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks. Pratt, Julius W. A History of the United States Foreign Policy. New York: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1955. Richie, Alexandra. Fausts Metropolis: A History of Berlin. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, Inc. 1998. Taylor, A.J.P. The Origins of the Second World War. Penguin Books, 1963.

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