Aide Me Moire - Final Evaluation VIE 00013006

AIDE-MEMOIRE
FINAL EVALUATION OF THE INTERVENTION INCREASE THE AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION THRUOGH THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE IRRIGATION SYSTEMS IN PHU MY DISTRICT OF BINH DINH PROVINCE COUNTRY : VIETNAM NAVISION CODE : VIE/00/013/006
TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 CONTEXT OF THE FINAL EVALUATION (FE) ................................................................................. 5
1.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL EVALUATION..................................................................................... 5 1.2 METHODOLOGY OF THE FINAL EVALUATION................................................................................. 5 1.3 COMPOSITION OF THE FINAL EVALUATION-TEAM........................................................................... 6 1.4 INTERVENTION AREA AND BENEFICIARIES VISITED........................................................................... 6
2 MAIN FINDINGS & TEMPORARY CONCLUSIONS........................................................................... 7
2.1 BASIC CRITERIA.................................................................................................................... 7

2.1.1 Objective Level.......................................................................................................................... 7 2.1.1.1 Impact.................................................................................................................................... 7 2.1.1.2 Coherence.............................................................................................................................. 8 2.1.1.3 Sustainability.......................................................................................................................... 8 2.1.2 Immediate Results 1 and 2 .................................................................................................... 9 2.1.3 Immediate Results 3 and 4: .................................................................................................... 10 2.1.3.1 Result 4: Irrigation Management Strengthened.................................................................... 10 2.1.3.2 Result 4: Agriculture Technology Improved.......................................................................... 12
2.2 TRANSVERSAL THEMES......................................................................................................... 14

2.2.1 Gender Equality...................................................................................................................... 14 2.2.2 Environment............................................................................................................................ 15 2.2.3 Social Economy...................................................................................................................... 15 2.2.4 Childrens Rights...................................................................................................................... 16
2.3 HARMO-CRITERIA............................................................................................................ 16
2.3.1 Harmonisation......................................................................................................................... 16 2.3.2 Alignment................................................................................................................................ 16 2.3.3 Result Based Management..................................................................................................... 18 2.3.4 Mutual Accountability............................................................................................................... 19 2.3.5 Ownership............................................................................................................................... 20 3 LESSONS LEARNED....................................................................................................................... 21
3.1 AT PROJECT CONCEPTION AND FORMULATION .......................................................................... 21 3.2 AT PROJECT START UP ................................................................................................... 21
3.2.1 Detailed Design Stage............................................................................................................. 22 3.2.2 Construction............................................................................................................................ 23 3.2.3 Soft Component...................................................................................................................... 23 3.2.4 Project Management............................................................................................................... 24
3.3 AT THE LEVEL OF THE PROJECT STEERING COMMITTEE............................................................... 24 3.4 AT THE LEVEL OF BTC REPRESENTATION................................................................................ 24 3.5 AT THE LEVEL OF BTC-HQS............................................................................................... 24
4 FOLLOW-UP OF RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................................................... 26
4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINAL EVALUATION ........................................................................ 26

4.1.1 For Stakeholders..................................................................................................................... 26 4.1.2 For PSC/BT/Donor.................................................................................................................. 26 4.1.3 For Future Investments........................................................................................................... 27 5 CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................................ 29
5.1 MAIN PRELIMINARY FINDINGS ON THE ASSESSMENT CRITERIA......................................................... 29 5.2 PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................................... 30
6 ANNEXES......................................................................................................................................... 32
6.1 LIST OF PEOPLE MET......................................................................................................... 32 6.2 PERFORMANCE INDICATOR ACHIEVEMENT................................................................................ 36

6.2.1 Cay Sung Irrigation Systems................................................................................................... 36 6.2.2 Dai Son Irrigation System........................................................................................................ 37 6.2.3 Irrigation Management Improved............................................................................................ 38 6.2.4 Agricultural Technologies Improved......................................................................................... 38
6.3 IMPACT PRODUCTIVITY DATA................................................................................................. 40

6.3.1 Cay Sung................................................................................................................................ 40 6.3.2 Dai Son................................................................................................................................... 41
6.4 STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP CONCLUSIONS............................................................................... 42
1 Context of the Final evaluation (FE) 1.1 Objectives of the Final evaluation
The Final Evaluation (FE) seeks to ascertain the impact of the Project through comparison of pre-project situation with the post project situation whilst attempting to neutralise the effects of external factors and trends. The (FE) will define the change from the baseline and then assess these changes in terms of their relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability with respect to the stated Project objectives and the indicators agreed to measure project performance. The final evaluation uses these assessments to prepare lessons learned for all stakeholders to assist with the future planning and implementation of similar projects and specifically for the ongoing project VIE0703511 for the rehabilitation of the Hoc man Reservoir in the same district. The evaluation is required to answer the following questions: 1. Is the rehabilitation and construction of dams, as presently planned, designed and built in Viet Nam, the best strategy in terms of water management? 2. What are the pros cons with respect to the local economy, social and the environmental aspects? 3. What lessons can Belgium Technical Cooperation (BTC) and the Vietnamese authorities learn from this type of ad hoc approach in dam construction? 4. What are the limits in terms of planning, design, and implementation that could be emphasized? The evaluation presents recommendations for similar projects relating to the (i) planning, design, construction, operation, management and maintenance, and (ii) soft activities in terms of achieving more effective and sustainable outcomes. Through these recommendations we attempt to identify the value added of the Belgium Government through BTC in these programs.
1.2 Methodology of the Final evaluation

The evaluation has been undertaken with a degree of independence of the Project stakeholders, the BTC and their Chief Technical Adviser (CTA). Whilst all those available have been interviewed the evaluation team has sought to the extent possible to verify and triangulate issues and data. The methodology has included the following steps: 1. Review of documentation and confirmation of expected performance indicators 2. Key informant interviews involving officials, Project Management Unit (PMU), Commune and cooperative leaders 3. Site visits and investigations to review physical works and the status with designers, engineers and contractors 4. Secondary data from the Phu My District Peoples Committee (DPC) and Binh Dinh Provincial Peoples Committee (PPC) 5. Secondary data from the communes of My Loc and My Hiep 6. Beneficiary meetings to discuss changes in the access to water, use of water, and the impacts on agriculture productivity and household incomes 7. PMU record review and BTC file reviews 8. Interviews with CTA and other national experts
BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation 5
Once data was assembled and structured the team provided an initial assessment of the Project by result area and objectives that was presented to a stakeholder workshop hosted by the PMU in Phu My. The workshop sought feedback and to identify lessons learned with respect to (i) project activities and their impacts, (ii) stakeholder perception of weaknesses, (iii) stakeholder perception into the scope of the Project, and (iv) stakeholder risk assessment of agriculture and irrigation systems. The findings of the workshop were used to modify the ratings against evaluation criteria. The revised ratings are presented in this Aide Memoire that is presented to the Provincial and District officials and also to BTC and national stakeholders. Feedback on the aide memoire will be incorporated into the final evaluation report.
1.3 Composition of the Final evaluation-team

The final evaluation team is composed of two consultants contracted separately. The National consultant Dr Nguyen Ha an engineer from Hanoi is contracted directly by BTC. The international Consultant Mr Lindsay Saunders is supplied under contract to Fraser Thomas Limited from New Zealand. Mr Saunders is trained in agriculture, agriculture economics and natural resource economics with extensive experience in rural development, irrigation and water resources management programs in Asia. Mr Saunders as team Leader has responsibility for assembling the aide memoire and final report incorporating the outputs of Dr Ha.
1.4 Intervention area and beneficiaries visited

The FE team was mobilised on the 10 th February in Hanoi with meetings arranged by BTC and then from Binh Dinh for the period of 12 th to 25th February. The wrap- up of field work and stakeholder participation concluded in the period from 25 th February to the 2nd March in Hanoi with the final report to be completed from Mr Saunders home office thereafter. Binh Dinh site visits were made to both Cay Sung and Dai Son field sites and the supporting irrigation systems. Meetings and interviews were held with Provincial and District officials, PMU staff and experts, Commune and Cooperative officials, Irrigation Management Stations and their Irrigation Management Team staff, Irrigation beneficiaries from each village in the two schemes including women. The CTA who is currently residing in Quy Nhon was interviewed.
BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation
2 Main findings & temporary conclusions

2.1 Basic criteria
2.1.1 Objective Level
2.1.1.1 Impact
The indicators for the general and specific objectives presented in the Technical and Financial File (TFF) were not well formulated and lack quantified time-bound targets for increases to household income and household agricultural production. The project contribution to both the general and specific objective as stated has been significant with the contribution from irrigated crops to household incomes estimated to be an increase of 48% in Cay Sung and 112% in Doi Son1.
Table 1: Estimates of Impact on Agricultural Output and Household Incomes

Before Command Area (ha) Total Annual Cropped (ha) Cropping Intensity (%) Total Output (rice Equivalent) mt/yr Average Production per household (kg) Estimates sales per household (Vnd '000's) Cay Sung (actual) After Change Before Dai Son (forecast) After Change
168 220 131% 1254 2322 4644
238 380 160% 2233 2757 6892
70 160 29% 979 435 2248
240 342 143% 1692 2155 4311
269 621 231% 3348 3659 9147
29 279 88% 1656 1504 4837
The agricultural output per household significantly increased due to an increase in the irrigation command area (24%) and from increasing cropping intensity from 131% to 160% in Cay Sung and from 143% to 231% in Dai Son. Dai Son irrigators are forecasting significant movement into a third crop whereas Cay Sung has insufficient reservoir storage for a third crop. The combined impact of the two reservoirs on irrigated crop output is an additional 2,635 metric tonnes per year. The impact on household incomes is difficult to ascertain without an adequate baseline, however field interviews indicate that crop sales per household increased by VND 2.2 million in Cay Sung and an expected VND 4.8 million in Dai Son. An important caveat on this data is the influence of external factors, with District level income increasing from 2006 to 2009 from VND 5.4 million per capita to 16.9 million per capita2. Similarly at the commune level data income per capita increased from VND 3.2 million to 5.7 million in My Loc commune and from VND 3.8 million to 9.7 million in My Hiep commune. As this data was before the Doi Son Reservoir was constructed significant gains in household income occurred due to external factors such as underlying productivity responding to increasing commodity prices for rice (from 2,500 to 4,320 VND/kg). The lack of an adequate baseline and a control group for household income limits the ability to evaluate project specific impacts on household incomes, however it is obvious that there are significantly higher volumes of crops available. The increased volumes provide opportunity for increased sales or increased use for livestock production.
1 2 Based on the reports average proportion of total output sold identified during field interviews. Figures for Doi Son are forecast as the first annual irrigated cropping pattern is 2010 2011. As Provided by DARD Statistic Officer 7
Feasibility studies reported expected income streams from fisheries from Dai Son in excess of VND 15 billion. It is currently too early to assess these but the initial 2011 tender of fishing rights realized approximately VND 50-70 million.
2.1.1.2 Coherence
Project coherence is rated high in terms of the National Ministry of Agriculture and Development (MARD) Rural development Strategy we seeks improved rural economic growth and reduced rural poverty. The Central Government policy for Irrigation Scheme Rehabilitation is consistent with the Projects rehabilitation of small scale irrigation infrastructure. Viet Nam has allocated significant investment to irrigation schemes to capture the full command area and increase cropping intensity to which the Project was well aligned. The formulation was consistent with other irrigation initiatives of the same period with strong technical input to hard investment during Project identification. The identification process rightly identified the requirement for development of soft systems in terms of irrigation management capacity, water user capacity and water use management, and for crop diversification that supports higher value outputs per unit of water use. The identification report recommendations for soft systems development were consistent with the emergence of institutional arrangements and weak capacity as major constraints that limited benefits generated from irrigation infrastructure investment. Formulation included soft sector activities but the design did not do so effectively due to inadequate background assessment and problem analysis and a lack of a coherent strategy. The design did not establish relevant performance indicators, or define the resources necessary for the proposed activities to achieve these. The soft component was relevant in the view of the evaluation but its subsequent weak formulation during the design and its delayed implementation reduced the relevance and effectiveness. Despite very strong lessons learned from within Viet Nam regarding the need, scope and approach to soft investment in irrigation management few of these lessons appear to have been included in the design. Similar issues exist with agriculture technologies improvement program including crop diversification which was poorly strategized, under resourced and not integrated within the context of commercial agriculture, market access and value chains. These shortfalls contribute to the lack of effectiveness and sustainability of these activities.
2.1.1.3 Sustainability
Sustainability of Project impacts is rated according to economic, social, and environmental parameters. Economic sustainability is assessed in terms of maintaining the functionality of the irrigation infrastructure and the ability to support the stream of economic benefits. The functionality of infrastructure is less likely to be sustainable being compromised by the reliance on central government subsidies for maintenance and operation of head works and reservoirs. The transfer of these costs to the local beneficiaries or local government would add significant additional costs that may result in maintenance being far less certain. The maintenance of economic benefits from increased irrigation is we believe secure as farmers with greater food and income security will seek to innovate through crop choices,
changing practices, and new technologies as such is rated very likely. Social sustainability is assessed in terms of human resource and social capital. Human resource capacity is rated as very sustainable reflecting the excellence of the training programs and the institutionalization of training and trainers at all levels. Social capital through the formation of irrigation management teams, and increased participation at the community level is rated as being less sustainable. The rating reflects the lack of institutionalization of Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM), the delays in Dai Son construction resulting in only limited support during the current irrigation season. Ecological/Environmental sustainability is rated in terms of water supply to the reservoirs and the neutrality of ecological and environmental impacts arising from the irrigation systems. The testing and estimation of available water supply was completed during the design stage indicating annual run off levels more than double requirements. There was no inclusion of expected changes due to changing climatic conditions, no data on drought events and their frequency and impact on the water supplies. Based on available data the water supply is rated as sustainable for an average year. Environmental impacts are both positive and negative. On the positive side there is a significantly reduced risk from dam failures and increased ability to control flood waters, reduced pumping from shallow aquifers during dry periods or for supplementing the summer crop irrigation. Negative impacts relate to the potential contamination of groundwater from intensification and the deforestation and damage from increasing livestock but reduced areas for grazing. The impacts are assessed to be less sustainable due mostly to the foreseen impacts of cattle grazing on reservoir catchment deforestation. Overall the sustainability of the Project is rated as sustainable.
2.1.2 Immediate Results 1 and 2

Results 1 and 2 relate to the rehabilitation of Cay Sung and Dai Son Reservoirs and irrigation infrastructure subprojects. The rating of the hard investment at the two subproject sites is presented for the planning and design, the construction of the reservoir infrastructure and the canals in the table below. A summary of achievements by result area compared to the logical framework performance indicators is appended for each immediate result. For Cay Sung the reservoir is rated as highly relevant, effective and efficient reflecting the lack of design issues, timelines of construction, and the overall impact on delivering irrigation benefits. Dai Son is rated more poorly in terms of the design and planning were relevance was lost due to significant and repeated design changes involving reduced reservoir capacity to meet budget constraints. The subproject as implemented is rated ineffective, the spillway has already been raised through temporary sandbagging. Further the inadequacy of geotechnical investigation required follow up investigation for the spillway design. The evaluation notes that despite contractual requirement to do so the borrow pit was not rehabilitated to enable previous users to resume cropping. Dai Son is rated as an inefficient set of activities.
The canal construction and planning for both schemes was highly relevant but not so effective with only a part of the canal systems rehabilitated. Upgrading of canals were considered piece-meal, without prior survey data as surveys were completed for only the selected segments. Some Cay Sung canals discharge into open flood zones or dams with other segments picking water up at the outlet. Given the objective of canal lining is to reduce leakage the resultant system is inconsistent. However the canal system does enable the capture of surface water from a range of sources providing increased irrigation opportunity. Some canal elevations were raised creating flooding risks for existing houses. The canal program was cost efficient to farmers providing paid labor for construction works. The canal program is rated as likely to be sustainable reflecting the farmer ownership of works and the service fees collected for financing their operation and management.
Table 1: Initial Evaluation Ratings

Criteria Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Sustainability Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Sustainability Relevance Effectiveness Efficiency Sustainability Cay Sung A: Planning and design Moderate to high Very Very Likely B: Reservoir Program Very high Very Efficient Likely C: Canal Program Very high Limited/Low Efficient Likely Dai Son Limited Ineffective Low Unlikely Limited Fair Inefficient Limited Very High Limited/Low Efficient Likely
2.1.3 Immediate Results 3 and 4:

Immediate results 3 and 4 included strengthening Irrigation Management Capacity and Agriculture Technology Improvement, the two soft components of the Program.
2.1.3.1 Result 4: Irrigation Management Strengthened

The institutional strengthening activities involved the clarification of roles and responsibilities for Provincial and District Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD), Irrigation Management Stations (IMS), Communes, Cooperatives, Villages, irrigators, Irrigation Management Teams. DARD and District Peoples Committee (DPC) issued guidelines for the management, operation and exploitation of irrigation works before, during, and after the flood season. DPC officials produced professional inspection guidelines for the IMS, Irrigation Management groups/teams (IMT), and farmers regarding water operation for timely irrigation and water saving.
The program was very relevant given that the base line survey found commune leaders almost totally unaware of the roles, responsibilities and rules. All respondents reported no knowledge of documented reports on these roles or irrigation regulations. Regulations do exist but communication has been ineffective. The effectiveness of the Project role clarification is rated as limited with 28% of baseline respondents remaining unaware of the roles and regulations in 2010. The efficacy of the program is considered fair given the scope of work undertaken. The program has limited sustainability at the irrigation system level despite the formation of an irrigation management team at each commune funded by the service charges and central government subsidy. Service fees collected remain remarkably low with My Hiep collecting less than USD1,000 in 20093 and USD 5,900 for My Loc. The fees represent a cost to the farmer of less than 0.1 percent of irrigated crop revenue for My Hiep and 1 percent for Cay Sung. The evaluation team is unaware of new rules being established. The relevance of rules and regulations is rated as low with no enforcement of existing regulations. Without enforcement, the effectiveness and efficiency of rules and regulations is very limited. The one area where effectiveness and efficiency is good is the implementation of irrigation service charges where collection rates at Cay Sung are reported to be over 85% with the remainder linked to poorer households whose fees are often waived. The collection rate is misleading however as the vast majority of the collected fees are paid back to farmers as wages for completing cleaning and maintenance programs. The irrigation fees indicator defined at design is not applicable due to the cancellation of irrigation fees by Central Government Decree in 2007. Dai Son service fee compliance cannot be ascertained as it is too early. Dai Son farmers did however report an option of using the fees to provide additional investment into future canal lining. Sustainability of fees and services is considered to be limited due to reliance on government subsidy for head work protection and primary canal maintenance see Table 2:
Table 2: Irrigation/Service Fee and Central Government Subsidy (VND)

2005 A: Cay Sung Govt Subsidy (VND 000s) Service Fee (VND000/ha/yr) B: Dai Son Govt Subsidy (VND 000s) Service Fee (VND000/ha/yr) n/a 250 n/a 250 n/a 250 87,714 250 224,96 3 850 187,476 900 n/a 250 n/a 250 n/a 250 84,221 600 216,00 8 600 168,991 600 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(Source: DARD Statistics Office. Note the data provided is inconsistent with the official record of revenues collected at My Hiep which indicated a service charge fee of only VND 300,000 per crop per ha.) The irrigation manager training on improved water resource management and participatory irrigation management (PIM) is rated as very relevant given the increased intensity of water use, the philosophy of Doi Moi and past experience of inadequate public sector service provision in the management of irrigation schemes. Farmer interviews identified training in water resource management, training of trainers and
3 This data was provided by the My Hiep Commune but is in direct contradiction to fee levels provided by DARD 11 BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation
farmer training programs to be very effective and very efficient and are considered most likely to be sustainable given the knowledge development, institutionalization and the supporting training resources. On participatory irrigation management the project had two strategies. The first based on farmer involvement in canal construction and lining was highly relevant, very effective and efficient and sustainable provide external investment is available to pay for participation. The second strategy was based on training PIM principles for irrigation scheme and water resource management is relevant, but had low effectiveness and limited efficiency due to the lack of institutional reform and management systems development to support PIM. The Project adopted a far too narrow perspective of PIM and would have benefitted from greater understanding of past and ongoing PIM experience in Viet Nam. PIM needed far more attention during the design and formulation process and the implementation strategy development phase. Without institutional change the FE believes PIM is considered non-sustainable. The participatory canal construction by farmers is only sustainable if there are external funds to support the material and labor costs for a farmer construction program. Farmer enthusiasm for participation in construction of canals reflects the financial benefits they received for their labor input as much as the resultant service improvement from new canals. Future programs should consider fiancnig only the material cost with farmers providing the labor either at their own cost or through payments from the irrigation fees collected by the communes A significant contributor to irrigation infrastructure damage is cattle/buffalo grazing that plays an important role in reservoir catchment deforestation. The program as planned was rated as highly relevant to the long term sustainability of the infrastructure. The Project program as implemented was limited to awareness raising with none of the intended pasture management planning completed. The program is rated as less relevant and ineffective, inefficient and unsustainable. The lack of adequate technical support and priority given to the issue of cattle grazing was largely unaddressed by Project staff and technical assistance. The importance of the program is emerging in Cay Sung where some farmers have increased livestock numbers by 100%, with livestock now being far heavier reflecting the increased access to fodder (e.g., grass and grain) for the an extended period. With the higher reservoir levels during the latter part of the wet season and early in the dry season, graziers are removing trees above the new high water mark to replace the grazing lost with the filling of the reservoir. Continued growth in livestock numbers will most likely see these trends continue. The result area 3 activities completed were mostly relevant but will limited effectiveness. The lack of an agreed and comprehensive strategy for both irrigation institutional strengthening and PIM saw inadequate coverage of these areas to have an impact. Efficiency was limited, but good in the irrigation management training and canal construction programs. Sustainability is likely for the irrigation management capacity building but less likely for institutional strengthening, canal construction and livestock threat management. Overall the result is considered non-sustainable.
2.1.3.2 Result 4: Agriculture Technology Improved

The agriculture technology program was a baseline survey, training needs assessment, development of trainers and training programs, and a crop diversification/marketing program. The baseline survey was less relevant due to its completion in 2008 - 2 years after project start up and due to the lack of historical data. The survey does not provide a systematic
basis for final evaluation - Cay Sung reservoir was completed before the baseline survey. Implementation was reoriented to an institutional development activity with staff from the Department Agriculture and Rural Development District level trained and implementing the baseline survey. Training was provided by the Center for Social Work and Community Development Research and Consultancy (SDRC) who also designed the survey sampling frame, prepared topics and questions, prepared manuals and trained enumerators. While providing local opportunities and individual benefits these came at a significant cost to the Project, something that the should have been raised with the PSC, and BTC. The lack of local capacity could have been addressed through outsourcing to an experienced survey institute. A 10% sample consisting 200 households were surveyed using a 10 person team from the Agriculture Promotion Station of My Loc and My Hiep communes. A range of survey techniques including interviews and 13 village level focus groups were used. For My Hiep 52% of respondents were female whilst 28% were female in My Loc. 13 focus groups were held in 10 villages, with a minimum of 1/3 of participants being female. Secondary data was collated from a range of sources including the Department of Statistics for Phu My District and through interviews with officials and key informants. A repeat survey was completed in 2010 using a similar sample and questions but different enumerators. The issues with the first baseline survey were repeated in the follow-up suggesting no evaluation took place. Here the Program experts and the CTA could have been far more proactive. The three survey reports are of mixed quality, being weak in the analysis and presentation of findings. Quality control on data validity and the analysis was inadequate. Data and result disaggregation (i.e., female and wealth ranks) is not provided. Reported data is highly summarised, presented in percentage terms and there is no understanding of the variance in responses and findings. On the positive side the reported data on areas and yields is consistent with field interview findings but somewhat different from reported commune or cooperative level data. Data on project rice yields are significantly higher for Cay Sung than those reported through Project Identification, Formulation and the TFF of 2.0-2.5 t/ha/crop. The formulation yields are considered incorrect, with a possible explanation being the unit of measurement, farmer reports of 2.0 to 2.5 are in quintals per acre a figure that is consistent with the baseline findings for yields of 4 to 5 t/ha. The survey output had limited relevance for the intended project management and evaluation functions. The surveys have limited effectiveness and low efficiency in terms of informing Project Management. The institutionalization of monitoring and evaluation is a significant achievement and contributes to increased sustainability that would benefit from additional technical support in the analysis and reporting of data The farmer training program was developed with Phu My DARD, and trained 50 extension workers as trainers, 364 farmer trainers and 1,927 farmers with 48% being female. The use of three annual training needs assessment is questioned in efficiency terms with adequate information being available from one comprehensive assessment. The inclusion of need assessment respondents in training achievement targets in the draft final report and the training summary provided to the evaluation is misleading and inappropriate. Courses were evaluated by trainees on completion of the course. Evaluations indicate very strong support for the style of training, course content, and trainers with average ratings of 55% to 59% for the overall experience being good and a further 38% rating the experience excellent. Field interviews confirmed very strong support for the training and
found examples of application of water management, crop technologies being actively applied. The second baseline survey and field interviews during the FE confirms very strong support for the farmer training programs including the programs delivered on irrigation water management, agriculture technologies were rated very highly by recipients. The farmer training program is rated as highly relevant, very effective and efficient. The sustainability of the training program was enhanced through the institutionalization of trainers, building cadre of farmer trainers, and the significant achievement in the production of course materials and training resources. Currently these courses are being offered beyond the Project Area. The Project Formulation as presented in the TFF identified the need for crop diversification and included activities for the study of agricultural markets to ascertain demand and market opportunities. In this area Project support targeted farmer awareness and training in new cash crops. The Project as implemented deviated significantly from the formulation limiting the relevance and effectiveness of activities. The marketing studies were turned into price realisation estimates for differing Binh Dinh markets while new cash crop demonstrations supported rice, maize, sesame, and peanut production systems, all existing crops grown by farmers. The demonstrations targeted new varieties of existing crops. The diversification of crops did not eventuate and farmers still face the limitation of a largely monoculture rice farming system. The lack of agriculture extension and agribusiness services technical expertise contributed to a major weakness in Project formulation and implementation supervision. These subprojects were rated as having limited relevance, limited effectiveness, inefficient and non-sustainable. Field interviews and the repeat baseline survey however confirm that farmers did adopt new rice and maize varieties after their exposure to the demonstrations. The relevance of the result area as planned was very high but as implemented is considered slightly less relevant. The loss of relevance reflects the lateness of the baseline studies and the inherent weakness of the crop diversification strategy and marketing program. The effectiveness of the training is very high, was highly efficient and most likely to be sustainable. The effectiveness of the crop diversification and baseline evaluation activities are rated as ineffective but efficient due to the institutionalization of evaluation survey skills and the uptake of new crop varieties for traditional crops. The sustainability of the baseline work and crop diversification is considered to be low to unsustainable requiring external financing and a more complete strategy involving reformed institutional arrangements.
2.2 Transversal themes

2.2.1 Gender Equality
Gender equality as a transversal theme recognises the emergent differences between men and women and how these are reflected in social and economic institutions, the basis for participation, and the resultant share of duties and benefits. Historical roles have often marginalised or excluded women from the benefits of development especially rural women. Women played roles in the planning and implementation of the Project and are significant beneficiaries of the training programs. The project is considered to have been gender
responsive in terms of participation however, in terms of expanding the roles of women in irrigation management and decision making there is no evidence that the dominance of men has changed. Women in Dai Son reported significant improvement in household incomes and household wealth resulting in improved wellbeing and reduced stress in providing for children.
2.2.2 Environment
During formulation, subprojects were assessed to provide environmental benefits due to the reduced risks of floods from failing infrastructure at each site. The final evaluation agrees with this finding. During implementation environmental regulations were respected during the design and construction process. The evaluation mission identified the following potential environmental impacts arising from the project: The exposure of bare land in borrow pits with significant loss of use rights to the existing farmers at Project start up The inability to drain some flood and drainage water leading to water logging, and potential inundation risk The likely resultant increase in deforestation to support the increased number and size of cattle and buffalo Risk arising from agrochemicals as rice cropping intensity increases by 50 to 120 percent. Apart from the borrow pit where DPC has issued an instruction for its rehabilitation the other potential environmental risks have not been mitigated during the project. These risks are rated as being of low to moderate importance.
2.2.3 Social Economy

At Project Formulation social economy was not a transversal theme and was not explicitly addressed. Key aspects of social economy criteria refer to the nature of goods and services delivered (direct and indirect), whether the benefits social or economic, their distribution. Benefits were delivered directly at Cay Sung to 870 households (increased from 540) and at Dai Son to 915 households (increased from 785 )households in the form of increased irrigation water that supports increased agricultural production. Further benefits were provided to those beneficiaries that participated in the construction of canals however this was almost entirely male dominated. Indirect benefits in the form of awareness, training and skill development were delivered to 4,820 individuals of which, 41% were female. Beneficiary characterisation is difficult to define due to the lack of baseline data however the 2007 data suggests that 10 to 12% of households were officially rated as poor (holder of poverty certificate and eligible for state support). The distribution of benefits has gone mostly to existing irrigation farmers however the 460 additional households have received reservoir water for the first time reducing their need to pump irrigate or to rely on rain-fed crop systems. Social capital was strengthened through the training, and increased participation in
irrigation programs. With greater knowledge, skills, representation and involvement in water management beneficiaries have developed far greater cohesion. An opportunity was lost however to define the roles of decision makers including the delegation of decision making by commune leadership.
2.2.4 Childrens Rights

The project provided indirect opportunities to children through the increases in household income. Women report that one of the impacts of higher and more reliable income is the ability to afford education costs and to extend the education of their children.
2.3 HARMO-criteria
The Project was formulated prior to the introduction of the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness and as such the HARMO criteria were not incorporated into the design, the specific agreement or the Project planning frameworks. Local project stakeholders are unaware that such criteria exist making it difficult to evaluate the Project and their role in achieving the criteria.
2.3.1 Harmonisation
The project design, planning or formulation did little to harmonise with other dam and irrigation programs in Viet Nam and it is unclear to what extent knowledge of these programs was included in the design thinking. The Project identification report does refer to lessons learned from other donor and irrigation infrastructure investment programs. Project implementation linked project stakeholders to other Provincial programs for construction linked activities and irrigation management. Opportunities to build stronger strategies for participatory irrigation management and for building successful crop diversification programs were not developed limiting the potential benefits to the Province from the use of National Expert and CTA inputs. The Project did not reflect the critical aspect of PIM lessons learned in Viet Nam of building awareness, capacity and supporting systems for monitoring and operating irrigation systems in a decentralised or delegated manner. There was a clear lack of understanding of these issues and opportunities were lost. The lost opportunity reflects the contradiction of local or delegated project management that seeks to maximize local benefits through assigning roles to local staff or experts. The effect of this contradiction was further magnified by the part time nature of CTA inputs often from afar and national experts with limited skills in PIM and crop diversification.
2.3.2 Alignment
The Project is closely aligned with national policy priorities relating to poverty reduction, food security and irrigation rehabilitation. The Project was implemented through a PMU aligned to and headed by the DPC Chairman. Other staff members have been recruited on a joint basis with the now complete Belgium financed Phu My Drinking Water Project. Capacities required, but outside of the original PMU structure, were recruited from other DPC units or national experts. The outsourcing of the baseline surveys, training programs and construction of canals supported alignment between Project implementation and local programs. .
The desire for a joint PMU without a full time director and with other PMU staff also holding multiple roles and or positions created significant work load pressures and delays. The strong political linkages with the Chairman of the DPC provided additional strength in the PSC arrangements but required additional engineering inputs. The addition of vice director roles addressed this issue but only in part. The PMU preference for recruiting local candidates irrespective of experience and skills created delays and resulted in weakness in the resultant program strategy and supporting activities. Technical skills in institutional development, PIM and crop diversification were poorly aligned with needs. The national skills in training and community engagement were well aligned and provide a good example of the benefits from such alignment in terms of relevance and effectiveness if not always in efficiency terms. The evaluation considers the technical inputs to the PMU to be poorly designed for the range of tasks assigned to it and in particular highlights the weakness in the identification of soft expertise. The formulation mission is identified as a major contributor to this weakness as it did not apply the same design and formulation standards to the soft components that were applied to the engineering program effectively repeating the mistakes of past irrigation infrastructure programs that created a strong supply orientation as opposed to understanding the problems from a water demand perspective. Project management procedures were generally efficient and appropriate. The Viet Nam procurement systems were followed albeit to varying degrees. The Program was comanaged between the DPC and BTC through the Project Steering Committee (PSC) which met regularly as planned and made decisions in a timely manner and most surprisingly taking strong positions on some requests from the PMU. PMU reports to the PSC were not pre-circulated and may not have represented the co-management views of both the PMU and BTC as represented by the CTA. Procurement was undertaken in the Vietnamese market for goods and services. There is concern over the award for construction contracts for Dai Son. For Cay Sung reservoir despite 5 companies expressing interest only 2 bids were received and both were scores technically and financially. For the larger Dai Son contract 12 bidders expressed interest, 3 companies bid with two of the three excluded before technical scoring leaving a single valid bid raising questions over the appropriateness of the contract award. CTA recruitment and final evaluation was undertaken by BTC. CTA input was critical in the first year through a two month input that identified the design issue at Dai Son. However having been central to clarifying the Dai Son design issues the CTA was not physically present for any period thereafter with file records indicating a presence of only 17 days over the following year. The part time nature of the role was further complicated by the shifting of the CTA roles by BTC between the two candidates. The PMU did not therefore receive the benefit of the CTA role during this period on a daily basis. Project formulation had budgeted 50% of a full time equivalent for the CTA which was reduced to approximately 20% with a focus on financial approvals. The CTA input is rated as relevant, less effective and less efficient. The evaluation team acknowledges the CTA candidates were highly regarded by the PMU and played important roles in bringing problems to the table and finding solutions. An example was minimizing the risk of wet season collapse when the Dai Son infrastructure construction was delayed and dangerously incomplete entering the rainy season. The evaluation also feels that greater attention to the crop diversification and baseline study report could have been provided by the respective CTA candidates.
2.3.3 Result Based Management

Project design performance indicators and targets are not considered adequate as they provide little indication of the scope of change in household income from agriculture and the change in agriculture productivity. The problem with these is ably demonstrated by the agriculture income per capita for My Hiep commune which increased from VND 2.6million in 2003 to 9.7 million in 2009. In 2009 there was no irrigation from the reservoir despite the impact indicator would suggest success. Likewise irrigated crops comprise only two thirds of agricultural land use and livestock provides approximately one tenth of total household income. Agriculture productivity per se does not necessarily indicate the impact of the Project. Generally the performance indicators do not provide indicators of change in behaviour, change in management decisions and focus more on tangible outputs that do not necessarily signify change. The Project management systems applied were integrated with the Provincial and District planning systems with annual and six monthly work plans for each result area. The monitoring of plans and activities focused on input reporting, both financial and physical completion and contractor performance. Project monitoring was adequate but not strong in terms of data capture, analysis and reporting with the target audience for monitoring appearing to be the Project Steering Committee as opposed to the Implementing Agency or the Project Management Unit and the technical service provided. A good example of this was the implementation of the training program where each training event included a trainee evaluation of the event. These evaluations were retained but have not been consolidated and analysed for the overall quality of training and how this could be enhanced. There was little or no monitoring of Project benefits and impacts. While these are known they have not been consolidated, reviewed or reported to stakeholders and beneficiaries. Specific activities and their achievements were also not reported, such as the pasture management process. The TFF identifies the PMU as responsible for the Project Final Report with a requirement to include a survey of a sample of managers and staff in the Phu My district. The survey is to assess the impact of the Project in setting and developing the institutional capacity of the organization and of a business plan for sustaining O&M of each scheme. The Draft Final report has been prepared by the CTA, not the PMU, and has not addressed the requirements outlined above. The lack of a Final report before final evaluation is seen as inappropriate by the evaluation team and the response of both CTA candidates that the final report will use the final evaluation findings is inconsistent with the Project reporting requirements. The role of the Final Report is to summarize and interpret the Project data sets and of the FE report is an assessment of what was achieved and how good these achievements are in terms of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. Vietnamese contract laws and rules have been applied with some provision in these rules for quality control and payment systems based on the quality of works and timeliness of these. Unusually in Viet Nam the design contractor BIHECCO for Dai Son was financially penalized for (i) the lateness of detailed drawings estimated to be 124 days by the BTC, CTA and (ii) inadequate geotechnical survey for the Dai Son Spillway structure. Aan alternate design contract was awarded with the cost of the award deducted from BIHECCO design contract. While performance was inadequate the same design institute was contracted for further work. The use of a Terms of Partnership contract for contracting irrigation farmers at the community level to construct and rehabilitate canals provided a strong financial incentive for work quality and timeliness. The use of project beneficiaries reduced costs and
created strong demand for maintaining quality and timeliness.
Despite the significant cost over-runs at Dai Son the cost savings from the Cay Sung Reservoir and the savings from exchange rate movements resulted in an overall Project cost as at 30 December 2010 of amounting to a 5% saving - see Table 3.
Table 3: Budget Savings by Financier as at December 30 2010

Financing Total Saving (Eur) I: ODA i. ODA ii. Reg II: Countervalue Fund III: Provincial Counterpart Fund IV: District Counterpart Fund Total (11,840.91) 12,409 46,560 14,784 62,433 124,340 -1.34% 11% 7 4 44 5.8 n/a n/a 46.550 n/a 62,433 108,983 Percentage Saving Proposed reallocation Cay Sung Canal (Eur)
The PMU seeks to allocate the saved funds from the counter value Fund and the District Counterpart Funds to continue the canal rehabilitation on Cay Sung Reservoir. The PMU proposes to build a further 4 km of lined canal with the budget savings contributing 2.2 to 2.5km of this amount. The District and Beneficiaries are expected to provide the remaining inputs. The FE recommends that this be further explored but suggests that funds only be applied to the provision of materials.
2.3.4 Mutual Accountability

Resources were co-managed by the two countries through funds from the Belgium Government, Counter Value Funds, and Counterpart funds from the Province and District Government. Co-management has applied at the Project Steering Committee level and at the operational level. There are a total of 8 PSC meetings with detailed progress and issue reports provided by the PMU to the PSC and the minutes of the PSC indicate quality of decision making. The lack of prior distribution and the lack of CTA review and input into these reports despite providing input for inclusion was a significant departure from the intent of co-management. Operational decision making appears to have been transparent, however there were issues regarding the identification and contracting of national experts where it is obvious that the PMU and DPC preference for local staff irrespective of experience and qualifications created delays and the possible failure to confirm the first national training candidate after the probation period. The replacement candidate was placed under what appears to be inappropriate pressures for performance during her early inputs however by the end of the Project she had been promoted to Vice Director and is regarded highly by the PMU. Contract awards followed government procedures with no conclusive evidence of inappropriate awards. There is concern over the award for construction contracts for Dai
Son. For Cay Sung reservoir despite 5 companies expressing interest only 2 bids were received and both were scores technically and financially. For the larger Dai Son contract 12 bidders expressed interest, 3 companies bid with two of the three excluded before technical scoring leaving a single valid bid raising questions over the appropriateness of the contract award.
2.3.5 Ownership
Ownership was a significant achievement of the DPC and the PMU. Ownership was strong from the Project Steering Committee, the DPC and its Project Management Unit through to the development of increased involvement of the Irrigation Management Station for Phu My, DARD, local extension staff, and with beneficiaries through training and participation in water management. The skill development program has been a major success and contributes to increased institutionalization of improved water resource control. The decentralized implementation has meant no meaningful extension of the project activities and approach outside of the Province. Some extension of programs outside of the Project Area occurred but there has been far too little integration of knowledge into Project strategies and equally little going into wider sector development.
20
3 Lessons learned
There are several important lessons to be learned from the Project.
3.1 At Project Conception and Formulation

Inadequate dialogue and problem assessment at the initial stage of project specification created significant impacts on the Project creating costs that we consider exceeded the costs of more professional due diligence during this period. The significant issues and their contributing factors were: The DPC / DARD non-disclosure of the basic design status added 2 years to the required Project Implementation period The lack of quality due diligence with respect to the basic design during identification and formulation processes demonstrates a lack of judgement. These issues can be avoided through requesting an official statement of the basic design approval. This request should be included in future formulation procedures and should include the basic design, and its cost estimate being specifically ratified to the DPC and PPC level A contributing factor during formulation was the focus on documentation development as opposed to the validation of the underlying causes of the problems to be addressed, the scope of work required and the recommended strategy. These shortfalls also impacted the formulation of the soft components with only 25 days of social expertise supplied. An option for the formulation weakness could be to develop programmatic approvals with a design and implement approach that enabled the first year of the implementation cycle to develop the implementation strategy and plans as part of the institutional building and due diligence. Such an approach, would enable far greater due diligence and greater consensus building at project start up. The lack of use of sector lessons from other programs and donors. The lesson, in part, arises from the consideration of the project as an engineering or infrastructure supply initiative as opposed to an irrigation water demand project. The prevailing concept reflects the institutional arrangements for irrigation at the time of identification. This approach had been identified by other donors (e.g., ADB and WB) in Viet Nam and other regional countries as a major weakness. Formulation teams need the skills sets and sector experience required to develop problem analysis and formulation that is not predefined to fit the current institutional structure and incentives of the Project proponent. For the Project this would have involved skills in water resource institutional analysis, sector planning, agricultural systems and water use efficiency, and agribusiness. The Project design while recognizing the need for soft investments failed to develop the strategy in a comprehensive manner with project activities lacking cohesion, context and ultimately impact.
3.2 At Project Start Up

Establishment of the appropriate PMU skill sets at start up is more efficient than the incremental additions of skills to the PMU. The PMU appointment process created delays and in the view of the evaluation team resulted in the lack of technical attention to the basic design issue. Consequently the issue was managed as an approval priority rather than a sound design that subsequently received the necessary approvals. The appointment of the DPC Chairman to the Project Director role needed far greater assessment not in terms of its rejection but in terms of the functionality
21
of the PMU. The evolution team supports, on balance, the DPC Chairman appointment. The establishment of technical Vice Directors should have been foreseen and required as part of the approval of the Project Director. The recruitment of PMU experts needed to have far greater co-management input from BTC/donor to ensure that while local candidates are assessed they possess the commensurate skills and experience. The close alignment of the Project Director to DPC simply emphasizes the need for this. A key lesson learned was the role of the CTA, although mobilized late the CTA in their first two month full time input was central to moving the project forward and for identifying and clarifying the basic design issues for Dai Son. However, for the next year during which the detailed design was continually delayed the CTA was only present in the PMU 17 days. Technical assistance needs to have far greater presence during start up, the preparation and planning of project strategies and work plans when it can influence in a proactive manner the approach. Part time CTA roles, often result in the position being placed in the role of fire fighting which is not the most effective use of their skills and expertise. There needed to be strategy development input for (i) water institutional strengthening including the definition and application of PIM, and (ii) agricultural technology improvement. The strategies need to reflect sector realities and the lessons from wider Viet Nam. Once the strategies were defined there needed to be a more comprehensive set of activities that were then followed. The development and implementation of strategies need to be participatory using the institutions and stakeholders in these sectors to develop consensus and to enable the leverage of local and government programs into the Project. Short term national and international expertise may be needed for strategy formulation Strategy development at the Project level should be a discrete output that is linked to District, Provincial and National sector policy and plans. For example, in Phu My there were 44 reservoirs at district level and 6 irrigation dams in two Project communes of My Hiep and My Loc that need rehabilitation. Incremental investment one or two dams at a time removes the opportunity to redefine institutional incentives, structures and procedures for sustainable and participatory irrigation management, the implementation of effective crop diversification and value addition.
3.2.1 Detailed Design Stage

The BTC representative needed to have far greater supervision of the detailed design processes for Dai Son especially after the issues of the Basic Design were identified. The evaluation does not want to take away from the responsibility of the design contractor (see below) however some of the lost time and additional costs may have been avoidable if far closer supervision had been applied. The position that the basic design was the responsibility of government was appropriate in terms of financing but was not consistent with co-management principles. As such, the resolution of the issues required greater effort to review the basic design before detailed design work was contracted and improved communication between the detailed design contractor and the Project was necessary to ensure all parties had the same specifications and expectations. DPC/DARD/PMU were in part negligent and should have ensured that changes in the basic design were presented to the PSC prior to the detailed design process starting with the resultant design issues. Further detailed design contracts should not be awarded before basic design due diligence and concurrence between all parties Given the budget constraints, the level of technical presence in the PMU was far
22
too low - 17 days present 24 days allocated over the year following the revised basic design. The criticality of the outstanding design issues with respect to implementation timing, budgets, and ultimately project success warranted far greater input from the CTA in this period BIHECCO as a contractor failed in its professional and contractual responsibilities in terms of (i) the quality of work, (ii) the ability to deliver on time, (iii) contract management and client communication. The use of local consulting firms affiliated with DPC or its agencies is understandable however their capability to complete the work to a sufficient standard is paramount. This was again demonstrated by the finding of inadequate geotechnical survey input to the detailed design causing additional design inputs and design modification to the Dai Son spillway. The outcome to the increased costs was to change technical specifications lowering spillway elevation and simpler technology. Within the first irrigation season the spillway has been sand bagged to raise the storage capacity for increasing the third crop. The lesson to be learned is the need to design to water demand and availability and if budget is inadequate serious consideration should be given to cancellation of the subproject rather than build a suboptimal structure. Greater effort should have been put in place to source additional budge resources to construct to the design specifications.
3.2.2 Construction
Construction management during short dry seasons is difficult and needs to be closely supervised not just in engineering quality terms but also in terms of progress. The CTA provided valuable input to the Dai Son reservoir minimizing a potentially hazardous scenario with the unfinished reservoir. Local supervision and the PMU did not identify or respond to this risk highlighting the value of the external CTA input.
3.2.3 Soft Component

While informed by training needs assessments and the base line survey, the soft component lacked overall coherence reflecting the timing, skills and support for the national expert. Capacity building expertise is not necessarily the same as wider institutional expertise required. Specific technical expertise is needed at project start-up to define the strategy and approach and then to refine the activities to be implemented Delayed timing and apparent marginalisation of external national experts by the Project resulted in delays and lost opportunities. Continuation of these influences will simply place at risk the delegation and decentralization of project management The work planning of the national expert was far too optimistic and needed to better reflect local capacity and constraints. Fewer training events should have been planned with more use of outsourcing to local or regional resource persons. The CTA identified this issue but the national expert response was inappropriate. The use of local institutions for training proved to be successful and should be included in future project formulation Baseline survey delays due to capacity constraints need to be addressed urgently possibly by using outsourced service providers repeat surveys can then be used to build local capacity Project monitoring of soft activities needs to be significantly strengthened to turn information into knowledge and then into understanding for improved project management and reporting
23
3.2.4 Project Management

Political leadership of the PMU has significant benefits as well as potential costs. On the benefit side, decision making and District support is more readily available on the cost side it opens the Project to far more political control and weakens the both technical input and neutral and transparent procurement of Project management. The political role of the Project Director worked because technical vice directors were introduced during implementation, similar balances should be considered in the future Project management needs access to the correct range of skills and procedures from Project start up more attention is required to reflect on appointments and the impact of each appointment on remaining skill gaps and requirements. The project management modality of managing through financial budget control while adequate, did not capture the benefits of proactive management decision processes that are guided by strategy and informed by monitoring. Monitoring needs to be established as project management information for improving decisions, identifying problems and for reporting to the PSC and Donors
3.3 At the level of the Project Steering Committee

The political linkage between the PSC and the PMU proved beneficial with the PSC being more active and strategic than is usually the experience in Vietnam. The PSC needs to be the conduit to ensure the National and Provincial policy and strategies are applied from a technical and strategy perspective and not simply a high level decision body for unexpected or unplanned events. The PSC needs to be charged with ensuring that the contract compliance provisions are applied to contractors and should play a role in ensuring where necessary such penalties are fair and applied irrespective of affiliation and institutional linkages.
3.4 At the level of BTC Representation

Projects need BTC representation to ensure proactive decision making that is strategic and well informed by past sector lessons and from regional and international best practice. The reduction of CTA input and the scheduling of inputs along with the continual changing of roles reduced the effectiveness of the CTA role in supporting strategic and proactive management of the Project resources. The District of Phu My was particularly weak at start up and would have benefited from more CTA and technical presence in the PMU. Design flexibility is required to enable the provision of short term technical inputs in addition to the CTA using national or international expertise.
3.5 At the level of BTC-HQs

Understanding where BTC brings value added and ensuring that this is recognised and planned in advance on an annual or semi-annual basis would provide more effective co-management benefits. The evaluation believes such value added is provided through modernisation of strategies, approach and institutional and human resource development. The issue of increased costs at Dai Son Reservoir or changing specifications for
24
the designed construction needed far more explicit consideration of production trade-offs including the costs and benefits of available options and not simply means to cut the budget. This requires a review of choices from the perspective of beneficiaries and not simply infrastructure suppliers.
25
4 Follow-up of recommendations
4.1 Recommendations of the Final Evaluation
4.1.1 For Stakeholders
The understanding of the use and purpose of the irrigation service fee needs to be reviewed. Current fees collected form Dai Son irrigators is VND 122 million; less than USD 1,000 at a unit rate of VND 300,000/crop/ha/yr. The level of fees collected is inadequate for sustainability and while it is presented as a cost to growers this is not the full story. Of the VND 122 million collected at Dai Son some VND 22 million is spent on overheads and the remainder is spent on paid back to farmers to maintain infrastructure. The argument over poverty and affordability deserves scrutiny. Dai Son farmers expect to grow 2.3 crops per year at an average yield of 5.3 to 5.5 t/ha. Each hectare produces some VND 68.75 million of rice per annum the irrigation service fee amounts to less than 0.1 percent of the value of rice and approximately 80% of that goes back to farmers. Irrigation service fees can remain low as donors and central government keep bearing the cost of rehabilitating infrastructure reducing the need for local users and beneficiaries to maintain it. FE focus group discussions introduced the concept of using fees for expanding canal rehabilitation and water control technology, surprisingly some farmers identified this as a good opportunity. PIM requires the facilitation of water user dialogues and coordination that can then be used to address sustainability and efficiency issues. DARD/Irrigation Management Stations/irrigation management teams and their relationships, delegated authority and decision making have to be revisited and addressed in a comprehensive manner. The evaluation views the IMTs as a work unit not a decision making body. DPC needs to request DARD to prepare an irrigation system support strategy for both rehabilitation and management and then use this as a means of attracting a long term donor commitment. This program should include development of PIM district wide as well as high value agriculture with market linkages Detailed engineer design processes need accurate survey data, no DPC or PPC approval or finance should be provided to works designed without the necessary survey information Development of effective strategies to mitigate infrastructure risks including livestock grazing damage to catchment vegetation and irrigation infrastructure. Increased grains yields, and grass availability is leading to more livestock, that are far bigger and heavier and have important links to the production of compost and nutrient for irrigated crops. A commune level plan for this issue is inevitably required and should be prioritized for My Loc and My Hiep communes.
4.1.2 For PSC/BT/Donor

The PSC should align Project strategies to provincial and national strategies. This can be facilitated through the pre-circulation of PMU reporting to PSC to enable more time for their consideration. The PMU reports needed to ensure their reports are inclusive of both DPC and BTC inputs under the co-mangemetn princples. The program of sharing and cross-visits between irrigation sites should be extended. If PIM is to emerge in Phu My then cross visits to effective PIM
26
programs should be provided for PSC, PPC, DPC, DARD and IMT staff BTC and Government of Viet Nam could agree to reallocate budget savings from CVF and District Counterpart Fund to Cay Sung for extension of canal lining program involving an amount of EUR 108,000 depending on final reconciliation of Project contracts. The FE recommends these funds be applied to material costs only with farmers providing labour. BTC could seek to support Phu My District to develop a pilot framework of a district wide sector investment strategy that includes all irrigation systems, the development of comprehensive PIM and high value agriculture. The rationale for this is that the FE believes that an institutional basis for PIM is not possible through a project by project approach working at the level of a single irrigation system. PIM this requires institutional commitment at the district level as it requires supporting roles, structures and functions within DARD, IMT etc. Without such frameworks and agreements there is little point in investing in PIM and high value agriculture. The District strategy process could be a pilot for a Provincial wide roll out of these approaches but this will require active engagement with BTC to explore the possibilities. BTC needs to ensure improved due diligence and increased quality of formulation to overcome shortcomings, with this in mind all formulation should be required to conform to (i) problem analysis, (ii) proposed scope and strategies and (iii) provision of documentation BTC programs could include means of delivering expertise on a demand driven basis this may require the use of unallocated resources set aside for such purposes. The PMU and CTA would need to justify the use of these resources to the PSC.
4.1.3 For Future Investments

A project by project program is not considered optimal if the Donor and Viet Nam are serious about moving irrigation forward into sustainable water demand and use systems. If future investment is project by project all that is required is financing for engineering and agricultural training. The investment in study tours, agriculture demonstrations, irrigation management etc. are pointless without a District wide reorientation of institutions and approaches that can support and sustain a demand responsive approach to irrigation management. A sector wide approach is recommended with the priority being to identify the needs and strategies that would underpin such an approach. The biggest contribution that Belgium can provide is in the formative stages of strategies and capacity to use and manage irrigation water. There is little or no comparative advantage in the building of irrigation infrastructure without these elements. Future investment needs far more diligence across a range of key sector inputs for both identification and especially in formulation. Where time lines are too short for this, it is recommended not to participate as this requires a forgoing quality of process, one of the fundamental lessons that all projects are attempting to encourage and build in local institutions and procedures The delegated and decentralized Project Management needs continued refinement, the use of local institutions without necessarily building a formal PMU could be considered, where the construction bureau is charged with their responsibility, the agriculture bureau with programs that fit their mandate etc. Project management would then become a coordination and administration function aligned to the DPC and a supplier of support service. The PSC would act as a Board of Directors where senior management from the implementing partners collectively review progress and ensure strategic alignment.
27
Financial sustainability needs to be a prerequisite of a future investment and not a project outcome or purpose indicator. There is now sufficient evidence that farmers actually identify themselves as no-longer poor and in some instances rich as with Dai Son farmers with more than 1 ha of irrigated land. There is sufficient income and benefit for farmers themselves to individually or collectively finance a significantly higher proportion of their costs enabling public funds to be applied to poor households.
28
5 Conclusions
5.1 Main preliminary findings on the assessment criteria
The final evaluation preliminary findings suggest that the two subprojects have achieved a successful project outcome and impact as defined by the TFF logical framework. The evaluation believes that this is confirmed for the Cay Sung Reservoir and it is probable for Dai Son reservoir. At the time of the FE it is not possible for the evaluation team to confirm Dai Son impacts this due to the delayed infrastructure program. The delays in Dai Son reflect weak formulation, a lack of disclosure by DPC/DARD on the basic design and significant shortcomings on behalf of BIHECCO the detail design contractor. Collectively, the Project stakeholders and management was unable to define and attain an efficient project management responses resulting in significant delays and costs. The soft component was highly relevant but poorly conceived at formulation and suffered from a lack of institutional buy-in at the concept and strategy level. The soft component was under invested in technical expertise and marginalized by the PMU for far too long. Future sector work needs to acknowledge that soft and institutional issues cannot be applied at a project level as they require an institutional paradigm shift to introduce PIM and crop diversification. The paradigm shift moves from a supply driven commodity modality for irrigation infrastructure and for agricultural commodities to a demand driven and demand responsive management objective that seeks to supply these needs with water and markets. As such the institutions, organisations need to buy into a common strategy, be realigned and reformed, and then supported with operational procedures. It is improbable that a single Project can supply such conditions without a wider mandate. The capacity building program was a significant success on a number of levels including scope, approach, institutionalisation and the resource materials and clearly demonstrates the benefit of appropriate expertise, and institutional alignment. On hard investment, successful outcomes reflect the project design, and implementation procedures and requires all the building blocks to be in place at Project start up. The nonapproved basic design presented to BTC as an approved design, even if only in dialogue, showed a lack of professional judgement and is ultimately responsible for the failings at Dai Son. Unfortunately these failings were compounded through weak formulation, premature contracting of the detailed design, weak detailed design, delayed and extended construction etc. The hard component was relevant as planned and implemented but for Dai Son was less effective and efficient in the implementation. Government needs to accept the costs of adequate survey for small scale schemes if these are to be offered to donors for investment. Water resource and geotechnical survey data was far too sparse within the basic design and the detailed design process. Contract management intervention by BTC through the enforcement of contractual penalties is a lesson that the PMU and DPC should review and it is suggested that this be one of the tasks included in the terms of reference of future PSCs. While local service providers and experts are strongly preferred by DPC managed PMUs the Project Managers need to recognise the value of professional design work that is accurate first time. The reallocated of budget savings to Cay Sung canal systems will address a weakness in
the irrigation system where canal lining was only partially completed. There needs to be clarity over the extent of canal to be lined to ensure that financing is confirmed before commitments are made and the FE suggests that the funds only be used for materials with farmers providing labour.
5.2 Preliminary recommendations

The final evaluation was asked to address the following questions: 1. Is the rehabilitation and construction of dams, as presently planned, designed and built in Vietnam, the best strategy in terms of water management? Findings: The evaluation team does not believe that this is the most effective use of funds and is not the most appropriate strategy in a water management context. Benefits in the long run will involve a far wider scope of work for water resource management that moves the objective away from commodity (water or grain) supply to demand responsive strategies reflecting consumer and producer needs. Adopting a Project approach simply retains the current approach by supporting out dated institutional arrangements and organisations to survive longer. We suggest the Belgium government and the PPC /DPC step back from dams and clarify the longer term strategy with a view of using Phu My district as pilot through which to change the paradigm of irrigation and high value crop production to a demand responsive model. This would entail District level planning and agreements with a commitment to support small scale irrigation systems as well as the institutional reforms and strengthening required. 2. What are the pros-cons with respect to the local economy, social and the environmental aspects? Findings: these are detailed throughout the final report. We see in balance positive outcomes on all dimensions however the effectiveness, relevance and efficiency of these varies significantly and in the case of Doi Son it remains too soon to fully understand and measure what these are. The evaluation team concern relates to the ability of maintaining these gains and then building on them which will require a shift in approach something that we feel local stakeholders are not yet well placed to achieve. Economic benefits are high and significant but accrue largely to those with that already receive significant irrigation benefits. Where irrigation command areas expand less well- off households have received significant benefit by moving from a single rainfed crop to two or more irrigated crops. Social benefits are high in terms of the additional household income and the use of these for savings, education, and consumption. The project has enabled people through the capacity building programs creating greater awareness and providing skills. It has started to build social capital but did not achieve the desired or necessary changes with respect to irrigation management. The environmental aspects are assessed to be positive with the protection offered to previously at risk infrastructure and the associated high risk of flooding etc. To counter this there is increasing evidence of deforestation in catchment areas due to cattle grazing that could be significant. There are also
increased risks to water quality from agrichemicals if intensification continues to rely upon rice. 3. What lessons can BTC and the VN authorities learn from this type of ad hoc approach in dam construction? Findings: The lessons are detailed above but the most important of these is the need for clarity in the overall investment strategy and that there be an assessment of the feasibility of such programs. The project failed to have such clarity for the soft component and was unable to achieve the implied changes. Engineering programs need far greater diligence in basic and detailed design work, more analysis is required in formulation of interventions and greater alignment with future strategies and policies rather than existing institutions and organisational interests. 4. What are the limits in terms of planning, design, and implementation that could be emphasized? Findings: The limits arose due to the means by which projects were brought to the Viet Nam BTC partnership. These were an assemblage of existing priorities and as such should not be judged to harshly in terms of the lack of strategic focus. What is more important is the need to build future programs on the experience and ensure that more comprehensive strategy options are identified and that these strategies be linked to the underlying problem analysis as well as government policy and plans. Planning at the DPC level is far too narrow as it designed and implemented by local institutions created to achieve largely historical development and administrative objectives, i.e., irrigation expansion. If the problem analysis seeks to adopt more demand responsive approaches such as PIM or more value addition options such as high value commodity and value chain development, local planning frameworks need to be adjusted which will require planning systems to span existing institutional mandates. Design limits are identified for small scale infrastructure including the lack of adequate field survey work especially hydrological study and geotechnical study. The other design limit for district level design implementation is the quality of local affiliated design institutes that district leaders seek to offer preference in contracting. Options for supporting such groups may be necessary to overcome capacity constraints. Implementation constraints link to the above constraints and how these flow through into project management functions. District level implementation if supported with the correct technical skills, financial controls and monitoring systems offer significant additional benefits from the use of local institutional groups that then use their experience and resources more widely. The focus within the training programs on the use of local expertise for service delivery was a major success and highlights opportunity for significant gains in effectiveness and efficiency.
31
6 Annexes
6.1 List of People Met
List of People Met In Quy Nhnon
No. Name 12th. Feb : Afternoon 1 Mr. Dang Thanh Mai 2 Mr. Pham Van Van 3 Mr. Dang Anh Son 4 Ms. Tran Bich Khoi 5 Mr. Jozef de Smet 13th.Feb 1. Mr. Huynh Van Nam 2. Ms.Tran Hong Hanh 14th.Feb : Morning 1. Mr. Nguyen Huu Vui 2. Mr. Le Minh Luan 14th.Feb: Afternoon 1 Mr. Huynh Van Nam 2 Mr. Dang Thanh Mai 3 Mr. Pham Van Tra 4 5 6 7 8 Mr. Pham Van Van Mr. Dang Anh Son Ms. Tran Bich Khoi Ms.Tran Hong Hanh Mr. Phien Position Pro. Officer Field Coodinator Training Expert Training Assistant CTA Project Director Chief Accountant Vice. Director Vice Director Project Director Pro. Officer Chief Agricultural Field Coordinator Training Expert Training Assistant Chief Accountant Vice Station Vice Director Supervisor Director Vice President Chairman Chief Agricultural Field Coodinator Training Assistant Chief Accountant Chief Agricultural Training Expert Training Assistant Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Unit Work PMU PMU PMU PMU PMU Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU DARD of Binh Dinh DONRE of Binh Dinh Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU District Agricultural Office PMU PMU PMU PMU Agricultural Station Extension Cay Sung Reservoir Note Quy Nhon Hotel Quy Nhon Hotel Quy Nhon Hotel Quy Nhon Hotel Quy Nhon Quy Nhon Hotel DARD DONRE DPC
15th. Feb. : Morning 1. Mr. Le Tran Tan 2. Mr. Lan Van Du 3. Mr. Tran Van Thoi 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 1 2. 3. Mr. Dang Thanh Long Mr. Dang Van Hung Mr. Pham Van Tra Mr. Pham Van Van Ms. Tran Bich Khoi Ms.Tran Hong Hanh Afternoon Mr. Pham Van Tra Mr. Dang Anh Son Ms. Tran Bich Khoi
BIHECCO Thien An Limited Company Limited Liability Company to Integrated Build Nhan Loc My Loc Commune My Loc Cooperative District Agricultural Office PMU PMU PMU District Agricultural Office PMU PMU Tan Loc Village IMT of Tan Loc Village An Bao Village IMT of An Bao Village
PMU Office
16th. Feb. Morning 1. Mr. Pham Van Man 2. Mr. Luong Hoai Xuan 3. Mr. Duong Minh Chau 4. Mr. Dang Van Thong
My Loc Commune
32
5. 6. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Ms. Tran Bich Khoi Ms.Tran Hong Hanh Afternoon Mr. Dang Van Huong Ms. Phan Thi Dieu Mr. Le Hong Son Mr. Dang Van Dieu Ms. Tran Bich Khoi
Training Assistant Chief Accountant Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Training Assistant Chief Accountant Chairmen Vice Director Depute Chairman Chief Agricultural Field Coodinator Training Assistant Chief Accountant Project Director Pro. Officer Chief Agricultural Staff Staff Training Expert Training Assistant Chief Accountant Vice Director Director Vice Director Supervisor Supervisor Deputy Training Assistant Chief Accountant Chairman Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Training Assistant Chief Accountant Pro. Officer Chief Agricultural
PMU PMU An Tuong Village IMT of An Tuong Village Cuu Thanh Village IMT of Cuu Thanh Village PMU PMU My Hiep Commune BIHECCO My Hiep Cooperative No.3 My Hiep Cooperative No.2 District Agricultural Office PMU PMU PMU Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU District Agricultural Office Agricultural Station IMS PMU PMU PMU Limited Liability Company to Build Minh Phuong Joint Stock Company to Build Irrigation Binh Minh IMC Thien An Limited Company Thien An Limited Company My Hiep Cooperative No.3 PMU PMU My Hiep Cooperative No.2 My Hiep Cooperative No.2 IMT IMT My Hiep Cooperative No.2 PMU PMU PMU District Agricultural Office Quy Nhon Hotel My Hiep Cooperative No.2 My Hiep Cooperative No.3 Extension PMU Office Dai Son Reservoir My Loc Commune
6 Ms.Tran Hong Hanh 17th. Feb : Morning 1 Mr. Tran Minh Tuan 2. Mr. Le Tran Tan 3. Mr. Vo Hong Son 4. Mr. Le Dinh Dieu 5. Mr. Pham Van Tra 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 1 Mr. Pham Van Van Ms. Tran Bich Khoi Ms.Tran Hong Hanh Mr. Huynh Van Nam Mr. Dang Thanh Mai Afternoon Mr. Pham Van Tra Mr. Pham Van Thanh 2 3. 4. Mr.Tran Ngoc Dong Mr. Dang Anh Son Ms. Tran Bich Khoi
5. Ms.Tran Hong Hanh 18th. Feb: Morning 1 Mr. Nguyen Hoang Nam 2 Mr. Tran Ngc Kim Mr. Dang Thanh Long Mr. Lan Van Du Mr.Nguyen Minh Tien Mr. Vo Hong Son Ms. Tran Bich Khoi Ms.Tran Hong Hanh Afternoon Mr. Le Dinh Dieu Mr. Tran Van Nghiem Mr. Vo Van Lap Mr. Tran Van Loc Mr. Le Cong Chinh Ms. Tran Bich Khoi
3 4 5 6 7 1 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
7. Ms.Tran Hong Hanh 19th. Feb. 1 Mr. Dang Thanh Mai 2. Mr. Pham Van Tra
33
3. 4. 5.
Mr. Pham Van Van Mr. Dang Anh Son Ms. Tran Bich Khoi
6. Ms.Tran Hong Hanh 20th. Feb. 1 Ms. Tran Bich Khoi 2 Ms.Tran Hong Hanh 21th Feb. 1 Mr. Huynh Van Nam 2. Ms. Tran Bich Khoi 3. 9 10. 22th 1. 2 3 4. 5. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Ms.Tran Hong Hanh Mr. Huynh Van Nam Mr. Dang Thanh Mai Feb. Mr. Nguyen Dinh Sanh Mr. Dang Van Hung Mr. Dang Thanh Long Mr. Nguyen Van Tong Mr. Duong Minh Chau Mr. Nguyen Hu Tho Mr. Dang Van Phong Mr. Dang Van Thuong Ms. Luong Hoai Xuan Mr. Tran Van Nga Mr. Vo Van Son Mr. Le Dinh Dien Mr.Vo Van Ming Mr. Tran Dinh Vang Mr. Le Van Toi Mr. Don The Hanh Mr. Vo Van Phong Mr. Nguyen Tien Mr. Nguyen Quoc Anh Mr. Ha Dinh Dang Mr. Nguyen Van Luu Mr. Nguyen Xuan Dang Ms. Ha Thanh Huong Mr. Le Xuan Long Ms. Ha Ngoc Chinh Mr. Huynh Van Nam Ms. Tran Bich Khoi
Field Coordinator Training Expert Training Assistant Chief Accountant Training Assistant Chief Accountant Project Director Training Assistant Chief Accountant Project Director Pro. Officer
PMU PMU PMU PMU PMU PMU Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU PMU Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU Joint Stock Company to Build Irrigation Binh Dinh My Loc Cooperative No.2 My Loc CPC My Loc Coopertative N0.2 My Loc Commune Farmers Unions An Tuong Village My Loc commune IMT IMT My Hiep Coopertative No.3 My Hiep Coopertative No.2 My Hiep Commune IMT IMT My Hiep Commune My Hiep Commune My Hiep Commune My Hiep CPC Thien An Limited Company Joint Stock Company to Build Irrigation Binh Dinh Joint Stock Company to Build Minh Phuong DONRE Phu My DPC Phu My DPC Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU PMU Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU PMU PMU Quy Nhon Hotel DPC Quy Nhon Hotel Quy Nhon Hotel
Chairman Vice Chairman Vice Chairman Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Vice Chairman Chairman Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Farmer Vice Chairman Director Vice Director
28 Ms.Tran Hong Hanh 29 Mr. Huynh Van Nam 30 Mr. Dang Thanh Mai 23th Feb. Morning 1 Ms. Tran Bich Khoi 2 Ms.Tran Hong Hanh 24th Feb.
Staff Staff Staff Project Director Training Assistant Chief Accountant Project Director Pro. Officer Training Assistant Chief Accountant
34
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Mr. Huynh Van Nam Ms. Tran Bich Khoi Ms.Tran Hong Hanh Afternoon Mr. Ho Quoc Dung Mr. Huynh Ngoc Tam Mr. Dirk Deprez Mr. Nam Mr. Jozef Mr. Huynh Van Nam Ms. Tran Bich Khoi Ms.Tran Hong Hanh
Project Director Training Assistant Chief Accountant Vice Chairman Vice Director Resident Representative CTA Project Director Training Assistant Chief Accountant
Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU PMU Binh Dinh PPC Binh Dinh DPI BTC BTC BTC Chairman of Phu My DPC PMU PMU
Quy Nhon Hotel
Binh Dinh PPC
35
6.2 Performance Indicator Achievement

The following annex summarises the achievement of the Project performance indicators as reported in the TFF.
6.2.1 Cay Sung Irrigation Systems Table 4: Indicators of Cay Sung reservoir and irrigation rehabilitation
Planned Activities and Indicators (TFF) Total investment (VND millions) Indicator Total Cost VND 5,486 Achievements Headwork cost VND 2,972 Canal cost VND 1,831 Total VND 4,803 1.1 To make detailed design and prepare tender document Detailed Design Tender Documents Detailed Design (10,100 completed by May 2006 euro)
Tender documents issued July 2006 Completed prior to effectiveness New Spillway Wave Wall Reservoir with water volume increased from 0.4 to 0.9 million m3 Spill way and wave wall constructed by 15 July 2007 Dam constructed by 2007 1 August
1.2 Repair works
head
1.3 Emergency Repairs to Spillway 1.4 Upgrade Structure Dam
Reservoir capacity increased from 0.65 to 0.87 million cubic meters due to wrong elevation on dam height in basic design actual elevation minus 0.5m Design for 4.853km completed March 2007 81 canal facilities/structures constructed by April 2008 (2 extensions) 4.853 km primary and secondary canal lined by March 2007 73 water installed by control structures input
1.5 Rehabilitate main canal system
101 ha irrigable area with lined canals and water control
1.6 Supervise works program 1.7 Rehabilitate Onfarm canal system
8 person consultancy
months
8 pmnths contracted.
supervision
Households with access to irrigation water increased from 540 to 870
220 ha irrigable with 175 ha of spring winter rice, 160ha summer rice, and 60ha of third crop rice Total Irrigated crop per yr 342ha to 670 ha Number of households with access to irrigation increased
36
from 540 to 870
6.2.2 Dai Son Irrigation System Table 5: Indicators of Dai Son reservoir and irrigation rehabilitation
Planned Activities and Indicators (TFF) Investment Cost (VND Million) Log Frame Indicator Achievements
Total Budget VND 21,882
Head works VND 23,537 Canal Cost VND 5,400 Total VND 28,937
2.1 Prepare Drawings and tender documents 2.2 Emergency repairs to spillway 2.3 Upgrade Dam Structure
Detailed design Drawings Tender Documents
Detailed by
drawings
completed
Tender document issued by Completed effectiveness Dam and saddle dam rehabilitated to design standard Reservoir volume increased from 1.2 million m3 to 2.5 million m3 prior to
Dam and saddle dam completed on August 2010 Reservoir volume increased from 1.2 million cubic meters to 2.65 million cubic meters
2.4 Rehabilitate main canal system 2.5 Supervise works program 2.6 Rehabilitate On-farm canal system
Irrigation canal for 290ha with mainly lined canals and water control 30 person months Increased number of households with irrigation water
7.57km canals lined
upgraded and
Household with irrigation increased from 785 to 915 hh Irrigable area for Spring winter crop of 269ha, summer crop 240ha and third crop 161ha Total irrigated area increased from 342 ha per year to 730ha per year within a maximum command area of 269ha.
37
6.2.3 Irrigation Management Improved

Table 6: Result 3 Achievements
Planned Activities and Indicators (TFF) 3.1 To review and clarify roles and responsibilities of management structures Indicators Roles and responsibilities clarified Achievements Definition of roles for DARD, IMS, Cooperative, Village/farmers, Irrigation Management teams. DARD and DPC issuing guidelines for the management, operation and exploitation of irrigation works Dai Son establish irrigation management committee 84 trainees - 3 female 3.2 To review and refine rules and regulations on protection of irrigation / water management Cases of violations of irrigation rules decreased Irrigation fee collection compared to number of water users increased Number of people on all relevant levels trained and capable in irrigation system No regulations were prepared. No. of violations - nil. Irrigation fees were abolished by central government in 2007 434 trainees 199 female 1388 trainees 79 female
3.3 To train local irrigation managers and technicians on participatory irrigation /water management 3.4 To design and implement pasture management scheme
84 trainees - 9 female
6.2.4 Agricultural Technologies Improved 6.2.5 Table 7: Result 4 Achievements

Planned Activities and Indicators (TFF) 4.1 Carry baseline survey out Indicators Baseline survey completed 2006 Achievements Trained female 400 trainees 154
Baseline survey of 200 households in 2008 repeated in 2010 4.2 To assess training needs of farmers regarding farming skills, cropping pattern Needs assessment completed by June 2006 3 needs assessment one in 2008,2009, 2010 Interviewed a total of 1,653 respondents of which 386 are
38
management and water use cost / benefit calculations 4.3 To design appropriate training curriculum materials and strategies Number of staff from agriculture extension service having successfully participate in training of trainer course on improved agricultural extension Training sessions delivered and number of farmers trained disaggregated by gender and poor- non-poor
female
50 trainers trained of which 5 were female
4.4 To conduct training sessions on all levels
364 farmers trained as trainers of which 188 were female 1,927 farmers trained 0f which 1180 were female
4.5 To execute market studies on alternative crops and establish pilot demonstration on new cash crops
Crop increased
diversification
41 Trainees of which 4 female 10 demonstrations provided to 787 farmers 181 female Crops demonstrated include rice, sesame, corn and peanut
Agricultural marketing improved and marketed produce increased
39
6.3 Impact Productivity Data

The following Data was provided by the PMU/DARD Statistics Office
6.3.1 Cay Sung

Cay Sung (ha) Irrigated area Dryland Total
Area (ha) Cropped before Rice Winter Spring Summer Third Crop Corn Winter Spring Summer Third Crop Other Winter Spring Summer Third Crop Total Cropped area Cropping intensity 120 90 Area(ha) cropped After 220 140
Before 168 70 238

Yields tonnes per ha Irrigated Irrigated Before After 5.9 5.7 3.9 5.7 5.8 5 2.7 2 6 6 4.7 5.9 5.9 5 2.9 2.2 Total (mt) % gain VND ('000's) VND billion hh output (t/hh) % Sold vol sold (t/hh) Value per hh (VND 000)
After 238 238
15
220 131%
380 160%
Total Production (metric tonnes per annum) Irrigated Irrigated Net Before After Gain 708 1320 612 513 840 327 0 0 0 0 11.4 29.5 18.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21.6 43.5 21.9 0 0 0 0 0 0 1254 2233 979 78% 6,270,000 11,165,000 4,895,000 6.27 11.165 4.895 540 810 0.43 2.32 2.76 40% 50% 0.45 0.93 1.38 2,248 4,644 6,892
40
6.3.2 Dai Son

Dai Son (ha) Irrigated area Dryland Total Before 240 29 269 After 269 269
Area (ha) Cropped before Irrigated Rice Winter Spring Summer Third Crop Corn Winter Spring Summer Third Crop Other Winter Spring Summer Third Crop Total Crpped Area Cropping Intensity 180.00 113.00
Area(ha) cropped After 220.00 240.00 112.00 2.00
Yields tonnes per ha Irrigated Irrigated Before After 5.10 5.80 4.40 5.20 6.10 5.50 4.80 6.00
Irrigated Before
Production (metric tonnes) Irrigated After 1,342.00 1,320.00 537.60 12.00
Gain in production 424.00 664.60 537.60 1.60
918.00 655.40 10.40
2.00
47.00
47.00
2.30
2.90
108.10
136.30
28.20
342.00 1.43
621.00 2.31
Total Output % Gain VND (000's) VND billion Households Output(t/hh) % Sold (t/hh) Est Sales (VND 000)
1,691.90 8,459,500 8.5 785 2.16 0.40 0.86 4,311
3,347.90 16,739,500 16.7 915 3.66 0.50 1.83 9,147
1,656.00 0.98 8,280,000 8.28 1.50 0.97 4,837
41
6.4 Stakeholder Workshop Conclusions

Group Agency Conclusions Project Strengths and Impacts Supports policy of reducing poverty and increasing agricultural productivity in the local. Supports irrigation policy of concreted canals and for increasing reservoir safety The allocation and reasonable use of water Improves environmental landscape Raises beneficiary awareness of environmental protection Created jobs, Improved social awareness and resources protection of the beneficiaries both during construction and future operations. Weaknesses Investment Period Require preparation work for capital investments especially: Geological survey Hydrographic survey and calculation No, government price norms for hydrographic surveys and costs for irrigation structure. Legal procedure to prepare investment need to be applied. Agree criteria both budget and technology before detailed design to ensure shorted implementation time avoids material resources and time waste. Construction Period Limited period of suitable weather condition. Ground clearance for construction was slow and delayed Survey weather, hydrography, geology to define more exact of reservoir capacity Enough budget to invest in Outstanding work or issues Development of fisheries in reservoirs Develop Tourism and recreation Incomplete canal rehabilitation need more Construct more concrete lining to reduce costs Supervise water quality assessment for irrigation service Strengthen management in upstream catchment forests Risks to irrigation and agriculture Operation of flood discharge was not with schedule Insects damaged body of dam Climate change is over design frequency Awareness of beneficiaries who use irrigation system is incomplete. Increasing use of pesticide and waste for the environment and for water supply Destruction effect of upstream forests
My Loc Beneficiaries Suitable for policy of the government in irrigation construction period. Dam and canal system were concreted sustainable
Training course on irrigation management, maintenance for beneficiaries. Long-term budget to maintain irrigation system annual.
New canal system has not yet interested in flood discharge, made flood water in some areas and inside canal Some small dams (prevented
42
Group
Project Strengths and Impacts Increase irrigation area, productivity, quality of crops Increase incomes to improve life of the local citizens Raised beneficiaries awareness on irrigation management This area is invested to construct irrigation structure. Develop agricultural economy, eliminate hunger and reduce poverty, deal with job for beneficiaries. Agricultural productivity raising Flood regulation to reduce natural disaster in the lower section
Weaknesses frastructure, close tight from headwork to irrigation system of on-farm canal Install more direct steel pipes and operate water saving better. Shorten time of project identification and evaluation Invest comprehensive for irrigation system
Outstanding work or issues Build security house and protector of the structure Equipment to measure rainfall
Risks to irrigation and agriculture by tree and straw) have not yet constructed in the lower section, so landslide lost water and spent budget by flood annual.
My Hiep Beneficiaries
Training courses on irrigation management, maintenance for IMT Construct completely canal system Raise beneficiaries awareness on irrigation management and maintenance in the area.
Risks of Flood, Natural disaster
43

Aide Me Moire - Final Evaluation VIE 00013006

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Deskripsi Asli:

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Aide Me Moire - Final Evaluation VIE 00013006

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

AIDE-MEMOIRE

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 CONTEXT OF THE FINAL EVALUATION (FE) ................................................................................. 5

2.1 BASIC CRITERIA.................................................................................................................... 7

2.2 TRANSVERSAL THEMES......................................................................................................... 14

4.1 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE FINAL EVALUATION ........................................................................ 26

6.1 LIST OF PEOPLE MET......................................................................................................... 32 6.2 PERFORMANCE INDICATOR ACHIEVEMENT................................................................................ 36

6.3 IMPACT PRODUCTIVITY DATA................................................................................................. 40

6.4 STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP CONCLUSIONS............................................................................... 42

1.2 Methodology of the Final evaluation

1.3 Composition of the Final evaluation-team

1.4 Intervention area and beneficiaries visited

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

2 Main findings & temporary conclusions

Table 1: Estimates of Impact on Agricultural Output and Household Incomes

168 220 131% 1254 2322 4644

238 380 160% 2233 2757 6892

70 160 29% 979 435 2248

240 342 143% 1692 2155 4311

269 621 231% 3348 3659 9147

29 279 88% 1656 1504 4837

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

2.1.2 Immediate Results 1 and 2

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

Table 1: Initial Evaluation Ratings

2.1.3 Immediate Results 3 and 4:

2.1.3.1 Result 4: Irrigation Management Strengthened

Table 2: Irrigation/Service Fee and Central Government Subsidy (VND)

2.1.3.2 Result 4: Agriculture Technology Improved

2.2 Transversal themes

2.2.3 Social Economy

2.2.4 Childrens Rights

2.3.3 Result Based Management

created strong demand for maintaining quality and timeliness.

Table 3: Budget Savings by Financier as at December 30 2010

2.3.4 Mutual Accountability

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

3.1 At Project Conception and Formulation

3.2 At Project Start Up

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

3.2.1 Detailed Design Stage

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

3.2.3 Soft Component

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

3.2.4 Project Management

3.3 At the level of the Project Steering Committee

3.4 At the level of BTC Representation

3.5 At the level of BTC-HQs

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

4.1.2 For PSC/BT/Donor

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

4.1.3 For Future Investments

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

5.2 Preliminary recommendations

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

Quy Nhon Hotel

Binh Dinh PPC

BTC, Belgian development agency Aide-mmoire Final Evaluation

6.2 Performance Indicator Achievement

1.2 Repair works

1.3 Emergency Repairs to Spillway 1.4 Upgrade Structure Dam