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Critically assess a causal theory of names.

In this essay I shall be providing a critical assessment of the causal theory of names, as initially outlined by Saul Kripke (Kripke, 1980, pp. 95-97) and improved upon by Evans. First, I shall define a causal theory of names in the Kripkean sense, while providing some of my own clarifications and further definitions of some technical terms. I shall then briefly provide some of objections to the Kripkean causal theory, followed by a brief exploration of Devitt s causal theory of names, and why I believe it fails to add much more to the Kripkean theory. This shall be followed by an exploration of Evans amended theory. I shall then provide objections and support for Evans amended theory. Finally, I will conclude that although useful to the debate, Evans theory falls short of being able to satisfy the requirements for a working theory of naming. Firstly, it is important to grasp what a casual theory of names is. Here, I shall be using causal theory of names to indicate the initial Kripkean formulation of the theory, whereas I shall use amended causal theory to refer to Evans formulation and singular term causal theory to refer to Devitt s formulation. Let us start with the Kripkean formulation of the theory, which Kripke posited after criticising the cognitive determination hypothesis , or CHD as it is known. The CHD states that a proper name refers to an individual, in virtue of the speaker associating the name with a condition that singles the individual out. (deRosset, 2010, p. 1) Kripke s solution to the problems faced by CHD was to provide a causal theory of speaker denotation ( speaker denotation referring to what the name denotes on the occasion of its use (Evans & Altham, 1973, p. 188)). Instead of being conditional, the causal theory of names is positional, in that the use of the name depends on your position relative to its utterance (within space-time). To take an example from the literature, my use of Cicero to denote a Roman orator is different from the initial use of Cicero , as I am further down the imaginary line . Kripke states that an initial baptism must take place, either by ostension or description (Kripke, 1980, p. 96). In Cicero s case, this would have been him mother using the name Cicero to refer to him in conversation, or for a more contemporary example, think of how nicknames can stick over time. It is also important for Kripke that the intention of the usage is clear to the receiver. For example, I talk about Cicero (the orator) and you decide that Cicero would be an excellent name for your dog, and thus use Cicero when referring to your dog. I eventually come across someone who you have spoken to about your dog, so when I talk about Cicero (the orator), you think I m talking about Cicero (the dog). In summary so far, Kripke attempts to solve issues with CHD by proposing a causal theory of names, in which what a speaker denotes by a name is not brought about conditionally, but positionally, through receiving the intention of what the name is used to denote from other users of said name. I shall now briefly consider an important objection to this theory. The biggest problem with the causal theory of names, as it stands currently, is that it places a large amount of emphasis on the initial baptism . As a result, it fails to accommodate that a name can change reference. Evans provides both a real world and imaginary example, that of Madagascar and the switched twins. (Evans & Altham, 1973, p. 196). In the case of Madagascar, the name was originally used to refer to the African mainland, but due to a confused famous explorer,

2|4110238 Madagascar came to denote the large island off of the south-eastern coast. In the case of the switched babies, John and Jack are identical twins. Due to a clumsy nurse, the name tags on the cribs fall off, and the nurse unknowingly swaps them, leading Jack to refer to John and vice versa. It could be argued that both of these examples are poor, as they are the result of error, and that tracing the causal chain would allow the error to be corrected. However, I contend that the damage has been done , so to speak. In any case, there are other examples that show the inflexibility of Kripke s theory. I shall now briefly consider Devitt s singular term causal theory, before moving on to a critical discussion of Evans amended causal theory. Devitt attempts to solve this problem through stating that when we use a singular term to refer to an object, we use it in virtue of the causal links we have with the use of term and the object, and not in virtue of any beliefs we may have about the object. (Devitt, 1974, p. 184). At first glance, this does not seem to be any different from the Kripkean formulation. However, by using a stricter formulation, we can illuminate the differences. In the singular term causal theory, the causal history of the term is necessary and sufficient for the subject to use the term to refer to an object, and that this causal history does not contain beliefs about the object that is referred to. This addition allows for the changing of reference to take place, as there is no grounding in true belief. However, as Turner points out, this means there is no sorting heuristic for what kinds of causal connection are the right kinds when we need to obtain a reference for a name. This leads us to the problem that the only kinds of causal connection that the right kind are those that exercise the ability to refer. (Turner, 1976, p. 157) As a result at best, we gain nothing new from exploring the causal chain and at worst; Devitt s formulation is viciously circular. However, this attempt at solving the problems faced by the causal theory of names brings us to Evans amended causal theory. Earlier, we considered the problem of the initial baptism having too much emphasis placed upon it. Evans imagines (Evans & Altham, 1973, p. 193) a case in which a subject, S, is at a pub having a conversation about a certain Louis, and his use of Louis can be traced back down the causal chain to Louis XIII of France. This seems all well and good so far, as it fits in with Kripke s formulation. However, Evans imagines an extension, in which S is asked about the conversation some time later and makes a statement about Louis that does not match up to Louis XIII. However, under Kripke, he is still referring to Louis XIII! Thus, Kripke s formulation is insufficient. Evans solution is to say that the causal relation is not really between the initial baptism of an object and the use of the name thereon, but the causal relation between the object and the information the speaker possesses that is associated with the name of the object. In the Madagascar example, Madagascar names the island because the island itself plays a role in the acquisition of the information associated with the name, rather than just the name fitting better. I shall now provide an explanation of the amended causal theory, followed by a critical analysis of it. Evans amended theory(Evans & Altham, 1973, pp. 202-206)is, paraphrased, as follows: NN is a name of xiff: 1. There exists a community, the members of which use NN to refer to x. 2. NN referring to x is common knowledge within the community.

3|4110238 3. There reference in [1] is reliant on the knowledge in [2], not on a true belief that x fits NN . Upon cursory examination, this doesn t seem to be a causal theory at all and in fact closer to CHD. However, if we break down the premises further, we can see that the causal theory is embedded in premise [1], and premise [3] denies CHD. Premise [1] contains Evans earlier thesis that NN is used to refer to x because x is the source of information they have associated with NN , much like the Madagascar example above. As the Madagascar problem has already been solved by Evans solution, let us look at the others. In the case of the twins, Jack is used to refer to John as John is the source of information that the community associates Jack with, and this is common knowledge. We do not run into issues with what Jack should refer to because the naming of the object is nothing to do with fit. In the Louis case, the community is the group at the pub, and the problem is no longer an issue under Evans theory. As a result, Evans amended causal theory seems to be the best bet so far: it does not run into problems with transference of names or changes of referent, nor is it circular. However, it is not perfect, and I shall provide criticism of the theory. Firstly, we are left with the problem of naming abstract objects, such as numbers. Under the causal theory, abstract objects must stand in causal relation to the usage of a concrete name. For example, the Roman numeral XIII is the name of the number 13. But how do we trace a causal chain back to the abstract object? Here, it makes sense to put emphasis on the act of baptism, as Kripke does: the act itself is a concrete event that stands in the causal chain. However, this leads us back to the problems of emphasising the baptism, and Evans does not seem to provide a way out. Secondly, we run into the problem of the notion of a community of language users. Under Evans, the causal chain for a name is established through the usage of the name within a community to refer to an object. But what if there is no community? Consider this: a young child is stranded on an isolated island after a plane crash, and through fortuitous circumstances matures into an adult. Some explorers arrive at the island and find him, and he attempts to communicate with the explorers about the islands native flora and fauna. In this case, the community is himself, and thus we run into a problem. Is what he uses as a name truly the name of the object, if there is no one to provide another possibility? Moreover, the notion of a community of language users is vague. This vagueness is a problem that Evans faces, as he does not fully specify what is meant by a community of language users, or what it means for an object to be a dominant source of information. Without this specification, the latter term strays dangerously close to principle of fit that Evans denies. As a result, more precision is required in defining some of the language Evans uses; although I worry that the theory will lose much of its strength increased precision is used. In conclusion, we have come from the humble beginnings of an insightful, if flawed causal theory of names proposed by Kripke, through problems stemming from clumsy nurses, Marco Polo and conversations in a pub, arriving at a persuasive and powerful amended causal theory formulated by Evans. Although Evans theory suffers from vagueness and the issues of community and abstract objects, it provides a great insight into how out language works. However, I find the picture

4|4110238 incomplete, because human language is far too subtle and complex to be easily categorised into theories, but Evans formulation gives us an excellent approximation.

Bibliography
deRosset, L. (2010). Reference and Response. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1-18. Devitt, M. (1974). Singular Terms. The Journal of Philosophy, 183-205. Evans, G., & Altham, J. (1973). The Causal Theory of Names. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 187-225. Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cambrdige, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Turner, D. (1976). Devitt's causal theory of reference. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 153-157.