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Jstor is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content. Julio santos esposito argues that meaning has been the chief object of musical speculation in our century.
Jstor is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content. Julio santos esposito argues that meaning has been the chief object of musical speculation in our century.
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Jstor is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content. Julio santos esposito argues that meaning has been the chief object of musical speculation in our century.
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Souvce InlevnalionaI Beviev oJ lIe AeslIelics and SocioIocv oJ Music, VoI. 12, No. 2 |Bec., 1981), pp. 181-189 FuIIisIed Iv Croatian Musicological Society SlaIIe UBL http://www.jstor.org/stable/836560 . Accessed 17/03/2011 1342 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=croat. . Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. Croatian Musicological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to International Review of the Aesthetics and Sociology of Music. http://www.jstor.org DISCUSSIONS, IRASM, 12 (1981), 2, 181-202 DISCUSSIONS THE DILEMMA OF MUSICAL MEANING Meaning has doubtless been the chief object of musical speculation in our century. For good or for ill it has largely replaced older philosophic and aesthetic concepts such as beauty, imitation, expression, and content. The replacement seems very much to the good as far as content is con- cerned, for it is not at all clear that music >contains<< anything, but there seems little doubt that it has meaning of some kind, if only because the music of distant times or cultures does not always make sense. The predominance of meaning in musical thought is a reflection, as we might expect, of its importance in 20th-century philosophy, which brought about a deeper understanding of logic and mathematics and language. The problem of knowledge became a problem of the symbolic formulation of knowledge. The domain of meaning was expanded by an- thropology and by the psychology of childhood. But the conception of meaning, ramified and complex in general, was peculiarly intractable in its application to music, for even if music is unquestionably meaningful, it rarely possesses meaning in the most obvious sense - that of referring to or representing extra-musical objects or occurrences. The emergence of meaning as a central concern of philosophic thought has been attested to by three types of investigation: hermeneutics, sym- bolism, and semiology. However diverse their original fields of application may have been, these approaches to meaning are alike in claiming appli- cability to every area of human expression. This generality was attributed to hermeneutics by Dilthey and Gadamer, to symbolism by Cassirer, and to semiology by Peirce and Saussure. In each case nothing less than the distinguishing feature of human mentality was at stake, an attribute that was to succeed reason and language as the defining characteristic of intelli- gence. As a logical consequence of their generality, then, the three modes of understanding were applied successively to the question of meaning in music. In two articles published in the 1902 and 1905 issues of the Jahrbuch Peters, Hermann Kretzschmar advanced a detailed plan of musical her- meneutics. He provided a verbal interpretation first of intervals, rhythmic patterns, chords, and themes, and then of the first Fugue of the Well-Tem- pered Clavier. He used a conventional vocabulary of types of feeling: >Joyous<<, defiant<<, >elegiac<<, >energetic<<, >triumphant<, and so on. Oc- casionally visual images were drawn into the description. Kretzschmar 181 DISCUSSIONS, IRASM, 12 (1981), 2, 181-202 182 pointed out three alternatives to such an interpretation: a formal description in technical and statistical terms, the uncritical adoption of a summary characterization, and a flight of poetic fancy, all of them unsatisfactory, although for different reasons. Kretzschmar undercut his hermeneutic enterprise, however, by intro- ducing a pedagogical purpose. His proqposal was literally one of a curric- ulum for beginners in music, for untrained listeners. Musically gifted people, he proposed, will be able to skip over much of his course. Whether or not Kretzschmar's plan would have pedagogical value for any group of people we need not consider here; but words of course cannot faithfully convey any non-verbal experience. They may characterize music, but neither descriptive words nor the concepts represented by them are de- noted by the music, and it is difficult to imagine a connotation without a denotation. Nor can music be reduced to a means of communication, espe- cially not for a message that can be stated in language. With respect to an essential musical meaning, then, Kretzschmar's hermeneutics must be regarded as inadequate. It is clearly to be used in alternation with the music itself, a practice that amounts to lan implicit acknowledgment of its inadequacy. It has the further defect that Kretzschmar's descriptions are in his own view the same as those of the Baroque Affektenlehre; there is no indication that hermeneutics may be a historical variable. The chief musical representative of Cassirer's views of symbolism is Susanne Langer, who like Arnold Schering, attempts to define musical meaning in terms of the conception of symbolism. She tries persistently to arrive at a satisfactory definition of musical symbolism, continually revis- ing her terminology and her conception. She employs paradoxical notions such as ,presentational(< symbol and >>unconsummated< symbol. The mu- sical symbol is fused with its meaning, she maintains, but finds subse- quently that music has no meaning: it has import instead. Or again, music becomes a virtual image of inner experience. But if the inner experience in question has no existence separate from or independent of the image, how can it be represented or referred to by the music. Finally symbols are said to formulate as well as to refer, and formulation is logically prior to reference; musical symbolism formulates only. But how, then, can music have meaning? Schering's difficulties are equally evident. After his valuable studies of Bach's symbolism, he begins to find external reference where there is no evidence of it - an understandable tendency for some one convinced of the universality of symbolism. Both his theoretical position and his con- fusion can be examined readily in two important articles published in the Jahrbuch Peters for 1935 and 1936 respectively. The motif that opens Tristan, to take a conspicuous illustration, may have the antecedents that Schering proposes, but in what sense are these antecedents symbolic? Sym- bolism in vocal music does not appear to represent a problem, for the question can simply be transferred to the text, where the imponderables conveniently seem to disappear. Even though the transfer is actually not a DISCUSSIONS, IRASM, 12 (1981), 2, 181-202 183 legitimate one, the falsification it entails is readily overlooked.1 But the problem of instrumental music cannot be disposed of quite so easily. One important approach is certainly to trace meaning to some explicit verbal connection. Just as a title or a program can specify meaning, so can instru- mentally performed melodies or motifs acquire meaning if they are sung elsewhere in the same work, or if they are well known to begin with as vocal music. Or alternatively, meaning may be bestowed by a visible dra- matic action or event. The vocabulary of symbols derived in these ways from explicit connections is obviously very different in different spheres of musical practice - very different for Bach than for Beethoven or for Wagner. And it is apparent that the contents and even the existence of an older symbolic world will be known only to some one conversant with the styles and documents and pictorial evidence relevant to a given problem, even if familiarity with the symbols was relatively common at the time they came into existence. In this respect Schering cannot be criticised; he was particularly sensitive to the historical career of musical symbols. For that very reason, however, there are times when we cannot easily distinguish unfounded speculation from insight in his case. Demonstrating the presence or the exact nature of musical symbolism, particularly of an esoteric or purportedly suppressed symbolism, can obviously be a difficult if not insuperable problem. Did Beethoven really have to provide a key to the question and answer of >Mu13 es sein?< or was the symbolism suffi- ciently well known at that time to. make explanations unnecessary? Or again, were the portentous questions asked in terms of the same motivic family by Liszt and Wagner recognized as such even apart from their programmatic and dramatic context? Or to take a difficulty directly in- volved in Schering's work, when is instrumental lyricism symbolic of sing- ing? If the lack of precision in Schering's thought is added to the problem of obtaining evidence for his contentions, it is not at all surprising that his protracted and provocative effort to convert symbolism from a particular device to a phenomenon accounting for musical meaning in general fell short of his goal. Semiology has been still less productive for music than hermeneutics and symbolism. Its generality, like that of all schemes for a universal language, has been more promise than fulfillment. It has been based for the most part on linguistics, so that its application to music - which has been undertaken most prominently by Jakobson, Ruwet, and Nattiez - consists largely in searching for similarities between music and language. The similarities, unfortunately, are outweighed by the differences. To be sure, the distinction between an individual musical work (or an improvisation) and the musical system it is grounded mirrors the dis- tinction between an individual literary work (or an improvised discourse) and the systematic structure of the language it employs. And tones can be compared, with some degree of accuracy, to phonemes, just as successive The falsification is a simplification, for the symbolism of vocal music is actual- ly the resultant of the symbolism of the sung text and that of the accompaniment. DISCUSSIONS, IRASM, 12 (1981), 2, 181-202 musical motifs, themes, phrases, and so on (in an articulated style) can be compared to morphemes, words, linguistic phrases, and so on. Cadences are comparable to junctures, the scalar system to the phonological system, melodic grammars to linguistic grammars. But resemblances such as these do not appear to advance our understanding and analysis of music in any significant way; they seem simply to provide fashionable rubrics for prob- lems that can be handled just as well with traditional terminology. Even worse, they pretend to be sufficient in themselves,, and thus succeed in eliminating the historical study of style, which is their true competitor in defining musical meaning. The question is really how thoroughgoing the similarities are. Double articulation in music, for example - if it exists at all - is certainly different from double articulation in language, for the relationship of tones to themes is really not the same as the relationship of phonemes to words, which differ from one another much more sharply. But even the comparable aspects of music and language belong almost entirely to the province of structure; a comparative consideration of mean- ing yields a completely different and much more negative result. In the end, semantics may be no more than a new word for the familiar referen- tial aspects of musical meaning, and syntax a new word for form or for structure. The value of replacing >form<< and >meaning< by >syntax< and >se- mantics<< may be simply that our attention will be directed to aspects of music that would otherwise not be considered, tol the detailed course of meaning, for example, through whole musical statements or sections, which would be analogous to sentences or paragraphs. The intimate connection of syntax and semantics, which is much more striking in music than it is in language, is a relevant circumstance here. While it may seem to pre- vent or obstruct the separate study of syntax, it suggests at the same time that we may be able to get at musical semantics through musical syntax - to get at the invisible, as it were, by means of the visible. Certainly the types of repetition and recurrence and equivalence in musical syntax, which generally play so prominent a role, are responsible for conspicuous aspects of musical meaning. They are also an example of the character of the relationship between music and language, for syntax in language is based on principles which are entirely different from repetition and equiv- alence, so that music would seem closer to poetry and rhetoric in partic- ular - as indeed it has been historically - rather than to language in general. On the other hand, syntax is responsible for meaning in language also, even if this kind of >structural meaning(< is relatively inconspicuous. The various inadequacies of hermeneutics, symbolism, and semiology as accounts of musical meaning - at least as they have so far been con- ceived - prompts a return to musical experience itself in a renewed effort to discern features which would explain the unmistakable feeling that music makes sense and that it is meaningful. Now we can sometimes dis- tinguish in music an instance of meaning in its proper sense of external reference. There may be a duplication or an imitation of external sounds, 184 DISCUSSIONS, IRASM, 12 (1981), 2, 181-202 or an approximate formal similarity to some external object or event, or to some narrative or dramatic action. Through its formal properties or the feeling it evokes, or through both at once, music may refer to some emo- tional experience known outside of music or to some general conception such as heroism. References of these kinds during the Baroque era could make use of a conventionalized vocabulary of figures. In general, however, references such as these would not be grasped without a descriptive title or narrative to guide the performer or listener. Indeed program music so increases the range and precision of every type of external reference, that music is given a deceptive versatility of meaning which suggests the cap- ability of language. On the other hand, even purely instrumental music will represent the society or culture in which it had its origin. And there is finally what we may call associative meaning, which consists in the images or ideas entertained by various listeners in response to music, although these are always private reactions or reveries that can be entirely unrelated to the music that evokes them. External reference may also be musical in nature. One work may refer to another - one of Brahms to one of Schumann, for example. Or a work may refer to an older style in general - to the imitative polyphony of the Renaissance, or to the style of Bach. Even without the composer's intention, a musical work will normally represent the composer's own style, and the styles of its genre, nation, historical era, and so forth. Somewhat similar to this is the reference of functional music to the occasion of its use: of liturgical music to a religious service, or a wedding march to a wedding. Meaning can also be based on the division of the musical experience itself, with one part or aspect becoming the meaning to which the other part refers. This division can occur with composite musical arts such as song, dance, and opera. The melody sung will point to the meaning of the text as its own meaning, or to the text itself. The music of a dance will refer to the dance, even if this is not present. A general type of division is that of the sound of music from its acoustic sources. This is a fundamental type of perceptual meaning: the tones represent the singers, or the instru- ments being played; they are in fact part of their sounding sources. A very important type of internal meaning is the reference of a part of a musical composition to other parts and to the whole. The meaning of the opening of a work is made up to some extent of anticipation or inti- mation; it often becomes charged, in addition, with the meaning of the whole. Recurrences of themes refer to their earlier or initial appearance; cadences of various kinds signify the end of sections and of the work; indeed each distinguishable phrase contains some reference, however poorly defined, to the whole, especially after repeated hearings; and in its melodic and harmonic characteristics, the phrase defines its particular position and its status with respect to the movement or work as a whole. Each phrase also contains some reference to its predecessors, particularly to the phrase directly before it. It may be a repetition, for example, or begin as a repe- 185 DISCUSSIONS, IRASM, 12 (1981), 2, 181-202 tition, only to diverge as it ends, like the answering phrase in the balanced structures with half and full cadences that are so familiar to us. It may form a contrast having relatively little resemblance to what precedes it, as in the Abgesang of a Bar form. Or it may have a complex relationship made up of both similarity and difference, as in the second section of Baroque dances. Extremely common also are motifs, themes, melodic phra- ses, or whole melodies that differ from their initial form in some way, dec- orating, inverting, augmenting it, or changing the rhythm or key or mode. It is not difficult to see in instances of any of these how the meaning of the repetition or transformation or novel configuration depends on what pre- cedes. Indeed in a larger framework, even the meaning of the individuai style of a composer or of a work is constituted by departures from the past or from the style of some other composer or the style of a given genre. This alteration of what is past is not only the source of meaning but the source of the precise quality of the meaning. Matched against the given, the new brings a difference into existence that is measured accurately by the mind, which closely compares the moving specious present of the new with the retained trace of the original. This is the basis of the composer's construction of the new as well as the listener's reception and constitution of it. Anticipation similarly is not limited to the opening of a work, but is more or less present throughout, and in crescendos, accelerations, or tran- sitions to significant restatements of themes, can reach a dramatic intensity. Thus meaning can best be defined by form; the two are paired aspects of the same totality.2 Simultaneously with the production of meaning by partition, another type of division will also reveal relationships of meaning in a fashion that is more continuous and that is not dependent upon the relative similarities and the properties of parts. The inner course of musical feeling can be separated from the audible physical process that accompanies it. The sound then will refer to the feeling that it embodies as an outcome of the process of composition or the process of performance, and to the feeling it provokes the performer and the listener to constitute. All of these inner experiences are ideally the same, but will differ substantially from one another when the performer and listener belong to a later or distant culture or to a different social class than those connected with the work when it was composed. The inner experience follows every detail of the flow of sonority. It is compounded of the sensational and sensuous quality that is directly attached to the sound, the concomitant course of emotive and volitional experience, the dynamic feeling of forward motion, which ranges from languishing to propulsive, and perhaps also of associated ideas and visual images, which represent an external type of meaning. The qualities, feelings, volitional properties, and propulsion are not fully separable from one another; they tend to fuse and interpenetrate. Each instrument and 2 Even the material represented by the musical system possesses form and mean- ing, which can be connected ;(somewhat abstractly) with the nature and history of society. 186 DISCUSSIONS, IRASM, 12 (1981), 2, 181-202 187 each range of pitch and loudness and rapidity contributes its own sphere of feeling to the totality. The trombone, for example, possesses an intrin- sic quality to which the characterization )>reverential and awe-inspiring<< might well be applied, although its association with occasions of religious solemnity and with supernatural figures in opera has reinforced and en- hanced this quality for many generations of composers and listeners. The association may even reach back further, to the use of sackbuts in Renais- sance ceremony and to their depiction in paintings of angelic musicians. Internal meaning is both meaning in the process of forming and mean- ing as already formed; the segments of the work as well as its larger divi- sions and the work as a whole all create not only a dynamic, moving and growing meaning but also a synoptic, static meaning that is synthesized by the retentive powers of audition. It is a striking and essential feature also that many if not all of the components of internal meaning take on an objective as well as a subjective character; they are perceived as belonging to our inner experience and at the same time as belonging to the sound - in the tendencies of the tones and the phenomenal ebb and flow of the course of the music. While we attribute colors to environmental objects and pain to ourselves, music combines both of these localizations.3 What justifies or at least motivates, then, the division of music into sound and feeling, into outer and inner? This division would seem to represent a fundamental tendency of thought, grounded doubtless in perceptual and environmental experience; our successful adjustment to life rests on detecting the significance for our well being of every symptom and physical event around us. We auto- matically connect our reactions with their provocation, and our formative and constituting activities with their external products. In the case of art and music in particular, more than in non-aesthetic experience, we find that our inner experiences appear also outside us,4 as properties of aesthetic objects. But the very institution of the musical audience, of listeners, com- posers, and performers, reinforces the division of music into outer and inner, while the fundamental dualities of Western thought, of object and subject, of body and soul, impose themselves on our experience as a matter of course. And in aesthetics also, we speak of form and content, or more usually now, of form and meaning. The internal reference of part to part and of part to whole, and espe- cially of sound to inner experience, seem to account for the meaningfulness of music, for the fact that it makes sense. They also explain why it has been said so often that music means itself, but also has been said just as often that music has no meaning. The meaning is wedded to the form; they are both aspects of a single experience, both present even in the most ele- mental fcrmulations of sonorous material. But from its very beginning, 3 Strictly speaking, musical properties do not adhere to environmental objects, but to phenomenal ones, which are not localized at all. 4 Cf. footnote 3. DISCUSSIONS, IRASM, 12 (1981), 2, 181-202 this inner meaning is a product of cultural modes of musical perception.' There is a basic constituent of meaning that is universal: the continuity and self-identity of consciousness, the kinesthesis connected with audible rhythm, the variety of auditory and vibratory qualities connected with differences in pitch. But any tonal pattern whatsoever builds on these foundations a cultural mode of organization, a musical style specific to time and place, and may add to this cultural style a further specificity of genre, of person, and of instrument and type of vocal tone. The style of the culture may be entirely foreign to our own, and from this circumstance there arises the necessity of hermeneutics. The value of hermeneutics, however, is another matter. For the mean- ing of music is so idiosyncratic that it cannot be conveyed in language. Words can at best give us a very approximate description, a kind of locus of meaning rather than the meaning itself. And the universally intelligible features of music are only a small part of the whole; their relevance is appreciable only as they enter into the culturally specific meaning of the style. But if verbal description is taken together with the music rather than in place of it, the musical meaning is really changed and made precise. It is impossible to give a description of the meaning without making the meaning conform to it - so eager is music to cling to every suggestion from the outside. This is not to say that the meaning of instrumental music in itself is not precise. It is just that this precision is not amenable to inter- pretation of whatever kind; a new precision created by the description suppresses it and replaces it. Still another approach to musical meaning is provided by a knowledge of other aspects of the culture in which the music was created. These will have some familial similarity to music, they will present kindred modes of thought and expression, and at the same time they will doubtless be easier to comprehend. Ultimately we must rely on the music itself: on listening and perhaps on performing and composing as well. Indeed the performance of some one sensitive to the style of a work is nothing less than a non-verbal hermeneutics. The meaning of music - taken now as the consummation of the experience implied and initiated by its perform- ance - will yield at least in part to a combination of approaches. But full comprehension is possible only to the extent that we can enter into the culture, in imagination if not in fact. There is finally a pragmatic conception of meaning, which looks beyond the original context of the musical work to its subsequent perform- ance and use, to the changing institutions and varied social settings that become its context in turn. And there is another pragmatic determination of meaning in the history of the criticism of the work, in which the insuffi- ciency of verbal description is somehow dignified by its inclusion in a his- torical succession of attitudes, probably because we then almost auto- 5 I have treated the interrelationship of form, meaning, and style in detail in A Humanistic Philosophy of Music, New York 1977, Ch. 3-5. 188 189 189 matically take the interpreter and his social milieu into consideration. Hermeneutics is made more precise; and it is made more relevant as part of a broader kind of meaning. A third type of pragmatics is comprised by the musical works that refer to or are derived from a given work. These also belong to a historically broadened conception of musical meaning, and they in turn are subject to a verbal interpretation. In principle, the accre- tion of meaning never ceases, since each interpretation itself calls for interpretation. Edward A. LIPPMAN New York LE DISCOURS DES COMPOSITEURS En vue d'un travail plus important, portant sur >>la creation dans la musique contemporaine<<, des entretiens ont ete realises avec quatre vingts compositeurs d'origine et de tendances diverses, entretiens axes sur la phase pr6cedant la concretisation. A travers le >>discours<< de ces musiciens sur la representation qu'ils se font de leur travail d'elaboration, apparais- sent des differences de vues, determinees par un certain nombre de fac- teurs: - la tranche d'age: ainsi, les compositeurs de plus de cinquante ans qui, dans l'immediate apres-guerre, ont vecu la periode post-serielle, pensent autrement que ceux de trente ans, qui sont arrives lorsque ces problemes etaient deja depasses. - le type de formation: jusqu'a une epoque recente, la plupart des musiciens-createur,s se cantonnaient dans le domaine qui leur est specifi- que, et faisaient des etudes dans les seuls ,conservatoires; mais desormais, on rencontre de plus en plus de compositeurs ayant regu d'une part une formation musicale, et d'autre part une autre, dans un domaine totaleinent etranger: physique, lettres, philosophie..., ce qui les amene a aborder les problemes de la composition en d'autres termes que les ,>purs musi, ciens<, parce que leurs etudes ont developpe en eux des modes de pensee dissemblables. -les choix: l'apparition dans le champ du musical des magnetopho- nes, generateurs et autres appareils destines a produire des sons in-ois, possedant une ?texture<< singuliere, a fait surgir un type de compositeur procedant, sur le plan de l'Slaboration, autrement que celui qui ecrit de la musique instrumentale. Les choses deviennent encore plus complexes avec l'ordinateur considere en tant que producteur de sons. - les origines ethniques/culturelles: en effet, ,il semblerait que le mode de pensee des Franqais soit different de celui des >autres<< (terme matically take the interpreter and his social milieu into consideration. Hermeneutics is made more precise; and it is made more relevant as part of a broader kind of meaning. A third type of pragmatics is comprised by the musical works that refer to or are derived from a given work. These also belong to a historically broadened conception of musical meaning, and they in turn are subject to a verbal interpretation. In principle, the accre- tion of meaning never ceases, since each interpretation itself calls for interpretation. Edward A. LIPPMAN New York LE DISCOURS DES COMPOSITEURS En vue d'un travail plus important, portant sur >>la creation dans la musique contemporaine<<, des entretiens ont ete realises avec quatre vingts compositeurs d'origine et de tendances diverses, entretiens axes sur la phase pr6cedant la concretisation. A travers le >>discours<< de ces musiciens sur la representation qu'ils se font de leur travail d'elaboration, apparais- sent des differences de vues, determinees par un certain nombre de fac- teurs: - la tranche d'age: ainsi, les compositeurs de plus de cinquante ans qui, dans l'immediate apres-guerre, ont vecu la periode post-serielle, pensent autrement que ceux de trente ans, qui sont arrives lorsque ces problemes etaient deja depasses. - le type de formation: jusqu'a une epoque recente, la plupart des musiciens-createur,s se cantonnaient dans le domaine qui leur est specifi- que, et faisaient des etudes dans les seuls ,conservatoires; mais desormais, on rencontre de plus en plus de compositeurs ayant regu d'une part une formation musicale, et d'autre part une autre, dans un domaine totaleinent etranger: physique, lettres, philosophie..., ce qui les amene a aborder les problemes de la composition en d'autres termes que les ,>purs musi, ciens<, parce que leurs etudes ont developpe en eux des modes de pensee dissemblables. -les choix: l'apparition dans le champ du musical des magnetopho- nes, generateurs et autres appareils destines a produire des sons in-ois, possedant une ?texture<< singuliere, a fait surgir un type de compositeur procedant, sur le plan de l'Slaboration, autrement que celui qui ecrit de la musique instrumentale. Les choses deviennent encore plus complexes avec l'ordinateur considere en tant que producteur de sons. - les origines ethniques/culturelles: en effet, ,il semblerait que le mode de pensee des Franqais soit different de celui des >autres<< (terme