INTHEHIGHCOURTOFJUDICATUREATBOMBAY CIVILAPPELLATEJURISDICTION WRITPETITIONNO.4524OF2008 GaneshRambhauKhalale ..... V/s TheStateofMaharashtraOrs.... Mr.AnilMardikar,Adv.Forthepetitioner. Mr.AbhayPatki,AGPfortheState. CORAM:S.B.MHASE,A.P.DESHPANDE AND P.B.VARALE,JJJ. DATED:7thJANUARY,2009. ORALJUDGMENT:(perA.P.Deshpande,J.

) Having noticed divergent views expressed in two judgments delivered by coordinate Benches of this Court the instant writ petitionsarereferredtothisbenchofthreeJudgeswhichinvolvea common question of law. The reference is in relation to grant or refusal of protection to candidates appointed or admitted prior to 20.11.2000againstthepostsreservedforscheduledtribe/scheduled caste category of the backward class on cancellation of their .... .... Petitioner Respondents

caste/tribecertificatespursuanttotheverificationofcasteclaimby theScrutinyCommittee.Beforeweproceedtodealwiththerelevant issueitwouldbeappropriatetorefertotheviewstakeninthetwo judgments. The judgment first in point of time is inWrit Petition No.853of2007(UnionofIndia&Ors.V/s DeepakY. Gotefode ) 2008(1)Mh.L.J.790. Therespondentinthesaidwritpetitionwas appointed as lower division clerk against a post reserved for scheduledtribe. Inclause20oftheletterofappointmentissuedto the respondent it was specifically stated that the appointment was provisionalandwassubjecttocaste/tribeverification. Theletterof appointmentmadeitfurtherclearthatifthecastecertificateisfound to be false, the services of the respondent would be liable to be terminatedwithoutassigninganyreason. Acopyofthecaste/tribe certificate was forwarded tothe CasteScrutiny Committee, Nagpur and despite repeated demands from the Committee the respondent did not produce the original certificate. Hence ultimately on consideration of all the relevant factors the caste/tribe certificate came to be cancelled and confiscated, on the basis of which the

respondent had sought the appointment. Aggrieved thereby the respondent filed an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal and the Central Administrative Tribunal havingallowedthesame,theUnionofIndiapreferredwritpetitionin theHighCourtwhichinturnwasallowedbytheHighCourtquashing thejudgmentandorderpassedbytheTribunal.Whilereversingthe judgmentoftheTribunaltheHighCourtheldthattherespondenthad soughttheappointmentbymisrepresentationandhencecannotbe permittedtotakeadvantageofhisownwrong.Itisalsoheldthatas the appointmentwas procured by playing fraud by producing false castecertificatetherespondentcannotbesaidtobeholdingthepost withinthemeaningofarticle311oftheConstitutionofIndia. The saidappointmenthasbeenheldtobevoidsinceitsinception.While allowing the application the Tribunal had placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in the case of State of Maharashtrav/sMilind &Ors., 2001(1)Mh.L.J.(SC)1AIR2001 SC393andhadheldthattherespondent(beforetheHighCourt)was entitledtothereliefprayedfor.

2.

ThelaterDivisionBenchjudgmentisinWritPetitionNo.3980

of2006alongwithbatchofotherconnectedwritpetitionsinthecase of Prashant Haribhau Khawas v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors. 2008(2)Mh.L.J.322whereintheDivisionBenchhasconsideredthe issue of grant of protection to number of petitioners in relation to appointmentsinthelightoftheobservationsmadebytheSupreme Court inthecaseof StateofMaharashtra v/s Milind&Ors. The DivisionBenchhasdecidedthequestioninfavourofthepetitioners before it and granted protection to the appointments by placing relianceontheobservationsmadebytheSupremeCourtinpara36of thesaidjudgment.TheDivisionBenchafternoticingthefactthatall the petitioners were appointed prior to the date of the judgment renderedbytheSupremeCourtinStateofMaharashtrav/sMilindit heldthatthepetitionersareentitledtotheprotectionsoughtfor.The DivisionBenchhasalsoheldthatobservationsmadeinpara36ofthe said judgment is `Law declared by the Supreme Court' and hence proceededtofollowthesame. Thusinsubstancetwofoldfindings arerecorded:

(1)

ThattheobservationsmadebytheSupremeCourtin

para36istheratiodecidendihenceconstruedthesameas`Law declaredbytheSupremeCourt' andfollowedit. (2) ThatthejudgmentoftheSupremeCourtinthecase

of StateofMaharashtra v/s Milind operatesprospectivelyand notretrospectivelyandhencealladmissionsandappointments thathavebecomefinalonthedateofthejudgmentshallremain unaffectedandthusneedtobeprotected. ForproperunderstandingofthedisputewereproducePara36inthe caseofStateV/sMilindhereinbelow: 36. RespondentNo.1jointedthemedicalcourseforthe year198586. Almost15yearshavepassedbynow. Weare told he has already completed the course and may be he is practicingasdoctor.Inthisviewandatthislengthoftimeitis for nobody's benefit to annulhis admission. Hugeamount is spentoneachcandidateforcompletionofmedicalcourse. No doubt,oneScheduledTribecandidatewasdeprivedofjoining medicalcoursebytheadmissiongiventorespondentNo.1. If

any action is taken against respondent No.1, it may lead deprivingtheserviceofadoctortothesocietyonwhompublic money has already been spent. In these circumstances, this judgment shall notaffectthedegree obtained byhimand his practicing as a doctor. But we make it clear that he cannot claim to belong to the Scheduled Tribe covered by the Scheduled Tribes Order. In other words, he cannot take advantageoftheScheduledTribesOrderanyfurtherorforany otherconstitutionalpurpose. Havingregardtothepassageof time, in the given circumstances, including interim orders passedbythisCourtinSLP(C)No.16372/85andotherrelated affairs,wemakeitclearthattheadmissionsandappointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment. 3. ThreewritpetitionsareplacedbeforethisFullBench,twoof

which pertain to seeking protection of appointments whereas one relatestoadmission.Itisundisputedthatallthethreepetitionersare appointed/admittedpriortothedateoftheSupremeCourtjudgment,

the date being 28.11.2000. Besides deciding the above referred questionthelaterDivisionBenchhasalsoconsideredthequestionof grantofprotectiontoappointmentsmadeoradmissionsgrantedprior to15.6.1995inthelightoftheGovernmentResolutionbutthisissue hasnotbeenarguedbeforeusasinthefactsofthepresentpetitionsit does not arise for consideration, as the petitioners are appointed/admittedafter15.6.95,viz.thecutofdate,henceweare notcalledupontodecidethesaidquestion. 4. TheDivisionBenchhasheldthattheSupremeCourthasmade

its judgment prospectively operational and has protected all the admissionsandappointmentswhichhadattainedfinality. Inother words,whathasbeenheldinthejudgmentisthattheobservations madeinpara36bytheConstitutionBenchoftheSupremeCourtis theratio decidendi whichwouldbindalltheCourtsinviewofthe mandateofArticle141oftheConstitutionofIndia,itbeingthelaw declaredbytheSupremeCourt. Beforeweproceedtoexamine the correctnessofthesaidfindingweformulatethequestionthatneeds anadjudication.

(1)

Whethertheobservationsmadeordirectionsissued

by the Supreme Court in para 36 in the case of State of Maharashtrav/sMilind,reportedin2001(1)Mh.L.J.(SC)1 (para 38SCC) is declaration of law under Article 141 of the ConstitutionofIndiawhichisbindingonalltheCourtsorare the said observations made/directions issued in exercise of powersunderArticle142whichonlyprotectthepetitionersin thatcaseinthefactsandcircumstancestherein. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have

submittedthatallthepetitionershavesecuredemploymentpriorto 28.11.2000 on which date the Constitution Bench of the Supreme CourtdeliveredthejudgmentinMilind' scase(supra)overrulingthe judgmentofDivisionBenchoftheBombayHighCourtdeliveredon 4.9.1985. The petitioners had obtained the caste/tribe certificates showingthemtobebelongingHalbascheduledtribe. Howeversaid certificates are invalidated by orders passed by the Caste Scrutiny Committeeasstatedhereinabove.Itiscontendedthatbasedonthe observationsmadeinpara36ofthejudgmentinMilind's case(supra)

variousordersarepassedbythisCourtextendingprotectiontothe appointmentsinterpretingthe saidobservationsaslayingdown the law. Our attention is also invited to many orders passed by the Supreme Court as well, protecting the appointments and/or admissionsgrantedtothecandidates.Thebasicissuewhicharises forconsiderationisastowhethertheobservationsmade/directions issued bytheConstitutionBenchoftheSupremeCourtinStateof MaharashtraV/sMilindisdeclarationoflawbySupremeCourtwhich shallbebindingonallCourtsorwhetherthesaidobservationsarein exercise of discretionary powers vested under article 142 of the ConstitutionofIndia. Iftheobservationsinpara36areheldtobe law declared by the Supreme Court the present petitioner' s appointments/admissionswouldstandprotected.Howeverifthesaid observations/directions are held to be issued pursuant to the exercise of jurisdiction under article 142 which power is only available to the Supreme Court, the petitioner's appointments/admissionscannotbeprotectedbythisCourt. Letus examinetheSupremeCourtjudgmentswhichfavourthesubmissions

madeonbehalfofthepetitioners,interpretingthejudgmentinState of Maharashtra v/s Milind. The first judgment is in the case of R.VishwanathaPillaiv/sStateofKerala&Ors.,reportedin(2004) 20SCC105. InthiscasetheSupremeCourtwasconsideringthe casesofappointmentssoalsoadmissionswhichweredisposedofbya commonjudgmentbytheHighCourt.Dealingwiththeappointments theSupremeCourthasheldthatapersonprocuringanappointment inthepostmeantforreservedcategorycandidateonthebasisoffalse caste certificate is not a person holding a civil post within the meaningofarticle311andassuchtheappointmenthasbeenheldto benoappointmentintheeyeoflaw.Whiledealingwithadmissions theSupremeCourtobservedinpara28thus: 28. In this case we find that the appellant had joined RegionalEngineeringCollegeintheyear1992. Hecompleted the course of his studies in the year 1996 under the interim ordersof(sic theHigh)Courtwhichweresubjecttothefinal orderstobepassedinthewritpetition. Nopurposewouldbe servedinwithholdingthedeclarationoftheresultonthebasis

10

oftheexaminationalreadytakenbyhimordeprivinghimofthe degree in case he passes the examination. In terms of the orderspassedbytheConstitutionBenchofthisCourtinStateof Maharashtrav.Milindwedirectthathisresultbedeclaredand hebeallowedtotakehisdegreewiththeconditionthathewill notbetreatedasaScheduledCastecandidateinfutureeitherin obtaining service or for any other benefits flowing from the castecertificateobtainedbyhim.Hiscastecertificatehasbeen ordered to be cancelled. Henceforth, hewill be treatedas a personbelongingtothegeneralcategoryforallpurposes. 6. The next judgment is in the case of Sanjay Madhusudan

Punekarv/sStateofMaharashtra&Ors.2002(2)Mh.L.J.SC300. TheorderpassedbytheSupremeCourtisveryshortandthesame readsthus: Leavegranted. ThisCourt hasnowdecidedthequestionoflawagainst theappellant.Atthesametimeithastakennoticeofpassageof time and, therefore, made its order prospective, keeping

11

unaffected appointments that had become final. This is an appropriatecaseinwhichto applythesameprinciplehaving regard to the fact that the appointment of the appellant was made long back. Therefore, the only order that needs to be made is to say that the judgment of this Court in State v/s Milind&Ors,2001(1)Mh.L.J.SC(1)=2001(1)SCC4shall notaffecttheappointmentoftheappellant. Orderontheappealaccordingly. Noorderastocosts. 7. Thethirdjudgmentrelieduponbythelearnedcounselforthe

petitioner is in the case of Central Warehouse Corpn. V/s Jagdishkumar Vitthalrao Panjankar & Anr.in SLP (C) No.25644/2004whereinitwasobservedasunder: TheappellantclaimsthatthoughhebelongstoaKoshtis, thesubcasteoftheHalbaScheduledTribe.Thequestioncame upbeforetheBombayHighCourtthatwhetherKoshtisisasub casteofHalbaornot,thisquestionwasdecidedbytheBombay High Court anditwasheldthat KoshtisissubcasteofHalba

12

(ST) and every Koshtis may be treated as a Halba (1987 MaharashtraLawJournal572).Thismattercameupinspecial leave petition before this Court and this Court reserved the judgmentandtooktheviewthattheKoshtisisnotasubcasteof Halba.However,whiledisposingofthatappealtheirLordships saidinlasttwolineswhichreads: We make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffectedbythisjudgment. TheConstitutionBenchmadeitveryclearthatthose whohavebeengivenbenefitofbeingasaKoshtissubcasteof HalbaSTcategorytheirappointmentsthoughbadshallnotbe disturbed. Thereafter, many matters followed and learned counsel invited our attention tovarious orders passed bythis Courtfromtimetotimewhereinliberalviewhad beentaken thatthosewhohavebeengivenbenefitsshallnotberevoked buttheywillnotbeentitledtobenefitinfuture. Similaristhe positionherealsointhepresentcase.

13

8.

Thenextjudgmentisinthecaseof PunjabNationalBank&

Anr. V/s Vilass/oGovindraoBokade&Anr.,2007(3)Mh.L.J.SC 805. Thisjudgmentneedstobedealtwithmoreelaborately.Inthe factsofthesaidcasetherespondentwasabankemployeewhowas appointedintheyear1989onareservedpostofscheduledtribe.The respondentwasclaimingtobebelongingtoHalbaScheduledTribe. OninvalidationofhiscastecertificatebytheScrutinyCommitteehe was terminated from the service in the year 2002. The said respondentfiledwritpetitionintheHighCourtchallengingtheorder passedbytheScrutinyCommitteeinvalidatinghistribeclaim. The bank employee had put forth two contentions viz; (i) that he is protectedbytheGovernmentResolutiondated15.6.1995thedecision whereinisreiteratedinthesubsequentGovernmentResolutiondated 30.6.2004 and (ii)that his appointment stands protected by the decisionoftheConstitutionBenchoftheSupremeCourtinthecaseof State v/s Milind. Relianceis placed primarily ontheobservations madeinpara36. TheBenchcomprisedoftwolearnedJudgeswho havedeliveredseparatejudgments. JusticeH.K.Semahasheldthat

14

the appointment ofthe bankemployee isprotectedbyGovernment Resolutiondated15.6.95.Howeverthesaidjudgmentdoesnotdeal withthebindingnatureoftheobservationsmadeinthecaseofState v/sMilind.TheotherlearnedJudgeShriV.S.Sirpurkarhasrefrained fromdecidingthequestion,astowhetherthebankemployeestands protected under the Government Resolution dated 15.6.95 but has concluded that the concerned employee's appointment stands protectedinviewoftheobservationsmadeinthecaseof State v/s Milind.Itisobservedthus: 5. Itisnotnecessaryforustoconsiderthequestionas

to whetherprotection providedin the Government Resolution dated 15.6.1995 is applicable to a bank employee like the respondentsincetheprotectionisprovidedinMilind's caseinno uncertainterms.Thiscourthasveryspecificallyobservedatthe endofpara38asunder: Havingregardtothepassageoftime,inthegiven circumstances, including interim orders passed by this Court in SLP (C)No.16372/85 and other related affairs,

15

we make it clear that the admissions and appointments that have become final, shall remain unaffected by this judgment. (Thiswasofcourseafterdiscussingthefactualsituationinthat caseandparticularlynothingtheprejudicethatcouldbecaused totherespondentMilindinviewoftheperiodof15yearsspent infinalizingtheissueofhiscastestatus.) 7. ....... ...... ..... Therefore it was tried to be

suggestedbeforeusthattheobservationswereapplicabletothat particularcaseandthefactstherein.Ordinarilywewouldhave beenpersuaded toacceptthe argument. However fortunately forrespondentthisobservationwaslateronrelieduponbythis CourtinanotherdecisioninCivilAppealNo.3375/2000(arising out of SLP (C) No.6524/88) dated 12.12.2000 wherein this Courtobserved: The appellant having belonged to Koshti caste claimedtobeincludedintheScheduledtribeofHalbaand obtainedanappointmentasAssistantEngineer.Whenhis

16

appointmentwassoughttobeterminatedonthebasisthat hedidnotbelongtoscheduledtribebytheGovernmentin awritpetitionwasfiledbeforetheHighCourtchallenging thatorderwhichwasallowed.Thatorderisquestionedin thisappeal.Thequestionsarisinginthiscasearecovered bythedecisioninStateof Maharashtravs.Milind&Ors. 2000(7)Scale628andwasgottobeallowed,however, the benefits derived till now shall be available to the appellant to theeffect that his appointment as Assistant Engineershallstandprotectedbutnofurther.Theappeal isdisposedofaccordingly. 8. The situation is no different in case of the present

respondent. He also came to be appointed and/or promoted waybackintheyear1989onthebasisofhiscastecertificate whichdeclaredhimtobeScheduledTribe. Ultimatelyitwas found that since a Koshti does not get the status of a ScheduledTribe,theCasteScrutinyCommitteeinvalidatedthe saidcertificateholdingthatrespondentwasaKoshtiandnota

17

Halba.Imusthastentoaddthatthereisnofindingintheorder of castescrutinycommitteethatthepetitionerlackedinbona fides in getting the certificate. I say that to overcome the observationsinpara21in SanjayNimje's case. Butitisnota casewheretherespondentpleadedandprovedbonafide. 9. Under such circumstances the High Court was fully

justified in relying on the observations made in Milind's case. TheHighCourthasnotreferredtothejudgmentandorderin CivilAppealNo.3375of2000decidedon12.12.2000towhicha referencehasbeenmadeabove. However,itisclearthatthe HighCourtwasrightinholdingthattheobservationsinMilind's caseapplytothecaseofthepresentrespondentandhestands protectedthereby. Itisvehementlycontendedonthebasisofabovereferredjudgments thatthejudgmentinthecaseofStatev/sMilindhasonlyprospective operationandall appointments and admissionswhich had attained finalitypriortothedateofdeliveryofthejudgmentinthesaidcase standprotected.

18

9.

Now, let us examine the judgments which take the contrary

view. Inthecaseof BankofIndia v/s AvinashMandvikar,2005 (4)Mh.L.J.SC409.AnappealwascarriedtotheSupremeCourtby BankofIndiaaggrievedbythejudgmentoftheHighCourtgranting protection to the respondentemployee on equitable considerations and by placing reliance upon the decision in the case of State v/s Milind.Theemployeehadjoinedthebankintheyear1976inapost thatwasreservedbyscheduledtribecandidate.Thecastecertificate of the employee was referred to the scrutiny committee for verificationandthescrutinycommitteehadrejectedthecasteclaimof the employee. Thereafter various proceedings were taken up including writ petitions in the High Court at the behest of the employeeandthematterwasremandedtwicetotheCasteScrutiny Committee. Ultimatelythe Committeeinvalidatedthe claim of the employee. Acting on the said decision of the Caste Scrutiny Committeechargesofmisconductwereframedagainsttheemployee andadepartmentalinquirywasconducted whichculminatedinhis dismissalfrom servicewhichorderwaschallengedbeforetheHigh

19

Courtsuccessfully. ReversingthejudgmentoftheHighCourtthe SupremeCourthasinnouncertaintermsheldthattheemployeehad obtainedtheappointmentintheserviceonthebasisthathebelonged to scheduled tribe and when the Scrutiny Committee has recorded clear finding that he did not belong to scheduled tribe, the very foundation of his appointmentcollapses andhis appointment is no appointmentintheeyeoflaw. Therelevantobservationsfindplace inpara6ofthejudgmentwhichreadasunder: 6. RespondentNo.1employeeobtainedappointmentin

theserviceonthe basisthathe belongedto Scheduled Tribe. WhentheclearfindingoftheScrutinyCommitteeisthathedid not belong to Scheduled Tribe, the very foundation of his appointmentcollapsesandhisappointmentisnoappointmentin theeyesoflaw.Thereisabsolutelynojustificationforhisclaim in respect of post he usurped, as the same was meant for reservedcandidate. In the said case the employee had put in nearly three decades of serviceandhadonlyleftaboutthreeyearsforhisretirement.Despite

20

thesametheSupremeCourthasallowedtheappealbyholdingthata person who has obtained an appointment by illegitimate means cannotbepermittedtoenjoythesameashehasnoiotaofrighteven to be considered for the appointment. The Supreme Court has distinguished the judgment in State v/s Milind in recording the abovereferredfindings. 10. The next judgment is in the case of Additional General

Manager, Human Resource, BHEL Ltd. v/s Suresh Ramkrishna Burde.,2007(4)Mh.L.J.1.Thesaidjudgmentisalsointhesameset of facts wherein the employee was appointed on the basis of false castecertificate andthe questionwas as towhether could such an employeebepermittedtoretainthebenefitofwrongcommittedby him.AnsweringinthenegativetheSupremeCourtheldthatsuchan employeeisliabletobeterminatedfromservice.Inthiscaseaswell theemployeehadclaimedtobebelongingtoHalbascheduledtribe andhadgottheappointmentonsubmissionofacastecertificateto thateffect. ThecastecertificatewasreferredtotheCasteScrutiny Committee and the Caste Scrutiny Committee invalidated that

21

certificatesubmittedbytheemployee.Whileallowingthepetitionof the employee the High Court had held that the judgment of the SupremeCourtinStatev/sMilindisnotthejudgmentpertainingto thatcasebutisasettledlaw.Whiledealingwiththesaidjudgment inStatev/sMilindtheSupremeCourtinpara7observedthus: 7. TheHighCourthasgrantedrelieftotherespondent

and has directed his reinstatement only on the basis of Constitution Bench decision of this Court in State of Maharashtravs.Milindandothers,2001(1)Mh.L.J.(SC)1= (2001)1SCC4 inouropinionthesaidjudgment does notlay downanysuchprincipleoflawthatwhereapersonsecuresan appointmentbyproducingafalsecastecertificate,hisservices canbeprotectedandanorderofreinstatementcanbepassedif he gives an undertaking that in future he and his family members shall not take any advantage of being member of a castewhichisinreservedcategory. Intheconcludingpartofpara7theSupremeCourtobserved: ThelawdeclaredbytheConstitutionBenchdoesnotatall

22

lay down that where a person secures an appointment by producingafalsecastecertificate,hisservicescanbeprotected onhisgivinganundertakingthatinfuturehewillnottakeany advantageofbeingamemberofthereservedcategory. TheSupremeCourthasfurtherobservedinpara8that: 8. After interpreting the relevant constitutional or

statutoryprovisionsandlayingdownthelaw,itisalwaysopen toaCourttomouldthereliefwhichmayappeartobejustand properinthefactsandcircumstancesofthecase. Thus the observation made in para 36 of judgment in the case of State v/s Milind have been read and explained in this judgment as mouldingofreliefinviewofthefactsofthesaidcaseobviouslyin exerciseofdiscretionunderArticle142oftheConstitutionofIndia. 11. The next judgment is in the case of Union of India v/s

DattatrayaNamdeoMendhekar&Ors.,2008(2)Mh.L.J.720.This threeJudgesjudgmentgoestoexplainthedecisionoftheConstitution Bench in the case of State v/s Milind and concludes that the said judgment has no application to the cases relating to securing

23

employment by wrongly seeking benefit of reservation meant for scheduledtribe.Italsoheldthatinsuchcasesthepropercoursetobe followedistocanceltheappointmentobtainedonthebasisoffalse certificatesothatsamecanbefilledinbyacandidateentitledtothe benefitofreservation. Afternarratingthecircumstancesinwhich the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court protected the degree obtainedbythecandidateitisexplainedthus: In these peculiar circumstances, this Court held that the decision will not affected the degree secured by respondentorhispracticeasadoctorbutmadeitclearthat hecouldnotclaimtobelongtoaScheduledTribe. Butthe said decision has no application to a case which does not relate to an admission to an educational institution, but relates to securing employment by wrongly claiming the benefitofreservationmeantforScheduledTribes. Whena person secures employment by making a false claim regarding caste/tribe, he deprives a legitimate candidate belongingtoscheduledcaste/tribe,ofemployment.Insucha

24

situation, the proper course is to cancel the employment obtainedonthebasisofthefalsecertificatesothatthepost maybefilledupbyacandidatewhoisentitledtothebenefit ofreservation. Thejudgmentsinthecaseof BankofIndia v/s AvinashMandvikar and Additional General Manager, Human Resource, BHEL Ltd. v/s Suresh Ramkrishna Burde (supra) have been quoted with approval andreliedupon.Thelastjudgmentonwhichrelianceisplacedbythe learned counsel for the respondent is in the case of Yogesh Ramchandra Naikwadi v/s State of Maharashtra & Ors.2008(3) AllMR835. ThisjudgmentoftheSupremeCourtdirectlyconsiders the question raised in the presentwrit petitions inas much asthe SupremeCourthascategoricallyheldthattheobservationsinpara38 (SCC)(Para36inMah.L.J.)inthecaseofStatev/sMilindareinthe natureofmouldingthereliefinexerciseofitspowersunderArticle 142oftheConstitutionofIndia. Thesaidobservationsin Statev/s Milindhavebeenheldnottobethe ratiodecidendi butissuanceof direction after considering the equities by having recourse to the

25

jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The SupremeCourtafterreferringtothejudgmentinthecaseofStatev/s Milindhasobservedthus: 5. In Milind, the question was whether the first

respondent who belonged to `Koshti'caste could claim the benefitofSTreservationonthegroundthatitwasasubtribeof `Halba' (EntryNo.19inPartIXoftheConstitution(Scheduled Tribes)Order,195). ThisCourtheldthat`Koshti' wasnota partoftheScheduledTribeofHalbaandthattheentiresinthe ScheduledTribesOrdercouldnotbeamendedorexpandedby any Authority. As a consequence, the State'sappeal was allowed and the claim of first respondent therein that he belongedtoascheduledtribewasrejected.Havingallowedthe State's appeal,thisCourtmouldedthereliefinexerciseofits power under Article 142 by permitting the first respondent therein to retain the benefit of his degree (for the reasons extracted above). Vishwanatha Pillai merely followedMilind. InMilind,therewasabonafidedoubtastowhether`Halba

26

Koshti' couldbeconsideredas`Halba'. InVishwanathaPillai, the candidate's caste certificate was cancelled merely as a consequence of cancellation of his father' caste certificate. s Thus in Milind and Vishwanatha Pillai, the candidates apparently believed that they belonged to a scheduled tribe/caste when they sought admission and were admitted. Further,theircastecertificatesshowingthemasbelongingtoa scheduledtribe/castehadnotbeeninvalidatedwhentheywere admittedtothecourse. Thedirectioninbothcasespermitting retentionofdegreewasinexerciseofpowerunderArticle142 oftheConstitution. 6. There may however be cases where it will not be

propertopermitthestudenttoretainthedegreeobtainedby making afalseclaim. Oneexampleiswherethecandidates secure seats by producing forged or fake caste certificates. Theremaybecases,whereknowingfullwellthattheydonot belongtoascheduledtribe/castecandidatesmaymakeafalse claimthattheybelongtoascheduledtribe/caste.Theremay

27

alsobecaseswhereevenbeforethedateofadmission,thecaste certificates of the candidates might have been invalidated on verification of the Scrutiny Committee. There may be cases where the admissions may be in pursuance of interim orders grantedbycourtssubjecttofinaldecisionmakingitclearthat the candidate will not be entitled to claim, any equities by reasonof theadmission. Thebenefitextendedin Milind and Vishwanatha Pillaicannotobviouslybeextendeduniformlyto allsuchcases.Eachcasemayhavetobeconsideredonitsown merits. Further what has precedential value is the ratio decidendi of the decision and not the direction issued while mouldingthereliefinexerciseofpowerunderArticle142on thespecialfactsandcircumstancesofacase.Wearetherefore of the view that Milind and Vishwanatha Pillai cannot be considered as laying down a proposition that in every case whereacandidate' scaseclaimisrejectedbyacasteverification committee, the candidate should invariably be permitted to retainthebenefitoftheadmissionandtheconsequentialdegree,

28

irrespectiveofthefacts. (emphasissupplied) 12. Aftercarefulconsiderationofthejudgmentsreferredtoherein

above it is noticed that three of the judgments need elaborate consideration as they clearly deal with thequestion raised in these writpetitions. Thefirstjudgmentisinthecaseof PunjabNational Bank&Anr.V/sVilass/oGovindraoBokade&Anr. Inthesaidcase therespondentwasabankemployeeappointedintheyear1989ina reservedpostforscheduledtribe.Therespondentwasclaimingtobe belonging to `Halba' scheduled tribe. On invalidation of his caste certificatebytheCasteScrutinyCommitteehewasterminatedfrom service.AggrievedbytheterminationtheorderoftheCasteScrutiny CommitteewaschallengedbyfilingwritpetitionintheHighCourt andtwofoldsubmissionsweremade(i)thathewasprotectedbythe Government Resolution dated 15.6.95 and (ii)that his appointment was protected by the decision of the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in State v/s Milind. The Bench comprised of two learnedJudgeswhodeliveredseparatejudgments.JusticeH.K.Sema

29

hasheldthattheappointmentofthebankemployeeisprotectedby Government Resolution dated 15.6.1995. However said judgment doesnotdealwiththebindingnatureoftheobservationsmadeinthe caseof Statevs.Milind. TheotherlearnedJudgeShriV.S.Sirpurkar hasrefrainedfromdecidingthesaidquestionastowhetherthebank employee stands protected under the Government Resolution dated 15.6.1995 but has concluded that the concerned employee' s appointmentstandsprotectedinviewoftheobservationsmadeinthe caseofStatevsMilind.ThelearnedJudgeinhisseparatejudgment observedthus: Thereforeitwastriedtobesuggestedbeforeusthatthe observationswereapplicabletothatparticularcaseandthefacts therein.Ordinarilywewouldhavebeenpersuadedtoacceptthe arguments.However....... ....... ....... Intheconcludingpartofpara9thelearnedJudgeheldthattheHigh Court was right in holding that the observations in Milind'scase applied to the case of present respondent and he stands protected thereby. It is thus clear that one of the learned Judge in Punjab

30

National Bank'scase has by necessary implication held that the observationsmadebytheSupremeCourtinpara36inthecaseof StatevsMilind isadeclarationoflawwithinthemeaningof141of theConstitutionofIndiaandthusbinding. Thenextjudgmentisin thecaseof UnionofIndiavs DattatrayaNamdeoMendhekar&Ors. ThesaidjudgmentisdeliveredbytheDivisionBenchofthreeJudges of the Supreme Court which goes to explain the decision of the ConstitutionBenchinthecaseofStatevsMilindanditiscategorically statedthereinthatthejudgmentinStatevsMilindhasnoapplication tothecasesrelatingtosecuringemploymentbywrongfullyseeking benefitofreservationmeantfor scheduled tribe. It isfurtherheld thatthepropercoursetobefollowedinsuchcasesistocancelthe appointmentobtainedonthebasisoffalsecastecertificate.Itisheld inthisjudgmentthathavingallowedtheState's appeal(inStatevs. Milind) the Court moulded the relief in exercise of powers under Article142bypermittingthefirstrespondenttoretainthebenefitof thedegree.Hadtheobservations/directionscontainedinpara36in StatevsMilindbeenadeclarationoflawbytheConstitutionBenchof

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theSupremeCourtthreeJudgesBenchwouldnothavedilutedthe ratiolaiddownin Statevs.Milind, asitisobservedinthecaseof State vs. Milind that the admissions and appointments that have becomefinalshallremainunaffectedbythesaidjudgment.Thevery factthatthoseobservationshavebeenexplainedsoastomeanthat they would only apply to the cases of admissions and not the appointments it is implicitly made crystal clear that the observations/directionsin Statevs.Milind ashavingbeenissuedin exerciseofdiscretionarypowerandjurisdictionunderArticle142of theConstitutionofIndia.ThelastjudgmentisinthecaseofYogesh RamchandraNaikwadiv/sStateofMaharashtra&Ors.Thisjudgment istheonlyjudgmentwhichdirectlydealswiththequestionraisedin thepresentwritpetition. InthiscasetheSupremeCourthasinno uncertaintermsheldthatthedirectionsissuedinthecaseofStatevs Milind andinthecaseof R.VishwanathaPillai vs StateofKerala& Ors.havebeensoissuedinexerciseofpowersunderarticle142of the Constitution of India. It is also held that the said observations/directionsdonotconstitute ratiodecidendi butarethe

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directionsissuedwhilemouldingthereliefinexerciseofpowerunder Article142onthespecialfactsandcircumstancesofthecase. This judgmentinYogeshRamchandraNaikwadi's caseputsthecontroversy beyondanyperilofdoubtandconcludesthequestionraised. 13. Havingregardtothelegalpositionthatemergesfromtheabove

referredjudgmentswerecordthefollowingconclusionsandanswer thequestionframed: 1)The observations/directions issued by the Supreme Court in para 36 of the judgment in the case of State V/s Milind reportedin2001(1)Mah.L.J.SC1isnotthe`lawdeclaredby the Supreme Court' under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 2)The said observations/directions are issued in exercise of powersunderArticle142oftheConstitution. 3)The said observations/directions have no application to the casesrelatingtoappointmentsandarerestrictedtothecases relatingtoadmissions. 4)The protection, if any, to be granted in the facts and

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circumstancesofthecasewoulddependupontheexerciseof discretion by the Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. As the powers under Article 142 are not availabletotheHighCourtnoprotectioncanbegrantedby thisCourtevenincasesrelatingtoadmissions. 14. IntheresultweholdthatthejudgmentoftheDivisionBenchin

thecaseof UnionofIndiavs.Deepak Y. Gotefode, 2008(1)Mh.L.J. 790laysdowncorrectpositionoflawandwefurtherhold,withdue respect to the learned Judges that the judgment in the case of PrashantHaribhauKhawasv/sStateofMaharashtra&Ors.2008(2) Mh.L.J. 322 does not lay down the correct law. The reference is answered accordingly. The writ petitions be placed before the respectiveDivisionBenchesforhearingandfinaldisposalinthelight ofthisreferenceJudgment. S.B.MHASE,J. A.P.DESHPANDE,J. P.B.VARALE,J.

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