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ROUNDTABLE

U.S. Re-engagement in Asia

S.R. Joey Long

Simon Tay
Kumar Ramakrishna
Carlyle A. Thayer
Zheng Wang

The National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, Washington

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China's Rise and the Passing of u.s. Primacy:

Australia Debates Its Future

Carlyle A. Thayer

hen China surpassed the United States in 2007 as Australia's largest trading partner, Australian strategic planners were confronted with a strategic dilemma unique in the country's history. In the past, Australia's

key ally was also its major trading partner. Canberra now must fashion a strategic policy to take into account that this is no longer the case and that its major ally and economic partner are great-power rivals.

Australia Debates China's Rise

Australia has engaged in two debates about how to respond to China's rise. The first took place within government circles in 2009 during the drafting of the defense white paper released in May that year. 1 Both the Office of National Assessments and the Defence Intelligence Organisation reportedly offered the view that China's military transformation was primarily defensive, being largely in response to U.S. naval power in the Pacific, and was also comn1ensurate with China's status as an emerging great power. 2 But this view was countered by senior officials in the Department of Defence who saw China's military modernization as posing a potential challenge to Australia's security interests. The latter view prevailed. It is now known, thanks to WikiLeaks, that then prime minister Kevin Rudd also shared such reservations about China's rise. Five weeks prior to the release of the white paper, Rudd reportedly told Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that integrating China into the international community should be pursued by multilateral engagement, while also preparing to deploy force if everything goes wrong."3 Rudd also foreshadowed the report's focus on naval capability

CARLYLE A. THAYER is an Emeritus Professor at the University of New South Wales at the Australian

Defence Force Academy in Canberra. He can be reached at <c. thayer@adfa.edu.au>. Australian Government, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 (Canberra, 2009). "U.S. Embassy Cables: Hillary Clinton Ponders U.S. Relationship with Its Chinese Banker;' Guardian, March 28, 2008 ~ http://www.guardian.co.uklworld/us-embassy-cables documents/199393. For commentary, see Paul Maley "Rudd's Plan to Contain Beijing;' Australian, December 6, 2010; Laura Tingle, What Rudd Really Thinks about China;' Australian Financial Review, December 6,2010; and David McLenan, "Secret Cable Shows Rudd Warned U.S. on 'Paranoid' China;' Canberra Times, December 6, 2010.
\ 20

2 Cameron Stewart, Deaf Ear on Agency Advice;' Australian, December 7,2010.

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U.S. RE-ENGAGEMENT IN ASIA

in "response to China's growing ability to project force." The 2009 defense white paper concludes:
China will also be the strongest Asian military power, by a considerable margin. Its military modernization will be increasingly characterised by the developn1ent of power projection capabilities. A major power of China's stature can be expected to develop a globally significant military capability befitting its size. But the pace, scope and structure of China's military modernization have the potential to give its neighbours cause for concern ... [China's] modernisation appears potentially to be beyond the scope of what would be required for a conflict over Taiwan. 4

The white paper proceeds to recommend the largest peacetime defense expenditure since World War II and lists as future procurements three air warfare destroyers, eight frigates, and twelve conventional submarines. Australia's second debate over the strategic implications of China's rise was initiated in 2010 by Hugh White, former deputy secretary for strategy and intelligence in Australia's Department of Defence. White penned a provocative essay challenging the fundamentals of Australian strategic policy over the past 40 years,S followed by a series of op-ed essays in leading newspapers as well as journal articles. 6 "A decade or two from now," White argues, "America could very easily be locked in a struggle with China for regional leadership, or slowly withdrawing from Asia."? In such circumstances Australia would have five alternatives:
We can remain allied to America, seek another great and powerful friend, opt for armed neutrality, build a regional alliance with our Southeast Asian neighbours, or do nothing and hope for the best. 8

White's essay is grounded in classical realism generally and the so called billiard ball theory of international relations in particular. His basic unit of analysis is the state. States are differentiated only by power and their interaction in the international system. However, White depreciates balance

4 Australian Government,

Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century, 34. Quarterly Essay,

5 Hugh Wbite, "Power Shift: Australia's Future between Washington and Beijing:'

no. 39 (September 2010): 1-74.

Hugh White, "Our Role in Asia's Superpower Shuffle;' Weekend Australian, September 4, 2010; Hugh White, "As China Rises, We Must Look Beyond the U.S. Alliance:' Australian, September 13,2010; Hugh White, "China's Rise Calls for Shared Leadership:' Australian Financial Review, September 23,2010; Hugh White, "Wealth and Power: Corning to Terms with China:' ANU Reporter, Autumn 2011, 29-30; and Hugh White, "Power Shift: Rethinking Australia's Place in the Asian Century;' Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (February 2011): 81-93. White, Power Shift: Australia's Future;' 60.

8 Ibid.

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of power theory in his analysis to explain China's rise and the response by the United States and regional states. Instead, he argues that economic power is the prime component of national power:
In the long run, economics is what counts in power politics. National power has many manifestations-military, political, cultural-but only one ultimate source. No country in history has exercised great power without great wealth, and the country with the most wealth always ends up with the most power. The wealth that matters is the aggregate wealth of the state, rather than that of individuals. 9

According to this reasoning, China will become more powerful than the United States around 2030, when its economy is predicted to surpass the u.S economy. China's growing economic power will allow the country to bulk up its military muscle and successfully challenge U.S. military dominance in the Western Pacific. In White's words:
If China grows fast enough to keep our [Australia's] economy buoyant, it will overtake America to become the richest country in the world sometime around 2030. That will make it too strong to live under American leadership in Asia. It will look to lead in its own right, and challenge America's position. Lo

White argues that the current international order in the Asia-Pacific was fashioned by Sino-U.S. accommodation in 1972. For the four decades since then, American primacy has been uncontested. The United States shaped a benign regional and international order that created the conditions for many states to develop and prosper. Yet in recent years China's phenomenal economic rise has also benefitted many Asian states, including Australia. White contends that most states in the Asia-Pacific both want the United States to renlain engaged and want to trade with Cllina. They do not want to choose between the two great powers. According to White, a Chinese challenge to American power in Asia is no longer a future possibility but a current reality."11 The most controversial part o[White's treatise is his evaluatioll of options facil1g the United States and his recommended policy prescriptions for Australia. He asserts that America has three options for responding to China's rise. It can withdraw from Asia, share power with China, or compete with it for primacy."12 White favors the second option as most conducive to regional

9 White, "Power Shift: Australia's Future:' 19.

1a Ibid., l. 11 Ibid" 2.

12 Ibid., 36.
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stability: the United States must share power with China "as an equal" while "surrendering primacy and all that goes with it."13 He concludes that a concert of Asian powers is the best mechanism for managing China's rise. 14

Australians Debate Hugh White's Power Shift Thesis

White's "Power Shift" essay provoked an immediate response in the pages of the Australian, Australia's leading national daily. Four op-ed pieces were published in quick succession. Greg Sheridan, the foreign affairs correspondent for the Australian, characterized White's article as "the single, stupidest strategic document ever prepared in Australian history by son1eone who once held a position of some responsibility in our system."15 Sheridan takes issue with two main points. First, he argues that Sino-u.S. power-sharing would not guarantee that China will not bully regional states or continue to develop its nuclear arsenal. Second, Sheridan challenges what he terms White's patronizing depiction of Washington's China policy. White argues, in effect, that it is not in the American psyche for the United States to see itself as treating China as an equal. According to White, "Exceptionalism is fundamental to Americans' image of their country... Americans simply do not accept that theirs is just one country among others."16 Sheridan argues that the United States has been "treating China as a fellow great power for many decades"-for example, by supporting China's membership in the United Nations Security Council. The second op-ed response to White's "Power Shift" was written by Michael Danby (a federal member of Parliament and former chairman of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee), Carl Ungerer (director of the National Security Program at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute), and Peter Khalil (an associate of the Centre for International Security Studies at the University of Sydney). This trio argues that White's policy prescriptions for Australia amount to a modern-day form of appeasement to the challenge of totalitarianism, inasmuch as "China... is a totalitarian power that seeks to

13 White, "Power Shift: Australia's Future;' 37, 39.

14

Ibid., 23-24, 37-39, 51, and 55. For a discussion of the concert of Asian powers as one possible future mechanism to manage great-power relations, see Malcolm Cook, Raoul Heinrichs, Rory Medcalf, and Andrew Shearer, Power and Choice: Asian Security Futures (Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2010), 38-50.

15 Greg Sheridan, "Paper Proj ects Distorted Vision of Future U.S. -China Relations;'

Australian,

September 11-12,2010.
16 White, "Power Shift: Australia's Future;' 40.

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extend hegemony over its neighbourhood as a means of protecting itself."17 Danby, Ungerer, and Khalil reject outright White's suggestion that strategic circumstances might dictate that Australia disengage from the United States and accommodate China. Although they do not directly confront White's argument that, irrespective of Australia's preferences, power relativities are changing in China's favor, they do argue that "the maintenance of the U.S. alliance system in Asia is vital for the continuance of Australia's security." The third piece to comment on White's "Power Shift" was written by Geoffrey Garrett, the head of the U.S. Studies Centre at the University of Sydney. Garrett begins by taking issue with the emerging view that self defense is needed now because "Australia can no longer rely on the U.S. for its security and it cannot trust China to remain peaceful." Thus, Australia faces three options: "side more with the U.S., sidle up to China, or go it alone."18 Garret dismisses the assumption that it is no longer possible for Australia to become closer to both China and the United States at the same time: "Australia does not have to and should not want to choose between its alliance with the U.S. and its economic ties with China. The most important foreign policy move the government can make is to ensure that it stays that way."19 Garret further argues that Washington does not view its relations with Beijing as a zero-sum game. He notes that the United States has been pursuing economic engagement with China for two decades and that "America seeks to maximise the economic benefits of China's rise and minimise the chances that it will have malign political consequences."20 The U.S. agenda for the Asia-Pacific century, Garret concludes, "seeks to engage and socialise China rather than isolate and chastise it." What of Australia's role? According to Garret, Australia not only shares a similar approach to China as the United States but also Japan and South Korea. Australia should assist the United States in becoming more involved in the East Asia Summit and transforming "its hub-and-spokes alliances with Australia, Japan and South Korea into a more integrated system."21 Finally, the fourth op-ed essay to comment on White's "Power Shift" was written by Josh Frydenberg, a member of Parliament and a former

17 Michael Danby, Carl Ungerer, and Peter Khalil, "No Winners by Appeasing China," Australian,

September 16,2010.
18 Geoffrey Garrett, "A New Pacific Triangle Looms:' Australian, September 18,2010. 19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.
21

Ibid.

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Liberal government ministerial adviser. 22 Frydenberg takes issue with White's proposal that the United States should relinquish primacy in Asia. In Frydenberg's view, Australia shares liberal and democratic values with the United States, whereas China does not. He further notes that U.s. leadership is required to deal constructively with China to address key security issues in the Asia-Pacific. Frydenberg concludes by arguing that "Australia's national interest is best served by continuing to engage and encourage our longstanding ally, the U.S., to retain its primacy in the region."23 The editors of the Australian Journal of International Affairs commissioned Hugh White to write a summary of his power shift thesis and invited two academics to comment on it. The first comment was prepared by Andrew Phillips, a fellow in the Department of International Relations at the Australian National University. Phillips argues that White's assertion that U.s. primacy was responsible for 40 years of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific overlooked the important role that East Asian states played in pursuing economic integration and adopting self-strengthening policies. 24 Phillips concludes:
White rightly acknowledges the unsustainability of regional order if it is exclusively predicated on a waning American primacy. Bllt I believe he understates the role that great and middle powers' self-strengthening choices played in the first instance in radically broadening the political support base for the open, commercially integrated and predominately rule governed order over which America has presided since 1972. Consequently, I believe that he exaggerates the contemporary fragility of that order, and overstates the degree to which the security architecture will need to be radically overhauled if peace is to be maintained. 25

The second academic commentary on White was written by Nick Bisley, a professor of international relations at La Trobe University.26 Bisley cuts open White's China billiard ball to expose its inner composition. Bisley finds that there are economic and social constraints at play that deserve greater prominence in any analysis of China's future rise. According to Bisley:
China remains a poor country, and there are numerous factors that present significant challenges to China's long-term growth. These

22 Josh Frydenberg Washington Is Integral to Our Region;) 23 Ibid.

Australian, September 21, 2010.

24 Andrew Phillips, From the Age of Asymmetry to the Great Reconvergence: Securing Order in the

Asian Century;' Australian Journal of International Affairs 65, no. 1 (February 2011): 94-101.
25

Ibid., 99-100.

26 Nick Bisley, "Asia's Transformation, International Relations and Public Policy;)

Australian Journal of

International Affairs 65, no. 1 (February 2011): 102-8.

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include the environmental costs of development, managing large scale and high-tempo social transformation on a massive scale, social inequality and perhaps the hardest of all, moving to more con1plex capital- and knowledge-intensive economic systems. 27

Conclusion
Hugh White's essay "Power Shift" has provoked a range of responses from various quarters of the Australian strategic policy community. Yet few of these analyses engage directly with his central assumptions regarding the relationship between aggregate economic wealth and military power and how to define and operationalize the concept of primacy as a dependent variable. White's concept of primacy appears flat and static. Are there different dime11sions of primacy? Is primacy a relative term? Exactly what is meant by the binary terms "contested" and "uncontested" primacy? White is strongest in his a11alysis of the growing basis of China's power, but he leaves the issues of Chinese weaknesses and what u.S. national power will look like in 2030 largely unexplored. 28 Even though power relativities may be changing, White's argument is deficient without an analysis of the role u.S. scientific and technological innovation will play. For example, White argues that China's developn1ent of anti-access and area-denial capabilities is currently challenging u.S. primacy in the Western Pacific. Yet he does not take into account how the United States will respond to this challenge over the next several decades. Finally, White's essay is devoid of any serious consideration of the role that multilateral institutions are likely to play now and in the future in mitigating great-power rivalry. Last year the United States, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, Russia, and New Zealand joined the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting to i11augurate a new security mechanism. This year Russia and the United States will participate in the East Asia Summit for the first time. The membership of both bodies is congruent. American and other regional analysts need to engage in a discussion, if not a debate, about how to shape these fledgling institutions to underpin regional security by effectively incorporating Cl1ina into the decisionmaking process. ~

27 Bisley, "Asia's Transformation:' 105. 28 For alternate views, see John Lee, "Why America Will Lead the 'Asian Century:" Centre for

Independent Studies (CIS), Foreign Policy Analysis, August 19,2009; John Lee, "The Fantasy of Taming China's Rise:' CIS, Foreign Policy Analysis, May 6,2010; and Ross Babbage, Australia's Strategic Edge in 2030, Kokoda Paper, no. 15 (Kingston: Kokoda Foundation, 2011).

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