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105mm Howitzer Battalion in attack of a 4 position, Hill 192, N ormandy, 11 Jul 44,

by Lt Col D. C. Little, FA. Command and Staff College, 1946-47.

This Document
IS A HOLDING OF THE

ARCHIVES SECTION
LIBRARY SERVICES FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

DOCUMENT NO.N- 225131

CGSC Form 160 13 Mar 51

COPY NO. 1
Mar 52-5M

Army-CGSC-P2-1798-7

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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS S School of Combined Arms Regular Course 1946-1947

105mm Howitzer Battalion in Hill 192, NORMANDY,

Attack of a Position 1944

11 July,

(Personal Experience of Battalion Commander)

Lt.

Col.

Donald C.

Little,

FA

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Table of Contents Index Bibliography Introduction The situation The terraih The enemy The plan of attack The artillery plan Preparation for the attack The attack Conclusions Lessons learned page a b 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 8

Chart 1 Sketch Chart 2

Progress 2d Inf Div from 7-17 June, Hegerows of Normandy Plan of Attack Artillery Plan--Barrage of Supporting Artillery

1944

Overlay to Chart 2 Chart 3

Organization

Bibli ography
*

Personal Diary (Copy

of Diary of 38th FA Bn) of the Second Infantry

**

Division History (Combat HIs .ry Division in World War II)

Introduction In this talk I wish to describe the plans and actions

of a 105 mm howitzer battalion of an infantry division in an attack on an organized position. rolling barrage was used. artillery fires In this operation a

A rolling barrage is

a series of

delivered on successive lines on a fixed During World War I, fire the rolling barrage was in an attack. Experience

time schedule.

the normal method of artillery with the rolling barrage

indicated that it

was both wasteful

of ammunition and ineffective, means of coordinating infantry. its

since we had no positive

advance exactly with that of the

The forward observer system adopted by our field artillery between World Wars I and II enabled our artillery to fire on

areas of enemy resistance successively as aur infantry advanced in the attack. Why then was a rolling barrage fired Division on Hill 192

during the attack of the 2d Infantry in July, 1944? We shall see. The situaton

(Chart 1)

Hill 192 was a commanding height situated three miles east of ST LO, FRANCE. On June 7, 1944 (D plus one of the

Normandy landings) the 2d Infantry Division had landed on OMAHA beach, passed through elements of the 1st and 29th

Infantry Divisions which held the beachhead, and fought 30 kilometers south to Hill 192. o There, because of stiffening support, the division

German resistance

and lack of logistical

had halted on June 17. For over three weeks the division sat on the northern slopes of Hill 192 and on a line 6 kilometers east of it,

while supplies and reinforcements head.

were brought into the beach-

Then on July 11 the division was ordered to capture

Hill 192 and the ST LO-_BAYEUX road one half-mile south of it, as a preliminary to the general ST LO breakt rough to

take place two weeks later.

Chart 1 Progress .2d Inf Div from 7-17 June, 1944

15

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Sketch

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The terrain Hill 192 was not a commanding peak, but was a long, sugarloaf hill some 50 meters higher than the surrounding ground. summit, and from

The Germans built a tower in

the trees on its

this tower, on a clear day, you cogld see the shipping off OMAHA beach, twenty-odd miles to the north. We thought that

when we had taken Hill 192 we would turn the trick on the Germans, but we were disappointed to find that ground south of Hill 192 was. even higher. looking south. This was the hedgerow country of Normandy. Hill 192 and It was a fine OP looking north, no good

the entire zone of the 2d Infantry Division was a patchwork of hedgerows (sketch). The hedgerows surrounded fields and sizes and shapes.

lined sunken roads.

The fields were of various

About a third of the fields were orchards, the rest under cultivation. Small groups of farm buildings dotted the area. were formidable obstacles. They

The hedgerows themselves

ran from four to eight feet i n height and from three to eight feet in thickness. They.were built of closely packed earth

and rock and were usually sodded and topped with hedge, whose roots further strengthened the wall. It can be seen from the preceding description that each field in this terrain was a battleground in itself. Each hedge-

row was obstacle and observation combined and afforded field of fire only to the next hedgerow. On Hill 192, however,

the Germans had excellent observation of not only the zone of the 2d Infantry Division, west and east, respectively. but of the 29th and 1st on the From Hill 192 artillery fire

was directed over the entire area of V Corps, and roving guns fired from any number of firing points. It its was this dominating hill, interlaced throughout that the 38th

length and heightby formidable hedgerows,

Infantry of the 2d In fntry

Division was o capture on July 11,

1944.

The enemy Of more importance defended Hill 192. In than the terrain was the enemy that the first dk ys of the fighting south

of OMAHA Beach the enemy had been for the most part members of the static coast defenses, including Russians. As Hill

192 was approached, however, a new brand of opposition developed. These new defenders all wore mottled camouflage

suits and seemed to be all armed with automatic weapons. Soon they were identified as members of the 9th Parachute Regiment of the 3d Parachute Division, who had been rushed from BRITTANY to halt this American penetration of the Normandy defenses. They were clever, tenacious foes. Th y fired their and buildings. while the Americans

"burrp" guns from trees,

hedgerow corners,

During the period from June 17 to July 11,

awaited the order to resume the attack, the paratroopers converted each hedgerow on the northern slope of Hill 192 into a maze of dugouts and firing positions. Tunnels were

dug at ground level through the hedgerows to afford apertures at the base of the hedgerows. Pits dug through the tops of the

hedgerows were zig-zaged for greater protection. Machine guns and towed and self-propelled anti-tank guns fired from prepared positions throughout the defended area. Movement laterally and to the front was covered by the hedgerows themselves and the many orchards and tree-lined throughout. Mortars were emplaced in trails

countless positions, of advance.

and covered every American position and avenue

The Germans' greatest asset was the caliber of the troops themselves. They were always in the next hedgerow. Our pat-

rols sent out at night were shot up badly or gobbled up entirely. If we withdrew a hedgerow or two to bring down fire on

their positions, next hedgerow.

they followed us back and were again--in the I watched as a group of paratroopers was being

questionaned after the hill had been captured.

One ragged

bearded survivor expressed the esprit of the 3d Parachute 3

C1B rt 2
Plan off

Attack

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Division when he was asked what he thought now.

of the Americans

Looking fixedly at his questionner he answered without

hesitation "Germany will wint" The plan of attack (Chart 2)

When the order came from V Corps to capture Hill 192, the 38th Infantry held the right third of the 2d Infantry Division sector, with Hill 192 to its front. On the right

of the 38th Infantry was the 116th Infantry of the 29th Infantry Division. 2d. With its three regiments already on an extended front, On its left was the 23d Infantry of the

the division ordered the 38th Infantry to capture Hill 192, the 23d to capture the ST LO"wBAYEUX road in the division and supporting corps artillery fort of the 38th Infantry. its gone, and

to weight the ef-

The 29th Infantry Division would

attack simultaneously to capture high ground to the west. The 38th Infantry decided to attack with the 1st and 2nd Battalions abreast, the 2d on the right, to capture the objectives shown on Chart 2.In the zone of the 2d Battalion lay the main roads and trails being used by the enemy, the

farm villages of CLOVILLE and LE SOULAIRE, of woods on the summit of Hill 192.

and the small patch

The 1st Battalion zone and a very

included the more exposed eastern half of the hill

large patch of thick woods on the reverse slope of the hill. Because in of the hedgerows, the opposing front lines were Each hedgerow line Therefore, in order

some cases less than 100 yards apart. line of resistance. of artillery

might be the main to bring maximum fire enemy hedgerow, be two hedgerows line.

and mortars on the nearest

our line of departure for the attack wogld (about 200 yards) back of our present front

Withdrawal to the line of departure would take place part of the artillery preparation. light) H-hour

during the first

for the attack was 0600 hours (about first

11 July.

Overlay

to

Chart 2

Artillery Plan- -Barrage

UC

ii

Th

artillery plan

To support this attack the division artillery was reinforced by the 62d and 65th Armd FA Battalions , and two battalions The 38th FA En, in
V

of the

Co r 's

of heavy corps artillery.

direct support of the 38th Infantry,

was given the 62d and 65th Armd FA battalions to reinforce its fires. The artillery, fire (1) plan consisted of two main parts: for one hour and (2) consisting of a

the preparation which would last

the supporting fires during.the attack,

rollingarrage for the light battalions, and deepening and thickening fires of the medium and heavy battalions. During the first battalions fifty minutes of the preparation the light

fired on located machine gun and mortar positions

in the enemy forward area, while mediums and heavies went for enemy batteries, CP's, and reserve areas. In the last

ten minutes of the preparation the lights and mediums came down on the first enemy-held hedgerow, the mediums firing

on impact, and the lights with time fire, the fragments reaching down into the Germans' holes and emplacements. Fires of the infantry heavy weapons were integrated with the artillery preparation. Then was to begin the second phase, or rolling barrage (Overlay to Chart 2). It was estimated that the infantyy and

might advance at the rate of 100 yards every 4 minutes, therefore every four minutes the artillery in

the barrage

would raise the range 100 yards, fire one volley, and maintain a slow fire of one round per gun per minute until at

the end of the four minute period the process was repeated. In order to keep the fire plan flexible and conforming to the 100 yard fire lines

the actual advance of the infantry,

were superimposed on the 1:5000 yard battle map being used by the infantry and forward observers. Each range line

was lettered, and the fire lines of each artillery battalion 5

were named as a could report 50 yard

group by colors, on Jig, barrage

so that a advance were

forward observer to by King". calling for

"Hold Brown of the

Green

advances

obtained

"King

plus 50".
Prdparation Because of the nature for the attack terrain, the closest co-

of the

operation was necessary between infantry, and artillery. Tank platoons of the battalion

tanks, engineers, attached company, to the

division were attached to each assault intensive

infantry

and divi.-

tank-infantry assault training was conducted in attack. Tanks

lion rear areas for two weeks prior to the were not all equipped at this the for the

time with the cutting teeth ST LO breakthrough two weeks demolition teams hedgerows for to precede It

that were used entirely in later, tanks and it and blast was necessary holes

through

them.

was a squad and a tank to a the next hedgerow while

field, the squad to advance to fire of the tank,

covered by the

t1n

the tank advance while covered by the squad. The artillery in direct support
(Chart 3):

of the 38th Infantry

was

organized as

follows

a,
all fires,

Fire
acted

direction

center

of the 38th

FA

Bn controlled
and made

on requests in

of forward

observers,

necessary changes b. in a

scheduled fires. 38th Infantry

A forward CP was established by the

sunken road about

a thousand yards back of the line of

departure.
established, officers progress to of

At this

forward CP complete
from the

communications were

including lines the each

artillery liaison Here fire plan the

artillery battalion company was studied

commander. and the

supplemented or revised as necessary. c It can be seen from Chart 3 that each artillery

liaison

officer

was on a party hookup with the forward

the fire direct-

observers with the assault rifle companies,

ion center, and the artillery battalion commander. of coarse was the alternate means of communication. 6

Radio

Chart 3 Organization of' Supporting Artillery

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... _.._ .. _ .,....._..

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..,_._...._e,...M..._..__" _.__ .,.. ... _._..

.,._...__

....

...

...

,...

WIRI~E

Co

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d.

Observation furnished by forward observers was

supplemented by a sixty-foot tower OP erected in the trees 500 yards in rear of the front lines, and affording excellent

observation of the hill.

Liaison planes furnished overall

surveillance of the battle area, and looked especially for enemy batteries. e. The forward observers of the 38th FA Bn who operated of the 38th Infantry

normally with the assault companies

would control the barrage fires of the three artillery battalions firing in front of the infantry. The 62d and errors

65th had forward observers

out to report any initial

direct to their own fire direction centers, but the fire direction center of the 38th gave the targets, time schedules and commands to fire f. talions to the 62d and 65th.

On the two days prior to July 11, the eight batof division and corps artillery that were to support

the attack,

registered on map located points on the hill.

Every lot of ammunition that was to be used was registered. This assured direet hits on located gun 6mplacements during the preparation. Aerial photos and patrols had uncovered

many of these exact locations. The attack At 0600, 11 July, following the artillery preparation,

the infantry jumped off, and following the rolling barrage, by late afternoon had captured its objectives. Ene my

resistance was continuous and stubborn th roughout the day, for altho4gh gun emplacements hits from artillery fire, and hedgerows had taken direct that

the enemy was so well dug in

many had to be killed at close quarters. Captured German officers were curious about the American "automatic" lery. * Cbunterattacks expected, by the enemy to retake the hill were artil-

and defensive fires

were already prepared on call,

and forward observers adjusted on check points as soon as * Personal Diary

the hill was taken in order to mass all fires. attacks did not develop.

The counter-

The 38th Infantry had taken fairly heavy casualties, but they were less than had been anticipated for the reduction of this heavily defended area.** Less thah 200 prisoners were taken, but the enemy dead were many times the number of prisoners. fire Many German dead, killed by time had to be dug

and bursts on the tops of hedgerows,

out of holes and hedgerow emplacements. An unmailed letter taken off a dead German two weeks later described the shelling of Hill 192 to a friend back in Germany: "At 1135 I left the platoon sector as last man.

Carried my machine gun through the enemy lines into a slightly more protected defile and crept back again with another fellow to get the wounded....On our way back we were covered again with terrific an open area. artillery fire. We were just lying in

Every mbment I expected deadly shrapnel. my nerves. The others acted just whistling,

At that moment I lost like me.

When one hears for hours the whining,

and bursting of shells and the moaning and groaning of the wounded, 30 men left one does not feel too well....Our company has only (out of 170)." ++ Conclusions More than 25,000 rounds were fired by the eight artillery battalions in this attack, an average of 300 rounds per piece for the

1051s.

Except for three days during the Battle of

the Bulge, this was the heaviest expenditure of ammunition in the experience of the 38th FA Bn.

This was the only rolling barrage fired by the 2d Infantry Division Artillery in eleven months of combat, but no-

where again did the situation require its use. Lessons learned (1) Unusual situations sometimes require unusual methods.

(2) Shells are less expensive than men's lives. (3) In every operation careful prior planning saves **Division History ,

lives and. assures accomplishment of~ the mission whatever the enemy reaction may be.