Cas e Dig es t_E ld epi o L as c o et al v Un it ed N ati ons R evol vi ng F un d F or Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE) Facts: Petitioners were dismissed

from their employment with privaterespondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural ResourcesE xpl or ati on (UNR FNRE), whic h is a s p ec i al f un d and s u bs idi ar y org an of t h eU nit ed N ati ons . T he UNRFNRE is i n vol ved i n a j oint pr oj ec t of th e Phil ipp in eG overn m ent an d t h e U nit ed N ati ons f or expl or at i on work in Din ag at Is l and .Petitioners are the complainants for illegal dismissal and damages.Private respondent alleged that respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. Issue: WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity Held: Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner have no recourse.Section 31 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the SpecializedAgencies of the United Nations states that each specialized agency shall makea pr ovis i on f or appr opr i at e m od es of s ettl em ent of ( a) d is put es aris i ng ou t of contracts or other disputes of private character to which the specialized agency isa p a r t y . P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t i s n o t e n g a g e d i n a c o m m e r c i a l v e n t u r e i n t h e P h i l i p p i n e s . I t s p r e s e n c e i s b y v i r t u e o f a j o i n t p r o j e c t e n t e r e d i n t o b y t h e Philippine Government and the United Nations for mineral exploration in DinagatIsland.

BPI vs. CIR Facts: Petitioner BPI, sold $500,000 in 1985 to the Central Bank for the total amount of $1,000,000. On October 1989, the BIR assessed BPI for tax deficiency of documentary tax on its aforementioned sales of foreign bills of exchange. BPI filed and protested the assessment on 1989 through its counsel. BPI did not receive any immediate reply to its protest. On 1992 BIR issued a warrant of Distraint and/or Levy against the petitioner. The warrant was served on 1992 but never heard anything from the BIR until the 1997 when the reconsideration was denied. BPI filed a petition for Review with the CTA and raised prescription as a defense. It alleged that the right to collect must be done within 3 years only, but the BIR waited more than 7 years to deny the protest. BIR reiterated its position and remained silent as regards the issue on prescription. CTA rendered the decision in favor BIR stating that the action has not prescribed but the sale of foreign currency is not subject to documentary stamp tax. Further the assessment was order for cancellation because the transaction between BPI and the Central Bank was tax exempt. The CA sustained the finding of the CAT that the action has not yet prescribed, but it adopted the position of the BIR that the sale of foreign currency was not tax exempt. Issue : Whether or not the right of the BIR to collect from BPI the alleged deficiency on documentary stamp tax had prescribed? Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the action for collection had already prescribed. The period to collect the deficiency is limited to 3 years as provided by Section 203 of the Tax Code. The statute of limitation on collection may be interrupted or suspended by a valid waiver executed in accordance with paragraph (d) of Sections 223 and 224 of the Tax Code as amended. The purpose of the limitation is to protect the taxpayer form the prolonged and unreasonable assessment and investigation by the BIR.

No. L-26400 February 29, 1972 VICTORIA AMIGABLE, p l a i nt i f f- a pp el l a nt , vs. NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Pub. Highways and REP. OF THE PHIL, def endant sappellees. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu dismissing the plaintiff's complaint. FACTS: Victoria Amigable, is the registered owner of a lot in Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot for the construction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues. On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the Philippines, requesting payment of theportion of her lot which had been appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the AuditorGeneral, who disallowed it in his 9th Endorsement. Thus, Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint,against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca (Commissioner of Public Highways) for therecovery of ownership and possession of her lot. The defendants denied the plaintiffs allegations stating: (1) that the action was premature, the claim nothaving been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right of action for the recovery hadalready prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the Government, the claim for moral damages,attorney's fees and costs had no valid basis since the Government had not given its consent to be sued; and(4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that appropriated and used the area involved in theconstruction of Mango Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants. On July 29, 1959, the court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause ofaction for the recovery of possession and ownership of the lot on the ground that the government cannot besued without its consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear and decide plaintiff'sclaim for compensatory damages, being a money claim against the government; and that it had longprescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said claim because the government had not given its consent tobe sued. Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government RULING: Yes. Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of her certificate of titleand that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, theappellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an action to recoverpossession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of the attributes ofownership. However, since restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither convenientnor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for road purposes, the only relief available is forthe government to make due compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine thedue compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value thereof at the time of the taking. As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form of legal interest on the price ofthe land from the time it was taken up to the time that payment is made by the government. In addition, thegovernment should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court after MYLA RUTH N. SARA hearing. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation, including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above indicated

Republic v. Feliciano FACTS: Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State. On January 22, 1970, Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the RP, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion, Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Feliciano alleged that he bought the property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30, 1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by an informacion posesoria that upon his purchase of the property, he took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954. On November 1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in question, while located within the reservation established under Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of Feliciano and should therefore be excluded therefrom. Feliciano prayed that he be declared the rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177 hectares; that his title of ownership based on informacion posesoria of his predecessor-in- interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers. ISSUE:WON the State can be sued for recovery and possession of a parcel of land RULING :NO RATIONALE : A suit against the State, under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except upon a showing that the State hasconsented to be sued, either expressly or by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to bemisinterpreted. It may be invoked by the courts sua sponte at any stage of the proceedings. Waiver of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but must be construed instrictissimi juris (of strictest right). Moreover, the Proclamation is not a legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body. Addtl: Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that the informacion posesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office (Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost. Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. These circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacion posesoria" relied upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting "possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged ownership of lands.

MERITT vs GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS When the plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part of Calle Padre Faura, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or from the post place there. By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely injured that, he was suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a wound in the same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued from his nose and he was entirely unconscious. According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur. As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom. Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads: An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in said suit. By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Legislature, that: SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same. Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, . . . ." In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so by legislative enactment, is well settled. As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract - By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. In determining the scope of this act - It simply gives authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the amount of damages is the only question to be settled. It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article 1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not such an agent.

PHIL.

NATIONAL

BANK

vs.

JAVIER

PABALAN

Issue; The petitioner is requesting for certiorari against the writ of execution authorized by the Hon Judge Pabalan regarding the transfer of funds amounting to P12,724.66 belonging to Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration.

Facts; Philippine National Bank invoked the doctrine of non-suability in behalf of PVTA. It is to be admitted that under the present Constitution, what was formerly implicit as a fundamental doctrine in constitutional law has been set forth in express terms: "The State may not be sued without its consent." In addition, the amount held by said bank is subject to garnishment.

Held; The certiorari was dismissed without cost by the Supreme Court saying that the funds held by PNB is subject for garnishment, thus, the writ of execution be imposed immediately. The non-suability clause raised by PVTA being a government owned corporation was also denied citingprevious decisions held by the Supreme Court specifically citing that of Manila Hotel Employees Association vs Manila Hotel Company and to quote 'it is well-settled that when the government enters into commercialbusiness, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.'

Torio vs Fontanilla Facts: Municipality of Malasiqui passed resolution number 159 to manage the 1959 town fiesta. Jose macaraeg was appointed as chairman of the committee concerning the entertainment and construction of stage for the said event. The committee constructed two stages for the event, one for the sarzuela and the other for cancionan, bamboo were used for the construction of both.

The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravaganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe for the performance and one of the members of the group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela" then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned underneath. Fontanilia was taken to tile San Carlos General Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day. Heirs of the deceased filed a complaint against the municipality of malasiqui, municipal council and all the members thereof. Answering the complaint defendant municipality invoked inter alia the principal defense that as a legally and duly organized public corporation it performs sovereign functions and the holding of a town fiesta was an exercise of its governmental functions from which no liability can arise to answer for the negligence of any of its agents. Trial court ruled that the defendants exercised diligence of a good father of a family and therefore they are not liable for damages as the undertaking was not for profit. Appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Vicente Fontanill. Issue: Whether or not the municipality and its councilors are liable for damages for the death of Fontanilla. Ruling: The municipality is liable for the death of Fontanilla, however the councilors acted as mere agents of the municipality thus are not liable. Rationale: We hold that of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malsiqui Pangasinan was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the municipality. It follows that under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitionermunicipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilia if that was attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or agents. The rule of law is a general one, that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or want of skill of its agent or servant in the course or fine of his employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is injured. Municipal corporations under the conditions herein stated, fall within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability co-exist. Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. . . Art. 2180, Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. . . When it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act of servants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them, can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove the can hold them responsible for the manner in which they discharge their trust, and if those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers, and are for the benefit of the corporation in its local or special interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the maxim of respondent superior applies."

KHO S RO W M INUCHE R vs. HO N. CO URT O F AP PE ALS a nd ARTHU R S CALZO March 6, 2009 by raquel KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents

FACTS: Khosrow Minucher, an Iranian national and a Labor Attach for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan and Manila came to the country to study in 1974 and continued to stay as head of the Iranian National Resistance Movement. In May 1986, Minucher was charged with an Information for violation of Republic Act No. 6425, Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The criminal charge followed a buy-bust operation conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in his house where a quantity of heroin was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who became one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. In August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on the trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. ISSUE: WON private respondent Arthur Scalzo can be sued provided his alleged diplomatic immunity conformably with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations RULING: The SC DENIED the petition.Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the diplomatic mission involve, the representation of the interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state. Only diplomatic agents, are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic nature. Being an Attache, Scalzos main function is to observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government. He is not generally regarded as a member of the diplomatic mission. On the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because of the diplomatic note, divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person, his diplomatic immunity is contentious. Under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit, the precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. The implication is that if the judgment against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between the two sovereigns. The buy-bust operation and other such acts are indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseurbuyer during the buy-bust operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties.

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. vs Court of AppealsFACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated August 11, 1989. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for eight (8)hours of service security per day. On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition. PADPAO and PC-SUSIA found VMPSI guilty and recommended its expulsion from PADPAO and thecancellation of its license to operate a security agency. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one. VMPSI filed Civil Case No. 88-471 against the PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA in theRTC-Makati Branch 135, on March 28, 1988. On the same date, the court issued a restraining order enjoining the PC Chief andPC-SUSIA from committing acts that would result in the cancellation or non-renewal of VMPSI s license. The PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion to Dismiss, Opposition to the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and Motion to Quash the TRO, on the grounds that the case is against the State which had not given consent thereto and that VMPSI s license already expiredon March 31, 1988, hence, the restraining order or preliminary injunction would not serve any purpose because there was nomore license to be cancelled. Respondent VMPSI opposed the motion. On April 18, 1988 the lower court denied VMPSI sapplication for a writ of preliminary injunction for being premature but VMPSI reiterated its application for the issuance of preliminary injunction because PC-SUSIA had rejected payment of the penalty for its failure to submit its application forrenewal of its license. On June 10, 1988, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of P100,000,restraining the defendant from cancelling or denying renewal of VMPSI s license. The PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a Motion forReconsideration of the above order, but it was denied by the court. On November 3, 1988, the PC-Chief and PC-SUSIA soughtrelief by a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. On August 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the petition. HELD: Wherefore, the petition for review is DENIED and the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. The State may notbe sued without its consent. Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA, being instrumentalities of the national governmentexercising a primarily governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, orsecurity guard agencies, said official and agency may not be sued without the Government s consent, especially in this casebecause VMPSI s complaint seeks not only to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSIseeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum P1,000,000.00 exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00as attorney s fees from said public respondents. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not beenforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for that purpose. PRINCIPLE: State s immunity from suit.