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Justification of parameter weight: External Corrosion

Coating Type : Coating type do play important role in external corrosion .Based on the type of coating used like the Thermoplastic coatings , multilayer polyethylene and the FBE the type and extent of corrosion varies. Coating condition: Disbonding of coating can result for CP shielding and can be a habitat for microbial organisms and thus cause MIC. This gives a high parameter weight. CP system: ISO 15889: criteria for protection not less than 850mv and not more negative than -1200mv.DCVG data indicate severe corrosion problem on the pipeline. The ON potential is given as -850mv, this indicates the pipeline is not having enough protection. Dig/ ILI: Gives information on the geometry and the level of the dents and metal loss. Soil Characteristics: This is a function of external corrosion rate. The parameter weight of 0.5 is based on the assumption of all other factors are ok (Ref: Dr Julia Race Lecture Notes).

Internal Corrosion

ILI: Gives the idea about previous active corrosion areas and the nature of the corrosion if any say SRB or APB. Stress Level: The protective film Fes and FeCO3 may get damaged due to the increase in stress level leading to the high corrosion rate. Inhibitor Availability: This forms the protective layer to prevent corrosion. Bacteria: Information about the bug count and the condition favouring its growth can be studied if present.

Third Party Threats

Vandalism: Gives information on interference from unauthorised persons. One Call record / Encroachment record: Previous encroachment reports and one call records gives us a reference about the activities carried in the vicinity of the pipeline. Wall thickness: Reduces the 3rd party threat and thereby providing extra safety to the pipeline.

Justification of Additional Parameter Weight: Internal corrosion

Fluid processing: Internal corrosion can be accelerated by increase in water cut, emulsions, oils and suspended particles like sands, microbial organisms in fluids. Processing of the fluid ensures their levels are controlled. Pipeline cleaning: Cleaning removes the hydrates, wax, solid particles, water, oil emulsions etc accumulated at different points inside the pipeline which leads to internal corrosion. External corrosion Stray Current: Pipelines can be low resistance path for stray current. The region where the current enters the pipe behaves as anode and corrodes. Water logging: Water content of the soil effect internal corrosion by providing environment for microorganisms to exist. Also causes cathodic reaction to take place.

Third party damage

Depth Of Cover: A minimum depth of cover ensures the pipeline is safe from activities of 3rd parties. Surveillance: This increases the chances of detecting and limiting the third party activities near the pipeline.

Consequence value: Pipeline -1 (9)

High Population density which may include high consequence areas.(houses, ice sink, nearby metro station, railway line roads). High pressure gas line.

Hence high consequences are possible. Pipeline -2 (6) Low population density (only one house) Natural resources ( lakes, mountain)

Identification of important threats & repair criteria to be adopted. Pipeline 1 Based on the risk assessment, main threats affecting pipeline 1 Third party damage as the pipeline runs through a densely populated area External corrosion due to damage in Polyethylene wrapping Chance for stray current corrosion.This will result in risk of CP shielding. Additional measures to be taken for the pipeline safety are briefed below.

For the threat of Third party damage: 1) Installation of warning boards at the area of high population density in the pipeline vicinity. 2) Increase the surveillance frequency at the high population area. For the threat of External corrosion: 1) Repair the damaged external coating whenever possible. 2) Ensure that the CP system protection is effective maintain ON potential more negative than -850mV. (Macaws pipeline defects) 3) Ensure that external coating is in good condition at ice rink to avoid water ingress and microbial activity. (Macaws pipeline defects) 4) Check for stray current interference on the pipeline near the rail crossing. Record pipe potentials and ensure no coating faults at this suspected area. 5) ILI

6) Leak detection systems at HCA. (Ref:49 CFR 192)


Other measures:

1) Install Leak detection systems at HCA. (Ref: 49 CFR 192).

2) Perform a periodic evaluation based on data integration & Risk assessment. (Ref: 49 CFR
192) 3) Identify and Evaluate the Threats to Pipeline Integrity at the Area of Potentially High Consequences. (Ref: 49 CFR 192). Pipeline 2 According to the risk assessment main threats affecting pipeline 2 are Third party damage, External Corrosion due to damage in coal tar enamel and Internal corrosion in the given order. Additional measures to be taken for the pipeline safety are mentioned below. For the threat of Third party damage: 1) Installation of warning boards at the area of high population density at the pipeline vicinity. 2) Increase the surveillance frequency at high population density area. For the threat of External corrosion: 1) Recoat the pipeline to FBE or 3 layer polyethylene whenever possible. 2) Ensure that the CP system protection level maintain ON potential more negative than -850mV.

3) Ensure no disbonded coating at pond area to avoid water ingress and microbial activity. (Ref:
Macaws pipeline defects)

4) For the deepest defect (40%wt), burst pressure to be calculated from the remaining strength
of the pipe, using a suitable metal loss strength calculation,(ASME/ANSI B31G (1991) or AGA Pipeline Research Committee Project PR3805 (December 1989)) (Ref:49 CFR 195) For the threat of Internal corrosion: 1) Monitor the quality of crude oil. 2) ILI for internal corrosion for high water cut. 3) Remove particles from the feed to avoid possible erosion problems 4) Run cleaning pigs. Other measures: 1) Structural analysis of the dent repaired with clock spring. 2) Baseline assessment schedule. References: 1) Macaws Pipeline Defects. Yellow pencil Marketing Co. Ltd. 2) 49 CFR 192 3) 49 CFR 195

a) endation of inspection methods and appropriate inspection intervals, Pipeline 1


1. Regular surveillance required to monitor activities from third party. Air surveillance should be carried out every 2 weeks Walking surveillance should be carried out 1-4yrs

2. CP monitoring of the pipeline is required.

Power supplies should be checked at 1-3 months intervals Coating should be monitored to identify regions of disbondment to prevent CP shielding Close interval survey required to determine the instant OFF potential at the test points and should be conducted annually

Pipeline 2 Electrical Resistance Probes should be used to monitor the internal corrosion rates. The probes rugged and well adapted to any corrosive environment; liquid, gas or particle streams. The technique is well proven in practice and is simple to use and interpret. ER monitoring permits periodic or continuous monitoring to be established for one or a multiple number of probes. Corrosion can thus be related to process variables, and the method is one of the primary on-line monitoring tools. ( Valland A. et al) a) Recommendations for the collection of additional data, Pipeline 1 Based on the risk assessment, main threats affecting pipeline 1 are Third party damage and external corrosion. Additional measures to be taken for the pipeline safety are briefed below.

For the threat of Third party damage: 1) Installation of warning boards at the area of high population density at the pipeline vicinity. 2) Increase the surveillance frequency at this particular area. Surveillance through the right of way at this region will be the most economical way of doing it. 3) Rehabilitation of the TOL dents identified. For the threat of External corrosion:

1) Recoat the pipeline with FBE wherever possible at HCA.


2) Ensure that the CP system protection is effective maintain ON potential more negative than -850mV. (Macaws pipeline defects) 3) Ensure no disbonded coating at ice rink to avoid water ingress and microbial activity. (Macaws pipeline defects) 4) Check for stray current interference on the pipeline near the rail crossing. Record pipe potentials and ensure no coating faults at this suspected area. 5) Monitor and compare ILI reports. Other measures:

1) Install Leak detection systems at HCA. (Ref: 49 CFR 192). 2) Perform a periodic evaluation based on data integration & Risk assessment. (Ref: 49 CFR
192) 3) Direct assessment, (a process that includes data gathering, indirect examination and/or analysis, direct examination, and post assessment evaluation) (Ref: 49 CFR 192). 4) Identify and Evaluate the Threats to Pipeline Integrity at the Area of Potentially High Consequences. (Ref: 49 CFR 192). Pipeline 2 According to the risk assessment main threats affecting pipeline 2 are External Corrosion and Internal corrosion in the given order. Additional measures to be taken for the pipeline safety are mentioned below. For the threat of External corrosion: 1) Recoat the pipeline with FBE wherever possible at HCA. 2) Ensure that the CP system protection level maintain ON potential more negative than -850mV. 3) Ensure no disbonded coating at pond area to avoid water ingress and microbial activity. (Ref: Macaws pipeline defects) 4) For the deepest defect (40%wt), burst pressure to be calculated from the remaining strength of the pipe, using a suitable metal loss strength calculation,(ASME/ANSI B31G (1991) or AGA Pipeline Research Committee Project PR3805 (December 1989)) (Ref:49 CFR 195) For the threat of Internal corrosion: 1) 2) 3) 4) Monitor the quality of crude oil. ILI for internal corrosion for high water cut. Remove particles from the feed to avoid possible erosion problems Run cleaning pigs.

Other measures:

1) Structural analysis of the dent ( at 6O clock) repaired with clock spring.

2) Baseline assessment schedule. a) Repair criteria to be adopted, Based on the risk analysis chart above, the risk to the pipelines can be ranked in the following order, from the highest to the lowest:

1. Third party activities in pipeline 1 2. External corrosion in pipeline 1 3. Internal corrosion in pipeline 1 4. Third party activities in pipeline 2 5. Internal corrosion in pipeline 2 6. External corrosion in pipeline 2
The priority of repairs will therefore be based on this order of risk of failure on these pipelines. However it is very important to note that the repairs of the hazards/defects within these pipelines are according to the prescriptive (ASME B31.8S) method of assessment for pipeline 1, this is due to the inability to obtain enough data for a predictive analysis. The disadvantage for this is that, there might be more number of repairs than is actually necessary. While ASME B31.4 predictive methods have been used for pipeline 2. Predictive (ASME B31.G) method of assessment done on pipeline 2 shows that there is no repair needed. Dents and Gouges: The dig information show that there are sign of gouges around the dent on pipeline 1, this means that an immediate action is required. Hence pressure reduction and immediate repair using the two half shell sleeves filled with epoxy. Fully encycled welded half sleeves will be preferably used where welding is required. Coating Condition: The damaged coating on pipeline 1 needs to be repaired using a better coating material e.g. FBE or 3 layer polyethylenes. CP System Protection Level: The CP OFF potential needs to be established to provide a reference for setting the required protection level which might result in under protection currently happening on pipeline 1. While the issue of stray current need monitoring and rectified as soon as possible. Most of coating protection on pipeline 2 does not require repairs but need to be monitored. However the causes of external corrosion defect with a length of 200mm and a depth of 40%wt need to be investigated. Even though it does not pose any significant threat of failure, but to ensure it does not continue to grow. If the investigation shows that it is as a result of coating damage, then it will need immediate repair using the most suitable coating e.g. FBE.

There is high possibility that the dents under the pipeline are constrained dent which do not have any significant chance of failure. However the only one greater than 6%OD repaired using a Clockspring repair is of great concern due to the removal of the constraint and the repair method used. There is a very big chance of failure from fatigue and the clockspring is not enough to provide the constraint required. Therefore, bolted full shell epoxy or fully encycled welded half sleeve method will be the best option. Before any repairs it is advised to lower the operating pressure to a safer pressure. With the anticipated rise in internal corrosion in pipeline 2, it is advisable to start applying inhibitors to reduce the rate of corrosion where the right corrosion allowance is not in place.

a) Any other requirements as recommended by the relevant Federal Regulations. ( Ref: 49 CFR
Parts 192 and 195) Immediate repairs are required for:

Repairs within one year are required for: i.

i. defects where the calculated failure pressure Pfail is less than 1.1 x MAOP; ii. dents with any metal loss, cracking or stress raisers;

smooth dents on the top 2/3 of the pipe with depths in excess of 6% of the diameter; and ii. dents in excess of 2% of the diameter on a girth or seam weld. Operators must record and monitor the following: i. ii. dents greater than 6% of the diameter on the bottom 1/3 of the pipe; dents greater than 6% on the top 2/3 where an engineering assessment has shown they will not fail; and iii. dents in excess of 2% on a girth or seam weld where an engineering assessment has shown they will not fail. References International Organization for Standardization ,2003, Petroleum and natural gas industries Cathodic protection of pipeline transportation systems . On-land pipelines, ISO 15589-1:2003(E), First edition: 2003-11-15.Switzerland. Norwegian Marine Technology Institute, 2010: Steel pipelines - state of the art for internal corrosion monitoring and inspection technologies, Report no: 260057.00.02, pp 64, [Online]: http://www.ptil.no/news/report-concerning-internal-monitoring-and-inspection-of-pipelines-article683979sss.html. Accessed: 13/05/2011 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT., 2003, 49 CFR Part 192 Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Gas Transmission Pipelines); Proposed rule, Vol. 68 No: 18, [ Online ]: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_01/49cfr192_01.html. Accessed: 13/05/2011 Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), DOT., 2000, 49 CFR Part 195 Pipeline Safety: Pipeline Integrity Management in High Consequence Areas (Liquid Transmission Pipelines); Proposed rule, [ Online ]: http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_01/49cfr195_01.html .Accessed: 13/05/2011 ASME B31.8S, 2004 Code for Pressure Piping: Managing System Integrity of Gas Pipelines, The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Three Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016-5990, [ Online ]: http://www.asme.org/codes/. Accessed: 15/05/2011 ASME B31.4, 1998 Code for Pressure Piping : Pipeline Transportation Systems for Liquid Hydrocarbons and other Liquids, The American Society of Mechanical Engineers Three Park Avenue New York, NY 10016[ Online ]: http://www.asme.org/codes/. Accessed: 15/05/2011 COPYRIGHT American