Police Power 1.

Definition / Description Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. (Freund, The Police Power [Chicago, 1904]). Police power is the power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of the public convenience and general prosperity. The police power is subject to limitations of the Constitution, and especially to the requirement of due process. Police power is the exercise of the sovereign right of a government to promote order, safety, security, health, morals and general welfare within constitutional limits and is an essential attribute of government (Marshall vs. Kansas City, Mo., 355 S.W.2d 877, 883) Police power has been defined as the state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare. As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August 1989]) 2. Scope Police power regulates not only the property but, more importantly, the liberty of private persons, and virtually all the people. The scope of police power, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August 1989]) 3. Basis The justification for police power is found in the ancient Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex, and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number. Salus populi est suprema lex. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. (Lingo Lumber Co. vs. Hayes, Tex. Civ. App. 64 SW 2d. 835, 839) Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. (Common law maxim meaning that) one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another (1 Bl. Comm. 306. Chapman vs. Barnett, 131 Ind. App. 30, 169 N.E. 2d 212, 214). It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare. (Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323) The police power of the State is a power coextensive with self-protection, and it is not inaptly termed the law of overwhelming necessity. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. It is the plenary power of the State to govern its citizens. (Sangalang vs. IAC, [GR 71169, 25 August 1989]) B. Characteristics Pervasive and non-waivable. The police power is the pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs or the public order of the general community. (Tablarin vs. Judge Gutierrez, [GR 78164, 31 July 1987]) Essential, insistent and illimitable. The police power of the state has been described as the most essential, insistent and illimitable of powers, which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. (Lozano vs. Martinez, [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986]) Dynamic. Police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state may even override a constitutional guaranty, such as that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must yield to the police power of the state. (Lozano vs.

Martinez, [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986]) Police power is dynamic, not static, must move with the moving society it is supposed to regulate. Once exercised, it is not deemed exhausted and may be exercised repeatedly, as often as it is necessary for the protection or the promotion of the public welfare. Police power may sometimes use the taxing power as an implement for the attainment of a legitimate police objective. C. Who exercises said power? On the legislative organs of the government, whether national of local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts. (Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators v. City Mayor, [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967]) 1. Police power is lodged primarily in the national legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Police power cannot be bargained away through the medium of a contract or even a treaty. 2. Police power under the general welfare clause authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein. (Villanueva vs. Castaneda, [GR L-61311, 21 September 1987]) The exercise of police power, the choice of measures or remedies if indeed action is made, and the ascertainment of facts to which police power is to be based, lies in the discretion of the legislative department. No mandamus is available to coerce the exercise of the police power. The only remedy against legislative inaction is a resort to the bar of public opinion, a refusal of the electorate to return to members of the legislature who have been remiss in the discharge of their duties. The remedy chosen by the legislature cannot be attacked on the ground that it is not the best suggested solution, that it is unwise, impractical, inefficacious, or even immoral. These issues are political in nature, and cannot be inquired into by the legislature. D. Tests of Police Power 1. Lawful subject. The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the police power. The enjoyment of private rights, when within the scope of police power, may be subordinated to the interests of the greater number. 2. Lawful means. The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The lawful objective must be pursued through a lawful method. The means employed for the accomplishment of the police objective must pass to the test of reasonableness and conform to the safeguards embodied in the Bill of Rights for the protection of private rights. a. Rational Relations Test (property rights) A mere reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. (PBMEO vs. PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June 1973]) Notwithstanding the new equal protection approach with its emphasis on suspect classification and fundamental rights and interests standard, the rational relation test still retains its validity. (Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984]) b. Clear and present danger Test (human rights) A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. (PBMEO vs. PBM, [GR L-31195, 5 June 1973])

Zoning and Regulatory Ordinances: Test of a valid ordinance An ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) it must not contravene the constitution or any statute, (2) it must not be unfair or oppressive, (3) it must not be partial or discriminatory, (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade, (5) it must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) it must not be unreasonable. (Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp. [GR 111097, 20 July 1994]) 1. Lao Ichong vs Jaime Hernandez Treaties May Be Superseded by Municipal Laws in the Exercise of Police Power FACTS: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities herein abound (then) particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act the purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause (pacta sund servanda). He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country he should be given equal opportunity. ISSUE: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles. HELD: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law clause does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced; and, that the equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. LUTZ VS. ARANETA [98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955] Facts: Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue, the sum of money paid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment Act. Under Section 3 of said Act, taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of the lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the collections made under said Act shall be for aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter of public concern hence making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court of First Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act 567) is unconstitutional. Held: The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great industries of our nation, its promotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds greatly to the general welfare. Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and is therefore constitutional. It follows that the Legislature may determine within reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection and expedient for its promotion. If objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment. Taxation may be made with the implement of the states police power. In addition, it is only rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore, the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.

3. Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Board 151 SCRA 208 Facts: Presidential Decree no. 1987 which took effect on April 10, 1986 is known to be an Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board. Petitioner Valentin Tio filed the following objection with the said Presidential Decree: 1. The tax provision of the Presidential Decree is RIDER is without merit. 2. The 30% tax imposed is harsh, oppresive, confiscatory, and is restraint of trade. 3. Theres no legal or factual basis for the promulgation of the Presidential Decree. 4. The Presidential Decree contains an undue delegation of legislative power. Issue: Is the Presidential Decree no. 1987 be considered unconstitutional? Held: The Presidential Decree no. 1987 is not considered as unconstitutional because the presumption was not overcome. It is clearly stated in the no. 2 and no. 5 preambular clause that shows the motive of the law making body to confer such act. Before there is no tax levied to the different establishment offering videogram, but this decree the establishment will be taxed 30%. This which will be an additional revenue to the government, 50% of which shall be accrued by the City/Province and the other 50% shall be accrued by the Municipality. 4. Virgilio Gaston, et. al. vs. Republic Planters Bank, et. al. 187 SCRA 525 G.R. No. L-77194 March 15, 1988 Doctrine: To rule in petitioners' favor would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. Facts: Petitioners who are sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers, who have come to this Court in their individual capacities and in representation of other sugar producers, planters and millers and intervenors Angel Severino, Jr., et. al., who are sugarcane planters planting and milling their sugarcane in different mill districts of Negros Occidental, were allowed to intervene by the Court, since they have common cause with petitioners and respondents having interposed no objection to their intervention, filed with the Supreme Court a petition praying for a Writ of mandamus to order respondent Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM, for short) which was superseded by its co-respondent Sugar Regulatory Administration (SRA, for brevity) and Republic Planters Bank (briefly, the Bank), a commercial banking corporation, implement the privatization of the Bank by the transfer and distribution of the shares of stock of the said Bank which is in the name of PHILSUCOM to the sugar producers, millers and planters, who are the true and beneficial owners thereof. PHILSUCOM and SRA argued that no trust results and that the stabilization fees collected are considered government funds, that the transfer of shares of stock from PHILSUCOM to the sugar producers would be irregular, if not illegal. Issue: Whether the stabilization fees collected from sugar planters and millers pursuant to Section 7 of P.D. No. 388 are funds in trust for them, or public funds Held: The Supreme Court held that the stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax which constitutes public funds, which is within the power of the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz vs. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148). They constitute sugar liens (Sec. 7[b], P.D. No. 388). The collections made accrue to a "Special Fund," a "Development and Stabilization Fund," almost Identical to the "Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund" created under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 567. The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State. The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters and producers for a special purpose that of "financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign market the fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even though they are held for a special purpose. Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the

language of the statute, "administered in trust' for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of the Government. The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special fund is emphasized by the fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. That the fees were collected from sugar producers, planters and millers, and that the funds were channeled to the purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds into a trust fired for their benefit nor make them the beneficial owners of the shares so purchased. It is but rational that the fees be collected from them since it is also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. To rule in petitioners' favor would contravene the general principle that revenues derived from taxes cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, "and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market," including the foreign market the industry being of vital importance to the country's economy and to national interest. WHEREFORE, the Writ of mandamus is denied and the Petition hereby dismissed. No costs. 5. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989 Facts: The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program: SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just

compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. Issue: Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657. Held: P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement. When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that: All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead." R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner. The case at bar, present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of eminent domain.

The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid classification have been violated. Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. 31To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1) it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory. Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights. WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: 1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. 5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. 6. THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, vs.VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., FACTS: On February 10, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued E.O. No. 179 which tasked the MMDA to come up with a plan to decongest the worsening traffic in Metro Manila. The MMDA recommended, and was subsequently approved, a plan to integrate the existing transport modes - buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR - and to facilitate and ensure efficient travel through the improved connectivity of the different transport modes through the Greater Manila Transport System. Initially, it involves the removal of existing bus terminals along the major thoroughfares and immediately establishing the mass transport terminals for the north and south Metro Manila commuters. The respondents assailed the constitutionality of the said Executive Order. On September 08, 2005, the RTC declared that the EO was a reasonable exercise of Police Power. The petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but were denied. ISSUES:

1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy on the part of the respondents to initiate the case at bar.
2. Whether the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the Constitution. 3. Whether the MMDA has the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals.

RULING:

1. The contention of the petitioners that there is no justiciable controversy on the case at bar has no merit. The
plan to remove the terminals clearly points to an injury that will be incurred by the respondents. It is immaterial whether the said EO is directory or administrative in nature.

2. It was ruled that the said EO is valid and constitutional as per E.O. No. 125 and E.O. No. 292 which gives
the President the authority to undertake or to cause the implementation of the said project. The said EO is also a valid exercise of the Police Power.

3. By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the
limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. It should be the DOTC who should implement the project as the MMDA only has the administrative, coordinating and policy-setting power as espoused in its charter. 7. Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation FACTS: Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic. On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads: SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. ISSUE A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby safeguarding the petitioners constitutional right to procedural due process? B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars violate the petitioners constitutional rights to. (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard? HELD: As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. [5] It may also regulate property rights. [6] In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. 8. VELASCO v. VILLEGAS Facts: The petitioners filed a declaratory relief challenging the constitutionality based on Ordinance No.4964 of the City of Manila, the contention being that it amounts to a deprivation of property of their meansof livelihood without due process of law. The assailed ordinance is worded thus: "It shall be prohibited for any operator of any barber shopto conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of saidbarber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where the barber shop is located as longas the operator of the

barber shop and the room where massaging is conducted is the same person." The lower court ruled in favor of the constitutionality of the assailed ordinance. Hence, the appeal. Issue: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4964 is unconstitutional Held: NO. It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: "(1) To be able to imposepayment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 asamended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business ofbarbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction ofseparate rooms for massage of customers." The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause because it "delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality; this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence." The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. 9. Bautista v. Juinio [GR L-50908, 31 January 1984] Facts: Letter of Instruction 869 was issued on 31 May 1979 to respond to the protracted oil crisis dating back to 1974, banning the use of private motor vehicles with H and EH plates on weekends and holidays from 12 am Saturday to 5:00 am Monday, or 1 am of holiday to 5:00 am of the day after the holiday; but exempting service, truck, diplomatic, consular corps, and tourist cars. Pursuant thereto, Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications and Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation Commission issued on 11 June 1979, Memorandum Circular 39, which imposed the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of registration on owners of the above-specified vehicles found violating such Letter of Instruction. Memorandum Circular 39 does not impose the penalty of confiscation but merely that of impounding, fine, and for the third offense that of cancellation of certificate of registration and for the rest of the year or for ninety days whichever is longer. Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista questioned the validity of LOI 869 and MC 39 through a prohibition proceeding with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether LOI 869 and Memorandum Circular 39, banning certain vehicles from using the motorways in specified time, are constitutional and/or valid. Held: A regulatory measure enjoys a presumption of constitutionality or a presumption that such an act falls within constitutional limitations. When a questioned statute deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power, and which is asked to be declare void on the ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute. Herein, as to LOI 869, the determination of the mode and manner through which the objective of minimizing the consumption of oil products and measures conducive to energy conservation (require and establish taxi stands equipped with efficient telephone and communication systems; strict implementation and observance of cargo truck hours on main arteries; strict observance of traffic rules; effective solution of traffic problems and decongestion of traffic through rerouting and quick repair of roads and efficient operation of double decker buses; rationing of gasoline to avoid panic buying and give the private car owner the option and responsibility of deciding on the use of his allocation; allow neon and electrically devised advertising signs only from five oclock p.m. to nine oclock p.m.; prohibit immediately the importation of heavy and luxury cars and seriously re-examine the car manufacturing program) are left to the discretion of the political branches. The question before the Court is limited to whether or not LOI 869 as implemented by MC 39 is violative of certain constitutional rights. On the other hand, as to MC 39, while the imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is valid under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the impounding of a vehicle finds no statutory justification. To apply that portion of MC 39 would be ultra vires. It must likewise be made clear that a penalty even if warranted can only be imposed in accordance with the procedure required by law. 10. FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986 FACTS: Petitioners, charged with Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law, assail the law's constitutionality. BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than

one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute itself creates aprima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor, "shall constitute primafacie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written, stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions. ISSUE: Whether or not (W/N) BP 22 violates the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. HELD: No.The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. ISSUE: W/N BP 22 impairs the freedom to contract. HELD: No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the regulatory power of the state. ISSUE: W/N it violates the equal protection clause. HELD: No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no unreasonable or arbitrary. 11. City Government of Quezon City vs. Ericta [GR L-34915, 24 June 1983] Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled Ordinance Regulating the Establishment, Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation thereof provides that at least 6% of the total area of the memorial park

cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities, and where the area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than 6 months from the date of approval of the application. For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal (Branch XVIII at Quezon City), a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002) seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question for being contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. There being no issue of fact and the questions raised being purely legal, both the City Government and Himlayang Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A motion for reconsideration having been denied, the City Government and City Council filed the petition or review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to taking of private property without just compensation. Held: There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries. This has been the law and practice in the past and it continues to the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners. 12.Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987) Facts: Petitioners'''' 6 carabaos were confiscated by the police for having been transported from Masbate to Iloilo in violation of EO 626-A. He brought an action for replevin, challenging the consitutionality of the EO. The trial court sustained the confiscation of the animals and declined to rule on the validity of the law on the ground that it lacked authority to do so. Its decision was affirmed by the IAC. Hence this petition for review. HELD: (1) Under the provision granting the SC jurisdiction to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide final judgments of lower courts" in all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures, lower courts can pass upon the validity of a statute in the first instance. ; (2) There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals (except where there at least 7 yrs. old if male and 11 yrs old if female upon the issuance of the necessary permit) the EO will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion. We do not see, however, how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed any where, w/ no less difficulty in on province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says the EO, it could be easily circumsbcribed by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat. (3) In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond w/c was ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The EO defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, w/c

was carried out forthright. The measures struck him at once and pounced upon the petitioner w/o giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him elementary fair play. &n bsp; (4) It is there authorized that the seized prop. shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit in the case of carabaos." The phrase may see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden w/ perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution 13. TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST LAWYERS VS. COMELEC [289 SCRA 337; G.R. NO. 132922; 21 APR 1998] Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881. Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides: Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known as the Comelec Time which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of campaign. Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time. Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995 senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such. Issues: (1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws. (2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due process of law and without just compensation. Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them. The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.

As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.