EXECUTIVE ORDER 10631

CODE OF CONDUCT
FOR MEMBERS OF THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
By virtue of the authority vested in me as
President of the United States; and as Com
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the
United States, I hereby prescribe the Code of
Conduct for Members of the armed Forces of
the United States"which is attached to this
order and hereby made a part thereof.
Every member of the Armed Forces of the
United States is expected to measure up to the
standards embodied in this Code of Conduct
.while he is in combat or in captivity. To ensure
achievement of these standards, each member
of the Armed Forces liable to capture shall be
provided with specific training and instruction
designed to better equip him to counter and
withstand all enemy efforts against him, and
shall be fully instructed as to the behavior and
obligations expected of him during comlmt or
captivity.
The Secretary of Defense (and the Secretary
of the Treasury with respect to the Coast Guard
exeept when it is serving as part of the Navy)
shall take such action as is deemed neeessary
to implement this order and to disseminate and
make the said Code known to all members of
the Armed Forces of the United States.
THI'J WHITE HOUSE
August 17, 1955
For sale by tbe Superintendent of Documents, U,S. Government Printing Office
Washington 25, D,C, . Price 50 cents
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VI
1II
IV
CONTENTS
Page
Foreword.... . . . .. .. .. . . .. 1
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1. The New Role of the POW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2. The Lessons of History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3. Outbreak in Korea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4. "Progressives" and "Reactionaries"... . . 38
5. Interrogation.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
6. Indoctrination. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
7. Propaganda....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
8. Probing for Weak Spots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
9. The POW Can Resist " . . .. 73
10. The Code Is Your Armor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
11. The Geneva Rules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
12. You Guard Our Country. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
13. Never Say Die. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
14. Keep Up the Fight. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
15. Keep Faith. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
16. By Word and By Deed...... . . . . . . . . 132
17. Faith Will Triumph , .. . 140
Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
v
FOREWORD
D
uring and after the Korean war it became appar
ent that many U.S. fighting men had been inade
quately prepared for the ordeal they faced in Korea.
Accordingly, a "Code of Conduct for ::Uembers of the Armed
Forces of the United States" was drawn up. Based on
traditional ideals and principles, the Code is intended to
give guidance to all members of the. Armed Forces in any
future conflict.
Since the Code was proclaimed in 1955, each of the Serv
ices has improved its instruction on how to avoid capture
and what to do if taken prisoner of war. Each Service
program has been analyzed, and the best points are
reflected in this revised pamphlet, "The U.S. Fighting
Man's Code." Some of the material in the booklet has
been drawn from Army Pamphlet No. 30-101, "Commu
nist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation of
Prisoners of 'Val'''; The Airman, official journal of the Air
Force; and the Naval T1'aining Bulletin. Materials and
suggestions have been received also from the U.S. Marine
Corps, and these are reflected in this pamphlet.
The assistance of all of the Services is acknowledged
with thanks.
INTRODUCTION
T
he United States is proud of the record of its fj.ghting
men. The overwhelming majority of them have met
the standards of the Code of Conduct from the beginning
of our military history. Every war has produced outstand
ing examples of their devotion to duty, country, God.
Although the Code of Conduct grew out of studies of
behavior in Korea, that conflict also had its heroes, too
many to list here. The individual acts of courage and
fortitude by Americans in Communist prison camps alone
would fill volumes. For their exemplary conduct while
prisoners of war, many American fighting men were
decorated.
But the fact remains that in Korea, as in every other
war, a few Americans did less than their best to avoid
capture-and a few of those who were captured cooper
ated with the enemy. 'Vho is responsible? Certainly, the
men concerned. But the military Services, the Department
of Defense, and our Nation must assume a share of the
responsibility.
An indomitable will to resist is not acquired overnight.
Kor can it be supplied by military training alone. For it
rests on character traits instilled in our homes, our
schools, our elull'ches-traits such as self-confidence, self
reliance, self-discipline, self-respect, moral responsibility,
and faith in country and God.
The sen'iceman equipped with the will reinforced by
the skill to resist is prepared for whatever military serv
ice has in store for him. Both the will and the skill to
resist a Communist foe are strengthened by knowledge of
Communist tactics and techniques. '
The serviceman who understands the nature of Com
munist enslavement will do his utmost to avoid it. Guided
by the vrecepts of tlle Code of Conduct, and profiting by
the experiences of those unfortunate enough to have been
captured by the Comillunists, he will never surrender him
self 01' his men while there is the slightest chance of avoid
2
ing it. He will never give up the fight before the situation
is truly hopeless.
If capthre is inevitable, he will continue the battle in the
prisoner-of-war camp. He will make every reasonable
effort to escape and help others who attempt to escape.
He will resist enemy efforts to make a tool of him. He
will strive to maintain the unity of his group. He will
assume leadership if necessary, or obey the leader of his
group.
In so doing, he will be fulfilling his mission and uphold
ing the tradition of U.S. fighting men of the past.
3
Chapter 1
THE NEW ROLE OF THE POW
S
omething baffling happened to the American fighting
man who became a prisoner of war in Korea. It
baffled' his Service, the Department of Defense, and our
Nation as welL
The Po-W expected interrogation and brutal treatment.
He knew the Communists would try to squeeze military
information from him, and he certainly did not think they
would use kid gloves. In this situation, he was to give
only his name, rank, service number, and date of birth.
He would evade answering other questions to the utmost
of his ability.
If tortured, he could pray for strength to withstand his
ordeal.
If possible, he would try to escape and rejoin U.S. forces.
Otherwise, based on the experience of past wars, the
POW could expect to "sit out" the remainder of the con
flict in a prison camp.
The POW got what he expected ... plus Illuch he had
not expected!
ASSAULT ON THE MIND
The moment a PO'W fell into Comillunist hands in Korea,
his captors launched an assault upon his mind and his
spirit. Taking advantage of his bewilderment, they plotted
their every move with a definite end in view,
The Communist aim: To make pl:isonel's of war serve
the cau,se ot international communism.
Accordingly, American PO"V's were subjected to a well
planned and well-organized type of warfare with which
few were familiar and for which few were prepared.
Briefly, this warfare was aimed at undermining their
loyalty to their country and their faith in the democratic
4
way of life--and thereby, conditioning them to accept
communism.
How did the enemy wage this new type of war against
our fighting men? 'Vhat strategy and tactics were em
ployed? What kind of weapons were used? A thorough
study of hundreds of interviews with repatriated Amer
ican prisoners providecl the answers to those questions.
"rhere the Communists were most successful in making
a prisoner do as they wished, they preyed upon his clefects,
his lack of knowledge, and his lack of experience. It fol
lows, then, that if U.S. fighting men in Korea had known
what to expect and had been prepared, those who became
PO'V's could have spared themselves much agony ... and
could have put up much more effective resistance.
As long as the Communists threaten direct or indirect
aggression to free nations anywhere, the danger of war
continues. The United States and her allies will seek
by every honorable means to avoid a shooting war. In the
event of hostilities, however, you-as a U.S. fighting man
could become a prisoner.
The prisoner's life is never an easy one. And life as a
prisoner of the Communists is especially grim, since it
holels ordeals beyond the usual hardships of captivity.
Hence, you will want to avoid it to the best of your
ability. In doing so, you will not only be following the
honorable course-set forth clearly in Article II of the
Code--but you will be serving your own best interests as
well. Some alternatives to surrender are indicated in
chal,ter 13. If you fail to explore every alternative when
threatened with capture, you will be making a serious
mistake--possibly a fatal mistake.
BE PREPARED
The purpose of this booklet is to help you prepare your
self for any eventuality. By reviewing what happened in
past wars, especially in Korea, and by examining ,vhat the
Communists are trying to achieve, you will be better pre
pared for what may lie ahead.
5
Specifically, this booklet aims to acquaint you with some
of the tactics, techniques, and methods of Communist
interrogation, indoctrination, and handling of prisoners of
war, and to suggest some defenses against these enemy
weapons. It is intended to show you also how the U.S.
];'ighting Man's Code can serve as your armor, either in
combat or in a POlY camp.
"KnOWledge is power." 'I'his holds just as true for the
U.S. fighting man facing the Communist aggressor as it
does for the scientist in the laboratory. Much of the
knowledge and much of the strength you need to sustain
J'ou as an effective fighting man will sustain you also if
you become a prisoner.
'['0 combat Comlllunists effectively, either in battle or in
a prison camp, remember this:
.. International communism seeks world domination.
.. Communists will use military force when it suits their
purpose.
s
Military force is simply onc way of winning control
of the world.
Communists also keep up an unrelenting war of propa
ganda, subversion, sabotage.
In :1\"orth Korea, most American POlY'S learned the hareI
way that no enemy is a friend in a prisoner-of-war camp;
that friendships must be deYelolled among their own people
and not with the enemy. In the eyent of another con
flict with a Communist foe, American fighting men can
expect similar treatment. All Communists are trained for
one purpose--defeat of the capitalist democracies, eSllecially
the United States.
If you eyer find yourself a llrisoner of the COIlllllunists
and are tempted to think that war has swept on beyond
you, just remember: thcrc is 110 SlIch thing as "timc out"
in the global struggle between communism and the forces
of freedom. Your Communist captor \vill not take 'time
out" to proyide shelter, food, or medical care. 'Yhateyer
care or help he gives you will not be for humanitarian
reasons. It will be giyen to help atlvcnce thc COIIUllllnist
cause.
How coulcl the Communists use you? What woulcl they
expect of you?
THEY SEEK INFORMATION
First, as in preYious wars, they woulcl be seeking military
information. There is nothing new about this. Captors
haye been seeking this from llrisoners since the clays of
primitiYe warfare. Next, they will attempt to get all kinds
of nonmilitary information-about you, your fellow pris
oners, ancl your country. Your instructions in either case
remain the same.
You will giye only your name, rank, service number,
and date of birth. You will evacle answering other ques
tions to the utmost of your ability.
If you were defending a vital spot, you would not sur
rencler it simply because enemy fire threatenecl your life.
To do so woulcl be to unclermine the safety of your outfit
7
and your ('ountry. By the :-;ame token, if you become a
1'0\", you will not the enemy any information Ill'
('an use again:-;t your fellow PO\"'s, your fighting forees,
your eountry, or your ('ountry's allies.
A Comlll unist interroga tor may threa ten a 1'0\" with
death, torture, or solitary ('ontinement:. If the 1'0\" gives
Ilim what he wants beeause of these threats, he is as
disloyal as the lllan who surrenders in ('omlmt to save
Ili:-; own hide.
If you are ta ken priso]H'r of war, a big test will
come when you are firM interro,u:ated. Hefuse to give
anything but your n:une. rnnk. :-;en'ice number, and date of
birth nnd you

yonI' "hnnees of survivnl. If you
waver. you nre lo:-;t! If you allo\v your Communist captor
to drag other informn tion froll1 you-military or other
wise--he will ],eep mnl,ing more and more demands. In
the end, he will foree you into n sh:unefnl ('ollaboration.
The COmll11111ists ,,'ill nse wlwtever means they feel is
tbe most

to g'et the information tlwy want. Being
8
only human, they prefer to ao this the easy way. If they
can get what they want from you with sweet talk, so much
the better for them. But if you indicate a willingness to
talk, or cooperate, you are a better subject for further
questioning than the prisoner who obviously will not
cooperate. If you show you are afraid of harsh treatment,
you invite it.
What can you expect when you resist? In later chap
ters, you will read of men who did resist-even when
threatened with death or physical torture. Some of them
did die, victims of Communist brutality. But many more
lived ... and came home with honor!
The path of honor is neyer easy for a fighting man.
But it is the onTy path for a man who respects himself
and loves his country!
THEY WANT TO USE YOU
Apart from information, what will the Communists be
seeking from you if you ever become a PO'V?
They will want to use you in the cause of cOlllmunism.
This does not mean that they want you to become a mem
ber of the Communist Party. Even in the Soviet llnion,
the Communist Party has accepted only 8 million members
out of a total population of 200 million. However, the
Communists woulcl like to have you become an open cham
pion of their ideas. If they succeed in getting you to
cooperate, they will find many uses for you-both as a PO'V
and after you are repatriated. For example, while you're
a PO'V, they would like for you to broadcast propaganda
messages to the folks back home. After you are released
they would like for you to help pave the way for commu
nism in the USA. They will not be concerned in the least
with your welfare, your rights, or Y01tr happiness as an
individual. 'l'hey will be concerned with you only as a
tool of comm11llisill.
The Communists will sometimes offer small bribes or
rewards to get you to do what they want. If you prove
uncooperative, they will not hesitate to use force.
For example, suppose' the Communists want yon to be
an informer-to tattle on your fellow PO\V's, If any PO\V
yalues a few cigareUe's :md "ome ('andy more' than he does
his honor and the welfa re of his fpllow PO\V's, lJe ean
make a deal. If he ean supply information of more than
routine usefulness. his reward may be more. Suppose he
refuses; Ill' nwy be subjeeted to all kinds of penalties,
from lJeatings to solitlHY confill('ment. But he still has
his honor!
GUISES OF COMMUNISM
Some of what happened in Korea may be outmoded if
und jclicn another war breaks out:. If so, aIHI if be
come a PO\\', be alert for ne\Y tricks and new ways to
eon'r up old trieks. Comnll111ism assumes many disg:ui"ps.
At Y1Hious times awl places, it Inay 1'rp"ent itself as
and eonsidera teo ()n the other hand, dependi n,S\'
011 the situation, it be displayed in all its naked
brntality. Some Ameri<'lln prisoners o!Jsen'ed both sides
and many g:ui"es dnring their captlYity in Korea. OtllPrs
saw only one side of communism. Most Alllerieans were
imprps"pd by the Illannpr in which cOlllml111hlll can undergo
quick changes from one guisp to another. Any man falling
into ('Olllmllllht hands in the I'utul'e should Ill' jJl'('jJah'd to
10
encounter communism in any of the forms it may assume-
even the indignant denial that it is communism at all.
No matter how the Communists change their tactics,
their motives and broader purposes will not change. Learn
these, and you will understand that whatever they want
YO/l to do will have some calculated end in view, and that
ena will be to advance the ComIllunist cause.
IN CONCLUSION
The odds are that 'you will never become a prisoner of
the Communists. At the same time, in any realistic
appraisal of what lies ahead, it is a possibility that can
not be overlooked.
If such a fate should overtake you, you may be sure
that your Government will do everything possible to rescue
you. Meantime, until such help comes, you will have to
rely on your own resources. This is the hard, cold truth!
In sUlllming up, remember that the Communists have
three basic uscs for prisoners of war. They may seek to
use any prisoner in one or more of these ways:
As a source of military information.
As a champion of communislll.
As a stooge to do their dirty work.
All three possibilities are repulsive. Yet your Govern
ment would be doing you a disservice if it did not try to
make you aware of them. As bad as they are, fear of the
unknown is worse. An ugly truth is no less ugly if it
remains in hiding.
Face the facts! You'll find them, unadorned, in this
pamphlet.
505596--59----2 11
Chapter 2
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY
F
OR a full understanding of today's prisoner-of-war
problem, knowledge of the past is essential. This can
help you prepare for the future.
Looking back to prehistoric times,we know that primi
th-e man and his barbarian descendant annihilated or
enslaved all captive foemen. In time it occurred to the
conqueror to hold a captured leader as hostage. Such a
vidim was Lot. According to Scripture, he was freed by
the forces of Abraham-perhaps the earliest prisoner
rescue on record.
The Romans sported with their war prisoners, often
using them for target practice or for gladiatorial shows
to amuse the public. Enslaved warriors rowed Caesar's
galleys to North Africa and Britain, and were killed when
they could no longer pull an oar. "Slay, and slay on t"
Germanicus ordered his Rhineland invaders. "Do not
take prisoners! vVe will have no peace until all are
destroyed."
Chivalry developed in the Western vVorld with the rise
of Christianity, the concept of "Do unto others." The
code of knighthood served to curb the warrior's steel. The
true knight refused to slay for slaughter's sake. Facing
battle, he was pledged to remain true to his king or cause,
even if captured. The disclosure of a trust or the deli \"er
ance of a friend to the enemy was treacherous and merited
swift punishment.
Thus rules for the fighting man in combat or in cap
tivity were linked to knightly concepts; of duty, honor,
loyalty to friend, and gallantry to a worthy foe.
Some time during the Crusades a prisoner-interrogation
rule developed. The captive knight was permitted to
divulge his name and rank-admissions necessitated by the
game of ransom. However, the medieval foot soldier
continued to risk death or enslavement at the hands of a
conquering enemy, without hope of escape through ransom.
12
In Europe; during the 17th c"entury, the idea emerged
that prisoners of war were charges of the capturing sov
ereign or state. No rules for their treatment had been
formulated, but they were protected from servitude and
personal revenge. Later, during the 18th century, captivity
came to be considered a means of preventing the prisoner's
return to friendly forces. This was a step forward.
Military prisoners were no longer considered guilty of
crimes against the state.
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
To discourage desertions during the Re\olution,. the
Unitecl States established the death penalty for prisoners
who, after capture, took up arms in the service of the
enemy. Duress or coercion was recognized as mitigating
only in the event that immediate death had been threat
ened. This was the first definition of required prisoner
conduct.
Since' George III decreed that all Americans who re
volted against Crown authority were war criminals subject
to' hanging, Revolutionary soldiers and sailors went to war
under the shadow of the gallows. The noose was relaxed
only because it proved impractical and because English
liberals deplored such high-handecl tyranny. Soon after
the outbreak of hostilities, prisoner exchanges were begun
and paroles arranged.
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
During the Civil "Val', about 3,170 captured Federals
joinecl the Southern forces, and about 5,450 captured Con
federates joinecl the Fecleral army. War Department Gen
eral Order No: 207, issued 3 July 1863, apparently was
intended to curb widespread surrender and subsequent
parole to escape further combatant service. It provided,
among other things, that it was the duty of a prisoner
of war to escape. Punishment for misconduct was based
on three criteria:
Misconduct where there was no cluress or coercion.
13
Active participation in comlmt against Federal forces.
Failure to return voluntarily.
In cases involving disloyal prisoners of war, the ques
tion of duress-or degree of duress-was weighed in the
balance. The Union Judge Advocate General recognized
coercion as a defense. It was held that "extreme suffer
ing and privation which endangered the prisoner's life"
might justify his enlistment with the enemy. However, if
the prisoner made no effort to escape when opportunity
offered, he was liable to a desertion charge.
Lieber's Code. Civil 'War prison camps were harsh. In
Southern camps, particularly AnderSOllYille and Florence,
men suffered greatly from malnutrition and lack of medi
cation. The Union prison on Johnson's Island in Lake
Erie was a bleak Alcatraz, and Union stockades at Point
Lookout on the Potomac were described as "hell holes."
Humane citizens, North and South, appealed for lenient
treatment of captives. In 1863 President Lincoln requested
Professor Francis Lieber to prepare a set of prisoner rules.
Lieber's Instructions tor the Governmcnt at Arm'ics at the
Unitecl States were probably the first comprehensive code
of international law pertaining to prisoners of war to be
issued by a government. Based on moral precepts that
recognized the enemy as a fellow human with lawful rights,
Lieber's code contained the following injunctions:
A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment for
being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked
upon him by the intentional infliction of any suffering,
or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by
mutilation, death, or any other barbarity.
A prisoner of war remains answerable for his crimes
committed before the captor's army or people, (for
crimes) committed before he was captured, and for
which he has not been punished by his own authori
ties.
A prisoner of war ... is the prisoner of the govern
ment and not of the captor.
14
JlIIII!! Civi! Wllr prisollcrs lI'crc cOllfillcd in ICllls (aliovc)
or }J}II!;csiJ/f1 Slrll('[llrc8 (11('!01l') ((lid !lIc!;ed liJe most ele
Jl!clilllr/! sallitar/! facilitics.
15
Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or im
prisonment such as may be deemed necessary on
account of safety, but they are to be subjected to
no other intentional suffering or indignity.
A prisoner of war who escapes may be shot, or other
wise killed in flight; but neitl1er death nor any other
punishment shall be inflicted upon him simply for
llis attempt to escape, which the law of order does
not consider a crime. Stricter means of security
shall be used after an unsuccessful attempt at esca[Je.
Every captured wounded enemy shall be medically
treated according to the ability of the medical staff.
Lieber's code was a step forward. The Confederacy
agreed to abide by the code but could not always fulfill
the code's intention. For example, the code required that
prisoners' rations be similar to those issued their captors.
But the South was slowly starving under pressure of
blockade, and Southern soldiers as well as their prisoners
suffered from the scarcity of food.
Interrogation and Information. In the American Civil
War, espionage, military intelligence, and counterintelli
gence were important features. In previous wars, few
trained intelligence operators had served the American
forces. Efforts to gather military information had been
haphazard and disorganized. The advent of the Pinkerton
Service which operated with l\IcClellan, the Federal Secret
Service under Colonel Lafayette Baker, and a well-organized
Confederate Secret Service put intelligence-gathering (and
defensive counterintelligence) on a modernized basis.
Spies were called "scouts." As old as war was the rule
that enemy spies, caught in disguise, faced death. They
were beyoncl the pale of prisoner-of-war exemptions. The
Civil War featured many heroic spy exploits. It also
featured daring raids on enemy lines to take prisoners for
interrogation.
The officer or man who gave his captors military infor
mation was as dangerous to country and cause as the
16
deliberate traito'1', So soldiers were enjoined "not to talk."
Lieber set down the rule:
Honorable men, when captured, will abstain from giv
ing to the enemy information concerning their own
army, and the modern law of war permits no longer
the use of "any violence against prisoners, in order
to extort the desired information, or to punish them
for having given false information.
The rule was easier to recite than observe. On the one
hand, there was the interrogator ordered by his chiefs to
acquire vital information-intelligence that might win a
battle and save many lives. On the other hand, there was
the prisoner, sworn to withhold information that might
cost a battle and the lives of his countrymen. Here are the
oPvosing forces for a cruel contest.
Despite Lieber's rules, prisoners were sometimes chained
together, placed in brutal irons, or "bagged" (a suffocating
canvas sack tied over the head). They were placed in soli
tary confinement and denied water. These vicious meas
ures were used more often to wring information from a
cavtive than as disciplinary punishments. Such "third
degrees" were conducted privately, usually by military
police or Secret Service agents.
Backsliding there was on both sides. However, the gen
eral trend was toward more humane treatment of POW's.
The going was slow, but the stel)s were in the right direc
tion.
THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS
III H:iG4, the Swiss philanthropist Henri Dunant wrote a
book that set the stage for a conference at Geneva and
the founding of the International Red Cross. The Red
Cross offered relief to all combatants, regardless of the flag
they served, All participants agreed that "the sanitary
personnel might continue its duty in the presence of the
enemy." 'l'hrough the determined campaigning of Clara
Barton, the United States joined the convention in 1882,
and the AmeriC'an Red Cross was organized.
17
Dunant's work inspired the founding of other prisoner
relief societies. In 1874, a conference was held in Bnls
sels at the instigation of the Russian Goyernment. Dele
gates of all the major European nations attended. A code
based on Lieber's was projected. The Brussels code was
not ratified, but it strongly influenced the first Hague
Conference, which met at the turn of the century.
Czar Nicholas II sponsored the Hague Conference of 1899,
which produced a Convention with respect to laws and
customs of war on land. Representatives of 26 nations
attended the conference. Discussed were disarmament
proposals and the possibility of establishing a world court.
The delegates negotiated various agreements relating to
warfare and war prisoners.
The prisoner-of-war code adopted at The Hague was
based on the one proposed at Brussels. It embodied many
of Lieber's original stipulations. Prisoners of war were
to be considered as lawful and disarmed enemies.. They
were captives of tIle hostile government and not in the
power of the individual captors or jailors. It was agreed
that unruly prisoners could be punished for insubordina
tion, but humane treatment was required.
Twenty-foul' of the attending powers ratified the Hague
Convention. Signers included the United States, Germany,
France, England, and Russia. A hopeful generation
called the conference the "First Parliament of Man."
Acting on a Russian proposal, the Netherlands called a
second Hague Conference in 1907. During this conference,
the powers reaffirmed their adherence to the principles
previously adopted.
THE FIRST TOTAL WAR
Another conference was in the making when the First
'World War exploded. German intentions seemed only
too clear when the Kaiser's spokesman described a treaty
with Belgium as a "scrap of paper."
The concept of total war-mustering an entire nation and
its forces for the conflict-was not new. But in the mod
18
ern sense, it was first advocated by a Prussian militarist
before "World War 1. If rules and codes abetted the war
effort, observe them. If they didn't, they were unrealistic
and to be dispensed with. Total war was no gentleman's
game. Any expedient that spelled victory was justifiable.
This concept was not entirely accepted by the High Com
mand, but the Prussian school generally endorsed a policy
of Sclire7clichkeit (planned terror or "Frightfulness") to
subdue defiant enemy peoples. Prussian "Frightfulness"
was amateurish, and" not very effective. But it did repre
sent a 20th-century development in psychological warfare.
Its usefulness was countered when it backfired in another
area-propaganda warfare.
'l'he Germans introduced another innovation during
World 'Val' 1. This new element could be called "political
warfare." As distinguished from propaganda, it involved
the process known today as political indoctrination.
At Limburg and Zossen, the Germans set up what were
known as "political camps." To these camps were sent
prisoners who seemed likely subjects for subversioll. The
inll\ates were quartered in comfortable barracks. Instead
of the normal prisoner ration they were fed the best food
available. Tobacco and candy were plentiful. During the
first eighteen months of the war, Irish prisoners were
selected for these segregated camps.
As reported by Major H. C. Fooks in his book P1'isoners of
War: "One commandant talked to his men and stated that
the emperor was aware of the downtrodden state of Ireland,
and wished that the Irish captives be placed in a separate
camp, where they would be better fed and treated better
than the English captives."
By ancl large, the Germans met with little Sllccess. Most
of the Irish PO'V's resisted subversion. But the Germans
were vioneering. They were setting a pattern for the future.
At war's end approximately 2,200,000 prisoners were in
the hands of the Central (Germanic) Powers. The Allies
were holding 615,900. The Americans had captured some
49,000 Germans and the Germans, 4,120 Americans. A total
19
of 1A7 Americans (lied in the enemy's prison camps. Few
Americans escaped from Germany, but daring attempts \H're
made. On the whole, the American prisoners \ Y e l ' ( ~ \yell
treated.
In reviewing ,Vor](1 ,,'ar I-the first total \\"Hr-one may
note four major deH>]opments:
Scientific intelligence ,,'arfare.
o Psychological warfare.
o Propaganda warfare.
Political warfare.
All dealt with tlw Illlm:lll mind, and all \vou]d be IJrou,gbt
to be'ar on future priso]l('rs of ,,'ar-in \\'or]dWar II :llU] in
I\:orea,
THE SECOND TOTAL WAR
During ,Yol'ld \\"11' II a total of 12D.701 ,\lllel'k'lllS ,,'ere
captured by tile ,\xis enemy.
A t this model German prisoner-oj-war camp neal' FVetzlar,
Gerll/allY, Allied ail'lI/cl/ captured dUl'ing lVorld lVal' 11
reecired e,rcellcnt eal'e.
20
T!tese liberaled Amerieall inmate!; of a German prison hos
liila! at PlidtSlltlle!t1 (World War 1J) show tlte cjfects of a
"farratitJII diet.
Perllnps fenring reprisnl more than public opinion, the
German military were fairly careful in handling American
]>O\\"s--with SOllIe ex('elltions. Americnns captured in Italy
were gin'n silllilarly ('Orl'ect trentlllent.
In tile matter of prisoner interrogation, the German mili
tary seem to have behaved well enclUgll-at least toward the
21
Americans. There was none of the brutalizing that existed
in such Japanese camps as Ofuna and Ashio, where Ameri
can submariners were tortured.
Tl1e Americans captured by General Homma's forces on
Bataan Peninsula and at Corregidor were fortunate if they
reacl1ed a prison camp alive. In tl1e Bataan Deatl1 March
General "\Vainwright's surrendered troops endured one of tl1e
most excruciating ordeals of tl1e war. Britons and Aus
tralians caught at Singapore were treated witl1 similar
brutality.
Airmen and submariners bore tl1e brunt of interrogation
ordeals. Reason: tl1ey usually possessed information of
more value to the enemy than an infantryman's. Tl1ey may
have flown from a carrier or perhavs i>ailed from some l1id
den island base. The name of tl1e flattov, the location of tl1e
base-this was vital intelligence. The submariner knew a
dozen secrets: his sub's cruising range, its radar and sonar
devices, its torpedo gear. One of tl1e best kept secrets of tl1e
war, and one of the most important, was tl1e devth at which
a U.S. submarine could operate.
So pilots and submarine sailors who were captured "got
the works." The Japanese did not employ subtle interroga
tion methods. Prisoners were flogged and tortured. They
were treated to such Oriental punishments as judo exverts
and hatchet men could devise. The ordeal of one submarine
skipper who "took it" hardly bears recital-cigarette burns,
bamboo splinters under the fingernails. . .. But the Jap
anese did not extract from him the diving depth of U.S.
submarines.
In the Pacific after the war, Americans found the graves
of American destroyermen who had been beheaded and the
bodies of other American prisoners who had been drenched
with gasoline and burned alive.
These grim deeds, which the present Japanese Govern
ment condemns as heartily as we do, may be regarded as the
exception. However, even where the treatment was more
humane, the realities of war were making themselves felt.
The blockaded Japanese were reduced to meager rations.
22
The Philippines and the Home Islands were undergoing non
Rtop bombardment. Consequently, food and medical supplies
were at barrel-bottom. The 1'O",V's received the leftovers.
But beheadings, torture, the 1'alawan massacre, and the
Bataan Death March were on the record. Like the Malmedy
maRRacre in the Belgian Bulge, like Buchenwald and Belsen,
they awaited an accounting. The outraged people of the
United Nations demanded retributive justice.
The Germans applied other and seemingly more effective
interrogation methods. Consider the testimony of Joachim
Seharff, an interrogator stationed at Auswerstelle "'Vest,
Obernrsel, Germany. This was the camp where all captured
aviators (except Russian) were brought for questioning.
From "all but a handful" of the 500 Americans questioned,
Seharff obtained the information he was after. Scharff's
methods were not so remarkable. It might be said that he
killed his victims with kindness.
In the war there were many "Scharffs." Not all of them
were on the German side. Adept Allied interrogators pumped
information from case-hardened Luftwaffe pilots and U-boat
skippers. In the closing days of the war they pumped their
riYals-captnred Nazi interrogators-among them Joachim
Scharff.
THE COMMUNIST SHADOW
That coming events cast their shadows proved true in the
Sovipt treatment of Axis prisoners taken during ",Vorld "'Val'
II. l<;yen then the Soviets demonstrated methods that they
:11\(1 other Communist nations were to use in later years.
'l'he Communist pattern was beginning to unfold in Octo
ber 1!Jl1, when the Red (Soviet) Army sent a directive to
all Communist interrogators, which read in part: "From the
vpry moment of capture by the Reel Army, and during the
entire period of captivity, the enemy enlisted men and offi
cerR IllUSt be under continuous indoctrination by our polit
ical workers and interrogators."
This was followed by a series of directives that explained
in detail what type of information would be extracted from
23
German prisoners first, how the interrogations shoul<1' be
conducted, and the manner and extent of the indoctrination.
Analysis of these directives revealed that the Communists
were more intereste<1 in economic all<l political inform:1 tion
than in purely military inform:1tion, though they di<1 not
overlook military information. Military information was
sought, as a rule, soon after the prisoner was capture<1 and
while he was being enlcuated from the combat zone to the
rear.
Physical Pressure. The intel'l'ogators ll.'<erl
physical pressure against German PO",V's in an effort to
lower their resistance to interrogation and to make the job
of the interrogator easier. Physical pTCSSltTe, wilen IIscd,
was dit'ectecl aga'inst sclectecl 'indidr/1lals ancl not '((!Jail/st
gTOlipS ot p1"1soneTs. The Communists realized that vhysical
pressure against a prisoner group would strengthen the
unity of the group and defeat their purpose of obtaining
information. Examvles of the types of physical IJreSsUre
exerted against selected indiYidual prisoners are: Solitary
confinement; requiring the prisoner to assume rigid and un
comfortable positions for long periods of time: prolong-ed
interrogation of the vrisoner by using- relays of fresh inter
rogators; depriving the vrisoner of sufficient sleep or rest;
and denying the prisoner the use of the latrine.
",Vhen the Soviet interrogators relaxed their pressure, it
was not for humane reasons. They were being realistic.
After all, the object of interrogation is to obtain informa
tion. A badly injured prisoner, or one too exhausted or
confused to talk intelligently, is of no use to the interro
gator; therefore, there are definite limits on the amount of
physical pressure that can be exerted on a man under inter
rogation. It should be noted that such methods as those
mentioned above were reserved for selected prisoners who
were known, or thought, to possess important information;
they were not applied to the prisoner vopulation as a whole
because of the obvious expense in both manpower and time.
The Indoctrination Process. Although some
attempts at indoctrination of German prisoners were made
near the front lines almost immediately after cavtul'e, the
24
organized, concerted indoctrination program began at per
mallent POlY ('tUllpS.
The basic technique was to disereflit not only Hitler but
the whole German concept of goYernment. The ComIllunists
attacked all German leaders and all German schools of
thonght. Eyery social system exeellt communisIll was de
seribed as being against the common man. ComIllunism was
adnmeed as the salYation of the workers and the guardian
of peaee.
Propaganda. C(lll1Iilllllist propaganda was perhaps the
most effeeti,-e part of the Communist indoctrination of
German prisoners. 'l'he COIllmunists collected a large num
ber of diaries and letters of deacl German officers that indi
eated defeatist attitucles after Hitler's forces began to slow
down on all fronts. These clocumeuts were disseminatecl to
newly eavtured vrisoners. They were used to discredit and
degrade the officer class and served to create doubt and to
weakell the enlisted prisoners' faith in their officers and in
Germany.
Germau prisoners were asked to make recordings, sup
poserlly to be broadcast to relatives in Germany. The re
corrlings were broadcast, instead, as propaganda to the
ovvosing troops on the front line, and gave the impression
that life with the Soviets was pleasant. These propaganda
reeonlings caused Illany Germans to surrender to the Red
Army.
"Peaee" was the basic theIlle of the Communists. How
ever, this theme was merely a frout to hide their true
moth'es. In actuality, it meant peaee on Communist terms.
T h r o n , ~ h fraud, deception, and some German collaborators,
nllIllerous German prisoners signed "peace petitions," which
the COIllmunists Imblished throughout the world. These
"petitions" gave German soldiers and civilians the false iIll
pre"sion that only the COIllmunists wanted peace. As a
matter of fact, the current Oommllnist "lwa,ce e1"1lsade'
st:1I'ted in their prisoner-of-war camp" in 1945.
Handling' of Japanese POW's. Communist methods of han
dling Japanese prisoners of war were generally the same as
25
those employed in handling German prisoners. The interro
gation procedures were the same, as were the techniques of
indoctrination. The illegal and unjustified detaining of Jap,
anese prisoners for years after hostilities had come to an
end paralleled the illegal holding of German prisoners, some
of whom were released as late as October 1955, more than
ten years ajte1' the-ir capture. Others, so-called "war crim
inals," may never be released.
IN CONCLUSION
The interrogation and indoctrination methods used by the
Soviets against German and Japanese prisoners of war fol
lowed the same pattern as those used against the Russian
people. They are a Communist trademark, an established
procedure peculiar only to communism.
At the close of 'VorIel 'Val' II, these facts had already been
written on the pages of history. Unfortunately, llluch of
what was on those pages was still a Comlllunist secret. If
we had known all the facts and had taken them to heart, we
could have spared oursel\'es much grief during the Korean
'val'.
26
Chapter 3
OUTBREAK IN KOREA
A
rmed with Soviet weapons, North Korean Communist
forces invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. Six days
later a battalion of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division was
rushed to Korea from Japan.
Thus began one of the strangest wars in American history.
Our cause was simple and just, but our objectives were
frequently confused in the public mind.
The Korean war had three aspects. There was the civil
war aspect-North Koreans fighting South Koreans for con
trol of a divided country. There was the collective aspect
the first United Nations' attempt to stop a treaty-breaking
aggressor. And there w ~ s the cold war aspect-the Western
powers blocking the expansion of Commlmist imperialism.
The causes of the war, United Nations' objectives, and the
need for American intervention were not clearly delineated
in the public mind. This lack of understanding prevailed
among American civilians and fighting men.
The Communists attempted to exploit to the fullest this
condition both in international propaganda and in dealing
with our prisoners of war.
THE COLD FACTS
The United States began a piecemeal bUild-up of the fight
ing forces in Korea. The first units to reach Korea were not
well prepared for combat. However, by November 1950, the
North Koreans had been completely beaten, their capital
was in Allied hands, and their remnant forces' were scat
tered and disorganized. The victory seemed assured until
the Chinese Red avalallChe crashed over the Yalu.
In late November, the Chinese opened a massive counter
offensive, hurling our forces into retreat. Early in Decem
ber, American and Allied forces were trapped at the Chang.
Jin Reservoir. By fierce fighting they broke the trap and
fought their way to Hungnam, where they were evacuated.
There ensued a \vinter of back-to-wall battling in subzero
cold.
It was during this grueling period, which began in .July
1950, that most of the American PO,Y's were captured.
"DEATH MARCHES"
The first ordeal the prisoners had to suffer-and often the
worst--was the mardi to the PO,Y camps. 'l'he .L\orth
Koreans frequently tied a prisoner's hands behind his back
or bound his arIllS with wire. 'Younded prisoners \,"ere
jammed into trucks that jolted, dripping blood, along broken
roads. Many of the wounded received no medical attention
until they reached the camp. Some were not attended to
until days thereafter.
The marching prisoners \vere likely to be beaten or kicked
to their feet if they fell. A nunrlJer of the Communist oflicers
"ere bullwhip barbarians. T h e ~ ' were particularly brutal to
28
South Korean captives. Many ROK prisoners were forced
to dig their own graves before they were shot-an old orien
tal custom applied to the execution of criminals. Some
Americans, with their hands tied behind their backs, were
shot by the enemy.
So the journeys to the prison camps were "death marches."
On one of these marches, 700 men headed north. Before
the camp was reached, 500 had perished.
The camps were what might be expected in a remote
corner of Asia. Prisoner rations were scanty-a basic diet
of rice occasionally leavened with some foul kind of soup.
The average American could not stomach such fare. Sick
ness broke out in the camps, and many of the men suffered
long sieges of dysentery.
The men suffered much from c0ld in winter and heat in
summer. 'Water was often scarce; bathing became difficult.
Barracks were foul and unsanitary.
In the best of the camps, the men behind the barbed wire
were sometimes given tobacco, a few.morsels of candy, occa
sional mail. A few Red Cross packages got through. How
ever, the enemy consistently refused to permit the Interna
tional Red Cross to inspect prisoner-of-war camps. There
was good reason!
THE "BAD" CAMPS
In the worst of the camps, the prisoners existed by the
skin of their teeth and raw courage. Men in the "bad" camps
were known to lose 50 pounds in weight in a matter of
weeks.
The "bad" camps included the so-called "Bean Camp" near
Suan, a camp known as "Death Valley" near Pukchin, an
other camp called "The Valley," apparently in the vicinity
of Kanggye. Among the worst camps were the "Interroga
tion Center" near Pukchin and a neighboring disciplinary
center called "The Caves." This last was literally composed
of caverns in which the men were confined. Here they 'Were
forced to sleep without blankets. Their food 'Was thrown at
them. There were no latrine facilities. In "The Caves" the
29
prisoners were retlueetl to a tlegTE'e of miselT n]](l degradn
tion a lmost unbelievable. 'I.'hose sent to "Tile eaves" we.re
prisoners accused of insubordination, breaking camp rules,
attempting to escape, or committing some otller so-called
crime. 'rhe testimony of sun'ivors suggests tlwt tl1E' "crime"
was seldom fitted by the punisllllwnt.
Tile primnry interest of the Korth Koreans was to impress
United Kations captives and Korean civilians with their
"superiority" over "'Vestern barbarians." TllPY operated on
the theory that "might is right" and demonstrated that
"right" by some of the most inhumane types of atrocities
and brutalities that "'estern civilization has seen. '1.'0 im
press the civilian pOlHllation, the Korth Korean Communists
placed American capOn's on display in the village squares
of Korea. They beat and even murdered exhausted, sick.
:lllcl wounded Americans who could not defend themselves.
J:\Iistreatment of American prisoners by the Korth Koreans
had no relationship to interrogation and political indodrina
tion. Ac:tually, the Korth Koreans were not primarily inter
ested in collecting intelligence information or exploiting the
prisoners of war. 'I.'hey did not conduct an organized pro
gram of indoctrination.
They did conduct some interrogations of United Nations
prisoners. These were limited, crude, and aimless, and did
not produce enough tactical or political information to con
stitute an achievement. One of the stock questions was,
"Why did the United States invade North Korea 'I" Most
Americans questioned by the Koreans were asked, "How
many automobiles has each American?" 'I'he manner in
Which the Koreans conducted their limited interrogations,
using tlll'eats and beatings, usually resulted in opposition
by the prisoners rather than cooperation.
CAPTURE BY THE CHINESE
'I.'he brutal manner in which the North Koreans treated
captives became known to thousands of the United Nations
forces. As a result, many Americans felt that capture by
the Chinese would bring similar treatment. Therefore, when
an American captive of the Chinese was not shot or other
30
trained and indoctrinated themselves in communism and all
of its techniques was demonstrated by their bitter criticism
of everything American and by repeated references to the
"capitalists."
After the initial contact with the enemy. some Americans
seemed to believe that the enemy was sincere and harmless.
They relaxed and permitted themselves to fall into a well
disguised trap by a cunning enemy.
The Chinese Communist leaders, military and political,
were educated-many, in the United States.
c
Many also
spoke English fluently. Most of them possessed a fairly
good understanding of Americans and of the other nation
alities that composed the United Nations forces. They were
shrewd, and they recognized the potential value to the Oom
munist cause of converting prisoner-of-war camps into lab
oratories in which they could experiment with various
methods of group-handling and indoctrination of United
Nations prisoners, especially Americans.
THE FffiST BRIEFING
Shortly after capture, American prisoners were escorted
to a point some distance behind the front lines. The Ohinese
used these points for assembling and briefing the prisoners
before marching them to permanent prison compounds.
When assembled at the collecting point, the prisoners were
briefed by an English-speaking Ohinese Communist officer.
The officer told the prisoners that the war in Korea was a
civil war, like the Civil War in the United States in 1861.
The prisoners were told that the United States was the real
aggressor in Korea and that the American capitalists forced
other nations to send troops to Korea to help fight a war for
Wall Street. The prisoners were told that the military
aggression by the United States so angered the Ohinese
people that the "workers" of China decided to "volunteer"
for military duty and come to the rescue of the North
Korean people. The prisoners were told that the war in
Korea was illegal because the Oongress of the United States
did not declare war against the People's Republic in North
Korea.
32
The Communist officer further told the prisoners that, in
view of the fact that the war wrrsnot legal, the Chinese and
K:or-ean peoplewonld not consider thecaptives:,pl"isoRers of
war but rather as "students." As students they would be
reeducated .by the Chinese and K:orean People's Govern
ments. The reeducation about which the enemy spoke meant
indoctrination-Communist indoctrination.
PERMANENT CAMPS
After the prisoners. had undergone the briefing at the
collecting points and had been identified and tagged, they
were evacuated to one of the permanent camps in North
Korea. The evacuation under the Chinese was more orderly
and less ruthless than umler the North Koreans-another
instance of the Communist deception technique in operation.
The sick and wounded were assisted by Korean civilians
who used carts to help them along the marches. The food
en route did not meet American standards but was far better
than the food given prisoners by the Koreans. Medical care
for the marching prisoners was poor, but the Chinese made
what they had available to the more serious cases of sick
and wounded.
After arriving at permanent camps, the prisoners were
immediately organized into units comparable in size to
United States Army units. They were grouped into squads,
platoons, and companies, each under a unit leader. Orig
inally, the leaders were selected by the Chinese Communists
on the basis of leadership qualities, military bearing, and a
loud, commanding voice. This manner of selection, however,
was discarded almost immediately because the units were
run too much like regular military organizations, and this
was contrary to the Communists' strategy. The enemy re
examined the original leaders, checked their backgrounds,
and determined which ones could be depended upon to lead
the units in the way the Communists wanted them led. In
many instances, the unit leaders were studied as potential
group leaders and monitors for indoctrination classes. Obvi
ously, the objective behind all this was to gain and maintain
complete control over the prisoners.
33
After the Chinese had established a POW organization
that would satisfy their purposes, they began a conditioning
process designed to render the prisoners more vulnerable to
their propaganda assaults and to their political indoctrina
tion program. The enemy's initial objective was to gain the
prisoners' neutrality, if not cooperation, by undermining
their sense of duty, their friendships, and their democratic
ideals. To attain this, the enemy had no set of rules. No
trick was too dirty or mean, no weakness too unjust to ex
ploit, no threat too violent 01' subtle to be used again and
again to batter the resistance of the prisoners and to crush
their will.
Fear, threats, confusion, tension, isolation, retaliation,
informers, and censorship of mail were used effectively by
the Chinese Communists. Since these control measures
played such an important part, and since they will probably
be used again and again in any future situation of this kind,
it is important to explain some of them in detail.
SPREADING FEAR
The Chinese Communists first generated fear among the
prisoners by warning them that they might be strafed by
our own planes in Korea. This was not an unfounded warn
ing, because we had ail' superiority in Korea at the time,
and the Chinese did not report accurately the locations of
the various PO'V inclosures. This warning created a pecul
iar fear in the minds of the prisoners-fear of harm by
friendly forces. Stories of atrocities and brutalities, a few
of which were based on fact, were deliberately spread. In
this instance, the implication was that in some rare and
unusual situation, the enemy might find it necessary to re
sort to torture, but if he did it would be as a last resort for
the sake of discipline. The enemy spread rumors that some
prisoners might be shipped to Manchuria or to China and
that the trip might be a one-way affair.
Another rumor deliberately. planted and spread by the.
enemy was that if prisoners did not cooperate wiJh the
Chinese and Korean People's Governments for peace, some
might not be repatriated. This inspired the greatest fear in
34
the prisoners-of spending an indeterminate period as pris
oners of the ComIllunists.
Playing on basic human instinC't and emotions, the enelllY
started a rumor that food might be withheld from those
prisoners who did llot cooperate with the enemy. 'I'his
rumor, coupled with another that even the primitive medical
care would be withheld in case of illness, intensified the
normal fear of siekness and disease. This fear increased
further when the prisoners considered the fact that they
were liVing under conditions far below the normal sanitary
standards in the United States and other modern countries
of the world.
Perhaps the most significant and destructive fear was fear
of the unknown. The Chinese played upon it in the hope of
redueing the resistance of the prisoners. 'I'his caused some
prisoners to weaken and a few to accede to Communist de
mands. An analysis of this aspeet of group-handling by the
Chinese COllUllunists r e H ~ a l s that the prisoners actually
were more afraid of the unknown than of the things they
could see, feel, and hear.
INFORMING
One of the most VICIOUS and despicable tactics employed
by the Chinese Communists was to organize nets of in
formers. The enemy had two types of informers. One ,yas
the unwitting informer. He had no specific instructions
from the enemy nor, as a matter of fact, did he realize that
he was serving as an informer. He was called to the enemy
headquarters at various times and engaged in general con
versation. The conversation would a l w i 1 ~ - s
lead to prison
life and prisoner actiyities. Through careless talk, the pris
oner gave the enemy information about other pi'isoners and
unwittingly informed on them.
The other type was the regular informer, who reported
to the enemy at night or at other specific hours designated
by the enemy. He gave the enemy information about other
prisoners through weakness or to enhance his position in the
eyes of the enemy. In certain instances a regular informer
deliberately gave the enemy false information about some
prisoner or prisoners, which resulted in unwarranted pun
ishment or hardship for the victims. As a result, prisoners
were tried and severely punished for offenses about which
they knew nothing-the work of the informer.
The position of the informer was so insecure that he had
to report any questionable act in case someone else informed
on him, thus causing him to lose his position. These "ques
tionable" acts included such indefinable misconduct as "nn
wholesome" or "hostile" attitude, the recording of "improper
notes" at an indoctrination lecture, and expressing "a capi
talistic philosophy." The type of prisoner recruited by the
enemy for this work was the opportunist, who stopped at
nothing to further his own gains. In return for informing,
the Chinese enemy permitted him to conduct various activ
ities, snch as selling food to hungry prisoners. The informers
were feared to some extent by the other prisoners, but their
attitude and conduct more frequently were viewed with
anger, shame, and dis6'ust.
36
IN CONCLUSION
Despite the wide publicity given to informers and collabo
rationists, they did not set the pattern for our fighting men
in Korea. The large majority of American prisoners resisted
the enemy in the highest tradition of the service and of our
country. Of those who resisted, some were singled out for
brutal treatment. Some of these cases will be discussed in
later chapters. In the long run, however, those Americans
who I:esisted fared about as well physically and materially
as the few who chose t:p,lil road of least resistance. And they
had this decided advantage-the personal satisfaction of
having acted in the highest moral tradition of a nation
under God.
37
Chapter 4
"PROGRESSIVES"
AND "REACTIONARIES"
W
ho were the "progressives" and who were the "reac
tionaries" ?
These words took on special meanings in the prison camps
of North Korea. American fighting men who considered
themselves liberals were proud to be called "reactionaries"
for demonstrating firm resistance in a Communist prison
camp. On this point, they saw eye to eye with their more
conservative buddies. And both liberal and conservative
POW"s looked with contempt on the P01V who came to be
known as a "progressive."
How did a man become a "progressive"?
If he began to show the "propel' spirit"-to cooperate with
his captors-he was lectured and handed Communist litera
ture. A docile prisoner who read the literature and listened.
politely to the lectures was graduated to a better class.
Finally he might be sent to "Peaceful Valley." In this lenient
camp the food was relatively good. Prisoners might even
have tobacco. And here they were given all sorts of Marxian
propaganda.
The graduates from "Peaceful Valley" and others who
accepted Communist schooling were called "progressives."
And there were shades of meaning!
THE "PROGRESSIVE" ROLE
A British study described a "progressive" POW as one
who accepted the political, economic; and social gospel of
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin-even if he was not quite
sure what this was. In order to be fully accepted as a "pro
gressive," however, the prisoner had to do more than pas
sively accept communism. He had to become a Communist
propagandist and assist the Chinese, not only by giving them
all the military information he had but also by acting as an
38
informer, reyealing the plans and thoug11tS of his fellow
prisoners, and helping to spread COItlInunisIll among them
and among his family and friends at home. Thus he would
show that he had becOIl1e "politically conscious."
'l'lie seeond allil more literal application of the "progres
siYe" label beeallle apparent in the systematic exvloitation
of a prisoner's serykes once he had gi yen in on just one
issue. Often the first bit of eooperatioll with the enemy
seemeel minor in nature; and the prisoner eould rationalize,
with the captor's help, to justify the act. But the first eon
cession va yeel the way for a second, and so on down the line.
"l,Vith each "progressiye" step dOWll collaboration road, the
chance of turning back becaml' more remote. 'rhus SOUle
vrisoners learned too late that they couldn't be just "a little
bit" of a collaborator so long as the COIIlmunists wanted
their senices.
The were called UpOll to deliYer lectures,
write pamphlets, and make propaganda broadcasts. They
..39
wrote speeches condemning capitalism and "American ag
gression in Korea." They organized a group known as
"Peace Fighters."
On a percentage basis, fewer officers than enlisted men
were "progressives." However. the officers' influence, unfor
tunately, was strong on the enlisted men. "If the Captain
can do it, why can't I?" "If the Colonel signs a peace peti
tion and orders the rest of us to do it, we have to follow
orders, don't we?" Altogether, the officers and enlisted men
who resisted were on a spot. That most of them refused to
join the "progressives" (and rejected a promise, sometimes
unfulfilled, of better food, minor luxuries, and mail call)
says something for the spirit of both officers and enlisted
men.
The Communists soon learned that Americans were not
readily sold on communism. Even those of lesser education,
or perhaps having little appreeiation of their own country's
principles, were by no means eager to accept this foreign
ideology or to submit to it. The early "converts" turned
out to be simply opportunists seeking to better their own lot
without regard to the consequences for their fellow pris
oners.
THE "REACTIONARY" LABEL
Ho,v did the "reactionary" fare? He could expect to be
separated from those prisoners "'hom the enemy deemed to
be more susceptible. 'Yhile there was good chance the "re
actionary" would experienc'e some solitary confinement, in
time the Communists found themselves short of facilities for
handling all resisters in that manner. Thus small "reac
tionary" groups formed, increasing in size as time ,vent by,
isolated to prevent their interference with the subjugation
program in the "progressive" camps. Brought together by
virtue of their demonstrated resistance to the enemy, these
were men who could, despite any personal differences alllong
themselves, present a united front against the enemy and
help each other survive.
Still, the "reactionary" label ,vas n6 guarantee that the
prisoner was permanently free from enemy efforts to sub
40
jugate him. Any American who signed a propaganda leaflet,
a peace petition, or a gerIll-war eonfession was a big f('ather
in the enemy's hat. Logieally, the higher the rank of the
prisoner the more useful would be sueh serviee to the enemy.
Also, the "breaking" of a senior offieer, a "notorious reac
tionary," or anyone who had demonstrated leadership and
other strong qualities that had earned the respeeot: and trust
of fellow prisoners, was of tremenelous benefit in the COIll
munist effort to convince other prisoners (anel people baek
home) that resistance was futile. For that reason, various
''reactionaries'' were subjected to pressures often loosely
refel'l'ed to as "brainwashing."
Breakdown of leadership was what the enemy wanted.
Ofiieers were usually segregated. "Progressives" were placed
in leadership positions. And if the enemy's .appointees
weren't obeyed by the other pOIV'S, punishments were in
store for the "insubordinate prisoners."
41
THAT LONESOME ROAD
"'hat did the "progressiye" expect to gain in the long run
... after the Korean war was oyer? "Vas he thinking that
far ahead?
It is doubtful that any of the "progressiyes" beeame sin
cere converts to the Communist ideology. Even in the ease
of the turncoats-21 American prisoners who r e f u ~ e d re
patriation and remained in Red China-the seemingly logi
eal assumption that they lw,d been c<l!1verted has pro\'ell
erroneous. Perhaps this misconeeption was fostered by
frequent references to them during the repatriation proeess
as ,those who chose cOlllmunism." Indications are that this
misleading phrase was introduced by Communist publica
tions.
In any event, reports by returned American prisoners on
the actions of those men indicated that they remained for
quite different reasons. The subsequent return of some of
the 21 further refutes the idea that they "dlOse eommu
nism." One of these, interviewed in Hong Kong and asked
why he stayed in Red China in the first place, replied, ".
I'll tell you this much-it wasn't for political reasons."
,Yhy did the 21 refuse repatriation? Perhaps, in some
cases, they feared vengeance at the hands of men they had
betrayed, or at the hands of friends of men who had died
because of their treason.
THE LAST MILE
Having cut himself off from his own country and his own
people, what can the collaborator expect from the Commu
nists? The answer became apparent during the Korean war
and it is just as true today.
The Communists know that the turncoat will be no more
trustworthy for them than he was for llis own side. The
enemy cannot expect to [lain actua.l allegiance from a col
la,bomtO?" if for no other reason tllan tllat lie has none to
[live. For a chan[le of alle[lianee, the ultimate possibility of
colla,boration, wouldneeessItate a willingness to die for the
enemy. Obviously, the prisoller 1[ho betrays his Olen people
out ot teal' tor his lite isn't going to be willing to die tor
anyone else, either.
:1'10 matter where collaboration begins, the Communists
continue to press a POlY for further services until they have
no further use for him. At that point they drop him; and
no one is anxious to pick him up. Certainly his prison-mates
will lwve little use for him, since his collaboration with the
e n e m ~ ' . no matter what it was, will have in some manner
inflieted further hardship on them. Perhaps even more illl
pOl'tant, from the standpoint of his chances for survival, the
collaborator will have little respect for himself.
'Yhatever the Communists may promise in exchange for
collaboration, their payoff will be smalL Any slight advan
tage the collaborator might gain as a result of service to the
enemy will be of no value over an extended period of im
prisonment. In the long run, the resister and the col
laborator may fare about the same in the purely physieal
sense. But psyehologically, there will be a big differenee.
For the man who gives in will have several handieaps: A
sense of failure, or remorse: the loss of respect, both self
respect and that of his fellow prisoners, that in time may
well destroy his ,vill to live. In any case, "Man does not live
by bread alone," In a Communist prison, where bread is
likely to be sean'e, snstenance of the spirit-hope, faith, and
Will-may well be the determining factor in survivaL
Having kept faith, the "reactionary" is the winner.
505596--59----4 A3
Chapter 5
INTERROGATION
A
pow should be prepared for brutal treatment if inter
rogated soon after capture by an enemy seeking
military information of immediate value. Tactical inter
rogation, wherein time is of the essence, is more likely than
any other to include severe physical torture. Certainly it
will include many threats, probably beginning with the first
refusal on the part of the captive to give information.
During the Korean war, practically all Air Force POW's
were given special attention. The primary objective of the
Chinese Communists was to use them for propaganda pur
poses, particularly for germ-warfare propaganda. How
ever, they were grilled also for military information.
Not only in fliers but in all POvV's, the Chinese interroga
tors tried to create a fear that, by some mysterious process,
they would break under questioning. The idea of "brain
washing" was spread by the Communists to create the false
impression that their method and manner of conducting
interrogations were irresistible.
METHODS ARE KNOWN
Actually, the methods used by the Communists to obtain
information are not new, mysterious, or irresistible. They
have been used for centuries. These methods are based on
the simple idea of progressively weakening an individual's
physical and moral strength. They are not based on some
weird psychological theory. Numerous persons have faced
Communist interrogation and withstood so-called Commu
nist "methods" for weeks, months, and even years, without
"breaking" or even demonstrating fear of any kind. Many
of those persons have returned without showing any IJecul
iar or unusual ill-effects as a result of their experiences.
Communist interrogation of United Nations prisoners of
war in Korea revealed this significant principle-that
Communist objectives frequently limit the use of physical
eoprdon or torturp. The intplTogator knows that thp pris
oner eannot answpr (] uestions after he is dead. Ali Ye, re
J'nsiug to yield, the prisoner remains a potclltial sourep oj'
iu[ormation to his captors: dead he is worthless. Although
the Commnnists will attempt to make use oj' a prisoner's
nntural anxiety and J'ear, most oj' the prisoners who are
subjP(tp(l to Communist interrogation will not be physieally
tortured, (,yen though they reJ'usp to cooperate with the
'1'he rpnsons for this "nry. but a "ery important one
is that the Comillunists are praetiC'al in their approaeh to
illtprrogation. learned during their reigu of
terror in thp SOYiet {'nion that physieal "iolence. morp
fre(llwntly than not, stiffens gronp l'l'sistance, rather than
the rp\'prse.
NATURE OF INTERROGATION
Ill[('l'!'og"ation has some charnC'tpristics oj' both a sdpnce
nud au art. It rpsemblps a sdenee ,,"hen conducted by a
45
shrewd and trained interrogator who knows what he wants
and proceeds in an orderly, logical, and determined fashioll.
Interrogation resembles an art when the interrogator
establishes a relationship between himself and the person
being interrogated wherein the latter is subtly persuaded to
cooperate in giving information beyond the simple answer
ing of questions. The interrogator, by demonstrating pa
tience, tolerance, sympathy, and understanding, is able to
obtain cooperation in achieving his desired results.
Some of the Chinese Communist interrogators in Korea
were skilled and possessed the drive, tolerance, and patience
to obtain the information they were after. Often they knew
English and were well-informed about life in the United
States. Some had been educated in the United States and
were familiar with the economic and political institutions of
the United States. In fact, some of the enemy personnel
in the interrogation section were better informed on certain
aspects of American life than many of the prisoners.
From the first interrogation, the COlllmunists tried to
confuse the American PO",V's into questioning the sincerity
of our objectives in Korea. "Divide and conquer" was the
insidious keynote. Only a few Americans were casualties
in this battle to capture their minds in the PO",V camps.
The Communists, nevertheless, regarded their interrogation
and indoctrination program as an effective weapon in
exploiting American POvV's.
FIRST INTERROGATION
The Communists began their interrogation soon after a
PO",V was captured. With a downed flier, it began almost
immediately after he was picked up. ",Vith other PO",V's, it
began at the collecting point where they were brought to
gether. However, the first conversation was more like an
interview than a real interrogation:
Generally, the enemy asked the prisoners several routine
questions and a few questions on the military situation in
the United Nations areas. After completing his direct inter
rogation, the enemy distributed numerous forms and told
the prisoners to sign them. Some of these forms carried
American, International Red Cross, or one of many other
headings, most of which were invalid. In addition to sign
ing and completing these forms, the prisoners were told to
sign just their names on blank pieces of paper, which the
enemy collected and subsequently used for propaganda
purposes.
Many Americans signed the various forms because they
did not know or believe at the time that the enemy would
use the contents of the forms for purposes of incrimination.
During the initial interrogation, many Americans talked
freely with the enemy and answered most of the questions
asked. The lack of resistance during the initial interroga
tion by the enemy resulted from the apparent friendliness
the Chinese had displayed when the prisoners were captured.
At the various collecting points were Chinese whose duties
were to screen the completed forms and record the results
of the initial interrogations. They studied the answers to
the questions on the various forms and compiled a per
sonnel file on each prisoner, which included the question
naires, results of the initial interrogation, and the blank
slips of paper on which the prisoners had signed their
names. These files were later forwarded to the camps to
which the prisoners were assigned, and the results of all
subsequent interrogations were added to them.
An analysis of the results of the interrogations enabled
the Communists to select or determine the subjects or atti
tudes that should be emphasized and exploited in the indoc
trination program. In this way they could hand-tailor the
indoctrination given to the various groups of prisoners.
At the permanent camps, appropriate physical facilities
were provided by the prison command. The United States
British Prisoner of 'Val' Camp Number 5, located near the
city of Pyoktong, North Korea, was the model for all other
camps in Korea. The interrogation sections were located
in the camp headquarters, usually near the commanding
officer or near the security officer. They were equipped
with wire recorders, exposed and hidden microphones,two
way mirrors, and a version of a lie detector. The interroga
tors were Chinese officers, assisted by Chinese women,
47
whose duties primarily were to record interrogations on
paper in Chinese characters and maintain accurate rosters
of prisoners who had and who had not been interrogated.
The sections operated on a 24-hour basis and conducted some
of the most fruitful interrogations at night.
PRETENSE IS FUTILE
Alone and disarmed, what can one man do under such
interrogation? If he yields, he knows he is disgracing him
self and undermining his country's safety. Yet when he
holds out, he knows he may be in for rough treatment.
Is there an easier way out?
Just after the Korean war, there was talk about sueh a
solution. One suggestion was that members of our Armed
Forces should be instructed, if taken prisoner, to "confess
to anything." Not only would this take the pressure off the
PO,,,, it was argued, but it would also confuse the enemy
since he would not know where truth left off and fiction
began.
This strategy was to haye included the preliminary
announcement to the world that our men would do this if
captured, thereby "nullifying" the propaganda value to the
enemy of any such things as false confessions and peace
petitions. In its original form, the "confess-to-anything"
fOl'mula made clear that it was to apply only to such things
as false confessions and propaganda. In the realm of
military information and maintenance of unquestionable
faith with fellow captives, there could be no deviation from
a rigid standard.
It was a fine theory! However, experience has shown
that once a prisoner started answering questions, the skilled
interrogator could be certain of gaining some information
from him if he had sufficient time. By no means does this
mean, as some have contended, that an interrogator can get
all that he wants from a prisoner in due time. It does
mean, however, that the prisoner who tries to outmaneuYer
the interrogator is certain to divulge some information.
Baiting a trap for the POW, the Communists will allow
him to "get away" with pretense during interrogation
48
eyen encourag"e it-for the simple reason that they want the
prisoner to develop a habit of pretending. One official study
of Communist methods in attempting to elicit false "germ
warfare" confessions from captive American fliers describes
them as something of a training process. The victim was
not simply confronted with demands for a false "confes
sion": he was enticed into pretense. First the subject of
"germ warfare" was discussed in very general terms, with
broad hints that the prisoner knew quite well what it was
all about. Suggestions were made that if the prisoner "had
something on his conscience," it would be to his own advan
tage to "unburden himself." This could go on for days or
"'eeks, until the prisoner himself Blight ask if he was being
accused of such activity. To this, the enemy would often
respond with something to this effect: "I have accused you
of nothing. Howeyer, if you have something on your
conscience ... !"
The prisoner was left to figure out for himself exactly
"'hat was wanted. If he did figure it out and if he did
comply, he soon learned that "tongue-in-cheek" compliance
was not enough. He must learn to speak, write, and act
as if his false confession-hmyever preposterous-was en
tirely true. Since he was "confessing" to a "horrible
atrocity," he must also pretend feelings of guilt, shame, and
eyen repentance.
""here such pretense supported Communist propaganda,
as in the case of a "confession" to germ warfare, the Com
munists could-and did-go along with it indefinitely. But
where they had encouraged the PO,V to lie as a way of
trapping him, they showed no leniency when the conflict in
his stories became apparent.
The prisoner whose lies led him into the Communist trap
was considered a more grievous offender than the man who
refused to answer, for in addition to wasting the interroga
tor's time he proved that he was "insincere" and "had not
learned the truth." An interrogator was more likely to
desire personal vengeance against the prisoner who "sold"
him on false information than against the prisoner who
maintained a position of respectful noncompliance.
49
SUMMARY
The means employed by the Communists to obtain infor
mation from United Nations prisoners of war were not new,
unique, mysterious, or irresistible. They were recognized
and understandable methods of undermining an individual's
physical and moral strength. By deception, and by other
tricks, the Communists obtained apparently useless informa
tion from prisoners who did not realize that all information
is important. The success of the enemy's program of in
terrogation depended, to a large extent, on the prisoners'
lack of knowledge of what was happening to them-a factor
on which the Communists have always relied.
The American fighting man should remember that the
Communist interrogator is not a superman with mystic
powers and unique methods by which he can accomplish the
impossible. He is not all-knowing, nor is he all-powerful,
eyen when dealing with a seemingly powerless Yictim, such
as a prisoner of war.
It would be foolish, however, to underestimate the skill
of the Communist interrogator. Effective resistance to in
terrogation, as one ex-prisoner has put it, is not so much a
matter of outwitting the interrogator as of otttlasting him
by determined, steadfast refusal to cooperate in the face of
all manner of treachery, threat, coercion, and even death.
Those who resisted completely the most skilled Communist
interrogators deserve the gratitude and admiration of every
American, for they are examples of courage, determination,
and endurance.
Chapter 6
INDOCTRINATION
W
hen plunged into a Communist indoctrination mill,
the average American PO'V was under a serious
handicap. Enemy political officers tried to force him to
read Marxian literature, to participate in debates. He was
prodded to tell what he knew about American politics and
history. Lectures - study groups - discussion groups - a
blizzard of propaganda and hurricanes of violent oratory
were all a part of the enemy teehnique.
To many American prisoners this procedure came as a
complete surprise and they were unprepared. That some
refused to read the literature, participate in the debates, or
engage in politieal discussions with their skilled captors is a
tribute to their courage.
But to a frightened, confused, and hungry prisoner,
depri"ed of leadership and guidance, these initial steps by
the Communist enemy were effective. Although most pris
oners did not realize what was happening to them as the
program progressed and while they were being subjected to
interrogation, there were no secrets about what the enemy
planned to do along the line of "reeducating" the prisoners.
It was reiterated numerous times that they were "students,"
and, as students, they were going to be reeducated along
Communist lines. This fact was made clear at the very
beginning. It was never altered.
Basically, the indoctrination program had two main
objectives. One was to indoctrinate completely a smaH,
select group of prisoners in the actual theory and practice
of communism as a world conspiracy. The second objective
was to undermine the faith and trust of the other prisoners
in their country, their government, and its 'political leaders
-not to make Communists out of all the prisoners.
In attempting to achieve the first objective, the Commu
nists selected the prisoners on whom they felt they could
depend, gave them special training, tutoring, and counsel
51
ing, and extended them special treatment. This was in
keeping with the ComllJunist concept, as advaneed by Lenin,
that a small, select, disciplined group should lead the
masses. As an incentiTe for the "chosen few" to apply
themselves to the task of betraying their country and their
fellow prisoners, the Communists told them that tlH'y were
the "liberators" of thc nHlsses, and prollJised tlH'm positions
of leadership in the 17nited States-after a Commlmist
(ljreeted revolution had replaced our democratic system
with a Communist forlll of government.
In pursuing their second objective, the Communists con
sistently smeared the 17nited States. Any imperfections of
our political and economic institutions were (listorted com
pletely out of proportion. At no time was mention of the
true democratic principles of the 17nited States Government
permitted in discussions. In addition to attacking Ameri
can concepts of democra('y, the COIllmunists launelled attack
52
a[U'!' 1Itt1l('k :lg"ill"r ..\lll('rican statesillen by nallle, c!1Iillling
th1lt tll('y we!'e the ('bid' pNpetrators of war and e\"il.
'1'11e COllllllunists felt that if they eoul<l su('('eed in the
se('ond ol,jedil-e--sub,-erting the prisoners' loyalty---tlwse
AllIericans would be less opposed to eOItlIllunislll after their
repatriation to the United States. The COllllllunists also
re:lsoned that these ex-pl'isoners would be mo!'e likely to be
to all.v C"ltllllunist eonspiraey against the
l'nited St:ltes. Part of their plan ('ailed for the thoroughly
indoetrinated prisonerf', upon their return to the United
Sr;ltes. to 1ISSllIll(, leadership of the snbverted ex-prisoners
alld lII'ge tI,Plll to snppo!'t tile C"'lllllllllist eonspiraey through
the instrunwnt:llity of the COlllIllunist Party.
OTHER OBJECTIVES
III support of these two main but general ohjel'tiYes,
there were sppelfie (J!JjeetiYes that had a more direct: e[[eet
on the lin's of the prisoners. '1'0 faeilitate internal eontrol
of the pris"ner p"pulation, the Chinese COlllIllunists at
tE,mptecl to org:lni%e a net of informers to relay to the camp
53
authorities information concerning the activities of other
prisoners. Through informers, the Chinese Communists
were able to thwart many escape attempts. Informers also
furnished the Chinese Communists information concerning
prisoners who were actively resisting indoctrination.
Another objective was to recruit collaborators to assist
the Chinese Communists in implementing the indoctrination
program. These collaborators would give propaganda lec
tures, write articles, and attempt to talk other prisoners
into signing "peace petitions," surrender leaflets, and other
types of propaganda.
Still another objective, which fortunately had no success,
was to recruit potential agents to perform espionage or sub
versive activities for the Communists after re]latriation.
The few who agr-eed to work for the Communists realized
soon after their repatriation that they had been duped and
notified the American authorities of this Communist ]llot.
COMMUNIST FRONTS
Every Communist activity in North Korea was geared for
one general purpose-to support the overall mission of
political indoctrination. Early in the war, for example,
there were various Peace Committees, whose job was to
smear America as a warmonger and to laud Communists as
champions of peace. In addition to operational committees
for indoctrination, the Communists established a number
of committees for the administration of the prisoners.
These were: Sanitation Committee, Daily Life Committee,
Athletic Committee, Mess Committee, and a Committee for
Prisoner Morale. The membership of these committees,
like that of the others, was made up of prisoners. At all
levels of committee activities there were Communist politi
cal advisers who insured discipline, control, and nondevia
tion from the established routines of the program.
Most Americans have heard about Communist-front
organizations. A Communist front is an organization con
ceived by Communists, inspired by Communists,controlled
by Communists, and directed by Comlllunists, but which has
as a "front" some popular or ]lseudo-patriotic cause. The
various committees in the prison camps in North Korea
served as fronts for the Communist enemy. POvV's who
became members served the Communist enemy in North
Korea in the very same manner in which other naive individ
uals have seryed the Communist conspiracy outside of
prison camps.
PHASES OF INDOCTRINATION
The Communists administered their indoctrination pro
gram in two general phases. The first can be called the
preparatory phase, the second the implementation phase.
Preparatory Phase. This phase, a "softening-up" or "con
ditioning" process, was conducted through the medium of
a series of lectures on the imperfections of the governments
under which the prisoners lived before capture. Th.e United
States Government and its economic and political systems
constituted the main target for all lectures. During this
phase, the United States was accused of instigating the
war in Korea.
Implementation Phase. This phase of indoctrination was
devoted to selling communism as a way of life to be
preferred over the democratic system. The Communists
used an old technique during this phase--comparing one
with the other, pointing up the favorable aspects of com
munism and emphasizing the so-called "defects" of democ
racy. The enemy pictured the Communist state as a state
in which every man, woman, and child lives a life of happi
ness, free of poverty and class discrimination.
METHODS OF CONTROL
The Communists used the carrot-and-stick method of
controlling POW's. When the carrot failed, they relied on
three sticks: repetition, harassment, and humiliation.
Repetition. This technique was used against all prisoners
at one time or another during their captivity. Some pris
oners, yielding to pressure, memorized certain material and
were questioned and examined on it for days, weeks, and
months. They were asked to answer the same questions
over and over again. They were required to read and re
55
read Communist propaganda over and over again. By
repetition the enemy caused some prisoners with relatively
poor formal education to memorize heavy works on com
munism and economics. Some of these prisoners memorized
entire sections pf books by Stalin and Lenin. .As a result
of this repetition technique, some prisoners who had not
advanced beyond the sixth grade could recite long essays
on communism and its economic and political theories.
Harassment. This technique, like repetition, was used
against a great number of prisoners during their captivity.
Harassment was employed on a precise schedule that did
not vary from day to day, week to week, or month to month.
Its purpose was to create a state of anxiety in the prisoners
-to keep them tense and in a state of constant uncer
tainty. It was also contrived to make the prisoners believe
that harassment would end eventually, and that they could
then live as normally as possible in prison. Harassment
was usually based on trumped-up charges against prisoners.
These charges could be anything from a very minor infrac
tion of the rules to a major offense, such as striking an
enemy officer. However, it worked best on, and was
designed for, prisoners who committed minor offenses in
connection with the indoctrination program.
Humiliation. This technique was designed to be used
against prisoners who demonstrated a great deal of per
sonal pride. Its objective was to break down a prisoner's
personal pride by making him look ridiculous in the eyes of
the other prisoners-to provoke shame and embarrassment
in him. To assure its effectiveness, it was almost always
used by the enemy in the presence of other prisoners.
GENERAL RESULTS
The results of Communist indoctrination in North Korea
by the Chinese must be appraised in the light of the
enemy's objectives. .As mentioned earlier, the Communists
in North Korea did not attempt to convert every United
Nations prisoner. They wanted to indoctrinate a few
selected prisoners whom they could trust to accept com
munism as a \Yay of life. These could subsequently develop
,,56
into Communist revolutionists. Primarily. the Communists
in North Korea desired to destroy, or at least reduce, the
hostility felt by the prisoners toward the Communist cause.
They attempted to plant seeds of doubt that would grow
and produce an attitude less opposed to communism.
In the light of those objectives, it is reasonable to
assume that the Communist program of indoctrination in
Korth Korea was successful to some degree. Official find
ings revealed that a small, select group of United Nations
prisoners of war in North Korea was indoctrinated by
the enemy in the theory and practice of communism. They
also revealed that an undetermined number of other United
Kations prisoners of war did not accept communism as such,
but adopted an attitude of "seeing both sides" of commu
nism, observing some "good" points here and there. These
sources further showed that the indoctrination weakened
the old beliefs of some prisoners, confused other prisoners,
and frustrated still others. 'With the exception of the
allegedly indoctrinated prisoners, the others who saw
merit in some aspects of communism failed to visualize com
munism as a threat to their democratic governments or the
political institutions in their countries.
SUMMARY
The political indoctrination program had two major
objectives:
The first was to indoctrinate a small, select group of
prisoners in the theory ancI practice of communism,
not as it appears through Communist propaganda but
as it actually exists-an international conspiracy.
The second objective was to weaken the loyalty of the
prisoners to their countries by undermining their
political, religious, and moral convictions and thereby
so confusing them that when they returned to their
native countries they would be less opposed to
communism.
Some American POW's did not know what the Communist
program was all about. Some were confused by it. Self
57
seekers accepted it as an easy out. A few may have be
lieved the business. They signed peace petitions and
peddled Communist literature. It was not an inspiring
spectacle. It set loyal groups against cooperative groups
and broke up camp organization and discipline. It made
fools of some men. and tools of others. And it provided the
enemy with stooges for propaganda shows.
Fortunately, that was not the whole story. The over
whelming majority of United Nations prisoners of war
rejected communism as a system of government and as a
way of life. Generally, the Americans returned to their
country wiser in the ways of communism and stronger in
theIr faith in the United States of America.
58
Chapter 7
PROPAGANDA
P
ropaganda is tl1e H'ry lifeblood of communism. It
keeps tl1e Communist world conspiracy alive. 'Yitl1out
propaganda, communism could never have grown an(l
spread as it has. Througl1 propaganda, tl1e Communi",t
leaders sound the keynote of tl1e current "party line" to be
followed and parroted by tl1eir underlings. The terms
"'Yall Street warmongers," "Yankee imperialism," and
"decadent democracies" are but a few that were conceived
by Communist The "big-lie" technique, em
ployed in the germ-\varfare accusations leveled against the
"['nited States, exemvlifies tYllical Communist propaganda
in action.
It should have been expected, therefore, that the Com
munists \vou](l try to use e.x. prisoners in Korea for
provaganda purposes. In the prisoner-of-war camps,
provag'anda was the backbone of the enemy's indoctrina
tion program.
The tie-in with the worldwide Communist plot is shown
by the fact that several Soviet vropaganda experts were
attached to the Chinese Communist prison organization and
actively supported the Chinese in all vhases of prisoner
of-war administration. The presence of these experts from
the Soviet l;nion ,,-as one of the reasons that group
handling in North Korea by the Chinese was so similar to
Communist group-handling in Germany, Polaml, and the
Soviet Union. One such eXl'ert was from the )foscow
Aeademy of Propaganda, where eareer Communist propa
gan<lists are specially trained in the propaganda themes
best suited for each of the geograllhical areas of the world
or for each of the various racial groups.
In addition to the Soviets serving on the propaganda staff,
an Australian newspaperman and longtime Communist an(l
a British Communist correspondent served as advisers to
the Communist propaganda chief. These two "'estern
newspapermen were responsible for giving the propaganda
-5 59
n ""'est'ern sIn nt" nnd presl'nting it in a falllili:lr "'estern
forlllat.
PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES
The objel'tive of all CoIII nlllll ist propng"lIl<1a in .'iorth
Korea was the glorification of l'omlllunislll amI the degrada
tion of the Vnited States. It was tbe COlllnlOn ell'nH'nt of
cOllllllunism present in all COllllllunist ac-tivities of the prison
COIllIlW]H1.
TIle basil' theme of COlllmunist propag':l!Hla in 1'\orth
Korea wns penl'e, nnd tlwt general tIlellle n e n ~ r challged
because the "pence offl'nsive" J)y COllllJl11l1ists throughout the
Y\'orI<l hns ne\'er ch:lIlg-e(1. The COllllllllllists were talkill,g
peace back in 1!)80 and said tIlPn that t l H ' ~ ' \vould lull tIll'
free world into a stnte of pP:H'e nnd thell strike \dtIl a
c1endwd fist. In lllore ]'('('('nt times. tIw Comlllllllists have
llePIl trying actin'ly to achien' th:1t objectin'. In 1!)17. the
COlllllll1lIists held a series of confer('I!('ps in :\Josco\\' and
m:t<]e plans for an international peal'e oj'fpnsive, A similar
60
conference was heW in 1949. As a result of these peace con
ferences, the Stockholm Peace Convention, the Chicago
Peace Crusade, and the Helsinki Peace Conference followed.
The latter conferences were heW to convince the world that
communism was a peaeeful movement and that the Com
munists were the real d1amlJions of peace. At the same
time, the Communists were accusing the \Vestern powers of
prelJaring for \Vorld \Var III. This strategy followed the
plans made by the Communists at their various conferences
for peace.
In 1Q:")O, the Comlllunists accelerated the peace offensive as.
a result of the war in Korea. PrOIJaganda generated in
North Korea by the Chinese COIllmunists was designed for
the prisoners, for the Communist and non-Communist worlds,
and for the hig;h eommand of the world Communist con
spiraey. The manner in ,vhkh a typical "peace lJetition"
was used hy the Communists in Xorth Korea serves as a
good example of the far-reaching effects of this type of
propaganda.
Communist lJropagandists prepared the basic material for
peace petitions. The petitions then were forwarded to the
prison camps for signatures. After each petition had been
signed by several hundred prisoners, the Communist propa
gandists checked it amI made ,vhatever additions woulel
more sper-iti<-ally support the overall Communist objectives.
'rhe peace petition was then sent to certain strategic coun
tries, s\1(h as the United Stntes, India, Japan, and
all Communist countries. In those countries, certain Com
munist agencies receiyed them for further dissemination.
example, in the Unitecl States, the Daily 1Vorkcr, the
Conm1l1lli,st Pnrty, nnd the Xationnl Peace Center receiYed
the petitions and distributed them to the ;'front organiza
tions," In addition to Communist agen(jes, one other organ
ization receiYed at lenst fiye copies of almost eyery petition
signed in Xorth Koren by United Xations vrisoners. That
agene.y was the Unitecl Xations. The reason for this is
obyious.
Few, if any, United Xntions prisoners who signed peace
petitions thougllt those documents woulcl find their way into
61
every Communist channel in the world and eventually reach
the United Nations as an "indictment" of the United States.
Too late they realized that they had helped the Communists
with two propaganda objectives, which were (1) to portray
Communists as lovers of peace and (2) to demonstrate to
the world that comlllunism had won hundreds of United
Nations prisoners over to its cause.
PROPAGANDA TARGETS
Certain special propaganda targets were designated by the
Communists. These, as a rule, were the aspects of American
life that the Communists believed they could attack on the
basis of their imperfection. The Communists attacked these
targ"ets by using false "confessions" made by prisoners, in
which they leveled charg"es against the United States and
against the American way of life. For example, some 11ris
oners volunteered to write long papers on American banking,
relating it to war and profits. Other prisoners wrote on
racial discrimination and religious intolerance, making it
appear that these practices were usual and not exceptional
in the United States. The Communists would take this
material, distort it, and fashion it into propaganda against
the United States.
The most ambitious and far-reaching propaganda effort
was the extraction of utterly false germ-warfare charges,
which were coordinated with the "peace offensive." The
Communists obtained from some United Nations prisoners
"confessions" in which the prisoners allegedly admitted that
they personally had engaged in germ warfare against the
Korean civilian population. Such "confessions" were not, in
themselves, enough to support the Communist charges, so
the Communists also used "confessions" from other pris
oners who said they believed that America used germ-war
fare weapons against the Korean people. The prisoners'
voices were recorded, and the comments of those who heard
and saw them were recorded.
By actual count, the Communists broadcast the germ-war
fare charges against the United States throughout Asia at
least 415 times during one period of 17 days. They prepared
62
(lnd (]istributed the "eonfessions" in book form, eom]llete
\\itll 1'1lUtogral'hs of the "bombs" and the Unite(] "'ations
prisoners who admitte(] using the "bombs," So deU'rmined
\\ere the COlllmunists to distl'edit the United Stat('s that the
eharges were oflieially ]lresented to the Unite<1 Xations Gen
eral Assembly by (]elegates "frolll the Soviet Union. Tbese
ebarges \\"l!re so serions that the Cnited States Govermnent
found it ]l(.'eessary to issue an official denial.
On a [ess('r seale, the COllllllnnists trie(] lllany other triC'ks.
Tbey tried to the fre(! world into belie\'ing
that tbt'y l\"l're providing the Cnited Xations prisoners \I'itll
faeilities eOlllparable to those the prisoners had enjoyed be
fore their ('apture. The COlllllll111ists that notbing
produ('es better "proof" tban a picture. So, in pnrsuit of
their objeetin" t!lPY made lIUlllel'ons photographs of pris
oners enjoying ba:--:k(lthall. f('Ullis, s\\'inulling, and cheC'l\:er:-;
in a nlUdern re(']'('al iona 1 elll bilOllse. These )lllOtographs were
63
disseminated to the world under glowing captions, indicating
that the prisoners in North Korea were well treated by the
COmllllll1ists.
For months, prisoners did not receive any mail whatsoever
because the Communists were withholding it. At the same
time, the Communists did not permit the prisoners to write
letters to the Cnited States. At the propaganda center, how
ever, the enemy made numerous "prop" photographs of
prisoners sitting at tables in the clubhouse writing letters or
reading alleged mail from their families in the United
States. These "props," like the others, were given wide
dissemination in the free world to create the false impres
sion that the Communist enemy in North Korea was permit
ting a free exchange of communications between the pris
oners and their families. Some such "prop" photographs
even had captions "urging" the prisoners to write to their
families.
"TOWARD TRUTH AND PEACE"
This publication was the official organ of the Communist
prison command and was under the supervision of the
propaganda section. Although it was staffed by United Na
tions prisoners, a Communist propagandist served as adviser
and insured that the newspaper would not deviate from the
accepted policies. The paper appeared to be a purely pris
oner activity, with prisoners contributing to it as editorial
writers or as reporters of camp news. However, most of the
articles were Communist-inspired, supporting the enemy and
severely attacking the United States and the United Nations.
The prisoners submitted an average of 600 articles for each
iSHue, of which approximately one dozen were published.
The ones that were not published in the paper were pub
lished in a wall newspaper-a sheet plRced on all company
and unit bulletin boards at all camps. "Toward Truth and
Peace" was published at United States-British Prisoner of
'Val' Camp Number 5 and was circulated to all other camps.
A WORD TO THE WISE
Of the various aspects and techniques of communism,
propaganda is one vital element that the American fighting
64
lllan shou!<l know, lllH]erstand, and be able to evaluate in the
light of COlllmunist. objc'etives. The lUere reeognit:ion of
C\Hlllllunist IH'()paganda is a defense against COllllll1ulist in
doctrination, beeause in(]oetriuation is nothing more than an
organized distortion of faets aud fabric-ation of falsehoods
disseminate(] through the medium of propaganda.
It. SllOU!<l be reiterated, too, that the Amerlean fighting
lnan should yiew (;omnl11uist propaganda in the light of
COlUmunist. objettin's-loeal, uational, and worldwide. Com
munist propaganda nen'!" ehanges its basic liue of exaltiug
communism and eriticizing eapitalism, especially eapitalisIU
as it exist.s in the Unite(] States. All local COlUlUuuist prop
ngauda lias a din'tt or ind]n'('(: relntiouship with worl(I\Yitle
COIlllunllist IIl'Ollag:lnda.
.i1 !.'JJ/Z SCCIIC at Dcalh Gallip (Calilp O'DollllclI) on LII;OIl,
Aftcr tli c pllOlo[jraplicr SIIPPCr! Iii is picturc of Amcricu
prisollcrs Of /1"1', sclcctcr! for thcir hcalthy appcarancc, the
ricc ICC18 rCl/torcr!.
65
Chapter 8
PROBING FOR WEAK SPOTS
F
rom the moment a PO'V falls into their hands, the Com
munists begin probing him for weak spots. Sometimes
they cajole; sometimes they threaten. In either case, they
are trying to find ways to make him do their bidding.
Sometimes by direct threat, sometimes by subtle implica
tion, the prisoner is made to feel that unless he does the
enemy's bidding, he will die. In early stages of captivity
the threat is more likely to be direct: "Answer the question!
- "-rite a self-criticism! - Sign this peace petition! 01'
you will die!"
Captain Theodore Harris, an Ail' Force PO'V, experienced
this in dramatic fashion during the Korean war. One day
he was forced to dig his own grave. Then he was told he
would be shot unless he signed a confession that he had
drolllled germ bombs on North Korea. 'Vhen he refused, he
was lliaced before a firing squad. Triggers were pUlled, but
the guns were emllty.
By his bravery, Captain I-Iarris won this game of Russian
roulette. But this did not end his troubles. 'l'hroughout his
14 months as a PO'V, the Communists kept probing-IJrob
ing-probing.
TACTICS CAN CHANGE
Sometimes a PO'V will respond to a threat of death with
hopeless resignation, rather than with the determination
that moved Captain Harris. 'When this happens, the Com
munists can do a quick about-face. Dead, the PO,,' is of no
value to them. Their job now is to find other ways of making
him do what they want him to do.
Kext comes a period of "reassurance" to bring the man out
of his fatalistic, resigned mood. "'Ve do not kill prisoners,"
he is told; "we have a lenient policy." Great "sympathy" is
shown by the enemy for this unfortunate fellow, much "con
cern" for the things concerning him the most. But at the
66
first sigh of relief or flicker of IlOPO in the prisoner's eyes,
there follows: "Of course, if yon are to qualify for our
lenient treatment, you must demonstrate your Willingness
to ('ooperate."
In some such nUlIlner it begins. Like a eat toying with a
mouse, the captor manipulates the llrisoner's emotious, alter
nating between wistful hope for release and abject fear of
death. Whether the threats are direct or implied, til(; skilled
interrogator does his best to hold the captive on the fine
edge of indccision. He relies on the tug of war between the
prisoner's hopes and fears to wear down his resistance. For
67
a prisoner, except for the opportunist, does not decide
collaborate; he submits gradually-"progressively," fro
the Communist point of view.
DECENCY IS UNKNOWN
In probing for weak spots, the Communists make no co:
cessions to decency. They know that food, medicine, ar
mail are important items in prisoner-of-war camps, more f
than in normal life. In North Korea, they used these thin!
to break down prisoner resistance. Each had a place in tt
enemy's program of indoctrination, and each was used by tl:
enemy in a variety of ways, for a variety of reasons.
Food. Food was manipulated, not so much by tIle enem.
as by prisoners whom the enemy had selected to distribut
it. "Progressives" or collaborators in several camps weI'
given the responsibility of issuing food. They manipulate,
the food as a reward for cooperating with the enemy. AI
though this practice was not the general rule, it nevertlleles
was used to persuade certain prisoners.
Medicine. Medicine and medical treatment for a time wen
offered to prisoners as special rewards. The fact that th.
enemy did not allow the captive American medical officer!
to attend the sick and wounded prisoners indicates tIm
medical treatment was considered a controlled function re
served for the enemy to use as he determined. Many Ameri
can lives could have been saved if the enemy had actec
humanely by dispensing available medicine and hy llermit
ting American doctors to care for the sick and wounded
prisoners.
Mail. Under the provisions of the Geneva Com"pntion, and
under the established policy of the International Red Cross,
the detaining power is required to deliver the mail to the
prisoners after it has been censored. Such mail must be
conveyed by the most rapid method at the disposal of the
detaining power. Instead of following this established pro
cedure, the Communist enemy used the mail as a weapon
and released it piecemeal in many instances as a reward for
"cooperation."
68
To break down the resistance of the prisoners, the Com
munists established a "system" of releasing mail. If they
wanted to gain control of an individual prisoner, they would
select and release only letters whose contents reflected worry
and discontent, or conveyed bad news. Naturally, such let
ters would have an adverse effect on the prisoner. Knowing
what the normal reaetion would be, the enemy approached
the prisoner and, by hints and insinuations, further added
to his worries and loneliness. The Communists tried to con
vinee the prisoner that they were the only friends he had.
By withholcling favorable letters from the prisoner, they
weakened his spiritual bond with his family. In some cases,
the enemy IH'aetically divorced prisoners from their families
and loved ones simply by manipulating the mails. By so
doing, the enemy hoped to establish himself as the only prop
on which the prisoners could lean for moral support.
At this stage, Communist pressure would be applied gently.
The Communist captors would do their best to arouse the
POlY's self-concern. "You must consider yourself," they
would tell him. Then they would add that he owed nothing
to the "fat capitalists" who were living in luxury while he
suffered in prison. Under the pressures of the moment, the
POlY frequently forgot that the very enemy who pretencled
this sympathy was responsible for his suffering.
GIVE-UP-ITIS
Sometimes the Communists defeated their own purpose by
pnshing a man too far. Thus they learned that the sarne
factors ancl cirCitrnstances that had aided thern in their
efforts to ancl eamloit a lwisoner can also destroy
the pdsonel"s will to live! And in many cases, death inter
vened to end a POW's troubles.
Unquestionably, the physical hardship of imprisonment
accounts for most of the deaths; lack of medical care for
the wounded and siek, for example. But time and again
when survivors were asked how some particular prisoner of
their acquaintance had died, the answer was, "He just gave
up."
69
Investigation of the nature of "give-up-itis" showed certain
similarities in all cases. One of the most noticeable was
what might be termed the "withdrawal." Each prisoner who
died in such a manner had isolated himself from the others.
Not only had he avoided conversation or association, but he
had actually resisted-in the earlier stages when he had
strength to resist-overtures of friendship or assistance
from others. In the latter stages, he had lacked the strength
to tell anyone to leave him alone, but his unresponsiveness
had usually been enough to discourage any would-be Samar
itans.
Most often the victim huddled in a corner. He would
cover his head with a blanket, if he had one, or some piece
of his clothing-anything to shut himself off more com
pletely. He refused to eat, if anyone bothered to offer him
food. He soiled himself rather than get up and go to the
latrine. Usually, when he died his body would be drawn up
into an approximation of the prenatal position. Each
"victim" of "give-up-itis" died tttterly alone. Rarely, if
ever, did any of the witnesses sincerely mourn his passing.
WHILE THERE'S LIFE . . .
The Communists do not want to promote "give-up-itis"
any more than a lobsterman wants to promote a disease that
will kill his lobsters. Most of the men who resisted the more
extensive pressures realized somewhere along the line that
the enemy did not want them to die; at least not while they
were under special duress. Often, in fact, the Communists
exerted considerable effort to keep a prisoner alive if he
became dangerously ill. And they tried to prevent him from
killing himself if he appeared suicidally inclined. This is
perhaps explained in part by the simple fact that the Com
munists want martyrs tor their "cause," not against it.
This was shown in the case of Captain Theodore Harris,
previously mentioned. Once, as a protest against the type of
questions being asked him, he went on a hunger strike that
lasted 12 or 13 days. His Chinese captors finally got him to
end the strike by agreeing not to ask him any more ques
tions about germ warfare. They honored their agreement
70
for one month-nntil he lwll rei!:ninell some of his streni!:th.
'l'hen they bei!:an probing ni!:nin for weak spots.
'l'he Communists ha"l"e leilnwd through long experience
that physical mistreatment is not the best way to
obtain reliable information from a prisoner. 'l'hough an in
tt'lTog-lltor lllily be able to foree a lUan to talk by nsing
torture. he lloes not know whether a nswers so obtainell are
reliable or false. 'I'ht, answer may hn been made up for
the simple purpose of stopping the torture. Nor llo all meu
break (lo\\n nwl talk under tortnre. Sometimes uneonsdous
ness or siwek relieves them of all pnin: in other eases, so
intense is the hatred awl delia nee aroused that they o\er
whelm all other sensa tions.
COllsider case of it tough .ArlllY Sergeant natHed
bert, who was a PO\\' in Korea. Questioned ai!:ain and ai!:ain,
he stu('k to name, rank, serinl nUlllber, and dnte of birth.
In tellini!: of his experienees, he said the Communists made
71
him kneel on sharp boards, they put him in a grave, the
made him stand outside in the winner cold in his unckrwem
They shot a pistol behind his head.
"If I got no other satisfaction out of the war," he saic
"I do have the satisfaction of knowing that I didn't tel
those anything and they couldn't make Ill<
tell them."
In probing for weak spots, the Communists frequentl:
meet "Sergeant Talberts." They provide food for thought
72
Chapter 9
THE POW CAN RESIST
T
he C'ommunists j('al'llel1 that if they push a POIV
too far too soon, their al1vautag-l' will be lost. A pris
oner's acceptance of his fate--ileath, torture, or whatevl'r
l1eprh'es them of tllPir main lever ag-ainst him: tear.
. \t till' mOlllent of his l1edsion to resist the enemy, eome
\\-1111 t may, the prisoner will 1mn' overcome the main psycho
log'ii'al ohstnl'les to slll'\'intL '['his cOl/l/l/est of fear on his
part relien'S his minl1 of frustration. Ill' retains hope, hut
lIP is no long'er torn lll'tween hope nUil fear. His lllinl1 is
now alert to prohlems of survival awl escape. No long-el' is
lte ilreamy allll wishful; heneefot'th, he will a vail himself of
11t the risk of death, A-meTiean prisollCrs of war celebrated
ttll: -1tt! of .TI/tl!, I.'Jf!, in a Japanese eamj) on, Jli}/(talw.o,
Pit ilij!Jline T8tU liltS.
73
every opportunity to care for himself and help others do the
same. He welcomes work details that might offer an oppor
tunity to pilfer from enemy supplies or scavenge for food in
fields or woods. Rather than benHmnhis cireumstanee, he
makes the best of it: thus he counters the eaptors' efforts
to make him feel dependent on them.
THE POW MUST BE ALERT
Despite his apparent vietory, the POlY must remain alert.
His Communist captors have not given up; they probably
are biding their time ... just as tIley did with Captain
Harris during his hunger strike. IVhen they think the time
is ripe, they will renew their efforts.
If ever you become a PO,,' and find yourself at this point
in your relations with your Commujlist captors, remember
this: not only must you gct outside yourself; you must stay
outside yourself. For the man who is free in spirit, "stone
walls do not a prison make,nor iron bars a eage."
Even if you are kept isolated for long periods of time, you
can stay outside yourself if you think of yourself as a
fighting man, still fighting for your country. Think of your
fellow Americans who are counting on you to help preserve
our way of life. Think of your fellow POlY'S whose welfare
will often depend on your success in resisting subjugation.
You are not alone!
TOGETHER WE STAND
Although long periods of solitary confinement are a possi
bility for which you must be prepared if you become a
prisoner of war, the chances are much greater that you will
spend most of your time in the company of other POlY'S.
If so, you can draw strength from them, and they will draw
strength from you. This was pro,ed again and again in
Korea.
Especially insplrmg was the record of the Turkish pris
Ollers captured while fighting on the side of the U.N. forces.
Although almost half of the Turkish POlY'S had been
wounded before being captured, not one died in prison. In
an article on prisoners of war that appeared in The New
74
rorkCl' o[ :2(; Octobpr 1!);')/, Brig-ac1ipr Gpneral Willis A.
Perry, CSA, \\'as quoted as [ol!O\\'S :
At Dpath "allpy, one of the tpllll'Onu'y prison camps
established by thp .\'orth I(orpan COllllllunists in the early
<1ays o[ thp war, thp skk amI \\'onIlde<1 pOllr('d in
for \yeeks ill a ghastl.v stTf?Hlll, the T1nl'ks lost not :l sing'le
Illan ont o[ a hUIHlrec1 all(l ten, \\'hile we lost I'onr huu<1red
to eig-ht hIllHII'('([ out of tiftppn hUIHlred to eig-bteeu Imn
dred. \\'hen a Turk g-ot skk, thp I'(,,.;t nur,.;pd him back to
hpalth, If a ,.;ick Turk \\'a,.; ordered to thp llO";l'ital, t\\'O
wpll Turk,.; weut along'. Thpy mini,.;tpred to him hand all(l
foot \\'hile he \\'as there, all(l when lIe \\'as discharg-ed, they
carripd him hack to the COIllPOIIIHL The Tnrk,.; all ,.;lwrpd
thpi l' (loth ing- and thpi I' food equa Ily. "'hen thp Com
lll\llIists did the cooking- for thp caJllp, t\\'o Tnrks were
dispatched to bring- ba('k 1'00<1 [01' thp g-ronp, amI it was
<11\'ided in equal portion,.; ([m\'ll to the Inst JIlor,.;el. '1'11erp
,vas no no rule of dog eat clog.
75
"'hile it is true that some Americans fell short of what
was expected of them, this was not the general rule. MallY
seryicemen exhibited pride in themsel yes and their units.
This was particularly vronounced in those who had belonged
to the same unit for years. They stood by one another like
that "hand of brothers" inspired by Nelson. If a man was
sick, his fellow POlY'S took care of him. They washed his
clothes, bathed him, and pulled him through. They exhibited
true fraternal spirit, comradeship, military lllide. These
men did not let each other down. Nor could the Korean
Reds win much cooveration from them.
'Yherever resistance was successful, esprit de C01pS aIHl
disciVllne were imvortant factors. This was true of Ameri
cans as well as Turks. In their hatred of COllllllullism, how
ever, the Turks were eyen more outspoken than the Ameri
cans. HaYing llYed near the Communist world where they
could see communism at close range, the 'l'urks l o a t h e ~ l
everything communistic. They broke camp rules and refused
to obey eyen reasonable requests simply because those re
quests were made by Communists.
ANTAGONISM DOES NOT HELP
,Yhile such behayior showed courage, it is generally true
that an unduly antagonistic attitude 'Yill not help you if you
become a POlY. The best conrse is to maintain a proper
and forlllal military bearing. 'Yhile no course of aetion ean
relieve all hardship, respectful refusal to gi\-e information
or to comply with other improper demands is less apt to
incur further vhysical maltreatlll,,"nt than are those actions
or mannerisms that in themselYes might insult or infuriate
the captors.
Self-resvectlng demeanor and formal prnvriety in the face
of all threats and abuses will in some measure hinder the
enemy's efforts, perhrrps in time thwart them altogether.
A3To{jauce, on the other hand, cannot but bring on further
abuse. A captor can hardly be expected to accept personally
abusiYe or insulting language from a captiye. Nor would
he be likely to permit for long an insolent attitude or actions
disrespectful to himself. A little comIllon sense-an appraisal
76
of the situation from the captor's point of view-will show
why proper military bearing is the most desirable conduct
in the face of whateYer the enemy might threaten or do.
SUICIDE IS NO WAY OUT
As a fighting man, you are prepared to give your life for
your country. If you fear that under torture you may do
or say something that would hurt your country, the thought
of suicicle may haye occurred to you. If so, get rid of that
thought NOW.
Neither yonI' country nor your Service will countenance
suicide. Kor will your God! Suicide runs counter to the
teachings of both Christianity and Judaism.
You are prepared to giye your life only when you are so
oYerwhelmell that you c-an no longer resist. If you choose
to die at tllC 7/(/nd8 at tlic cllcm!J rather than to yield in such
a way that yon compromise yonI' country, you will have
died a hero's death. Between death and dishonor, you will
have chosen death.
You haye no such choice if you contemplate suicide to
esc-ape torture. If you resist to the bitter end in a POW
camp and if death comes at the hands of the enemy, you will
haye liYed and died as a fighting man. But if you die by
your myn hanel because you are afraid you will not be able
to uphoW your honor and your country's honor when the
test comes, yon actually will have surrendered-finally, and
for all time.
Suicide is no way ont!
THE BREAKING POINT
Resistance by a fighting man can bring on his death, either
in combat or as a PO'V. A wise man understands and
accepts this. He knows also that resistance can lead to his
surviyal. "'hat will be his own fate, he cannot say.
It has been said that "eyery man has his breaking point."
If by this we mean that any man can be broken physically,
driven to the point where he may collapse because of pain,
hunger, or lack of sleep, the statement is true. However, it
77
is not true if we mean that a man of intc,gTity can reach a
point at which-to escape further suffering-he will con
sciously and willingly do or say things to dishonor himself
and his country.
Viewed thus, anyone who still holds that "eYery man has
his breaking point" is necessarily including himself among
the breakable. He also is demonstrating a fairly common
human shortcoming: namely, he is trying to justify his own
self-recognized shortcomings by telling himself that "eyery
body is like that." A man may very well not be sure how
much physical or mental stress he can withstand until he is
put to the test. He can be taken at his word if he announces
in advance that he lias no values, principles, or convictions
for which he is willing to endure more than minor incon
venience.
HE WHO DIES RESISTING
The man who dies resisting is not broken. Nor is one who
is driven to mental distraction. Men were driven to distrac
tion by psychological pressures in the Communist prison
camps of Korea. But this was a form of mental escape,
much as unconsciousness is relief from physical suffering.
ViThen the preSfHlres were removed, mental faculties soon
were restored. The man who dies for something in which
he believes does so willingly, and without regret unless the
regret is such as that expressed by Nathan Hale-that he
had "but one life to lose."
Our foes in the past have expressed admiration fot' U.S.
fighting men who fought valiantly against them or held fast
to their convictions at all costs. The Communists actually
fear the man who proves himself willing to die rather than
submit to their demands. His resistance creates for them
something of a dilemma; even though they are in a position
to kill him if they wish, to do so would create a martyr
against their "cause." This they wish to avoid. Further
than that, such resistance proves that the Communists are
not invincible, negating the Marxist premise that comnlU
nism is the "irresistible waye of the future."
78
So long: as tht'l'e l'('llUtillS rt llUlll \\"ho is \vHling h) (lie for
his cOll\'idious, it cauuot be said that "e\'ery man has his
brpakiu,:';- I'0iut:." Those who woul(l claim for themselves the
title of U.S, fighUug Ulau, a.nd all olhers who staud reso
lnlel:..- for luullan <1ig'nity ami freedom, must be persons of
sw,h ('ouyictions ami faith, So 10llg as men l i n ~ there will
he those who, by one me:lllS or another, will strin> to force
their ways 11iH>!1 all lll:lllldnd, Only so long as other lllell
are \villing to die for their principles, will they c011tin11e to
know-or even deserve to know-the meaning of freelloJU!
79
Chapter 10
THE CODE IS YOUR ARMOR
E
yery war has its disturbing aftermath. 'l'here is al
ways another side to the Victory coin. If the victory is
not clearly imprinted and the war has ended in what seems
a stalemate, the coin becomes susjlect. In any event, there is
usually a postwar inventory. If losses haye been heavy and
objectives obscure, the coin may seem debased.
'l'he inventory after the "War of 1812 was unpleasant.
There were some painful reactions after the Spanish-Amer
ican ,Val'.
In a great war, some battles are inevitably lost. lIlilitary
leaders study these battles, determined to uncover' "mistakes,
if any were made, so that errors in kind may be avoided in
the future.
Correction of possible errors and the need for a unified
l,lan for the future led the Dejlartment of Defense to ex
amine closely the prisoner-of-war situation in Korea. Accord
ingly, the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of ,Yar
was organized early in 1955 to study the problem.
Guidelines for the Committee were given by Honorable
Charles E. ,Vilson, then Secretary of Defense. In a memo
randum to Mr. Carter L. Burgess, then Chairman of the
Committee, he had this to say:
I am deeply concerned with the imllortance to our na
tional security of provifling Americans who sen"e tlleir
country in battle with every means ,ve can devise to
defeat the enemy's techniques. To assure tile success of
our Armed Forces it is equally as essential to arm them
with the best weajlons of the mind and body as it is to
W'ovide them with the machines of war.
Our national military needs must be met. This requires
that each member of the Armed Forces be thoroughly in
doctrinated with a simple, easily understood code to gov
ern his conduct while a jlrisoner of war. However, this
80
!IIilit:I!'Y nel'd be Inet ill a ll\;lllllPr cO!llpatible with
thp and p!'eeepts l"ISie to onr fO!'!11 o[ gOH'rn
!IIent. En [oj'('ellIPll]- !IInst bp 1ll'l'Olllpiisheil \\'ith justice
and nnderstall<ling,
A SEARCHING STUDY
Going to \\'ork i!llllll'diatply, thp COIll!llitl:ep Illade a search
illg o[ thp 1'0\\- probleills by the {(orPHn \\'ar.
AftPI' a review 0[ the treatment of PO\\"s in past centnrips,
thp Comlltitl:ep sc!'ntini%pd \\'hat the COlllllllmists bad done
to (',S, lighting lllen \y!lo ],l'l'ame pl'isoners in KorPIl, It
stndipd t!lp CO!llmnnist Illenwds of iIltl,lTogation, indoctri
natioll, anll propagallll:l in prpyions (bapters.
Delying' into statbties, the COllllllit(:ee facell t!H'se filets:
A totlll of ct,t::!'" Allle!'iean fighting mpn were recovered
frtnn ellPlllY C'alllpS ill rrhe prison exchanges
],egan \yUh "Operation Litne S\\'itcb" in April lD;i8. Some
noo .\llietl prisoners were retnnwd in eXI'bange for ten times
"Operation Little 81uiteh." American soldier in first: group
oj' si('k II}/({ f("o/Ii/(/('iI 1'0 lV's ('.I'chllili/cllin Eorca reachcs
Jlljill II , .n April l!6.i.
81
"Operation Hip S1vitch." U.N. prisoners, released by Com
11/lIllisl ful' I'I'))(//I'i(//iol/, (/1'1'11'(' (// ]'(/)/1111111)0/)/. 11'01'('(/.
ti ..I11,1/lls1 If/.j'!.
thut muny Conllllunist und :\orth
"Operution Big S\\'i!'ch" of tbe Alllerir'ull
\\,prp re,'oYered. At tillw it lenrned thnt
2,7:30 hud (liell ill Korenn prisoll ThiN
f! denth or nenr]y fOllr out of en'!'Y tell.
By joint action of the all of the I'('COY
ered \\'ere by militnry intelligence Of the
565 \yhONe cOllduct a7:3 \\,el'(' c!P,lred or the
charges them \\'('1'1' dropped after ()f
the remnining 1!l2 the of ,17 j'ol'\yarded
to the appl'oprin te lield for in\'('sl ig'u lion to
dptermine \Yhether they \\'f!l'I'anted Irial by rtin!.
Only 14 of the 47 cases Iried by rtia!. nnd of
tl)(' 1'1, three \\'en" f!c/lnitted nnd 11 conyicted.
Typical Charges. A PO\\' 1SO of
delh'pl'ing anti-U.S. ",peecl!es, infol'llling on fello\\"
82
hoarding food, teaching classes in communism, and ordering
men to sign peace petitions. There was no evidence he
suffered duress.
Another case involved a PO,Y accused by many witnesses
of "ratting" on his prison-mates, beating a sick prisoner,
forcing' a fellow prisoner out into the snow and leaving him
therp. to die.
There was a PO,Y who allegedly courted favors of his
captors as soon as he reached prison camp. He was charged
with confiscating the small tobacco ration dealt to the other
men and eating more than his share of the food. Allegedly,
he made the heartless remark, "The more men who die here,
the more food for the rest of us." He signed peace petitions,
made propaganda broadcasts, and evidently "ratted" on
other prisoners. There was no evidence that he was coerced.
There was evidence that a PO,Y informed on fellow pris
oners planning to escape. He wrote Red literature for his
cal)tors. He was put in charge of a spy system that led to
the lmnishment of "reactionaries" in his camp. He asked
for the job. No "brainwashing" there.
Turncoats. The Oommittee studied the cases of the 21
turncoats who decided to stay with the Oommunists. Their
nUlnlJer included men accused of informing-which sugg'ests
a good reason for electing to remain in the enemy's country.
Evidence indicates that few of these 21 were "sincere" con
verts to communism. Expediency, opportunism, ancl fear of
reln'isal doubtless infiuenced some of the group.
No Drugs Used. The Committee also learned that POW's
in Korea had not been drugged. Other methods, such as
denial of food or sleep, had been equally effective and more
practical.
POW SHORTCOMINGS
The "braimvashing" question ,vas thoroughly investigated.
In some cases this time-consuming and coercive technique
was used to obtain confessions. Most of the prisoners, how
ever, were not SUbjected to brainwashing but were given
high-powered indoctrination for propaganda purposes.
83
Only a handful of the PO'V's in Korea were able to main
tain absolute silence under military interrogation. Xearly
all of the American prisoners went beyond the "absolute"
name, rank, number, date of birth restriction.
Reviewing the interrogation matter, the Committee felt
that the steps taken up to 1955 by the Armed Forces had
been decidedly inadequate.
The Committee heard evidence which revealed that many
of the PO'V's knew too little about the United States and
its ideals and traditions. So the Chinese indoctrinators had
the advantage.
The uninformed PO'V's were up against it. They couldn't
answer arguments in favor of communism with arguments
in favor of Americanism, because they knew very little about
their America. The Committee heard a number of ex-PO''''s
state that a knowledge of communism would have enabled
them to expose its fallacies to their camp-mates. The Red
indoctrinators tried hard to win the support of faetory
workers. But as one of them put it, "'Ye'd heard all that
guff before. Back home. 'Ye knew their line." Knowledge
was a defense weapon.
'Yhile it might be argued that few of the men became
sincere converts to communism-indeed, the percentage
seems to have been infinitesimal-the inability of many to
speak up for democracy distressed loyal PO,Y's. Acti"e
collaborators aside, there were certain passive prisoners "'ho
"went along." They lacked the weapon of knowledge.
However, such conduct was not typical of U.S. prisoners
in Korea. On this point, the Committee exvressed itself as
follows:
A few statistics may prove reassuring to anyone who
thinks the Armed Forces were undermined by Communist
propaganda in Korea.
A total of about 1,600,000 Americans served in the
Korean war. Of the 4,428 Americans who survived Com
munist imprisonment, only a maximum of 192 were found
chargeable with serious offenses against comrades or the
84
United States. 01' put it another way. Only lout of 23
American PO'V's was suspected of serious misconduct.
'Vhen one realizes that the Armed Forces come from a
cross-section of the national population, the record seems
fine indeed. It seems better than that when one weighs
in the balance the tremendous pressures the American
PO'V's were under. "'eighed in that balance, they cannot
be found wanting.
THE REMEDY
As the Committee grapIlled ,,'ith these problems, answers
gradually became apparent.
In a war for' the minds of men, the enemy's methods can
be successfully combated by military training and civilian
education. In battle and in captivity the fighting American
is no better than his training and character. Military school
ing can teach him combat skills. Such know-how is a "must."
But skill must be reinforced by will-by moral character
and by basic beliefs instilled in home and classroom long
before a lad enters the military service. Pride in country
and respect for its principles-a sense of honor-a sense of
responsibility-such basics should be established long before
"basic training," and further developed after he enters the
Armed Forces.
As the Committee saw it, united action was needed. Al
though all the Services had regulations on conduct, the U.S.
Armed Forces had never had a clearly defined code of con
duct. There had been piecemeal legal restrictions and regu
lations but no comprehensive codification. However, despite
this lack of a code, American fighting men had demonstrated
through all wars that they do not surrender easily. They
had never surrendered in larg'e bodies. 'Vhen overwhelmed
and captured, they had-in the main-acquitted themselves
with honor. Still, a clear-cut code was desirable.
Accordingly, the Committee undertook to (lraft a code of
conduct that would reflect the basic 11rinciples by which U.S.
fighting men have lived since the days of the Revolution.
But was some change needed to meet new conditions? For
85
example, should a PO,\, be ginm :my leeway in ans\ypring
questions beyond name, rank, seryice nl1ln]wr, and date oj'
birth '!
'There \"as s()ulethin,g to l)e said IIY ()Xppl'iellCed oHlcC'l's
who felt: t1Jat a man could bp taught to hold his O\yn in thp
battIe of wits against enemy interrogators. Authoritips
pointed out that the Gpl1('ya (lid not impose
"absolute silence" on the interrogated war prisoner. Thpre
were e1auses indicating that he might discuss his employ
ment, his finances, his state of health. or "conditions of
eaptiYity" if necessity demanded. In short. he did not han:
to remain IIlute.
The Committee agree(l that the main line of resistance
must he drawn as far fOl'\yanl as possible. The name. rank,
and sen'ice number vroyj,.don of tllt: Geneya Conn'ntion \yas
accevted as this line of rpsistance.
In the fnee of it wns recognized that the PO'V
might be subjected to a n extreme of coercion. En'll then he

'/f)I../n_ 1z;urduu
RANK __ v .....--------- -----
_ 0
SERIAL NO. __
\
86
is expected to avoid by every means any disloyalty in word
or deed to his country, his Service, or his comrades.
THE CODE IS PROCLAIMED
After long study and earnest deliberation, the Committee
came to its decision. That decision is embodied in the Code
of Conduct for Members of the Armed Forces of the United
States. The Code, duly proclaimed by President Eisenhower,
is as follows:
Article I
I am an American fighting man. I serve in the forces
which guard my country and our way of life. I am prepared
to give my life in their defense.
Article II
I will never surrender of my own free will. If in com
mand I ,vill never surrender my men while they still have
the means to resist.
Article III
If I am captured I will continue to resist by all means
available. I will make every effort to escape and aid others
to escape. I will accept neither parole nor special favors
from the enemy.
Article IV
If I become a prisoner of war, I will keep faith with my
fellow prisoners. I will give no information nor take part
in any action which might be harmful to my comrades. If I
am senior, I will take command. If not, I will obey the
lawful orders of those appointed over me and will back them
up in every ,vay.
Article V
"'hen questioned, should I become a prisoner of war, I am
bound to give only name, rank, service number, and date of
birth. I will evaell' answering further questions to the ut
most of my ability. I will make no oral or written state
ments disloyal to my country and its allies or harmful to
their cause.
87
Article VI
I will never forget that I am an American fighting man,
responsible for my actions, and dedicated to the principles
which made my country free. I will trust in my God and in
the United States of America.
YOUR ARMOR
The Code is your armor. It was hammered out for you by
successive generations of fighting men, who loved their coun
try and who demonstrated their love by what they dirt In
drafting the Code, the Committee merely put down on paver
certain basic ideals and rules by which these fighting men
had lived. Tried and tested, the Code meets the neefls of
this new age.
The conscience and heart of all America are needed in
the support of this Code, and the best of training that can
be provided in our homes, by our schools and churches and
by the Armed Forces will be required for all who under
take to live by this Code.
Thus spoke the Committee in a letter to the Secretary of
Defense. Signed by all the members, the letter continued,
in part, as follows:
America no longer can afford to think in terms of a
limited number of our fighting men becoming prisoners of
war and in the hands of an enemy in some distant land.
Modern warfare has brought the challenge to the doorstep
of every citizen, and so the Code we propose may \vell be
a Code for all Americans if the problem of survival should
ever come to our own main streets.
And then too the United States must constantly be
aware of her high position of world leadership, and the
Code we propose must consider the standard of the 'l'en
Commandments and of our Constitution, as well as our
pledge to the United Nations.
No Code should overlook the watermarks of America's
greatness or bow to the easier courses which might entrap
more easily our men as alleged war criminals and \veaken
88
their fiber for the many ordeals they may face. We must
bear in mind the past and future significance of the reser
vation made by Soviet Russia and other Oommunist na
tions to Article 85 of the Geneva Oonvention of 19c19 on
prisoners of war.
How does this reservation affect you? How can you meet
the obligations imposed upon you by the Geneva rules and
by the Oode? How can the Oode protect you?
. These and other questions will be considered in the re
maining chapters.
89
Chapter II
THE GENEVA RULES
A
ny discussion of atrocities, brutalities, and mistreat
ment of prisoners must logically include some reference
to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1!l29 and
1949. These grew out of the Hague regulations, mentioned
in Chapter 2.
Troubled by the terrible death toll of prisoners in World
War II, delegates of many countries met at Geneva in 1949
to formulate and define 11igher standards of treatment for
POlY'S. The articles of the earlier Geneva Convention ,vere
clarified and strengthened. It was agreed that the detaining
power would be responsible for the health and welfare of
any prisoners held. Fifty-seven nations signed the new
Geneva treaty.
In general, the rules llrovide that prisoners of war nllmt
be treated humanely. Svecifically forbidden are "violence to
life and person ... cruel treatment and torture ... out
rages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and
degrading treatment."
Under the articles of the Convention, vrisoners must be
given decent housing; nourishing food, adequate clothing,
and the right to communicate with their families.
They may not be punished for refusing to ans\ver qnes
tions of any kind.
They are to be given medical care, and allowed to worship,
exercise, and participate in sports and intellectual pastimes.
Machinery was set up to enable protecting powers amI the
International Red Cross to have access to camIJs amI to
investigate conditions in them.
In short, the Convention spells out in detail the treatment
to be accorded prisoners of war.
THE COMMUNIST RECORD
The Soviet Union signed the 1949 Convention as did eight
other nations in the ComIIlunist bloc. 'l'he U.S.S.R. and its
90
satellites held out, however, on certain points. One of their
reservations concerned Article 8;; of the Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The Article reads:
"Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the De
taining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall
retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present Com'en
tion. "
The Soviet delegate entered the following reservation:
"The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not con
sider itself bound by the obligation, ,,;hich follows from
Article 85, to extend the aplllication of the Convention to
prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of
the Detaining Power, in accordance with the principles of
the Xuremberg trial, for war crimes and crimes against
humanity, it being understood that persons convicted of such
crimes must be SUbjected to the conditions obtaining in the
country in question for those who unclergo their punishment."
Under this resel'Yation, a prisoner of war convicted of an
alleged war crime under the laws of the captors loses the
protection afforded a prisoner of war by the Geneva rules.
Therefore, a confession or a statement by a prisoner is
likely to be used to convict him as a "war criminal" and
thus, according' to this Communist bloc device, deny to him
any protection under the terms of the Geneva Convention,
including repatriation until his sentence is served.
This reservation was a disturbing sign of Soviet intention.
Moreover, it set the pattern for later action by other Com
munist countries.
Early in the Korean war, the United States and the Gov
ernment of South Korea announced that they would act
in accordance with the humanitarian principles contained
in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of ViTal' of 12 August 1949. A few days later,
North Korea said that the terms of the Convention were
being followed. Still later, the Red Chinese stated that
they were following the provisions of the Convention "with
resel'Yations."
505596--59----7 91
The effect of these reservations became painfully apparent
when the Communists deluded prisoners and tricked them
into admitting' acts that the Communists claimed were
"war crimes." Then they used this admission, either verbal
or written, to convict prisoners as "war criminals" and to
declare that they had lost their status as prisoners of war.
In practice, the articles of the Convention were consist
ently violated by the Red Chinese and the North Koreans
in their treatment of prisoners.
An investigating committee of the U.S. Senate noted that:
American prisoners of war were placed in solitary con
finement for long periods of time.
They were shackled.
They were subjected to the curiosity and insults of the
local populace.
They were physically maltreated.
They were not given adequate medical attention or
adequate clothing.
Officers were forced to work.
Prisoner-of-war camps and hospitals were not properly
marked and identified.
All of these practices were in direct violation of specific
articles in the 1949 Geneva Convention.
IMPORTANCE OF THE CONVENTIONS
Because experience has shown that the Communists will
observe the Convention only when it suits their purpose,
one must inevitably wonder why we should be concerned
with it.
There are at least two reasons why you should have
some knowledge of the provisions of the Geneva Convention.
1. The United States is a law-abiding Nation. We have
ratified the Geneva Com'ention and we will abide by it
both as a Nation and as individuals. Your conduct as a
U.S. fighting man will be judged accordingly.
92
2. The second reason is equally important from your per
sonal Sl<lIH1point. If you (10 not know the provisions of
the Connmtion. yOl1 nlig'ht violate some of them llllwitting1y.
'1'he COlllmunists, altllOugh they may not obsen'e all the
l'rol'isions o[ the ConHmtion. h a n ~ demonstrated t:lwt they
are qnic-k to seize upon alleged yiolatiolls.
In ease yon eyer become a PO\". here are some of the
illlportant Genenl rules yon sllOnl<1 I,now:
Yon mnst giye your name. rank. spryice nnmber, and
date of birth (Article (7),
YOl1 lllay not rellOllllCe any of the rights to which you
are entitled under the Geneva ConHmtion (Article 7).
o You are snbjpct to medical inspection at least once a
month (Artiele 81) .
If you a re a l'hysieian, a snrgeon. a dentist, a nurse. or
a nlf>dical orderly. yon may be required to care [or
pO\,,s who need yonI' sen'ices crcil if !fOil o/'c /lot
93
attached to the medical service at your branch ot the
AI'med Forces (Article 32).
o You must salute officers of the enemy and show them
any other mark of respect required of their own
forces. However, officer PO'W's must salute only
officers of higher rank... except for the camp
commander, who must be saluted regardless of his
rank (Article 3D).
o Enlisted PO'W's who are physically fit may be required
to work. However, noncommissioned officers who are
prisoners of war may only be required to do super
visory work. Unless he volunteers, a POW may not be
employed on labor of an unhealthy or dangerous
nature. Nor may any POW be assigned to labor
deemed humiliating by the detaining power when per
formed by a member of its forces. Prisoners of war
may not be compelled to do, nor may they volunteer for,
the following classes of work when these have a mili
tary character or purpose: (1) Public works and
building operations; (2) transport and handling of
stores; (3) public utility services (Articles 49-54;
62) .
.. If you have cash in excess of a fixed amount when cap
hIred, it may be taken from you and held in account
for you. However, before repatriation the detaining
pmver must give you a statement showing the credit
balance due you. The United States is responsible
for settling with you any credit balance due from
the detaining power at the end of your captivity
(Articles 58, 64, 66).
o You are subject to the la,,'s, regulations, and orders in
force in the armed forces of the detaining powers.
If accused of a violation, you may be brought to
trial (Article 82).
RULES FOR ESCAPE
Under the Code of the U.S. Fighting Man, you must make
every effort to escape and to help others to escape if you
should be captured. The Geneva Convention recognizes
94
that prisoners will attempt to escape and limits punish
ment for POW's attempting it to mild disciplinary action.
However, you should know that you can be prosecuted in
the enemy's courts for serious criminal acts committed while
you are trying to escape.
Article 93 of the Geneva Convention states that "offenses
committed by prisoners of war with the sole intention of
facilitating their escape and which do not entail any
violence against life or limb, such as offenses against public
property, theft withQut intention of self-enrichment, the
drawing up or use of false papers, or the wearing of civilian
clothing, shall occasion disciplinary punishment only."
The clisciplinary punishment so authorized (Article 89)
consists of the following:
(1) A fine which shall not exceed 50 percent of the
advances of pay and working pay which the pris
oner of war would otherwise receive under the
provisions of Articles 60 and 62 during a period of
not more than thirty days.
(2) Discontinuance of privileges granted over and
above the treatment provided for by the present
Convention.
(3) Fatigue duties not exceeding two hours daily.
(4) Confinement.
The punishment referred to under (3) shall not be
applied to officers.
In no case shall disciplinary punishments be in
human, brutal or dangerous to the health of prisoners
of war.
You may steal the food or dothing-even money in small
amounts-that you need to effect your escape and yet retain
your status as a prisoner. But if you commit a murder,
or steal valuables to enrich yourself, while attempting to
escape, there are no limitations on the punishment you may
be sentenced to as a result of appropriate judicial proceed
ings, except that it must be the same as provided for
members of the armed forces of the detaining power who
have committed the same acts.
95
POINTS TO REMEMBER
The United States may, as a nation, prescribe
certain rnles of conduct, compatilJle with the Geneya Con
vention, for its military personnel who become prisoners of
war.
Artide 105 of the Uniform Colle of Milita!'y Justice is an
example of sucll a rule. This artide, concerning the
punishment of misconduct by a United States senieeman
while a prisoner of war, proYides:
Any person subject to this code who, while in the
hands of the enemy in time of war
(1) for the purpose of secnring faHH'able by
his captors aets without proper authority in a man
ner contrary to law, custom, or regulation, to the
detriment of others of wlwten'r nationality held by
the enemy as ciyilian or militarJ' prisoners: or
96
(2) while in a Ilosition of authority over such tlersons
maltreats them without justifiable cause; shall be
punished as a court-martial may direct.
Another example of rules of conduct prescribed by the
United States is the Code of Conduct for members of the
Armed Forces of the United States.
Pillally, jcmcmbcr this: If eyer you become a PO'V, you
are expected to abide by all of the Geneva rules that affect
you personally, eyen though the enemy is obserying only
those he chooses to observe. In some instances, captiyes
luwe been able to imluce their captors to comply with the
Geneya rules, but this cannot be expected of a Communist
captor.
During 'Vorld War II, Colonel Paul R. Goode, at the risk
of his life, demanded that his German captors accord the
prisoners of war the rights to which the Geneya Convention
entitled them. The Colonel, who commanded a regiment of
the 29th Infantry Division, was captured soon after the
Allied invasion of Normandy while personally leading an
attempt to rescue elements of his division. Stumbling" into
a German bivouac in the rlarkness of night, he was oyer
powered and wounded by the enemy. Colonel Goode as
sumed the leadership of his fellow prisoners, American and
British officers, organizing them along the lines of a regi
ment and maintaining the highest morale among them until
his release in May 1945. He narrowly missed being shot
for an attempt to escape but continued to work toward that
end and to help others in their attempts. For his superior
leadership, character, and soldierly conduct, Colonel Goode
was awarded the Legion of Merit.
'Vhether or not your captor follows the Geneva rules, you
should abide by them as a law-abiding fighting man of a
law-abiding Nation. You can't force good faith on your
Communist captor. But you can demonstrate to him and
to the world that we Americans live up to our word-as
individuals and as a Nation.
97
'! ONly 1ll::CRET TH,\T t
HAVE Ht:T ONE Uff
TO LosE rOR MY
.+:'''7'4
SEPT n. L:;"

oam an AmericanY..9llting man. f\ serve in -the
forces whlchguar6 countrg an6ur f
to glue m-':.\ Cite in their6ifense.
99
Chapter 12
YOU GUARD OUR COUNTRY
I am an Ame1"ican fighting man. I se1've in
the forces which guard my country and 01tr way
of life. I am pl'epa1'ed to give my life in
their defense.
T
-Article I, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.
hese words were quoted with deep conviction.
The speaker was Admiral Arthur Radford, appearing
on 25 October 1955 at the Second Kational Conference on
Spiritual Foundations. The Code of Conduct had been
proclaimed during the preceding summer, and Admiral
Radford-then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
was discussing its meaning.
"I believe," he said, "most of you realize this is written
in the form of a creed. Possibly some of you feel that it
is written mostly for those of us in uniform. If so, you
are not wrong. It is written as a guiding precept to be
followed by the men in our Armed ]'orces.
"I would suggest, however, that this creed could ,ery
well be a part of every American's attitude. '1'here is no
hidden meaning, nor is there lack of meaning, when you
pledge: 'I serve in the forces which guard my country and
our way of life.' These words are the key to the part
played by the mind and the spirit in our national security.
They signify:. Militant Liberty.
Every American should be dedicated to this mis
sion. It is not sufficient for only a relatively few to defend
the United States. In our present peril, lleople everywhere
must unite in the fight against militant international com
munism, or any other threat to our American way of life."
The people of the United States have united in this fight.
But if the need arises to defend our country on the battle
field or in the prisoner-of-war stockade, the United States
relies on you.
You are an American fighting man!
100
YOU GUARD OUR WAY OF LIFE
Wlla t is tllis Allleriean way of life \\'11 iell you-as a
lllPlll bel' of tile ArlllPd Foreps-are sworn to l]pfend'! Can
you dptine it'! A(lmiral Hadford did so in a few silllple
words.
":\Iy own unclerstamlin." of tile AlllPl'!eau \\'ay of life is
many-foW," he sa 1<1. "First it is Frc'edom awl Liberty.
"l'reedom bpgan \\'ith a bl'lief in human dignity. and it'
gre\\' \\'itll thp history of the world. Often it {'ame in eon
flkt \\'itll tyl'<lnny and {lespotbm, Oftpn it was lmoekpl!
do\\'n. bnt a l \ \ ' a ~ ' s it arose to figllt again. It. \\'ould fight.
and losp, am] tllpn figllt again,
"WP lparnp(] this in hbtory \\'hen ]\Josps stood ll{<[ol'e
Pllar'lOll ;1]1(1 sai(l: 'Lpt illy peop]p go.' \\'e read it again
\\'llpn thp barons stoo(l ]wf'orpKing Jolln am] the :\lagna
Carta \\'as Plllbodipil into l,[\\'s, \\'p li\'e(] it still agnin in
thp epk of \'all('y Porg(',
lor
"Our Founding Fathers were adept at choosing the right
words to explain the meaning of our way of life. Thomas
.Jefferson called it 'Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happi
ness.' Patrick Henry summed it up when he said: 'Give
me liberty or give me death.'
"All of you lmow well the other meanings of our four
freedoms. They are all part of the American way of life:
-freedom of religion, freedom of press, freedom of assem
bly, freedom of speech, and many more. We have liYed
with these freedoms so long, and have enjoyed them so
much, that we are prone to take them for granted."
Continuing, Admiral Radford cited faith as a "second
primary ingredient in our American way of life."
"Faith," he continued, "is our belief in the equality of
man in the sight of God. It is our belief in what Alexander
Hamilton referred to as 'the Sacred Rights of Mankind.'
Far beyond the point of lip service, we must all belieye that
each and every human is entitled to 'Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness.' These are the 'substance of things
hoped for.'
"That cold winter at Valley Forge was truly an ordeal.
The suffering from freezing and starvation almost led
American troops to abandon their cause. Faith in their
God; faith in their great leader, George Washington; and
faith in the righteousness of their cause inspired the cour
age with which these men were victorious in their hour of
trial. These are the 'evidence of things not seen,' to return
again to the words of the New Testament.
"Without such faith, we could not be ready, as written in
the Code of Conduct, 'to give my life in their defense.' But
with it, we can meet successfully any future hour of trial."
Admiral Radford called next for "individual acceptance
of responsibility" to defend our way of life against any
threat. Then he asked how we could meet the Communist
threat.
"The answer lies," he said, "in the heart, the mind, and
in the spirit of all Americans. "\Ve must teach a better
102
understanding and appreciation of 'the American way of
life'; ,,'e must rebuild the conviction that our path is the
closest to that which God would have us follow, that it is
truly worthy of personal sacrifices."
YOU ARE PREPARED TO GIVE YOUR LIFE
Toward the close of his address, Admiral Radford voiced
this thought:
"'Ye must spread the word, both at home and abroad.
"'e must call on the good offices and influence of the home,
church, school, and Armed Forces, to develop the sound
minds and deelicated spirits upon which our national secu
rity is fundamentally based. 'Ve can take our cue from
Nathan Hale, who, when asked by his captors if he had any
last words, simply said: 'I only regret that I have but one
life to lORe for my country.' "
Life held great promise for Nathan Hale. A graduate of
Yale, he had taught in Connecticut. His parents wanted
him to enter the ministry. However, soon after the Lexing
ton alarm in 1775, he wrote his father that "a sense of duty"
urged him to "sacrifice everything" for his country. Soon
afterwarcls he entered the Army as a lieutenant, and a few
months later he became a captain.
After the retreat of the Army from Long Island in 1776,
General 'Yashington asked for a discreet officer to enter the
British lines and get information as to British plans. Hale
volunteered and was accepted.
Disguised as a Dutch schoolmaster, he visited the British
camp "'here he made full drawings and memoranda of all
the del' ired information. However, on his return, he was
captured by the enemy. Taken before General Howe, of the
British f01'('es, Hale was ordered executed the next morning.
Denied the comfort of a Bible or a clergyman, Hale stood
facing the gallows. Instead of cringing, he spoke those last
words that revealed the full measure of his elevation to his
country.
In death, Xathan Hale sen-ed as an inspiring example to
other Revolutionary fighting men struggling to safeguard
103
our country's new freedom. Ever since that tragic day in
1776, his name has symbolized the selfless devotion that
American fighting men of all generations have felt for our
country.
From their final resting places, other heroic fighting men
speak also-to you, the men who have fallen heir to their
task of defending our Nation. They speak in the words
of the poet:
Take tiP our quarrel with the foe"
To you from failing hands we throw
The torch,' be yours to hold it high.
If ye break faith with us who die
We shall not sleep, though pOPIJies grow
In Flanders fields.'"
'John McCrae, "In Flanders Fields."
104
9 wilT neuer surren6er mg ownJl-ee wi(r. f1[
0wi.ll surren6er m.!J men UJhi(e
still have themeans 10 resist.
105
Chapter 13
NEVER SAY DIE
I wUl never s/l1"1'c}ulcr ot my own tree will.
It in command, I will never slll"rendel' my men
while they still have the means to l'esist.
-Article II, The U,S, Fighting Man's Code.
T
he tradition of "never surrender" \yas born during the
Revolutionary War. On land and at sea, U.S. fighting
men proved their mettle.
On 23 September 1779, John raul Jones, Captain of the
Bonhomme Richm'd, challenged two British ships of war,
the Sel"apis and the Oountess ot Scal'bol"Oit[lh. Old and slow,
the Richard was outclassed. The Serapis was beating in
one of the Richard's sides while blowing out 'the other. The
Richard caught fire again and again. Meanwhile, the
waters in her hold were rising alarmingly.
"Do you ask for quarter?" called the calltain of the
Scrapis.
"I have not yet begun to fight," Jones hurled back.
The outcome is well known. After three and a half hours
of fighting, the Serapis struck her flag. Then Jones and his
crew boarded the Serapis and watched with mixed emotions
as the Richard sank.
The spirit of John Paul Jones has inspired America's
fighting men ever since. On many occasions, the will to
resist, no matter how unfavorable the odds, has served other
fighting men as well as it did Jones.
In modern war, combat units or individual combatants
may frequently find themselves isolated from the main
body of friendly forces. Without communications, the
situation may appear hopeless. Even with radio or other
communications, the isolated unit or individual cannot be
completely aware of what goes on outside the immediate
area.
However, there are innumerable instances in which iso
106
lalpd units haye fought tll('ir way out 01' llaye held fast
until joinpd by olher friendly forcps.
Somplimps onr men haye foughl Iheir way out; at otller
UlllPS t1H'y ll<lye slipped through pnemy lines. Airmpn shot
down dePll in pnemy tpl'l'itory han' walk('cl 11luHlrecls of
miles, liYing off natural foods from the land and ayoiding
eapture, in order to reaeh fl'ipn(1Jy tpl'l'itory. Soldiers,
sa ilors, airmen, or ma rines-they were fulfilling their mis
sions and their obligations.
. . . OF YOUR OWN FREE WILL
Recognizing tll(' flifTerent eireumstanees-tlle confusion,
Ullcprtainty, apIll'P)lPnsion, and other pressures on the man
who finds himself isolated in cOlllbat--the simple guirlelinc
suggPSls itself-Iltc ji!lltlil/!/ II/llJl lI/u81 I/fTer surrcl/dcr of
It is 0/1'1/ frec/cill.
It should not be neeessary to define the meaning of "his
own free will," as some h11ye asked. If 11 man giyes up, he
\\'ill lmow full \\"C'll wllNllcr his surrender was willful. No
107
amount of rationalizing will rid him of the stigma of failure
to himself if his surrender was voluntary, born of wellk
ness. His sense of failure and the realization of his lack
of will are with him for the rest of his life.
As long as a fighting man can inflict casualties on the
enemy, he is selling himself short if he does not. For the
casualties he infEcts, however few, or the disruption he
effects in the enemy's attack may be the determining factor
in repelling the enemy and in llis rejoining friendly forces.
In case he is isolated and can no longer inflict casualties,
perhaps because he lad;:s ammunition, it becomes his duty to
evade capture.
Once in Korea, a machine-gunner found himself isolated.
Having used all the available ammunition and worn out two
gun barrels in the process, he sat helplessly-or so it
seemed-in his foxhole as hordes of attacking Chinese
Communist soldiers streamed by. But as the last of the
enemy passed his position, his own forces moved in from the
flanks and cut off the Chinese.
Suppose a man surrenders while he still has the means
to fight back or can remain in hiding. 'Vlwt can Ill' expeet to
gain? Four out of ten Ameriean prisoners of the Com
munists died in Korea. Untold numbers were coldly exe
cuted shortly after laying down their arms, and these were
not induded in the "prisoner" statistics. The odds are in
favor of the man who sticks by his guns. And realizing
that many of the deaths in a prison eamp result from lack
ot will, how much less is the chane'e of sun'inl1 for the
fellow whose surrender to the enemy is for that very same
reason?
IF IN COMMAND
No responsible U.S. comllwmler advocates suieidal resist
ance when nothing is to be gained by further fighting. The
view of the average commander was expressed by Viee
Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN (Ret.), in these words:
"I am not advising anyone to fight to the death. 'Yhen
your chances of being captured or killed are so strong that
further resistance is useless, then it is the duty of the
108
>"'lii,,]' 1l1:'11 ]irC'>'C'l11 t" dc'('ide wlwt lllllSt be dOlle, A1'ter all,
gn';\ I :C;,'liC'r;\!s, ill IllallY II"arS, h;\ I'e snrrelll!el'e(l Iheil' ll'o"pS
I" ]ll'eH'lll lIsl'll'ss I"ss "f lifl', bnl y"n Illusl always l'l'lllelll
1,,-1' Ih;\1 y"'1 he a stl'all'!,d(' POSitiOll Il"1lidl
h" hl'ld as 1"11(( as 1'"ssihl(, ill ol'dl'r 10 kel'1' Ihe l'lil'llly
f1'<>lll :C;l'tlin:c; !>l'hind onr OIl'll Jilles, Thel'l' are a Ilulllhl'l' of
alll'rli'lliI"l'S 10 as slippill:C; tllr"u:c;ll tlH' sllr
C'll('ltly Hut's to your 0\\'11 troops or (lyen });1(k ()f
tlll' ('lll'lll,\" lim's'"
(lltl' "l1ll-r alli'rllalin- is to fly/If ou!. alld
this is wh"l tll(' Firsl Dil"isi"11 "I' Ihl' C,S, :\Iarille COl'PS
(lid ill ]\:"n'<I iii l<lll' 11;;)0, C<ln,Ud ill a lll"mllaill"ns an'a
][(',11' flH' Chi).'-dll Oll' IJi\"i::iI>ll \\'(\:-, :"tll'l'(lunt!e(l by
Chilll'""r- Till' ,lilll o[ thl' ChitH'sr' \\',IS plaill:
Th,',\" illl"l1d"l! I" "ll1lillil"I(' Ihc,\I,Il'illl'S, ,"\01 1I'''l1ll!
this I,,, " dl'll<"r,liizill,l( 1>1"11" to "II Cllitl'd :\aliolls for('('s, Imt
it 11"'lllll! ('Iil<tilllll,' a siz,,]>I,' l'!<'llll'lll of Ihe tlH'1l al'"ilahle
AI<H'ri"<lll ""IIlI',1I s1l"'ll"lh, For Ihis l"ask 111l' l'lll'llly h,\(l
Ir,'rl<"lld"l1S lll1rl<"I'i",,1 "'illl 110 rl'lil'[ possihle,
llll'lIU','li"lwl>I,\" Ih,' pr"L>I"lll [or U,l' SUl"l'oulldl't! ullit hl'caIlll'
109
one of survival and breakout. As the Marine comman<ler
pointed out, when a fighting unit is surrounded by the
enemy there is no such thing' as retreat.
Three weeks of fighting in subzero cold preceded the
lO-day ordeal of the breakout. There were daily instances
of smaller units and individuals breaking out of smaller
pockets of isolation, fighting their way or infiltrating through
Communist forces, sometimes simply to join a larger force
that still had to fight its way out. These included British
Commandos, U.S. Army men, and men from otller forces
fighting men all.
Casualties? Of course there were-heavy casualties.
Some due to the constant assault by the enemy, others due
to the bitter elements of the :North Korean winter. But
how many more would there have been if they had sur
rendered'? How many would have died as prisoners of war?
Command Knows No Rank. Often the decision to keep
fighting or to surrender will be made not by an officer but
by an enlisted man. During a land battle, more of direct
command authority will be exercised by squad leaders than
by generals, for the simple reason that there are more of
them. Kot infrequently, when casualties are high, even
the senior private in the remnants of a combat unit must
assume leadership of his unit. He may not be as well
prepared in terms of training or experience as those of
higher rank, but he remains in command for the duration
of the battle or until properly relieved. 'l'hat command
carries with it certain responsibilities and demands that
cannot be set aside. It is his job, in short, to keep his men
fighting as a unit as long as tlley can fight effectively.
IN CONCLUSION
If individuals and commanders were permitted to sur
render whenever a situation seems desperate it would he an
open invitation to all weak of will or depressed in spirit.
As an individual, a member of the Armed Forces may
never voluntarily surrender himself. 'When he is isolated
and can no longer inflict casualties on the enemy, it is his
duty to evade capture and rejoin the nearest friendly forces.
110
The responsibility and authority of a commander never
extend to the surrender of his command to the enemy while
it has power to resist or evade. When isolated, cut off, or
surrounded,a unit must continue to fight until relieved, or
able to rejoin friendly forces by breaking out or evading the
enemy.
]'\0 matter how tough the going, a U.S. fighting man never
says die.
III
0amc::YJture6 g will continue to -resist Gg aCI
means avaiGt6re_ 9 1.vilI make everg trtfort 10


an6 ai6 others 10

9 will acc!pt
neithe:yaroLe nor the

113
Chapter 14
KEEP UP THE FIGHT
If I am capturcd, I continllc to l'csist
by all means avallable. Izeill make evcry
effo'rt to escape awl aid (Jtli crs to cscapc.
I accept ncIther parole nor spceial favors
fl'om the enemy,
-Article III, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code,
H
oweyer determinNl a lighting man he to Hyoid it,
there remains a llossibility that he will be cavtured
by the enemy. The PO\V could be anyone of these:
The soldier or marine rendered unconscious or badly
wounded in battle.
The sailor adrift at sea, whose raft is hardly equipped
to engage an enemy warship or effect an amphibious
assault on an unfriendly beach.
The airman bailing out over enemy territory and com
ing down in a populated area or llerhaps into the
waiting hands of an armed patrol; or caught during
his long, evasive trek to freedom.
\Vhat can the PO,V do when he faces his Commnnist
captors? He knows they 'Yill try to suhjngate him and use
him to defeat his own country. Disarmed, he could feel
completely helpless-if he let himself. But he is not alone!
His country and his Sen'iee are with him in sllirit ...
guiding and sustaining him in this crucial hour. 'Vhen a
PO\V repeats to himself the words of the Code, he is com
muning with his fellow Americans. He knows he is fight
ing their fight , .. as well as his own. He is one with
them, and they are one with him . . . eyen thongh he IIlay
be thonsands of miles from home. Liying by the Code, the
PO,,, 1;;nmos also that he is keelling faith with America's
fighting men of past generations. From these sources, he
draws strength to resist his Communist call tors.
114
. BY ALL MEANS AV AILABLE
That the "me:lns :lyailahle" for resistance after capture
are limite<l is (Iuite ohYiou". "\ Ilhyskal attack on an in
terrogator, for eX:lmple, will he use<l as an excuse fnr
more Yiolent physical abuse of the jlrisoner. Sometimes
the prisoner will IUlye to "take" treatment against which
his instincts rebel.
Consider the case of one PO"W in Korea. '''hen his
Chinese guard wiped his feet on the PO,,"s dothe:", the
PO,,, struck him. );'01' this, the p(nV was jllaced in a
box about 30 inches square. Kellt there for nine hours,
the PO,,' became temporarily Afterwards, his
arms ,yere IWlHkuffed to his :lnkles for three or four days;
following this, he ',",lS hallllcul'fe<l in a conYentional manner
for about six weeks.
'VI' can admire the courage of the ro'v. At the same
time, we recognize that this kin<l of resistance sen'es no
useful jlurjlose. It takes "guts" to stand calmly in the
face of insult and abuse, but it will most often be the best
thing to do.
For the timc bcing, the PO,,"s best resi:-;tauce is jlassive
resistantp. The means he still jlossesses are his mental
faculties :lnd his llloral code-the determination amI the
will to resist. 'I'hese must be kept alive in the captiye
lighting" man bec'ause they are what "'ill keep him alive.
'l'hat the Communist enemy is aware of these '"means"
too, and their imjlortance, is eYidenced in his vrolonged
and continuous efforts to destroy them.
YOU WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ESCAPE
AND AID OTHERS TO ESCAPE
The fighting Ulan has one alternative to "taking" what
ever treatment his captors ajljlly-for as long as they choose
to ajljlly it. 'l'hat is, of course, escave. Hc must conccn
tTatc all his 'resollrccs to/("ard cscapc-both for himsclf and
oth crs. '1'his will eutail the full apjllication of his 1'1'
lllallllllg me'lIls-w!t:-;, wilL and jlatience. Furthermore,
the Genenl Convention imJlliecUy recognizes the right of
115
\
a prisonpr of \,-ar to try to escape pro\'iding a limitation
of puni"llment for certain offense"-",,ncll as oJTen"es
against pnblic IJroperty, theft. \yitllont intention of self
enricllmpnt, tlle dra\ying up or u"e of false papers, or tlle
wearing' of ciyilian clotlling"-\\'llen snell otIpnsps are COIll
mitted \yitll tlle sole intenUon of fal'ilitating escape and do
not entail any \'iolenee against' life or limb,
HClI/ell/rIC)' t1/('sc p)'ocisiolls, and abide by tIH'm if yon
become a 1'0,\', Xencr gin' COllllllllllisj' captor any
\'alid rpaSOll for labpling yon a \\'ar criminal.
Aboye all elsp, usp good jndglllPnt in pl:llllling to pscapp,
Bp alprt to opportnniUes of tlle llJoJllPnt-tlle careless gnard
or a fripndly one interested in dpsert!ng'-or moments of
c'lllfnsion (Tea ted by an a ir raid or :J ttack by friendly
forces, Sncll opportnnitips Illay be tlle ones will
get. Tlley are more likelr to occnr in til(' enrlr singes of
enpt!yifT, before trnnsfer to a prison camp,
By all me:ws IlJnke :H1ya11<'e plans and pJ'('pnrations if
you can, but don't e"pel't tllnt tIlis \yill be possible in
116
any COllllllllllist pl'isonl'r-of-\\'ar camp, Once in an
lishl'(l call1p, yOll Illay he ahle to org-anize an l1lHlerg-ronnd
COlllllliUl'l', c'tn your of
lilaking' a StlC'('p;..;;..;flll e:'(";l!Je.
11'01' reaSOllS pl'cyiol1s1y eite(l, physical yiolence agaillst
l'llemy PCI'SO]lIlel dnring- escapl' from a l'O\V camjl shonld
he al'oided except as a last n'sort, wilen the sitnation is
despl'r'lte, (That is, if a prisoJl(']' fl'el:-; deatll hy tile
enC'IllY's lIalld is iIllIllillCllt ;lllY\Vay, and as a fighting lnan
he is detl'I'lltined to take some of the elH'my ,,'!til him in
his tillal hattie,) Except in such extreillely desperate eir
('1llllstallces, it is a(!\'isahle for til(' prbo]l<'r to avoid violence
dllring- his escape frolll camp 'tnd ltis trek to freedom until
his ohjedin'-J'ril'ndly fOITI'S or Il<'lltl'al territory-is aT
tllally in viell' and nlltil snl'11 adion migllt elimi
llate til(' fillal o!>stal'1es to ltis hid for freedom.
Onc pilot who escapel] his captors in Korea against
tn'mC!l<]ollS odc]s is Major Wan] :.\lillar (tllen Captain).
117
As his plane plunged into enemy territory both of his
ankles were broken. Dragging himself on his stomach
to a creek, he attempted to gain coYer, but the Communists
soon spotted him. From the moment of his capture, Cap
tain Millar began planning to eSCalJe. He eluded his guards
before his improperly set ankles had healed and started
his slow, painful trek to freedom on foot, using sticks as
crutches and hobbling along in ill-fitting galoshes. As
hope of a successful escape was dimming, he enlisted the
help of a Korean-a sergeant in the Xorth Korean army
'''ho also wanted to escape the Communists. The two
succeeded in signalling a U.S. helicopter, which flew them
to safety.
YOU WILL ACCEPT NEITHER PAROLE
A captor's deYiees-especially a Communist captor's-to
subdue a prisoner or render him complacent are many and
,'aried. Among the more subtle of these is the offer of
"parole"-an agreement whereby, in exchange for certain
privileges or freedom of mo,ement, the prisoner gives cer
tain promises to the detaining power, such as the promise
that he will not try to escape.
It is sometimes suggested that captured Chaplains and
medical personnel should accept parole in order to minister
to other prisoners. In accordance with the Geneva Con
"ention, parole is not necessary for such persons in that
they are "retained" personnel, rather than prisoners, with
minimal restrictions placed upon them in order that they
may render their sen"ices as needed. Howeyer, you should
remember that the Communists did not honor that ruling
during the Korean war and cannot be expected to in the
future.
Recognizing that the captor is in a position to make
parole terms advantageous to themselves and disadvanta
geous to an unwitting captive, the United States caJp1cssly
forbicls lIcr captive figll ting men to enter intosllch agree
ment with the enemy.
118
. . NOR SPECIAL FAVORS
Another ruse of captors such as the Communists is to
offer special favors. However innocent these offers may
seem, you may be sure there are strings attached. 'l'he
cigarette or bit of candy offered by an interrogator at the
beginning of a session, apparently to establish a relaxed
atmosphere, may place the prisoner under an obligation.
The wisest course is to reject all offers of favors, even in
exchange for what may seem to be very minor concessions.
Such offers should be Jeported promptly to the senior in
cOlllmand of the prisoner group.
There are several reasons why favors should not be
accepted-even as a "planned" deception, so that the pro
ceeds may be divided among the group. In the first place,
such a deception would necessarily involve pretense, which
could lead to a trap. For another, there can be no overall
benefit to the group for the simple reason that the favors
or the funds to purchase them-will have come from the
sources allotted for the prisoners anyway. The prisoner
who accepts favors and keeps them for himself is incli
rectly stealing from his fellows. And even if he accepts
them in order to share them with the others later, he is
contributing to the downfall of his group by allowing the
enemy to increase his control over it. It thus becoI1l!!s
apparent that the captive fiyht'iny man mU8t not accept
8pecial favor8 from the cnemy.
IN CONCLUSION
The fight is e,-erywhere. Even in the prison camp!
,"Vhen the use of physical weapons is denied, the mental
,and moral "will to resist" must be kept alive in every
prisoner.
A PO'V has no alternatives. Either he resists, to death
if necessary, or progressively submits, in time completely,
to the dictates of his captors. Nor is death any less likely
in submission than in resistance. It Illay be different in
submission-more lingering-but the more to be a voided
because of that. Certainly this leaves little choice for the
fighting man who cherishes freedom.
119
He will escape if able to do so and will help others to
escape. He will not sign or enter into a parole agreement.
In the POW camp as in battle, there is no place for the
coward. In either place, the watchword is:
"Keep up the fight."
120
0J0_become ayrisoner gf 0 wier jaith
with. \ wier give no it}jDnna
tion nor part in 1'mg action whi.ch be
fo comrabes_ 0] am senior, f) wiU
take Wnat, 0 will O(;E the
or6ers those over me an6 wi[ 6ack
them in
121
Chapter 15
KEEP FAITH
If I become a p1'isoner of wa1', I will keep
faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give
no information n01' take part in any action
which might be harmfnl to my C01nTCldcs. If
I am senior, I will take command. If not,
I will obey the lawful orders of those appointed
ove1' me and will back them up in every way.
-Article IV, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.
O
ne of the worst acts an American can commit is to
give aid and comfort to the enemy by informing on,
or otherwise harming, fellow prisoners. A POW must
avoid helping the enemy identify fellow prisoners who may
have knowledge of particular value to the enemy, even if
this course brings coercive interrogation.
If ever the Communists hold you as a prisoner, they will
try in many ways to make you an informer. At the same
time, they will try to break down your faith in your fellow
PO'V's and their faith in you. In Korea, they deliberately
placed many prisoners under a cloud of suspicion:'-by
requiring their company on walks or by frequently calling
them to headquarters for interrogation-in order to create
the impression that they were "cooperating." This practice
had a two-fold purpose. It made it difficult to detect an
actual informer by hiding him within a selected group. It
also cast suspicion on every other individual in the group.
YOU WILL GIVE NO INFORMATION
WHICH MIGHT BE HARMFUL
l ~ a c e d by such tactics, tl/C fighting man who becomes a
prisoner of war must keep faith 1cith his fellow p1'isoners.
It is natural during a long term of confinement for men
to discuss intimately their past lives and their future
dreams, as well as matters of immediate concern, such as
thoughts or plans of escape. They will talk with eacl'
122
other of many things they would .not wish disclosed to the
enemy. The need for mutual confidence is obvious.
In this connection, an inspiring example was set by Derek
Godfrey Kinne, captured on 25 April 1951.
In July 1952, the Chinese Comlllunists accused Kinne of
being uncooperative. He was brutally interrogated about
other prisoners of war who had uncooperative views.
"As a result of his refusal to inform on his comrades, and
for striking back at a Chinese officer who assaulted him,"
his citation for gallantry in captivity stated, "he was twice
severely beaten up and tied up for periods of 12 and 24
hours, being made to stand on tip-toe with a running noose
around his neck which would throttle him if he attempted
to relax in any way."
In conclusion, Kinne's example was cited as "an inspira
tion to all ranks who came into contact with him."
YOU WILL TAKE PART IN NO ACTION
WHICH MIGHT HARM YOUR COMRADES
The Central Peace Committee was one of several organiza
tions used by the Communists to support their political in
doctrination program in Korea. Composed of prisoners, the
committee helped prepare material to be used in courses
given to other PO",V's. From the setup and activities, it
should have been apparent that this committee was being
used to undermine PO'V resistance and to mislead them as
to the role of the United States in the Korean war and in
world affairs.
Nevertheless, two American prisoners played key roles.
One had charge of indoctrination. The other had charge
of propaganda. Both took instructions from the Commu
nists. Under this committee was an elaborate workshop
staffed by approximately 30 prisoners. The principal duty
of the prisoners stationed there was to pose for propaganda
pictures. For example, 10 men would be shown playing
basketball. Others would be snapped playing tennis, swim
ming, or engaging in other sports or recreational activities.
505596
0
--59----9 123
Subsequently these pictures would appear in various
newspapers. The purpose, obviously, was to convey the
impression that UN prisoners in Korea were being well
treated by the Communists.
By their actions, the PO-VV's who worked on this COlll
mittee helped give an erroneous picture of their fellow
POW's. At a time when world opinion should have been
mobilized against atrocities in Communist PO'V camps,
some of our own men were helping to a vert this. For their
labors, they received a "mess of pottage."
Here, if you ever become a PO'V, is an example of what
not to do. There will be many other things also. The
COlllmunists are clever, and they will propose many things
that cannot be predicted. Keep alert! Make up your mind
now that in peace or in war, in combat or in a PO'V camp,
you NEYER will take part in any action that could harm
your fellow fighting men.
IF YOU ARE SENIOR,
YOU WILL TAKE COMMAND
Strong leadership is essential to discipline. 'Vithout dis
cipline, camp organization, resistance, and even survival
may be impossible. Personal hygiene, camp sanitation, and
care of the sick and wounded are imperative. Officers and
enlisted men of the United States will continue to carry
out their responsibilities and exercise their authority after
capture. The senior officer or enlisted man eligible to com
mand within the prisoner-of-war camp or group will assume
command according to rank (or precedence) without regard
to Service. This responsibility and accountability may not
be evaded. If the senior officer or enlisted man is incapac
itated or unable to act for any reason, command will be
assumed by the next senior.
Such command can be exercised, even when conditions
make it seem impossible. This was demonstrated in Korea.
For their inspiring conduct while prisoners of war, 56
American soldiers were decorated. Consider the conduct
of four, selected at randolll-Corporal Donald R. Bittner,
124
Sergeant Gale \V. Cartel', Lieutenant Colonel .John :r. Dunn,
and Corporal Riehard J? Doug!;lss. Theil' citations speak
for themsel Yes.
Corporal Bittner's "leadership awl personal example in
clefying his eaptors and in cliseouraging eo!lahorators
raised the morale of his fellow prisoners and holstered
their faith in Amerkan ideals." The Corporal headed
an aetin' prisoner organi:oation to keep eo!lahorators in
line. J;'or repeateclIy refusing to sign lll'opaganda dO(:lI
ments, he ineurre(l swh l>llnishlllents as hard lahor for
more tlwn a year and eonfinement in a eold room for two
months.
Sergeant Carter, who also led a prisoner resistance group,
"was sel'erely punished and mistreatec1 for his aetivities.
Howen'r, throughout the periods that he was sUhjeeted to
solitary eonfinement, hard lahor, ,1I\(1 staryation, he re
mained steadfast in his devotion to duty and eountry."
Lieutenant Colonel Dunn, then Major, was the senior
otIieer in a group of seyeral hundred Allleriean POW's.
125
He received the Legion of Merit for his "courageous and
outstanding leadership, despite the multitude of difficulties
confronting him and without regard for the fact that he
was sick and wounded at the time he assumed those im
portant responsibilities. He was instrumental in main
taining the morale and welfare of his comrades, assisting
many to defy communistic teachings and to maintain hope
necessary to remain alive. Throughout the period of cap
tivity he constantly demanded more food, clothing, and
better living conditions essential to the preservation of
life."
Corporal Douglass, whose "determined stand against
Communist teachings gave heart to those with less spirit
and fortitude . . . risked severe punishment by liberating
from confinement a fellow prisoner suffering from maI
nutrition and cold."
But superior leadership was not a monopoly of the
Army. Lieutenant Colonel 'Villiam G. Thrash, a U.S.
Marine Corps aviator, won a Gold Star in lieu of a second
Legion of Merit for his conduct as a senior officer in a
Korean prison camp. Although threatened with harsh
punishment if he attempted to organize resistance, and
under constant surveillance, he went to work tightening
discipline and uniting the prisoners-officers from several
nations. For his work in counteracting Communist in
doctrination, the Colonel endured solitary confinement for
eight months, intense mental pressure, and physical mal
treatment. These efforts to "break" him succeeded only
in strengthening his influence upon the other prisoners.
YOU WILL OBEY LAWFUL ORDERS
The Communists in Korea attempted to prevent group
unity by suppressing leadership. Prisoners were ordered
to report to the Communist camp officials if any of their
seniors in rank attempted to exercise authority. That
there may be weaklings and opportunists who will comply
must be considered. This happened in several instances.
Against such odds, the establishment of order and dis
cipline by the prisoners themseh'es is clifficult, to say the
126
least, And even when established, it will need cOBstant
reinforcement, as the Communists will do their best to
undermine it. But it must be done, and it can be-as was
proven in Korea-if men will stand together behind proper
leadership. Obviously, the senior officer can effectively
fulfill his responsibilities in this regard only when those
of lesser 1'ank obey his lawful 01'ders and back him tiP
in every way.
Being a PO'V does not relieve you as a serviceman from
your obligation to follow designated leaders. 'Vhen pris
oners reject the autho:i'ity of their superiors and refuse to
obey lawful orders, discipline and organization break down.
This is just what the Communists want, for they know
how important discipline is to the success of any resistance
movement in a prison camp.
There is the possibility, of course, that the prisoner in
authority may be an opportunist, a weakling, or one who
will collaborate with the enemy. To prevent wholesale
betrayal of the group by such a person, it is stipUlated
that only lawfttl orders must be obeyed. This does not
mean that a prisoner can arbitrarily refuse to obey orders.
But, obviously, if a senior tells a subordinate to sign a
propaganda leaflet or perform some other collaborative
service for the enemy, it is not a lawful order and should
be refused. By the same token, collaboration by a senior
is not justification for similar action by those of lesser
rank.
IN CONCLUSION
Sometimes keeVing faith calls for strange action. If some
strange act contributes to the welfare of the POW group,
it should be judged by what it accomplishes,
In Korea, for example, a PO'V was showing early signs
of "give-up-itis." He was soon rejecting food and spurning
the attention of his fellow POW's who were trying to
"snap him out of it." Nothing his fellow POW's said Oll
did seemed to make much difference. Expressions of
sympathy seemed only to increase his self-pity.
One day when chow was being passed out, a Navy Chief
121
Petty OiIicer noticed that this 1'0\\' had failed to dailll his
portion. called, the POW replied that he was not
hungry,
"Tell that ," sahl the Chief, "to go out
nnd dig his o\\"n gran" ilpfore hp gets too \\"eak to do it.
OtlJel'\yise, some of the rest of us \\'i Il ha \'e to do it for
him, nnd \ye'ye got more importtIllt things to <]0."
Soon aftel'\Ynrds the man callIe 0\'('1' am] ate his chow.
Tl]('n he lW2:an to come out of his shell. nnd soon he
oyercame his "giYe-up-itis."
"It \\"ns shock trentllH'nt," psplaine<] tlw Chipf aftpl'\\"al'(]s,
"and it \\'orke<1. He h;)(] pnssed the stage \I'1Jere ];ind
words or sYllIpn tlly would ha helped hill!."
Apart from thpre \\"ill be mallY cases in
nn:,' P()\\' camp where illdh'idunl prisoners dislike one
nnutlll'r, But lW llIattpr \ylwt your fecdillg's as a prisoner
be. nil llIust be resol\'('(l \yithill the
P(J\\, group.
128
"Behind-the-barracks" settlement of personal feuds is
extremely risky in a prison camp. For one thing, injuries
do not heal easily in the absence of decent food and medical
facilities. Furthermore, such incidents are difficult to
conceal from the ever-watchful eyes of the captors. COIll
munist camp administrators like nothing better than op
portunities to remonstrate with prisoners for their "bad
attitudes" toward each other and to "counsel" them on
their conduct. Such incidents provide the best possible
opportunity for the enemy to aggravate discord and sow
seeds of distrust.
Remember how essential teamwork was on your high
school or college football team? You wouldn't slug your
worst enemy if he was on yom: team. You'd cover up
your own personal feelings and guard him while he was
carrying the ball for YOU1" team.
How much more vital it is, then, for you to keep faith
with your fellow fighting men!
129
eWhen questione6, shOuGS 9 become a yrisonet'
ifwar, am boun6 to give name) Tan"k,
service number an6 6ate eff birth. gwaf eua6e
answertng..JUrther:..questions to the
gwill ma(ze no oraror written statements
6isCO.,galto countr.!:3 an6 its allies or harm.ful
to their cause.
131
Chapter 16
BY WORD AND BY DEED
When q'uestioned, should I become a prisoner
of war, I am bound to g'i'De only na'me, 1'ank,
se1'vice nttmber and date of birth. I Ifill evade
answeT'ing further quest'ions to the 'ntrnost of
my ability, I u;ill malce no O1'al 01' written
statements disloyal to my COli ntry and Us
allies 01' harmflll to the'ir cause.
-Article Y, 'l'he U.S, Fighting Man's Code.
E
very fighting man possesses some military information
of potential value to the enemy, By revealing it to
the enemy he might bring death to his comrades or dis
aster to his unit. Indeed, one man may have some small,
seemingly unimportant bit of lmowledge that coulll com
plete a composite intelligence picture for the enemy and
enable the enemy to defeat major forces of his own country.
The length of time he has been in service; how "lOng and
where he was trained; how long in combat-'1l1Y such
information will serve to improve the enemy's avvraisal
of our fighting strength and potential.
YOU ARE BOUND TO GIVE
ONLY NAME. RANK. SERVICE
NUMBER, DATE OF BIRTH
If you become a prisoner of war, there is an obvious
need for some communication with your captors. To fulfill
their obligations under the Geneva Convention, your cap
tors need to know who you are. Moreover, they need to
identify you so unmistakably that you will not be con
fused with any other member of our Armed Forces. This
is in your interest as well as in theirs, since you will want
your Service and your loved ones to know what has
happened to you.
For this reason, you are bound by the Code and the
Geneva rules to give your name, rank, service number,
and date of birth if captured. (For those who wonder
132
wby tbe date of lJirtb is required, it is simply to establish
yOll!' identity more eompletely.) If you refuse to give
tllis information, you may be denied privileges you otller
wise might enjoy.
By tile same token, you are exvect:ed to help identify
any of your comrades who may be too badly wounded or
too ill to identify tllC'mselves. In so doing, you will apply
the same restrictions that you would if you \vere being
questioned about yourself.
Assume your captors Communists. You know tbey
will honor their obligations under tile Geneva COllvention
only if it senes their elHls. 'WIly, then, you may ask
yourself, should you give tbem any informatioll '! Why
shoulcl you give til em your name when they probably
will try to use it for propaganda purposes?
'rhis is a risk you must tal,e. ,Yllen you give the Com
munists personal information they can relay to your Gov
133
ernment and your loved ones, you have no guarantee they
will not misuse it. However, in spite of this possibility,
you could not afford to give your Communist captors a
bona fide excuse for not relaying word of your capture to
your Government.
Remember, finally, that we Americans honor our obli
gations. Under the Code and the Geneva rules, you are
obligated to give your name, rank, service number, and
date of birth. 'i'his you can and should do in good
conscience.
YOU WILL EVADE ANSWERING
FURTHER QUESTIONS TO THE
UTMOST OF YOUR ABILITY
Ideally, if ever you become a POvV, you should give your
captors no information other than name, rank, service
number, and date of birth. Don't be stampeded into going
beyond this.
There are instances on record where Americans, when
summoned for interrogation, have been so terrified by
their own unrealistic imagining of what would happen
to them that it was not even necessary for their captors
to question them. These men had frightened themselves
so badly that they poured out any information they had.
Other prisoners, almost as frightened, held out until the
C6mmunists mentioned that "it would be better" for the
POW if he talked. In the prisoner's frightened state,
he thought this statement was a threat of all kinds of
torture and unknown, mysterious outrages-so that this
remark was all that it took to make him give in. In
this way, by playing on fear and lack of knowledge, the
Communists had their work done for them-the prisoners
had defeated themselves.
Actually, the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners
of War has never been able to verify even one case in
which a POW was killed because he refused to answer
questions. Keep this in mind!
Whatever you do, don't try to evade questioning by
134
making up a story. Sometimes highly trained and skilled
persons can deceive a trained interrogator, but then for
only a short period of time. Any improvised story, clutched
by a desperate, confused, frightened prisoner of war, will
probably be more of an aid to the enemy than a hindrance.
The interrogator is always at an advantage, because the
prisoner does not know exactly what information the
interrogator has. The prisoner's answers are carefully
screened by enemy intelligence experts, and false infor
mation is easily detected. After his story is destroyed,
the prisoner is then at the mercy of his captors.
Playing stupid is something else. A POW who knows
he cannot fool an interrogator with false information may
evade answering further questions by appearing to know
so little that the interrogator gives up.
This happened in the case of a Navy fighter-bomber
pilot who was shot down behind enemy lines in Korea.
After capture, his system was to be very polite, to be
sorry that he didn't know this or that. He knew nothing
about the new planes. He did not know where the bases
were . . . nor did he know how long the runways were.
This sort of game continued during most of his six months
as a Po-W.
Just before the pilot was released, an interrogator told
him he was a disgrace to his uniform . . . that he was
the most ignorant naval officer he (the interrogator) had
ever encountered.
Yes, the officer was dumb ... like a fox!
lIe had resisted successfully to the utmost of his ability.
YOU WILL MAKE NO
DISLOYAL STATEMENTS
On first thought, your pledge to make no disloyal state
ments seems merely an expression of fundamental decency.
You find it hard to conceive of a situation in which you
would break your pledge. Yet a number of American
PO'V's signed germ-warfare confessions in Korea, and
many othel'ssighed peace petitions that cast l'eflections
135
on lJnited States policy and ohjeetiycs. Tllese lllPn did
not intend to he disloyal. lJndoubtedly, they \yere )I]'('s
sured into signing. Yet the efIeet: of their statf'nl('nt"s \,":lS
definitely harmful to our eountry. '''hat led tlJelll to :Id
as they did'! How can yon step] yourself now to \\"ith
st:llld sneh pressures if eyer you be('OIlle a pel\\' 'I
First, let it be understood that for en'ry Allleriean 11'110
made a disloyal statement \\"hile he \\"as a 1'0\\' in Korea.
there \\"ere lllany, lll:lny others who refused to do so.
FolIo\\" the example of the majority.
Consider the ease of an Air Force c:I)ltain w]ws(' )llane
was struck by Comlllunist antiail'<'raf't firp OH'r Nol'! IJ
Korea on 8 April 1D52. IIp \\"as Pjected, and as ll(' fell
into range, a squad of Chinese COllllllllllists opell(,d fire.
On the ground, he saw stealthy figures running toward
him, still thing. "With lJis seniee .45, lJe killed t\\"o of
more than 200 Communists \\"ho eonyerge(] on hinl. ()yer
l!o\H'red, he \vas taken prisoner.
133
'l'he cavtain was charged with germ warfare and "mur
dering Chinese Communist volunteers" in his last ditch
fight. Despite unrelenting pressure, he steadfastly re
fused to sign any statements disloyal to his country. After
a midnight trial, he was confined in a camp for unde
sirables. As a member of the camp's escape committee, he
tried three times to make it to U.N. lines. All three at
tempts failed. Finally, on 31 August 1953, he was re
patriated in" "Operation Big Switch."
Courage and faith sustained the captain through his
ordeal. 'l'hey can sustain you also if ever you are pressured
to make a disloyal statement.
IN CONCLUSION
In the face of experience, it is recognized that you, if
you should become a POiV, may be subjected to an extreme
of coercion. Still, you must resist to the limit of your
ability. Don't expect to fall back to successive lines of
resistance. Once you have gone beyond the first-your
name, rank, service number, and date of birth-in almost
any respect whatever, you have taken the first step that
leads to collaboration. On the first line you must endeavor
to stand to the end.
137
owilt lleUee that 0 am. au. American
man, JOr actions, an6
6e6icate6 to theyrinciPces which."" u1a6e
ftee. 0 will trust in Gob anb in ihe
UniteS States ifAmerica.
Chapter 17
FAITH WILL TRIUMPH
I wUl never fm"get that I am an American
fighting man, responsilJle for 'my actions, and
dedicated to the principles which made my
connt1'y free. I 1ciU trust inlny God and in
the UniteiZ States of America.
-Artide VI, The U.S. Fighting Man's Code.
American is responsible and accountable for his
A
n
actions. Prisonel'-of-war statns doesn't change this
nor does it change the obligation to remain faithful to the
United States and to the llrinciples for which it stands.
Throughout his cavtiYity, a vrisoner shoulc1 look to his
God for strength to elHlure whaten'r may befall. He
should remember that the United States of America '''ill
neither forget nor forsake him, and that it will win the
ultimate victory.
TIle life of a prisoner of war is hanI. He must never
give up hope. He must resist enemy indoctrination. Pris
oners of war who stand firm and united against the enemy
will aid one another in surviving their ordeal.
NEVER FORGET THAT YOU
ARE A FIGHTING MAN
If you become a PO'V, you will be fighting for your country
in a new arena.
Keep this constantly in mind. Never let yourself be
lulled into a feeling that you are "out of the war" .
that your only problem is to survive until you can be
repatriated.
When you face a Communist interrogator, you are under
fire--just as trUly as if bullets and shell fragments were
flying around yOU. In trying to make you c10 his bic1ding,
the enemy is attacking the United States of America and
our way of life. If you succumb, your country is the
loser.
140
Disarmed and unable to pnt up physical resistaJl('e, yon
will tight with yonI' mind ami yonI' spirit:. If yon J'ield
no military information, you help safeguard your conntry's
fighting strength. If you remain faithful to your fellow
POlY'S, you help l,eep up a united front in this new arena
of war. Resist eyery attempt at indodrination, and you
bea t back a Commtwist oft'ensi n ~ . 'I'urn back eyery Com
munist effort to use you for propaganda, and yon help
protect the good name oj' your country and maintain your
own l,ersonal integrity as well.
Remember always that the Communists are waging a
relentless war to oyerthrow our eountry and our way of
life. YonI' role may ehange, but you are neyer out of the
conflict as long as yon remain aliYe.
NiTer forget that you are an American fighting man.
YOU ARE RESPONSIBLE
FOR YOUR ACTIONS
'1'lJe proYisions oJ' the Uniform Code of Military .Justice
continue to apply, w h e n e n ~ r appropriate, to members of
141
the Armed Forces while they are prisoners of war. Keep
this in mind if you become a POW. The circumstances
of your capture and your conduct during the period of
your detention are subject to examination, with due re
gard for your rights as an individual amI consideration
for the conditions of your captivity.
Still, you are a fighting man, and your Government ex
pects you to act like one.
Any man may face odds that overwhelm him despite his
best efforts. If this explains your callture, your Gm'ern
ment will be understanding.
While you are a PO'V, your conduct will be weighed by
your fellow prisoners. You will weig;h your own conduct.
You will know in your own mind whether or not you are
acting as a responsible fighting man.
If your conduct as a prisoner of war requires official
examination, your guilt or innocence will be determined
not by sentiment but by the actual facts. In short, your
conduct will be judged by what could reasonably be ex
pected of a loyal, dedicated fighting man under the con
ditions you are called uIJon to endure.
Acquit yourself with honor, and you will have won the
undying gratitude of your fellow countrymen!
For inspiration, look to the records of those heroes \vho
stood up against staggering odds while prisoners of war
in Korea. There were weaklings, of course, and much
has been written about them. More important, there were
many heroes-from the Army, the Navy, the Air Force,
and the Marine Corps-and too little has been written
about them!
Major 'Valter R. Harris, USMCR, for example, won the
Legion of Merit for his adamant resistance. As the rec
ognized leader of a prisoner group in North Korea, he
welded the prisoners into a disciplined military organi
zation and conducted educational and religious programs.
He did his best to helll those who attempted to escape and
142
macle certain they knew the probable punishment if
recaptured.
'When Major Harris' influence among the prisoners came
to the attention of his captors, they tried to force him to
sign compromising statements. This he refused steadfastly
to do, in spite of solitary confinement, loneliness, hunger,
and llhysical torture.
YOU ARE DEDICATED TO PRINCIPLES
THAT MADE YOUR COUNTRY FREE
We llOld these trllths to be selt-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are en
(101Oe(Z by tli cir 01'eat01' 10ith certain 1tnalien
able Rights, tlwt among tllcse a1'e Lite, Liberty
and the lJ1Wsuit ot Ha.ppiness. That to seCU1'e
these rights, Govcr'nments a1'e instituted antony
.iIIen, deriving tlleir just pOlOers tro111 the con
scnt ot the f/ovcrne(l . . .
The Declaration of Inclependence contains the essence
of our democratic faith. It was meant to give form to the
sentiments of the colonists, to provide a common statement
of a new Kation's reasons for carrying on the fight for
freedom. The principles expressed in the Declaration
heartened the soldier in the Revolutionary War, and those
same principles sene as a time-tested standard for the
American fighting man toclay.
If you become a PO,,, of the Communists, you will expect
intensive indoctrination in atheistic communism, which
rejects the idea of individual liberty expressed in the
Declaration of Indepenc1eilce. It is your duty as a fighting
man to carryon the battle in the prison camp by resisting
Communist indoctrination efforts with all your ability.
Your best answers to the Communists lie in the basic
principles that have made our country great and free.
Your best weapon is an appreciation of the true meaning
of these principles.
Your steadfast adherence to the principles of, freedom
and democracy ,,'Hl help both you and- YOl.n' fellow l)l:isoners.
143
The Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War
found that when a few American POW's signed peace
petitions and peddled Communist literature it had far
reaching results.
So long as the principles that have made our country
free claim our love and respect, so long will our free and
representative government endure and be a source of hope
to those who seek human freedom and who believe in the
dignity and worth of every human being. Such princillles
are worth fighting for-on the battlefield or in a POvV camp.
TRUST IN GOD
Most religions consider valor and patriotism virtues of
the highest order. The person with firm religious con
victions, whatever his religion, and the courage to defend
those convictions at any cost, is _able to defend himself
and to maintain his integrity as a man and as a fighting
man.
If you are a devoutly religious man you do not need to
be reminded that your faith is a source of courag-e and
strength in time of peril. Men who recognize the existence
of God and believe in the importance of a man's soul
recognize also that there are worse things than death;
as a result, the idea of death does not appall them. 'l'hey
may not always understand why things are happening as
they are, but they believe with firm conviction that God
will not forsake the man who trusts Him and lives by
His commandments. When death ends this earthly struggle,
it opens the door to everlasting life.
The United States, when still a young, hard-pressed
Nation, proudly proclaimed its position to the world in
its slogan, "In God We Trust." This heritage helps ex
plain why there are few atheists in the Armed Forces.
Even those men who do not subscribe to a formal creed of
any kind generally recognize a God who rules the world
with justice and mercy.
Centuries ago, a soldier wrote the 23rd Psalm. Its
message has echoed in the minds and hearts of other
soldiers in each succeeding generation:
144
Yea, though I walle tTwough the valley of the
shadow of death, I will fear no evil; for thOtl
art with mc; thy rod and thy staff, they
comfort mc.
TRUST IN YOUR COUNTRY
Your country expects you, as a member of the Armed
Forces, to support it to the utmost of your ability. In
return, you may expect your country to support you.
In times of war, communications sometimes break down.
Messages from home' may neyer reach you. Undoubtedly,
you will worry about your family.
If you are a prisoner of war, these worries and fears
will be aggraYated. Meantime, you will be subjected to
a steady onslaught of propaganda and lies about the defeat'
of American forces and the victories of the enemy.
In such circumstances, remember this: The United
States of America will win the war, and she will not forget
you-no matter what the enemy says.
In signing the Executive Order that put the Code of
Conduct for the Armed Forces into effect, the President
of the United States declared:
No American prisoner of war will be forgotten by the
United States.
Every available means will be employed by our govern
ment to establish contact with, to support and obtain the
release of all our 11risoners of war.
Furthermore, the laws of the United States provide
for the support and care of dependents of members of the
Armed Forces including those who become prisoners of
war. I assure dependents of such prisoners that these
laws will continue to provide for their welfare.
IN CONCLUSION
The U.S. Fighting Man's Cocle sets a high standard for
members of the Armed Forces of the United States. But
it is a reasonable standard-one based on principles and
ideals that have made America free and strong, on moral
qualities found in all men of integrity and character. And
145
it is a standard that every member of the Armed Forces
of the United States is expected to meet. Complete and
loyal support of the Code is to the best interests of the
American fighting man, his comrades, the United States,
and the free world.
The written Code of Conduct is a direct outgrowth of
the Korean conflict. But the Code's importance extends
far beyond the limits of a single war or a single group
of Americans.
Every American citizen-whether in or out of uniform
must share the responsibility for preserving our freedom
and our way of life. For in modern warfare, the home
front is but an extension of the fighting front. There are
no distant front lines, remote no-man's lands, far-off rear
areas. Courage and loyalty are expectecl of every American.
And every American might well adopt as his own personal
code the Code of Conduct for the serviceman.
Scientific advances have resulted in weapons so for
midable that they stagger the imagination of mankind.
Less tangible but no less formidable are the psychological
weapons the Communists have devised. Their method of
treating captives is but one of the weapons they use in
their unending, worldwide war for the minds and hearts
of men.
vVe cannot take freedom for granted. Threats to Amer
ican security must be met with appropriate Amerkan
weapons.
The physical weapons of war are assured by American
enterprise, science, and industry.
The mental and moral weapons are supplied by the
strength, will, and minds of the American people.
So long as the weapons, whatever they be, are wielded by
men of honor and integrity, who believe in-and practice-
the principles upon which this Nation was founded, so
long will our Nation be free and invincible.
146
147
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS AND DOCUMENTS
Beck, F., and Godin, tV. Russian Purge and the Extraction
ot Oontession. New York, Viking Press, 1951.
Biderman, A. D. Oommunist Techniques ot Ooercive In
terrogation. Air Force Personnel and Training Research
Center Development Report TN-56-132, Lackland Air
Force Base, Texas, 1956.
Blair, Clay. Beyond Oourage. New York, David McKay
Co., Inc., 1955.
Oommand and the Oode-Nevel' Surrender. Officers' Call.
Department of the Army, DA Pam 355-6, July 1956.
Oommunist Interrogation, Indoctdnation and Exploitation
ot American Military and Oivilian Pl'isoners. Hearings
Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
of the Committee on Government Operations, 84th Cong.,
2d Sess., 1957. Senate Report No. 2832, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess., 1957.
Oommunist Interrogation, Indoctrination, and Exploitation
ot Prisoners ot Wal'. Department of the Army, DA
Pam 30-101, May 1956.
Oommunist Psychological TVartm'e (Brainwashing). Con
sultation with EdwlJ.rd Hunter. Committee on Un
American Activities, House of RepresentlJ.tives, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess., 1958.
Giovanitti, Len. The Prisoners ot Oombine D. New York,
Henry Holt, 1957.
Hansen, Col. Kenneth K. Heroes Behind Barbed Wire.
Princeton, New Jersey, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1957.
Hunter, Edward. Brainwashing: The Story ot the Men
Who Defied It. New York, Farrar, Straus and Cudahy,
1956.
Am an American Fighting Man. Troop Topics. De
partment of the Army, DA Pam 355-51, 6 May 1957.
148
I
Kinkead, Eugene. In Every TVar But One. New York,
W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1959.
Kirk, Russell. The American Cause. Chicago, Henry
Regnery Co., 1957.
The Law of Land Warfare. Department of the Army.
FM 27-10, July 1956.
Lectures on the Geneva Conventions of 1'2 August 1949.
Department of the Army. DA Pam 20-151.
Manual for Courts-Martial Unitea States.
Meerloo, A. M. The Rape of the Mina: the Psychology
of Thought Control, Mentici1le, ana Brainwashing.
Cleveland, World Publishing Co., 1956.
Millar, Ward. Valley of the Shadow. New York, David
McKay Co., Inc., 1955.
Operations Research Office, Johns Hopkins University.
Study of Combat Stress in Korea. ORO-T-41 (FEC),
Dec. 1952.
Rigney, Harold W. Four Years in a Rea Hell. Chicago,
Henry Regnery Co., 1956.
Sargant, William Walters. Battle for the Mind. Garden
City, New York, Doubleday, 19G7.
Segal, Julius. Factors Related to the Collaboration ana
Resistance Behavior of U.S. Army PW's in Korea. Tech
nical Report 33, Human Resources Research Office, The
George Washington University, 'Vashington, D.C., 1956.
Thompson, Elizabeth M. War Prisoner Repatriation. Edi
torial Research Reports, 3 Dec. 1952, 11: 823-40.
Thorin, Duane. A Ride to Panmunjom. Chicago, Henry
Regnery Co., 1956.
Treaties Governing Land Warfare. Department of the
Army. DA Pam 27-1, Dec. 1956.
The Uniform Code of Military J1tstice.
Whitcomb, Edgar D. Escape from Corregidor. Chicago,
Henry Regnery Co., 1958.
149
White, William Lindsay. The Captives ot Eorea; An
Unofficial White Papc1' on the Trcatment ot War Pris
01W1'S. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957.
ARTICLES IN PROFESSIONAL AND OFFICIAL
PERIODICALS
Berle, A. A., Jr. "Legal BackgTound of Communist Methods
of Interrogation and Indoctrination." Bulletin ot the
New York Academy ot Medicinc, Sel). 1957, 33: 645-53.
Bettleheim, Bruno. "Individual and Mass Behavior in
Extreme Situations." Journal ot L11mormal and Social
Psychology, 1943, 38: 417-52.
Biderman, A. D. "Communist Attempts To Elicit False
Confessions from Air Force Prisoners of War." Bltlletin
ot the New York Academy ot 1J[edicine, Sep. 1957, 33:
616-25.
"The Communist "'Varin PO",V Camps." DC1Jartment ot
State BUlletin, 16 Feb. 1953, 28: 273-75.
Driscoll, Col. John J. "It Could Have Been You." Air
Force Maga.zine, Nov. 1952, 35: 23-27.
Farber, 1. E., Harlow, H. F., and "'est, L. J. "Brainwash
ing, Conditioning, and DDD (Debility, Dependency, and
Dread)." Sociomet1'y, Dec. 1957, 20: 271-85.
Henderson, B. A. "CoIllmunist Indoctrination Methods."
Military Review, Nov. 1955, 35: No.8, 27-38.
Hinkle, L. E., and ",Volff, H. G. "Communist Interrogation
and Incloctrination of 'Enemies of the State.''' A.M.A.
Archives ot Nelwology and Psychiat1'y, Aug. 1956, 76:
115-74.
Hinkle, L. E., and Wolff, H. G. "The Methods of Interro
gation and Indoctrination Used by the COIllmunist State
Police." Bulletin ot the New York Academy ot Medicine,
Sep. 1957, 33: 600-15.
150
Johnson, Capt. James R. "If You Are Captured ..."
Marine Corps Gazette, Nov. 1952, 36: 60-62.
Klumper, G. H. "Army Psychiatry in Korea Following the
Cease Fire Agreement." American Journal ot Psychiatry,
1955,112: 260-9.
Lifton, R. J. "Home by Ship: Reaction Patterns of
American Prisoners of War Repatriated from North
Korea." American Journal ot Psychiatry, 1954, 110:
732-9.
Lifton, R. J. "'Thought Reform' of Western Civilians in
Chinese Communist Prisons." Psychiatry, 1956, 19:
173-95.
Lifton, R. J. "Chinese Communist 'Thought Reform': Con
fession and Re-Education of Western Civilians." Bulletin
ot the New York Academy ot Medicine, Sep. 1957, 33:
626-44.
Maloney, J. C. "Psychic Self-Abandon and Extortion of
Confessions." International Journal ot Psychoanalysis,
1955, 36: 53-60.
Marren, J. J. "Psychiatric Problems in Troops in Korea
During and Following Combat." U.S. Armed Forces
111edical Journal, May 1956, 7: 715-26.
Mayo, C. W. "The Role of Forced Confessions in the Com
munist 'Germ Warfare' Propaganda Campaign." Depart
ment ot State BUlletin, 9 Nov. 1953, 29: 641-7.
Meerloo, A. M. "Pavlovian Strategy as a Weapon of Menti
cide." Ame1'ican Jou1'nal ot Psychiatry, 1954, 110: 809-13.
"Misconduct in the Prison Camp : A Survey of the Law
and an Analysis of the Korean Cases." Note to Prisoners
of War Section. Colttmbia Law Review, May 1956,
56 :'709-94;
Murray, J. C. "The Prisoner Issue." Marine Corps
Gazette, Aug. 1955, 39: 32-40; Sep. 1953, 39: 28-35.
Prugh, George S., Jr. "The Code of Conduct for the Armed
Forces." Columbia Law Review, May 1956, 56: 678-707.
151
Prugh, George S., Jr. "Prisoners at War: the POW
Battleground." Dickinson Law Review, 1956, 60: 123-50.
Schein, E. H. "The Chinese Indoctrination Program for
Prisoners of ",Var." Psychiatry, 1956, 19: 149-72.
Strassman, H. D., Thaler, ~ L , and Schein, E. H. "A Pris
oner of ",Yar Syndrome: Apathy as a Reaction to Severe
Stress." American Journal ot Psychiatry, 1956, 112: 998
1003.
Thorin, Duane. "Code of Conduct Training." Naval Train
ing B1tlletin, Spring 1958.
ARTICLES IN POPULAR PERIODICALS
"American Hero; Interview." W. R. Dean. Scholastic,
18 Nov. 1953, 63: 6.
"American Prisoners in Korea." E. Kinkead. Reporter at
Large. New Yorker, 26 Oct. 1957, 33: 114.
"Analyze 'Mind ",Vashing.''' Science News Letter, 16 May
1953, 63: 310-11.
"Bugs and Buddy-Buddy, Washed Brains of PO",Ys: Can
They Be Rewashed?" Newsweek, 4 May 1953, 41: 35-7.
"Asiatic PO",Vs Throw the Book at Reds." Sat1t1"day Eve
ning Post, 14 Nov. 19.53,226: 10-11.
"Atrocities in Korea." America, 12 Dec. 1953, 90: 283.
"Back from Red Death Camps, POW's Rediscover Freedom."
Newsweek, 17 Aug. 1953, 42: 29.
"Back of Germ Warfare Hoax-Tortures: U.S. Officers'
Own Story of Forced 'Confessions.'," U.S. News <I; W01'ld
Report, 4 Sep. 1953, 35: 24; 18 Sep. 1953, 35: 20-6.
"Big Lie; How Reds Got Germ Confessions." Lite, 9 Nov.
1953, 35: 51.
"Brain 'Warfare-Russia's Secret ",Veapon." Allen W.
Dulles. U.s. News <f World Report, 8 May 1953, 54-58.
152
"Brainwashing." Time, 8 Oct. 1951, 58: 39--40.
"Brain Washing in Stalinist China." D. H. Lew. Vital
Speeches, 1 June 1952, 18: 497-501.
"Brainwashing at Work." Time, 26 May 1953, 59: 41.
"Burial Above Ground." E. E. Fahy. Lite, 8 Sep. 1952,
33: 126--46.
"Captiye Sales Audience." Newsweek, 2 Nov. 1953, 42: 81.
"The Changed Concept of Man." Fulton J. Sheen. Vital
Speeches, 15 Noy. 1953, 20: 83-5.
"The Cliches of Conduct." News Republic, 29 Aug. 1955,
133: 4.
"Code Also for Prisoners of Defeatism." D. Lawrence.
U.S. News & W01'ld Report, 26 Aug; 1955, 39: 128.
"Code for Our paws." America, 3 Sep. 1955, 93: 524-1).
"Conflict Oyer PWs." Ame1'ica, 17 Oct. 1953,90: 63.
"Courage and Loyalty Are Not for GI's Only." Saturday
Evening Post, 17 Sep. 1955, 228: 10.
"Cowardice in Korea." Time, 2 Nov. 1953, 62: 31.
"Destroying American Minds; Russians Made It a Science;
Text of Report to Political Committee, UN." G. W. Mayo.
U.S. News & World Report, 6 Nov. 1953, 35: 97-101.
"Dogs, Rats-and Now, Men." New Republic, 9 Nov. 1953,
129: 8.
"Forced Confessions." Science News Letter, 21 July 1951,
60: 43.
"General Clark Reports on Korea." U.s. News &; World
Report, 14 Aug. 1953, 35: 82-5.
"Germ Warfare: Forged Eyidence." Time, 9 Nov. 1953,
62: 22.
153
"Germ Warfare: The Lie That Won." Fortune, Nov. 1953,
48: 92-4.
"GIs Outshine Eggheads in Resisting Reds." S a t ~ t r d a y
Evening Post, 31 Oct. 1953, 226: 10.
"Have ",Ye Let Our Sons Down?" E. Kinkead. McCall's,
Jan. 1959, 86: 4.
"Heroism of General Dean Is Revealed ",Vhen Most Famous
POW Is Set Free." Lite, 14 Sep. 1953, 35: 42-45.
"How Much Red Brainwashing Do We Expect a GI to
Take?" Saturday Evening Post, 16 April 1955, 227: 10.
"How Reds Tortured U.S. Prisoners." U.S. News a World
Report, 2 Sep. 1955, 39: 26-7.
"How Reds Used Captive Brains." Lite, 27 May 1957,
42: 77-82.
"How U.S. Prisoners Broke Under Red 'Brain Washing.'''
Richard Wilson. Laale, 2 June 1953, 80-83.
"I Saw Red China from Inside." John D. Hayes. U.S.
News a World Report, 13 Mar. 1953, 26-32.
"I Came Back from a Red Death Cell." Robert T. Bryan,
Jr. Satttrday Evening Post, 17, 24, and 31 Jan.; 7 Feb.
1953.
"I "'Vas Stalin's Prisoner." R. A. Vogeler with L. ",Yhite.
Saturday Evening Post, 27 Oct.; 3, 10, 17, and 24 Nov.;
1 Dec. 1951.
"It's Easy to Bluff Americans." B. Fay. Colliers, 16 May
1953, 131: 20-3.
"Just a Stone's Throw" (Anti-Comlllunist North Korean and
Chinese Prisoners). Time, 28 Sep. 1952, 62: 19.
"Korean Puzzle; Americans Who Stay." U.s. News d:
W orlel Report, 9 Oct. 1953, 35: 38-40.
"The Korean Prisoner-of-",Var Issue." Paul H. Douglas.
TTital Speeches, 1 July 1953, 19: 568-70.
154
"A Line Must Be Drawn." Time,29 Aug. 1955, 66: 16-17.
"Marines to the Rescue." Reporter, 8 Sep. 1955, 13: 2-4.
"From the Ordeals of Prisoners of War in Korea-Moral
Mandate for All Americans." Lite, 27 Aug. 1955, 39: 31-4.
"The New Code for War Prisoners." Christian Century,
7 Sep. 1955, 72: 1012.
"Operation Persuader Backfires." America, 31 Oct. 1953,
90: 115.
"Ordeal in the Desert; Teaching Men How to Resist Brain
washing." P. Wyden. Newsweek, 12 Sep. 1955, 46: 33-5.
Discussion, 19 Sep. 1955, 46: 36-8.
"Prescription for Our P.O.W.'s." W. Keempffert. Science
Digest, Dec. 1953, 34: 29-30.
"Prisoners of War." Ch'ristian Century, 4 Nov. 1953, 70:
1254-6.
"The Prisoners." Commonweal, 16 Oct. 1953, 59: 25-9.
"Prisoners Swayed-Didn't Fall .. ." (Interview with C. B.
Peterson). U.S. News & World Report, 28 Aug. 1953, 35:
28.
"The Prisoners Who Broke." U.S. News&; World Report, 1
Aug. 1953, 35: 30-31.
"Pro-Communist Twenty-Three." America, 10 Oct. 1953, 90 :
35.
"Pros on Trial." Ame'l'ica, 29 Aug. 1953, 89: 511.
"The, Rats." Newsweek, 24 Aug. 1953, 42: 30.
" 'Reactionaries.''' Time, 7 Sep. 1953, 62: 32.
"Real Story of Returned Prisoners."
GIs back from Korea.) UB. News
May 1953, 54-63.
(Tape recordings of
<f World Report, 29
505596--59----11 ISS
"Red Torture Broke Few GI's." U.S. News ((; World Report,
26 Aug. 1955, 39: 38-9.
"Resistance to the Death by P''i''s.'' America, 3 Oct. 1953,
90: 1.
"Riots and Repatriation Rules." Newsweek, 12 Oct. 1953,
42: 36.
"The Roots of Courage." Colliers, 30 Sep. 1955, 136: 106.
"The Second Humiliation." Time, 9 Nov. 1953, 62: 26.
"Snafu at Valley Forge." Newsweelc, 18 May 1953, 41:
44--46.
"A Soldier's Soldier." Time, 7 Dec. 1953, 62: 27-30.
"Story of GI Turncoats." U.S. News ((; World ReZJOrt, 28
June 1957, 42: 58-64.
"Terror and Torture: Five Prisoners' Stories." Newsweek,
17 Aug. 1953, 42: 32.
"Terrors of Brain-'Vashing Ordeal." Harold 'V. Rigney.
Vital Speeches, 1 June 1956, 22: 504-9.
"They CllOse Freedom." ScllOlastic, 28 Oct. 1953, 63: 12.
"They Refuse To Go Home." Scholastic, 7 Oct. 1953, 63: 17.
"To a Young Progressive." Time, 19 Oct. 1953, 62: 32.
"Torture Techniques of ComIllunist Prosecutors in Iron
Curtain Countries." Scholastic, 15 Mar. 1950, 56: 22.
"Tough Prisoners." Time, 21 Sep. 1953, 62: 28-9.
"Train Pilots To Resist Brain Washing." Science Digest,
Jan. 1955, 37: 30.
"Training by Torture." Time, 19 Sep. 1955, 66: 21; Dis
cussion, 10 Oct. 1955, 66: 8.
"A Turncoat Comes Home." L. Bergquist. Loole, 25 June
1957, 21: 125-8.
"Valley Forge GIs Tell of Their Brainwashing Ordeal."
William Brinkley. Life, 25 May 1953, 108-24.
"We Can Baffle the Brainwashers!" D. V. Gallery. Satur
drty Evening Post, 22 Jan. 1955, 227: 20.
156
"What a Man Must Do; Servicemen's Code." Newsweek,
29 Aug. 1955, 46: 18.
"What About Reds Among Freed U.S. Prisoners?" N(!'/IJs
week, 17 Aug. 1953, 42: 21.
"What Communists Did to Americans in Korea: Official
Report." U.S. News & World Report, 26 Aug. 19G5, 39:
40-8.
"What Is Brainwashing?" F. 0. Stockwell. Christian
Century, 28 Jan. 1953, 70: 104-5.
"What To Do About Brainwashing." U.s. N e 1 D . ~ &; 1For7cl
RepoTt, 8 JUly 1955, 39: 24-5.
"'Vhy Did Many GI Cavtives Cave In?" Interview with
Maj. William E. Mayer. U.S. News & WOTld Report,
24 Feb. 1956, 40: 50-72.
"Why Did Some GIs Turn Communist?" B. Stavleton
and T. D. Harrison. CollieTs, 27 Nov. 1963, 132: 25-8.
"Why PO'Vs Collaborate." Science News LetteT, 11 May
1957, 71: 301.
"Why Some GIs Stay with Reds: Interview." S. S.
Dickenson. U.S. News & 'WoTld Report, 13 Nov. 1953,
35: 33.
"Without Honor." Ne1csLceek, 13 July 1D53, 43: 30.
RELATED BIBLIOGRAPHIES
Biderman, A. D., Herman, Louis lVI., and Howard, Harwell.
Reading 1J1ateTials in Ch'inese Communist IndoctTination
Attempts Against American Prisoners ot War. Air Force
Personnel and Training Research Center, Lacklancl Air
Force Base, Texas.
Communist Explo-itation and IndoctTination ot POW's. Air
University Library, Svecial Bibliographies, 1956.
Oklahoma Medical Research Foundation, BehaviOl'al Science
Section. PO,V Research Project, Unclassified B'ibli
ography, 30 Sep. 1966.
157
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON
6 August 1959
THE U.S. FIGHTING MAN'S CODE (DOD Pam 1-16). This
official Department of Defense publication is for the use of per
sonnel in the military Services.
By ORDER OF THE SECRETARIES OF THE ARMY, THE NAVY,
AND THE AIR FORCE:
L. L. LEMNITZER,
Genenll, United States Army,
OFFICIAL:
Chief of Staff.
R. V. LEE,
Major General, United States Anny,
The Adjutant General.
H.P. SMITH,
Vice Admiral, United States Navy,
OFFICIAL: Chief of Naval Personnel.
K. M. McMANES,
Rear Admiral, United States Navy,
Assistant Vice Admiral of Naval Operations/
DiTector of Naval Administration.
158
THOMAS D. WHITE,
OFFICIAL: Ohief of Staff, United States Air Force.
J. L. TARR,
Oolonel, United States Air Force,
Director otAdministrative Services.
R. MeC. PATE,
General, U.S. Marine Oorps,
OFFICIAL: Oommandant Of the Marine Oorps.
WALLACE M. GREENE, JR.,
Major General, U.S. Marine Oorps,
Deputy Ohief of Staff (Plans).
DISTRIRUTION :
ArrYl/lj:
Active Army:
3 Copies per each 100 Military Personnel: Plus:
ASA (CMA) (2) TJAG (2)
ASA (FM) (2) TPMG (2)
ASA (LOG) (2) TAG(XO) (2)
ASA (MP&RF) (2) OJfCh (2)
ASA (2) Tech Stf, DA (2)
CofS (2) USCONARC (15)
DCSPER (2) US ARADCOM (15)
ACSI (2) US ARADCOM Rgn (15)
DCSOPS (2)
OS Maj Comel! (15)
DCSLOG (2) OS BaseComd (5)
'&CSRC (2)
Log Comd (5)
CAMG (2) MDW (15)
CoA (2) Armies (15) except
CUSARROTC (2) First US Army (17)
CofF (2) Corps (5)
CINFO (30) Div (10)
~ " C N G B (2)
USATC (10)
CLL (2) Brig (5)
DRD (2) Regt/Gp/Bg (5)
CRD (2) Bn (5)
CMH (2) Co/Btry (2)
TIG (2) Inst! (5)
159
USMA (75) PMST Mil Sch Div Units
USACGSC (20) (2)
USAWC (20) Rct Dist (2)
Dr Svc Sch (20) RMS (2)
Specialist Sch (10) MAAG (2)
PMST Sr Div Units (2) Mil Msn (2)
PMST Jr Div Units (2) ARMA (2)
NG: State AG (3); Div (3)'; Brig (1); RegtjGp
(2) ; Bn (1) ; CojBtry (2).
USAR: Div (3) ; Brig (3); RegtjGp (3) ; Bn (3);
CojBtry (2).
For explanation of abbreviations used, see AR
320-50.
Air Force:
F.
160
u. s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959