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A-to State Ks ( ) ***Even if the State is imperfect of academically obsolete, we cant underestimate its centrality.

Normative refusal to discuss or work with it is nave and counter-productive

Dr. Inis Claude is a Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, Emeritus, at the University of Virginia. During his teaching career, Professor Claude held positions at the University of Michigan, Harvard University, Columbia University, University of Wales, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague. States and the Global System 1988

let us take note of the view that the state is obsolete, or is rapidly becoming so. This is the view of the discouraged student of international relations, who finds states always too small, too big, too weak and too powerful, who fears for the future of a world so divided. It is, however it may be put, primarily a prescriptive or normative position, an assertion that the state ought to be superseded, a plea for the abandonment of international relations. It does not correspond with what is actually going on in the world, namely the proliferation and the flourishing of states. The state has its difficulties, but it clearly has not yet gone, or begun to go, out of fashion. The state is a dangerous and troublesome institution; it is also a valuable and indispensable one. There is no substitute in sight. For the foreseeable future, man will live in a world of states. We very much need to work at developing a balanced view of states, one that is not distorted by a tendency toward either uncritical adoration or cynical denunciation. We will do well to concentrate on learning to understand and to manage the problems of a multistate system, rather than to rail against the system and to dream of abolishing it.
Finally, References and notes 1. On Bentham's coinage of this term see Hidemi Suganami, A Note on the Origin of the Word "Inter national" \ British Journal of International Studies, iv (1978), pp. 226-232. 2. Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London, 1977). 3. This is the assumption underlying Vernon Van Dyke's 'The Individual, the State, and Ethnic Com munities in Political Theory', World Politics, xxix (1977), pp. 343369.

(Please note that this is the conclusion of Claudes piece the footnotes are provided to demonstrate that. Many teams (mis)quote Claude to say he is opposed to the State solely b/c he cites imperfections in the State)

A-to State Ks ( ) Claims that the State is categorically immoral or self-interested are wrong too sweeping

Dr. Inis Claude is a Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, Emeritus, at the University of Virginia. During his teaching career, Professor Claude held positions at the
University of Michigan, Harvard University, Columbia University, University of Wales, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague. States and the Global System 1988

The state has a widespread reputation, at least among academic people, as being in its international dealings utterly selfish and irresponsible. Its selfishness is epitomized in its putative devotion to the national interest. Its irresponsibility is expressed in its claim of sovereignty. This adds up to the notion that the state is, at best, amoral. It is a self-seeking
entity that acknowledges no value higher than its own advantage and no obligation transcending its commitment to its own welfare. We students of international politics have been inclined to think that Reinhold Niebuhr got it just right when he entitled one of his early books, Moral Man and Immoral Society, in order to highlight his thesis that 'a sharp distinction must be drawn between the moral and social behaviour of individuals and of social groups, national, racial and economic' .5

There is certainly no warrant for switching to the myth of the state as virtue incarnate, but this image of the state as selfish and irresponsible deserves critical appraisal. I see no logical reason to expect that individuals would retain their virtues while transposing their vices to the national level, nor do I see convincing evidence that this occurs. The twentieth century has brought the collectivization of charity and compassion, and this has spread to the international scene; states have become in many respects the successors to the religious and other charitable agencies that formerly were claims of selfishness may deserve quite as sceptical reception

dominant in carrying out missions of mercy throughout the world. Governmental engagement in such activity is sometimes clearly motivated by national self-interest, and is almost always justified domestically by reference to that interest, but a as claims of altruism. It is not inconceivable that a generous and compassionate government, acting on behalf of an entire people, may feign self-interestedness for the benefit of stingy taxpayers who are not

disposed to make sacrifices to aid foreigners. The national interest is a conveniently elastic term, and those who believe that their state has a moral obligation to promote the welfare of other peoples are quite likely to make the happy discovery, and the delighted pronouncement, that this serves the national interest as well. All doing of good tends to derive from mixed motives, whether the doer is an individual or a collectivity.

A-to State Ks ( ) Your generalizations of the State are based on a faulty scholarship too sweeping

Dr. Inis Claude is a Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, Emeritus, at the University of Virginia. During his teaching career, Professor Claude held positions at the
University of Michigan, Harvard University, Columbia University, University of Wales, and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and the Institute of Social Studies at the Hague. States and the Global System 1988

This notion of the state derives, I think, from two sources. First, it is a product of the academic theory of the state, the conventional inclination to lard the definition of the state with such phrases as 'supreme coercive power', 'monopoly of physical force' and 'monopoly of the legitimate use of violence'.In truth, theorists display a good deal of ambiguity about all this, never quite seeming to make up their minds, whether the state has a monopoly of coercive capability or merely a margin of superiority, and vacillating between talk of power and of authority, between references to using force and to being entitled to use force. The upshot of this kind of definitional discussion is that we tend to emerge with the view, muddled but ostensibly profound, that the state is by definition all-powerful within its domain;qualifications of the assertion of monopoly fall by the wayside, and the claim of authority to coerce comes to be translated as the possession of power to coerce. Such a definition of the state inevitably colours our description of actual states, i.e. the real-world manifestations of the state idea. One might think it more sensible to arrive inductively at a characterization of states, relying not on the implications of a definition but on observations of actual states. Unfortunately, this route has also led us astray. The second source of the myth of the almighty state is our tendency to gaze obsessively at the more formidable states at their moments of greatest effectiveness. It may be that we in the West are still transfixed by the spectacle of Nazi Germany, which we saw as the epitome of the totalitarian state, the monstrous power that crushed all opposition and stifled all
freedom in Germany and wherever else it ruled, the juggernaut that ran roughshod over numerous other states and threatened to smash western civilization. We know, of course, that the Nazi regime was not as effective as we once believed, and we rejoice that it collapsed, ultimately, in defeat. We know, as well, that it was not typical of states?that totalitarianism, even in its realworld, non-absolute version, is a rarity. Yet, our general tendency to pay attention primarily to great powers and our particular experience of having had to deal with enemies whose claim to absolute power seemed all too plausible for our comfort have persuaded us all too often to indulge in absurdly sweeping generalizations about the impressive power of states. Whether we argue from a definition of the state as a literally sovereign entity or impute to states-in-general the formidable quality that we have seen in the exceptional case, we tend to think of states as being altogether too powerful for the freedom of their people, the safety of their neighbours, and the order of the world.

For every state that approaches totalitarianism, there must be half a dozen that approach anarchy. Tyranny, oppression and regimentation do exist in the world
of states, but so do chaos, disorder and civil war. The map is spotted with states that can barely hold their peoples together, states that can hardly make a decent pretence of controlling their territories, states that may be willing but are in no sense able to fulfil their obligations as members of the international system, states whose capacity to fend off either external attack or internal collapse is in doubt. But incompetence is not limited to a special category of weak and uncertainly viable states. The ?lite of the system?the established, developed and advanced states?have their own versions of the problem of capability. The United States, superpower that it is, has no sure touch in such matters as controlling the importation of illegal drugs and people, safe guarding its citizens against violent crime, or enforcing respect for American diplomatic premises and personnel. We are not alone in our incompetence. Can one be sure that Poland, alone or with Soviet assistance, is able to avoid or contain an explosion of popular discontent? Has the United Kingdom subdued the IRA? What state has proved itself master of the problem of international terrorism? Confronted with crises, leaders of the most powerful states in the world are at least as likely to respond with the plaintive cry, 'What can we do?', as with confident schemes for doing what needs to be done; handwringing is no less typical of statesmen than swashbuckling. The vision of the state as a well-oiled mechanism, richly endowed with capability to do whatever its leaders wish to have done, does not survive a careful examination of the workings of real states in the real world. There is comfort in this, for the less than almighty state is less dangerous. But it spells trouble, too, for the limitation of the competence of the state extends to its capacity to serve as well as to oppress, to protect as well as to attack, and to uphold world order as well as to disrupt world order. Not all of the problems of international relations stem from the power of states; the weakness of states produces its own batch of difficulties.

A-to State Ks ( ) Turning away from the state prevents mobilization. That turns the K.

Goble 98 (Paul, Publisher of RFE/RL, THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOLITICIZATION, Radio Free Europe, October 12, 1998,,mozilla,unix,english,,new), accessed July 07)

as people turn away from the state as the source of support, they inevitably care less about what the state does and are less willing to take action to assert their views. That means that neither the state nor the opposition can mobilize them to take action for or against anything. As a result, the opposition cannot easily get large numbers of people to demonstrate even if the opposition is taking positions that polls suggest most people agree with. And the government cannot draw on popular support even when it may be doing things that the people have said they want. That means that the
First, size of demonstrations for or against anything or anyone are an increasingly poor indicator of what the people want or do not want the state to do. Second, precisely because people are focusing on their private lives and taking responsibility for them, they are likely to become increasingly upset when the state attempts to intervene in their lives even for the most benign purposes, particularly if it does so in an ineffective manner. Such attitudes, widespread in many countries and important in limiting the power of state institutions, nonetheless pose a particular danger to countries making the transition from communism to democracy. While those views help promote the dismantling of the old state, they also virtually preclude the emergence of a new and efficient one. As a result, these countries are often likely to find themselves without the effective state institutions that modern societies and economies require if they are to be well regulated. And third,countries with depoliticized populations are especially at risk when they face a crisis. The governments cannot count on support because people no longer expect the governments to be able to deliver.