A Critique

Of

Monika Kellers analysis of interpersonal friendship conflict and morality

By Brian Valenzuela sotomayor 2011

The main argument in Resolving Conflicts in Friendship (Keller, 1984) is that children develop a moral awareness and understanding towards moral implications, within different stages of friendship in regards to particular forms of interpersonal conflict (ibid:p.2). Kellers main argument is compelling as it contains underlying psychological and cognitive developmental theories that support her claim (ibid; p3). Keller claims that a developmental link exists between different stages of friendship and the moral decisions, moral rules and principles that are considered and understood by children (ibid: p.9). This hypothesis was determined by perspective-taking interviews, that documented childrens moral approaches towards an adapted version of a Kolhbergian moral dilemma (ibid: p. 9).

My commentary is based on the precedence that partial obligations within a friendship represents, in comparison with Kellers principles of morality: this precedence appears to undermine the effectiveness of Kellers hypothesis as a plausible indicator of childrens moral reasoning. In support of my argument I will explore the importance of friendship; its impacts on a Childs moral development then compare its motivations and principles that will prove to reside above Kellers use of childrens friendship conflicts to measure their moral principles. This will support my claim that as a result of friendships partial obligations, Kellers moral dilemma should only be used to represent the partial moral reasoning of children, not moral reasoning in its entirety due to the significant partial charge underlying Kellers (1984) moral dilemma. My second argument extends Kellers recommendations for empirical analysis by exploring the socio-cultural differences in order to highlight the cultural impact on moral reasoning to further support my claim that Kellers moral dilemma should only be used for measuring childrens levels of partial moral reasoning.

The Precedence of Partial obligations over Morality

importance and impact on a childs moral development only then can we comprehend the significance of friendships partial obligations and its precedence above morality. An argument supporting a new representation of partial moral reasoning will be constructed. The importance of friendship could be measured by listing the advantages of a world without friends; I am confident with the claim that the human experience would suffer if friendship was removed from human life (see Harman, 1983). It is of significant importance; friendship impacts Childrens moral development, it provides a base, forming a part of a cognitive and psychological moral fabric; imposing distinctive demands on a childs beliefs and virtues (McCall, 1970). This moral fabric is woven by their social and cognitive development (Selman, 1980). Lets focus specifically on the imposition and distinctive demands of moral beliefs and virtues. According to Holden (1997) distinctive and directed demands of friendship transform towards a self-regulating prophecy; Keller (1984) refers to this prophecy as a moral orientation, a moral understanding that matures with age and within levels of friendship (ibid; pp.3, 9), until eventually becoming a childs self expression (ibid, p 5).

efore exploring the partial obligations of friendship we must first establish its

Friendship appears to be a vehicle of moral beliefs and virtues, illustrated by Keller (1984) as encompassing the conceptual developments of morality (Keller, 1984; p9), meanwhile demanding moral principles (McCall, 1970). I will now propose that these demands are not predominantly based on moral principles but on the partial obligations of friendship. First let us establish the demands of friendships partial obligations which will lead us towards its precedence over morality.

Milestones of moral development

According to Keller (1984) once children reach level 3 of friendship they will have reached a mature moral dialog; a milestone of development, representing a childs ability to solve moral conflict, re-establish moral balance along with matching moral responsibility (ibid,p9). This is certainly a compelling developmental truism, but Kellers milestone of moral development is predominantly motivated by the partial obligations of a friendship and not necessarily based on morality. For example; to deny the partial nature of friendship is to agree that it is worse to harm a stranger than to harm a friend (Jeske, 1997); meanwhile to disagree with this statement is to place (your reason whether based on morality or not) with precedence above the partial nature of friendship, but in doing so would undermine the demands of friendship (McCall, 1970). A similar notion of friendships partial obligations are contained within Kellers (1984) moral dilemma, please note that it has been conceptualised;

Is it a moral duty or responsibility to keep a promise towards an intimate friend who is in need or instead accept an invitation to go to the movies with the new kid in the neighbourhood who has no friends (Keller, 1984, p4).

Kellers moral dilemma provokes a utilitarian situation (see Darwall, 2003), as there appears to be no straight forward right or wrong moral principle of duty or responsibility, but only that which might be worse. Kellers intent of presenting conflicting obligations of friendship is clearly calculated (Keller, 1984 p4), but after considering the partiality of such obligations, even in a conflict situation the moral outcome of such a dilemma does not present a balanced indicator for measuring a Childs moral reasoning within an interpersonal conflict.

For example; Keller (1984) defines the moral duty and responsibility as normative conflicting obligations of friendship (ibid, p4) but this presents a problem as the normative is actually partially charged thereby will not solely represent a Childs moral reasoning, but predominantly represent a childs partial obligations towards friendship. Furthermore, the self-interest towards partial obligations in friendship is believed to lead people to the neglect their moral duties (Williams, 1981 p2), and may not necessarily be caused by Kellers (1984) notion of hedonistic desires vs. duty (ibid: p.5), but by a self-interest towards a partial obligation. In this case Kellers (1984) moral principles of duty and responsibility that are indebted to her approach of levelling moral reasoning (ibid, p.4), only provide a partial account of moral reasoning, due to the precedence of partial obligations and its possible neglect towards moral duty or responsibility. The power and precedence of partiality over morality should not go unnoticed, according to Sandel (1982) friendship between two persons is independent of duty and responsibilities, exemplifying higher and nobler virtues (ibid: p.460). For example; if we remove friendships partial liking such as the fondness and reciprocal obligations over others friendships esteemed intrinsic value would be degraded; If this is plausible then moral duty, moral concerns and responsibilities could also be neglected by childrens moral reasoning in order to sustain the benefits of friendship, where the benefits of a friend are much finer than those from a stranger (Aristotle, 1 169b 10).

In combination with the prior account, if the partial obligation claim is merited in which obligations can lead a child to neglect moral duty and responsibilities then it is plausible that Kellers (1984) empirical research should only represent the partial moral reasoning of children within a friendship conflict (ibid; 4).

A SOCIO-CULTURAL Extension OF KELLERS partial moral reasoning

ocio-cultural differences cause a variation in a Childs reasoning about responsibilities and obligations in close relationships. I will be focused on Kellers moral principle of

responsibility (see Keller, 1984: p4) with the prior notion of friendships obligations. I will extend Kellers (1984) work on resolving conflict in friendship by highlighting individual differences of moral reasoning using a comparison across two cultures. This will further support my claim that morality should only represent the partial moral reasoning of children within a friendship conflict.

According to Milgram (1963) society contains a morality of accepted traditions, customs, accepted authority, and groups of loyalty which preside over preventing harm; this almost replicates the notion with partial obligations of friendship residing above moral principle, but we must remain focused on the precedence that particular moral principles possess within different cultures. The first, of two studies, is a longitudinal study performed by (Keller et al, 1998) with children aged 7, 9 and 12 to 15, from China and Iceland. Children from China focused more on altruistic and relationship moral principles in comparison with Icelandic children who focused on self-interest and contractual moral principles, but both cultures during adolescence focused on a similar principle, the obligations of friendship which became equally important (ibid, 740-741). This means that Kellers notions of the normative considerations towards friendship (Keller, 1984, p4), does not necessarily represent a developing moral dialog (ibid, p9) but that there is also a socio-cultural precedence towards the obligations of friendship, which we have already established can reside above moral considerations.

It is also hard to know what role moral considerations actually play in our choices because our behaviour is a function of countless and unknown factors (Blackburn, 1998). According to (Gardner, 2007) it is possible that when some of us make decisions, moral considerations can be completely idle (ibid, p501).

The second study is based on aspects of interpersonal understanding in friendship reasoning, this involved an investigation of individual differences concerning gender, social class, and levels of cognitive development (see Keller et al, 1989). Empirical evidence shows that social class and levels of cognitive development causes a stable influence over friendship reasoning. This study aligns towards my first argument as we established the importance of cognitive development towards morality with its directed -to- self-expressions of a moral orientation, now proven to affect reasoning in regards to friendship with its partial nature. But social class seems to present a further concern towards Kellers (1984) approach in measuring levels of moral reasoning. For example, friendship is not only a matter of personal negotiation with partiality (William, et al, 1996), but can operate outside kinship systems of social norms that require rigid roles and conformity (Allen, 1989), such as morality.

So with moralities placement outside the boundaries of friendship can we really measure a Childs moral orientation impartially between what is moral and what is demanded of friendship? The only way is to partially represent levels of moral reasoning for childrens behaviour within their friendships.

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Keller, M., Edelstein, W., Schimid, C. (1998) Reasoning about responsibilities and obligations in close relationships: A Comparison Across Two Cultures, in: Developmental Psychology (1998), 34(4), 731-741. Kant, I. (1981) Grounding for the metaphysics of morals in Ellington. J.W. (1985) Trans. Indianapolis; Hacket Publishing Company. Keller, M. (1984) Resolving Conflict in Friendship: The Development of Moral Understanding in Everyday Life in Kurtines W.M, Gewirtz J. L (1984) Morality, moral behaviour, and moral development. New York, John Wileys & Sons. pp: 140-158 Keller, M., Edelstein, W., Schimid, C. (1998) Reasoning About Responsibilities and Obligations in Close Relationships: A Comparison Across Two Cultures. In: Developmental Psychology (1998), 34(4), 731-741. Keller, M. Kohlberg, L. (1976) Moral Stages and moralization. In Lickona.T (Ed.), Moral development and behaviour, New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston.

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