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KAJIAN RCFA

ANALISA KEGAGALAN PADA STEM GOVERNOR


SISI RIGHT 1(GV R1)

NOMOR : 009/RCFA/BSR/II/2015
REVISI : 00
TANGGAL : 11 Oktober 2015

PT. INDONESIA POWER


UNIT BISNIS OPERASI DAN PEMELIHARAAN PLTU BANTEN 1 SURALAYA
2015
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DAFTAR ISI

LEMBAR PENGESAHAN ...................................................................................................... 1

KATA PENGANTAR ............................................................................................................ 2

DAFTAR ISI ...................................................................................................................... 3

DAFTAR GAMBAR .............................................................................................................. 4

DAFTAR TABEL .................................................................................................................. 5

DAFTAR SINGKATAN ......................................................................................................... 6

BAB I PENDAHULUAN

1.1. Latar Belakang Masalah .............................................................................. 7


1.2. Dasar Pembuatan RCFA .............................................................................. 7
1.3. Metodologi ................................................................................................ 8
1.4. Sistematika Penulisan ................................................................................. 8

BAB II DATA PERALATAN

2.1. Fungsi Peralatan .......................................................................................10


2.2. Prinsip Kerja .............................................................................................12
2.3. Riwayat Kerusakan dan Gangguan Peralatan ...............................................13

BAB III PEMBAHASAN DAN ANALISA

3.1. Kronologi Kejadian ....................................................................................15


3.2. Data Operasional ......................................................................................16
3.3. Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA) ........................................................17
3.4. Kemungkinan Penyebab ............................................................................18
3.5. Analisa Pembahasan .................................................................................19

BAB IV KESIMPULAN DAN REKOMENDASI

4.1. Kesimpulan ..............................................................................................25


4.2. Failure Defense Task (FDT) .......................................................................25

DAFTAR PUSTAKA ............................................................................................................26

LAMPIRAN – LAMPIRAN
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DAFTAR GAMBAR
Gambar 2.1 Turbin respin terhadap rejection.......................................................................10

Gambar 2.2 Characterictic Governor Valve ..........................................................................11

Gambar 2.3. Konstruksi Bearing 9 exciter ............................................................................11

Gambar 2.4 Posisi Governor Yang patah .............................................................................14

Gambar 2.5 Perbandingan Kondisi Stem Patah dengan Stem Normal .....................................14

Gambar 3.1 Lokasi GV R1 yang patah .................................................................................15

Gambar 3.2 RCFA dengan Fish Bone Diagram untuk General Root Cause ...............................19

Gambar 3.3 Pengambilan data material stem GV ................................................................20

Gambar 3.4 Patahan Fatigue padastem GV R1 .....................................................................20

Gambar 3.5 RCFA dengan Fish Bone Diagram untuk specific Root Cause ...............................21

Gambar 3.6 Skema Kondisi GV dan Steam Flow ...................................................................22

Gambar 3.7 Ilustrasi Initial Crack pada Stem GV R1 .............................................................23


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DAFTAR TABEL
Tabel 2.1 Komponen Governor Valve ................................................................................... 9

Tabel 3.1. Data Gangguan stem GV R1 ...............................................................................16

Tabel 3.2. FMEA Governor Valve ......................................................................................17

Tabel 4.1. Failure Defense Task (FDT) ................................................................................25


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DAFTAR SINGKATAN

WO : Work Order

SR : Service Request

RCFA : Root Cause & Failure Analysis

FDT : Failure Defense Task

CM : Corrective Maintenance
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BAB I
PENDAHULUAN

I.1. Latar Belakang Masalah

Governor valve adalah peralatan yang berfungsi untuk mengatur jumlah steam yang
masuk ke HP turbin. Pengaturan Governor Valve berpengaruh pada kenaikan dan penurunan
beban selama operasi. Pengaturan Governor Valve dikotrol oleh system control hidrolik yang
disuply dari EH oil. Pressure EH oil dijaga pada tekanan 13 MPa menggunakan 1 pompa dengan
kapasitas 100% dan 1 pompa stand by. Governor terdiri dari banyak komponen mekanik dan
control yang harus mempunyai ketahanan terhadap temperature tinggi, tahan terhadap impact
dan getaran dari aliran main steam selama operasi. Governor valve di desain untuk mampu
bekerja normal dalam temperature tinggi dan tahan terhadap erosi dari steam flow.
Permasalahan pada GV R1 terjadi pada bulan mei 2015. Permasalahan pada GVR1 tidak
memberikan respon pembukaan ketika dibutuhkan beban naik. Ketidak mampu memberikan
respon GV R1 dimungkinkan dari patah stem GV R1, namun pekerjaan Inspeksi dan
penggantian hanya dapat dilakukan saat ME pada bulan juli sampai agustus 2015. Dari rentang
waktu mei sampai akhir juli 2015 Unit beroperasi menggunakan 3 Governor untuk mensuplay
kebutuhan beban pembangkit. Kegagalan yang terjadi pada Governor R1 memiliki potensi
failure yang sama untuk terjadi pada Governor Valve yang lain.
Berdasarkan latar belakang tersebut, Engineering System Owner terkait bermaksud untuk
melakukan kajian engineering dengan metode RCFA sehingga diharapkan akar permasalahan
dapat ditemukan sehingga kejadian serupa tidak terulang kembali
I.2. Dasar Pembuatan RCFA

Berdasarkan Prosedur no. PER-005-06/BSR Rev. 00 tanggal 18 Januari 2011, maka


gangguan ini perlu dilakukan RCFA karena didasari oleh beberapa hal antara lain:
1. Permasalahan yang belum diketahui akar penyebab permasalahannya.
2. Permasalahan peralatan yang mengakibatkan atau berpotensi mengakibatkan Unit
Trip/Derating atau Gagal Start.
3. Terjadinya penurunan ketersediaan, keandalan, dan efisiensi unit dimana belum diketahui
akar permasalahannya.
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I.3. Metodologi

Dalam melakukan kajian RCFA ini, metode yang dilakukan adalah sbb:
1. Melakukan pengumpulan Operasi, HAR dan CBM.
2. Melakukan site visit dan pengamatan pada obyek peralatan di lapangan.
3. Melakukan wawancara terhadap pihak operasi dan pemeliharaan.
4. Melakukan studi literatur dan review data-data pendukung.

I.4. Sistematika Penulisan

Dalam melakukan kajian ini, isi dari penulisan terdiri dari beberapa unsur sbb:
BAB I. PENDAHULUAN
Berisikan latar belakang masalah, dasar pembuatan kajian RCFA, metodologi
penulisan, serta sistematika penulisan.
BAB II. DATA PERALATAN
Berisikan fungsi peralatan, spesifkasi peralatan, riwayat kerusakan dan gangguan
peralatan, serta gambar pendukung.
BAB III. PEMBAHASAN DAN ANALISA
Berisikan kronologis kejadian, data operasional, dokumentasi/foto, kemungkinan
penyebab, dan analisa pembahasan.
BAB IV. KESIMPULAN DAN REKOMENDASI
Berisikan kesimpulan hasil RCFA, rekomendasi Failure Defense Task (FDT)
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BAB II

DATA PERALATAN

II.1. Fungsi Peralatan

II.1.1 Governor Valve

Governor valve adalah peralatan yang berfungsi untuk mengatur jumlah steam yang masuk
ke HP turbin. Pengaturan Governor Valve berpengaruh pada kenaikan dan penurunan beban
selama operasi. Pengaturan Governor Valve dikotrol oleh system control hidrolik yang disuply dari
EH oil. Pressure EH oil dijaga pada tekanan 13 MPa. Governor terdiri dari banyak komponen
mekanik dan control yang harus mempunyai ketahanan terhadap temperature tinggi, tahan
terhadap impact dan getaran dari aliran main steam selama operasi. Governor valve di desain
untuk mampu bekerja normal dalam temperature tinggi dan tahan terhadap erosi dari steam flow
Fungsi Governor Valve yang lain:
1. Pengatur kecepatan acuan (Governor Speed Reference)
Input utama yang digunakan untuk mengotrol turbin, khusunya saat sinkronisasi
dengan mengatur kecepatan acuan. Kecepatan acuan biasanya dinaikkan hingga 4%
agar proses sinkron dapat berlangsung
2. Over speed Testing
Test Overspeed digunakan untuk membuktikan nilai over speed sebenarnya saat trip
terjadi. Tentu saja test ini dilakukan saat unit tidak tersinron

Gambar 2.1 Turbin respon terhadap Load rejection


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Gambar 2.2 Characteristic Governor Valve

Gambar 2.3 Konstruksi Governor Valve


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Tabel 2.1 Komponen Governor Valve

No Component Material
1 Valve Pocket
2 Valve Stem 2Cr12NiMo1W1V
3 Bushing 38CrMoAIA
4 Round Pin 2Cr12NiMo1W1V
5 Press Plate 12Cr2Mo
6 Bushing 38CrMoAIA
7 Round Pin 2Cr12NiMo1W1V
8 Valve Disc 2Cr12NiMo1W1V
9 Hex Nut 40CrMoV
10 Round Pin 2Cr12NiMo1W1V
11 Spec Washer Q235-A
12 Thrust Washer DQ35SF-1
13 Spec Bolt 45
14 Spring Seat 20g
15 Spring 50CrVa
16 Inner Heax Screw 2Cr12NiMo1W1V
17 Spring Support Q235-A
18 Plain Washer Q235-A
19 Socket Screw 42CrMo
20 Spheric washer 38CrMoAIA
21 Thrust Washer DQ35SF-1
22 Linkage 2Cr12NiMo1W1V
23 Taper Thread Socket Screw 2Cr12NiMo1W1V
24 Extension Nut 40CrMoV
25 Gasket 8
26 Electrode Rod E6015-B3(R407)
27 Column End Holding Screw 25Cr2MoVA
28 Hex Bolt 40Cr

II.2 Prinsip Kerja

Pergerakan Governor dikontrol menggunkan oil servo. Pergerakan dari valve Governor
akan berpengaruh pada jumlah steam yang masuk ke dalam HP Turbin. GV Turbin berjumlah 4
Buah (Sisi kanan 2 dan sisi kiri 2). Pergerakan naik turun GV berdasarkan Kebutuhan beban dan
diatur melalui ControL Room Operator.
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Komponen-Komponen Utama Governor

1. Disc Valve
Bagian valve utama yang menutup dan membuka untuk mengatur jumlah steam yang
masuk kedalam HP Turbin. Jenis Valve berdasarkan area kerja termasuk Throtle Governor.
2. Stem
Bagian dari GV yang menghubungkan disk Valve dengan system Kontrol Minyak
3. Linkage
Bagian GV yang berfungsi untuk menyambungkan Bagian mekanik GV dengan bagian
Kontrol Servo
4. Spring
Bagian GV yang berfungsi untuk mempetahankan posisi GV agar tidak berubah jika terjadi
impact atau vibrasi yang besar selama operasi
5. Valve Pocket
Bagian luar dari Valve, yang berfungsi sebagai dudukan serta rumah utama valve.
6. High temperature Bolt
Bagian dari GV yang berfungsi untuk mengencangkan dan mengikat satu komponen
dengan komponen yang lain.

II.3 Riwayat Kerusakan dan Gangguan Peralatan

1. Tanggal 24 Mei 2015, GV R1 tidak memberikan respon ketika dilakukan penaikan beban
2. Tanggal 26 Mei 2016, Dilakukan test Characterisitik Valve, Mengindikasikan tidak adanya
pergerakan dari Valve yang lain terhadap GV R1. Dimungkinkan GV R1 patah dari sisi mekanik/
Stem GV patah
3. Saat dilakukan ME 27 Juli 2015-30 Agustus 2015, ditemukan bahwa Stem GV R1 mengalami
Patah pada posisi Screw.

Dari gangguan yang ada, Unit masih mampu beroperasi untuk memenuhi target produksi, namun
terdapat resiko dengan hanya mengoperasikan 3 GV dari normal 4 GV yang harus beroperasi. Resiko
yang mungkin terjadi adalah ketidak seimbangan aliran steam yang masuk ke dalam HP Turbin yang
dapat berpengaruh pada kenaikan Vibrasi dan laju erosi pada sudu turbin. Makan dari resiko yang ada
perlu dilakukan kajian untuk mencari sebeb terjadi kegagalan pada GV R1
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Gambar 2.4 Posisi GV R1 yang patah

Gambar 2.5 Perbandingan Kondisi Stem GV normal dengan GV yang patah


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BAB III
PEMBAHASAN DAN ANALISA

III.1. Kronologi Kejadian

Setelah unit sinkron tanggal 20 Mei 2015 ada indikasi bukaan Governor Valve
bermasalah (terlihat dari bukaan Governor Valve 34 % saat beban 540 MW, dari
trending DCS untuk beban sama dengan kondisi pressure dan temperature main steam sama
bukaan.sekitar.28%).
- Pada tanggal 24 Mei dilakukan pengujian governor valve dengan variasi demand
pembukaan dari 0 – 25 %. Dari hasil pengujian tersebut terindikasi ada permasalahan
pada GVR 1
- Dari mitigasi awal dimungkinkan stem GV R1 mengalami patah, sehingga secara sinyal
instrument masih mengindikasikan adanya pembukaan atau respon pada GV yang lain.namun
tidak ada pergerakan dari local.

Posisi Stem GV yang patah

Gambar 3.1 Lokasi GV R1 yang patah


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III.2. Data Operasional


Tabel 3.1. Data Gangguan Stem GV R1
Tanggal Deskripsi Keterangan / Foto

Mei 2015 GV R1 tidak memberikan


respon Terhadap perubahan
Beban.Dilakukan Charakteristik
test, GV R1 tidak memberikan
respon kenaikan.

Juli 2015 Temuan pada ME, Stem GV R1


Patah pada sisi Screw Stem
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III.3. Failure Mode & Effect Analysis (FMEA)

Tabel 3.2. FMEA Governor Valve

No Failure Effect on
Alias KKS of Comp. / Amount
Item Identification Function Failure Mode Failure Cause Component or Functional
of Comp. Next Higher Assembly (Equipment) System
Assembly
1 Steam chest Large Space for Steam from Creep Temperature exceeding Reduce heat trasnfer Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
Superheat Boiler normal metal properties capability
Reduce the material
strength

Life Time/ Aging Reduce the material Loss of turbine performance


strength

Leak out Gasket failure Heat loss Reduction turbin effisiency Safety/Potential Injury

Reduce heat trasnfer Loss of turbine performance


Erosion Foreign object damage capability
Life Time/ Aging Reduce the material Loss of turbine performance
strength
Steam Flow Loss of turbine performance

2 Spring Maintain Valve Position Broken Fatigue Valve cannot be operated Loss of operation Derated
with normal conditon
Dampen the shock force
from steam flow
aging/ Life time Valve cannot be operated Loss of operation Derated
with normal conditon

High Vibration from steam Valve cannot be operated Loss of operation Derated
flow during operation with normal conditon

3 Valve Disc Regulate the amount of Erosion Improper material Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
reheat steam before selection with normal
entering the IP turbine

Foreign Object damage Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
with normal

Steam flow Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown


with normal

Leak Through Plug and seat cut Loss of turbine performance Safety/Potential injury

4 Valve Seat 1. Prolong the durability of Erosion Improper material Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
the valve seat and prevent selection with normal
leakage .
2. Simplify replacement
when the position of the
valve having damaged

Foreign Object damage Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
with normal

Steam flow Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown


with normal

Leak Out Piston pulsations Loss of operation Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
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5 Valve Stem Connecting the valve to the Broken Improper Installation Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
intrument side with normal

Fatigue Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown


with normal

High Vibration from steam Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
flow with normal

aging/ Life time Valve cannot be operated Loss of operation Shutdown


with normal conditon
Bending Improper Installation Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance
with normal

Improper of Handling or Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance


Storage with normal

6 Linkage Unites mechanical side with Broken Pin Improper material Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
instrument side with normal
Improper Installation Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
with normal
High Vibration Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
with normal

Life Time Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown


with normal
Looseness in Screw Improper material Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
with normal
Improper Installation Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
with normal
High Vibration Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown
with normal

Life Time Valve cannot be operated Loss of turbine performance Shutdown


with normal
7 High Temperatur Bolt As fastener, to hold two Crack Corrotion Oxidation Leak Out Safety/Potential Injury
objects together
Broken
Improper of storage Leak Out Safety/Potential Injury

Creep aging Leak Out Safety/Potential Injury

Fatigue Improper material Leak Out Safety/Potential Injury

Improper Installation Leak Out Safety/Potential Injury

aging Leak Out Safety/Potential Injury

8 High Temperatur Isolation Prevent Heat Loss Crack Improper Material Heat loss Reduce Turbine Performance Safety/Potential Injury
Improper Installation Heat loss Reduce Turbine Performance Safety/Potential Injury
High Vibration from Heat loss Reduce Turbine Performance Safety/Potential Injury
Steam flow
9 Valve Pocket The Main Valve seat Leak Out Improper Installation Heat loss Reduce Turbine Performance Safety/Potential Injury
Gasket failure Reduction turbin effisiency Safety/Potential Injury

III.4. Kemungkinan Penyebab

Dari temuan dan Fakta lapangan saat ME, maka selanjutnya dilakukan brainstorming untuk
menentukan root cause dari permasalahan GV R1. Metode yang dilakukan adalah Fish Bone
diagram.

Untuk mencegah kegagalan yang sama pada masa mendatang maka perlu dilakukan
RCFA, untuk mencari penyebab Kelainan (patah) sisi GV R1.
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Fish Bone Diagram General Root Cause

Measurement Material Man Power


Improper during
operation
Improper of
Lapping test
Handling
Characteristic Test Improper
hasil aktual Stainless 422
Installation

Looseness Temperatur Tinggi

Worn Out
Vibrasi steam flow
Fatigue

Machine Method Enviroment

Gambar 3.2 RCFA dengan Fish Bone Diagram untuk General Root Cause

III.5. Analisa Pembahasan


Dari kemungkinan-kemungkinan penyebab yang telah dituangkan dalam fishbone diagram
dilakukan pembahasan tiap parameter.
a) Measurement :
1) Dari Lapping test Saat FYI kondisi Valve Masih Normal dan layak untuk dioperasikan
2) Dari hasil characteristic test valve saat FYI kondisi pembukaan valve dengan sinyal yang
dikirim sama, artinya valve masih normal untuk dioperasikan.
3) Hasil Characteristic saat Terjadi kelainan pada sisi GV R1, terdapat indikasi tidak ada
respon pembukaan actual dengan sinyal yang diberikan. Disimpulkan terjadi kelainan
GV R1 dari sisi mekanik Valve (stem valve).
b) Material
1) Material yang digunakan untuk stem GV adalah material yang tergolong bagus dari sisi
mekanik
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Hasil 3.3 Pengambilan data Material pada stem GV

Stainless 422 (AMS 5655)

Tabel 3.3 Properties Material Steam GV

Chemical Composition Limits


Weight C P Si Ni V Fe Mn S Cr Mo W Cu
0.040 0.030
Alloy 422 0.20-0.25 0.20-0.60 0.50-1.0 0.17-0.30 Bal 1 11.0-13.5 0.75-1.25 0.75-1.25 0.5
max max

Typical Mechanical Properties


0.2 % Yield Ultimate Tensile % Elongation in % Reduction of
Material Condition Hardness HB
Strength (ksi) Strength (ksi) 2" Area
Hardened & Tempered
Alloy 422 140 115 13 25 293-341
(AMS 5655)

Conditions
Properties
T (ºC) Treatment
Thermal expansion 11.2 x 10-6/ºC 0-100 -
Thermal conductivity 23.9 x W/m.K 100

Equivalent Material

 AISI 422, AMS 5655, ASTM A565, DIN 1.4935, GE B50A125E, SAE 51422, SAE J467
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Dari pemilihan material yang dipilih memiliki ketahanan yang bagus terhadap oxidasi, scalling
dan tahan terhadap temperature tinggi 649OC, serta memiliki mechanical properties yang bagus

c) Manpower
1) Improper during Operation: Selama Operasi Governor hanya bergerak naik turun
untuk mengontrol jumlah steam yang masuk kedalam steam. Selama operasi Governor,
operator mengontrol gerakan GV dari Control Room serta memantau kenaikan atau
pergerakan GV di CR melalui indikasi Intrumentasi yang tergambar pada monitor di CR
UJP BSR. Gerakan stroke GV 0-7 cm.
2) Improper During Handling: Refer dari proses pengiriman GV yang terakhir dari China,
GV ditaruh pada box kayu tebal 2 cm dan dibungkus dalam lembaran sterofoam yang
memastikan tidak terjadi benturan dan karat selama proses pengiriman dari China ke
Indonesia.
3) Improper During Installation: dari hal ini dimungkinkan terjadi kesalahan saat
pemasangan dan pelepasan baik saat Pemasangan awal maupun FYI. Memang untuk hal
ini agak susah dibuktikan, namun dari hasil pola patahan mengindikasikan bahwa
patahan adalah patahan fatigue dimana initial crack awal dimulai dari sisi luar screw dari
steam GV. Initial crack ini bisa dimungkinkan dari adanya gaya putar pada yang berlebih,
sehingga menyebabkan terjadinya initial crack pada sisi Screw Steam GV R1.
d) Machine
1) Looseness: Dari pola patahan yang terjadi stem GV hal ini dimungkinkan terjadi,
looseness disini dimungkinkan dari gesekan permukaan screw dengan linkage. Akibat
geseken yang berlebih ini memicu keausan pada screw stem yang nantinya berdampak
pada getaran stem selama operasi
2) Worn Out: Keuasan yang terjadi dimungkinkan dari aktivitas bongkar dan pasang GV
dari awal pembangunan unit dan saat FYI. Dimensi tidak diukur saat FYI, sehingga tidak
kelihatan pengurangan dimensi yang terjadi.
3) Fatigue: Dari pola patahan yang terlihat, patahan yang terjadi karena beban fatigue.
Beban fatigue terjadi dari aliran steam flow yang menabrak stem GV serta naik turun GV
selama Operasi. Fatigue cenderung tidak bisa dilakukan prediksi.
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Gambar 3.4 patahan Fatigue pada Stem GV R1

1. Dari gambar patahan yang ada, terlihat jelas adanya Beach mark (Garis pantai) pada
permukaan patahan  Indikasi patahan adalah patahan fatigue
2. Pola patahan adalah patahan getas (Britle), tanpa adanya pengecilan penampang
permukaan stem. Pola patahan pada bahan yang ductile dipastikan dari beban fatigue
3. Initial fatigue dimulai dari tepi steam dan bergerak ke tangah
4. Initial Crack dimungkinkan dari salah pemasangan stem, yang menerima beban puntir
melebihi daerah elastis material.
e) Method : --
f) Environment
1) Temperatur tinggi: Selama Operasi stem GV harus mampu menahan temperature Main
Steam sebesar 538OCelcius dengan pressure 169.9kg/cm2. Refer kepada material
Properties material stem GV adalah material yang tahan sampai temperature
10000Celcius. Dampak dari temperature tinggi dari steam temperature dapat
diminimalisir dari material properties
2) Vibrasi dari Pressure Steam Flow : Selama operasi Vibrasi timbul

Dari hasil analisa diatas dilakukan eliminasi terhadap kemungkinan-kemungkinan root cause
sehingga fishbone diagram nya menjadi seperti dibawah ini:
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Measurement Material Man Power


Improper during
operation
Improper of
Lapping test
Handling
Characteristic Test Improper
hasil aktual Stainless 422
Installation

Looseness Temperatur Tinggi

Worn Out
Vibrasi steam flow
Fatigue

Machine Method Enviroment

Gambar 3.5 RCFA dengan Fish Bone Diagram untuk Specific Root Cause

Root cause dari gangguan yang terjadi adalah berasal dari sisi machine yaitu Fatigue. Fatigue
mungkin disebabkan dari Improper Installation saat pemasangan awal dan FYI sebagai trigger
terjadinya initial crack. Beban dari steam flow dan naik turun GV selama operasi merupakan beban
fatigue yang berpengaruh terhadap kegagalan pada GV R1. Untuk memperkuat analisa maka dibuat
penggambaran kondisi Internal GV R1 operasi

Gambar 3.6 Skema kondisi GV dan Steam Flow


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1. Selama Operasi, GV R1 menerima beban dinamis dari steam Flow dengan pressure
mencapai 169 kg/cm2.
2. Beban dinamis yang diterima oleh Stem GV juga berasal dari pola operasi. Naik Turun
beban berpengaruh pada Pembukaan Valve. Pola buka tutup valve berupa naik turun Valve
pada jarak stroke 0-7 cm. Pada pembukaan Valve GV harus mampu menahan beban aliran
agar tetap dalam posisi yang stabil. Penghubung naik turun Valve antara sisi mekanik
dengan Instrument di hubungkan dengan Linkange yang disambung dengan stem GV.
3. GV R1 cenderung menerima Beban dinamis yang lebih besar jika dibandingkan dengan GV
R2 sehingga potensi kegagalan GV R1 lebih besar dibandingkan dengan GV R2

Gambar 3.7 Ilustrasi Initial Crack Pada Stem GV R1

4. Initial Crack GV R1 dimulai dari tepi Screw dari adanya beban puntir yang melewati
tegangan elastis dari Material Stem
5. Intial Crack terus menjalar menjadi crack seiring dengan perubahan beban dan aliran
Steam selama operasi.
6. Patahan akhir (Final Rupture) terjadi pada posisi tengah dengan sudut kemiringan
45derajat
7. Indikasi patah Fatigue terlihat dari pola patahan yang halus dengan ditandai beach mark
yang mengindikasikan beban dinamik yang bekerja dibawah beban material.
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BAB IV
KESIMPULAN & REKOMENDASI

IV.1. Kesimpulan

Adapun kesimpulan yang didapatkan setelah melakukan kajian RCFA ini adalah :

Root cause pada kegagalan GV R1 disebabkan karena Fatigue. Tegangan fatigue dipengaruhi
dari Steam Flow serta perubahan naik turun Beban selama Operasi. Initial Crack pada stem GV
dimungkinkan dari beban puntir yang berlebih saat bongkar pasang saat awal pembangunan
Unit serta FYI. Pembuktian kuat terkait hal ini perlu diuji ke Lab metalurgi untuk memastikan
pendapat dari ahli Failure Analysis.

IV.2. Failure Defense Task (FDT)

Tabel 4.1. Failure Defense Task (FDT)

Recommended Action
Item Identification Failure Mode Failure Cause Failure Detection Method
Description Frequency PIC
Valve Stem Broken Improper Installation 1 Maintenance check Visual check, repair or SI/ ME SPS HM
replace if needed
Penetrant test SI/ ME SPS HM
Fatigue 1 Maintenance check Visual check, repair or SI/ ME SPS HM
replace if needed
Penetrant test, SI/ ME SPS HM
High Vibration from steam 1 Operator Monitoring magnentic
Monitoring test
reheat steam Every shift SPS OP
flow pressure
2 Operator Round Do operator round, Every shift SPS OP
3 Maintenance check visual check
Visual check, repair or Event base SPS HM
replace if needed
aging/ Life time 1 In Situ Metallograpgy Measure Material 15-20 Years Enjinering
properties and Life Time Operation/
Bending Improper Installation 1 Maintenance check Visual check, repair or SI/ ME SPS HM
replace if needed
Run Out and SI/ ME SPS HM
Improper of Handling or 1 Maintenance check Dimensional
Visual check,Check
repair or SI/ ME SPS HM
Storage replace if needed
Run Out and SI/ ME SPS HM
Dimensional Check
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DAFTAR PUSTAKA

N600-16.67537537 TYPE 600MW Condensing Re heat Steam Turbine General Description and
Operation Manual.

Handover Manual Book Steam turbin Governing Valve System.


LAMPIRAN - LAMPIRAN
Tabel Manual test tanggal 26 Mei 2015

1. Manual test pada GVL1


Load : 297 MW MS Flow : 1119 t/h
MS Press : 13.1 Mpa

GVL1 (*) GVLR1 GVL2 GVR2


DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK
23 20 27 22 27 24 27 23
20 17 28.13 23 28.13 25 28.13 26
17 14 29.01 24 29.01 26 29.01 25
14 11 30.03 25 30.03 27 30.03 26
11 7.8 30.82 26 30.82 28 30.82 27
7 3.7 31.72 27 31.72 29 31.72 28
3 0 32.72 28 32.72 30 32.72 29
0 -2 32.74 28 32.74 30 32.74 29

Temuan : Kondisi GVL1 masih dalam kategori normal

2. Manual test pada GVR1


Load : 306 MW MS Flow : 1121 t/h
MS Press : 13.25 Mpa

GVL1 GVR1 (*) GVL2 GVR2


DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK
24.97 23 24.97 22 24.97 20 24.97 21
24.6 22 21 15 24.6 22 24.6 20
24.6 22 18 12 24.6 22 24.6 20
24.6 22 15 9.2 24.6 22 24.6 20
24.6 22 12 6.1 24.6 22 24.6 20
24.6 22 9 3 24.6 22 24.6 20
24.6 22 6 0 24.6 22 24.6 20
24.6 22 3 -1 24.6 22 24.6 20

Temuan : Saat demand pada GVR1 dirubah ke mode manual kemudian memberikan
variasi setting nilai, valve GV lain ( GVL1, GVL2 dan GVR2) tidak berespon
terhadap perubahan feedback pada GVR1 (yang seharusnya demand valve
GV lain harus menyesuaikan terhadap perubahan feedback GVR1).
3. Manual test pada GVL2
Load : 314 MW MS Flow : 1117 t/h
MS Press : 13.1 Mpa

GVL1 GVLR1 GVL2 (*) GVR2


DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK
24.91 23 24.91 20 24.91 22 24.91 21
25.6 22 25.6 20 21 18 25.6 21
25.9 23 25.9 21 18 15 25.9 22
27.2 25 27.2 22 15 12 27.2 23

Test tidak dilanjutkan mempertimbangkan fluktuasi beban, berkurang sampai 280 MW


Temuan : Kondisi GVL2 masih dalam kategori normal

4. Manual test pada GVR2


Load : 300 MW MS Flow : 1119 t/h
MS Press : 13.1 Mpa

GVL1 GVLR1 GVL2 GVR2 (*)


DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK DEMAND FEEDBACK
24.72 22 24.72 19 24.72 21 24.72 22
25.3 23 25.3 20 25.3 22 21 16
26.4 24 26.4 21 26.4 24 18 13
27.6 25 27.6 22 27.6 24 15 10
28.4 26 28.4 23 28.4 25 12 6.9
29.5 26 29.5 24 29.5 26 9 3.8

Temuan : Kondisi GVR2 masih dalam kategori normal

: Indikasi Abnormal

: Mode Manual
Root Cause Failure Analysis - Understanding Mechanical Failures

Machines aren’t supposed to break, and mechanical components such as shafts, fasteners, and
structures aren’t supposed to fail. But when they do fail, they can tell us exactly why.

It may sound a little far-fetched, but experts say that the causes for more than 90% of all plant
failures can be detected with a careful physical examination using low power magnification and
some basic physical testing. Inspection of the failure will show the forces involved, whether the
load applied cyclically or was single overload, the direction of the critical load, and the influence
of outside forces such as residual stresses or corrosion. Then, accurately knowing the physical
roots of the failure, you can pursue both the human errors and the latent causes of these physical
roots.

UNDERSTANDING THE BASICS

Before explaining how to diagnose a failure, we should review the effects of stress on a part.
When a load is put on a part, it distorts. In a sound design the load isn’t excessive, the stress
doesn’t exceed the "yield point", and the part deforms elastically, i.e., when the load is released
the part returns to its original shape. This is shown in Figure 1, a "stress-strain" diagram that
shows the relationship between loads and deformation.

In a good design, the part operates in the elastic range, the area between the origin and the yield
strength, the part will be permanently deformed. Even greater increases in load will cause the
part to actually break.

Figure 1 illustrates a very basic point of design, and applies when the load on a part is relatively
constant, such as the load on the frame of a building or the stress in the legs of your desk. It is a
very different case when fluctuating loads are applied, such as those in a hydraulic cylinder or in
an automotive connecting rod. These fluctuating loads are called fatigue loads, and when the
fatigue strength is exceeded, a crack can develop. This fatigue crack can slowly work its way
across a part until a fracture occurs. (Corrosion can greatly affect the fatigue strength).

Figure 1
Machine components can fracture from either a single overload force or from fatigue forces.
Looking at the failure face will tell which of these was involved. A single overload can result in
either a ductile fracture or a brittle fracture.

DUCTILE OVERLOAD VS. BRITTLE OVERLOAD FAILURES

A "ductile failure" is one where there is a great deal of distortion of the failed part. Commonly, a
ductile part fails when it distorts and can no longer carry the needed load, like an overloaded steel
coat hanger. However, some ductile parts break into two pieces and can be identified because
there is a great deal of distortion around the fracture face, similar to what would happen if you
tried to put too much load on a low carbon steel bolt.

The term "brittle fracture" is used when a part is overloaded and breaks with no visible distortion.
This can happen because the material is very brittle, such as gray cast iron or hardened steel, or
when a load is applied extremely rapidly to a normally ductile part. A severe shock load on the
most ductile piece can cause it to fracture like glass.

An important point about failures is that the way the load is applied, i.e., the direction and the
type, can be diagnosed by looking at the failure face. A crack will always grow perpendicular to
the plane of maximum stress. Below we show examples of the difference in appearance between
ductile overload and brittle overload failures.

Figure 2

From the examples above in Figure 2, we know we can look at an overload failure and knowing
the type of material, tell the direction of the forces that caused the failure. Common industrial
materials that are ductile include most aluminum and copper alloys, steels and stainless steels
that are not hardened, most non-ferrous metals, and many plastics. Brittle materials include cast
irons, hardened steel parts, high strength alloyed non-ferrous metals, ceramics, and glass.

One note of caution is that the type of fracture, ductile or brittle, should be compared with the
nature of the material. There are some instances where brittle fractures appear in normally ductile
materials. This indicates that either the load was applied very rapidly or some change has occurred
in the material, such as low temperature embrittlement, and the material is no longer ductile. An
example of this was a low carbon steel clip used to hold a conduit in position in a refrigerated (-
50 F) warehouse. The clip was made from a very ductile material, yet it failed in a brittle manner.
The investigation showed it had been hit by a hammer, a blow that would have deformed it at
normal temperatures.

In a brittle overload failure, separation of the two halves isn’t quite instantaneous, but proceeds
at a tremendous rate, nearly at the speed of sound in the material. The crack begins at the point
of maximum stress, then grows across by cleavage of the individual material grains. One of the
results of this is that the direction of the fracture path is frequently indicated by chevron marks
that point toward the origin of the failure. Example 1 is a photograph of the input shaft of a
reducer where the chevron marks clearly point toward the failure origin, while Figure 3 is a sketch
of the cross section of the wall of a ruptured 20ft. (6.1 m.) diameter vessel. In both cases, by
tracing the chevron marks back to their origin, we knew exactly where to take samples to
determine if there was a metallurgical problem.

Notice how the


chevron marks
(high-lighted)
point toward the
origin of the
fracture.

Example 1 Figure 3

FATIGUE FAILURES

So far we’ve talked about the gross overloads that can result in immediate, almost instantaneous,
catastrophic failures. A very important distinction is that fatigue cracks take time to grow across
a part. In a fatigue failure, an incident of a problem can exceed the material’s fatigue strength
and initiate a crack that will not result in a catastrophic failure for millions of cycles. We have seen
fatigue failures in 1200 rpm motor shafts that took less than 12 hours from installation to final
fracture, about 830,000 cycles. On the other hand, we have also monitored crack growth in slowly
rotating process equipment shafts that has taken many months and more than 10,000,000 cycles
to fail.
Figure 4 shows a simple fatigue crack with the different growth zones and the major physical
features.

The fatigue zone is typically much smoother than the instantaneous zone, which is usually brittle
and crystalline in appearance. Progression marks are an indication that the growth rate changed
as the crack grew across the shaft and don’t appear on many failure faces.

Figure 4

There are some complex mechanisms involved in the initiation of a fatigue crack and once the
crack starts, it is almost impossible to stop because of the stress concentration at the tip.

STRESS CONCENTRATION

A stress concentration is a physical or metallurgical condition that increases the local stress in the
part by some factor. A good example is the shaft shown in Figure 5. We see that the stress in the
area of the radius varies depending on the size of the radius. A small radius can increase the
stress dramatically.
Figure 5

Stress concentrations, indicated by the symbol Kt, can be caused by changes in metallurgy,
internal defects, or changes in shape. There is extensive data that indicates that the resultant
values depends on both the type of stress, i.e., bending, torsion, etc., and the general shape of
the part.

Stress concentrations have a great effect on crack initiation because of their effect on increasing
the local stress. The crack can start solely as the effect of the operating loads or it can be multiplied
by the stress concentration factor.

WHAT TYPE OF LOAD WAS IT?

The face of a fatigue failure tells us both the type (bending, tension, torsion or a combination)
and the magnitude of the load. To understand the type of load, look at the direction of crack
propagation. It is always going to be perpendicular to the plane of maximum stress. The four
examples in Figure 6 reflects four common fracture paths.
Figure 6

Figure 6 brings up the question "what type of bending?" Was it one-way plane bending, like a leaf
spring or a diving board, or was it rotating bending, such as a motor shaft with a heavy belt load?
As seen in Figure 7, looking at the fracture face again tells us the type of load. Notice that "rotating
load" on the right causes the crack to grow in a non-uniform manner. In general, when the divider
of the instantaneous zone does not point to the origin, it shows there was a rotating bending
involved in the failure cause.

Figure 7

HOW HEAVILY WAS IT LOADED?

Fatigue failures almost always start on the outside of a shaft at a stress concentration, because
the local stress is increased. However, the instantaneous zone (IZ) carries the load in the instant
before the part breaks. By looking at the size of the IZ, you can tell the magnitude of the load on
the part. Figure 8 shows a comparison between a lightly and a heavily loaded shaft for both plain
bending and rotational bending.
Figure 8

THE EFFECT OF STRESS CONCENTRATIONS ON A FRACTURE FACE

If a part is relatively lightly stressed, the cracking will start at only one point and the result will
look like one of the examples above. However, if a shaft is more heavily loaded, then cracks can
start in several places and work their way across the part. In Figure 9 we see a sketch of a rotating
shaft that failed in only a few weeks. Inspecting it, you can see the instantaneous zone is very
small, indicating it wasn’t highly stressed. Also, the crack is straight across the shaft, showing the
cause was a bending load. But if the load was light, why did the shaft fail? The answer is stress
concentrations.

Figure 9

Looking at the fracture face, you see a series of ratchet marks. These are the boundaries between
adjacent fracture planes, i.e., between each pair of ratchet marks is a fracture origin, and as these
individual cracks grow inward they eventually join together on a single plane. The small
instantaneous zone indicates the stress at the time when the shaft finally broke was low, but the
multiple origins and the ratchet marks show us there was enough stress to cause cracking at many
points around the perimeter almost simultaneously.

From this you can conclude that there must have been a significant stress concentration. (The
calculated stress concentration was in the range of 4.0, so the stress in the area of those origins
was four times as much as it should have been.)

With this information on the type of load and the magnitude of the load, we can start looking at
some failures and diagnosing where they came from. Following are some examples of failures and
an explanation of their causes.
Figure 10. Figure 11.
A torsional fatigue failure resulting from a A rotating bending fatigue failure from a motor
loose hub fit. Note the severe fretting (from shaft. Notice the small instantaneous zone that
looseness) and the cracked shaft. shows the shaft was lightly loaded at the time
of failure.

Figure 12.
Figure13.
By tracing the progression marks backward,
Impressive brittle fracture of a large universal
we can see the failure started at the corner
joint. The chevron marks point to where the
of the keyway. But, the instantaneous zone
failure started. The fact that the surface has
is tiny. This indicates the shaft was very
uniform roughness tells us that this was an
lightly loaded at the time of failure and
instantaneous failure.
further research is needed.

Figure 14.
A testimony to an inept repair. The weld Figure 15.
repair of the shaft should never have been Typical rotating bending failure. Moderate sized
attempted. The four gross weld flaws instantaneous zone. Rotating bending failure
initiated fatigue cracking of a very heavily origins surround the shaft.
loaded shaft.
Figure 16.
Ugly plain bending failure.

About the Author

Neville Sachs, P.E., is President of Sachs, Salvaterra & Associates, Inc., which was founded in
1986. The consulting firm specializes in improved plant and equipment reliability and technical
support services. Among the firm’s capabilities are vibration monitoring, mechanical failure
anlaysis, corrosion and materials engineering, design reliability analysis and a wide variety of
nondestructive examination methods. Previously, Neville was Supervisor, Reliability Engineering
for Allied Signal Corporation where he was instrumental in developing one of the first large
predictive maintenance inspection programs in the nation. Mr. Sachs received a Bachelor of
Engineering Degrees in both Mechanical and Chemical Engineering from Stevens Institute of
Technology. Visit his web site at http://www.sachssalvaterra.com.

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