APPELLANT
versus
THE STATE
RESPONDENT
et
SIBOLEKA, J
[1]
accident. He pleaded guilty as charged and through his counsel, Mrs. Dreyer a plea explanation in terms of section 112(2) of Act 51/77 was handed in Court upon which a conviction followed. He was sentenced as follows:
Two (2) years imprisonment of which 14 (fourteen) months is suspended for 4 (four) years on condition that the accused is not convicted of culpable homicide committed during the period of suspension.
[2]
brought before us represented by Mr. Botes while Ms. Esterhuizen appeared for the respondent. This Court is indebted to the valuable
[3]
their heads of arguments filed we decided to set aside the learned Magistrates sentence and substituted it with the following:
N$7,000.00 or two years imprisonment of which N$3,000.00 or one (1) year are suspended for a period of five years on condition that the accused is not convicted of negligent driving, committed during the period of suspension.
[4]
We indicated at the time that our reasons for the ruling will follow
[5]
6.
That the learned Magistrate erred in fact and/or in law and misdirected himself by lending excessive weight to the evidence presented by the State in support of aggravating circumstances.
7.
That the learned Magistrate erred in law and/or misdirected himself in failing to properly consider and apply his mind to the relevant circumstances of the matter and sentences imposed by other Courts in respect of similar offences.
8.
That the learned Magistrate erred in law and misdirected himself in failing to exercise his discretion to impose a fine or a fully suspended sentence judicially.
[6]
3. I plead guilty to the charge. I admit the following facts and tender my plea of guilty of the basis thereof: 3.1 I admit that on 29 November 2007 I was at or near Otjiwarongo in the district of Otjiwarongo. 3.2 I admit that on or about the Otjiwarongo, Kalkfeld Main Road, I was the driver of the motorcycle with registration number N 111197 W. 3.3 I admit that due to my negligence, the said motorcycle collided with the barrier on the side of the road and overturned. 3.4 I admit that I was negligent in that I drove too fast in the prevailing circumstances and lost control over the motorcycle which then collided with the barrier of the road and Charlene Kesslau fell off the said motorcycle. 3.5 I admit that due as a result of my aforesaid negligence, Charlene Kesslau died of severe multiple internal organ damage. 3.6 I admit that I knew at the time of my action that such action was wrongful and unlawful and punishable by law. 4. In view of the foregoing I plead guilty to the crime as alleged in the charge sheet.
[7]
appropriate in the sense that although death has resulted, he did not seriously look into the appellants personal circumstances such as his age at the time of the offence, a first offender, the degree of his blame worthiness and the fact that his leg was amputated as a result of the accident. In the plea explanation the cause of the accident was
described as follows:
3.3 I admit that due to my negligence, the said motorcycle collided with the barrier on the side of the road and overturned.
3.4
I admit that I was negligent in that I drove too fast in the prevailing circumstances and lost control over the motorcycle which then collided with the barrier of the road and Charlene Kesslau fell off the said motorcycle.
my own underlining.
Although the words too fast could be understood to mean exactly what they say, they cannot be measured or be understood to represent a specific speedometer reading, for example 120 kilometers per hour or so. They cannot be rated in excess of a specific speed limit required in a given area on our national roads. In his reasons for sentence the learned Magistrate only refers to the offence as being very serious, a life of a human being was lost due to the accuseds negligence. He did not
elaborate more to give an indication why in his opinion an option of a fine was not appropriate as suggested by the Public Prosecutor. Ms.
Esterhuizen stated that negligent driving where death has ensued is a serious offence for which a custodial sentence may be imposed. However, it is my considered view that, it should be done by appropriately taking all the surrounding circumstances and most importantly the accuseds degree of culpability. The extent to which the accused has deviated from what a reasonable person finding himself in the similar situation would have done also comes into play.
[8]
1992(1) SACR 783(N) where the appellant swung at a high speed from his
lane in order to overtake; S v Nyathi 2005(2) SACR 273 (SCA) where the accused overtook on a double barrier line killing six people; S v Chretien 1979(4) SA 781 (1) the accused drove into a group of people gathered on the street whose presence he was aware of. It is my considered view that in all the above cases, custodial sentences were appropriately imposed. The reason being the presence of clearly stated high degrees of blame worthiness in the manner in which the above accidents were caused as well as the consequences that followed.
[9]
In my view although death has also ensued in this matter the level
of culpability cannot be equaled to the one stated in the above cases. Factors such as that the appellant pleaded guilty, is a first offender with no criminal record, will in all probability lose his employment as a result of the custodial sentence, that the appellant himself suffered a severe injury resulting in the amputation of his leg, was hospitalized for quite a long time incurring financial loses, and was in a position to pay a fine, cannot be disregarded. In my view, the cumulative effect of these factors clearly shows that the learned Magistrate has indeed misdirected himself when he imposed a direct custodial sentence in the face of other various sentencing options available to him.
[10]
[11]
negligent action alone cannot be concluded to warrant a custodial sentence. According to him if regard is had to the fact that the learned Magistrate did not give further reasons when the notice of appeal was noted the sentence of ten months imposed on the appellant is therefore not appropriate. In support of his argument he referred quite correctly in my view to the case of S v Van der Merwe 1992(1) SACR 48. [12] In his reasons for sentence the learned Magistrate stated that
human life is irreplaceable. I am in agreement with this fact. However, that alone does not warrant the imposition of a custodial sentence without an option of a fine. [13] A full bench in this Court in S v Van der Merwe 1982(1) SACR 48
Whatever the result of the negligent act or omission, the fact remains that what the accused person in such a case is guilty of is negligence the failure to take reasonable and proper care in given circumstances. His negligence may be slight and yet may have the most calamitous consequences, or it may be gross and yet be almost providently harmless in the result. I venture to suggest that the basic measure for determining fit punishment for a negligent motorist must be the degree of his culpability or blame worthiness.
[14]
Further down the same page at paragraph d-e, the Court said:
direct imprisonment is reserved for a case where there is a high degree of negligence or recklessness.
In the light of the above considerations we found that there was indeed a misdirection warranting our intervention and the sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate was accordingly interfered with.
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_________________ SIBOLEKA J
I agree.
_________________ NDAUENDAPO J
MR. BOTES
ADV. ESTERHUIZEN
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