TRIBAL LIAISON OFFICE

Afghanistan Border-Districts Exploratory Assessment

SouthernCluster :
Zabul,Kandahar Helmand,Nimroz ,

 2008 Tribal Liaison Office

T able of Content
INTRODUCTION Methodology ECONOMIC OVERVIEW Markets Agricultural Production Export/Import Goods Labour Migration Currency and Prices Land and land ownership POLITICAL OVERVIEW Influence of jiahdi commanders Insurgency Cross-border linkages/Refugee Warrior Communities Small Arms Flow Drug Economy TRIBAL OVERVIEW Cluster remits of tribes The Kuchi Nomads of Afghanistan 2 18 21 21 24 26 26 30 33 36 37 40 41 45 49 54 63

TRIBAL RELATIONS Ghilzai-Durrani fault line historical context Panjpai and Zirak Durrani struggle over power and resources Intra-Zirak Durrani power struggle Other tribal conflicts RECOMMENDATIONS Politics and Security Economy Research

66 68 70 72 73 77 78 79 81

1
Introduction

Chapter

he southern cluster runs from the province of Nimroz in the Southwest over Helmand and Kandahar in the South to Zabul, which links up in the east with the South-eastern province of Paktika and Ghazni (see Figure 1.1).

FIGURE 1.1 Overview of provinces and Districts in Southern Cluster The reason for placing Kandahar, Zabul, Helmand and Nimroz into the Southern cluster comes from the overall inter-connectedness of these provinces into the Southern region (also including Uruzgan), with Kandahar forming the regional capital.

Large areas along the borders are only sparsely populated. The entire area called Registan (including Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand, Reg in Kandahar and all of southern Nimroz) is nearly all sand-desert with villages in Dishu and Khanishin being located along the Helmand River in the Northern part. The drought has had an extreme effect over the past few years in this area, destroying most of the land that might be used for agricultural purposes. The drought has also affected the Kuchi populations inhabiting the area. As many of their animals perished, they have been forces to settle down and take up new businesses. Zabul, which lies in the East of the Southern cluster, has two districts bordering with Pakistan and the shortest border to Pakistan of all three Southern provinces. While Shamulzayi district borders Zabul (Shinkay) in the west, Ghazni (Nawa) in the North, Waza Khwa in Paktika in the East, and Zhob district in Pakistan, Atghar provides the link with Kandahar (Maruf). Its border with Zhob in Pakistan is disputed, as some claim that there is none, thus Table 1.1 does not provide an entry for the length of Atghars border with Zhob. Zabul can be considered a buffer between the Southern and Southeastern cluster, as there are many linkages between districts in Kandahar, Paktika, Ghazni and Zabul. Zabul is in the middle of major crossroads for the insurgency, drug and weapons trade: Insurgents move along the mountain ranges running from Quetta district between Maruf and Arghistan through Zabul to Ghazni; Narcotics from Nangarhar and Wana in South Waziristan meet in Zabul where they are directed through the Daman desert in Kandahar to the Baramcha bazaar in South Helmand and on to Europe via Iran and Turkey (see also discussions in the Southeastern cluster report). Leftover or stockpiled weapons from jihad times from weapons depots in Northern Afghanistan are smuggled via Bamiyan, Day Kundi, Ghazni to Zabul and on to Paktika and Wana in South Waziristan.

Kandahar has five districts bordering with Pakistan and also the most extensive border, a total of 401 km. Maruf (the link to Zabul in the Northeast) borders both Zhob and Pishin (Quetta) in Pakistan, while Arghistan and Spin Boldak only border Pishin. Shorabak borders Pishin and Chagai, and Reg, the link to Helmand, borders Chagai only. Kandahar is the most dominant province for two reasons: It has the most extensive border with Pakistan (5 border-districts running east to south: Maruf, Arghistan, Spin Boldak, Shorabak and Reg) It is considered the centre of the South (both politically and economically), with Kandaharcity being the regional capital. Its strategic location has made it a desired area of settlement since ancient times. Kandahar was the capital of Afghanistan until Timur Shah established Kabul as his capital in 1775.

Even though Helmand has two districts that border Pakistan, Dishu and Khanishin (both bordering Chagai), its border is slightly shorter than that of Nimroz. Helmand is wedged between Kandahar to the East (Reg district) and Nimroz to the west (Dishu district). There is a slight disagreement as to which of the Helmand districts actually border Pakistan: Khanishin or Garamsir, but our research indicated it to be Khanishin (see box and Figure 1.2).

FIGURE 1.2 Where in Helmand is Khanishin (=Reeg): ISAF vs. AIMS Unclear boundaries the Case of Khanishin and Garamsir The two border-districts of Dishu and Khanishin used to be part of Garamsir but were separated out as their own districts during the rule of the last Afghan King, Zahir Shah. While maps do show this reality, there seems to be an unclear demarcation between Khanishin and Garamsir, with contradictory information as to which of the two districts actually borders Pakistan. A main mapping source commonly used, AIMS, shows Garamsir (or Garmser in the map on Figure 1.2) bordering Pakistan; yet more recent maps drawn by ISAF reflect a reality that corresponds closer to our own findings (which are based on interviews and not satellite imagery or GPS coordinates). The ISAF boundaries show Reeg (which is Khanishin in Helmand), as Khanishin is essentially another word as Reg, bordering Pakistan (look for the red boundaries). These findings make sense since the entire area occupied by Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand, Reg in Kandahar and southern parts of Nimroz belong to an area called Registan (meaning Sand land or land of Sand in Persian). Registan is a natural border with Pakistan and has always presented an obstacle for conventional military forces. This border dispute highlights two important points: a) that there are different

understandings of district boundaries and b) that there is a dire need to redraw maps that are available to the general public, else our work is informed by wrong information. For example, one could note that district elections could prove a dangerous endeavour if district boundaries remain unclear. TABLE 1.1 Border Lengths between the Southern Districts and Pakistan Province District Zabul Shamulzayi Atghar TOTAL Maruf Arghistan Spin Boldak Shorabak Reg TOTAL Helmand Khanishin Dishu TOTAL Border in km 45 km *km km 91 km 20 km 93 km 112 km 85 km 401 km 55 km 55 km 110 km 188 km

Nimroz Chahar Burja

TOTAL SOUTH

Kandahar

744 km

* Allegedly no border with Pakistan although this is under dispute

Nimroz, the province farthest to the west, has only one district (Chahar Burja) that borders both Pakistan and Iran. Its border to Pakistan, at 188 Km) is longer than that to Iran, at 129 Km.. Nimroz is one of the most sparsely populated provinces in the country. With difficult terrain (which it shares with much of Southern Helmand and parts of Southern Kandahar) and strong winds, close-knit relationships between communities are very difficult, if not impossible. Nimroz is a buffer province toward the West of Afghanistan. Historically it formed part of ancient Sistan, a flourishing culture before much of it was destroyed during the Mongol invasion. The demographics of Nimroz differ from the other Southern provinces, all of which are majority Pashtun, while in Nimroz (and especially Chahar Burja) the nonPashtun tribe, the Baluch, constitute the majority. Nimroz is oriented very closely to the Iranian and, to a lesser degree, the Pakistani parts of Baluchistan (see Figure 1.3) 1

Balochistan or Baluchistan is an arid region located in the Iranian Plateau in Southwest Asia and South Asia, between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The area is named after the numerous Baloch (or Baluch, Balouch, Balooch, Balush, Balosh, Baloosh, Baloush) tribes, an Iranian people, who moved into the area from the west around A.D. 1000. All natives are considered Balochi even if they do not speak Balochi; Pashto, Persian, and Brahui languages are also spoken in the region. The southern part of Balochistan is known as Makran. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_%28region%29

FIGURE 1.3 Overview of Baluchistan What Figure 1.3 further illustrates is the influence of the Baluch in the Southern border districts, given that the territory they define as theirs (Baluchistan) runs from Nimroz in the West (part of Chahar Burja), encompassing nearly entirely the two border districts in Helmand (Dishu and Khanishin), as well as Reg in Kandahar and parts of Shorabak and Spin Boldak in Kandahar where it ends. Thus, this minority population with an ancient territory divided between several countries, is very influential in the Southwestern border districts. There are several border crossings between the Southern cluster and Pakistan and Iran, the latter bordering only with Nimroz; both official and unofficial. Table 1.3 lists the most important ones. Table 1.4 provides a general overview of the districts included in the Southern Cluster.

TABLE 1.3 Overview of Border Crossings in the Southern Cluster Province District Zabul Shamulzayi Atghar Maruf Arghistan Name of Crossing

Official/Unofficial

Countless small crossings. Main ones is Unofficial to Muslim Bagh Reportedly no direct crossing point Many small crossings in the mountains. Main one goes to Pishin in Pakistan Main crossing is to Shin Narai and Tujana in Pakistan Smaller crossings in the Khwaja Aman mountain range Paved highway to Chaman in Pakistan Other animal and motorbike paths, for example to Wesh bazaar near the border Road from Shorabak to Sarlat village on to Panjpai village in Pakistan Road leads from the district centre to Taraki village and on to Nuschki village in Pakistan Road leads from the district centre to Mashkran village and on to Nuschki in Pakistan. Road leads from Shorabak to Goaray village and on to Kashingay in Pakistan Road leads from the district centre to Sayedbus village and on to Reg district, Panjwai, and Helmand Moradali Kalay (Pakistan; 2-3 pick ups daily and motorbikes) Isatscha (Pakistan; by animals) Zaro (Pakistan; by animals) Numerous smaller crossings in the desert, main one around the smugglers bazaar in Baramcha Numerous smaller crossings in the desert

Unofficial Unofficial Unofficial Official Unofficial All unofficial

Spin Boldak

Kandahar Shorabak

All unofficial

Reg Helmand

Khanishin Dishu

All unofficial Unofficial Unofficial

Nimroz Chahar Burja

Band-e- Kamal khan crossing and 3 more smaller crossings.

TABLE 1.4 Overview of Districts in Southern Cluster

Province District Tribal Composition Population Size Villages Infrastructure Shamulzayi district is a large arid district with a surface of 2,972 km2 located in the Southeast of Zabul province. It borders Maruf (Kandahar) in the Southwest, Shinkay (Zabul) in the West, Nawa (Ghazni) in the North, Waza Khwa (Paktika) in the East, and Zhob district of Pakistan in the South. The border with Pakistan is 45 km long and there are countless small crossings. 100-150 cars and trucks cross the border on a busy day. Ghilzai (90%): Tokhi (88%) Shamulzai (80%) Basokhel (5%) Babuzai (3%) Kakar (2%) Zirak-Durrani: Yusofzai (5%) Safee (2%) Other Pashtun: Lodin (3%) There are five unpaved main roads: 1) Shamulzayi to Qalat 2) Shamulzayi to Muslim Bagh (Pakistan) 3) Shamulzayi to Ghazni (Nawa) 4) Shamulzayi to Paktika 5) Shamulzayi to Maruf (Kandahar) Allegedly there have never been any secular schools in Shamulzayi. There is the Ibni Sina Health Clinic in the district centre, which is in a bad condition. There are 5 pharmacies located in Shamulzai and Sanzir bazaar. There is no state electricity; few people have generators for wells and their shops. There is no telephone coverage except for satellite phones. Radio : BBC, VoA. The Rez and Jahan Gyr riverbeds carry water in spring. There are two wiala (canals), the Rez Wiala and the Jahan Gyr wiala. In addition, there are more than 100 wells that are more than 30 meters deep. In addition there are more than 100 kareez. Livelihood is based on agriculture and animal husbandry. Very windy district making agricultural production difficult. Of the arable land 50% is irrigated and 50% is rain fed. Locals allege that there is no poppy cultivation as the soil is bad and there is water shortage but UNODC figures claim that 159 ha were used for poppy fields in 2007. There is a tradition of almond production. The richest person owns 1000 2000 almond trees. Livestock (sheep, goats) is owned by 3% of population that does not own land. Drugs are bought in neighbouring Maruf (Kandahar) district. Food items are brought in from Kandahar or Pakistan Economy

Zabul

Shamulzayi

Pop Size est.: 35,000 Villages: 193

Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure Atghar district is located in the Southwest of Zabul Province and has a surface of 1,153 km2. It borders Shamulzayi district to the east and north, Naw Bahar to the north, Shinkay to the west, and Maruf (Kandahar) to the South and Southwest. It borders with Zhob district of Pakistan in the South, although some people allege it has no direct border with Pakistan.

Economy

There is no lack of land, but lack of water. In addition to some subsistence agriculture, the district engages in animal herding. Aside from agriculture, there is almond production, which has a long tradition in the district. The richest person owns about 1000 almond trees. A poppy production only accounts for 10% of the arable land and is one of the lowest in Zabul (about 16 ha in 2007). Due to a poor economy and unemployment many people work either in coal mines in Pakistan or in the poppy harvest in Helmand.

Zabul

Ghilzai: Hotak 95% Atghar Karyani: Wardak (5%)

Pop Size est. 60,000 Villages: 100-130

There are three unpaved main roads: 1) from Qalat to Atghar; 2) from Atghar to Maruf; 3) from Shamulzai to Maruf There were one or two schools for boys in tents but they closed due to insecurity. Literacy is poor (5%) There is no clinic, only a few shops with doctors. There is no state electricity and no telephone coverage. The only telephones working in the district are satellite telephones. Radio: BBC, VoA The Atghar riverbed carries water only in winter and spring. There are 70 kareez, the main source of drinking water. In addition there is the Atghar Wiala (canal).

Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure Maruf district is located in the East of Kandahar Province and comprises a surface of 3,702 km2. The district centre is Maruf, located in the northern part of the district. It borders Arghistan district to the West, Shinkay (Zabul) and Atghar (Zabul) districts to the North and Shamulzai (Zabul) to the Northeast. Maruf borders Quetta district of Pakistan in the Southwest and Zhob district of Pakistan in the Southeast. The border with Pakistan is 91 km long. Maruf is a mountainous district with many rugged mountain passes towards Pakistan. The highest peaks reach 2,935 meters above sea level. Maruf forms the upper end of the Arghistan valley.

Economy

Zirak Durrani: Barakzai (50%)

The majority of the population engages in agriculture (95%). Maruf has about 60% arable land. Legal agricultural products are wheat, corn, grapes (raisins), apricots, and almonds. Wheat and corn is grown for personal consumption only while raisins and almonds are exported. About 18% of the land is used for poppy production, which translates to about 914 ha. In addition the population engages in animal husbandry (goats, cows, donkeys)

Kandahar

Maruf

Panjpai Durrani: Alizai (25%) Ishaqzai (8%) Khugiani (2%) Ghilzai: Kakar (15%)

Pop Size est. 29,300 (2006, Wikipedia) to 130,000 (surveyors) Villages: 340

There are three unpaved road: 1. from Maruf (via Arghistan) to Kandahar 2. from Maruf to Spin Boldak 3. from Maruf to Pishin in Pakistan In order to reach Maruf, people from Kandahar often travel via Spin Boldak. There are two primary schools (although 29 are registered) in tents in the centre; both were closed in 2003 due to insecurity. There are no hospitals or clinic; a few doctors prescribe medicine. There is no state electricity or telephone coverage. The only telephones in the district are satellite phones. Radio: BBC, VoA. Irrigation through kareezes (150) fed by natural springs and open canals/wialas (20) receiving water from seasonal rivers (Salisun river, only in spring) and Arghistan/Atghar river. There are no functioning wells although 295 were drilled several years ago. The problems are decreasing levels of ground water or technical problems.

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Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure Arghistan is situated in the Eastern part of Kandahar Province and comprises a surface of 3,665 km2. It borders Spin Boldak to the South and West, Daman to the West, Maruf to the East, Shinkay (Zabul) to the North, and Quetta district of Pakistan to the East and South. The border with Pakistan is 20 km long. Arghistan is a large valley around 1,100 m above sea level. In the South the valley is part of De Hadi Ghar (Hada Hills, with peaks reaching up to 2,098 meters) and in the Southeast the Khwaja Amran Range, with peaks up to 2,547 meters, creates a natural barrier with Pakistan. The road between Kandahar and Arghistan is currently being paved. The other roads are unpaved. 1. Road between Arghistan district & Boldak district. 2. Road between Arghistan district & Surai district of 3. Road between Arghistan district & Maruf district 4. Road from centre of Arghistan district to Shin Narai and Tujana of Pakistan (4 cars a day, mountainous and desert, smuggler path). There are more than 10 secular schools in Arghistan district but all of them are closed due to insecurity. There is a newly constructed district governors building and a comprehensive health care centre in the district centre, The latter is in bad conditions and staffed with only 3-4 nurses. There is no hospital. Inhabitants of Arghistan go to Kandahar, Spin Boldak or Pakistan to see doctors. There are seven unofficial pharmacies in the district bazaar and some villages. There is no state electricity. Few people have generators to pump water from wells. Telephone coverage: Roshan, AWCC. Radio: Milli radio, Azad Afghan radio, VoA, BBC. 7% of the land is irrigated by wells (about 70/50m deep). There are almost 130 kareezs fed by natural springs and 100 open wiala/canals fed by seasonal rivers (Lowra and Khooshki) and Arghistan river.

Economy

Kandahar

Arghistan

Zirak Durrani Barakzai (25%) Mohammadzai (25%) Alkozai (15%) Popalzai (20%) As well as some Achekzai and Sayed families Panjpai Durrani 15%: Ishaqzai, Alizai, Khugiani

The main livelihood is subsistence agriculture (95%) and animal husbandry (cows, goats, donkeys). There are a few export products: pomegranates, grapes (raisins), watermelon, wheat and corn Local allege that there is no poppy cultivation which they attribute to water shortage and the fact that many inhabitants are Popalzai (who follow the orders of President). Indeed, its poppy production is relatively small with only 310 ha in 2007 (UNODC). Arghistan has historically strong economic links to Spin Boldak as it is situated on an old trade route used by Achekzai traders to bring almonds from Shah Wali Kot to Shahre Safa in Pakistan. When Spin Boldak fell to the mujahideen and Kandahar was still controlled by the PDPA, Arghistan ties with Spin Boldak became even stronger as the population had to get their supplies in Spin Boldak.

Pop Size est. 30,500 (wikipedia) to 85000 (surveyors) Villages: 234

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Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure Spin Boldak is located in the Southeast of Kandahar province and comprises a surface of 5898 km2. It borders Arghistan to the North, Shorabak to the South, Daman to the West and Quetta district of Pakistan to the East. The border with Pakistan is 93 km long. In the north of the district are the De Hadi Ghar or Hada Hills\) with peaks up to 2,098 meters above sea level, and in the east is the Khwaja Amran. About 5% of Spin Boldak is mountainous; the rest is flat land, which gradually turns into sand desert in the West. There are several roads in addition to animal and motorbike paths, for example, to the Wesh bazaar near the border. 1. A paved highway links the district with Kandaharcity to the north and Chaman in Pakistan to the south. 2. Spin Boldak to Loy Karez to Arghistan 3. Spin Boldak to Shorabak The entire district has 19 schools (including two high schools and two secondary schools), most of them operate two shifts to accommodate all students. There are no schools for girls. There are 7 health posts (10 more are planned) and 3 basic health care centres. There are more than 20 pharmacies without government registration. There is no state electricity but many people have generators. Radio: Milli radio, Azad Afghan radio, VoA, BBC, Quetta governmental radio. TV: ATR, Aryana, Tolo, Lemar, Khibar, PTV Telephone coverage: AWCC, Roshan, Areeba, and Telenore (Pakistani communication company which can be used near the border). There are seasonal rivers (spring/winter): Kadani River, Sha Shak River feeding the Buldak canal/wiala (about 20 km). There are almost 450 deep wells (not all are functioning) which are used for drinking and a few khareezes. There are more than 15 wialas from the Mel river located in Tachtapul district.

Economy

The economic situation of the population is one of the best in Kandahar due to its strategic location on the border of the Kandahar-Quetta highway. It is the second major port of entry between Afghanistan and Pakistan and major transporting, shipping and receiving site between the two countries. Cross-border smuggling networks are functioning well especially that of vehicles and electrical appliances. There is little agricultural land; fruit gardens are mainly for personal consumption. Nevertheless, 768 ha land is used for poppy cultivation (UNODC 2007). Legal crops include, wheat, poppy, watermelon, melon and cumin. Livestock includes goats, sheep, and cows, chicken. Spin Boldak is the only district with a significant amount of the population mainly employed in the service sector. 60% are farmers, 55% are shopkeepers and 15% are both. Most people are involved in the car business including spare parts and electronics. The most important markets such as Boldak Bazaar/Wesh Bazaar/The Lowi Kariz Bazaar are for cars, car parts, computers, and other electronics. Dried fruit, pomegranates, grapes, carpets, wool, and wood are also sold to Pakistan.

Kandahar

Spin Boldak

Panjpai Durrani: Nurzai (45%) Zirak Durrani: Achekzai (55%)

Pop size est. 100,400 (2006, Wikipedia) to around 150,000 (surveyors). Villages: 265

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Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure Shorabak is a remote district situated in the Southeastern part of Kandahar Province comprising a surface of 4374 km2. It borders Reg to the West, Spin Boldak to the North and Quetta district of Pakistan to the East and South. The border with Pakistan is 112 km long. In the East Shorabak borders the Khwaja Amran and the Sarlath mountain ranges. The rest is flat land which turns into a sand desert in the West. The district roads are unpaved and in poor conditions, all are used for smuggling. 1. Two roads from Shorabak to Boldak district. 2. Road from Shorabak to Sarlat village on to Panjpai village in Pakistan. 3. Road from the district centre to Taraki village on to Nuschki village in Pakistan. 4. Road from the district centre to Mashkran village and on to Nuschki in Pakistan. 5. Road from Shorabak to Goaray village and on to Kashingay in Pakistan. 6. Road from the district centre to Sayedbus village and on to Reg district, Panjwai, and Helmand. 7. Road leads from Shorabak to Bedawansa village and on to Registan, Panjwai, and Helmand. People travel from Kandahar city via Pakistan to reach this district faster. There are no schools in the district or telephone coverage. There is a pharmacy in the centre with a doctor who sells medicine. Plans for a hospital are currently under discussion with the government and the PRT; construction has not yet started. About 5% of the people have generators, mostly used for pumps on wells. Radio: Milli radio, BBC, Quetta government radio. There are three seasonal riverbeds with water only in spring (Lora; Mastan; Wasta river bed). In addition there are more than 100 wells (60-90 meters) and 8 kareez.

Economy

Agriculture is the main livelihood of the district. The land is very barren with little water resources. The most important legal crop is cumin which is exported to Pakistan. Most inhabitants are engaged in animal husbandry. About 20% of the agricultural land is used for poppy cultivation but the production levels are not high in comparison to other districts in Kandahar (308 ha in 2007). The population believes that decreasing security has lead to an increase in poppy cultivation. The people in Shorabak are poor since the agricultural output is weak. Many of them are therefore engaging in the smuggling business. Shorabak is a big transit route for narcotics and weapons smuggling between Iran and Pakistan. Most involved in the smuggling are allegedly the Baluch who live on both sides of the border, and the Bares tribe. The district has no bazaar. Most goods are imported from Pakistan.

Kandahar

Shorabak

Bares (98%) Baluch and Sayed make up 2%

Pop Size est. 10,200 (2006, wikipedia) to 48,000 (surveyors) Villages: 17

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Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure Reg district is located in the South of Kandahar and comprises a surface of 14,729 km2. It shares boundaries with Shorabak in the East, Panjwai and Daman to the North, Khanishin (Helmand) to the West and Quetta district of Pakistan to the South. The border with Pakistan is 85 km long. Reg is mostly a vast sand desert situated on a plateau at 1,000-1,100 meters above sea level. In the Southeast of the district there are mountains with peaks up to 2,280 meters. There are several unpaved roads in the district that link the the district centre. 1. Moradali Kalay (Pakistan; 2-3 pick ups daily and motorbikes); Isatscha (Pakistan; by animals); Zaro (Pakistan; by animals). 2. Panjwai (Kandahar) and Helmand by a very rough road that is usable only with jeeps. More than 10 land cruisers pass daily mostly for (narcotics) smuggling. 3. Shorabak, but only about 1 pick up passes daily, more motorbikes and animals Due to the distance from Kandahar city (and the poor road conditions), people travel to this district via Pakistan. The district centre has no government buildings, no school or clinic. People go to Pakistan for medical service. There is no state electricity, just two generators for wells. Radio: Milli radio, BBC, Quetta governmental radio. The only telephones working are satellite phones. There is no river or riverbed. There are 272 water holes that are used to collect rainwater. There are more than 60 wells (300 feet deep); only 2 are working right now, the others are destroyed from jihad times and have not been reconstructed.

Economy

Low population density with inhabitants being mostly nomads who are engaged in animal husbandry. There is only about 20% agricultural lands. About 4 ha were used for opium production in 2007 (UNODC), but it had higher levels in 2005 (327 ha), the only other year that opium production was registered. There is a high rate of smuggling (narcotics, goods and trafficking of humans). The mafia is old and longstanding. There is no bazaar in the district; people go to Nushki in Pakistan.

Kandahar

Reg(istan)

Baluch (100%): Mangal (40%) Mohammadsani (25%) Sasoni (20%) Chanal (10%) Pir Kani (5%)

Pop Size est. 3,500 (surveyors) to 7,900 (2006; wikipedia), Villages: 9

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Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure

Economy As in many parts of Helmand, the livelihood revolves around agriculture; mainly poppy cultivation. The 2007 UNODC survey reports that 8,484 ha of land are being used for poppy cultivation. Even thought the drought has impacted badly on the agriculture, opium cultivation is alleged to cover about 60-70 of all agricultural land. Khanishin is (as other poppy producing districts in the South) a magnet for labourers from the whole South and the East who come to work on the poppy fields in harvest times. Khanishin district has only one bazaar with about 20-25 shops, which is located in the district centre. Many shops have been destroyed during fighting between insurgents and NATO/ISAF/ANA troops. Fuel (gas, diesel, kerosene) is imported from Iran and Pakistan. Other goods are imported mostly Baramcha and thus Gerdi Jangal in Pakistan. Baramcha bazaar located in Dishu is the single most important hub for narcotics in Afghanistan. Depending on the current market situation, most poppy of Afghanistan is collected in Baramcha from where it is transported through Iran to Turkey and Europe.

Helmand

Khanishin

Pashtuns (50%): Ishaqzai (30%) Alizai (5%) Khugiani (5%) Achekzai and Nurzai (5%) Popalzai (5%) Baluch (50%)

Population est. 22,400 (wikipedia) and 70,000 (surveyors) Villages: 13

Khanishin district is situated in the Southern part of Helmand Province and comprises a surface of 7414 km2. It borders Chahar Burja and Dishu to the West, Nad Ali to the North, Garmser to the Northeast, Reg (Kandahar) to the East, and Quetta district of Pakistan to the South. The border with Pakistan is 55 km long. Most villages are located along the Helmand River on its western bank given that the majority of the district is almost a desert (unused dry land). There are three unpaved main roads : 1) From Garamsir district to the Khanishin district centre. 2) From Khanishin to Dishu district. 3) From Khanishin to Baramcha bazaar. There is no government or public service (schools, clinics or electricity) in Khanishin. Radio : Teheran Radio, BBC, VoA and Quetta government radio. Generators are used for the shops. The only telephone converage is through satellite phones. The main water source is the Helmand river. People use water pumps (aroeund 35-40) to irrigate their fields with water form the river.

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Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure Dishu is a district in the south of Helmand Province and comprises a surface of 9782 km2. It borders Chahar Burja (Nimroz) to the West, Khanishin to the East and North and Quetta district to the south Pakistan. The border with Pakistan is 55 km long. A great part of Dishu is desert (unused dry land). Most of the settlements in the district are along the Helmand River. There are three unpaved main roads in Dishu: 1) From Marja district to the Dishu district centre. 2) From the Dishu district centre to Baramcha bazaar. 3) From Baramcha bazaar to the Khwaja Ali area. There is one private clinic and a pharmacy in the Baramcha bazaar, where there also about 30 small generators. There are no schools or state electricity. Radio: Teheran Radio, BBC, VoA and Quetta government Radio. The only telephones working in the district are satellite phones. The insurgency has destroyed the police and district headquarters. There is no government presence in Dishu. The main bazaar has also been heavily destroyed due to the fighting between the insurgency and ISAF/GoA The Helmand river is the main source for irrigation of crops. There are about 4 main wialas/canals, 12-15 deep wells and 30-40 water pumps used alongside the river.

Economy

Pashtuns (55%): Panjpai Durrani: Ishaqzai (32%) Zirak Durrani: Barakzai (5%)

Even though Dishu is one of the districts with the lowest opium production in Helmand (1160 ha in 2007, UNODC), it still dominates the agricultural sector, covering about 50-60% of all agricultural land. In addition people grow wheat and vegetable for personal consumption and engage in animal husbandry (cows, sheep, goats, camels, donkey, and chicken). Dishu is (as other poppy producing districts in the South) a magnet for labourers from the whole South and the East who come to work on the poppy fields in harvest times. Baramcha bazaar located in Dishu is the single most important hub for narcotics in Afghanistan. Depending on the current market situation, most poppy of Afghanistan is collected in Baramcha from where it is transported through Iran to Turkey and Europe. Fuel (gas, diesel, kerosene) is imported from Iran and Pakistan. Other goods are imported mostly from Gerdi Jangal in Pakistan.

Helmand

Dishu

Ghilzai: Kakar (5%) Other Pashtuns: Bares (10%) Farsiwan (3%) Baluch (40%) Other: Sayed (5%)

Population est. 20,600 (wikipedia) and 70000 (surveyors) Villages: 18

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Province

District

Tribal Composition

Population Size Villages

Infrastructure Chahar Burja is located in the South of Nimroz province and comprises a surface of 21,035 km2. It borders Iran to the West, Chakhansur and Zaranj to the North, Khanishin and Dishu (Helmand) to the East and Quetta district of Pakistan to the South. The border with Pakistan is 188 km long and the border with Iran is 129 km. There are 3 unpaved main roads in Chahar Burja : 1. Zaranj city to Chahar Burja district, which unpaved. 2. Khawaja Ali to Chahar Burja district 3. Baramcha to Chahar Burja district. There are no schools in Chahar Burjak. There are no clinics or pharmacies. Patients are taken to Iran. There is no state electricity. There are about 30-40 generators in the district used for shops and houses. Telephone coverage is possible with sattelite telephones. Information on other telephone coverage, radio or TV was not obtained. Most villages are situated along the Helmand river. Approximately 100 water pumps are installed on the Helmand river for irrigation purposes. In addition there are about 70-80 deep wells.

Economy Agriculture and animal husbandry are the two main livelihoods in this district. Legal crops include wheat and barley; livestock are mostly sheep, goats, cows, and chicken. Donkeys, horses, and camels are used in agricultural work. Chahar Burja is one of the two (sometimes three) districts in Nimroz where opium is cultivated. With 87 ha in 2007 it is not a major producer although the past two years had higher yields. According to our research, poppy is cultivated on 20% of the agricultural land. This amount has decreased drastically due to a shortage of water (1,119 ha in 2006). There is one hub for narcotics by the name of Bandi Kamal Khan. There is also one major smuggling route famous by the name of Bandi Kamal Khan road. There is no big bazaar in Chahar Burja. Most villages have one to four shops. As they are usually cheaper, most goods (especially fuel, flour, oil) are imported from Latak Bazaar located in Zabul province of Iran and to a lesser degree from Pakistan or from the provincial capital in Nimroz - Zaranj.

Nimroz

Chahar Burja

Baluch (97%) Pashtuns: Bares (3%)

Population est. 5000 Villages: 69

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Methodology The methodology used for data collection in this reports approximates a pragmatic approach to a first rapid and explorative assessment in a difficult and insecure territory where obtaining information is not without danger. This is reflected by the selection of surveyors, sampling technique and triangulation of data. We decided to hire individuals from the districts in question given their prior knowledge of the context and ability to gather information efficiently without drawing too much attention to themselves. Our Southern coordinator had knowledge of trustworthy individuals in the Southern districts which helped to expedite the selection of surveyors. Surveyors were carefully chosen as to their existing knowledge on the district and its power-holders, their level of education, trustworthiness and ability to conduct interviews. Unless the Southern coordinator knew the surveyor for several years, background checks were conducted with other individuals of trust to assure that the surveyors were fit for the job. Selection of Surveyors We worked with one surveyor per district, excect for Helmand and Zabul, where one surveyor covered both districts in each province due to their knowledge of the area. After surveyors were selected they were trained on the survey questionnaire and information to be collected. In order to decrease attention and to integrate themselves into the communities, surveyors worked on their own. For security reasons only a few formal interviews were conducted in the South. The methodology was adjusted to informal discussions where surveyors engaged people into conversation and casually asked for information. Again, due to security, surveyors did not disclose that they were conducting formal research, or the organization for which they worked with. Surveyors used their knowledge about individuals in the district to engage them into an informal discussion covering various topics. The exception was two formal interviews held in Kabul with tribal elders from Maruf and Spin Boldak. They were informed about the intent of the interview and notes were directly taken. Data Collection method Except for the two interviews in Kabul security reasons forced most surveyors to not take notes during the interviews but to write findings from memory afterwards. This did introduce some gaps in the data collected as we had to rely on the memory of the surveyors. However, the number of interviews conducted allowed for this kind of method to work due to the ability to crosscheck missing information later on. On average, each of the surveyors conducted 30 different informal interviews/conversations in order to cover the questionnaire and be able to crosscheck information received (triangulation). Those interviewed were mainly village and district elders as well as members of the business community for the economic background questions (see also discussion on sampling technique). Surveyors tended to supplement interview data with information gathered through participant observation while working in the districts in question. This helped, at times, to put information into the relevant social, political and economic context, and is an important part of triangulation used in research to verify data through various methods of data collection. Sampling Size and Triangulation of Data

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After the data was collected the Southern coordinator checked the content of the data for gaps,and unclear information and then identified the need for further inquiry. After this dataquality check, surveyors returned to the field to improve upon the data collected. Some of the more critical data was also verified with knowledgeable elders from the district (or tribe) in question. Last but not least, two independent interviews by Kabul staff were held in Kabul with elders from the region in order to double-check some of the findings. Sampling Techniques For several reasons representative and random sampling was not used for this report. There is overall inadequate knowledge of the exact population in the four provinces of Zabul, Kandahar, Helmand and Nimroz. Thus, there are no adequate statistics that can inform representative sampling. Insecurity also made representative and random sampling difficult, as surveyors had to decide on an ad hoc basis who was best to interview and in what location and time.

Thus, we settled on a mix of non-probability sampling techniques which can potentially lead to a bias of the results presented here. We tried to manage the bias as much as possible through triangulation of data:

Purposive/stratified sampling In stratified sampling, usually a subset of the population is selected that share at least one common characteristic, here, tribal elders or individuals with relevant knowledge on topics were included in the study (e.g., the interviewing of shop keepers for price information). Convenience sampling is usually an inexpensive approximation of the truth and an adequate sampling technique for rapid and explorative assessments in insecure contexts. As the name implies, the sample is selected because they are convenient.

o An important part of the convenience sampling was a method of judgment sampling

whereby surveyors used their best judgment on whom to include in the interview process. This only worked due to the careful selection of the surveyors based on their previous experience and knowledge of the districts included in this study.

o Furthermore, surveyors also used a snowballing technique, meaning that they relied
on referrals from initial interview partners to identify additional ones. This again helped to reduce risk as the surveyors were able to move from very trusted individuals they knew onto the next ones that were suggested to them as being knowledgeable and trustworthy. While this technique dramatically reduces risk, it does come at the expense of introducing bias because the technique itself reduces the likelihood that the sample will represent a good cross-section from the population. Yet, as we wanted to gain a good overview of the situation in the districts, this meant that we did not necessarily need to have information from a good cross-section of the population, but could rely on key informants.

Cluster sampling Obviously the focus on the border districts already indicated a cluster approach with focusing on interviewing individuals living in those specific districts.. Nevertheless, within each cluster (or district) we did try to attempt to reach out to different individuals in terms of tribal background as well as age. Women and very young individuals were not interviewed for this study.

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Limitations of Assessment

This study was limited by several factors, all linked to the nature of a rapid assessment (time) in an insecure terrain (security). It has to be understood that in an insecure environment, such as the border-districts of the Southern cluster, conducting an assessment based on high scientific standards and rigor has limitations. Nevertheless, we did try to conduct the research with as much care as possible without jeopardising the lives of our surveyors. Thus, we have tried to describe our research methodology as detailed as possible, and highlight the main limitations of the rapid assessment conducted. Firstly, the report is clearly based on a non-representative sample of people living in the districts of the border-districts Southern cluster. As a result, those interviewed by no means reflect the views of the entire population in the areas studied, even though interview-partners were selected as the most adequate sources to echo and reflect the views and experiences of the local population in the context of an exploratory study. Second, security considerations impacted greatly on the kind of methodology used (such as informal discussions over semi-structured interviews) which results in an approximation of the truth so findings in this rapid assessment cannot claim a more scientific rigor. Even though we attempted as much as possible to double-check and triangulate information, we cannot guarantee fully the accuracy of data presented here. Third, as the purpose of this study was a rapid assessment, time for a more thorough data collection (or cross verification) was also limited (especially if wanting to apply social anthropological rigor). This again impacts on the accuracy of the data as well as the scientific rigor of results.

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2
Economic Overview

Chapter

he economy of Southern Afghanistan is closely linked to Pakistan for districts in Kandahar and Zabul, and Iran for Nimroz. Helmand is linked to both Iran and Pakistan. The dependence on Pakistan is even stronger for border districts where access to Pakistani markets is easier than to internal markets. For example, Reg and Shorabak in Kandahar and Atghar and Shamulzai in Zabul, Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand all tend to get the majority o their goods from Pakistan. Many food items and most other items of daily use are imported from Pakistan and to a lesser degree from Iran, except for Nimroz where the Iranian influence is stronger. As goods and services in Iran are cheaper and easier to access, most residents of Nimroz do not only import the majority of their goods from Iran, but also take their patients there in case of illness. From the Southern cluster border districts illegal goods such as poppy/opium, heroin and marble stones for construction purposes are exported. Legal export products, mostly to Pakistan, include dried fruits, grapes, almonds, and pomegranates. Exported fruits and vegetables are cool-stored in Pakistan and resold in Afghanistan in winter.

Markets
The Southern border district cluster orients itself either to the markets in Kandahar-city or the border district of Spin Boldak for the provinces of Zabul and Kandahar. In Helmand, the most important economic centre for food items is Lashkar Gah. In addition, Baramcha, a big smugglers market at the border to Pakistan is the main trading point for all kinds of illegal goods,including drugs and weapons, and also the trafficking of humans to Iran. Nimroz, as noted earlier, is oriented towards Zabul province in Iran. In the Zabul border districts there is no market of regional importance. Here, Qalat, the district centre, as well as different markets in Pakistan or Maruf (Kandahar) is more important for trading for Zabul district residents. Pakistani markets of regional importance for the Southern border districts are, for example, Nushki (especially for Reg and Shorabak districts), Muslimbagh (for Shamulzai), Pishin (for Maruf and Atghar), and Gerdi Jangal (Helmand). All these markets, especially at the border,

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function as intersections for the flow of economic goods to the neighbouring districts and provinces. The importance of Pakistani markets and goods is reflected by the predominance of Pakistani Rupees in the border districts. Afghan traders buy imported goods in Pakistani Rupees,- selling them in the same currency makes profit calculations easier and avoids losses due to fluctuations of exchange rates. Similarly, the importance of Iran for Nimroz, and also the border districts of Helmand, is indicated through the fact that Iranian currency is used (for everything in Nimroz and smuggling only in Helmand). The locals call the currency Toman, which is the name of the old currency of Iran that was replaced in 1932 by the Rial.2 See the section on Currencies and Prices in this chapter for an explanation of the Toman in the Afghan context. After Torkham in Nangarhar, Spin Boldak functions as the second most important port of entry to Afghanistan from Pakistan (linking up to Chaman in Pakistan). The cross-border market Wesh is the most important regional market for vehicles and electronic equipment. Most important Afghan traders actually live in Pakistan (many having Pakistani IDs) and cross the border to trade in their shops on the Afghan side in Spin Boldak. Thereore, despite an official border, the Wesh market essentially flows freely between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition to these legal markets, Baramcha in Helmand (Dishu) is likely the most important smugglers market for the South (goods, but also drugs and weapons), and single most important narcotics hub in all Afghanistan. The Baluch run this market. Table 2.1 provides an overview of all major markets in the districts of the Southern cluster.

Table 2.1 Major Markets in Southern Cluster Districts

Province

District

Main market

Secondary market

Other markets

Zabul

People from all over the district come to these two big bazaars by motorbikes, horses and donkeys. Shamulzayi The main bazaar is located in the district centre close to the police headquarter. Currency: Pakistani Rupee The Sanzir bazaar is in Sanzir, a border checkpoint with Pakistan. Currency: Pakistani Rupee The majority of villages have small shops

The toman ( in Persian, pronounced [tomn]), derived from a Turkic word meaning ten thousand, was the currency of Iran until 1932. In 1932, the rial replaced the toman at a rate of 1 toman = 10 rials (i.e., 1 rial = 1 qiran).

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Province

District

Main market

Secondary market

Other markets

Atghar

The main bazaar is in the district centre with about 50-80 shops, some of which have eroded due to the weather. Most residents buy their food items here, which are imported from Kandahar-city or Pakistan to Maruf and from Maruf to Atghar, or Pakistan- Shamulzayi-Atghar or from Qalat city-ShinkaiAtghar. Pishin (Pakistan) is an important market for Atghar where people sell cumin and almonds and import items of daily use. The decline of Qalats importance as a market for Atghar is a direct consequence of security conditions. The road to Qalat is considered insecure due to robbers and allegedly insurgents have laid out mines on the road. Most items that can be stored are bought during the summer since heavy snow in the winter months makes travelling difficult. Currency: Pakistani Rupees and Afghanis.

Some villages have small shops and these shops have some items (candy, cooking oil, kerosene) are available.

Zabul

Maruf

There is only one bazaar in Maruf district, which is located in the centre of Maruf and has about 200-250 shops. About 130-150 shops are in good condition while 100-120 was destroyed due to weather conditions and fighting between Taliban and GoA/NATO forces. Most of the shopkeepers import food items from Pishin (Pakistan) and Spin Boldak .The food from Pakistan comes via an unpaved road called Toba. Currency: Pakistani Rupees and Afghanis The only bazaar is located in Arghistan village, the district centre. Arghistan has historically strong links to Spin Boldak as it is situated on the trade route used by Achekzai traders to bring almonds from Shah Wali Kot (Kandahar) to Shahre Safa in Pakistan. In addition, when Spin Boldak fell to the Mujahideen and Kandahar was still controlled by the PDPA, inhabitants of Arghistan turned to Spin Boldak to get supplies. Currency: Pakistani Rupees and Afghanis

Kandahar

Arghistan

Weapons can be bought via jihaid commanders.

Spin Boldak

There are several imported bazaars in Spin Boldak such as the Boldak Bazaar, Wesh Bazaar, and Lowi Kariz Bazaar, which extends across the border to Chaman in Pakistan. It is mainly known for vehicles and vehicle spare parts imported from Dubai and electronics, but other things can also be bought there. Spin Boldak is the second most important port of entry for goods from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Currency: Pakistani Rupees There is no bazaar in Shorabak; people from Shorabak buy their items of daily use across the border in the Pakistani village of Nushki. Currency: Pakistani Rupees There is no bazaar in Reg or neighbouring Shorabak; people from Reg buy their items of daily use in villages across the border in Pakistan (Nushki, Muradali Kalay, Isatscha). Currency: Pakistani Rupees

Shorabak

Reg(istan)

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Province

District

Main market

Secondary market

Other markets
There are also some small shops in some villages too. In order to buy vehicles, residents of Khanishin have to go to the Baramcha bazaar in neighbouring Dishu.

Khanishin

Khanishin district has only one bazaar, which is located close to the police headquarters in the district centre. All items are imported from the Baramcha bazaar. This bazaar has about 100-150 shops; all but 20-25 shops destroyed due to fighting between insurgency and GoA. Some shops were also destroyed by heavy rain. All the district residents obtain their daily food items from this bazaar and there are also few mechanics that fix motorbikes, generators, bicycles and some parts of the vehicle. Currency: Pakistani Rupee and Afghanis

Helmand

Baramcha bazaar (100-150 shops, two car showrooms), which is located near the Pakistani border, is the main (smugglers market). Most Dishu residents obtain items of daily use from here. Most drug smugglers live close to this bazaar, which is owned by Haji Sharafudin. Baramcha is the single most important narcotics hub in Afghanistan. Necessary items are imported from the Dal Ban Din Bazaar located in Baluchistan, Pakistan.

Dishu

Kochini Rabaat (Kohi Malak) bazaar is located in the Kochini Rabaat area. There are about 10 to 15 shops, and the shopkeepers import fuel and other necessary items from Zaidan in Iran.

Bazaar in Dishu district centre with only about 2-3 functioning shops out of 50-60 in existence. The majority was destroyed due to the war between Taliban and ISAF/ GoA. There are also some small shops in some villages too.

Currency: Pakistani Rupee, Afghanis and Iranian Toman There is no bazaar in Chahar Burja district. Most villages have 1 to 4 shops. Fuel, flour, oil and other items of daily use are imported from the Latak Bazaar located in Zabul province of Iran and to a lesser degree from Pakistan. Some people import Iranian goods via the Zaranj bazaar in the capital of Nimroz province. Currency: Iranian Toman

Nimroz

Chahar Burja

There is one big hub for narcotics smuggling in Chahar Burja district called Bandi Kamal Khan.

Agricultural Production Export/Import Goods

The Southern cluster is, generally speaking, not a very wealthy region, although the more recent increase in drug production has changed this to some extent, especially in Helmand. Traditionally, as in most rural areas of Afghanistan, the population focuses its economic activities on agriculture (in many places mostly subsistence) and animal husbandry, with poppy becoming an increasingly dominant crop, especially in Helmand where it covers about 50-70% of all arable land in the two border districts Dishu and Khanishin. As these

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districts, however, are largely dry land (desert), neither district is one of Helmands biggest poppy producers (which is reserved for Nahri Sarraj and Nad Ali, producing over twice as much as much as Khanishin and twenty times as much as Dishu). The importance of this illicit economy has turned Helmand into a pulling point for labour migrants from other provinces. Skilled labourers and poppy cultivation experts from Kandahar, Helmand and Nangarhar also work in South Waziristan (Pakistan), another centre pf poppy production. In the two Zabul border districts wheat, corn, almonds, grapes, and vegetables are predominant in agricultural products, with almonds orchards being considered a traditional craft with a long history in the area. Zabul overall does not figure much in the Southern poppy production (1,611 ha), with the entire province covering only slightly more agricultural land than Dishu in Helmand (which as noted above is the second smallest opium producer in that province; the district with the biggest landmass covered with poppy fields is Daychopan with 389 ha). This is not necessarily due to lack of trying but due to an incompatibility between crop and soil (it does not grow well) and lack of water. People have only recently, alledgedly, learned about poppy cultivation through migrant labourers returning from Helmand. Nevertheless, both Shamulzayi (159 ha) and Atghar (16 ha) have some poppy fields. In Kandahar, pomegranates, cumin, wheat, corn, watermelon, almonds and poppy dominate. Cumin is an important cash crop in Shorabak, Reg, and Spin Boldak and is exported to Pakistan. As in all other districts, poppy cultivation is increasing in the Kandahar border districts. At present the coverage of agricultural land (16,615 ha) in the entire province is not even as high as the several individual districts in Helmand. Yet all border districts do grow opium: Maruf (914 ha), Arghistan (310 ha), Spin Boldak (768 ha), Shorabak (308 ha) and Reg (4 ha). The latter is likely so low due to the scarcity of water in the district. In Nimroz, wheat and barley are the main legal crops whereas the most important cash crop is poppy, although only one district - Khash Rod (6,421 ha) - produces nearly all opium in the entire province. While Chahar Burja (the border district) is the only other district that currently also has poppy fields (Zaranj had some last year, and Kang tried for years, but seems unsuccessful), it currently only has 87 ha of land covered in it. Poppy cultivation has somewhat been reduced by water shortages there, as in 2006, Chahar Burja had 1,119 ha of poppy fields. If water availability was less of a problem in Nimroz poppy cultivation would increase drastically (given that all but one district have tried to grow or has grown it in the past). As the overwhelming majority of the population is Baluch (a nomadic tribe), animal husbandry also plays also an important role in the economy. Legal business between Helmand and Iran is divided between the Barakzai, Alkozai, Nurzai and Baluch (the latter being a non-Pashtun tribe). The most important trade with Iran concerns fuel (diesel, petrol, kerosene). The Baluch control the fuel import from Iran to the Southern Helmand districts by the route of Daftan (Iran). The other mentioned tribes are involved in the trade from Chahar Burja to Lashkar Gah. Baluch and Pashtuns both have strong cross border economical links. The Baluch tribesmen control much of the cross border smuggling trade. Most Baluch living in Chahar Burja district have a house in Irans Zabul province. The Achekzai and Nurzai tribes both have very strong economic ties in the Spin Boldak/Chaman area where they dominate business and constitute much of the population overlapping the border.

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Labour Migration
The long period of drought in the South has further impacted on the already dry and harsh terrain, turning many areas into (semi) deserts, where even animal husbandry is hard to maintain. This has led to a shortage of available employment in the provinces that has resulted with many men (especially youth) being forced to engage in seasonal labour migration. Labour migration plays a different role in different parts of the Southern cluster. There is no labour migration from Helmand residents to other countries or provinces, except for the above mentioned skilled labourers that go to South Waziristan (Pakistan), since the poppy production and associated businesses allegedly provide enough work to Helmand residents, even requiring the use of outside migrant workers. Since the poppy production has taken hold of Helmand a great proportion of young men from all over the Southern districts (Uruzgan, Zabul), but also as far as the East and Southeast (Laghman, Nangarhar, Wardak) come to Helmand to work in the poppy fields during harvesting times. Otherwise, the industrial centres of Pakistan and Iran are a main destination for labour migration. From Zabul provinces, for example, people migrate to Muslim Bagh in Pakistan or to coalmines in Punjab during the winter. Helmand is also a major hub from all over Afghanistan (including Northern provinces) for illegal labour migration to Iran via human trafficking networks. The only exception among the Southern border districts is Chahar Burja in Nimroz which is mainly oriented towards Iran for its economy and labour migration.

Currency and Prices

Despite the official currency in Afghanistan being the Afghani, the border areas are still under the heavy influence of the Pakistani Rupee, especially in areas where goods are imported mainly from Pakistan. As noted earlier, Nimroz, and hence Chahar Burjak, are an exception as they depend on Iranian currency, locally called Toman (see the box). The same currency is used in the drug trade in Helmand. Traders importing goods from Pakistan and Iran prefer to sell them in the same currency they bought them in as a way of avoiding fluctuations in the exchange rates and making profit calculations easier. Table 2.2 provides an overview of the major food and fuel/heating prices in the Southern border-districts. Costs are very similar with the exception of the two neighbouring districts of Atghar in Zabul and Maruf in Kandahar. The reasons for these higher costs are the longer import route via Pakistan through rugged mountain terrain and goods passing through more middlemen on the way. In the winter months the importing of goods is nearly impossible to these two districts, which is why storable goods are stockpiled before snowfall. Prices in Chahar Burja are also different from the rest of the Southern district, on average, a fair bit cheaper. This could be due to several things: a) goods from Iran can be obtained at a cheaper price than those from Pakistan, b) the transport route from Iran might be shorter in order to get goods into Nimroz, or c) there is a problem with the exchange rate provided (see box).

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The value of a Toman in Afghanistan Although the Rial has become the official currency of Iran, many Iranians (and in this case Afghans) still use the term Toman in everyday transactions for an amount of about 10 Rial. The value of the Toman was hard to gauge, as in unofficial circumstances, as the indication Toman may also refer to either 1,000 tomans or 1,000,000 Tomans, with the order of the magnitude depending on the context and goods. When asked what a Toman was worth, our researchers were told that 1,000 Toman = 50 Afghani which results in: 1 AFA = 20 Toman The official exchange rate for 50 AFA = 9,262.81 Rial (IRR). If we apply the suggested rate of 10 Rial = 1 Toman, then we would arrive at: 1 AFA = 18.5 Toman, which is roughly the same as 20 Toman suggested above. Using a price comparison of food prices (see Table 2.2), however, it appears that this exchange rate may still too high, and it is more likely that, at least in a context of food, 1 AFA = 10 Toman (about half), unless of course, food prices in Nimroz are over 50% cheaper than in other districts in the Southern cluster. In light of the above, we will try to refrain from making price conversions, given that the exchange rate used for food prices may not translate into the same amount for vehicles, guns or drugs. The reader can then make his/her own assessment, keeping this information in mind. The only car showrooms in the border districts of Afghanistan reside in Spin Boldak (Kandahar) and Baramcha (Helmand). The majority of people from Kandahar buy their cars either in Kandahar-city, Spin Boldak or across the border in Pakistan (see Table 2.3 for prices). The closest showroom in Nimroz is in Zaranj, the provincial capital, where residents of Chahar Burja buy their cars if they do not end up in Baramcha in Helmand (Dishu). Due to the problematic conversion of the Toman (see earlier discussions), Table 2.5 simply provides the prices in the currency they are traded in. In Helmand, the people from Dishu and Khanishin go to the smugglers bazaar in Baramcha in Dishu, which is very close to the Pakistani border (see Table 2.4 for prices). The selection of cars, however, is small in comparison to that in Spin Boldak (which is, as noted earlier, a main vehicle market for the South). Most cars and trucks are not registered and therefore have neither official papers nor number plates. All vehicle prices are for cars imported from Dubai. Kandahar-city also has cars coming from Canada (or Europe) which are much more expensive. Table 2.3 provides an overview of vehicle prices in Spin Boldak, Kandahar, Table 2.4 for Baramcha in Helmand and Table 2.5 for Zaranj in Nimroz.Again, due to conversion problems, the prices are recorded in the currency they are traded in.

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TABLE 2.2 Price Comparisons, Southern Cluster

Zabul
Fuel/heating Kerosene Diesel Petrol Gas Wood 1 litre 1 litre 1 litre 1 kg 1mn = 4.5 kg Shamulzai
PKR 58 PKR 48 PKR 65

Kandahar*
Maruf
AFA 60-65 AFA 60-65 AFA 75-80 AFA 37 AFA 41 AFA 60 AFA 25

Helmand
Shorabak Khanishin
PKR 40 PKR 59 PKR 40 PKR 45 PKR 50 AFA 8 PKR 12

Nimroz
Chahar Burja #
290 444 350 316 264.4 AFA 29 AFA 44 AFA 35 AFA 32 AFA 26

Atghar
AFA 60-65 AFA 60-65 AFA 75-80

Arghistan

Spin Boldak
AFA 39 AFA 38 AFA 43 AFA 62 AFA 8

Dishu
PKR 40 PKR 40 PKR 45 PKR 50 PKR 12

PKR 90 AFA 100-105 AFA 100-105 PKR 23 AFA 26 AFA 26

Food Items Sugar 1 kg Flour 1 kg Tea/green 1 kg tea Black tea 1 kg

PKR 45 PKR 33 PKR 200 PKR 180

AFA 50 AFA 35 AFA 190 AFA 220

AFA 50 AFA 35 AFA 190 AFA 220

AFA 40 AFA 37

AFA 37 AFA 23

PKR 40 PKR 38

PKR 30 PKR 22

PKR 30 PKR 22

175 182.2

AFA 18 AFA 18

AFA 167 AFA 150 PKR 173-178 AFA 133 AFA 130 AFA 60 AFA 50 PKR 220

PKR 266 PKR 266 1,630.00 AFA 163 1,400.00 AFA 140 PKR 60 PKR 60 466.7 AFA 47

PKR 65 AFA 85 AFA 85 Rice 1 kg *People from Reg buy their food items in Pakistan

1 AFA = 1.26087 PKR 1 PKR = 0.793104 AFA

# original prices in Nimroz are in Iranian Toman Assumption made here is : 1 AFA = 10

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TABLE 2.3 Vehicle Prices in Spin Boldak, Kandahar Type Car Car Car Car Truck Car Car Car Truck Truck Car Truck Car Truck Car Car Truck Car Car Car Car Car Unit Toyota, Corolla 1990 Toyota, Surf Toyota, Saracha Toyota, Prado Small Hino, Mazda Toyota, Saracha Toyota, 4x4 Toyota, Land Cruiser Middle Hino, Mazda Bigger Hino, Mazda Toyota, Corolla 2007 Small Hino, Mazda Toyota, Cursing Middle Hino, Mazda Toyota, Parado Toyota, Land Curser Bigger Hino, Mazda Toyota, Surf Toyota, 4x4 Toyota, Lexus Toyota, Cruiser Toyota, Lexus Unit/Price PKR PKR 120,000 PKR 130,000 PKR 150,000 PKR 160,000 PKR 200,000 PKR 250,000 PKR 250,000 PKR 250,000 PKR 250,000 PKR 300,000 PKR 360,000 PKR 400,000 PKR 500,000 PKR 500,000 PKR 550,000 PKR 600,000 PKR 600,000 PKR 650,000 PKR 900,000 PKR 1,200,000 PKR 2,000,000 PKR 2,000,000
1 GBP = 126.536 PKR 1 USD = 62.7000 PKR

GBP 948.35 1,027.38 1,185.43 1,264.46 1,580.58 1,975.72 1,975.72 1,975.72 1,975.72 2,370.87 2,845.04 3,161.16 3,951.44 3,951.44 4,346.59 4,741.73 4,741.73 5,136.88 7,112.60 9,483.47 15,805.78 15,805.78

USD $1,913.88 $2,073.37 $2,392.34 $2,551.83 $3,189.79 $3,987.24 $3,987.24 $3,987.24 $3,987.24 $4,784.69 $5,741.63 $6,379.59 $7,974.48 $7,974.48 $8,771.93 $9,569.38 $9,569.38 $10,366.83 $14,354.07 $19,138.76 $31,897.93 $31,897.93

1 PKR = 0.00790291 GBP 1 PKR = 0.0159490 USD

TABLE 2.4 Vehicle Prices in Baramcha (Dishu), Helmand Type Car Tractor Car Tractor Car Car Car Unit Sifa 2005 Small Tractor Toyota 2006 Big Tractor Toyota with one set 1985 4x4 2006 Land Cruiser 2006 Unit/Price in PKR PKR 400,000 PKR 415,000 PKR 700,000 PKR 740,000 PKR 800,000 PKR 1,200,000 PKR 1,700,000
1 GBP = 126.536 PKR 1 USD = 62.7000 PKR

GBP 3,161.16 3,279.70 5,532.02 5,848.14 6,322.31 9,483.47 13,434.91

USD $6,379.59 $6,618.82 $11,164.27 $11,802.23 $12,759.17 $19,138.76 $27,113.24

1 PKR = 0.00790291 GBP 1 PKR = 0.0159490 USD

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TABLE 2.5 Vehicle Prices in Zaranj, Nimroz Type Parado Land Cruiser, Toyota Big Tractor Second hand Land Cruiser Small Tractor Corolla Saracha Toyota Pick up trucks, Toyota Pick up trucks, Toyota Unit/Price (Toman) 60,000,000 35,125,000 11,240,000 7,025,000 7,025,000 3,000,000-4,000,000 2,000,000-5,000,000 2,000,000 1,000,000

Land and land ownership

Land in the Southern districts is of little value. Despite an abundance of available land, harsh climate and water shortage limit the use (for agricultural purposes) and hence lower the value of land in many of the Southern border districts. This, of course, has an influence on a society where landownership traditionally has an impact on the standing of tribal elders. In areas where agricultural land is scarce, owning even a small amount of fertile land (such as plots with 1-2000 almond trees in Zabul) make a man rich. Districts vary greatly in terms of what makes a big landowner (see Table 2.6). It is hard to say exactly what the reasons for this difference is, but we assume a combination of land condition (fertile vs. dry-land), land usage (agriculture vs. fruit orchards vs. grazing vs. no use), and also the kind of people who inhabit vs. own the land. This makes price comparison difficult. For example, the Bares in Shorabak seem to own the land with value (i.e. water) in Reg (which used to be a sub-district in Shorabak), and allegedly they do not sell their land for cultural reasons (the same as in Shorabak) Therefore people are allowed to build houses but not own the land on which the house is built. In the districts where there is no government, people simply squat on government land, such as in Atghar, Zabul, Reg, Kandahar and Dishu, Helmand. This could lead to conflicts in the future if the government regains power there. Landowners in the Helmand districts own the most land (2,000-3,000 jarebs in Dishu), followed by landowners in Nimroz (500 jarebs in Chahar Burja), landowners in Kandahar (350 jarebs in Arghistan, 100-600 in Spin Boldak, 70 to 80 in Maruf, and 20 jarebs in Shorabak) and in Zabul (60-70 jarebs in Atghar, 40-50 in Shamulzai). The amount of land however, is generally only of limited explanatory value, as the availability and access to water is an important determinant of land value. Availability of land, of course, also influences the market for farming, commercial and housing plots. In the districts with land of little value, there is no real land market or prices. This is especially true for Reg and Shorabak in Kandahar, Chahar Burja in Nimroz, and the districts in Helmand (except for land along the Helmand river). Table 2.7 provides an overview of land prices in the Southern Cluster.

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TABLE 2.6 Overview of Landownership (in jareb)

Province District Shamulzayi Atghar Maruf Arghistan Spin Boldak Shorabak Reg(istan) Khanishin Helmand Dishu 2000-3000 500 150-200 100-500 20-40 Big Landowner 40-50 60-70 70-80 350 100-600 60-120 Land belongs to Bares tribe in Shorabak 3000-6000 1000-2000 100-600 30-50 Medium Landowner Small/Average Landowner 5-8 5-10 <50 20

Zabul Kandahar Nimroz

Chahar Burja

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TABLE 2.7 Land Price Comparison, Southern Cluster Zabul

Land Agricultural, close to Bazaar (or very fertile land) Agricultural, far from Bazaar (or good access to water) Agricultural (or some access to water) Shamulzai 1 jareb = 1'600-1'764, 1936 sqm 1 jareb = 1'600-1'764 sqm 1 jareb = 1'600-1'764 sqm Atghar PKR 40'00070'000 Maruf PKR 60'000100'000

Kandahar*
Arghistan AFA 50,000300,000 Spin Boldak

Helmand
Khanishin Dishu

Nimroz
Chahar Burja# 1'405'0002'107'500 AFA 140'500 210'750

PKR 250,000

PKR 100,000

PKR 60,000

PKR 35,000

PKR 120,000

PKR 60,000

PKR 25'00030'000

PKR 18,000

702'500- AFA 70'250 - 98'350 983'500

PKR 100,000

PKR 20,000

PKR 15,000

210'750- AFA 21'075 421'500 - 42'150

Shop in local Bazaar/ 18-40 sqm Commercial Fruit Garden 2-10 jareb

PKR 50,000

PKR 10'00050'000 PKR 2'000'0005'000'000 (Almond)

PKR 50'000100'000 PKR 2'000'0005'000'000 (Grape)

AFA 150,000

PKR 100'000- PKR 30'000- PKR 100'000400'000 50'000 150'000

Housing plot 600 sqm

AFA 200,000

PKR 150'000900'000

Access to water increases agricultural land in Zabul and Nimroz, in Helmand the proximity to the Bazaar seems more important New shops costs more than old ones in Atghar, Zabul * Neither Reg nor Shorabak in Kandahar have land prices as land is not really sold there (low quality of desert land)

# original prices in Nimroz are in Iranian Toman

1 AFA = 10 (sometimes 20) Toman

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3
Political Overview

Chapter

olitics in the Southern border cluster has historically been dominated from Kandahar. This continues to be the case given that the family of the current president (Hamid Karzai) and their tribe (the Popalzai) is running affairs in the regional capital. Other strongmen and tribal figures are currently trying to stay low-key and maintain relations with the Popalzai in order to access resources. The only real rival of the Popalzai is the Barakzai leader Gul Agha Sherzoi, whose power has been somewhat diminished since he was moved from the post of Governor of Kandahar to that of the province of Nangarhar. Security is a very scarce commodity in the border districts of the Southern cluster. Only in two districts in Kandahar (Reg and Spin Boldak) and one in Nimroz (Chahar Burja), does the Government control more than the district centre. In Helmand it controls nothing, and in all other districts, the governments control is limited often only to a small radius outside the police and army headquarters. Increasingly, due to the limited reach of the Government, we are seeing a repeat in the Souther cluster of what happened following the collapse of the Communist government - complete anarchy where nobody in in control. In the border-districts of Zabul the insurgency controls everything outside the district centre. In Shamulzayi district, the Taliban was never fully ousted at the end of 2001. The situation functioned on a loose coexistence agreement between insurgents and the local government,which was broken in 2006 by the newly incoming Chief of District. The population resented this move by the government since the security was relatively good as long as the coexistence agreement was in place. The Government maintains relative control in the Kandahar districts Reg and Spin Boldak. In Reg the reason for this may simply be the lack of value in the desert-like territory and lack of hiding opportunities for insurgents, while in Spin Boldak the importance of the crossborder market may be a driving stability force. Only in Spin Boldak is the government perceived to be able to provide security to the population. In the other three districts of Shorabak, Arghistan and Maruf, the government holds the control of the district centre only. The influence of the insurgency, however, is more limited than in the neighbouring districts of Zabul, or those in Helmand. One can argue that there is a stalemate between government and insurgency in these three districts, with neither being in power.

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In the two border districts of Helmand (Dishu and Khanishin), the government has lost complete control, with the insurgency and smugglers in control. In Chahar Burjak (Nimroz), the government control is said to extend to 30 km around the district centre therefore it might not be much different from the other districts. Outside, a combination of insurgency and smuggling networks control the district, with the latter bribing their way through government and insurgency territories. Local government is said to be weak, considered corrupt and linked to the smuggling networks. At the same time, this arrangement between government and smugglers is said to contribute to security, as otherwise armed conflict may erupt. In light of the above, in most districts the government does not have a good reputation and much faith in the government has been lost through bad governance. Government office holders tend to be interested only in their own enrichment and tend to alienate the population. The clearest expressions of anti-government feelings were found in the two border districts in Helmand (which are controlled by the insurgency and smugglers), where government posts are simply seen as a commodity that can be bought. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the current security situation in the border districts of the Southern Cluster (based on our own assessment). TABLE 3.1 District Risk Assessments Southern Cluster

Lowest Risk 1 -------------------------- 3 Medium Risk --------------------------- 5 Higher Risk Province District Name Risk Assessment
HIGHER RISK (4) The power of the state is limited to a 2 km radius around the district centre, especially the police headquarters. A coexistence agreement between local government and insurgency was broken in 2006. Outside of this radius the insurgency is in control. Allegedly the only reason why there are still Afghan border police posts is because the police protect the Shamulzayi communities against attacks from the Naser living on the Pakistani side of the border. The insurgency seems to be able to intimidate traditional elders, hence keeping an upper hand. As the insurgency is all from the Shamulzayi tribe, they tend not to attack local communities and do not allow other insurgent groups to operate in the district. The insurgency imports their weapons via Shamulzayi.

Shamulzayi

Zabul

HIGHER RISK (4) The power of the government is limited to the district centre and a 10 km radius. Outside, control is maintained by the insurgency. . The district is almost totally populated by the Hotak, the tribe of the Taliban leader Mullah Omar, making them close to the insurgency. Insurgency has mined the road from Atghar to Qalat.

Atghar

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Province

District Name

Risk Assessment
HIGHER RISK (4) A STALE MATE exists with neither insurgency nor government controlling the district. Government is strongest in the district centre and the insurgency does not permanently hold territory.

Maruf

Insurgency leads a guerrilla war, attacking pro-government individuals (and elders) from the mountains, thus limiting the control of the government. For example, the father of the district police chief cannot even visit due to insecurity. As there are a lot of mountains at border to Pakistan, insurgents can hide well. Few border-police check-posts

MEDIUM RISK (3) A STALE MATE exists with neither insurgency nor government controlling the district. Government is strongest in the district centre and the insurgency does not permanently hold territory.

Kandahar

Arghistan

The insurgency does not necessarily have full control of the district as they tend to move from village to village. Fighting is infrequent and never very heavy. The major insurgency stronghold is the region between Arghistan and Maruf.

LOWER RISK (2) Government is in control

Spin Boldak

Considered relatively stable, used to be instable in the past (2005) when insurgents crossed from Pakistan. This has improved. Cross-border smuggling networks are functioning well. Insurgency enters from Pakistan via Spin Boldak, but do not fight there, they just pass through on their way to Helmand.

LOWER RISK (2) A STALE MATE exists with neither insurgency nor government fully controlling the district. An Afghan National Army base limits insurgency activities.

Shorabak

Allegedly, an agreement between Bares tribal elders and the Government helps the security situation. At the same time there are complaints about a corrupt Government. The insurgency controls the mountains and move easily across the border from Pakistan.

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Province

District Name

Risk Assessment
LOWER RISK (2) Limited insurgency influence. Heavy smuggling activity. One-man show with one person being Chief of Police, District Chief and Head of the National Directorate of Security (NDS) at the same time. Mostly Kuchi, grazing lands (sand) with little population. There is a high rate of smuggling (drugs, goods and trafficking of human) by Baluch. Criminal networks are old and longstanding.

Kandahar

Reg(istan)

HIGHER RISK (5)

Helmand

Dishu

Government lost control of the entire districts. Insurgency and narcotics mafia is in control. Armed fighters enter here from Pakistan. HIGHER RISK (5)

Khanishin

Government lost control of the entire district. Insurgency and narcotics mafia is in control. Armed fighters enter here from Pakistan. MEDIUM RISK (3)

Nimroz

Government controls a radius of 30 km around the district. Smugglers or insurgency control the rest of the district.

Chahar Burja

The Government is allegedly closely linked to smuggling networks. Warlords occupy powerful local government positions (District Governor, Chief of Police). The Chief of Police is not present in the district but lives in the provincial capital. The insurgency is influential since most leaders are from the Baluch tribe who control the district. Many insurgents are also from the former Taliban regime.

Influence of jiahdi commanders

Jihadi commanders that integrated into Taliban forces in the mid 1990s or more recently seem to have kept their influence since the insurgency now control large amounts of rural areas. In contrast, jihadi commanders who were close to the Rabbani government or did not switch over to the Taliban tend to keep a low profile. In Zabul, power went back to jihadi commanders in the first years of the current government. Hamidullah, a Tokhi who had established links with President Karzai in Quetta and who moved to Zabul from Kabul during the military campaign to oust the Taliban, was

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Provincial Governor for two and a half years.The power of former jihadi commanders has been reduced, however, as the insurgency has regained much of its former strength. It is important to recall that in Shamulzayi district, the Taliban was never fully ousted at the end of 2001. Most powerful government positions in Kandahar districts are occupied by former Zirak Durrani jihadi commanders with the exception of Maruf, where the District Chief is an Alizai and Reg, where the District Chief is Baluch and the Chief of the Border Police is an Ishaqzai from the Fedayin 3 faction. The Achekzai from the former Fedayin jihadi faction occupy many powerful government positions (especially District Chief and Chief of Police) in the border districts of Kandahar province. In Helmand, smaller commanders may be engaged in providing security arrangements to the drug mafia but their influence is likely to be weak in insurgency-controlled territory of the border districts. Some may have also switched sides to work with the insurgency. In Chahar Burja (Nimroz) all powerful government positions are currently held by former warlords.

Insurgency
Even after the fall of the Taliban the Southern region remained a stronghold of the Taliban. Particularly in remote areas throughout the South, the Taliban was never fully defeated (especially in Zabul). There is recurrent insurgency in all of the Southern cluster districts from across the border in Pakistan. Many tribes (e.g., Baluch, Ackekzai, Nurzai, Alkozai, and Kakar) and Kuchis have strong cross-border linkages to Pakistan. In Chahar Burja (Nimroz), for example, the leaders of the current insurgency were associated with the former Taliban regime or studied in madrassas in Pakistan in that time. Links to neighbouring Dishu district in Helmand are strong. While much of the insurgency is controlled by prominent Afghan figures that are still residing in Pakistan (in Helmand for example the Gerdi Jangal refugee camp in Baluchistan plays a prominent role), not all insurgents are Afghan nationals. Insurgent groups include Taliban and al-Qaeda, but also members of Ghilzai or Panjpai tribes who are tired o being excluded from government and under the control of the Durrani. Allegedly even Popalzai are involved in the insurgency (in Arghistan, Kandahar). Thus, the insurgency is currently able to recruit support from marginalized elements within all tribes. The insurgency has in fact shown an ability to capitalize on the mistakes of the government in the past five years, including their ability to exploit the main tribal and factional conflicts and fault lines existing in the districts to their advantage. As such, they are a uniting factor among the underdogs in the tribal areas,benefiting from the poor behaviour of strong jihadi commanders. However, one should not exaggerate tribal allegiances as not entire tribes stand behind the Taliban, but often only those individuals who felt marginalized and left out. Furthermore, other factors (e.g., religious indoctrination for

The Fedayin faction was lead by Ismat Muslim and comprised mostly of Achekzai. They fought against the Soviets but then switched and worked with Dr. Najibullah and later also with the Rabbani regime. They controlled much of the southern Kandahar and epecially the highway between Kandahar and Spin Boldak. Many Achekzai affiliated with the Fedayin left the area when the Taliban came to power and returned under the current government.

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example) also play a role. Thereore only very general observations can tentatively be made about the level of tribal support towards the insurgency. Still it seems the Neo-Taliban is now managing to draw overall support from a larger group of tribes than during their first emergence. Even if the Taliban/insurgency as such are not really liked, they are able to provide one single important service to the local community they so very much desire: justice and security. Until the government is able to offer the same it is unlikely to receive popular local support. For the purpose of clarification, while we often use the term Taliban and insurgency almost synonymously, it is important to note that the word insurgency would fit better to describe the diversity behind the current anti-government movement. The insurgency has been able to recruit among many different groups capitalising on the mistakes made by the Afghan government as well as the international community (especially military forces), and individuals join the fight against the government and international military forces out of one or more of the following reasons: ideology (Neo-Taliban, Old Garde Taliban, international terrorists) grievances (political and economic marginalisation) greed (drug trade, common criminals) opportunity (getting back at old enemies). It is crucial to understand that the insurgency are not uniform and differ from district to district in their appearance and ability to draw on tribal support. This is the reason why we have chosen to speak of the insurgency in this report, rather than the Taliban , as many local communities see it the same way and become irritated if outsiders speak about the Taliban only without acknowledging the diversity of the insurgency and complexity of their motives. Stop calling them Taliban for a start. Taliban are Islamic students, people who study God. Of course, if you ask me to squeal on a Taliban, no one will accept to see him handed over to the foreign forces. Call them bandits or insurgents and nobody will give a damn. Kandahar resident on the western profiling of the insurgency: Much of the disturbance potential in the South is controlled from Quetta, Pakistan. It has become in many ways a safe haven for Taliban (much of the former Taliban Cabinet resides there) with the Taliban having the ability to move freely without interferences from the Pakistani government. Names were difficult to confirm at present due to their sensitivity. Our interviews indicate that the majority of insurgents and their weapons tend to enter Afghanistan via Shamulzayi in Zabul, Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand or Reg and Shorabak in Kandahar, while unarmed fighters may cross the border in Spin Boldak. It is worth mentioning here that neither the Afghan nor the Pakistan governments are able or willing to control their borders. Even at major border crossing points, such as Spin Boldak, Afghans can enter Pakistan without documentation. Many insurgents enjoy the backing of their tribesmen or became popular throughout Kandahar as religious figures. Sympathy for the insurgency has intensified due to the general perception that the Southern region was not part in the Bonn Accord, has been sidelined in the political

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process and is excluded from the development process. In many of the Southern borderdistricts, the insurgency is in full control from dusk till dawn. Nevertheless, our research also indicated a war-tiredness among the communities in the Southern cluster. Many would prefer the fighting to stop, one way or the other, which explains why local communities often do not oppose co-existence agreements between the insurgency and government officials, especially if they manage to decreases insecurity. Coexistence agreements: Shamulzayi (Zabul) and Chahar Burja (Nimroz) Until 2005, political power in Shamulzayi was vested in an informal coexistence agreement between the government and the insurgency. This changed with the appointment of Wazir (Yusofzai) as District Chief and Shah Khan (Yusofzai) as Police Chief. Wazir allegedly broke the coexistence agreement between the insurgency and the government by telling the government the whereabouts of the famous Taliban Commander Mohammad Hussain (aka Mustasayad), who was subsequently killed by the Afghan National Army. The fact that both the District Chief and the Police Chief are Yusofzai does not necessarily translate into political power for the Yusofzai tribe, especially as the District Chief is very unpopular within his own tribe and has lost the honour of tribal eldership. This betrayal of the District Chief, has however created a stronger opposition between the population in general and the Government and created a rift between the Shamulzayi and Yusofzai. In Chahar Burjak, the government is allegedly in a coexistence agreement (i.e. corruption) with smuggling networks involved in narcotics and other trafficking across the Afghan-Iranian border. As smuggling networks are closely linked to the current insurgency, this arrangement may also be interpreted as a more general coexistence agreement between government, smuggling networks and insurgents. Even though the insurgency is often blamed for controlling the drug trade in Afghanistan, our research indicates that it is more accurate to describe their relationship with the narcotics mafia as symbiotic. They currently seem to mutually benefit from eachother as the drug mafia often hires insurgents for securing their convoys (e.g., in Helmand) and allows in turn the smuggling of fighters into Afghanistan in the empty containers returning to the border districts. In areas controlled by the insurgency, they do levy poppy production as extra income, but then some government officials are also alleged to do the same. In the areas that are controlled by the government, the insurgency has been known to attack eradication efforts in an effort to undermine and weaken the government.

How long this mutually beneficial relationship between the insurgency and the narcotics mafia will continue is unclear. After all, the Taliban did issue a fatwa (religious decree) in 2000 that reduced poppy production in Afghanistan nearly altogether. However, as long as the insurgents are not firmly in power, such a fatwa is unlikely.

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Cross-border linkages/Refugee Warrior Communities

Baluch and Pashtuns both have strong political cross-border links to Pakistan, and the Baluch also to Iran. Both support independence movements for their respective ethnic group in Pakistan. The Afghan state has traditionally been close to and supported Baluch and Pashtun nationalist movements in their quest for independence in Pakistan. The support of Pashtun nationalists goes back to the Durand-line issue and a hope to regain Pashtun territory. It is said that this is a response to the Pakistani government supporting Taliban fighters (you destabilize us, we destabilize you). One could also argue, however, that the Pakistani government has favoured supporting resistance groups with strong religious ideologies in a hope that they would drop the nationalistic agenda of trying to reclaim Pashtunistan . Thus, there seems to be a cyclical relationship here, with both governments meddling in each others political affairs (on the Durand-line issue, see especially the Eastern cluster report). The Baluch Identity without borders Most Baluch in Chahar Burja have houses in both Chahar Burja and Zabul Province of Iran. Most narcotics traffickers allegedly live on the Iranian side of the border. Distinguishing Afghanistan Baluch from Iranian and Pakistani Baluch is nearly impossible since they do not have ID Cards or Tazkira to indicate whether their nationality is Afghan, Iranian or Pakistani. The Baluch are said to have great solidarity among each other and inter-marriages between Afghan, Iranian of Pakistani Baluch are quite frequent. In addition to the Baluch, Pashtun tribes also have established cross-border links, many of which were increased during the Afghan wars and long years of displacement in Pakistan. One of the most important Achekzai leaders, for example, is Mahmud Khan, the leader of the Pashtun-based nationalist party Pakhtun-khwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) active in the Pashtun speaking areas of Baluchistan. Many of these historical political and economical links were fostered in the jihad when there were important cross-border population movements. Many Helmandi families, for example, still have families in the Gerdi Jangal (Girdi Jungle) refugee camp in Baluchistan, Pakistan. Many tribes from Kandahari districts still have populations living in refugee camps in the Pishin area between Quetta and Chaman in Pakistan. Some of the Kandahari tribes as well as tribes from Zabul districts also have families still living in Muslim Bagh (Pakistan).

Recent fighting between the insurgency and NATO/ISAF/ANA has led to renewed population displacement, especially in Helmand. In particular, populations who had left Afghanistan during the Jihad and had since returned to Afghanistan, have moved back to Pakistan (Dal Ban Din area of Baluchistan). Another problem with displacement that little is known about are Kuchis. Many have lost their livelihood and are essentially without permanent settlement groups. For this reason,

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many Kuchis either return to Pakistan or squat in makeshift displacement camps. The feeling of not receiving attention, or assistance, is a major contributing factor for Kuchis to orient themselves toward the insurgency. Snapshot: Renewed Internal Displacement in Southern Afghanistan The Afghan Red Crescent Society (ARCS) recently described conflict-induced displacement in Southern Afghanistan as a major humanitarian challenge (IRIN, 20 November 2007).4 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2007), estimates IDPs in Afghanistan to be around 300,000 with an increasing tendency. Recent and ongoing displacements result from insecurity and escalation of conflict in the South (insurgency) and East. Violence and fighting between NATO and Afghan National Army forces and the insurgency had displaced about 20,000 families (about 100,000 individuals) in the provinces of Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan by the end of 2006. 5 This figure increased drastically in 2007 when the UN estimated in August 2007 that some 80,000 people have been displaced by insecurity, predominantly in the south, southwest and east of the country (IRIN, 16 August 2007) 6 and displacement is continuing. 7 UNHCR has raised its concern with both the Afghan government and international military forces about the protection of these individuals. They are generally unassisted due to lack of access. Two groups can be differentiated: Political IDPs consisting of families related to pro-government strongmen who flee out of fear of persecution from the Taliban insurgency in their native district. Those who flee more generally from existing or anticipated violence and fighting in districts of Taliban insurgency. Many flee proactively, fearing NATO/US bombardment in areas where Taliban has taken control; many do not return out of the same fears.

Small Arms Flow

As noted earlier, one of the most important smugglers market for illegal goods including weapons, narcotics and human trafficking is the Baramcha bazaar in Southern Helmand at the border to Pakistan. As the government has no control in this area, weapons and drug smugglers can deal with each other or the insurgency openly. The availability of small arms on this market, and elsewhere in the Southern cluster is diverse and plentiful, ranging from semi-automatic handguns, assault rifles (e.g., Kalashnikov), semi-automatic rifles, to machine guns (e.g., Kalashnikov type machine guns-PKMs) and RPGs (rocket propelled grenades). Table 3.2 provides an overview of weapons sold in the Southern cluster districts and their prices.

Afghanistan: Conflict-affected displacement major humanitarian challenge - Afghan Red Crescent, 20 November 2007 (IRIN) http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=75399, accessed 1 March 2008 5 http://www.internal-displacement.org/ 8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/DFADB5842F9262BF802570A7004BA6F0?OpenDocument 6 Afghanistan: UN highlights conflicts impact on civilians,16 August 2007 (IRIN) http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=73759, accessed 1 March 2008 7 Afghanistan: Hundreds flee fighting in Helmand Province, 06 December 2007 (IRIN) http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=75722, accessed 1 March 2008

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TABLE 3.2 Weapons Prices in the Southern Cluster (Other weapons found are AKs of German, Iraqi, Czech and Hungarian make, Pakistani
Makariovs and TTs, RPG with one and two handles).

Zabul Type AK 47 Chinese AK 47 Russian AK 47 Iranian (new) Russian Makarov Chinese T.T (new) American 9mm (new) PK Chinese PK Russian PK Iranian (new) Russian RPG (new) Chinese RPG (new) RPG Iranian (new) RGP (unknown make) PKR 20,00025,000 PKR 20,00025,000 Shamulzayi PKR 20,000 (old) PKR 20,000 (old) PKR 17,000 (old) Atghar PKR 20,000 (old) PKR 20,000 (old) PKR 17,000 Maruf

Kandahar Arghistan Shorabak/Spin Reg Boldak PKR 18,00030,000 PKR 15,000- PKR 16,00022,000 25,000 PKR 12,000- PKR 14,00018,000 20,000

Helmand

Nimroz

PKR 20,000 PKR 20,000(old) 28,000 PKR 20,000 PKR 17,000(old) 22,000 PKR 17,000 PKR 15,000(old) 18,000 PKR 35,00042,000 PKR 25,00033,000

Dishu/ Chahar Burja Khanishin (Toman) PKR 30,000 281,000-421,500 (new) PKR 30,000 210,750-351,250 (new) 281,000-491,750 PKR 40,000 351,250-562,000 PKR 25,000 PKR 80,000

PKR 110,000120,000 PKR 100,000120000

PKR 110,000- PKR 110,000120,000 120,000 PKR 50,000- PKR 80,000130,000 130,000

PKR 100,000220,000

PKR 120,000 (new) PKR 100,000 (new) PKR 40,000 PKR 25,000 PKR 30,000 PKR 25,000

1,405,0001,545,500 983,5001,405,000

PKR 20,00025,000

421,500-562,000

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Similar to most other goods in the Southern clusters, weapons prices are in Pakistani Rupee. Chahar Burja in Nimroz is again an exception as its orientation to Iran also influences weapons being dealt with in Iranian currency (the Toman). See earlier discussions in Chapter 2 (section on Currencies and Prices, box) on the difficulty to exactly determine the value of a Toman in specific business transaction, thus no attempt was made to convert it for the small arms prices. The Baramcha market in Helmand can be considered the end-point or transshipment centre at the end of one of the two big weapons smuggling routes with weapons mostly coming from Iran via Herat, Farah, and Nimroz into the Baramcha market in Southern Helmand and also the Baluch area at the Pakistan border. This smuggling route is under the control of the non-Pashtun Baluch tribe, which makes it important for the insurgency to have support among them.

Haji Bilal and Haji Sharfadin (both Baluch) are partners in weapons and narcotics smuggling and bring in weapons from Iran for the insurgents. Haji Wakil Nurzai (of the Nurzai tribe) and Hajji Abdul Rahim Baloch (of the Baluch tribe) are also partners in the weapon smuggling business. They smuggle weapons for the Taliban/insurgency from Pakistan. One of the big weapons dealers in the Baramcha bazaar is Abdul Nabi, an Ishaqzai originally from Maywand district of Kandahar who now lives in the Gerdi Jangal refugee camp in Pakistan. He supplies weapons to the Taliban/insurgency in Helmand and Kandahar city and has an extensive network of employees/associates across the region working with him.

There are two kinds of weapons available on the Baramcha market, the first we label political weapons, which are imported by the insurgency from Pakistan (Girdi Jangal) and are allegedly linked to diverse political groups. These also come from Iran. The other kind of weapons is what we would label business weapons, which are sold purely for profit-reasons without much thinking about the political impact they may have. They tend to come from old stockpiles from jihad times usually in the Northern provinces in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent from central Asian countries. Of course, some of the weapons coming from Iran and Pakistan may also be business weapons, and some of the ones coming via the northern route may also have links to political groups (as a porous border allows for diverse business transactions). There is an alleged link between the weapons and narcotics trade, with drug convoys being used to smuggle drugs out and weapons (and fighters) in. Nontheless the lucrative weapons trade is definitely cashing on the arms demand within the insurgency active areas in Afghanistan and across tribal areas of Pakistan. The second big trafficking route for weapons runs mostly from northern Afghanistan through the Hazarajat to Southern and Southeastern Afghanistan, and ends up in Wana and Miram Shah in South and North Waziristan in Pakistan. Miram Shah used to be more important than Wana, but the recent increased military presence in North Waziristan has shifted this importance to Wana. Most weapons find their way to Waziristan before they are redistributed according to the need of fighters in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Karachi (MQM) or to Baluch fighters (in Baluchistan province, Pakistan). Wana and Miram Shah are thus even more important than Baramcha in terms of weapons as it is the single most important hub of weapons in the Afghan-Pakistan region.

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While some small arms in Wana and Miram Shah do also come via Baramcha (those from Iran, while the Pakistani ones in Baramcha in turn may come from Wana and Miram Shah), it is also a big destination for weapons from the North of Afghanistan. As in Baramcha, there is a mix of business and political weapons. The trafficking route for small arms that runs from Northern Afghanistan is interesting in as much as it in an interesting example of inter-ethnic cooperation between Northern dealers (mostly Tajik and Uzbek), Uzbek and Hazara smugglers, as well as mid and low level ex- and current commanders, into the hands of Pashtun smugglers in the South and Southeast (thus moving from northern Afghanistan through the Hazarajat to Southern and Southeastern Afghanistan into Pakistan). Weapons sellers are usually provided safe passage (in exchange for money) in territories they cross, either bribing border security guards for passage or utilising isolated mountain passes for transborder trade. The interests of the weapon smugglers involved in this complicated network range from pure business interests linked to profit calculations to political interests linked to support of insurgents in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda, but also the Kashmir conflict, instability in Sindh and the Baluch freedom movement. As for the route to Baramcha, there is also a complicated linkage between the small arms and narcotics trade with networks cooperating with each other. Allegedly the northern network runs in the following steps: Former jihadi commanders and weapon supply networks from jihad times linked to the Northern Alliance/United Front, Jumbesh etc. buy weapons from former commanders, foot soldiers and old stockpiles. Uzbeks will transport it to Hazara territory usually Day Kundi (northern Part of Uruzgan) and Bamiyan and Hazara parts of Ghazni. These areas are allegedly considered a good business environment since little attention is focused there. From the Hazara areas, Hazara transport the weapons on to southern Ghazni where Pashtun tribes take over. Up to this point the transport structure is quite organized, but in the Pashtun territory the situation becomes chaotic. The buyer becomes the transporter here and thus there are a multitude of different factions/tribes (mostly Ahmadzai, Dautani, Daulatzai, Stanikzai, Niazi and Wazir) engaged in the transport through Abband, Qarabagh, Muqqur (Ghazni) to Dila (Paktika) and on to the border where bribes and countless passes lead to the South Waziristans centre of Wana. In Wana weapons are supplied to the insurgency; Taliban, Arabs, Uzbeks, and local tribes in exchange for cash.

Figure 3.1 provides a map that tries to illustrate the different routes taken for the smuggling of weapons. It is based on the old trade routes for smuggling weapons that were used by the mujahideen fighters during the 1980s. Our research indicates that many of these routes are still active however the change is that many of these border town markets are now also getting supplies from inside Afghanistan as well. Thus in addition to the routes indicated in the map below there are also weapons flowing to these Pakistan border towns from Afghanistan as well. Usually the town indicated in the map with exception of Chitral are used by insurgency to arm their fighters and re-distribution of weapons in to Afghanistan to support insurgency. But there are obviously variations that still need to be researched further. Thus, this map is an approximation of the truth for the current weapons trade.

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FIGURE 3.1 Historic Weapons flow into Afghanistan during the 1980s (Source: The Bear
Trap by authors Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Major Mark Adkin)

Drug Economy
According to (UNODC), 8 Afghanistan has cultivated 193,000 hectares of opium poppies (17% more than in 2006). The agricultural land used for poppy production is now larger than that used for coca cultivation in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia combined. Especially favourable weather conditions (more rain) have lead to a high opium output of about 42.5 kg/ hectare (again an increase from last year of 37 kg/ha). Opium from Afghanistan thus amounts for 93% of the global drug market. Leaving aside 19th century China, that had a population at that time 15 times larger than todays Afghanistan, no other country in the world has ever produced narcotics on such a deadly scale (UNODC 2007, iv). The UNODC (2007) survey confirmed In south-west Afghanistan, despite relatively higher levels of income, opium cultivation has exploded to unprecedented levels. This year around 70% of the countrys poppies were grown in five provinces along the border with Pakistan. An astonishing 50% of the whole Afghan opium crop comes from one single province: Helmand. With just 2.5 million inhabitants, this relatively rich southern province has become the worlds biggest source of illicit drugs, surpassing the output of entire countries like Colombia (coca), Morocco (cannabis), and Myanmar (opium) which have populations up to twenty times larger
8

UNODC (200): Afghanistan Opium Survey.

http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/AFG07_ExSum_web.pdf

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(UNODC 2007, iv). See Table 3.3 for a general overview of opium cultivation in the Southern Cluster. TABLE 3.3 General Overview of Opium Cultivation in the Southern Cluster Zabul About 50% decrease in poppy cultivation, from 3,210 ha in 2006 to 1,611 ha in 2007 Kandahar Increase by onethird from 2006 to 16,615 ha in 2007 (despite the eradication of 7,905 ha of opium poppy) Sharp increase started already in 2004 when only 4,959 ha were cultivated. Since then, the area under opium poppy has more than tripled. Helmand Increase by almost 50% reaching 102,770 ha in 2007, compared to 69,324 ha in 2006 (tripled since 2002). Fifty-three per cent of total opium poppy cultivation of Afghanistan Nimroz Opium poppy cultivation tripled since 2006 reaching 6,507 ha in 2007. Majority of the cultivation located in Khash Rod district. Only 43 ha of opium poppy were eradicated in 2007 in Nimroz.

Even though the Southern provinces, especially Helmand, provide the majority of Afghanistans opium production, the border districts included in this study are not necessarily the strongest producers within their respective provinces. A lot of this is linked to the unfavourable climate that prevails in the border-districts, where a scarcity of water and subsequent years of drought have diminished agricultural land. Combined, the border districts discussed in this report only account for about 9% of the entire opium cultivation in Afghanistans South (which includes Uruzgan). See Table 3.4 for a more specific overview of opium cultivation in the districts in the Southern Cluster. Zabul is such an example where incompatibility between the opium crop and soil, but also water scarcity, does not allow for major opium cultivation in the entire province (even though it was attempted). This is also reflected in the low levels of cultivation of the two border districts: Shamulzayi (159 ha) and Atghar (16 ha), jointly accounting only for about 11% of the total production in Zabul. The poppy production in the border-districts of Zabul is linked to Helmand as well as Kandahar. The few poppy growers in Atghar (Zabul) sell their products in Maruf (Kandahar). According to our interviews, the difficult economic situation in Atghar, including unemployment, lead people to migrate to Helmand to obtain employment in poppy cultivation. Allegedly they heard over the radio that there is a lot of money to be made from growing opium in Helmand. It is there they also learned how to grow and harvest poppy, thus poppy production. All Kandahar border districts rank at the lower end of opium production in the province, accounting jointly for about 14% of all opium cultivation in the province. Maywand (2,878 ha), Ghorak (1,445), Shah Wali Kot (1,258 ha) and Dand (1,220) are leading poppy cultivation; only Maruf (914 ha) comes closets to these levels.

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In Helmand, the two biggest opium cultivation districts in 2007 also did not come from the border area: Nahir Sarraj (22,769 ha) and Nad Ali (20,045 ha). While Dishu ranks only slightly above Washer, the district with the lowest coverage of poppy fields in Helmand, Khanishin is very much in the middle-field with all other districts cultivating poppy. Both districts account for about 9% of the opium cultivation in Helmand. Chahar Burjak (87 ha) is the only other district in Nimroz that currently also has poppy fields (Zaranj had some last year, and Kang tried for years, with little success), but fades in comparison (1.34%) to the main producing district (Khash Rod). If water availability was less of a problem in Nimroz, poppy cultivation would increase drastically (given that all but one district have tried to grow or grown it in the past). TABLE 3.4 District overview of poppy production in the Southern Cluster
Province District Name First Year Poppy recorded 2004 44 ha 32 ha 76 ha 117 ha 2005 16 ha 86 ha 102 ha 150 ha 2006 35 ha 36 ha 71 ha 464 ha 784 ha 454 ha 409 ha 0 2007 159 ha 16 ha 175 914 ha 310 ha 768 ha 308 ha 4 ha 2,304ha 8,484 ha 1,160 ha 9,644ha 87 ha 9.38% 1.34% 8.93% 10% 13.87% 70-90% 70-90% 10.86% 15% nil 30% 20% nil
% of Total 2008 (est. Provincial coverage) ha 2007

Shamulzayi 2003 Atghar 2003 TOTAL Zabul Early Maruf 1990s Arghistan 1999 Early Spin Boldak 1990s Shorabak 2003 Reg 2005 TOTAL Kandahar Khanishin 2000 Dishu 2004 TOTAL Helmand Chahar 2004 Nimroz Burja Zabul Kandahar
Helmand

nil 10%

651 ha 2,449 ha 303 ha 45 ha 0 218 ha 19 ha 327 ha

1,116 3,163 2,111 1,893 ha 2,772 ha 3,765 ha 369 ha 911 ha 851 ha 4,616 2,262 ha 3,683 ha 65 ha

526 ha 1,119 ha

TOTAL SOUTH Cluster

3,519 ha 7,474 ha 7,917ha 12,210 ha

Most of the narcotics trafficking in Helmand and Chahar Burja in Nimroz involving the Baluch smugglers are done in Iranian currency (Toman, see discussions in Chapter 2 under Currencies and Prices). An anecdote told by local researchers tells the following tale: They bring in entire trucks full of money. Security guards are tied on top of bundles of money so they do not fall off a truck driving very fast while possibly also having to fight off attackers. As noted earlier, there is often a linkage between the weapons and drug smuggling networks. Money generated by selling weapons is often used to buy poppy, which is resold for a profit. Similarly, money obtained from opium sales may be invested in buying small arms. The trucks that arrived with weapons are usually filled with opium and return often through the same routes as weapons to their destination (see Figure 3.1), such as via

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Baramcha to Iran onwards to Turkey and the European and international market. The northern route sends the drugs to the Central Asian countries, via Russia also onto the European and international market. Poppy from Loralai, Sibi, and Qalat in Pakistan also goes straight to the Baramcha market for sale. The drugs that are sold toward the North are transported in smaller quantities than the bigger convoys that go via Baluchistan into Iran and Turkey. In the North, there is also a value-addition to the raw opium as many heroin labs are located there. The drug smuggling networks are usually business-oriented dealers, in many parts of the Southern Cluster linked to Baluch smugglers (who also smuggle weapons), with Pashtun tribes also being involved in the trade. Even though it is often alleged that the insurgency is also part of the opium mafia, our research suggest more of a symbiosis between the drug mafia and insurgents. The former control drug production and trade while the latter tax opium yields and provide security for the drug convoys. The easy availability of opium has also created a local market, not so much for recreational drug use, but the substitution of other kinds of medicine with opium. Especially alarming is the use of opium as sleep inducer (sedation) especially for small infants.

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4
Tribal Overview

Chapter

he border districts in the Southern cluster do not necessarily reflect the tribal patterns in the entire South. For example, while the Baluch are a relative minority in the South, they do hold some dominance in the border areas, especially in Helmand, Nimroz and Reg district of Kandahar. This dominance does not necessarily come from their population size and certainly not from state power, positions, and influence. Their power rather comes from the fact that they control strategic border crossings, including cross-border trade (legal, but mostly illegal linked to narcotics and weapons).

The Southern cluster clearly lies in Pashtun dominated territory, a population group that traces its origins to one common ancestor, Qais Abdul Rasheed. There are three main tribal confederations: Durrani, Ghilzai, and Karyani, with the latter being relatively small and insignificant in Afghan tribal politics. The Durrani and the Ghilzai Pashtuns jointly account for over two-thirds of all Afghan Pashtuns. The Durrani tend to dominate in the South and SouthWest of Afghanistan, while the Ghilzai predominate in the East and Southeast of Afghanistan. The Karyani are more important in the Southeast and also Pakistan (see Southeaster cluster report), and are only found in Zabul province in the Southern border districts (Atghar, where the Wardak form a small minority). The Durrani confederation is further divided into two sub-confederations, the Zirak Durrani and the Panjpai9 . In addition, we find naqilin (migrants linked to population relocations favored by the state) tribes in the Southern cluster as well.10 See Table 4.1 for an overview of the tribes that fall within the Pashtun confederations discussed here. Among the Pashtuns that fall outside these three main confederations are the Bares,98% in Shorabak, Kandahar; 10% in Dishu, Helmand; and 3% in Chahar Burjak in Nimroz, and a small minority tribe of the Farsiwan (3% in Dishu, Helmand). They do, however, also trace their ancestry to Qais Abdul Rasheed. The Sayed, who trace themselves directly back to the prophet Mohammad (MBUH), are another minority in Kandahar (Shorabak, Arghistan) and Helmand (Dishu). Usually Sayed minorities can be found in many places throughout Afghanistan.
9 Note on the Panjpai: Panjpai tribes were originally Ghilzai tribes that have been partially integrated into the Durrani confederation in the South over the centuries (the Panjpai tribes in the East and Southeast of the country still consider themselves as Ghilzai). They have however often not been fully considered Durranis when it comes to power sharing at the provincial and regional levels, and retain a distinct character. Because of this, they are treated as a separate group throughout the survey. 10 Naqilin tribes and ethnic groups such as Turkmen, Hazara, Uzbek and eastern and Southeastern Pashtuns are non-native tribes that moved to the area in the 1950 and 1960.

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As noted, the biggest non-Pashtun group are the Baluch11 , which dominate in Nimroz (nearly all of Chahar Burjak), Helmand (making up about 50% of the population in both border districts) and Kandahar (100% in Reg and a minority in Shorabak less than 2%). TABLE 4.1 Overview of Tribes and Ethnic Groups in the Southern Cluster
Southern Cluster

Ghilzai
Hotak Tokhi Kakar Shamulzai Barokhail Babuzai Kuchis

Durrani

Karyani
Wardak Wazir

Others
Pashtun Bares Farsiwan Baluch Sayed

Zirak
.Popalzai Barakzai Mohammadzai Alkozai Acheckzai Yusofzai

Panjpai
Nurzai Alizai Ishaqzai Khugiani Mako

The Baloch ( ; alternative transliterations Baluch, Balouch, Bloach, Balooch, Balush, Balosh, Baloosh, Baloush) are an Iranian people inhabiting the region of Balochistan in the southeast corner of the Iranian plateau in Southwest Asia and the northwestern Indian Subcontinent, including parts of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

11

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The Ghilzai confederation is mostly dominant in the two Zabul border districts where they make up a majority, the Hotak in Atghar and the Tokhi in Shamulzayi. Zabul links up to the Southeastern cluster, where the Ghilzai tribes are the majority. Outside Zabul, the Ghilzai can only be found in the Kandahar border district of Maruf (15% Kakar) and Dishu in Helmand (5% Kakar). There are more Ghilzai in non-border districts in these provinces. In addition to the sedentary Ghilzai tribes various Kuchi tribes can be found in all border districts. As in the rest of the country, even though they are part of the Ghilzai confederation, the Kuchi feel marginalized due to their migratory lifestyle. In contrast to the Ghilzai Pashtun and non-Pashtun Baluch, the Zirak and Panjpai Durrani confederations are far more scattered between Helmand and Kandahar, and both are more strongly represented, especially in Kandahar. The Zirak Durrani make for a majority in the three Kandahari districts that are not dominated by either the Bares (Shorabak, 98%) or Baluch (Reg, 100%): Arghistan (25% Barakzai, 25% Mohammadzai, and 20% Popalzai, some Achekzai), Maruf (50% Barakzai) and Spin Boldak (55% Achekzai). They are in the minority in Helmand (Popalzai, Barakzai, and Achekzai). The Panjpai Durrani mainly live between Kandahar, Spin Boldak (45% Nurzai) and Maruf (Alizai, 25%) in Kandahar, with some scattered tribes also in Arghistan, and Helmand (where the Ishaqzai dominate): Khanishin (Ishaqzai, 30%, Alizai 5%, Khugiani, 5%) and Dishu (Ishaqzai 32%). Table 4.2 provides an overview of the geographic distribution of the tribes in the Southern cluster.

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TABLE 4.2 Overview of Tribal Composition of Southeastern Cluster

Confederation

Tribe
Popalzai Barakzai (incl. Mohammadzai) Alkozai Ackekzai Yusofzai
Nurzai

Zabul

Kandahar
Arghistan (20%) Maruf (50%) Arghistan (50%), 25% are Mohammadzai Arghistan (15%) Spin Boldak (55%) Arghistan

Helmand
Khanishin (5%) Dishu (5%)

Nimroz

Zirak

Durrani

Khanishin

Shamulzayi (5%) Spin Boldak (45%) Maruf (25%) Arghistan Maruf (8%) Arghistan Arghistan Maruf (2%) Atghar (95%) Shamulzayi (88%) Maruf (15%) Shamulzayi (7%) Atghar (5%) Shorabak (98%) Reg (100%) Shorabak Shorabak Arghistan Dishu (10%) Khanishin (50%) Dishu (40%) Dishu (5%) Chahar Burjak (3%) Chahar Burjak (97%) Dishu (5%) Khanishin Khanishin (5%) Dishu (32%) Khanishin (30%) Khanishin (5%)

Panjpai Ghilzai Karyani Other

Alizai Ishaqzai Khugiani Hotak Tokhi Kakar Smaller Ghilzai tribes Wardak Bares Baluch Sayed

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The regional political dominance by the Zirak Durrani has historical roots. The Ghilzai were the first to rule the South, when Mirwais Nika (or Mr Wais Khn Htak, 1673-1715) of the Ghilzai tribe of the Hotak, conquered Kandahar from the Persian Safavids in 1709 founding the Hotaki dynasty that rule Persia from 1722 to 1729. They were not able to maintain their power base for very long, however. In 1730 Nadir Shah12 destroyed the Ghilzai rule over Persia and established himself as the new emperor. After his death in 1747, a very young Abdali leader, who had served in Nadir Shahs army and was later in charge of his home security, Ahmad Shah Abdali (1724-1773) of the Popalzai, took power and established an empire stretching from Eastern Iran to Northern India. He renamed his own Pashtun confederation and name (Abdali) into Durrani (Dur-i Durrani, pearl under pearls), thereby founding the Durrani dynasty. Hereby he referred to tribal ideals and underlined his position as a primus inter pares (the first under equals, this referring to the ideal type of Pashtun societies where all (men) are equal). Since this period, all kings of Afghanistan came from the Durrani confederation until the last one: Zahir Shah, who died in 2007. Most of the kings were actually Mohammadzai, which are a sub-tribe of the Barakzai. This makes the Durrani tribes in the South the most influential as they have traditionally been close to the Government and associated influential positions and resources. Among the Durrani, the Zirak Durrani have been more powerful than the Panjpai. The Ghilzai and non-Pashtun tribes are next in the line of power. The Durrani-rule of Afghanistan was disrupted for only 23 years, starting with the Communist (PDPA) government (1978-1992), the short rule of the mujahideen government (1992-1996) and the Taliban rule (1996-2001). 1. The first PDPA president Noor Mohammad Taraki (1978-79) was a Taraki Ghilzai and his successor Hafizullah Amin (1979) a Kharoti Ghilzai. The PDPA government put not only an end to the Durrani dynastic rule but, moreover, tried to extinguish the larger Durrani royal family encompassing thousands of members. Furthermore, the PDPA government de-emphasized traditional rule altogether and actively tried to break the backbone of the Afghan power-holders composed of traditional landowners, khans and religious leadership. This caused many traditional leaders to take up the struggle jihad in defence of their power, mostly joining one of the seven jihadi factions (Peshawar seven). Other traditional leaders went into exile in Pakistan. 2. The rule under the mujahideen government was very diverse, and in the South linked to jihadi commanders from various tribal groups. Thus one cannot speak of a clear domination by one of the two confederations, albeit in some regions the Durrani did have the upper hand. The situation was much more of a patchwork, with many commanders dominating small areas.

Nder Shh Afshr (Persian: ; also known as Nder Qoli Beg - or Tahmsp Qoli Khn - ( ) November, 1688 or 6 August 1698 - 19 June 1747) ruled as Shah of Iran (173647) and was the founder of the Afsharid dynasty. Because of his military genius, some historians have described him as the Napoleon of Persia or the Second Alexander.

12

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3. The Taliban, which emerged in late summer 1994, tried to avoid the tribal split between the Durrani and Ghilzai. The term Kandahari for the core members of the Taliban became popular and members of both tribal confederations were found in the top ranks of the Taliban. Nevertheless, Mullah Omar, the mystic leader of the Taliban, belongs to the Hotak tribe of the Ghilzai confederation. He was furthermore considered a reincarnation of 18th century Mir Wais and was seen as a re-newer of Afghanistan after years of war and destruction. However, the Taliban were not free of tribal nepotism. In tribal terms, the Taliban power base was very much an expression of its geographical origins. The Taliban core remained mainly composed of Ghilzai and Panjpai Durrani coming from Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul. Taliban from the Southeastern and eastern clusters were less integrated into the core Taliban leadership, especially those from the eastern cluster. In addition, the Taliban were an expression of social mobility as they brought to power social groups and tribes that had been previously excluded from power. The exit of the Taliban changed the tribal power structure yet again. Important pre-Taliban jihadi commanders who had achieved an important status in the jihad or who came from traditional landowning elites came back to power. Ridding their former strongholds and areas of influence from the Taliban was usually a violent process. Abusing state power, supporting opportunistic clientele networks, and harassing former foes all added to communal grievances and increased the distance between tribal groups and communities and the state and created a renewed backlash on which the current insurgency builds on.

Cluster remits of tribes

Table 4.3 provides an overview of the cluster remits of the major tribes in the Southern cluster, which are described in more detail below. Table 4.4 at the end of the tribal overview provides a final summary of the tribes discussed here. Both the non-Pashtun Baluch as well as the Pashtuns have strong cross-border economic and political links. The Baluch tribesmen control much of the cross border smuggle in southern Helmand and Chahar Burja district of Nimroz. Among the Pashtun tribes, the Achekzai and Nurzai tribes both have very strong economic ties in the Spin Boldak/Chaman area where they dominate business and constitute much of the population. The Zirak Durrani tribes, especially the Popalzai (but also Barakzai and Achekzai), can be considered the leadership tribes of the Pashtun South albeit in the border districts discussed here their influence is limited mostly to Kandahar and partially in Helmand. Tribal myth goes that Zirak Durrani had four sons - Barak (the oldest), the second Popal, the third Achek, and Aloko the last one giving them the power over the Zirak Durrani region, and Barak the rule. After the death of Zirak, the rule was passed on to Popal, the second son. Among the Zirak Durrani tribes, the Barakzai (tribe of former Governor Gul Agha Sherzoi) are most prominent in controlling politics in Kandahar. They are also in significant number in Helmand province, even though not in the border-districts of Helmand. The Barakzai have maintained influence through successive regimes from monarchy to communism until today. Education and power in the government has made them important power brokers with elite families having maintained influence over their respective Durrani tribes.

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Table 4.3 Cluster Remits of the Major Tribes in the Southern Cluster Border Districts
Confederation Tribe Politics/ business/ Landownership power trade jihad links Religious/ spiritual Nomadic pops CrossInsurgency border Marginalized Smuggling (support) linkages

Popalzai Barakzai

Zirak

Durrani

Mohamadzai Alkozai Ackekzai Yusofzai Nurzai Alizai Ishaqzai Hotak Tokhi Kakar Kuchi
(historic) (Pakistan)

Karyani Wardak
Bares Baluch Sayed

Other

Ghilzai

Panjpai

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The Popalzai follow the Barakzai in political influence, especially outside Kandahar-city. The Popalzai are the tribe of President Hamid Karzai, which is headed in Southern Afghanistan by his brother Ahmad Wali Karzai who also heads the Provincial shura, thereby holding influence over power-holders in the district. The Popalzai are also influential in neighbouring Uruzgan province in Helmand and they try to build alliances to Zabul leaders as well. The Alkozai are the biggest tribe in Kandahar and currently the most vulnerable tribal group due to the recent killings of their most important leaders: Mullah Naqibullah Akhund (Mullah Naqib, an ex-jihadi commander); Mohammad Akram Khakriz Wal, The Head of Police of Kandahar province; Haji Gurrani (ex HiG commander); the brother of Haji Gul Ali (ex-jihadi commander of Mahaz); Haji Abdel Hakim Jan (ex-jihadi commander for Mahaz). Mullah Naqib was a known operator, politically very astute and had good relations with all influential individuals in Kandahar with the exception of Gul Agha Sherzoi. In addition, he had good links to the provincial and central government as well as Rabbani (Jamiat) who he fought for during the mujahideen years. He was known to change sides when it suited him. For example, he used his influence to allow a blood-less take-over of Kandahar from the mujahideen to the Taliban and later on from the Taliban to the current government, which has gained him respect and gratitude from the Kandahari population. He was badly injured in a bomb explosion in 2007 and later died of his wounds. The Achekzai who live mostly in Spin Boldak and in Quetta district of Pakistan are considered to be a wealthy tribe. They were originally Kuchis and became settled about 100 years ago. The Achekzai in Spin Boldak have historically been involved in trade. In the past the Achekzai would trade almonds from Shah Wali Kot and Shahre Safa to Pakistan. To this day, they control much of the trade and business in Spin Boldak and have important communities living on the Pakistani side of the border (Quetta) as well as in Dubai. They are also politically influential in Pakistan, as Mahmud Khan, the leader of the Pashtun-based nationalist party Pakhtun-khwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP) is an Achekzai. In Pakistan tribes of other Pashtun confederations (such as the Panjpai Nurzai and Ghilzai Kakar) support the Achekzai leader politically. The Mohammadzai live in Arghistan. The Mohammdazi allegedly originate from this district, since the grave of Mohammad Baba is in Arghistan. Although originally a Barakzai sub tribe, the Mohammadzai have become a tribe in its own right. They are still close to the Barakzai and join them in elections and when there are problems. Many Afghan kings belonged to the Mohammadzai tribe. As they are only in Arghistan, we have included the Mohammadzai with the Barakzai in all of our tables (but noting the separately).

The Panjpai Durrani tribes are second in terms of influence in the South, due to being linked to the Durrani dynasty. Again, however, in the border districts discussed here, their influence again is limited mostly to Kandahar and Helmand. The Durand line particularly divides the Nurzai. They live mostly in Spin Boldak, Kandahar and Quetta district of Pakistan. In Kandahar they are a large and prosperous tribe with a large business community owning the best land in Spin Boldak and having much better access to water than the Achekzai tribe. There are also large Nurzai communities in the non-border districts of Kandahar Province (Rabat, Kadanai) as well as in Farah and Herat. The Ishaqzai live in the two border districts of southern Helmand, as well as in other Helmand districts such as northern Helmand districts of Sangin, Grishk, Nawzad but also Lashkargah and Garamsir. They have been historically marginalized and were considered

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poor. This has changed to some extent since they recently achieved wealth in the narcotics trade and power by supporting the insurgency and becoming strong in its power structures. The Ishaqzai have strong roots among religious leadership and produce many spiritual figures and pirs. The Ishaqzai also have a large Kuchi population that have been effected by drought and post Taliban operession. Larger Ishaqzia communities have been kicked out of northern Afghanistan (Faryab, Sari Pul, Balkh, Smangan and Kunduz which are currently located in Mukhtar camp area of Lashkargah . The Alizai are the second biggest tribe in Maruf district of Kandahar and have a few families in Arghistan as well. There are important Alizai communities in Helmand as well (Musa Qala), but not in the border districts studied here where they only make up for about 5% in Khanishin. The Alizai are linked to smuggling and the Taliban/insurgency, especially in Maruf.

With the power and associated politics being mainly dominated by the Durrani, the Ghilzai have somewhat been pushed into the position of a political underdog in Southern Afghanistan, especially during the current regime. Nevertheless, at least historically, several of the Ghilzai tribes, especially the Hotak had links to rulers (Hotak dynasty, PDPA government, and Taliban). The Hotak seem to have concentrated on dominating the trade sector, which is now also being infringed upon from the Durrani tribes. In the border districts we are studying, they boast a specific strength in Zabul, where they dominate Atghar (98% Hotak) and Shamulzayi (88% Tokhi). As noted earlier, the Hotak are the majority in Atghar in Zabul. The Hotak dynasty (17221729) was the first Pashtun (Ghilzai) rule over Persia (including Afghanistans South) until the Persians under Nadir Shah defeated them in 1730 (who were then succeeded by the Durrani dynasty). Mullah Omar, who is a Hotak, restored some of the power of the Hotak when the Taliban ruled Afghanistan (1996-2001). indicating there is some traditional support for the Taliban by the Hotak. The Hotak tribes also live in Uruzgan and Kandahar. Traditionaly the Hotak have been strong in the business sectors and one of the dominant tribes in power structures of Zabul and over all dominant in the insurgency. The Tokhi make up most of the population in Shamulzayi (88%). As with the Hotak, there is a strong support for the Taliban. Today, the Tokhi in Shamulzayi feel marginalized as they feel insufficiently represented in the provincial government of Zabul. Apparently, their disillusionment has reached so far that they do not even bother anymore to request anything from their representatives in the provincial shura. The Kakar are on of the largest Pashtun tribes with cross-border ties in the South, with the majority residing in Zhob and Quetta districts in Pakistan, where most of their important elders live. In the Southern border districts they are a minority in Maruf, Kandahar (15) and Dishu, Helmand (5%).

As noted earlier, the third Pashtun confederation, the Karyani is not well represented in the Southern border districts, with the Wardak only accounting for 5% in Atghar, Zabul. There is one other Pashtun tribe that does not belong to any of the three confederations that lives in the Southern border districts. The Bares make up the majority of the population in Shorabak in Kandahar (98%), and form a minority in Dishu, Helmand (10%) and in Chahar Burjak in Nimroz (3%). They are also scattered across the Durand line and have strong ties to Nushki situated in Baluchistan province of Pakistan.

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As noted earlier, outside the Pashtun tribes, the Baluch tribe is quite important in the Southern border districts, especially due to their predominance in the isolated border areas of Nimroz, Southern Helmand and Reg in Kandahar. The tribal system within the Baluch is quite strong and there are few fault-lines among the various sub-tribes of the Baluch. Outsiders usually perceive them to be united. In addition to southern Afghanistan, western Pakistan and Southeastern Iran are largely populated by the Baluch tribe. The Baluch in Afghanistan are also linked to the larger Baluch cause such as the oppression of Baluch in Pakistan. In turn, the Afghan Baluch have strong cross-border support from Iranian and Pakistani Baluch making it difficult for Pashtun tribes or the state to control or dominate them. Many Baluch living in Chahar Burja also have houses in Zabul province of Iran. State presence and influence in Baluch territory is either weak or absent, mostly due to poor infrastructure and remoteness of the territory. Thus, control in Baluch areas lies either with Baluch smugglers networks or insurgents. In Chahar Burjak (Nimroz), for example, the Baluch government actors are allegedly linked to smuggling networks, thus highlighting state weakness. The interpretation of the population, however, is quite different. They see this alliance between government and smugglers as a stability factor that enhances security. In their view, a standoff would only lead to armed struggle. The state has provided few opportunities for the local population to engage in the legal economy in the remote Baluch areas. This means in order to survive, the local population is almost forced to move toward narcotics, weapons and human trafficking. Due to their geographic isolation, the Baluch tribe has largely remained outside the polarizing Pashtun power struggles. The Baluch actually seem to benefit a great deal from the growing rift among the Pashtun tribes (especially the two big confederations) and the power struggles between the insurgents and Afghan government/NATO/ISAF. As they stand united and control the major transportation/logistics routes from Chahar Burjak in Nimroz, Helmand, and Reg district of Kandahar to the Pakistani and Iranian border, both the insurgency and Afghan government (need to) work with the Baluch. This gives them great importance for the cross-border insurgency, as well as the poppy, weapons and fuel trade. The Baluch are currently living in a symbiotic and mutual beneficial/rewarding relationship with the insurgency. The growth of the war economy (mainly through the smuggling of opium and weapons) lies in the Baluch tribal interest as it provides ample opportunities to a marginalised population. Poppy from the rest of Helmand, and other parts of Afghanistan, are to a large extent smuggled though Baluch territory. In turn, the survival of the insurgency in southern Afghanistan largely rests on the support of the Baluch tribe as the insurgency needs the Baluch for the entry and exit of fighters (and weapons) to and from Afghanistan. As the insurgency is gaining foothold in the Baluch areas for strategic reasons (as it did in FATA Pakistan) it is likely that extremist support will further grow within the Baluch tribe, which could add to the instability of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. As the Pashtun tribes in the Baluch areas also benefit from the poppy trade it is unlikely that a larger conflict could emerge between the Pashtuns and Baluch unless livelihoods would drastically change from opium to more legal business. Thus, with the exception of the Nurzai in Southern Nimroz (see Chapter 5), the Baluch and Pashtun tribes enjoy a peaceful coexistence.

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This symbiotic relationship between the Baluch and insurgents is not historic. The Communist government and Soviet Union was sympathetic towards the Baluch national liberation struggle and supported two Baluch sub-tribes: the Mangal (who are strong in Baluch Nationalist politics) and Mahmundsani (and vice versa). There are, however, no Baluch in the current insurgency who have had positions in the former Communist government.

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Table 4.4 Overview of Major Tribes in the Southern Cluster Border Districts
Cluster tasks (remits), possibly subdivide in econ, political, insurgency

Tribes

Confederation Province Border Districts

Kandahar Arghistan (20%) Zirak Durrani Helmand Khanishin (5%)

Determinants of power
Second biggest tribe in the South, very close in size to Barakzai; majority in Kandahar-city (regional capital) Biggest landowners (together with Barakzai, Alkozai and Nurzai) Many big and wealthy businessmen Many influential jihadi commanders Tribe of past leaders and kings, such as Ahmad Shah Durrani; current president They are influential especially in Kandahar city (the regional capital) due to giving land to Ahmad Shah Durrani (a Popalzai) for building Kandahar-city Biggest tribe in South Biggest landowners (together with Popalzai, Alkozai and Nurzai) Tribe of former governor, Gul Agha Sherzoi Many big and wealthy businessmen Many influential jihadi commanders Most of the kings were Mohammadzai which are a sub-tribe of Barakzai tribe Inherited leadership (linked to Zirak Durrani) Biggest tribe in Kandahar Biggest landowners (together with Popalzai, Barakzai and Nurzai) Many influential jihadi commanders Important businessmen 2007 saw the killing of many important

Popalzai

Ruling clan since first ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani created the Durrani dynasty Strong in property and business

Barakzai Zirak Durrani (including Mohammadzai)

Kandahar Maruf (50%) Arghistan (50%, but 25% of those are Mohammadzai) Helmand Dishu (5%)

Strong in agriculture and property (due to landownership) Politics Business

Alkozai

Zirak Durrani

Kandahar Arghistan (15%)

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Tribes

Confederation Province Border Districts

Determinants of power
Alkozai leaders such as Mullah Naqib of Arghandab.

Cluster tasks (remits), possibly subdivide in econ, political, insurgency

Ackekzai

Zirak Durrani

Kandahar Spin Boldak (55%) Arghistan Helmand Khanishin, Helmand

Hotak

Ghilzai

Zabul

Atghar (95%)

Tokhi Kakar

Ghilzai Ghilzai

Zabul

Shamulzayi (88%)

Kandahar Maruf (15%) Helmand Dishu (5%)

Nurzai

Panjpai Durrani

Kandahar Spin Boldak (45%) Helmand Khanishin

Alizai

Panjpai Durrani

Kandahar Maruf (25%)

Rich and business men Political power in Pakistan Many former Achekzai jihadi commanders of the Fedayin faction of the late Ismat Muslim now occupy powerful political positions in the Kandahar border districts Majority in Atghar district Big landowners Link to jihadi commanders Weak relations to government Traditional rulers prior to Durrani dynasty Tribe of the former Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Strong in Zabul Majority in Shamulzayi district Traditionally united under one leader Strong cross border links Large population in Pakistan Sizeable population Biggest landowners (together with Popalzai, Barakzai, and Alkozai) Linked to Popalzai through political marriage Rich business men Influential jihadi commanders. Inherited leadership from father and grandfathers Supporter of Taliban Second largest in Maruf district

Traditionally in trade and business, smugglers

Strong in insurgency in Zabul and Uruzgan

Strong in insurgency in Zabul, Uruzgan Historic merchants nomads Business and land in Spin Boldak Supporters of insurgency Smuggler tribe, (traditional narcotics smuggling) Support insurgency

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Tribes

Confederation Province Border Districts

Arghistan Helmand Khanishin (5%) Khanishin (30%) Dishu (32%) Maruf (8%) Arghistan

Determinants of power
Political links with Popalzai in the South Wealth generated through smuggling

Cluster tasks (remits), possibly subdivide in econ, political, insurgency

Smuggling of narcotics Link to insurgency Poppy production Drug smuggling Strong roots in religious leadership (produce many spiritual figures and Sayed affiliations) Narcotics, weapons and fuel smuggling Insurgency Politically marginalized Independent, cannot be ruled Warrior tribe (Narcotics) smuggling

Helmand Ishaqzai Panjpai Durrani Kandahar

Population Traditionally marginalized, now strong in insurgency Wealth related to poppy production High level of solidarity

Reg (100%) Kandahar Shorabak Baluch Baluch Khanishin (50%) Helmand Dishu (40%) Nimroz Bares No confederation Chahar Burja (97%)

Irani and Pakistani Baluch support the Baluch in Afghanistan and vice versa Control border areas between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran Control the border areas (Helmand, Kandahar), from Dishu in Helmand to Shorabak Dominant tribe in Shorabak district Strong ties to Nushki in Baluchistan, Pakistan.

Kandahar Shorabak (98%), Helmand Dishu (10% Nimroz Chahar Burja (3%)

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The Kuchi Nomads of Afghanistan

In addition to the sedentary tribes discussed so far, the Kuchi (nomadic communities) deserve a separate discussion. 13 The Kuchi in Afghanistan are mainly Ghilzai Pashtuns, with some also being from the Panjpai confederation. Among the non-Pashtuns, the Baluch have large nomadic communities. Among the Panjpai in the Southern cluster the Ishaqzai make up the largest Kuchi group in Helmand and Kandahar. Among the Ghilzai Kuchis the Taraki, Kakar, Kharotee, and Nasar dominate the areas between Zabul and Kandahar. The Baluch Kuchis inhabit the Southern border area stretching from Chahar Burja in Nimroz to Helmand and Kandahar. Large populations of the Southern Kuchi tribes that were settled in the northern provinces of Faryab, Sari Pul, Jowzjan, Badghis, and Kunduz were forced out by local warlords and non-Pashtun residents of those areas in post Taliban times (as a revenge of Taliban suppression). These Kuchis, mainly from the Ishaqzai tribe, live now in the Mukhtar camp area of Lashkar Gah in Helmand. The Kuchis are a politically and economically marginalized group. Kuchis in the South, for example, rank among the least educated population with one of the lowest literacy rates and very poor access to health, education and development services. The local Kuchis have little interaction with local state authorities even though the Afghan Government created the Independent Directorate of Kuchi Affairs (IDKA) in 2006 through a Presidential decree. This has so far not materialized in any change in the status of local Kuchi communities, especially in the South, where, according to our interviews, there is a perception that a great portion of international development aid is not tailored to the needs of the local communities. In addition, the long drought and subsequent death of many animals has severely disrupted the livelihood of local Kuchi communities. The marginalisation and growing frustration of the Kuchis has provided ample recruitment ground for the insurgency and drug and weapons smuggling networks. Both settled and nomadic Baluch communities, for example, living in the border areas under harsh climatic conditions with limited agricultural potential, rely heavily on the smuggling of narcotics and weapons as well as trafficking in humans. The Ishaqzai, who also have large Kuchis populations, are also linked to the insurgency and narcotics trade mainly due to their marginalized status and lack of benefits from the state. Table 4.4 provides an overview of the Kuchi in Southern Afghanistan.

Table 4.4 The Kuchi of Southern Afghanistan

Province Nimroz Tribes Baluch Migratory patterns There are about 30,000 Kuchi in Nimroz, which accounts for about 1.2% of the total Kuchi population. All of these are short-range migratory, thus the Kuchi does not change much during the

This section, especially figures in Table 4.4, draws on the National Multi Sectoral Assessment on Kuchi Report by the Government of Afghanistan, 2005

13

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Province

Tribes

Migratory patterns seasons There are about 95,000 Kuchi in Helmand during the winter season (accounting for about 3.9% of the total Kuchi population). Out of the 49 communities, 63% are considered long-range migratory, 17% shortrange migratory and 20% is settled. In the winter season, about 80,000 (or 3.3% of all Kuchi) stay in Kandahar during the winter. Of this population, about 1% is considered short-range migratory, 51% long-range migratory and 48% is settled. The most important summer area for the short-range migratory Kuchi is Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Taraki and Dautani Kuchis move from Nawa district in Ghazni to Arghistan, Spin Boldak, and Shorabak in Kandahar. About 53,000 Kuchi stay in Zabul province during the winter. Of these Kuchi, about 80% are considered short-range migratory and 20% long-range migratory. All of these communities are in fact only partially migratory, and on average 30% of these households remain behind in their winter residency even during the summer. The main reason for this non-migration is loss of livestock; the initial stage in the pattern towards settlement. Taraki and Dautani Kuchis move from Ghazni through Shamulzayi to Pakistan in winter. Kuchis move from Ghazni through Atghar to Kandahar.

Helmand

Baluch

Kandahar

Taraki, Suliman Khail, Dautani, Kharotee

Zabul

Taraki, Dautani, Shamulzayi (Tokhi)

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Table 4.5 Kuchi Migratory Patterns

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5
Tribal Relations

Chapter

ribal relations in the Southern cluster are currently held in a precarious balance. One could describe it as a delicate inter-dependence among actors to stay in power. Tribes in the South have been polarized in a struggle for control over power and resources some tribes use the Government and others the insurgency to further their position. There are numerous latent conflicts with the potential to explode if the balance is disrupted. It would be wrong to assume that all tribes are necessarily unified. Tribal structures have been fragmented in the South over the past three decades of war and traditional decisionmaking institutions of the tribal system such as jirga and shuras are quite weak. In addition, feudal systems that existed in the pre-war era (1979) have been taken over by commanders and religious personalities that emerged during the three decades of war. However, this fragmentation has not been uniform for all tribes. Several Pashtun and Baluch tribes have managed to keep their tribal identity and solidarity. This emphasizes that it is difficult to treat tribes in the South of Afghanistan in a uniform manner, and also makes it exceedingly difficult to develop generic tribal policies. Even though conflicts and fault lines between tribes exist, the picture is never black and white, with the reality being far more complex and the existence of many grey areas. Balancing power is an important game for many actors in the South, who may have to foster (and shift) alliances with other individuals and tribes regardless of whether they like them or not. Many Afghan tribes had to survive in insecure and changing environments for long periods of time and as a result have learned how to always keep a back door open. One could argue that tribal actors have learned to never put all of their eggs into one basket, and tend to keep their options open thus becoming excellent political entrepreneurs. This, however, is not an issue exclusive to the South or Pashtun tribes. Under the mujahideen, alliances could shift quickly and create new frontlines literally over night. During the jihad there were multiple alliances that were broken several times. In addition to latent tensions and open conflict between tribes, each tribe also deals with their own internal politics and problems that are often unrelated to external actors or tribes. Conflicts may arise over the sharing of new (or old) resources. Alliances may be brokered

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between two tribes in order to subdue another. Conflicts and alliances may coexist and one sub-tribe may behave different than another. Or one tribal leader engages in a personal conflict with another while at the same time brokering an alliance with yet a third. Thus, alliances and conflict can be on a tribal level as well as individual level. Due to the fact that tribesmen tend to rally behind their leaders, differences or power struggles among individuals can also create bigger tribal differences. Nevertheless, it is also interesting that power position of tribes can quickly shift through the loss of important leaders/strongmen or their displacement to another region. Examples of power games in the South Popalzai: Even though the current president is a Popalzai, and Popalzai leaders also dominate the regional government in Kandahar, several leading commanders of the insurgency in Arghistan (Kandahar) are in fact Popalzai. Thus, the Popalzai tribe in essence supports both the government as well as the insurgency. Barakzai different survival strategies: In Nawa Barakzai (Helmand, not part of this survey), where the Barakzai constitute the (near) majority of the population, they managed to oust the insurgency. In Maruf, where they only constitute 50% of the population, they tried not to alienate the minority Alizai tribe (30%) who are strong in the insurgency there, and co-exist with them.

However, even if tribal coherence could be a stabilising factor when it comes to fighting a common enemy (see Barakzai example), it may not safeguard against inter-tribal conflicts. At the same time it can present a problem for the Afghan Government if an entire tribe chooses to join the insurgency, as this would mean an immediate loss of state control in that area. The relationship between tribes and Government is also very complex. Governments are not viewed as permanent entities but as structures that will sooner or later collapse. Therefore the Government usually becomes part of the game over power and resources with tribes trying to reap as much benefit as possible. Power-holders may rise and fall depending on whom currently has the upper hand, as the Alizai example (below) illustrates. Power Shifts among Alizai sub-tribes in Baghran, Musa Qala and Kajaki in Helmand (not border districts) The Alizai (Panjpai) are a good example of the complexity of tribal relations in the southern cluster. Even though many mid- and low-level Alizai joined the Taliban, few of the elite Alizai jihadi commanders were integrated in their power structures. This made the elite jihadi commanders important allies for the current government, who in turn for helping to oust the Taliban, were given many important posts in the current government as a reward. A very similar process could be observed in Uruzgan and Zabul and with other major jihadi commanders from the Barakzai and Alkozai in other regions of Helmand and Kandahar. The Alizai, and especially networks of the Akhundzada family, are central to the Popalzai alliance currently in power. However, in the process of re-establishing their power base, many of these pro-

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government former jihadi commanders were quite heavy handed, especially against former collaborators of the Taliban, marginalizing them and other power holders. Some of them have consequently (re-)joined the current insurgency. A very similar process occurred between the Durrani and Ghilzai confederation (discussed later). In addition to numerous smaller conflicts (discussed later), there are three important tribal faultlines within the Southern cluster that are pertinent to understanding tribal relations and politics in the region: 1. Conflict between Zirak Durrani (power holders) and Panjpai Durrani (marginalized) 2. Historical power struggle between Durrani and Ghilzai 3. Power struggles within the Zirak Durrani While some of these conflicts are historic, many of the more latent fault-lines emerged when it came to the distribution of power in the South after the exit of the Communist government, and again when the Taliban was defeated. The tensions within the Zirak Durrani tribes, for example, emerged during the jihad, when a patchwork of commanders created enclaves or fiefdoms in their areas of influence. The Ghilzai and Panjpai tribes dominated the Taliban regime and successfully removed the Zirak Durrani influence (traditional power holders) from Kandahar and the larger South. This has lead to a marginalisation of the Ghilzai and Panjpai under the current regime. It must be noted however, that in the southern border districts, these constellations of tribal relations are unequally distributed. The larger tribal rift between Ghilzai and Zirak Durrani is unlikely to be found within the administrative boundaries of the border districts, as for example Chahar Burja in Nimroz, Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand, and Reg in Kandahar are mostly Baluch, with Panjpai Durrani minorities in Helmand. Furthermore, Shorabak is majority Bares, who fall outside the Pashtun confederations. Arghistan is mostly Zirak Durrani and Atghar and Shamulzayi in Zabul are Ghilzai dominated. Thus only few of the districts fall exactly into the greater regional tribal politics, such as Spin Boldak and Maruf fitting the Zirak vs. Panjpai Durrani conflict. Nevertheless, these three greater conflicts do hold importance, not only for an understanding of the South, but also to gauge what may influence tribes and individual leaders in the border districts. We therefore have included this general discussion (even if some examples fall outside the border districts) in order to understand the larger context of the South. In order to fully understand the Southern border districts it is necessary to look at the region as a whole.

Ghilzai-Durrani fault line historical context

With the fall of the Taliban the latent tribal rivalry between the Durrani and Ghilzai confederations emerged again, presenting the most prominent conflict in Kandahar today. The Kandahari identity rapidly lost importance and the Durranis blamed the Ghilzais as the true Taliban of Southern Afghanistan. This tribal antagonism was accompanied by a take-over of power by the Durranis in Southern Afghanistan. At present there is no social justice between the Ghilzai and Durrani Pashtuns. Most problematic is that even the Ghilzai dominance over the private sector was lost to the Durrani tribes of the Barakzai, Popalzai and Alkozai.

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The non-Durrani (especially Ghilzai) tribes, despite being roughly equal in size to the Durrani, currently feel sidelined and lack access to power and resources. This has created a general feeling of resentment among them. Complaints of this imbalance in access to power and resources have been filed with central Government, the EU, UNAMA, and the Coalition Forces and NATO (CF, PRT). The power struggle between the Durrani and Ghilzai Pashtun confederations dates back in history to the sixteenth and seventeenth century and is linked to the power struggle between the imperial powers of Safavids (Persians) and the Mogul Empires. In that time the oasis of Kandahar was a main transit point for the trade between India and the Middle East/Europe. Kandahar was situated in the border region of Safavid and Mogul influence. The power over Kandahar shifted several times between the Mogul and Safavid Empire. The critical feature of this period of competition was the transformation of Southern Pashtun tribes into a vehicle of Safavid domination. To consolidate their power over Western Afghanistan, the Safavids appointed particular Pashtun tribes or clans to head tribal confederations and provided them with special privileges. As a result the tribes of Popalzai and Barakzai of the Abdali (later Durrani) and the Hotak and Tokhi of the Ghilzai rose to prominence. While the Ghilzai were the tribal confederation in Kandahar during that time, the Durrani confederation was in power over Herat and Farah. Already both confederations were struggling for dominance in Kandahar. In the year 1709 Mirwais (Nika) Hotak took over Kandahar from the Safavids. His son Mahmud and his cousin Ashraf were not only able to maintain the power over Kandahar but to also capture the Safavid capital Isfahan and set an end to the Safavid Empire. In 1730 Nadir Shah destroyed the Ghilzai rule over Persia and established himself as the new Emperor, and 17 years later when he died, Ahmad Shah Durrani (1724-1773) of the Popalzai, who served in the army of Nadir Shah, established an Empire stretching from Eastern Iran to Northern India. The Ghilzai were forced to move further to the Northeast and scattered in the region between Kandahar and Kabul. Despite this, the Ghilzais maintained their social and economic status, especially in Kandahar city. For the past three decades the Ghilzai have had a major share in the private sector (mainly trade), which is currently being infringed upon by Durrani tribes. Ahmad Shah confiscated the land of the Ghilzai and gave it to his own tribesmen. Since that time most land around Kandahar, but also in other parts of the South, is possessed by Durrani khans. The latter made them a prime target during the Communist government (lead by Hotak Ghilzai leaders) for land confiscations. The Afghanistan War was dominated to a certain extent by this Ghilzai-Durrani antagonism. Pakistan, the major backbone of the Islamic resistance, favoured only Ghilzai in the top ranks of the mujahideen parties and neglected all Durrani initiatives. The reasoning for this was due to fact that the royal family (Durranis) cared passionately the Pashtunistan question - the annexation of the Pashtun tribal areas in Pakistan to Afghanistan - which Pakistan tried to diffuse by strengthening the Ghilzai, first through mujahideen and later the Taliban. As the Ghilzai tribes were strongly affiliated with the Taliban (with Mullah Omar being a Hotak Ghilzai), a backlash occurred during the present shift in power back to the Durrani tribes. The Durranis would like to blame all Ghilzai for the rise of the Taliban despite the Taliban also included Durrani leaders in their ranks. Nevertheless, the result has been a backlash against the Ghilzai, particularly in terms of access to resource and power, with the Durrani holding the

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sceptre firmly in their hands and gate-keeping the Ghilzais out of important positions in politics and economy. This manifests itself as follows: The government administration and the provincial shura are under the influence of the Zirak Durranis (mainly Barakzai, Popalzai and Alkozai) with only a few members of the Ghilzai; o In response, the Ghilzai tribes have created their own council in order to counterbalance the influence of the Durranis. While this Ghilzai shura has an official status with the provincial government, it holds less power than the provincial shura, which is also referred to as Reform Shura of Kandahar.

Zirak Durrani control most Government departments (and key political appointments) in Kandahar and in Uruzgan; Zirak Durrani tribes control most of the reconstruction and development work (nearly 90%). There is an improper distribution of land especially in and around Kandahar city that has mostly been monopolized by the Durrani clans; The security sector is mostly made up by Zirak Durranis. The Barakzai, Alkozai, Achekzai and Popalzai are in control of private security companies, ANP and other irregular forces; o Among the non-Durranis only the Baluch got a sizable militia, created by Zahar Gulalai; The Durrani tribes are seen as well connected to the international forces present in the region and the Ghilzais feel that this link is being abused to stir the international forces against them, for example, arresting their members for alledgedly having links to insurgent (Taliban) forces; Even though Ghilzai and Baluch are also engaged in smuggling the narcotics trade is reported to be dominated by a few strong and prominent Durranis. This is shifting, however, as the safest routes for drug trafficking at the moment are in the more unstable areas considered to be known for insurgent activity.

Overall however, the Ghilzai tribes, the underdog at present, are more united than the Durrani tribes. Even though the central Government, as stated earlier, has made an attempt to balance out power politics in Kandahar among the different Pashtun tribes (as well as between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns), there is still a predominance of Durrani in politics, especially the Barakzai, Popalzai and Alkozai. This concentration of power among few stakeholders has decreased the legitimacy of the central Government and created resentment among other tribes resulting in a lack of willingness to work with the Government in fighting insurgencies. Commanders, even if not fully embedded in or challenging tribal structures, are still mostly in the centre of the conflict.

Panjpai and Zirak Durrani struggle over power and resources

Even though the Panjpai are part of the Durrani confederation they were not equally included in post 2001 power politics by the dominant Zirak Durrani. Even though they are not quite as marginalized as the Ghilzai Pashtun they nevertheless have also experienced exclusion (especially the Nurzai in Uruzgan) and therefore often feel closer to their Ghilzai cousins despite belonging to a different confederation. In terms of the three key determinants which serve as yardsticks to measure a tribes position in the political landscape (level of participation in the government, level of victimization by the government in terms of military and police operations, and level of support for the Taliban), Panjpai

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tribes stand in the middle of a spectrum whose opposite ends are occupied by the Ghilzais and Zirak Durranis respectively. In addition to the Ghilzai Pashtuns the Panjpai were also major part of Taliban regime during the mid 1990s. Already at that time the Taliban movement was representing the underdog or marginalized tribal groups of the South, mainly coming from Panjpai and Ghilzai confederations, with Zirak tribes only having a limited influence. As post-Taliban politics excluded many Panjpai sections and their leadership (in addition to also marginalising the Ghilzai and Baluch), with Zirak Durrani strongmen grabbing up most government posts (especially in Helmand, Uruzgan and Kandahar), it has created a tendency among the Panjpai to once again support the insurgency and Neo-Taliban. Thus, while the Zirak Durrani currently dominates Government positions, the Panjpai, through their alliances with other groups such as the Baluch, are currently very dominant in the non-governmental power structure in many of the Southern border districts. As the Government is already weak (or non-existent) in most Southern border districts, these marginalised tribes are actually in a power position at this moment. This is especially true for the Ishaqzai and Nurzai, both growing strong through links to insurgency and well as poppy production and smuggling. Historic power struggle between Zirak and Panjpai Durrani in the South: Case 1: Achekzai (Zirak) and Nurzai (Panjpai) in Spin Boldak (Kandahar) In Spin Boldak, the Achekzai (Zirak) and Nurzai (Panjpai) are engaged in a long-standing conflict over power. The most recent renewal of the conflict started when the Nurzai joined the Taraki (Ghilzai) in the PDPA government and the Achekzai fought against the PDPA government, mostly under Ismat Muslims Fedayin faction. The conflict between PDPA and Nurzai against the Achekzai became even more complex when Ghilzai jihadi commanders such as Hekmatyar (HiG-Kharoti) and Mawlawi Mahmad Nabi (Harakat-Andar) dually fought the Soviet supported PDPA and the Achekzai tribe under the leadership of Ismat Muslim. The political war thus became a tribal war. When the Taliban took power the conflict between the Nurzai and Achekzai deteriorated further. The Nurzai, who generally supported the Taliban, allegedly used their power to hang Mansur, the most important Achekzai-Fedayin leader at the time (the follower of the late Ismat Muslim). This also forced large portions of the Achekzai tribe to seek exile in Pakistan. After the collapse of the Taliban government, many Achekzai returned from Pakistan and joined the current Government. Mansurs nephew, Abdul Raziq, was given the position of Executive Officer of the Border police, which he still holds today. He currently is the most important Achekzai tribal elder and allegedly has a good reputation. At the moment there is relative peace between the tribes. There are good individual business relations and both tribes have shares in the businesses in the Spin Boldak area, providing an incentive to keep up the peace. The conflict is therefore latent at the moment. The relationship between the Achekzai and the Nurzai is quite complex. There is intermarriage between the tribes resulting in some important Nurzai being connected to powerful Zirak Durrani families. The presence of Coalition Forces is a further deterrent to open conflict. Nonetheless, the Nurzai secretly still support the insurgency, mainly because they had even

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more power under the Taliban and hope that this could happen again. The Achekzai in contrast have traditionally (except during the jihad) been supporters of the Government. Case 2: Ishaqzai vs. several Zirak Durrani tribes in Helmand The conflict is, at the heart of it, between Ishaqzai and power-holders of the current Government in Helmand. The Ishaqzai are historically considered to be a poor and marginalized tribe. They have large Kuchi sections and have suffered under the drought that has destroyed their livelihoods. In addition, many of them have been kicked out of northern Afghanistan in the post- Taliban period by local warlords. This has further added to their marginalized status. They do, however, have a strong religious base and support. Traditionally, the Ishaqzai have been weak in pro-Government structures. This changed in the former Taliban regime where they acquired some prominence in their power structure. This is also the case in the current insurgency in Khanishin, Nawzad, Sangin, and in the northern part of Grishk. They also have acquired prominence in the narcotics trade in Dishu (Helmand) as they populate large parts of border districts. Thus, despite being a smaller tribal group, they have been able to subdue larger tribal groups in northern Helmand through their alliance with the insurgency and their involvement in the narcotics trade.

Intra-Zirak Durrani power struggle

The Zirak Durrani power base is mainly in Kandahar province from where the neighbouring provinces of the Southern cluster are within its sphere of influence. The important power holders of the Zirak Durrani are mainly Popalzai, Alkozai and Barakzai. They are concentrated as a majority in Kandahar, but are also located in Helmand and Uruzgan. The examples below illustrated the internal conflict amongst the Zirak Durrani, mostly over power and resources in Kandahar, involving the Alkozai, Barakzai and Popalzai. Conflict over power and resources among Zirak Durrani tribes I. Kandahar (Barakzai, Alkozai, Popalzai) The rivalry within the Zirak broke out again with the fall of the Taliban, when the Alkozai, Barakzai and Popalzai all attempted to obtain control of Kandahar. The loose and informal power sharing among the major Zirak Durrani tribes that emerged after the ousting of Taliban proved to be fragile. The three groups felt that the spoils and power positions were unevenly distributed among them. Initially, power was distributed as follows: Barakzai: control over the governorship and local Government ministries Alkozai: control over the police Popalzai: control over the district commissioners Later on, the Central Government transferred the Alkozai Chief of Police from Kandahar to Mazar-i-Sharif, replacing him with another Alkozai (Khan Muhammad) who was considered completely illiterate and unprofessional. This Chief of Police was then replaced by a Tajik (Ayub Salangi), leaving the Alkozai without power in local Government. Most recently, in the summer of 2005, the Barakzai Governor Gul Agha Sherzai was replaced by a non-Kandahari (Asadullah Khalid), removing the influence of the Barakzai

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over local Government. This leaves, in the end, the Popalzai with influence in local Government in Kandahar, which is perceived as unfair by the Barakzai and Alkozai, and has led to tensions among them. II. Helmand (Barakzai vs. Popalzai) In a situation similar to Kandahar, a power struggle broke out among Zirak Durrani tribes in Helmand when the Taliban fell. The struggle was over power and resources in Lashkar Gah and particularly Grishk. Initially, a loose, informal power-sharing arrangement evolved wherein the governorship and district administrative posts were given into the control of the Barakzai tribe. This changed, however, and the Popalzai soon felt that they also wanted part of political power in Helmand. In 2004, a Popalzai strong man in Kandahar, Ahmad Wali Karzai, pushed the Governor of Helmand to appoint a Popalzai commander as the Chief of Police in Grishk. Subsequently, heavy fighting took place in Grishk and dozens of fighters from both sides were killed. Mualim Mir Walay (a local Barakzai commander formerly affiliated with the Hizb-i Islami Hekmatyar faction) was supported by the ex-governors of Kandahar Gul Agha Sherzai and Yusuf Pashtun (both Barakzais). In 2004 the UN, under the auspices of the DDR programme, disarmed the top commander of the Barakzai tribe (Mualim Mir Walay, Commander of 93 Div) and his militias. Mualim Mir Walay is currently a Member of Parliament. This did not help the latent conflict between the Barakzai and Popalzai as they Barakzai felt that the Popalzai had used their influence with central Government to weaken them in Helmand. The conflict remains far from resolved.

Other tribal conflicts

In addition to tribal relations situated in these major tribal fault lines, we have identified three other important conflicts in the Southern border districts, both inter as well as intratribal, and one involving the government: 1. Baluch and the Nurzai in northern Nimroz 2. Factional rivalry between Baluch sub-tribes 3. Tokhi and Naser conflict (both Ghilzai) in Shamulzai (Zabul) 4. Conflicts involving opposition to Government structures Case 1: Power struggle between Baluch and Nurzai in Nimroz Nimroz is the only province in the South where Baluch are also strong in the state administration of the province. This is mainly linked to their population size as Baluch make up 85% of the population in Nimroz, the rest are Panjpai Pashtuns (15%), mainly Nurzai, Ishaqzai and some Alizai. There are also some Zirak Durrani (Barakzai) living in Nimroz. The Taliban regime had supported the Pashtuns and encouraged their settlement, mainly in the north of the province. In addition, the provincial capital was moved from Zaranj to Kash Rod which is a predominantly Pashtun territory.

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In the post Taliban period the provincial capital was moved back to Zaranj. This has led to feelings of resentment among the Nurzai Pashtuns against the Baluch, who currently dominate the Government positions in Zaranj. The head of the Baluch tribe and current Minister of Tribal Affairs, Mr. Brahovi, is allegedly an instigator in this conflict by employing mainly Baluch in the current Government administration in Nimroz (98%). The Pashtuns from Khashrod therefore constantly demand drastic reform in the Government administration. As tribal solidarity is strong among the Nurzai they are getting support from the Nurzai of Helmand and Farah provinces. Case 2: Old factional rivalries between Baluch sub-tribes in Reg/Shorabak The tribal system within the Baluch is quite strong and there are few fault-lines among the various sub-tribes of Baluch. An exception to this unity is the rivalry between the Mangal and Mahmundsani sub-tribes vs. other Baluch sub-tribes (allied with the Pashtun Bares) in Reg/Shorabak that emerged during the jihad. Since then, power has shifted back and forth between the two sides as illustrated below: Both the Mangal and Mahmundzani, who are strong in Baluch Nationalist politics, supported the PDPA Government as the Government (and Soviet Union), in turn, were sympathetic to their nationalist agenda in Pakistan. When the jihad against the PDPA government started the other Baluch sub-tribes and the Bares joined mujahideen factions, putting them in opposition to the Mangal and Mahmundzani. Allegedly, however, there was only a little fighting between the PDPA and the pro-mujahideen Baluch and Bares. When the war turned more intense and the PDPA/Soviet regime started to bomb and destroy houses in the area, most pro-mujahideen tribes fled to Panjpai in the Quetta district of Baluchistan. When the PDPA regime collapsed the situation reversed, with the Mangal and Mahmundsani tribes having to flee Reg/Shorabak while the pro-mujahideen Baluch and Bares factions returned to the area. The Taliban movement and the Taliban government were mostly composed of Nurzai, Ishaqzai, Achekzai and Baluch from Pakistan (Chaghai, Dal Ban Din in Quetta district of Pakistan). Mullah Abdulai was the Taliban district governor (Ishaqzai) and Mullah Alim the Chief of Police (Baluch). The Baluch and Bares tribes did not resist them. Allegedly it was not a proactive support and they did not help them solve problems with local commanders as done in other areas. As the Mangal and Mahmundsani had supported the Khalq faction, they were not allowed to return during the Taliban regime. When the Taliban regime in Kabul collapsed the Bares and Baluch held a big gathering created a committee of three hundred elders. They sent an envoy to the Taliban and threatened to fight them if they would not leave voluntarily. The Mangal and Mahmundsani sub-tribes returned to Reg during the second year of the current Government when the Taliban had been removed from power. In Reg district the political power has apparently shifted back to the Mengal. The District Governor, Chief of Police and Head of the National Security Directorate (all the same person) is a former PDPA supporter from the Mangal subtribe. The heads of the two Government shuras in the district are from the Mangal sub-tribe as well.

Case 3: Land based conflict between Tokhi (Ghilzai) vs. Naser (Ghilzai Kuchis) More than 30 years ago settled Shamulzai (Tokhi) and the Kuchi Nasar populated the Shamulzayi district. Zahir Shah gave the Nasar tribe 5,000 jarebs in the Darwazegy area

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that was then an uncultivated desert. Reportedly, the Nasar were not satisfied with the 5,000 jarebs given to them and grabbed further land, totalling an area more than 31,000 jarebs which belonged to the Shamulzai. Subsequently, heavy fighting between the two tribes broke out. Supposedly the Nasaran killed many Shamulzai people. During the jihad the Nasar left the area and went to Pakistan and the Shamulzai reclaimed the land abandoned by the Nasar. Several years later, during the time of Dr. Najibullahs Government, 1,200 Nasar militia troops came with support from Major Ashrab (Pakistan) to reclaim their land in Shamulzayi. There was a battle which lasted seventeen days. The Shamulzai purportedly won the battle and the Nasaran returned across the border. Fighting also took place in Pakistan as many Shamulzayi refugees had fled to Pakistan. The situation improved when weapons licences were given to Shamulzai militia men. During the Taliban Government the tribes were disarmed and the conflict became latent. In 2005 (possibly 2006) the Governor of Zabul, Delbar Jan Arman, initiated a jirga to resolve the land dispute. Members of the jirga included the Governor of Zabul, the Chief of District, tribal elders from almost all over Zabul, ANA, and the Americans (the latter also to keep the parties from fighting each other). The jirga, however did not have a good start. Prior to the jirga, an envoy of Nasar cooks and labourers came to Shamulzayi to set up a temporary housing space for the tribal elders soon to arrive. Supposedly, an armed group of Shamulzai under the command of Commandant Spin burned the Nasar belongings as they thought this was an act by the Naser to once again occupy their land. The claims during the jirga were as follows: The Nasar wanted all their land back, but the Shamulzayi were only willing to give them the 5000 jarebs that was initially granted to the Naser, and for which land deeds as proof existed. Both sides had issues with the others claims: o o The Nasar felt that their settlements would be encircled by Shamulzai settlements and thus allow an effective control by the latter. The Shamulzai were afraid that there would be harassment at the border if Naser were to control it. Furthermore, they had made investments in the land over the last thirty years, such as the construction of deep wells.

The jirga was not able to resolve the conflict and in 2007 Nasar reportedly attacked police check points. Up to this day, the Nasar are alleged to organise hit and run attacks on Shamulzayi district from Pakistan. At the same time, the insurgency (which are allied with the Shamulzai) allegedly does not attack the police checkpoints in the border area since the border police protect the Shamulzai from the Nasar.

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Case 4: Conflicts involving Opposition to Government Structures: Baluch (narcotics mafia/insurgency) vs. Poplazai (government actors) in Southern Helmand Dishu and Khanishin districts are the gateway for opium smugglers that involve most of the Baluch tribes. The Lashkar Gah power holders are currently trying to put a ground presence in the border districts in order to gain a share in the illegal income derived from drug trafficking/smuggling. The Baluch do not want to see the Government return as this could mean that they would loose a portion of their share in the local war economy. In 2004/2005 the Helmand Governor and Provincial Chief of Police appointed their own people as District Commissioner and District Chief of Police in the two districts, but Baluch tribe members attacked them several times, and in May-June and October 2005 almost ten and 17 policemen were killed, respectively. Haji Saher from the Popalzai tribe was appointed as anti-narcotics Chief of the Province in 2006 and young Popalzai were recruited to support him. After attacks by insurgents/Baluch led by Mullah Zaher Baluch, the Government presence ended. The Popalzai who had supported Haji Saher retreated from the area to Lashkar Gah. When the insurgents confronted the Popalzai elders living in the district the latter claimed that Haji Saher and his supporters were out of their control. Even though Haji Saher was killed in a car accident and Mullah Zaher during a bombardment, the conflict continues. Haji Sahers brother Haji Daud is now the Antinarcotics Chief trying to complete this job.

Last but not least, and in form of a conclusion, the continued struggle between the insurgency and ANA/ISAF/NATO in Southern Afghanistan has proven to be somewhat distractive for many tribes. At least for a short time they may be to busy to engage in inter or intra-tribal disputes. An opposition toward either the insurgency (or foreign) actors could prove unifying, even if just for a short time, between the tribes. A similar situation could be observed when the different mujahideen factions fought the Communist government and when the Northern Alliance fought the Taliban. However, as history suggest, the moment the common enemy vanishes, the internal struggle over power and resources re-emerges.

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6
Recommendations

Chapter

The South at large needs more support and attention by the international community, and not just in the military area. The lucrative narcotics business, extensive smuggling networks (drugs, weapons, and humans), growing and diversifying insurgency and local tribal rifts combined with bad governance and power struggles among elites have produced a highly problematic situation. Disentangling the symbiotic relationship between smuggling networks and the insurgency alone presents a major challenge and the central/provincial Government is in dire need of support if stability in the Southern cluster is to be achieved. Prior to the individual recommendations made in the areas of politics, security, economy and research, we would like to emphasize a few guiding principles: There needs to be an understanding that without a serious reform within the Afghan Government at the national, regional and sub-regional level that addresses issues of corruption and lack of good governance, individual action in the border districts of the Southern Cluster will not prove effective. At present, the Afghan Government and the international actors who support it are up against tbe extremely poor track record of Government officials in the Southern border districts. In other words, a viable and superior Government alternative to insurgency needs to be offered and faith in good governance by the state needs to be rebuilt. The role of Pakistan in fuelling the conflict in the Southern border districts needs to be understood. Even though the insurgency has local support (or is able to recruit) locally, any local efforts to fight the insurgency needs to be cobbled with addressing the existing leadership and training cells in Pakistan. Combating conflict and insurgency in the Southern border districts cannot happen in isolation. The weakness of traditional leadership needs to be acknowledged at the same time as understanding that the tribe as a social unit is still of great importance among many tribes in the Southern border district. Traditional leadership without military background

he recommendations put forth here should be considered suggestions that are in no way conclusive when it comes to dealing with the current situation in the Southern border districts. They are based on a rapid and exploratory assessment and in many areas additional research is needed.

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and local capacities for peace, however, can only re-gain influence in their tribes in the absence of insecurity and a threat from insurgency. Given the relative poverty in the Southern border districts any kind of action needs to have a long-term commitment that comes with a sufficient level of financial and political support from international actors. The local drug economy cannot be seen in isolation from an international narcotics mafia that benefits from the situation in Afghanistan. The supply as well as demand side of the drug economy needs to be considered.

Politics and Security

State presence in almost all the border districts studied here is either extremely weak or non-existent (e.g., Dishu and Khanishin in Helmand), with Spin Boldak in Kandahar having the best local Government. In particular, the Baluch, Achekzai, Tokhi, Hotak, Nasar, and Ishaqzai areas along the border have seen very little state influence. Those Governments that do exist are often seen as corrupt and a compromise between the central state and local strongmen and their militias or insurgents. o Improving this situation requires a combination of selecting capable and non-corrupt Government officials, building the capacity of local Government structures and initiating confidence building measure with isolated and marginalised tribal communities. o The Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) within the Office of the President should have a policy and strategy that aims at working with the political leadership in the border districts. IDLG should come up with a strategy on improving the appointment of Government positions at a district level.

Existing Government in the border districts is often considered to be non-representative of the local communities. Measures should be taken to improve a representative Government that reflects the real balance of power among local tribal structures. o This means paying special attention to marginalized groups such as Kuchis and Baluch, but also to Panjpai tribes such as the Ishaqzai and Nurzai. o More creative matching of traditional community structures with formal Government bodies should be explored as a way to achieve a representation in local governance.

As tribal structures have been fragmented in the South there is a necessity to introduce reconciliation mechanisms that halt a further drifting apart among many of the tribes and continued inter and intra-tribal violence. The marginalisation of particular unified tribes, such as the Baluch, needs to be reversed, as their strong leadership structures and control of the border areas present a big stabilisation potential. o Reconciliation mechanisms should be considered between marginalised communities and the Afghan Government (this should also include the Ghilzai and Kuchi).

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The possibility to engage strong border tribes, such as the Baluch, into security arrangements should be explored.

International military needs to be very careful to not increase civilian casualties during its fight against the insurgency as this only provides further support to the insurgency. They need to be very clear about their rules of engagement and whom they work with. Too much credibility of the international military actors has been destroyed due to striking alliances with dubious individuals, especially those that could be considered as war criminals. o Coordination between Coalition Forces and ISAF/NATO as well as both entities with ANA and ANP in combating insurgency is essential, especially as the ANP has been heavily critised by local communities. Zabul should be considered as a strong focus of political (and security) action as it is an important cross-road for insurgents, weapons and narcotics trade. A specific plan for engaging local communities in Zabul should be developed, including the range of measures highlighted so far. The importance of the Baramcha market in Helmand for the smuggling of drugs and weapons (and also humans) and its impact on the regional security situation needs further assessment.

Economy
The South cluster, especially the border districts, presents a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, there are huge landowners, but the terrain is difficult and water and livelihood opportunities are scarce, pushing more and more locals either to migrate abroad or engage in opium cultivation. The lucrative poppy trade was started to compensate for a weak agricultural sector and has now added to the economic wealth of the South. As noted, Helmand, for example, has become one of the internal main labour markets during the poppy harvest season, attracting labourers from everywhere, especially those with skills from Nangarhar. Thus, poppy eradication without the provision of clear alternatives will prove futile and only hurt local farmers. On the other hand, the South, and especially the border districts, are an important strategic economic region. The Afghan economy largely depends on both the legal and illegal trade flowing across its porous borders to and from neighbouring countries (mostly Pakistan and Iran). Afghanistan is currently linked to regional (international) markets in Iran via Nimroz (and Herat) and Southern Helmand (such as the Baramcha market), Pakistan via Kandahar (especially Spin Boldak, but also Baramcha in Helmand and smaller markets in Zabul), and Zabul and Central Asian markets in the North via an elaborate network of traders and smugglers. Similarly there is access to the ports of Karachi and Gawadr (Baluchistan) as upcoming markets that will further impact on the economy of Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Border districts especially are more connected to the neighbouring countries markets situated close to the border in Baluchistan province (Quetta and Zhob) in Pakistan and Zabul region of Iran. One can even argue that it is because of the difficult livelihood situation in the Southern border districts that trade (both legal and illegal) plays such a crucial role in the South. Nevertheless, infrastructure at large remains very poor in these districts, especially roads and communication networks. The Helmand and Kandahar border is largely isolated from

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the Afghan Government and the international communitys attention. This living at the edge of the Afghan empire has essentially opened the door for smuggling networks to dominate the scene, which the Baluch and Pashtun tribes have historically exploited. In light of the above, the economic potential in the South, especially in the area of trade, is big. The regions economy can build on an old and well established business community and extensive trade networks. Even historically, the main route of business between Persia and the Indian subcontinent passed through the cities of Kandahar, Grishk and Herat. Private sector development is needed to bolster and boost legal economy and trade as currently it is overshadowed by the war economy. This holds promise as the business communities in the South has major shares in Quetta, Karachi, Lahore, U.A.E, and to a lesser extent in Europe and America. o Cross-border business associations among local and regional traders exist but could be strengthened. o o Smaller sector-specific business association such as medicine, automobiles, food items, and fruit merchants should be strengthened. The business sector at large in the South has good access to rural markets but formalised legal channels and the grading of agricultural produce needs to be improved.

Ways to de-criminalise opium cultivation need to be explored (such as legal uses for opium, legalisation of opium and taxing exports and ways to impact on the price structure to make the business less lucrative). Alternative livelihoods and staged mechanisms need to be explored to move farmers away from opium cultivation. o A good example is the introduction of cotton during the presidency of Daud Khan in the mid 1970s in Helmand province. Currently, however, due to corruption and a monopoly of local strongmen, farmers are disappointed with growing cotton. Subsidisation schemes for lower yielding crops (such as it often happens in Europe) should also be explored. o Well established sectors such as Afghan fruits (grapes, pomegranates, and melons), almonds, spices and vegetables need to be further developed.

Water shortage is a major problem in most of the Southern border districts. There is room for the development of more efficient ways of retaining and channelling water. Investments in water infrastructure such as reservoirs and channels (for example in Shorabak, Reg) should be a priority as it could increase agricultural outcome. Of course this needs to be cobbled with alternative livelihoods developments as otherwise it may increase opium cultivation further. At present the Afghan economy is dominated by goods imported from Iran and Pakistan. o More market research should be conducted on how to make the Afghan market stronger and market local goods better so that they are competitive with those coming from abroad. This could be a joint strategy with alternative livelihoods.

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The development of cool storage facilities for local fruits and vegetables is essential in order to break dependency on Pakistans market that currently provides this service for Afghan produce.

Incentives and development of border districts needs to take into account the strong cross-border orientations. Improvement of services and facilities along formal border crossing will divert more traffic towards such routes (away from informal and illegal ones) especially those linked to commerce, refugees, and daily commuters. The improvement of such strategic economic areas or zones can open up the isolated areas of the South for internal Afghan markets. Provinces such as Uruzgan, Ghor, Bamayan, and Day Kundi could also greatly benefit from these economic linkages. Spin Boldak is currently the second most important port of entry of goods from Pakistan. These supplies through Spin Boldak need to be secured and developed. Pursuing this idea means including the surrounding districts (e.g., Maruf, Arghistan, Shorabak, Reg and Atghar) into a regional development plan. These districts need to be tied to the economic gravity centre that is Spin Boldak. Arghistan already has historical trade relations with Spin Boldak. The other districts, however, are more oriented to Pakistan either because of a lack of infrastructure (Maruf) or tribal ties (Reg, Shorabak). Investment in connecting Maruf, Shorabak and Reg through paved roads with Spin Boldak should intensify trade relations between these districts and can present a stabilizing effect on the region as people benefiting from trade are often less likely to engage in armed conflict in order to protect their business interests. Development of appropriate infrastructure fostering trade relations between the five border districts in Kandahar will be a key necessity. Focusing on Spin Boldak is ideal for other reasons we well. The historical tribal conflict between Nurzai and Achekzai has already affected the businesses in the major market. Thus any development should try to use economic incentives to settle the NurzaiAchekzai conflict.

Research
Much of what has been proposed, of course, should be based on more extensive research prior to engagement. So far we have identified the need for research both in political and economic areas. Here we would like to highlight those we consider absolutely necessary Case study on Spin Boldak and how it can be made into a regional market centre that includes Shorabak, Reg, Maruf, and Arghistan; Research on alternative livelihoods to opium cultivation and development of methods for a staged shift to a legal economy. This could also include research in the development of local markets and how to make water usage more efficient; Studies on how to improve private sector development, including cross-border relations among Pashtun tribes; Development of a Business Directory for the South; Case study on the Baluch and their role in the political economy of the South;

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Identification of resource and land disputes that can be mediated with the support of IDLG, PRTs and MOI and Ministry of Tribal and Border Affairs; Case study on Zabul in order to identify entry points to break the stronghold of the insurgency and smuggling networks; Case study on the border district in Nimroz and their relationship with Iran; Research on the causes of displacement in the South (both political and also due to lack of livelihoods) and the special protection challenges for those displaced by violence; Understanding of transnational engagement of Afghans, the migration-development nexus and the importance of remittances.

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