AD-A273 054

A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE GROUND

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Army

by HENRY M. ST-PIERRE, MAJ, USA Virginia Military Institute,

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1979

B.A.,

;'V 2 4 NO::, 1993

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4 June 1993
A Plan for the Reduction of U.S. in Europe
6. AUTHOR(S)

Master's Thesis, 1 Aug 92 - 4 Jun 93

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Ground and Air Forces

Major Henry M. St-Pierre, USA.

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13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) For the past forty years, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies on our national security had forced the U.S. to take a direct role in the defense of Europe. This commitment required the U.S. to permanently station large numbers of ground and air forces in Europe to deter against the threat of a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe. Since 1989, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has changed the security paradigm which governed our military posture American focus has now turned inward to devote time and resources to the domestic agenda since 1949. This turning inward has forced military planners to relook the foreseen by the Clinton Administration. need to station a large number of forces overseas. A major point of this look is our need to station a large number of forces in Europe. This thesis will study the feasibility of reducing our ground forces from one full up Corps to one Corps headquarters with selected CS and CSS assets intact, one division In addition, Air Force strength would be reduced to two composite air and one air assault brigade. wings. The total number of combat forces stationed in Europe would be between 70,000 and 75,000 personnel.

14. SUBJECT TERMS

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Force reduction, NATO, forces

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Forward presence, Forward Deployed

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-,J

A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

GROUND

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Army

by HENRY M. ST-PIERRE, MAJ, USA Virginia Military Institute,

B.A.,

1979

Fort Leavenworth, 1993

Kansas

Approved for public

release;

distribution

is

unlimited.

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate:

Henry M. St-Pierre

Thesis Title: A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND AND AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Approved By*
X.William M. Connor,-M.A.

LTC Kenneth W. Osmond,

/ '-'-

B.A.
, Member, Consulting Faculty

T. James E. Swartz,

Ph.D.

Accepted this 4th day of June 1993 by:

A"O

_,

Director,

Graduate Degree

Phip

Brookes,

Ph.D.

Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ii

ABSTRACT

A PLAN FOR THE REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND AND AIR FORCES EUROPE by MAJ Henry M. St-Pierre, USA, 99 pages.

IN

For the past forty years, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its allies on our national security had forced the U.S. to take a direct role in the defense of Europe. This commitment required the U.S. to permanently station large numbers of ground and air forces in Europe to deter against the threat of a Soviet led invasion of Western Europe. Since 1989, the demise of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union has changed the security paradigm which governed our military posture since 1949. American focus has now turned inward to devote time and resources to the domestic agenda foreseen by the Clinton Administration. This turning inward has forced military planners to relook the need to station a large number of forces overseas. A major point of this look is our need to station a large number of forces in Europe. This thesis will study the feasibility of reducing our ground forces from one full up Corps to one Corps headquarters with selected CS and CSS assets intact, one division and one air assault brigade. In addition, Air Force strength would be reduced to two composite air wings. The total number of combat forces stationed in Europe would be between 70,000 and 75,000 personnel. Accesion For NTIS CRA&I DTIC lAB Unanrtounced Justification

El

By ................ ............ ..................... Dit. ib !tio; I Availabiiity Codes Dist Avail av dlor Special

ED' I

iiiC

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This thesis would not have been possible without the help of John W. Douglass, Brig Gen, USAF (Ret), former Deputy United States Military Representative to the NATO Military Committee who, during many long discussions, planted the seed for this thesis in my head. Equally responsible are Mr. William Connor, LTC Ken Osmond, and LTC James Swartz without whose help, time and forebearance, this thesis would never have gone beyond the idea stage.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE APPROVAL PAGE ......................................... ABSTRACT ............................................. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................... CHAPTER 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. INTRODUCTION .................................. REVIEW OF LITERATURE .......................... RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .......................... ANALYSIS ................ ..................... 1 8 34 39 68 85 91 93 99 ii iii iv

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................

ENDNOTES ............................................. FIGURES .............................................. BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................... INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The rise of the Soviet Union as a superpower and as our chief post-war rivals sparked, up to 1991, perhaps what has been,

one of the greatest and most divisive military The question was, who

debates facing Pentagon strategists.

would be responsible for striking the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in Force with its the event of war? Would it be the Air

large fleet

of strategic bombers and strike forces and

missiles or the Navy with powerful ballistic missile submarines?

This argument pitted the competition for limited winners' expensive the

Navy against the Air Force in

dollara required to build the eventual weapon systems.

An answer to this debate was found in

compromise that gave us our deterrence strategy. Since then, complete withdrawal by 1995, Treaty, events such as the promise of the of the Soviet forces to its own borders Europe

the signing of the Conventional the breakup of the Warsaw Pact,

Forces in

and the dissolution

of the Soviet Empire have

confirmed that the threat of

immediate war between the two blocs has regressed ever more to unlikeliness.

These new and unprecedented events have,

once again,

anchored the crucible of debates within the defense establishment. At stake are the dollars that will be used

to build the military structure which will safeguard our national interest into the 21st century. ultimate

Unlike the previous debate with its

question of how to build up the military to face the growing Soviet threat, this debate centers on how to reduce meet our national security in a world which has no large

the military structure and still objectives and treaty commitments clear-cut

threat against which to judge a need for a

military establishment. Like all debates, hand, the Chairman, this one has two sides. On one

Joint Chiefs of Staff and the former in spite of all the the

Secretary of Defense argued that, changes that have occurred in

the past three years,

remaining risks more than justify

the cost incurred to

maintain a large military presence overseas and a worldwide strategic deployment capability. These forces,

represented by the four services on permanent or temporary overseas deployment, would serve to reassure our friends of to support of those enemies

our continued commitment to stability,

friendly governments and convince our potential that the U.S. contend. is still

a potent force with which to

These large deployments also would insure our thereby continuing to support our 2

influence overseas,

national security needs.

Further,

these deployments would In

provide for forces close to potential trouble spots. the event of trouble,

these forward deployed forces could

be moved quickly to enter nations which require our help--recent examples are Somalia and Saudi Arabia. These

capabilities are seen by the Chairman as key to safeguard the nation's national security requirements The threat as it existed before 1989, in the future. and the need

to protect Western European democracies from the Eastern threat, was the basis by which the U.S. It designed its force Now the

structure.

was also NATO's "raison d'etre."

situation has changed--many say irrevocably.

Western

leaders and NATO strategists have admitted that the Soviet Union, and its successor state, the Confederation of no longer poses a threat to the

Independent States (CIS),

survival of a free and viable Western Europe. The counterpoint team in this debate, logic of the reduced threat, is using the

of the opinion that, in

view of the decline of the worldwide threat and the small residual risks, we should now reduce our overseas presence or even all, of our overseas

by bringing home the majoritl,

deployed forces and deactivate them.

The resources freed

by the reduction in defense spending could be used to finance the domestic programs envisioned by the new administration and, of course, of the deficit. 3 contribute to the reduction

In

view of these dramatic changes, forces, and reducing

withdrawal

of

forward deployed U.S. those forces, financial

the size of

appears to be an easy solution to reduce the today. Generally, such a It

strain facing the U.S.

move probably makes sense from a fiscal

point of view.

can probably be done quickly and without adverse effect on readiness. however? This lack of threat brings up the third point in debate--the affairs. issue of U.S. is: involvement in the What would be the U.S. risk by such a move,

NATO and European

The question

since the Alliance's role of

preventing a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe has been fulfilled and its its forty year mission has been complete, usefulness? Do the present domestic of all or part of the forward has

NATO outlived issues justify

the withdrawal

deployed force? Directly tied with the preceding question the reason for stationing U.S. essentially disappeared, is why, if

forces overseas has

should the United States maintain

a forward deployed corps and separate air force permanently stationed in central Europe? The next question, is: in this case the

one for this study,

what should a new, and what

restructured, should it

forward deployed force look like,

be capable of doing?

Nowhere else this does debate affect in our relationship Because resolution dealing in

in

the world does the resolution commitment more than

of it

our overseas

with our NATO allies. no definitive lies, arena, is, like in in answer, the

there is

to the debate the political of that

most things when the middle ground. effect, The

discovery this

compromise

the purpose of question, a

study. that

The basis for answering may well determine is based,

the main

question

the U.S. in part,

force structure in four general

into the next century, areas security vis-a-vis fend for introduced earlier. interests Europe?

They are:

What are the national

of the United States for the near term That is, should we let our NATO allies security needs

themselves when dealing with their involved in

or should we stay

helping them solve the risk in the future--in short,

issues which face them today and what is and threats forces in in it that Europe? still for us if we do?

Second,

what are the risks

might require the Third, in

involvemenL of U.S. roles and risks? to meet better If

are NATO's traditional view of the eme-ging is inadequate

functions the Alliance's

viable

present structure might it evolve

those tasks,

into some structure Finally, reductions, in

suited to meet future needs? already announced U.S. contribution to station force

view of the what would be the

best U.S. U.S.

to an evolving Alliance? forces overseas based on

Should the its own

continue

need to project force without taking NATO into consideration, or should it tailor its force representation

to a force better suited to deal with a new NATO with an evolving mission based on a new strategic concept? Central to this study is America contributes to NATO, overseas bases, the controversy of how much

the deployment of forces to and the issue

the military budget debates,

of closing domestic military bases while maintaining a large number of overseas bases. a way in still This study, then, may show

which we can maintain fewer troops overseas and Such a

meet our mission and treaty requirements. it

plan would have three purposes: will to remain engaged in European allies; presence in it

would demonstrate our

European affairs to support our

would allow us to maintain enough of a thus we could

Europe to maintain our influence,

protecting our interest in

that area; and finally,

maintain a headquarters that could support a rapid expansion should the need occur. In conclusion, the purpose of this thesis then, be to be is

to recommend a new combat structure which will permanently stationed in Europe.

This new force is

based on the following concerns: our national NATO; (3) interest in Europe;

(1) the need to secure (2) the risks which face and (4)

the future missions NATO might take up; remain in the U.S.

the forces which will after expected cuts.

force structure

The following concentrate on

chapters of this

thesis

will

investigating

these concerns.

CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW The purpose of this chapter is and determine what the literature questions outlined in include official documents, to survey literature

reveals about the These sources

the previous chapter.

government documents,

semi-official

interviews, articles.

works published by subject experts,

and periodical Official

documents surveyed include national in 1991

security documents published by the administration and 1993, military strategy documents,

and State Department

dispatches. Semi-official documents include Congressional of

testimony taken as evidence to support the feasibility reducing the defense budget in against our national facing our NATO allies.

light of the reduced threat

interests world wide as well as those Congressional testimony taken as

part of the Senate confirmation hearings for Secretary Aspin will also be surveyed to help determine the new administration's direction on national issues. security and defense

This study also will survey Speeches by the new

President for the same purpose.

Following semi-official

documents are the written These

products and interviews of subject matter experts. products include Ph.D. dissertations and monographs

produced for conferences on national security Sources also include personal

issues.

interviews conducted to help These interviews also security and

clear up any unanswered questions. provide updates in

the field of national

strategic force planning which could affect the outcome of this paper. All the written products from the experts involved

helped provide background on the sensitivities

when dealing with issues which involve our European Allies. The last major source used to do research was These articles, are helpful much like in

newspaper and magazine articles.

the written products discussed above, providing background recently written, information.

Because they are more

they help provide a better source of

information as to the specific problems of force reduction and ally concern with those potential The first U.S. reductions. in

question that must be answered is

developing a future force structure national is, is it

what will be the the future? That

security needs of this nation in in our interest to withdraw

into isolationism

much the same way we withdrew after the two previous excursions into European affairs must the U.S. during this century or building the

remain an active participant in

"New World Order" envisioned by former President Bush? 9

During the height of the Cold War,

the national

security goals of the Reagan and Bush administrations had been to continue deterrence and rontainment against an overwhelming Soviet threat worldwide. a strong and active U.S. participation This policy mandated in European affairs. in Central and

The downfall of communist governments Eastern Europe (C&EE)

and the break up of the Soviet Union

were clear indications that new policies dealing with C&EE nations would be needed. In part President Bush's National 1993 recognized this change security

Security Strategy document in

when he stated that the goals for our national

strategy would be the support of growing democracies, maintaining free markets, partners, competition with our economic

and prevention of and controlling military regional conflicts.'

confrontation which characterize These goals recognized that, U.S.

unlike the previous years when

survival was based on the need to contain communist our new focus would be to safeguard our economy

aggression,

by insuring the safety of our markets and the acquisition of potential new ones in the emerging C&EE democracies.

These goals clearly indicate the need to remain engaged in European affairs. This view was the basis for

the Bush administration's European-based U.S. personnel.

recommendation of a

force structure of no less than 150,000

10

Since January 1993,

however,

a new administration It is useful to

has taken the reins of policy formulation. examine this

new view on national security goals and

strategies. In a speech delivered to the Foreign Policy

April 1992, President Clinton stated that armed forces to abroad to

Association in the U.S.

policy should be to redesign its

meet changing needs, succeed,

to encourage democracies

and to "restore America's economic leadership at

home and abroad."2 President Clinton's views on the importance of the domestic economy were echoed by Secretary of Defense Aspin during his confirmation hearings when he stated, new era, our first foreign priority and our first
.. . "3

"In

this

domestic

priority are one and the same clearly

These statements

indicate that the focus of the Clinton like its predecessor's economy. later goals, would

administration,

focus on improving the U.S. is

The major difference

the method to be used to achieve the goal. Whereas the Bush administration would have focused

on the ability participation,

to in.1uence foreign markets through direct the Clinton philosophy will rely in less on

direct participation

foreign markets and more on Such means will

government influence on domestic markets.

include infusion of funds on the domestic scenes and sanctions and duties on imports. 11

The question,

then,

is

how to promote the

development of overseas democracies and maintain our influence over our overseas markets? On this question, to NATO, David Abshire, former Ambassador

states that the way to insure the growth of "to ensure cooperation and cohesion among the
4

democracy is

leaders of the three democratic centers." democratic centers, Japan. is he states,

These Germany, and

are the U.S.,

In his opinion,

the way to maintain that influence Europe and

by maintaining forward deployed forces in

Asia. Ambassador Abshire is not the only one who in Europe. Institute

recommends maintaining strong troop presence Francois Huisbourg,

Director of the International London,

for Strategic Studies in U.S. vital

states that, even though

interests are no longer threatened by an there may be

overwhelming and obvious threat from the East,

a tendency to want to disengage from direct participation in European affairs in the future. Huisbourg believes this

should not occur. is in the U.S.

He outlines four specific reasons why it interest to remain engaged in presence of

national

European affairs. Russian forces in any crisis the ability

He states that the residual Germany,

our ability to quickly react to

which might occur tied with our need to maintain to influence western European economic affairs, liberalism

and the need to maintain economic and political 12

in

western Europe makes it Europe.

5

imperative that we remain

engaged in

Huisbourg also points out that the ability to crisis situation is Europe.

to react

not the only reason to maintain The rise of the European community as and monetary system makes it

influence in

one market with one voice vital that the U.S.

be able to maintain some influence in He states that,

the development of European affairs.$ should the U.S. Alliance, served. withdraw its

forces completely from the

the interest of the nation would not be well He cautions, however, that such a presence should

be smaller and tailored for a different mission than what the force, even in a smaller form we have today, Europe. is
7

designed to do--fight a major land war in Alexander Gerry,

Assistant Secretary General

of the

Interallied Confederation of Reserve Officers,

a NATO body

responsible for the formulation of policy dealing with reserve officer augmentation to the NATO and SHAPE staff, states in National an article of the Reserve Officers Association "the North Atlantic Treaty

Security Report that:

Organization

remains the foundation for a continuing in Europe." '8

American security role Johann Holst, Rand Corporation, NATO to keep itself

a foreign affairs specialist with the need

states that not only does the U.S. in the European arena;

as long as there
9

are risks NATO needs the U.S.

to remain engaged. 13

The urge to remain involved in is the only way to keep the U.S.

Europe through NATO in Europe.

engaged

Obviously, presence in

the argument for maintaining a strong military NATO is neither unanimous nor should it be our

only vehicle for contacting and influencing our European allies. Many suggest that greater participation in such One

forums already in such body, Confidence

place would give us a greater voice. is

for example, in Europe

the Conference for Security and This body was established to

(CSCE).

discuss security issues involving European specific security issues. The problem with this it is forum is that,

unlike NATO and the UN,

not a lawfully constituted As such, it has

body but only a forum for discussion.

neither formal authority nor power to enforce any of its decisions. Clearly, all of the above sources realize the presence in Europe. is What the

importance of a continued U.S.

these cited individuals do not discuss,

however,

root issue for our need to maintain influence in Europe--stable and growing markets for our goods. As stated in fall Pact, the introduction to this paper, the

of the Berlin Wall,

the dissolution of the Warsaw

and the subsequent transformation of the all-powerful have forever changed the In designing a new force, the

Soviet Union into a confederation defense needs of western Europe.

the second problem planners must examine is 14

Confederation

of Independent States and its

potential

to

reemerge as a threat against the Alliance. must also examine other sources of risk The first risk to be examined is in

Those planners the region. One of

the CIS.

the better descriptions of the threat posed by the former Soviet Union was presented by Zbigniew Brezenski, National Security Advisor to President Carter. former

He described

the Soviet Union as having suffered a complete collapse of not only its system. political it is system but also of its a nation economic

As such,

"without the slightest

hope of redemption."10 The question many analysts ask themselves, then, is

what of the threat of the former Soviet troops remaining in Germany? What is the possibility of CIS senior military or Also,

civilian leadership stopping the tide of change? what is

the military potential of the force that remains

between the Urals and western Russian borders? In answer, NATO intelligence planners see ro chance planned withdrawal

that the CIS or Russia will stop its from German territory. leadership's ability Steinbrunner,

As for the senior military to halt the changes, John at

Director,

Foreign Policy Studies Program, testified before Congress,

the Brookings Institution, the foreseeable future, not be in

"For

the Soviet military leadership will deliberate

any position to initiate

aggression."1" 15

Finally,

of the force remaining stationed between former Secretary testimony that

the Russian western border and the Urals, of Defense Cheney stated in Congressional

the remaining force will be cut from 115 divisions to 60 divisions. The reduction of these forces by almost half impossible for them to launch any offensive

would make it

moves against the West without mobilization of their reserves. Such reinforcements would then provide warning own efforts.1 2 He

time for the Alliance to reinforce its also testified

that circumstances which could lead to a He

surprise attack against the West have clearly changed. explained that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,

coupled

with the signing of the CFE treaty has removed the option of the CIS changing their its plans by stopping withdrawal of

forces from Germany and central

Europe unilaterally. namely Poland, at worse,

The CIS would now have to deal with nations, the Czech and Slovak Republics, would be neutral

and Hungary who,

or perhaps even friendly to the West.

This neutrality would make covert movement of troops westward impossible. Indeed, NATO planners no longer judge attack

Russia or Ukraine capable of launching an "unwarned" on the West.'

3

The second issue in

terms of threats against NATO is C&EE neighbors. of the

the relationship of the Alliance and its

This relationship has been changed by the withdrawal Soviet Union and the turning

inward of Russia to solve its 16

own problems.

This withdrawal

has left

a vacuum in

security assurances to those nations that were once covered by the Soviet umbrella and its security would be guaranteed. guarantee that their That is now gone. NATO heads

Realizing that "nature abhors a vacuum,"

of state and governments declared during the Rome Conference stability in 1991 that NATO would help provide needed new

by opening dialogue between NATO and its

4

security partners.1

This indeed happened

in

the spring (NACC)

of 1992 when the North Atlantic Cooperation Council met in Brussels.

That same Rome Conference that directed as stated by Gerry,

the formation of the NACC also, "described a broad approach"

which mandated the use of such as economic, social and

alternative elements of power, environmental powers,

to provide that security which the On the subject of

C&EE nations have been seeking. 1 s security,

Francois Huisbourg also states that the use of power is what

what could be called the elements of national is

needed to deal with risks and to prevent those risks

from becoming threats as described earliEr.1 6 As already mentioned, might face are the residual control of nuclear weapcris, nations accepted others, and, the future risks the Alliance Russian military force, loss of

insecurities at having some

into the Alliance while not accepting the divergent cultural and social

finally,

groups which have been under artificial 17

control for the

past forty years and have now come to the surface. example is the instability in the former Yugoslavia.

An
17

The risks described above and the promise of stability offered by the Alliance with its Trans-Atlantic

link are why the former Pact look at NATO for help.'' To take the point further then, how will the The

Alliance set the minds of the Z&EE nations at ease? future European security picture, still reflects some concerns. although

looking better,

Treaties and the assure

verification protocols that go with those treaties

Western planners that the possibility of military attack on NATO territory revolution in is small. The possibility of military not, however, beyond the realm of Deputy and

Russia is

possibility.

On this subject,

Sergei Rogov,

Director for the Institute Canada in Moscow,

to the Study for the U.S.

stated that the future of the CIS lies in The first is that the armed

three possible scenarios.

forces of the CIS will be under control of a central authority. This would be similar to a strong federal power over a unified

civilian confederation having overall military structure. preferable in

This situation would be the most of the military. He gave

terms of control

this scenario only a 10% chance of success. scenario,

The next is that

and the second best vis-a-vis stability, control,

the military would be under no central as the number one military power in 18

but Russia, would have

the region,

leading voice in

the use of military power.

He rompares and its

this situation with the relationship of the U.S. NATO allies. The last,

He gave this plan a 30% chance of success and least desirable situation, has a 60% chance

of occurring.

He states that this situation would involve authority anu the

9

a total disintegration of any central total loss of control of the military.' As time and events have shown, predictions

Rogov's pessimistic

that the former Soviet Union would completely military would be under no control

disintegrate and its

have not materialized and are not likely to. Does the inability of the CIS to launch an unwarned attack on the West mean that NATO planners should not worry? The answer is an emphatic no. NATO must still look

eastward with a wary eye because the break-up of the Soviet Union has now caused the controls it to disappear. placed on its allies

The lack of controls has sparked the

fragmentation of not only the Soviet Republics but also artificially created eastern European nations such as These breakups have caused the case of Yugoslavia,

Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. regional instability and, as in

violence and bloodshed.

Repercussions from that war have within the Alliance. These

already made themselves felt

repercussions have included military incursion into neutral aoid Alliance nations and refugee influx into much richer
20

western nations such as Germany and Greece. 19

Ethnic and cultural potential nations. Committee,

differences are not the only in the C&EE

causes of unrest and instability In

testimony before the House Armed Services Stephen Biddel stated that the transformation of Eastern

government controlled economies like those in

Europe to market economies might also be a catalyst for civil war. This is especially true in view of these times

21 of austere economic times.

These dangers of instability

on the Alliance's

southern flanks have not been missed by NATO's military planners. Indeed, this year's REFORGER exercise calls for corps from the central region to

the deployment of a U.S.

the Alliance's southern flank. NATO's concerns over instability

This clearly reflects from other regions.

The preceding evidence has concentrated mostly on the dangers of instability in Central and Eastern Europe. and its allies

These are not the only dangers the U.S. face. tier There is

a major concern by the Alliance's southern

nations that a major south-to-north immigration flow littoral in states. Indeed, this

will occur from the African

flow has already started happening France, in turn, Germany, and Belgium.

nations such as

These mass migrations have, in those

set off ultranationalist movements

nations.22 In his confirmation statement to the Senate Armed Secretary of Defense Les Aspin pointed 20

Services Committee,

out that,

in

addition to dangers of instability,

the

nuclear weapons which exist in

the Russian and Ukrainian Another risk to the well nuclear blackmail made

arsenals are by no means secure.

being of Europe and the Alliance is

possible by the loss of control of weapons of mass destruction owned by Russia and the Ukraine.2" This portion of the survey indicates that the threat posed by the former Soviet Union has clearly and some say, forever disappeared. That disappearance has, however,

given rise to new concerns--risks--which transform itself instability to meet.

the Alliance must

These new risks include and guarantees

generated by the lack of control allies.

once provided by the Soviet Union to its

The next area worthy of examination in new U.S. force structure for NATO is

designing a

examining what NATO

might be called on to do in As already examined, that is, built its

the future. the old threat against NATO,

a massive land based attack which NATO members armed forces to counter, has gone away. if This has

been replaced by certain risks which, could possibly develop In

not controlled,

into new threats. risks, the question

looking at future potential

becomes how can NATO best handle the risks described above? Before this can be answered, it is useful to

examine emerging and existing European organizations interested in security issues. 21

The first fall

is,

of course,

the United Nations.

The

of the communist regime in

Russia has changed the role

of the UN from a largely the forum for mutual

ineffective body for dialogue to it was meant to be. As such,

security

the organization might be in settle'potential organization in is

a better position to help Europe. The second

security problems in

the Conference on Security and Confidence and the role it can play in solving

Europe (CSCE)

regional

security risks.

The third is

the Economic some legally are bodies set up to

Community (EC).

All of these bodies, like the CSCE, Europe.

constituted and others,

discuss security issues in

The help these emerging groups could provide has also been noticed and commented on by former Secretary of State James Baker when, in November 1991, he inferred that of which

only a network of European security institutions, NATO was but one, "whole and free."

would be capable of supporting a Europe The EC and the CSCE would also have integrating the East into the

important roles to play in community of nations.

2

4 would

This statement clearly indicated that the U.S. look at other organizations to help gain and maintain stability trends, in Europe. In

light of the above suggestions and

what would be the best use of the military power

under NATO's control?

22

The answer could lie in management and liaison,

three specific areas: and its

crisis

peacekeeping,

traditional

mission of deterring attack on its In

members. Secretary of Defense

his confirmation hearings, "Our overall

Aspin stated, at it

strategy should not to be to go

alone but to strive to get new burden sharing

25

agreements with our allies."

This indicates a willingness on the part of the new administration to let NATO, under if it its own authority or with to accomplish

cooperation from the CSCE, these crisis which,

so chooses,

management missions. CSCE,

These are missions for the military infrapresent and not to

unlike the UN,

and the EC,

structure needed to accomplish such a task is functioning under one body. without precedent in Indeed,

this example is The food airlift

recent history.

Russia during the winter of 1991 was managed by NATO even though the Alliance was not the proponent agency. The

alliance provided the in-country expertise and much of the infrastructure to support the operation, charge. Crisis management is NATO. not the only viable mission for with their in peacekeeping, civil unrest, but it was not in

The troops assigned to NATO could, nation's support, evacuation, be involved

individual

non-combatant

search and rescue,

strikes and raids,

support of national

authorities who

23

request NATO's help, demonstrations.

26

and show of force and

Should crisis the use of force, the overall

management fail, could be used.

then the next step, again under

This mission,

responsibility of the UN or CSCE,

could be Again, why

given to NATO to handle as the executive agent. NATO? According to Ambassador James Goodly,

former

negotiator on CFE and START and Ambassador to Finland, because NATO is the only organization in existence which

has the military force and infrastructure capable of carrying out the various missions from peacekeeping to war. Four types of peacekeeping missions the Alliance could be trained to accomplish are: I. Humanitarian missions. These missions would

include organizing and shipping foodstuff and medicines under hazardous condition. 2. or conflict 3. Border patrols or patrols of buffer and zones Observers in situations that contain some risks

demilitarized 4. harm in

Protection of enclaves of ethnic minorities from

27

the event of hostilities

Again none -ifthese missions are without precedent for NATO forces. As already discussed, NATO infrastructure missions during

provided support to the Russian food relief the winter of 1991-1992. Presently, 24

the Standing Naval

Force Mediterranean,

under UN request,

is

patrolling off

the Yugoslavian coast to enforce the UN sanctions against the region. The problem with the above stated new missions and priorities its is simply that NATO is neither organized nor are Indeed, NATO is it to

troops generally trained for such missions.

Ambassador Goodly and others emphasize that if survive and develop beyond its "metamorphose"

present structure,

must

into an organization

that will provide To do

genuine collective security throughout Europe. "2S this,

he urges that NATO should give priority to training

troops for such peacekeeping missions as quickly as possible. 2' There can be little literature doubt that much of the

available on the subject of NATO's future Alliance develop the does not role and

strongly supports the idea that the force for these future missions. emphasize is its

What it

the Alliance's continuing deterrence

role as a forum for discussion of mutual

security Finally, what

concerns between the West and C&EE nations. this literature organize itself also does not discuss is

how NATO must

to perform those missions. in order the

The fourth question that must be examined

to develop a military force for future NATO missions is

25

U.S.

domestic political

environment and its

effect on the

future U.S.

force structure as a whole.

Ever since Mikhail Gorbachev began unilateral withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, political that the

leaders and think tank specialists have advocated Alliance in general and the U.S. in

particular should show a7_unts of

support of these initiatives

by reducing equal

forces from the Alliance arsenals. coupled with new treaties, domestic agenda, on defense. Since early 1991,

Given these feelings, and a growing

reduced tensions,

we must look forward to reduced spending

the House and Senate Armed

Services Committees have been looking at ways to reduce defense spending in view of the new posture in Europe. In

an opening statement before the House Budget Committee, Committee Chairman Leon Penetta stated that the spending plan agreed to by the Bush Administration would not achieve the promised reduction in spending promised by both the

Executive and Legislative branches during the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. He stated that, in order to military

achieve the goals set by the budget agreement,

spending would have to be cut by a total of 40 billion dollars annually. hearing,

3 0

Chairman Penetta,

in

that same

also set the stage for further defense spending "We cannot afford to waste our

reduction when he stated,

26

resources on defense spending against threats that no

31 longer exist."

In

the October 1992 edition of the Reserve National Security Report, President

Association Journal

Clinton stated that it

was his goal

to reduce the defense

budget by 60 billion dollars from the proposed Bush budget by 1994.32 He also stated that in the future, the U.S.

would have to fight as part of coalition and to do that "We must also be able to fight effectively on our own," necessitating basing a larger part of our forces in U.S.3" 1993, Kohl, in This belief was confirmed when he, a joint thus the

on 27 March

press conference with Chancellor Helmut

stated that his goal was to have a force level of in Europe.

3

100,000 troops

In fact--not only will the

administration's policy force a return of forces from Europe, it but may well cause the floors agreed to by the This

Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 to become ceilings. would reduce the defense budget even more.35 This

expected change and the new administration's attitude on basing more forces in the continental U.S. will obviously

cause a reduction of force deployment in In already in view of these inevitable effect--that is

Europe.

reductions beyond those

reducing the deployed forces what should

from 350,000 to the present number of 150,000, the size of the forces overseas be?

To do that, we need to

27

examine what JCS Chairman Colin Powell suggests the total future force should look like. The force envisioned by General "Base Force." First, it This force is Powell is called the

to have four major goals.

must be able to deter aggression mounted both interests and those of our allies with whom we

against U.S.

have treaty obligations. the deterrence affect U.S. allies. presence. Second, Third,

This study will concentrate on forces would have for our NATO

the force must be able to project forward it must be able to respond to world-wide in Europe. Lastly it must

crisis--again,

for this purpose, it

be a strategic force--that is, worldwide. be divided

must be able to deploy the force is to

To do these various missions,

into four regions of concentration.

They are to Pacific the

be: Atlantic forces, forces;

which would include Europe;

Contingency forces,

which would be stationed in

United States ready for world-wide deployment; strategic forces,

and finally,

under whose responsibility would fall

maintenance of the nuclear force. Concentrating specifically on Europe, those forces, First, that is, the Atlantic forces, Powell, what would be able to do?

according to General in

those forces should be initial

able to deter aggression combat forces if

that area and provide fails.

deterrence

He suggests that present because of

assurance against threats in

Europe is

the military commitment represented by the large force 28

still

present in

Europe.
3 7

36

Ambassador David Abshire

agrees with him.

The Powell/Abshire solution to the in Europe, that is is the placing of

question of deterrence troops in everyone. Europe in

large numbers,

not agreed to by that

A counter argument to Abshire's thesis is not necessarily enforced by a

deterrence is

large amount of

stationed forces but by the idea that the commitment to return in In the event of problems is there and believed. John Steinbrunner is to

his testimony to Congress, if

states that,

the mission of the miliary forces

wait for a major invasion mounted by some unforeseen threat, that force need only be small.
38

Others,

such as

Stephen Flanagan,

former Deputy Director of Foreign Policy insist that the less visible

Formulation at the State Department, solution to peace in military forces. 3 '

Europe are smaller,

He emphasizes that large forces are

identified more with the old status quo than the new realities. He states that large forces represent because they lead to quick reaction which, is dangerous for crisis heads" and time to

destabilization

although good for wartime, management situations in

which "cool

defuse the potentially dangerous situation must be the primary considerations. earlier, In their article mentioned

Patrick Garrity and Sharon Weiner specifically is not dependent on the presence of a particular theater

state that deterrence

large military forces being present in 29

to be effective.

The threat or certain knowledge that the is just as

0

force would be used to support a policy effective as having a force present in precedent for such a thought is The entire theory behind U.S. on the idea that if against the U.S. kind. The fact that the U.S. respond to an attack in made it present

theater.4 in

recent history. is based

nuclear deterrence

a hostile force fires allies, the U.S.

a nuclear weapon would respond in

or its

policy that we would

kind is

deterrence against the use

of nuclear weapons since the capability to use the force is there. The same can be said for our own use of such the Korean War. The thought

weapons against North Korea in that Russia would retaliate certainly played a part in

against us if the U.S.

we used them

decision not to use This, in effect, was

those weapons during that conflict. deterrence.

Such stated deterrence has also been used to

prevent the perceived threat of Chinese intervention into the Indo-Chinese theater in 1954.41 Whether or not the

threat actually prevented Chinese intervention can only be surmised. The point is that the threat of American we had the capability to employ

reaction was present--again those weapons,

something the Chinese could not discount.

The same situation can be said about Europe or anywhere else the U.S. has commitments. As long as we back our

30

promises with the possibility of action, deterrence. The second point General

then we have

Powell discusses as a forward

mission for the forward deployed base force is presence. For the past forty years,

we have equated stationed

forward presence with basing a large permanently

overseas force and the maintenance of a large number of war stocks (POMCUS) in Europe. Again, Garrity and Weidner They

disagree with this definition of forward presence.

state that forward presence can be achieved by offsetting a smaller permanent representation forward with greater temporary participation U.S. in military exercises in which the

would provide more troops for exercises,

invest in done in in

foreign military infrastructure programs as is NATO, provide military assistance,

and participate

disaster relief efforts.

42

and other forms of humanitarian The U.S.

None of these are strange missions. in all of the above in

has participated other. If,

one form or the

indeed,

there is

no chance of a massive Russian or NATO interest, Europe, and if

attack or any serious threat against U.S. then should the U.S. so what should it suggestion, of the U.S. maintain any force in

be able to do?

As a partial

answer and

Johann Holst suggests that the future mission military in Europe should be to participate

31

within the NATO framework to work missions: 1. substantial 2. undeniably 3. Provide a cadre presence in

to do the following

for reconstitution

of a attack to be

the event of hostile

Provide enough capacity engaged Protect in combat in

for US forces

the event of attack nuclear weapons in Europe

the remaining

For these missions, only 75 to 100,000 would

he estimates that
43

a force of

be needed.

This chapter has demonstrated interest vis-a-vis Europe clearly lies

that in

our national our ability to

influence events on the continent.

The continued

development and emerging power of the Economic Community makes it critical in that we maintain some form of visible presence that participation in the

presence

Europe--a

CSCE or the UN cannot provide us. This chapter has also showed that which we built our defense structure, that the threat is for a

to contain

no notice attack by Soviet Union and Soviet supported Central and Eastern European nations, This threat has, is no longer credible been replaced war, that, if

and has gone away. by'risks. The risks

instead,

include possibilities

of civil problems

ethnic unrest and ultra-nationalism--all left unchecked, could spillover Such a spillover

into otherwise unaffected could then Qause the unsuited for missions

areas of Europe. deployment

of NATO forces--forces

32

which might be r missions, and crisis

-ired--that

is

peacekeeping,

humanitarian

management. internal

This chapter also has shown how U.S.

politics have mandated the restructuring of forces to be more in line with the changing economic realities, have made it Europe, as well

as how European politics U.S.

mandatory that the a presence

maintain a presence in traditional

albeit in

changed from its

role as a major supplier of ready to provide help

combat troops to a presence which is as it is

needed to cope with any problems which may occur. this chapter has demonstrated how the four

Finally,

supporting questions should go into making up a new force structure for the United States fo- participation within the NATO alliance. The questions are: what is what are our threat that

national security needs;

the changing

faces NATO; and what are the possible future missions for the U.S. military within NATO and the domestic politics

which will provide that force?

33

CHAPTER 3 RESEARCG METHODOLOGY The purpose of this chapter is to map out the

methodology of how the primary and secondary questions will be answered. The assumptions, definitions, be established. limitations and In addition, be

delimitations to be used will the criteria introduced.

for selecting a new force structure will

This type of study does not lend itself quantitative method of research. It does,

to a allow

however,

for a qualitative model with a subjective analysis of the material included in the literature and interviews.

Initial assumptions: (1)

research has yielded the following

The withdrawal

of CIS forces from Germany will be completed as foreseen by

not be interrupted and will 1995. (2)

The present democratization

of Eastern and

Central European countries will continue unabated. (3) Central and Eastern European nations will

continue rapprochement with the West.

34

(4)

The presently established Unified Command Plan

will not change. The above mentioned assumptions are based on fact and current trends. Initial research has discovered no those assumptions or indicates

information that contradicts a change in the near future.

Research has also provided some useful definitions. They are as follows:' (1) Forward Deployed forces: Forces deployed outside in peacekeeping,

their national

boundaries to participate

or alliance commitments. (2) Forward Presence: The influence one nation has power the former is willing to

on another and the national

use to maintain that influence. (3) nations in Collective Defense: The joining by several

a formal or informal agreement to provide for

defense of both nations should those nations come under direct attack (NATO). (4) nations in Collective Security: The joining of several

a formal or informal agreement to provide a security issues and needs. The

forum to discuss mutual

forum may or may not have an executive agent for discussion and conflict resolution (5) European Pillar: (UN or CSCE). Informal reference made to a

separate European based military structure,

which as a

35

body,

might provide defense or security apparatus a

uniquely European military structure. (6) Central and Eastern Europearn Nations (C&EE): The

nations include all former Warsaw Pact nations plus all republics which made up the former Soviet Union. Because this project deals with such a dynamic subject, research. certain delimitations have been placed on the Those limitations deal with the time frame from be drawn. Because this thesis deals

which information will with U.S.

involvement with NATO after the significant research If will be limited to

changes of late 1989, post-February limitation, it 1989.

there are any exceptions to this

will be stated. portion of this chapter covered the

The first definitions,

delimitations and limitations to be used to The following

define the scope of research and writing. portion will

discuss the methodology to be used to evaluate

the recommended force and command structure which should be placed in Europe. Methodology Whatever the force and command structure selected, they must be able to meet four criteria. First, the force security the

and command structure must support the national goals and national interests of this nation.

Second,

force must be tailored to meet the threat foreseen by both

36

U.S. its

and allied planners.

Since the U.S.

has articulated

support for a European defense

identity within NATO,

the U.S.'s force structure must be able to support the Alliance's new roles and missions. deployed force, then, The U.S. European to

should bolster NATO's capabilities of major U.S. ground forces.

operate independently

Fourth,

the new force and command structure must be capable of supporting U.S. unilateral military action while still size of the

meeting the needs for reduction of the overall U.S. active duty military strength. The proposed solution will

be arrived at by

subjective analysis of the primary and secondary source material already discussed in Chapter 2 and the analysis of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will

that material

to be presented in

describe the three options for recommended force structure and the two recommendations for the command structure. Chapter 5 will also make the recommendation as to which the U.S.

force and command structure would best suit

requirements for the near future based on the above mentioned criteria. In addition, Chapter 5 will also

outline some recommendation for future studies. This chapter also has discussed how I will research

information to answer the primary and secondary questions. It has also described the assumptions governing the This chapter has defined terms certain terms to be Limitations and 37

thesis.

used throughout the chapters.

delimitations governing the thesis research have also been outlined. Also described in be used in this chapter are the criteria to

developing and evaluating the recommended force

and command structure.

38

CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS Chapter 2 of this thesis concentrated on providing a survey of the literature on what has been written about the This

four questions used to support the primary question. chapter will analyze the information provided in answering the primary question, should the U.S. which is:

terms of

What forces

contribute to the future NATO?

Evaluation of the former and present administration policies and statements on security and national makes it interests

clear that both administrations agree as to the in world security environment.

implications of the change

Both administrations agree that the demise of the Soviet Union has changed our security interest focus from a single direction based on the need to contain Soviet expansionism to the need to counter a number of smaller problems caused by regional instabilities. is how to handle the change

Where the sides disagree

and how to focus on their new security strategy-strengthening our economy. The Bush administration was in. European affairs by

favor of continuing an active role in maintaining a large presence,

therefore exerting a greater 39

influence

in

the way the Europeans do business.

This

approach would help the U.S. could be detrimental Western Europe.

influence EC policies which to market our goods in

to our ability

The Clinton administration seems to favor to concentrate on its plan to

partial disengagement

revitalize the economy through domestic scene.

infusion of funds on the

Such a plan might help alleviate some of might reduce our

the more pressing domestic problems but it ability to influence the EC. The possible withdrawal in

of substantial

U.S.

presence

Europe begs the question'of why we saw a need to get in European affairs than we already

more directly involved

were immediately after World War II. The greatest concern of hostilities immediately after termination

was how quickly the American armed forces This lack of

could be demobilized and brought home. concern for the post war events in

Europe pushed Britain

and the USSR together as the great gatekeepers of European security. As events turned out, this situation of peaceful

coexistence did not last. Conditions in post war Europe were rife with the

conditions for civil unrest.

The Soviet Union took

advantage of these conditions and started supporting civil wars in Europe by bolstering communist inspired revolutions could exploit civil "Mr. 40 unrest. Not even on a State

wherever it

receiving George Kennan's

X telegram,"

Department memorandum outlining the steps that should be taken to deal with Soviet expansionist government concern itself Soviet aggression in declaration ideas, did the U.S.

with how to deal with growing It was not until the precipitated by recantation

Europe.'

of the Truman Doctrine,

Britain's abandonment of Greece and the later of its assumed responsibilities that the U.S.

as the guarantor of Western came to terms with its new

Europe's freedom,

role as the guarantor of European security. Up to and including the Greece and Turkish civil wars, the U.S. role in helping the beleaguered governments in the role of advisor and money Plan That

was generally fulfilled

provider--functions amply demonstrated by the Marshall and the deployment of advisors to Greece and Turkey. role was forced to change, first Berlin Crisis in however, as a result of the the passive

1948.

At that time,

measures used to help Western Europe were virtually abandoned.

2

A policy of active confrontation,

a policy

which would evolve into containment, dealing with the Soviet threat.

became our new way of

This policy was determined

to be the only useful method to hold back Soviet expansionism. With that, the Washington Treaty of 1949, defense a

treaty based on the already existing mutual Brussels Treaty signed by the UK, Netherlands,

Belgium and the The key ingredient

became the basis for NATO. This article

was Article 4.

stated that an attack on one 41

would be considered an attack on all. guaranteed that the U.S., involved in European affairs, with its

This article would be

vast resources,

thus forging the Trans-

Altantic link.

This treaty completed what the Truman

Doctrine and the Marshall Plan had started--the direct involvement of the U.S. in European affairs. Thus, the

American commitment to deterrence and containment has been, since 1949, its its one overriding defense concern and Europe

major focus. Prior to the fall of the Soviet Empire, the U.S.'s

national

security interests were directly challenged by the by the Soviet gone and the

overwhelming military threat represented Union and its U.S. is allies.

Now that the threat is

likely to take a more "laid back" attitude in it must not give the impression that the on the well both the

European affairs,

government no longer believes our interest lies being of the continent. 3 As mentioned earlier,

Bush and the Clinton administration although the U.S. reduced threat in

indicated that,

fully realized the implication of a Europe and elsewhere, it was still in the

U.S.'s interest to support the development of new and emerging democracies in the C&EE nations. in

The reasons for support of those emerging nations their effort to achieve stability purely political fourth is reasons, are fourfold. Two are

the third is

economic and the

a combination of the two. 42

The first nations in

reason for support of those emerging is to and

their effort to achieve integration

prevent the rise of conflicting economic, political alliances which might pit against another.

defense,

one group of nations

Such a situation could lead to a return in turn, well serve

of conflicting alliances which might,

as a repeat of the same situation which precipitated the continent into its In Surope, First World War.
4

view of the above stated need to integrate all of take the responsibility to The partial in

why should the U.S.

ensure that effort to achieve stability? answer is Europe. affairs,

the second reason why we must remain engaged In our last three major involvement in

European

we have not let

ourselves get entangled in In fact, we have encouraged This

intra-European

disagreements.

a greater autonomy for our Western European partners. attitude has helped build a certain amount of credibility which gives the U.S. a neutralist appearance.

This neutral

stance has placed us in broker in security Europe.

a position as the only honest to guarantee our a

Our only wish is

and pre-empt the need to return to Europe in to the U.S..5

situation which would not be beneficial

The third reason why we need to stay in purely economic. Nations of Western Europe are, If

Europe is as a group,

our largest trading partners.

they were single entities

43

then we could deal with them on a bilateral are not however. Western Europe has bound

basis. itself in

They a

community of nations which unites all of their individual economies into one economic power, organization NATO. make it in in which the U.S. the EC. It is an

has no voice except through

The potential markets of the emerging nations also imperative that we maintain a significant presence

Europe.$ The last reason why we need to stay engaged in

Europe is

the resurgent feeling of mistrust between the' This situation published in is best described in an

European powers. anonymous article Review.

the November 1991

National

This article,

describes how the Franco-German between the

Corps may be reviving some age-old rivalries three major European powers--Germany, Britain. The article

France and Great reemergence Europe will This tends to apprehensive. among the

suggests that Germany's

as the leading economic and military power in place it in position of dominance in Germany's principal the EC. rival,

make the French,

This situation could lead to a lack of trust

allies at worse and dominance of the EC by one power at best. This situation would probably serve to make the EC a for either control of its markets of

less capable organization or for its defense.7

capability to become the European pillar

44

If could

this is

permitted to continue, in

the situation This would be

lead to instability

Western Europe.

disadvantageous

to the U.S.

Although the EC has been possible European defense the

discounted as a major player in organization, its potential

as an economic block is

single most important reason why the U.S. engaged national stability in European affairs. In

needs to remain

the preceding paragraphs,

interest was equated with the need to maintain in Europe since this stability was needed to

conduct business. business is

Another ingredient needed to conduct For this purpose, these

access to markets.

markets are those with our traditional those potential nations.

trading partners and the emerging C&EE not-likely to be

new markets opening up in purpose, although it it is

For this

an effective defense block, that the EC ties

does not remove the fact

Western European nations together as a This block makes Europe the single has. It is an

single market block.

largest economic competitor the U.S. organization in which the U.S.

has little

opportunity to in both NATO

influence except for the common participation and the EC by many EC members. If

the disagreement we any in

have had with the EC over trades and tariffs'are indication,

we will not be able to assert any influence

Europe through the EC channel. It Europe.$ 45 is essential then, that we maintain a presence in

In

order to understand why it Europe, it

is

importance

to

maintain a presence in that since ours is

must first

be understood

a nation based on a market economy which we must guarantee those as a nation depends which to conduct

depends on free and open markets, markets in order to survive.

Survival in

on a stable, business.

prospering environment

The future potential of markets is reason why we must maintain presence is to be believed, it is in

not the only If history

Europe.

evident that European

instability

can cause regional conflicts which, provocation,

with the slightest

can throw the entire continent into turmoil. draw us into those same continental and Second World the U.S.

This turmoil could well conflict.

The years between the First

Wars serve to remind us of what can happen if removes itself affairs.$ from active participation in

European we then

By maintaining a presence in

Europe,

help to maintain stability C&EE.

for the emerging nations of the also be our ability to

An added benefit will

influence policies and events going on in now is

the EC which even This presence

emerging as our greatest competitor.

and influence can only be maintained'through an active support of NATO. The preceding sections have shown that participation in NATO is critical to support our national interest in

view of the growing influence of the EC. ,46

NATO was,

however,

an organization

born of necessity to provide for members against a lerge It has become more and more

the mutual defense of its conventional difficu:'. invasion.

to justify

the large expenditure of resources to chance of

support, an organization whose members see little ever being used for its original if purpose. there is

The next question is, keep NATO around?

no threat,

why

Before discussing the potential it is useful to understand

risks facing NATO,

the difference between threats

and risks. nation

Francois Huisbourg defines a threat as a

with a capable military force that has an intention towards its is neighbor.'
0

unfriendly

Using his a threat

definition it to NATO.

clear that no nation in

Europe is

Using Huisbourg's definition of threats is say that there are no risks, in Chapter 2, however.

not to

As already discussed

Europe abounds in

risks which must be

controlled if

the emerging C&EE nations are allowed to we (the United States) want

develop into the democracies them to be.

These risks include ethnic unrest, traditional border disputes, religious

ultranationalism, persecution,

and Islamic fundamentalism.

These risks have

replaced the traditional oriented.

threats on which the Alliance has in the preceding They also

The problems described to be sure,

paragraphs are,

real concerns. 47

present a problem in kept under control. There is

terms of stability

if

they are not

one remaining risk to European security surviving

which must also be taken into consideration--the Russian Army.

While true that NATO planners discount the

possibility of aggressive action on the part of Russian forces, forces still if present a certain risk of uncertainty, economic

especially problems. "Russia is

Russia is

not able to solve its

On this

subject,

Otto von Bismarck's admonition, seems," in the

never as strong nor ever as weak as it place its is

means that as long as Russia maintains its world as a nuclear and conventional should never be discounted."' power, it

position to the in

As such,

benefit of the Europeans to keep the U.S. European affairs. Russian strength. This engagement will

engaged

serve to offset

The preceding paragraphs have discussed the fact that the situation requiring NATO's large standing military force, East, that is, the danger of imminent invasion from the The danger of general conventional

has largely gone.

war has been replaced by dangers brought about by emerging nations who, frustration for the first time in forty years, can vent

at the suppression of traditional by artificial

problems The danger

which have been controlled is spill not that instability to Western

means.

from the emerging nations will

Europe but that the spawn of revolution, 48

that is

starvation and disease,

could lead to mass and This could give

uncontrolled migration towards the west. rise to ultranationalism in the West. in

Ultranationalism, NATO nations like

some of which has already occurred France, Germany, and Belgium,

has made it

possible for

right wing factions to gain popularity. Should these right wing groups be allowed to develop any type of power base, political the U.S. there exists a real danger that the is necessary for

and economic liberalism which to operate,

could be replaced by European

governments which could become even more protectionist in their attitudes towards free markets.
12

The preceding portion of the chapter has focused on the need of the U.S. exists in Europe. to safeguard the liberalism which key for a growing

This liberalism is in turn,

economy which will, That is national

guarantee our way of life. Europe is in the The is

why maintaining a conflict-free interest and critical

to national

security. then,

way for the U.S. through presence bilateral

to guarantee that safeguard, in

Europe beyond what can be done by We must have a Europe. The

relations with the EC nations.

way to influence the rmajor economic powers in vehicle to do that is Because NATO is critical that the U.S. NATO.

so important to our interest,

it

is

act to maintain NATO's viability as

the alliance of the future. 49

When questioned on this subject by Congress, Powell, CJCS,

General

answered that the Alliance's new mission was old one-that is, to provide for the "community of
13

the same as its security, stability,

and the defense of a

nations" with common values and interests. this is true, but it is

To be sure,

a narrow view which appears not to of Europe into account.

take the new strategic realities General

Powell's answer assumes that the status quo old the

remains the same and that the Alliance can continue its way of doing business without looking at the changes European security needs. Such a limited view of the to obsolescence in

Alliance's future will probably doom it since domestic politicians, elusive peace dividend, will

eager to collect on the evernot allow continued spending

for a large military force whose effectiveness against the risks described earlier is suspect. simply put, still remains

The Alliance's mission, the defense of Western Europe. however, is

What must be realized,

the fact that the Alliance's way of doing Prior to the fall its of the Soviet

business must change. Empire, NATO's

defended

members by maintaining a large

military force poised at the border ready to defend against a conventional Now, invasion from the east.
14

a new way must be found for NATO to defend Key to accomplishing

against the risks earlier discussed. these missions is

the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. 50

The concept,

adopted in

November 1991,

is

based on the idea

of changing the structure and missions of NATO's forces from a static single, defense based on the need to defend against a mobile and forces.

theater-wide threat to a more flexible, response with multi-national

multi-directional

This new concept is risk outlined in General is

designed to be able to respond to the

the preceding paragraphs. 1 s true--NATO's mission

Powell's assessment is

to guarantee Western Europe's freedom through mutual What is different is the way in which NATO must

defense.

guarantee that freedom. That guarantee, ways. The first some suggest, its will come from three role of The second management and

will be in

traditional

deterring any remote possibility of attack. will be by providing for.a forum for crisis the establishment of closer ties former adversaries. The last

between NATO and its

mission will be the use of

NATO's forces for peacekeeping.'$ First, on the issue of deterrence, Johann Holst phenomena which
17

described deterrence as a psychological

does not remain constant but changes over time. security environment in over time. In Europe is

The

a good example of change It

order to deter,

you must have a threat.

has already been shown that NATO's planners no longer consider Russia or Ukraine capable of launching an unwarned attack against the west. If that is 51 the case, then, the

maintenance of a large standing force every member's resources. When the Soviet Union had a

is

a useless drain on

large armed force ready a large standing

to cross the border to attack the West,

military force ready to defend against that force, bolstered, no doubt, by the large nuclear umbrella may have deterred the potential

guaranteed by the U.S., Soviet aggression. by varied risks,

Now that the threat has been replaced

does the same force provided the same The answer for NATO is that such a

amount of deterrence?

large force may be more of a liability Although true that a

than an advantage.

large force provided deterrence attack, in that same force may This

against a Soviet conventional actually lead to instability

the new Europe.

perception evolves from the fact that NATO's forces although smaller in capability. number, still represents a deep strike

This capability could lead to the perception of the new

that NATO has not adjustel to the realities situation.

This perception could push former Pact nations intentions and might push those by

to mistrust NATO's peaceful

former C&EE nations into defense structures which could, their very existence, lead to renewed mistrust between
18

Western and Eastern Europe. There is

no question that one of NATO's missions The question is how to deter

remains to deter aggression. in

view of the changing environment. 52

The way to do this is

for the Alliance's military structure visible. Less visibility

to become less

can be achieved by the idea of the This concept,

Non-Offensive Defense or NOD for short. initially

advocated prior to the demise of the Warsaw Pact,

sought a way to reduce the threshold of war between the two alliances by adopting a doctrine which would render neither side capable of launching a sustainable attack onto the others territory.
19

The success of this paradigm was, sides to trust forces. at best,

concept under the old defense would require both

dubious since it

the other to reduce their forward deployed

Since the situation has now changed and the C&EE NOD

nations are looking for ways to reduce fear of attack, may be an idea whose time has come. The second mission NATO should be able to do in

the

future was suggest by then Secretary of State James Baker in 1990. Realizing that the status quo would need to he suggested a new security architecture for the He specifically

change,

new era upon which Europe was entering.

called for giving NATO a structure that would be able to accomplish two missions. be in One, the Alliance would have to

a position to help overcome Europe's forty years of

division by being responsible for new programs such as arms control verification and responsibility for dealing with

53

regional conflicts.

He also proposed that the CSCE should

2 0

increase its activities and responsibilities.

Baker's recommendation to expand the Alliance's role to include verification would not be difficult. operations would require little Such

additional cost since the

verification teams needed to support this mission could be placed in Brussels or SHAPE where the infrastructure is already present. Along with verification, an additional role

envisioned for NATO's future was articulated by the NATO Heads of State and Ministers in Rome in meeting, 1991. At that

the heads of state clearly outlined two paths for The first required the Alliance to

a NATO of the future.

facilitate the liaison relationship between NATO and the C&EE nations by inviting them to participate meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). meetings, in expanded These

held at regular intervals invite heads of state in on expanded meetings of

or their representatives to sit the NAC. Those meetings,

North Atlantic Cooperation

Council (NACC),

are designed to provided the C&EE nations a

forum in which they can voice their concerns over issues which concern all of Europe. If Secretary Baker's verifications and peacekeeping the forces required

responsibilities were accepted by NATO,

to do those missions are much different than what is available to them now. For the purpose of treaty and 54

disarmament verification, mission is technical

the structure to support this

not a combat force but teams made up of experts with an infrastructure capable of

deploying and supporting them. Acceptance of Baker's second suggestion, peacekeeping, however, If is more controversial. If it chooses to so,

how can NATO contribute to peacekeeping missions?

requested to do so by bodies responsible for collective NATO, as an Alliance,

security such as the UN or the CSCE, could use its

well-trained soldiers and modern equipment

for such missions. Although the new administration has not specifically addressed these new NATO roles and missions, Clinton's belief, as stated by both him in President

various speeches

and Secretary of Defense Aspin in hearings,

his confirmation

indicates that he would support these new it would require more allied

functions and missions if participation.

Prior to getting involved in however, several

such a mission, The first is

problems must be overcome. on a unilateral basis,

that NATO cannot, troubled spots.

deploy to Europe's

Such a deployment could be perceived as of the

aggressive ambition on NATO's part on territories C&EE nations. This perception

could provide C&EE nations

who fear hegemonic on their territory

intentions on the part of NATO countries an excuse for conservative 55 hardliners to

reestablish themselves in power.

It

is critical then,

that

before NATO can get involved in peacekeeping mission in Europe, it must do so under CSCE or UN auspices. the

The second problem that must be overcome is

reluctance of some NATO countries to get involved in military operations outside of NATO territories. Indeed,

Germany's constitution forbids such a military operation. In order for the alliances out-of-area operations to be successful, all nations must agree to participate to their

2 capabilities. '

As for the peacekeeping force, there are several advantages to NATO playing a major role in such activities. First, again, the logistics infrastructure

needed to support such an operation is already in place. Second, the command and control requirements, is already in place. like the

infrastructure,

Third, the Alliance's military

political decision-making body is, structure, also in place.

like its

This would allow for faster

action should the Alliance be requested to participate in peacekeeping. The force to be used would be the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC).

Command Europe's (ACE)

The second result of the Rome Summit was the articulation of the New Strategic Concept and the creation of an ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. This multi-national force,

made up of units from various members of the Alliance, commanded by a British officer, 56 is to be NATO's

multi-national lethal.22

force,

designed to be flexible,

mobile,

and

The force is

made up of ten divisions plus other It is with this force that if the Alliance Such

combat support and CSS units. NATO initially

would defend itself

or,

members wish do so,

deploy to out of area locations. is in

locations could include areas where it

the Alliance's

interest to conduct peacekeeping operations. The ARRC came into being in October 1992. It is to

be NATO's force for rapid reaction and contingency missions within ACE area of responsibility. As such, it is to be

the land component of a rapid reaction force under control of SACEUR.

2

The significant difference between the old corps level organization which existed in NATO prior to the that, before,

formulation of the New Strategic Concept is

individual members of the Alliance were responsible for providing the corps structures, personnel. equipment, C2, and

Under the new structure,

the nation charged in this case Great

with the formation of the new corps, Britain, is

responsible for providing 60% of the corps structure versus 100%. The UK will provide

headquarters

all C2 assets down to divisions slated to make up the corps. their Member nations providing divisions will provide own logistics,
2

C2, 4

organizations and equipment below

the division level.

57

During non-crisis times, be made up of two multi-national divisions. The U.S.

the corps organization will divisions and two UK

does not provide any peacetime forces divisions which make up the It has committed itself,

for the two multi-national

ARRC's peacetime configuration. however,

to providing one of the six divisions which would combat power during times of crisis. the

round out the corps'

Because of the rapid deployment nature of the ARRC,

division would presumably come from the forward deployed V Corps. A key aspect not fully discussed for the corps is the question of its ARRC is however, air support. The air component for Lhe

a German responsibility. it

As of October 1992, in

was running about-six months behind itself.23 Even if

organizing

the Germans are able to there is still the

solve their organizational

problems,

issue of the force's capability. The future Rapid Reaction Force (AIR) to perform three functions in first is that it must be able The

support of the ARRC.

must be able to gain and maintain air deployment

superiority if area.

not supremacy over the potential that it

The second is

must be able to perform close interdiction (BI) is that it must be

air support (CAS)

and battlefield

missions (deep strike),

and the third

able to provide theater lift

for troop transport to the

deployment area and sustainment for those forces. 58

However,

the three air

functions discussed above The first

present some significant problems for the force. problem is the force's ability Presently,

to gain and maintain air

superiority.

the European air forces are forces better The

equipped with third and fourth generation air suited for air

interdiction than air superiority. in

French do possess a very capable aircraft 2000 C. has, The problem with the French aircraft

their MIRAGE is that it

so far,

not been bought by any other NATO nations. in

Given the reluctance of the French to entangle itself NATO military operations, is questionable.

the availability of that platform terms

The closest airframe available in

'of air-to-air

capability available to all NATO nations is Britain has the capability to deploy like the F-16, its it

the F-18 fighter.

TORNADO F-3 air superiority fighter but, is air

neither the newest nor the best available aircraft superiority missions.

for

Germany does not presently have defense fighter capable of aircraft such as the MIG 29,

a modern western designed air countering possible adversary

an airplane available to most former Warsaw Pact nations. Germany's own fleet of MIGs require logistic support from a be supporting the opposition
26

nation which could very well in

future milV'ary operations.

The European answer to its superiority fighter is

lack of a modern air

the European Fighter Aircraft (EFA). is 59 that it has not yet been

The problem with this aircraft

flight

tested and presumably will not be ready for field built F-22 is

deployment until well after the U.S. operational.2?

The second mission the Rapid Reaction Force (AIR) must be able to perform is battlefield in interdiction. The UK, close air support and In this area, the European are

better shape.

Germans and Italians have a very Several

capable airframe in

the TORNADO strike fighter.

other nations have F-16s capable of performing limited (daylight/clear weather) to fixed wing aircraft, would be used in BI and CAS missions. In addition

attack and observation helicopters

the deep strike and CAS missions. 2' forces have attack helicopters in

Although European air their inventories,

those are severely handicapped by

adverse weather and limited visibility. The third function the NATO air able to perform is theater-wide airlift. component must be Again, although their

many NATO nations have a limited lift C-160 and C-130 fleets, those aircraft

capability in

are limited in

number and are incapable of carrying oversize cargo. The last airpower addition, is their problem which the Europeans have vis-a-vis lack of stealth and EW capability. French and British AWACS, in the

except for NATO,

Alliance has very limited airborne C3 capabilities. The Alliance's air component is ability to fight and sustain itself 60 in key to combat. the ARRC's Yet it has

several

potentially crippling shortcomings which must be sustainable two

solved p-ior to that force being a capable, combat force.

The answer to NATO's problems lies in The first is that NATO nations

possible solutions.

belonging to the ARRC--specifically

Britain and Germany

spend a tremendous amount of resources to build the capability they need. every effort The second is engaged that NATO must make in Europe by taking can offer to the

to keep the U.S.

advantage of the air capability the U.S.

2 Alliance. '

The final consideration to be looked at in our contribution to NATO is force structure look like?

designing

what will the remaining U.S. The answer to this question can emphasis on

be gleaned by understanding the Congressional force reduction discussed in Gorbachev Chapter 2.

Ever since Mikhial

initiated Soviet unilateral

force reductions and

the demise of the Warsaw Pact have made the threat against the U.S. less likely, Congress has wanted to reduce the seen as useless in view

size of the force--a force which is

of the lack of a credible threat due of its non-deployability. The primary consideration of the size for the future military force is force. This is for a smaller, more readily-deployable

confirmed by Les Aspin's statement to the

Senate Armed Services Committee when he stated that the military of the future should be "flexible enough to do a 61

large number of simultaneous smaller contingencies.'30 Earlier, while writing in Reserve Officer he stated that he did

Association National

Security Report,

not believe the American people were willing to spend $250 billion a year for a military which, was incapable of operation contingencies" meaning, war.
3

he did not believe,

in

"all but the most extreme a large conventional

generally,

This statement indicates an unwillingness to fund fighting a large His

a large force whose primary focus is conventional war--a war which is

not likely to come.

statement makes it more on the ability deploy,

clear that future missions will depend of light forces which can rapidly Such

conduct forced entry and rapidly redeploy.

missions would depend more on the Marine Corps'

embarked

Marine Amphibious Brigades and the Army's 101st and 82d divisions. These suggestions are a clear indication that the active duty heavy forces will be reduced in strength and a the

greater emphasis will be placed on heavy forces in national guard and reserve for sustained combat
32

operation.

The question

is

by how much,

and what

effect will that have on the forces dedicated to Europe? Some experts suggest that the active force can safely be reduced to ten active divisions seven of which The

would be army units and three would be Marine Corps. total Air Force active strength could be as low as 10 62

fighter wing equivalents deployed world wide. Using these figures,

33

as a worse case basis,

it

can

only be surmised that the three Marine divisions,

along

with the Army's 82d Division and the 101st Division would be the nation's contingency force. These units would be

charged with rapid deployment and forced entry missions. These light, quickly deployed forces would then be the

augmented by the remaining heavy divisions based in U.S. The final likely to remain, structure? To recap then, vital Europe. question, then, is

with smaller forces

what should we contribute to the NATO

Chapter 4 demonstrated that U.S.

interests for the future remains tied to a stable This stability is required for the U.S. In turn, to be able

to maintain its stability

European markets.

European which Although events

depends on

maintaining an atmosphere in

free and liberal

trade practices are encouraged. Europe at this time,

such practices are present in

have demonstrated that work must be done to preserve that environment and that preservation of that atmosphere must be our number one priority. the EC is our chief rival, Such must be the case because a rival in which its members can

form an economic block against the U.S. block in which the U.S.

economic block--a

has no way of influencing since we except for the common 63

have no formal

representation

membership of many EC nations with NATO. the U.S. Alliance.

For this reason,

must remain a viable and active member of the

Chapter 4 has also demonstrated that the primary purpose for NATO, the threat of war caused by an As such, they

expansionist Soviet Union has disappeared. are no longer a threat against the Alliance.

The single

monolithic threat represented by the former Soviet Union has been replaced, not dealt with, however, by a number of risks, which if being

could prove as dangerous to the well therefore, U.S. intirests.

of western Europe and,

These new risks include the dangers of civil wars in the newly emerging nations caused by ethnic and religious unrest, traditional border disputes kept under control by

communist governments of economic systems.

and wars caused by the sudden change These acts of violence and their root themselves, but they do not have

causes are dangerous in

the chance of spreading to the richer more stable western nations. The danger represented by these wars is that mass

migration of displaced populations could western nations.

immigrate to those

These migrations could cause the groups in These

emergence of right wing ultranationalist traditionally liberal

Western European nations.

movements could precipitate a movement away from the economic liberalism which has characterized the end of the Second World War.. 64 Europe since

Such a move would serve

to isolate the U.S. to European markets.

even further from the access

it

needs

Chapter 4 has also demonstrated

that the remaining although

size of the Russian and Ukrainian forces,

incapable of launching a surprise attack against the west at this time, still retains enough conventional and nuclear

forces to make them the largest European military power. These facts make it engaged in essential for the U.S. aid in to remain

European affairs--to

working towards an It is also in

answer towards stability

for the C&EE nations.

advantageous for the Europeans to keep the U.S. European affairs forces. The third factor in missions of U.S. forces in

engaged

to help offset the Russian and Ukrainian

determining the role and the NATO of the future will Again, that is be

the Alliance future roles and mission. showed that NATO's past raison d'etre,

this chapter the defense

of Western Europe against the massive invasion from the East, is gone. With the disappearance of that danger has the

come the question of what can the Alliance do in future.

That question has partially answered by James

Baker who outlined three main missions the Alliance should be in position to do are deterrence, management, treaty verification Obviously, the

and crisis

and peacekeeping.

force required to complete those above stated missions are far different then the force required to fight a 65 large

scale conventional

war.

The

Alliance's refocus from the

fighting a large war to its new missions is articulated in its new strategic concept as outlined in the Rome Summit of 1991. Also identified earlier is the vehicle the Alliance is, the ARRC.

will use to enforce its new concept--that

One of the key concept to the rapid reaction force must be its capability to rapidly deploy and fight once deployed. Finally, the last factor that was examined in

Chapter 4 which will have an impact on our contribution to NATO forces must be the availability of U.S. As discussed earlier in this chapter, in the administration is forces. the atmosphere

that financial constraints

combined with the lack of a viable threat will make it difficult to support a large force permanently stationed in Europe. This belief will cause a substantial downsizing of With the majority of those remaining versus forward deployed in

active duty forces.

forcesstationed in the U.S. Europe.

Taking the above questions, consideration,

concern and facts into size and command

what should be the role,

structure to support NATO be? In conclusion, it is evident that the national its capability to maintain It is also clear

interest of this nation lies in

free and open markets to sell its goods.

that one of the larger markets available to us lies in 66

Europe--a Europe which

is

tied to its

own economic system

from which we are excluded.

The existence of the EC and the that we

the new potentially great markets which exist in emerging democracies of the East make it

essential

insure the maintenance of a stable Europe. can only be achieved if

This stability evolves into

we support NATO as it

a structure designed to deter aggression against its members or its that will C&EE neighbors. The vehicle in which to do

not be the traditional

military structure

designed to defeat the Warsaw Pact but a new Multi-National Corps guided by the new Strategic Concept.

67

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS The purpose of this deployed U.S. chapter is to select a European Whatever the force and

force for the future.

command structure selected, four specific criteria

that structure must support the Chapter 3. The forces

outlined in

that will be discussed are primarily Army and Air forces. Navy and Marine forces afloat are excluded from the total count because those forces are not permanently assigned to U.S. forces stationed in Those criteria safeguarding U.S. for the national Europe. The force must be capable of interest and continue to provide the force must be a credible it must support the in Eastern

are: national

security;

deterrent against an attack on NATO;

theater CinC's efforts to maintain stability Europe;

and the force must be able to work within the At the same

framework of the NATO's new Strategic Concept. time, will it should provide the additional

assets the new ARRC Finally,

require to be an effective combat force.

that force must fit

within the constraints established by is, it must be

Congress and the new administration--that smaller and therefore cheaper. 68

The first

issue to resolve then is in

what is

the be assured What

smallest force we can deploy

Europe and still

of continued safeguard of our interests in

Europe?

should the minimum capability of that force be? is

The answer

that the force needs to be large enough to allow the to make a contribution which is perceived as equal to or it must

U.S.

or greater then any single other of our allies be of sufficient capability to be seen as critical Europeans ability

to the

to maintain a credible military structure

1

without any further resources.

Since all evidence suggests that the military forces will undergo severe downsizing in the near future, the NATO

obvious solution to maintain an effective voice in

will not depend on the deployment of overwhelming U.S. forces but will depend on the U.S. ability to provide the

Alliance certain capabilities Which they are not able to provide themselves without substantial These capabilities unique to the U.S. financial costs.

would be used to help shortcomings

the European nations overcome their critical and lack of capabilities described in As discussed in capability to deploy, Chapter 4, in

Chapter 4.

Europeans do not have the an all-weather

the near term,

attack and observation helicopter capability which can be found in brigades. the U.S. divisional and corps level aviation

By deploying a corps level headquarters with its the U.S. would be able

subordinate attack aviation brigade, 69

to provide those attack and observation capabilities for the ARRC to be an effective force. Another asset critical
2

needed

to the ARRC's deep strike the ATACMS. The ARRC's could would

missions envisioned for the ARRC is

requirement for this system suggests that the U.S. either sell the missiles to the British which, require expenditure of resources on their part,

again,

or the U.S.

could make units equipped with MLRS available for use by the ARRC. In addition to army combat assets the U.S. could

provide certain CS and CSS assets.

Those assets would help

alleviate other shortcomings such as EW and C31 systems in the European force structures. in the corps' MI brigades in These army assets are found

the form of airborne All of these

electronic collection and jamming systems. assets are normally found corps level. If the U.S. were to make these critical in

brigade size units at the

assets

available to the NATO ARRC, our continued participation welcomed.

then we could be assured that in European affairs would be

This would insure that we could maintain our NATO therefor Europe. the forces

influence in In deployed missions.

addition to supporting the ARRC, in

Europe must be able to perform four essential First, they must be able to deploy out of

theater to places such as the Middle East or any other out of area region to support the CJCS plans and contingencies. 70

They must be able to take part in

the ARRC as per the U.S. They must

commitment to support the Corps with a division.

also be able to support the theater CinC by providing the capability to conduct combat operations independent of other NATO forces, they must be large enough to maintain they must be able to protect the

credible forward presence, U.S. citizens,

and they must be able to take part in

military contacts program as envisioned by the London Conference. Finally, they must be able to receive in a time of crisis Again, if a

reinforcements from the U.S. return to Europe is

called for.

the size of this

force suggests a corps size element since such an organization has all of the structure needed to be able to providing it is supported by the EAC

fight independently,

elements at some points. Since the need of a theater deployed corps has been identified, does this corps need to have its combat

elements at full strength? reasons why it does not.

Chapter 4 identified two The first reason why the corps that the risk of

does not need to be at full strength is needing a full-up corps is there is

presently nonexistent since The

not a threat of imminent attack against NATO. needs to maintain any decisive is because of our commitment to

only reason why the U.S. units in Europe, then,

provide a division to the ARRC.

The second reason why we

should reduce the strength of the corps combat units is 71

because of the belief that such a full-up corps can be deemed as offensive in nature by the C&EE nations. is no requirement in Europe. the U.S.

These reasons indicate that there

for a full-up corps to be permanently deployed Because there is not reason for a full up corps,

should proceed to reduce that structure. According to U.S. planners in NATO Headquarters, The

there are three possible ways to reduce the force. first is by deactivating one division in

the European based

corps along with the CS and CSS assets which would support that division. division. The second is to reduce one brigade per

The third would be to disestablish division

headquarters and leave separate brigades operating as separate units under a corps headquarters. However, answer,
3

none of these solutions offer a perfect

and all need to be examined for their separate

advantages and disadvantages. The first advantages. The first advantage is in Europe. that the U.S. maintains a a recommended solution has four major

corps headquarters

This would give the U.S.

credible presence in

Europe thus assuring us a "place at to influence events and in an indirect way, the EC.4 the

the table" and the ability decisions both at NATO and,

The second advantage would be to give the U.S.

C31 capability needed to rapidly redeploy ground forces in 72

theater if occur.

needed to support any contingencies which might

The third advantage to this organization would be that essential that is, capabilities needed to support the ARRC, brigades, units

attack aviation and artillery in

capable of participating

ARRC deep strike missions, Also forward deployed to

would be readily available.

support either the theater CinC or the ARRC would be aviation assets from the corps's MI brigade which would be capable of providing electronic warfare. The fourth advantage to this structure would be the manpower savings. With this structure, corps strength

could be reduced by approximately 23,000 personnel. The major disadvantage would be that USAREUR would be unable to meet its German corps. commitment to provide a division to a

This problem can easily be resolved however, 3d Corps

by earmarking a follow-on division from the U.S. to be part of that German Corps. The second solution,

the deactivation of a brigade

from each division offers no major advantage over the previous solution except the ability to provide an anemic corps would

division to a German corps while the U.S. retain control of a division. Savings in division, manpower,

approximately 6000 soldiers per the reduced

5

would not be enough to justify

capabilities of the remaining divisions. 73

The third solution is

to disestablish divisions and theater. there are several is that by reducing

have only separate brigades in Like the first solution,

advantages to this solution. the divisional middle man, would be realized.

The first

substantial manpower savings

Another advantage would be that the existed

force could be tailored to meet the situation as it at the time -that is,

you could add or take out brigades advantage is that

relatively easily.

Related to the last

the brigades would not need to be permanently Europe;

deployed to basis. The

they could be rotated on a semi annual

redeployment of these units could exercise our sea and airlift capabilities on a continuing basis. Some of the disadvantages that the U.S. the ARRC, to this organization are

would no be able to meet our commitment to a full up division, without substantial

that is

redeployment of forces from CONUS and train up time to reach the proper degree of proficiency for those divisions to be an effective fighting force. neither This solution would

support the ARRC's mission of rapid deployment nor

the CinC's requirement to have an effective fighting force at his disposal. Another disadvantage to this concept would be the

organization for combat required for the separate brigades would not be present. That is, the combat support and

combat service support organizations needed to support 74

those maneuver brigades might not be the habitual organizations needed for effective combat operations. Command and needed This

would harm the effectiveness of the units.

control would also suffer since the span of control to command as many as six maneuver brigades, brigades, three artillery brigades,

three aviation

plus numerous CSS units

would probably be beyond the capability of the standard corps headquarters. The headquarters would require of course, drive up

augmentation.

This requirement would, in theater.

the numbers of personnel objective of reduction reducing strength, is

Since the primary

to maintain capability while

this solution would not be acceptable. the army The ground

Regardless of the solution recommended, structure should then be organized as follows.

component commnander should be dual hatted as both the Theater Army and Corps Commander for peacetime and operations short of war only. Under his command would be

the standard corps organization for combat with the following exceptions. replacement of the assault brigade. The first exception would be the regiment with an air of course, be

armored cavalry

The second change would,

the reduction of divisional

level combat strength.

The replacement of the cavalry regiment with a separate air assault brigade with all of its lift assets

would provide the corps commander with the ability to deploy the brigade separately as a peacekeeping force if 75

that mission were prescribed. brigade could,

In

addition,

that air assault

with minimum support,

deploy nearly anywhere

within ACE at a moment's notice. proposal

An alternative to this

would be to replace one of the division's heavy assault brigade. the air component

brigade with an air

The next area to be discussed is of U.S. forces deployed to Europe. The U.S. air

component's mission in

Europe would be,

like the ground component, directions. mission, It

directed towards two component

should support the ARRC's air

that is,

the force must provide for air and strategic lift, and provide EW

superiority,

tactical

and airborne C3--all missions the ARRC's air component cannot do for itself. overseas, then, The U.S. air assets deployed

must be able to provide all of the above

support plus have the capability to provide CAS and BI in support of the theater CinC. Fortunately, Air Force the recent reorganization by the U.S. is ideally suited

into the composite wing concept

for the mission of supporting not only the ARRC but also the U.S. corps. The problem is that the mission require different

requirements for these two purposes airframes. As already discussed, ARRC's mission is

the requirement to support the

more for air superiority and jamming than The composition of

for the deep strike missions and BI. 76

the wing should then be heavily oriented on air superiority and EW type aircraft. aircraft. These would be F-15/EF-111/F-16 type

Their purpose would be to provide an air umbrella who would perform the actual deep

to the allied aircraft strike mission.

The wing deployed to support the U.S. would

CinC's mission would have to be more robust since it be required to be both air-to-ground and air-to-air missions. Such a wing would be heavily dependent on

multi-role capable aircraft This wing would also have its and C2 aircraft.

such as the F-15Es and F-16Cs. normal compliment of jamming

These two wings would be the major air power in personnel wing; i.e., Europe. in

force combat

Since wings have between 4,000 to 5,000

them (depending on the orientation of the ground attack vs. air to air) the estimate Europe would be

strength of tactical air forces strength in approximately and personnel remembered 10,000. Admittedly,

this number of aircraft it should be

seems small.

However,

that these forces are forward deployed to deal The rapid deploying nature of air that a large number of

with contingencies. power makes it aircraft forces.

less essential

be kept on permanent station overseas then army

The above described strengths for the Army and Air Force are for units at the tactical there is level and below. Since

a demonstrated possibility to reduce the amount of 77

forces in in

theater,

then the command structure which exists

theater could also be changed. Three possible considerations for a command

structure exists.

The first

is

the present structure. in which the CinC's officers

This structure calls for a theater

three components commanders are also four star with the appropriate level staffs.

The second command structure which could be in place to support the reorganized forces would be based on the Korea model. In this scenario,
overall

the CinC's headquarters

command of the theater and

would continue to be in

all assigned forces but planning responsibilities would be delegated to a sub-unified commander. Europe where the CINCEUR also fills Commander (MNC), national This is the responsibility In the case of

the role of Major NATO for planning for of the DCinC In the

missions would come under control the situation which exists in

Europe today.

case of this model,

the component commanders would be the in theatre. Using this

senior service commanders description,

the army/corps commander would become the He would also fiHl the role of

ground component commander. 7th Army commander.

The air component commander would, counterpart, theater. be the overall

like his Army in

senior air force commander

Whereas the position is

presently held by an Air

Force 4 star officer,

this position would be reduced to a 78

three star

office.

He would be in

command of the combat

wings described above. The navy component commander would be, present situation a four star billet. This is like the due to the

peculiar nature of the European theater in Because the naval component commander is Subordinate Commander (MSC), in

respect to NATO.

also a Major the

this case AFSOUTH,

planning and command responsibilities are delegated to his subordinate, a three star office. equal. for command structure would be based a peacetime environment. In for This would, in effect,

make all services

The third model

on the SOUTHCOM structure in this case,

the CinC would have direct responsibility

planning and executing all missions in and Alliance missions. and Air Force units be applicable if in

support of national of all Army,

He would have control theater.

This structure would only its

the U.S.

were to be replaced in

position of SACEUR. Because of the unique nature of the dual structure which exists in Europe, that is command

the NATO planning

and execution portion under command of the SACEUR who doubles as the CINCEUR, situation is the best command structure for the that is, a modified

clearly the second choice,

Korea Model where national

planning and execution is

conducted by someone other then the theater CinC.

79

Using the reduced tactical described in this chapter,

and operational

forces Europe

the forces stationed in

would then look as follows.

The army corps would be assigned personnel. 10,000 permanently The

between 50 and 55,000 permanently air force would have approximately

assigned personnel. personnel

The navy would have about 5,000 operations in Europe in terms

assigned to support the 6th fleet The total strength in

the Mediterranean. of operational

units and their supporting headquarters

would be approximately 70,000 personnel. In criteria conclusion, it is clear that in order to meet the the

for a viable force in

Europe as described in the U.S.

methodology section of Chapter 3,

should adopt the Europe. Corps by one

following Army and Air Force structure in

The army should reduce the size of its division.

Such a reduction would provide a manpower Further savings

savings of approximately 16,000 soldiers. could be realized if

the size to the Corps's support

command were reduced by the appropriate number of personnel required to support that deactivated division. In addition, the Corps's organic armored cavalry

regiment should be replaced by an air assault brigade with all of the organic lift capabilities normally asociated

with such a unit.

This exchange would better provide the react

corps and theater commander the capability to quickly

to any requirement for Army forces to handle operations 80

other than war.

These light forces would be particularly type missions as evidence by

well suited for peacekeeping

the deployment of the 10th Mountain Division to Somalia. Corps combat support units should be kept at full strength so as to support the ARRC missions as well as other deployments requiring CS and CSS support versus combat troops. Echelons above Corps units should be

maintained at an appropriate level so as to support the in-theater forces and be able to support the arrival of new units if warranted. The Air Force should permanently station two composite wings in Europe. One wing should be primarily dedicated to air This wing juch a return of U.S. forces to Europe was

equipped with F15C and F16C type aircraft superiority missions in

support of the ARRC.

could be removed from theater once the EFA or a suitable replacement were deployed. The second wing would be equipped with F15E type aircraft. It would be dedicated to providing the theatar interdiction and deep

commander with adequate battlefield strike capabilities while still capabilities. Should it be required,

provide adequate air-to-air

these two wings could be superiority aircraft

reinforced by Navy strike and air operating from carriers in

support of the theater CinC.

81

The command structure modified as follows.

in

Europe should also be

The service component commanders This

should be reduced from four to three star commanders. is certainly appropriate in view of the greatly reduced

force structure permanently stationed overseas. Reducing the force structure as described above and modifying the command structure would fulfill all of the Chapter

requirements for a force structure as described in 3. That is,

the force would help maintain our influence in by providing a force capable of rapidly in Europe. Maintaining a Corps

European affairs

deploying anywhere

headquarters with its two very powerful U.S. affairs.

robust combat support element with

and capable air wings assures that the voice in Alliance

will maintain an influential

This smaller force, invasion from the east,

less focused on an imminent

would also alleviate the fear that nature. This would help maintain

NATO forces are offensive in foster a feeling of trust, stability in

and,

therefore,

the C&EE nations by reinforcing the idea that

NATO has no design on their territory. The recommended solution would also be ideal to help NATO in its new roles and missions by providing substantial C2, CS and air power to the ARRC. This same

intelligence, force is still

capable of supporting the CinC with any mission he might be assigned to accomplish. 82

unilateral U.S.

Because the force is that the U.S. is

still

of substantial in

size,

the message is

remaining engaged is

European affairs

present--thus deterrence Finally,

achieved. smaller. This fits into the

the force is

scenario of having smaller active forces which must still contend with world wide instabilities capability to deploy world wide. Recommendations for Further Studies Recommendations for future studies could go into three different directions. The second is operation in The first is cost analysis. which require the

force structure estimates for a military operations other than war. Europe. on the the methodology money for The third would be

based on a changing situation in

Because this study was based strictly military-political requirements outlined in the cost in terms in

section of Chapter 3,

maintaining a forward deployed force was not taken into consideration. Further research could center on which

force structure would be best using the additional criteria: "How many dollars would such a force cost?" The force structure recommended section of this chapter is primarily support the ARRC in the previous

for a force which would in conducting missions such as The recommended force

peacekeeping or even peacemaking.

could be used as a point of departure to determine how much 83

reinforcement from CONUS would be needed if to conduct such a mission on a unilateral present situation in model.

the U.S. basis. The

were

Bosnia could be used as a situational

A different force structure could be recommended as

a result of such analysis. The third direction for future study is subject of this study itself. recommendations based in the

The conclusions and

reached above are a result of the criteria security goals and

established by articulated national requirements. change,

Should any of those goals and requirements for the specific force

the recommendations in

structure outlined applicable.

the previous section may no longer be in

These changes might then require a change

the recommended structure. if

This would be particularly true

the new administration were to articulate fundamental in our position vis-a-vis our relations with

differences NATO.

84

ENDNOTES Chapter 2
1

the-U.S., p.1.
2

George Bush, The National Security Strategy of (Washington DC.:Government Printing Office, 1991)

Policy: p. 421.
3

William J. Clinton, "A strategy for Foreign Assistance to Russia," Vital Speeches, 1 May 1992,

Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, Statement to the U.S. Senate Secreatry of Defense COnfirmation Hearings, (Washington DC: 19 January 1993), p. 13. David Abshire, "Strategic Challenge, Contingencies, Force Structure and Deterence," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 40. SFrancois Huisbourg, Washigton Quarterly, 'Ibid.,
7 lbid., 4

The

"The Future of the Alliance," p. 128.

Spring 1992,

pp. p.

132-133. 135.

'Alexander Gerry, "NATO in Central and Eastern Europe," ROA National Security Report, November 1992, p. 49. 'Johann Holst, Exploring Europe's Future and Trends and Prospects Relating to Security, September 1990: Rand Corporation, p. vi. ' 0 Zbignew Brezenski, "Order, Disorder, and U.S. Leadership," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 9. "IU.S., Congress, House, The Committee on the Budget, The Long Term Defense Budget, 102st Cong., 2d sess., 1991, p. 3.
12 13

1bid.,

p. p.

5. 7. 85

I bid.,

'4Gerry, 'Isbid, '

6

p. p.

50. 51. pp. 130-131.

ZHuisbourg, p.

17Ibid,

134. of Order," 25-26. New

"18ZManfred Woerner, "Three Pillars Perspective Quarterly, Summer 1992, pp.

''Sergei Rogov, "International Security and the Collapse of the Soviet Union," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 5. Personnal Intervier, LTC Dan Skeldon, USA, Intelligence Planner, U.S. Delegation to the NATO MC. January 1993, Brussels Belgium.
20

13

2IU.S., Congress, House, Committee on the Budget, The Long Term Defense Budget, Ibid., p. 24.
22

Interview with LTC Skeldon, Les Aspin, p. 12.

Ibid.

23 24

james Baker, "U.S. Committment to Strengthening Euro-Atlantic Cooperation," U.S. Department of State Dispatches, 23 December 1991, p. 15.
2 5 Aspin,

p.

7.

2 6General David Maddox, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Europe, Statement to U.S. Army Command and General Ft. Leavenworth, Ks., March 1993. Staff Class of '93,

Goodly, "Peacemaking in the New Europe," Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 166. Washington The Daniel Nelson, " NATO-Means, But no Ends," January 1992, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientist, 48:1, pp.10-11.
29 30 28

2 7 James

Goodly,

p.

170.

U.S., Congress. House, The Committee on the Budget, Defense Policy in the Post-Cold War Era, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 1991, p. 1.
31

Ibid.,

p.

2.

86

3 2

"The Candidate and National Security Report, October

Security," p. 36.

ROA

National

1992,

"3Irbid.
Remarks by President and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in Press Availability, The White House, Washington DC, 26 March 1993, p. 2. 35Ibid.
3 4

"36U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Aooropriations for 1992 - part 8: The Base Force Concept, 101st Cong., 2d sess., 1991, p. 32.
37Abshire,
3

p.

36.

Budget,

Congress, House, The Committee on the The Long Term Budget, p. 3.

9U.S.,

"39Stephen Flanagan, "NATO and Central and Europe: From Liaison to Security Partnership," Washington Quarterly Spring 1992, p. 95.
Patrick Garrity and Sharon Weidner, "U.S. Defense Strategy After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 97. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Defense in American Foreign Policy: Practice and Theory, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974) pp. 250-251.
4 2 4 3 4 1 4 0

Garrity and Weidner, Hoslt, p. 39.

p.

64.

Chapter 3 'These definitions are the author's. They are based on his understanding of the terms used throughout research.

his

Chapter 4 'Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterence American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), pp. 22-23. in

87

Francois Huisbourg, "The Future of the Atlantic Alliance: Wither NATO, Whether NATO?" Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 128.
3

Huisbourg,

p.

140.

4Personnal Interview with COL Jerome Watson, USA, Forces Planner, U.S. Delegation to NATO MC. Strategic 13 January 1993, Brussels Belgium. Flanagan, "NATO and Central and 'Stephen J. Eastern Europe From Liaison to Security Partnership," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 143. @"Esprit de Korps," November 1991, pp. 18-20.
7

National

Review,

43:21,

18

James Schlesinger, "The Trans-Atlantic Partnership: An American View," Brookings Review, 1992, p. 19. &Huisbourg, p. 'Ibid.,
1 0

Summer

138.

p.

140. de Korps," p. 143. p. 18.

"Esprit

" Huisbourg,
1 2

U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 8- The Base Force Concept, 101st Cong., 2d 1992 - part 1991, p. 8. sess.,
1 3

1nterview with Col

Watson,

Ibid.

14Ibid. Challenge: 15David Abshire, "Strategic Contingencies, Force Structure and Deterence," Quarterly, Spring 1992, p. 35. Johann Holst, Exploring Europe's and Prospects Relating to Security, (Rand September 1990), p. 30. 1 7 Colin McInnes, (London: Unwinn Hymann, lslbid., p. 165. The Changing Strategic 1990), p. 163.
16

Washington

Future Trends Corporation,

Agendas,

88

1 9 Andrew

Current History,
2 0"Why

Pierre, "The U.S. 89:550, p. 354.

and the New Europe," 323:7760, 23 May

NATO?"

The Economist,

1992,

p.
2

16.

1Micheal Mechams, "Signing NATO's New Strategy May be the Easy Part," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 35:20, 4 November 1991, p. 27. Rupert Pengelley, "ARRC Arising," Defense Review, October 1992, p. 981. 23Ibid.,
2 4 Ibid., 22

International

p. p.

981-982. 984. (Carrolton

Stapfer, MIG 29 in Action, Tx: Squadron Publishing, 1990), pp. 22-27.

2 6 Personnal

2 5Hans-Heini

Interview with John W. Douglass, BrigGen, USAF (RET), former Deputy United States Military Representative, NATO MC and presently senior Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee, 10 January 1993, Washington DC.
2 TPengelley,

p.

193. Ibid.

28Interview,
2 9Les

COL Watson,

Aspin, Statement to the Senate Armed Services Commitee, 19 January 1993, p. 14. Les Aspin, "With the Soviet and the Cold War Gone, What Future for U.S. Forces," ROA National Security Report, November 1992, p. 24. Correll, "The Right Mix Fight Heats Up," Air Force Magazine, January 1993, p. 68.
3 2 Ibid. 3 1 John 30

p.

69. Chapter 5

'Personnal Interview with COL Jerome Watson, Strategic Forces Planner, U.S. Delegation to NATO MC, January 1993, Brussels, Belgium. Pengelley, "ARRC Arising," Defense Review, October 1992, p. 63. 89
2 Rupert

15

International

1nterview,

COL Watson,

Ibid.

4Ibid. 5Ibid.

90

C2 Commang Structure

CinCEUR

DCi nCEUR

JFACC

V Corps

21st TAACOM

Comp Wing CinCEUR

Comp Wing ARRC

3 star command. Army component commander acts as Commander U.S. Army Forces, Europe. Air component commander acts as Commander, U.S. Air Forces in Europe.
*

Figure 1

91

Army Forces Structure

5th Corps

Air Forces Structure

9th Air Force

ARRC

Iwing

Win

Sueirt
win

-,

On order:

OPCON

Figure 2

92

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3.

4.

Mr. John W. Douglass Rm 228, Russell Senate Office Building Washington DC, 20510 LTC Kenneth Osmond Center for Army Tactics USACGSC Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-6900 LTC James Swartz 3801 West Temple Avenue Pomona, CA 91768-4083

5.

6.

99