THE WAR THEATER OF THE 21ST CENTURY.

A SECOND RAM ( Revolution of military affairs) I remember, today unfortunately with certain pride a work presented/displayed to the Spanish Army Prizes 2004 and that turned on. I wrote about the Spanish army and the future of this in the new theater that appeared before the same with the expansion of the asymmetric enemy. This work was given back to me and he did not enter the final selection. Pride, because it was given back to me with some pencil annotations by some expert in relation to my affirmation of which as the conflict of the Persian gulf considered the action of the coalition it was going to suppose 2 Vietnam, and that sharply asserted that of no way it was thus going to be. Unfortunately for him, and me; by the cost in human lives that my affirmation supposed; the time, non bribe judge, and General Mr. David H. Pretaeus came to confirm my predictions. In that same work I proposed a doctrinal change, in this case in our Armed Forces ( spanish army ), in my case I denominated a revolution, one second RAM (revolution of military Affairs). The Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency of June of 2006, came to corroborate my words of that work. Manual that has been exposed to all type of critics: for example : Mr. David Price that dedicates a demolishing article to this Field manual and whose title says; Prostitution of the anthropology to the service of the empire wars, like joy reactions, the one of Brazilian General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro who considers the document doctrinary counterinsurgency better elaborated book that the western world has seen to date. The peculiar thing of the case is that the own American army for more than two centuries has not made another thing that fight against insurgencies: war of the whiskey; war against the own American natives; boxers rebellion in China; revolution of Pancho Villa in Mexico, against the Vietcong in Vietnam. Except for the two great wars and Korea, they have not made another thing, and they have passed two centuries so that an ad hoc manual for this type of confrontations sees the light . If there were to look for a base of this manual, this is clear: the civil populace like target (in the good sense by all means) of the counterinsurgent strategy, is more, in the work previously mentioned I alluded to a deep term / concept: empathy; to put yourself in the shoes of the other, the enemy; is basic and.. Who is the other?. In the first place the civil population; since the growth and the continuation of an irregular force, depend doubtless on the support; in amplest of the senses of the term; provided by the civil population (affections, activities, vulnerabilities, movements, ideological and religious tendencies) without harming their fundamental rights, but working concerning intelligence. This is one of the branches that the new doctrine must harness exponentially, the intelligence, (true intelligence, without relax) taking with tweezers that principle of which the neutrality is suspicious or negative and the 00.34.615.06.56.56
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classification that tend to become in relation to not with me, against me, and the great weapon of S XIX, the information, in relation to which psychological war is denominated, whose objective is to influence in the opinions, emotions, attitudes and behaviors of groups, mainly hostile. (White, gray and black Propaganda). In the 2007, Head of the joint E.M of the USA, admiral Michael Mullen indicated before the Congress of this country: In Iraq we do what we must, in Afghanistan, we do what we can. The coordination and supervision of Petraeus broke the losing strategy through principles simple, but radical: to concentrate in the protection of civilians instead of to be reiterative to trying the destruction of the enemy, assuming majors risks and of using the minimum of outside instead of the maximum. Really what I referred at the time for our FFAA ( Spanish army, that also participate in this type of missions) had to carry out on the part of 1 world-wide power, a total revolution in the form to approach the armed confrontation. We do not have to forget that from the antiquity and it seems a lesson non learned by the great strategists whom history has given (Napolen, etc) that the military superiority pushes the enemy to the insurrection inexorably to reach its objectives. The study of the nature of the war is fundamental or of the conflict before which we faced, an incorrect appreciation can take to the disaster, since the strategy to apply is inherent to the nature of the conflict, always asymmetric, or in the streets of Baghdad or Gaza definitively, in the Forests of the Philippines or Colombia, and the appearance of new arisen nonlethal arms with the globalisation: communication. The example we found in Afghanistan. To that it must relative the failure of the Americans in Afghanistan. First a defeatist mentality in relation to the character of unmanageable of the border zone between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Secondly in relation to the attempt of extrapolating the western social structure to Afghanistan. They must think that when not existing a central authority to the western style, it implies of categorical form that government does not exist, when very well well-known is with visualize a documentary of National Geographic that the tribes pastuns who colonise the zone for centuries have developed their own form and to govern and its own means to solve disputes. The power must be given back to these, this despossesin or ignorance of the forces of the coalition is a weapon that take advantage of the leaders, talibans in their own benefit, because really according to observations of journalists, members of ONGs scorn of the foreigner on the part of the Afghan population does not exist most of, wish to free themself of talibans, but fear later. If right now a survey to the Afghan population were realised on as they are its main preoccupations, we will be able to observe that they do not defer so much from the western ones: electricity, work, water, education, really DEVELOPMENT, and this it necessarily implies the security generation and an increase of confidence as much in the foreign forces as in its own government, it is not question to organize first democratic elections to big drum and subject of gossip 00.34.615.06.56.56
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and to publish it at world-wide level, indeed in the place where that information must provide effect does not do it, because they lack infrastructures, work, education etc and therefore security in amplest of the senses. The counterinsurgency Manua,l and that one frustrated work ( my old work), made much emphasis in this aspect, basic, fundamental for the correct disappearance and development of the operation of the insurgency. The modern armies are designed; in that I did much emphasis at the time; in order to inflict unbearable casualties, disproportioned for the enemy, comparing the little number of casualties to the victory. It is a clamorous failure and the facts have not done more than give to me the reason, the firepower would only be effective in a conventional confrontation, this new doctrine preaches the substitution of the firepower by work power. There are several questions that do not have to be lost of view at any moment, and are that: the strategy of the counterinsurgency, according to the experts demands between 20 and 30 cash counter-insurgent by each 1000 inhabitants, for example in Afghanistan between troops of the coalition and Afghan forces there is less than a third of that amount. And for that reason less secondly, non important it is not possible to be in war always, is a situation that no army can maintain during long time To always measure the force. In many occasions whatever more force is used, minor is the effectiveness. Here we would approach the tremendous problem of the collaterals damages, each low civilian at the hands of friendly troops erodes already limited benevolence of the population towards the foreign troops, appears reflected in the propaganda of the insurgents. (very important) In European Union, at police level is known in the heat of the moment like the right of persecution; in this case; the cross-border persecutions or incursions without the support of the invaded country generate an effect boomerang that does not make them productive. In relation to the manual coordinated by General D.H. Pretaeus, we could summarize his more two hundred pages of treaty counterinsurgency in a series of basic premises: And first main like police the USA to protect and serve, to protect and to serve to the population, implying this not only the coexistence with the population (next Bases), but fast restoration of the basic services, to become familiar with the neighbourhood: to learn history, customs, structures and to respect them. The areas that have made sure must immediately be occupied, persecuting of implacable form the enemy once located not giving breathing him some. Fundamental piece, is to fight implacably the information war, since a clarified understanding of the situation constitutes a clear advantage, having to operate with base in having to share (according to with that). Basic arms also are the use of the money like a weapon system, to learn and to adapt (creation of specific equipment battle) and to prepare 00.34.615.06.56.56
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themselves and to be useful without letting pass one all the opportunities that appear to us. In the work to that I allude supra, was realised by myself an approach next to the gray land, the urban land, we do not forget that the catchphrase of the insurgent groups is clear: We will turn the cities into forests and marshes, although still theaters exist that favors the action of these groups and do not have to forget: forests and lands of the Afghan type. It is clear that, once again, as always they are the Americans first in adapting, at least theoretically; by means of the publication of field manual; a theater that takes suffering but of 200 years and whose explosion was than predictable more already since the end of the century last with the outcrop of the terrorism in its different facets and the capacity from use from the same through any revolutionary organization, the rest of the Armed Forces follows the tail although the simple logic warned of happening of the confrontations in the 21st century that now we began. Bibliography: -. Work presented/displayed by the author of the present article to the Prizes Army the 2004 with title Spanish army and the urban war. The necessity of a revolution. -. Field Manual 3-24, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24fd.pdf. -. Counterinsurgency indoctrinates and Asan realities. Video conference of the Professor Sir. Adam Roberts. Doctor in Counterinsurgency by the University of Oxford. www.youtube.com/watch?v=N02-AscpaYw. Conference in date 05/03/2009. -. The language of insurgency in Afghanistan. Prof Mr. Donald.M.Snow. Alabama University. -. Counterinsurgency Field Manual: Afghanistan edition. Nathaniel C. Fick,JhonA.Ngl.5of enerode2009.www.foreingpolicy.com/articles/2009/01/05/counterinsurgen cy_field_manual_afghanistan_edition.page -. Field Manual 31-15 U.S. Army. -. Manual of 1987: regulation battle of anti-guerrilla EJG3-10 approved by the general Commando of Troopses of Colombia.

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Brief Bio Luis Munar Born in Ceuta (Spain) Address: Avenue of Ribarroja 53 City: La Eliana (Valencia) Postal Code: 46183 Country: Spain Email: echnx@hotmail.com

Movil Number : 00.34.615.06.56.56

Lieutenant of the Spanish Air Force. Reserve Studies -.Degree in Laws University of Valencia.1984-1989. Valencia -.Pilot (airplane). Royal school flying club of Malaga. 1997-1998.Mlaga. More than 400 hours, in different planes 150 in turbo propeller plane. ( IFR and VFR flights) -.University specialist in security and defence.2001-2002. UNED / Instituto General Gutirrez Mellado Madrid.( Post degree formation) -. Graduated in calligraphic Skill and documentsoscopy.2004. Scrates center. Sevilla -. University expert in Intelligence Services.2005-2006. UNED / Instituto de Universitario Gral. Gutierrez Mellado. -. International course on the Yihadist Terrorism .2007. University Pablo de Olavide. Carmona. Sevilla. -. Certificated in Terrorism Studies by the University of St. Andrews (Scotland). 2007 -. Course of Commanding United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. (United Nations training and research Programme) .2007. -. Course of Management of Projects. MS Project. 2008. Valencia Enterprise confederation. 2008. -. Course of Multiprojects Management. Tea Cegos (Madrid). 2009 -.Seminar Al qaedas Afghan Strategy. Janes ( IHS Limited).2010 -. Course : Military Intelligence in peace operations. CIFCD. Centro de formacin interactiva para la Cultura de Defensa.2010 -.Course: Superior security direction. In Tel Aviv (Israel) 23-31 of October. PSOS. ( Professional School of security).

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-.Course: Security, Terrorism and Information. CIFCD. Centro de formacin interactiva para la Cultura de Defensa. 2010 -.Course of Counter terrorismo and modern Strategies. Institute Counter Terrorism. IDC. Herzliya. Israel. 2011. -.Course Intelligence and Technology investigation. Technologic institute of Aragn. Zaragoza. -.METT Advanced Course (Micro-expression training tool) by Peter Ekman Group. 2011. -.Course: Nuclear, biological and chemical hazards. Institute of Strategic Studies of the Catholic University Valencia. 2011. -. Day on Security systems in industrial sectors .PROSEGUR. 2011. -.Seminar. Unmanned Mission Impossible - 4 Steps to Conquering the UAV Human Machine Interface. By Keven Gambold.( Squadron Leader RAF (Retired).) Defence IQ. 2011 -.Seminar. The Military Mind at War: A PSYOPS Commanders Strategies for the Post-Afghan Battlefield. By Lieutenant-Colonel Bruno Vanasse, Former Deputy Director for Psychological Operations (PSYOPS) in the Canadian Army. Defence IQ.2011. -.Seminar.MARP Protection proven under fire( Mine Resistent Ambush Protected) By Colonel Peterson ( Military deputy for joint MRAP vehicle) and Trucke Norton (Dupont-Global Technology for the ballistic threat. IQ Defence.2011. -.Course Advanced combat and shooting in conflict areas. Guardian Homeland security Ltd. Gideon Kibutz and Qesarea. Israel.2011

Professional experience Lawyer ( Valencia, Mlaga ) Salesman Santa Lucia. Insurance company. Commercial inspector FIATC .. Insurance company Commercial inspector. Eagle Star Life S.A. (Valencia) Insurance company. Legal adviser of Divina Pastora Insurance

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Head of security more than 5 years in Divina Pastora insurance. Vice-president of insurance company during three years. .(Insurance company).Head of security. . (http://www.divinapastora.com/seguros/acercade/memoria_dp_09.pdf/ / http://www.google.es/#sclient=psy&hl=es&q=infrome+pacto+mundi al+divina+pastora+seguros&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&pbx=1&fp=ed9 6f8f82c7a9d3a )

(www.divinapastora.com/seguros/acerca-de/memoria_dp_09.pdf) IEEI (Estrategic International Estudies Institute) of Valencia Catholic University. Member Experience in conflict places. ( Gaza strip)

The

war

against

terrorism

after

Bin

Laden.

http://www.observatoriomilitar.es/articulo.asp? pagina=index.asp&seccion=25&titulo=La+guerra+contra+el+terrori smo+despu%E9s+de+Bin+Laden&id=2634.

Comunications IV Security and defence international Congress. Granada University. 3th November. Sahel as a islamic insurgency breeding ground. Water Wars. Others Profesor Course in Management of the Security in Facilities, Events and Sport Activities. Polytechnical university of Valencia.

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