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The Formulation of the Baghdad Pact Author(s): Ara Sanjian Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No.

2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 226-266 Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Stable URL: Accessed: 11/04/2009 09:45
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The Formulationof the Baghdad Pact


The formulation of the 1955 Turkish-Iraqi Pact of Mutual Co-operation, which metamorphosed soon afterwards into the short-lived five-power Baghdad Pact, is nowadays usually seen as the direct result of the initiative taken by the United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, after the latter's historic trip across eleven Middle Easterncapitals in May 1953. This famous tour - the first-ever to the area by an American head of diplomacy - is now generally considered as a watershed in Middle East politics, burying plans for the long-cherished Middle East Defence Organisation (MEDO), designated to create a regional bulwark against any possible Soviet penetration, and replacing it with plans to set up the so-called 'Northern Tier' collective defence project, based on the voluntary participationof pro-WesternMiddle Easterncountries lying on the southern borders of the USSR. In light of the documentary evidence now available, however, this assertion can be held as true only in its broadest sense. Dulles was indeed convinced during the said tour that the continuing controversy between the British and Iranian governments over the fate of the recently nationalized Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the conflict between Egypt and Britain over British military presence in the Suez Canal base zone, and the continuing Arab-Israeli dispute over Palestine clearly made MEDO a futureratherthan an immediate possibility. He also deduced that MEDO had not worked because of Western predominance. Instead, Dulles concluded that the prospect of an anti-Soviet collective defence alliance was more encouraging in Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq and Syria, where political leaders seemed to be more aware of the Communist threat. His new approach envisaged an association of local forces under an indigenous command. Outside powers could not present a blueprint and expect it to be accepted automatically. Their absence could even encourage other Middle Easterncountries to join. As the pact developed, however, Western advisers could become involved in the matters of planning and organization. The 'NorthernTier' scheme would, furthermore, separate the issues of regional defence from the intricacies of inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli politics.' Dulles understood, however, that, ultimately, for a really viable defence concept to develop fully, the participation,or at least the co-operation, of most Arab states in
Middle EasternStudies, Vol.33, No.2, April 1997, pp.226-266 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON



the regionwould be necessary. The latter,however,becauseof theirpast colonialexperiences with Franceandthe UnitedKingdom, theiremergent nationalism pastAmerican Britishsupport Israel,did not seem and and for readyto join any such scheme in the immediate future.Based on these observations,Washingtondecided to follow a more independentand responsible policy in the area vis-a-vis Britain; drop the previous multilateral and stateslike Iraqand approach work insteadon individual Pakistan,and possibly Syria. Nevertheless,the 'Northern Tier' project shouldnot be viewed still as a radicalbre,ak withpastplans.Indeed,none of the countries involvedin the extensiveconsultations set up previously to MEDO,Britainand Turkeyincluded,saw it as such. Rather, Dulles's trip was simplya new andimportant of stagein theevolution thegeneral Middle East defenceplan, which was being deliberated Westerncapitalsever in since the Cold Warpressures begun to be felt in the areain the late had 1940s.AyeshaJalalrightlypointsout thatmuchof Dulles's so-callednew ideas had been implicit in the policies pursuedby formerUS President S. Harry Truman his administration.2 and Dulles'spredecessor Secretary as of State,Dean Acheson, for example,had suggested,as early as August 1950,thatby linkingTurkey, andIraq,a formidable Iran shieldagainstthe Soviets might be raised at no real cost to Washington other than a few driblets military economicaid.3 of and Therehadindeedbeensomefriction, in thepast,betweenBritainandtheUnitedStateson how the regionshould be defended. Throughout bothsideshaddrawncloserin all 1952,however, areasof defenceco-operation, Britain with at arriving the conclusionthatit was necessaryto co-ordinate defenceeffortswith Turkeyand plan a new defence strategybased on rapidand mobile forces stationedin Cyprus, LibyaandJordan. Thisscheme,theBritish hoped,wouldeventually replace theirold plansof havinga staticandexpensivedefenceline witha locus at the Suez Canalbase. Hence,Britainhad begunto makefriendlyrelations with Iraqand Jordana priorityso that she could retainher strategically important positionsin both states and stockpilethere additional military A supplies.4 few weeksaftertheDullestour,Britain finallyagreed, theory in at least,thatthe collectiveMEDOapproach shouldbe shelvedfor the time being,andthatthe best courseto achievea collectivesecurityorganization wouldbe to workindividually withcertain MiddleEastern states.5 This articlestrivesto show thatthe individual concernsof the original of signatories the Baghdad Pact,Turkey Iraq,wereequally, notmore, and if significantin accordingthe 'Northern Tier' scheme its eventual shape compared with the above-mentioned relatively vagueproposals Dulles. of Turkeyhad fearedany Soviet advancein the MiddleEast ever since Moscow had made,in 1945, the automatic renewalof its 1925 Treatyof Friendship Neutrality Turkey and with conditional thelattersurrendering on



the easternregionsof KarsandArdahan acceptingSovietparticipation and and in the defenceof the straitsof the Bosphorus the Dardanelles. Hence, the vast majorityof TurksrejectedCommunismas a form of Russian imperialideology,and accordedthe class- and value-oriented ideological aspectsof the Cold Warless, thoughnot entirelynegligible,importance. in Even afterMoscow's relinquishment 1953 of all its above-mentioned withTurkey and wish to establishcloserco-operation claims,its expressed Ankara its repeated offersof economichelpdidnoteaseTurkish suspicions. believedthatMoscow'spolicy was to makesuch attractive proposalsand in an attemptto influence the course of Turkey's later withdrawthem in whileothernationalisms the developing world foreignpolicy.Therefore, were lookingto Moscow for sympathy supportagainstthe West,the and Sovietthreat closerto theWestandmadereliance perceived brought Turkey a on the latterto preventSoviet/Russian expansionism pillar of Turkish foreignpolicy. The Turkishgovernment consideredTurkey'sdefence intereststo be the view identicalwiththoseof the Westandofficiallyendorsed American thatglobalpeace was indivisibleand thattroublein any partof the world the two contained seedsof a generalconflagration.6 Turkey's mainpolitical parties,the Republican People'sParty(RPP)andthe Democrat Party(DP), of NATO in 1952, and accusationsof supportedTurkey'smembership 'pursuinga neutralistpolicy' reportedlybecame 'a powerful insult in Turkey'!. Turkeywas thereforeafraidof taking any steps which might and told Moscow on various jeopardizeits relationswith Washington in occasionsthatanyimprovement bilateral relations couldonly resultfrom the development of general relations between NATO countries and Moscow. The Turks were even concerned that the apparentlymore conciliatorySoviet line in the post-Stalinera might confuse Western sick andtiredof the ColdWar- andundermine NATO's opinion- already resolve to build up its defences,as well as open the way to negotiations which might involve concessions to the Soviets.8 Moreover,Turkey assumedthatAmericanaid to Turkeyand the latter'srole in the foreign of linked.AdnanMenderes, policy calculations the Westwere intimately Turkey'sPrimeMinisterfrom 1950 to 1960, used to tell visiting foreign that was of dignitaries his country the bulwark defenceof the MiddleEast and had, up to that point, saved the Middle East from Communist aggression.If it was to continueto play that vital role, however,then it would be necessaryto increaseits economic strength.9 Turkeyjoined in efforts to extend the networkof anti-Sovietalliances in its immediate vicinity. In the Balkans,in the early 1950s, Turkeymade the Balkan Defence Pact with Greeceand Yugoslavia, theoretically bindingthe three countriesin a mutualdefence accordfor twentyyears.'" Ankarahad also



in defencesystemas expressedwillingnessto participate a MiddleEastern had earlyas February 1949, andthe DP government laterplayedan active The RPP'sdisagreements role in all MEDOdeliberations." opposition with of on the government thisissuewereusuallyon pointsof application policy It certain andnoton fundamental principles. only expressed misgivingsthat Turkey might overreach itself by undertaking additional military or couldtry to commitments fellow MiddleEastern countries, thatthe latter in to make use of the new arrangements orderto claim Turkey's support againsttheirown regionaladversaries.12 in YetTurkey beenincluded a destination Dulles'stouronly atthe had as last minute, and that only at the expressedinsistenceof Menderes.In the headof diplomacy Ankara, American held meetingswithbothTurkish President CelalBayarandMenderes, failedto convert but themto accepting his new 'Northern Tier'planandthenecessityof bringing theArabstates in in somecapacity order maketheenvisaged in to and organization politically viable. Ratherthan wait any longer for the Arab states, the strategically Turkish leaderssaidthattheypreferred see the fourWestern to powers,the UnitedStates,the UnitedKingdom, FranceandTurkey, who had formally initiatedthe Middle East collective defence scheme in 1951, proceed toward immediately settingup a formalorganization stateclearlythatit and would be open to accession by all countriesin the region, including Pakistan. Menderes assuredDulles thatTurkeyremained anxiousto work with the Arab states. The latter,however,were still not ready for cooperation.'3 Hence, Turkey'sofficial, though not publicized,reactionto Dulles's 1 Junetelevisionspeech,outliningthe new 'Northern Tier' plan, was 'rathernegative'.The US ambassador Ankara,GeorgeMcGhee, in reportedthat the Turkishleadershipfelt that the Americans,despite thatthe establishment MEDOwith Arabparticipation recognizing of had now become only a remotepossibility,were failing to draw what they considered logical and necessaryconclusionof going aheadwith the the defenceorganization planned without Arabs.'4 the ThisTurkish reluctance workwiththe Arabsat thisjuncture to certainly needselaboration. the Throughout 1920s and 1930s,Turkey generally had shunnedfrom close relationswith its Arab neighbours,the short-lived Sa'dabad Pact(1937), whichincluded bothTurkey Iraq,beingthe sole and exception.Turkishintellectualsof the period thoughtof the Arabs as who backward, could only progressby adopting Republican Turkey's path of westernization, secularization collaboration the West.Thepostand with SecondWorldWarSoviet threat,however,had madeTurkeyrealizehow isolatedit hadbecomefromits neighbours. had,therefore, It hurriedly tried to ameliorate relationswith the newly emergingsovereignArabstatesby treaties withthe Hashemite in signingfriendship Kingdoms Iraq(1946) and



Jordan (1947). Turkey had since accepted, in principle, the necessity to forge close strategic links with all its Arab neighbours. Although Turkish leaders had no confidence whatever in the political or military competence of the Arabs, they still hoped that Arab involvement in MEDO would make Soviet infiltration into the region very difficult. Turkey's ultimate goal was to bring all Arab countries into NATO, since it considered the concepts of a neutralArab or a larger Islamic bloc as utopian. It had preferred,however, up to this stage, to work separately with individual Arab countries, fearing that if any proposal was referredto the League of Arab States, it would go nowhere. Turkey had also shared the belief that Egypt's position was the key to the Arab world. If Cairo could be convinced to adhere to a regional alliance, bringing in other Arab countries would be made much easier. Differences in political outlook between Turksand Arabs in general, as well as their contrasting evaluations of threats and interests, had made this envisaged rapprochementextremely difficult, however. Turkey's emerging close alignment with the West had inversely affected her relations with the Arabs. Arab nationalistsin many newly independentstates wanted to pursue their own political agendas like achieving full sovereignty and solving the Palestine problem. Some of them even viewed the new global antagonism between East and West as a serious distraction from their own causes, into which, they thought, the Western powers were determined to drag them. Because Turkey had had to demonstrate her strategic importance for the West, she had preferred not to get involved in conflicts of the newly emerging Arab countries with the Western colonial powers, and had attempted to placate all sides simultaneously. In the United Nations organization (UN), it had generally voted with the Western bloc on issues like Egypt's refusal to let Israeli ships pass through the Suez Canal, the future of France's North African protectorates and Palestine. The Turkish government wanted the British forces to stay in the Suez Canal base in the prevailing tense international situation, fuelling Arab fears that Turkey's role in MEDO was indeed a cover for Western designs in the region. The Dulles visit coincided with one of those periods when the Turks had lost faith in pursuing efforts to woo the Arabs and had concluded that, because of Arab reluctance, any hope of having the latter accept MEDO should be abandoned for the time being. In October 1952 Britain and Turkey had agreed that they should proceed as occasion offered to work on individual Arab states with the object of getting them to take a more realistic attitude towardsMEDO." Turkey,believing that she was in a betterposition than the other Western powers concerned to persuade the Arabs, had then gone forward with a program designed to strengthen relations with the Arab countries, mainly through a series of visits by top-level officials and as parliamentarians, well as cultural exchanges.'6The Arab states, however,




had shown little inclination to respond to Turkish overtures for closer relations; and as months had gone by, Turkey had become steadily more disillusioned by their behaviour.'7 Finally, Menderes had ordered the suspension of the initiative at the end of April 1953, i.e. a month or so before the Dulles visit.'8 Instead,in the months following the Dulles tour,Turkeymoved closer to Pakistan.The latterhoped that, by aligning herself with the West, she would receive military aid to enlarge and re-equip her armed forces and thus be in a stronger bargaining position vis-a-vis her neighbours, India and Afghanistan, with both of whom she had territorialdisputes. The United States showed interest in associating Pakistan with the chain of local defensive arrangements,but was unwilling to do this directly. It therefore secretly encouragedTurkeyto approachPakistanitself. The Turkishleaders went along with this American plan. A flexible Turkish-Pakistani agreement on bilateral defence co-operation was signed in Karachi on 2 April 1954, and Washington followed by committing itself to provide military equipment and trainingto the Pakistani armed forces on condition that Pakistan would not undertakeany act of aggression against any other nation and that the assistance received would be used exclusively to maintain the country's security, or to permit it to participate in UNsponsored or regional collective defence arrangementsand measures.'9 The staunchTurkishattitudeas regardsfuturedefence co-operationwith the Arab world soon underwentsufficient change, however, to make a new demarche to Iraq to join Turkey's projected alliance with Pakistanpossible even before the signing of any formal agreement. On 16 February1954, the Turkish ambassadorin Baghdad unofficially invited the Iraqi Premier, Dr Fadil al-Jamali, to join the projected Turkish-Pakistani treaty.20 Then, simultaneously with the publication of the joint Turkish-Pakistani communiqueof intent a few days later,Turkey'sForeign Minister,Professor Fuat Kopriilu,declared that the proposed agreement would be open to any friendly power that wished to join,2' and, a few days later, expressed the hope that 'the Arab countries would also one day show interest in the pact' 22 Turkey'sfull reversalto its old strategy of trying to bring Iraq,followed by other like-minded Arab states, into a Western-inspired Middle East collective defence arrangementwas formalized during a special conference of Turkish diplomats held in Ankara and Istanbul on 12-17 July 1954, chaired by Bayar and Menderes, and attended by other ministers, senior foreign ministry officials, as well as the Turkish heads of mission in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan,Egypt, Iraq and Syria. A consensus was reached that the Turkish-Pakistani agreement had stimulated some rather more constructive political thinking amongst the Arabs. The latter would



probably become furtherimpressed by friendly gestures from Turkey, like cultural contacts, invitations and exchange of visits with leaders. These measures would help erase the negative memories of past Ottoman domination in Arab lands. The conference also decided that, after having been rebuffed so many times in the past, an exception should be made for Egypt in Turkey's generalpolicy of goodwill, and this decision explained to other Arab states. It forecast that Syria, Lebanon and Jordanwould continue their 'wait and see' policy, while Iraq, although willing to join, was simply lacking the courage to do so. The proposed rapprochementwith the Arab world must not involve, however, any change in Turkey's policy of friendshipwith Israel. Arab countries should acknowledge the reality of the existence of Israel and that a solution should be found to the Arab-Israeli conflict according to the existing realities.23 The Turkisharchives being inaccessible, it is difficult to find out exactly why the Turkishleadershipchanged its attitudeas regardsthe Arabs. It may be that the views expressed to Dulles in 1953 had simply been a manifestationof one of the occasional troughs in Turkishenthusiasm to cooperate with the Arab world on defence matters because of repeated Arab cold-shouldering. Some contemporary observers, followed by a not negligible group of later historians, on the other hand, tried to find at least part of the answer in the fast deteriorating economic prospects within The Turkishgovernmentsaw additionalWestern Turkeyof the mid- 1950s.24 aid as one of the few ways available to ease the economic hardships,and a more determinedTurkishforeign policy in pursuanceof Westerngoals was probably deemed very important to create the right atmosphere to gain access to foreign, especially American, aid. The choice of Iraq as the first Arab country to be approached was perhapspredictable.Of all the Arab countries, the Iraqileadership felt most that the Soviet Union was a real threatto the country's independence and its established political order.It believed that Iraq'srich oil reserves could lure the Soviet regime to try to extend its influence there either through direct aggression, or, more probably, through members of the banned local Communist Party and its sympathizers, or through manipulating Kurdish nationalist sentiment in Northern Iraq. In the early 1950s Iraq was still a relatively poor country, and the establishment feared that widespread discontent among the lower strataof society could be easily manipulatedby propagandacoming out of Moscow and, even more skilfully, by its local sympathizers.These fears had crystallized especially after the confrontation in Iran in the summer of 1953 between the conservative forces loyal to the Shah and their radical-nationalist and left-wing opponents. The Iraqi establishmenthad been shocked in seeing the Shah being forced to leave his country temporarilyand had feared, for a while, that the coming to power



in Iran of the radical-leftist Tudeh(Masses) Party might have serious consequences in Iraq, as well as other Arab states. Soon afterwards,it had seriously begun to look for ways to make the repetition of such events, this time in Iraq, impossible.25 Iraq's main source of revenue, the oil royalties received from the foreign-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), were, according to the country's leaders, not enough both to keep their development programme

a going andto equipandmaintain strongarmyagainstany possibleoutside threat.They had, therefore,shown stronginterestin maintaining close with the formermandatory relations relations power,Britain.British-Iraqi sincethe termination theLeagueof Nationsmandate hadbeengoverned, of in 1932, by the 1930 Treatyof Preferential Alliance.Underits provisions, Iraqwas boundto co-operate closely with the UK on foreignanddefence to policy matters, accordthe Britishambassador Baghdad'precedence' in in relationto the diplomatic of representatives otherstates,andto resortto Britishmilitary civilianadvisers, and whenever assistance foreigntechnical was needed. Britaincould also use local facilities to transport troops
through Iraqi territoryand had retainedcontrol of the al-Shu'aybah and alThe 25-year treaty,due to expire in 1957, had long Habbaniyyahair bases.26 been unpopular with large segments of educated Iraqis, and both governments had come to recognize that new arrangementshad to be made, if the alliance was to survive. Many radical pan-Arab nationalist and reform-minded left-wing Iraqis, however, wanted to see the treaty simply scrapped unilaterally. Under their pressure, the Treaty of Portsmouth, Britain and Iraq had negotiated in January 1948 to replace the said 1930 treaty, had been repudiatedby the Iraqi establishment within a few days of

its signature.The Iraqi government, however,was still keen to sign a

revised agreement because it considered the alliance with Britain to be a factor of stability for the monarchicorder.It first suggested to the British the idea of terminating the existing treaty and replacing it with new arrangementsunder the guise of a regional defence co-operation scheme stipulated by Article 51 of the UN Charterimmediately after the events in Iran of August 1953.27Membersof the Iraqielite, had realised,in the

thatAmerican meantime, influencein the MiddleEast was growingvery

rapidly and had thereforebegun to shift some of their friendship and loyalty to Washington. In March 1953, Iraq made clear that, in order to strengthen

its armedforces,it wouldlike in the futureto receivesome of its military

equipment free from the United States, because the high cost of its development programmeant that it could not afford to continue to buy all its military needs from Britain.28 The request was repeated during Dulles's visit in May. Moreover, Iraq had, for a long time, had almost trouble-free bilateral relations with both Turkey and Pakistan. Finally, and as far as



military/strategic thinking was concerned, for the Turkish-Pakistani to wouldhaveto fill theterritorial agreement haveanyeffect,thesignatories gap between them sooner ratherthan later. The defence of the Iranian of the provinceof Azerbaijan, the passesthrough Zagrosmountains of and the Tigris-Euphrates valley in Iraqand Syriawere essentialfor protecting
the region and especially Turkey's eastern flank. Beyond the Zagros there

were no natural geographical obstacles to southern Iraq and the mentioneda Mediterranean. Iraq'sadherencewould give the agreement from in depth, air bases, and lines of communication strategicposition Turkeyto the Persian/Arab Gulf, which could be used to supportvital defensivepositionsat the saidpasses.9 withTurkey.30 did He Al-Jamali anxiousto improve was Iraq'srelations of and into notrush,however, an earlyacceptance the proposed agreement, or even deniedpubliclythatIraqhadbeeninvitedtojoin the agreement had with its clauses.3'He probablyfeared violent internal been acquainted the landedclassesin thecountry for werein opposition, although influential favourof both acceptanceof US militaryaid and associationwith the and nationalist left-wingopposition was Turkish-Pakistani the radical pact, A not negligible.32 furthercomplicationwas that the Turkish-Pakistani approachcoincided with the last stages of the State Department's deliberations whetherto approveof the March 1953 Iraqi requestfor aid The military or not. The two questionsbecameobjectivelyinterlinked. in of StateDepartment finallyauthorized, April,the signature a $10 million annualmilitaryassistanceagreementwith Iraq, on conditionthat Iraq should at least declare publicly its support for regional defence coDulles also warnedal-Jamalithat if Iraq'sfirst move after operation.33 signing the aid agreementwas against Israel throughaccomplishinga than the politicalunionwithSyria,rather toward 'Northern Tier',theUnited The deal Statescould still revokethe signed agreement.34 Iraqi-American not was officiallycalledan 'understanding', an 'agreement', view of the in special internallegal position in Iraq. Trying to avoid criticism and opposition all meanspossible,the Iraqigovernment by preferred to be not to of required submitthe agreement the Chamber Deputiesfor approval. to Al-Jamali officiallytold,however, theUnitedStatesconsidered was that the exchange of notes to constitutean international agreementand would themwiththe UN.35 eventually register Al-Jamalisoon had to resignon mattersunrelated US aid and the to Turkish-Pakistani pact, and the questionof Iraqiadherence the latter to had agreement to be put on hold pendingnew parliamentary elections.36 This delaymadeTurkey restlessaboutpossibleIraqinon-adherence the to Turkish-Pakistani tactics of granting treaty.It questionedWashington's seeminglyunconditional militaryaid to Iraq,fearingthatthe latterwould



Menderes now havelittleincentivetojoin the above-mentioned and treaty.37 Muhammad agreedin Junethat 'Iraq's the Pakistani primeminister, Ali, recent behaviourhad been unsatisfactory; since she appearedto say the the different thingsto the Pakistanis, Turks, Americans the British, and with the obviousintentionof drawingthe maximumadvantage of the out presentsituation,whilst avoidingany commitments.'38 also agreed They that the strongestpressureshould be broughtupon Iraq and that 'the momentmust shortlycome when Iraqshouldbe asked to say definitely whether proposed accedeor not'.3Menderes to it opinedthat'Iraq indulged of merelyin expression goodwillandput forward excuse of its public the opinionnotbeingreadyfor notjoiningin the defencearrangements. did He not considerthis argument valid.Publicopinionin Iraq,he thought, would be only too happyto see Iraqassociateherselfwith Pakistan Turkey. and One-third the population Iraqwas Turkish of of (sic!), andhe knew thata majorportionof the populationwas in fact alreadyin favourof these On arrangements'. 11 JuneMenderes told the Iraqiambassador Ankara in that Iraqwas not 'sufficientlyconscious' of the Communist dangerand wamedhim that 'if Turkey downto the Capeof Good collapsedcountries Hope would collapse too' A monthlater,the General-Secretary the .4 of Turkish ForeignMinistry, Muharrem Nuri Birgi, told BritishAmbassador Sir JamesBowkerthatthe Turkish government 'anxiousto putan end was to disingenuous ambiguities Iraq'sattitude; of even if Iraqgave negative reply to Turkish approach would at least enableus to see wherewe that stood'.4 StrongIraqiinterest adhere theprojected to to 'Northern Tier'collective defence scheme resurfacedin earnest late that summer with the reof appointment the veteran Iraqi Nurial-Said,to thepremiership. politician, The new Iraqi Chamberelected in June 1954 had some very difficult problemsto tackle,especiallythe termination the 1930 treatyand the of of negotiation new defencearrangements Iraq.PrinceAbdul-Ilah, for the CrownPrinceof Iraqandthe mostpowerfulfigurein the royalhousehold, becameconvincedthatonly Nurihad the influenceand the experienceto managethis trickytask. Nuri, however,was extremelyunhappywith the resultsof the recentelections, for his own Constitutional Union Party's numerical strength been reduced the Chamber manyprominent had in and leftistpoliticians,with whomhe did not wish to work,had been returned. To secureNuri'sreturn the premiership, to therefore, Abdul-Ilah left was with little choice but to promisenew elections even before the recently electedChamber officiallyconvened.42 had Nuri had long advocatedclose co-operation with the West, and with Britain particular. now saw in the new American in He readiness provide to armsto individual MiddleEastern states,in return theirco-operation for in



the 'Northern Tier' project,a golden opportunity Iraqand otherArab for countriesto improvetheirdefencecapability to influencethe Westto and agreeto some of the Arabdemands theirquestfor a lastingsolutionto in the Arab-Israeliconflict. Nuri contendedthat the Arab LeaguePolitical Committee agreedbackin 1949 thatthe Arabcountries had could not cooperate with the Communist states without themselves becoming and to Communist submitting the dictatesof Moscow,or remainneutral betweenEastandWestbecausetheydid not havethe meansto do so. They with could,however, Bloc provided questions the co-operate theWestern of the Suez Canalbase andPalestine weresettled.43 hadhencegreetedthe He Turkish-Pakistani as but agreement an inadequate, nevertheless positive, step towards eventual Arab co-operationwith the West." Upon his Nuri formallyasked King Faysal II of Iraq to call new appointment, electionsto give the population opportunity vote on his programme, an to whichstoodas follows: of of (a) termination the Anglo-Iraqi between Treaty 1930 andcooperation Iraqandotherforeignstatesin conformity withtheprovisions Article of 51 of the UnitedNationsCharter; of (b) the strengthening relationsbetween the Arab countriesand the removalof frictionandtensionbetweenthem; of withneighbouring statesandimprovement (c) strengthening relations of cooperationbetween them and the Arab states to repel the Zionist danger.45 He thenembarked a chainof measures silenceall his potential on to critics before proceedingwith the new general election planned to returna Chamber to entirelysubservient his politicalwhim. Included amongthose measureswere the suspensionof all existing politicalparties(including Nuri's own) and the closing down of certain oppositionnewspapers.' During the elections of 12 Septemberalmost all successful candidates lackedany recordof recentoppositionto the incumbent The regime.47 de of facto breaking-off Iraq'sdiplomaticrelationswith the Soviet Union formedthe finalchapter Nuri'santi-leftist in drive.48 Nurithenmadefindingsome sortof new defencearrangement the with United Kingdomand the United States his top priority.Soon after his above-described deal with Prince Abdul-Ilahin Paris, and even before to Baghdad takeup formallythe post of premier, to Nuripaid a returning privatevisit to Londonand had informalmeetingswith BritishForeign Office civil servants.At this stage his preferencewas 'not to join the Turkish-Pakistani to Agreement, rather forma separate but with grouping in Pakistan whichhe hopedHerMajesty's Government wouldplaya part'.4 He did not objectto Iraqbeing associatedwith Turkeyin a largeregional



groupingbut disliked the idea of signing a smaller pact with Turkey,arguing that the Turks were unpopularin Iraq and other Arab states, and were still suspected of harbouringirredentistdesigns in NorthernIraq.The assurances Nuri received later from Menderes personally, that Turkeydid not entertain any territorialambitions outside those stated in the 1920 Turkish National Pact, did nothing to allay his fears, for the terminology of the said pact as regards the previously disputed regions of Mosul and Kirkuk was too vague.'?Nuri told the Foreign Office staff that it had been agreed, during a private visit he had paid to Karachi in April, that, under a treaty limited to Iraq and Pakistan, 'Iraqwould not undertakeany obligation to go to the aid of Pakistan, but if Israel were to attack Iraq or her neighbours, Pakistan would undertaketo come to their aid, provided the United States saw no objection, because the Pakistanis reasoned that the success of the scheme depended on American military aid.'51 Nuri said that the projected Iraq-Pakistanpact 'would be open to accession by any country interestedin the peace of the area' - except France, whom Nuri disliked for its policies in Arabic-speakingNorth Africa and thought that it had nothing practicalto offer - and clarified that 'the purpose of this would be to enable the United Kingdom to join at a later stage'. British participation 'would provide a means', he said, by which Iraq and Britain 'could broach the question of revising the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty'. For Nuri, 'a pact of this kind could be a preliminary to either of two alternative broader solutions': a regional defence organizationbased on the Arab League with Egyptianparticipation; or a more limited sub-regional set-up, whereby Syria and Lebanon would join the projected Iraq-Pakistan treaty and thus ensure Iraq's lines of communication with the Mediterranean.Nuri said he had already spoken informally about his plans to American and, on mattersrelating to Syria and Lebanon, French officials. He went on to raise the possibility, perhaps to impress upon his British hosts his determinationto forge a new alliance, that Iraq might even have to leave the Arab League if Egypt refused to join the projected grouping.52 Thus, by August 1954, the situation in the Middle East as regards a possible breakthroughin collective defence negotiations seemed to have become more favourablethan it had ever been. Besides the renewed Turkish determinationto court Iraq and other Arab states, and the mandateNuri had given himself to revise the treaty arrangementswith Britain, a solution to the long Anglo-Egyptian dispute on the Suez Canal base had also become visible on the horizon with the initialling in July of a broadAnglo-Egyptian understanding,whereby the British agreed to evacuate the base within two years. Egypt, in return,conceded the right of British troops to returnto the base in case any member-stateof the Arab League Collective Security Pact (ALCSP) - signed in 1950 and including all independentArab states except



Libya - or Turkey were attacked from outside."3 This agreement finally changed British strategic thinking. With the air bases Britain possessed in Iraq suddenly acquiring additional strategic importance, she realized that Nuri's proposal of a 'NorthernTier' arrangement could provide the political 'umbrella', under which she could secure the revision of the 1930 treaty and, hence, finally decided to go by a scheme that excluded Egypt.54 The British government hoped that the new arrangementproposed by Nuri would satisfy Iraqi nationalist opinion, while preserving the spirit of the abortive PortsmouthTreaty.55 For Nuri, however, the Anglo-Egyptian agreementunexpectedly opened up other prospects as well, which, for a while at least, seemed to usher a radical shift in his plans for defence co-operation with the West. On 14 August the Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, Major Salah Salim, arrived in Sarsank, northern Iraq,56explaining that previous Egyptian with non-Arabstates, media opposition to all kinds of defence arrangements attacks on Iraq, and her indignant reaction to the news of the Turkish-Pakistani agreement had been made because of Egypt's fear of isolation, but, since agreement had now been reached on the future of the Salim said that although Egypt base, all those had become past history.57 continued to oppose the Turkish-Pakistani pact and all defence arrangementswith non-Arab countries, she saw merit in co-operation with the West and was ready to work towards it. He claimed to have been accorded full powers to reach with Iraq an understanding, written or otherwise, on the 'formulationof a general policy covering the relations of the Arab States with the West including the defence aspects of this policy'. 58 Nuri, therefore, suggested to Salim an idea which had always appealed to him personally: modifying the ALCSP to meet the requirements of Article 51 of the UN Charter and permit membership of regional and Western non-Arab states. Salim seemed to like it. Although no draft agreement was drawn up in the end, both sides agreed in principle to approachindividually both Britain and the United States to seek their views on the modifications requiredin the ALCSP text in order to expand it into an effective regional defence organization.59 Nuri was delighted with this preliminary agreement. He used with the US ambassador every argument he could think of to make Washington agree to the proposal. He suggested that, in the expanded pact, with US and British participation,the Arab members should pledge troops and military support to each other against aggression, from whatever source, as well as provide general support to its non-Arab members. There would be no question of Arab troops being sent abroad, but, he said, he was quietly confident that, in those circumstances, Egypt would agree to the reactivation of the Suez Canal base in the event of an external attack even




on Iran. Britain and the United States could provide military and technical aid to the Arab members in peace-time, as well as promise to send armed forces in case hostilities broke out. Nuri told the ambassador that 'the proposed pact had the merit of concentrating attention of Arab States on Soviet menace and diverting it from Israel', and one of its functions would be to prepare for peace with Israel in accordance with the spirit of the 1947-49 UN resolutions calling for the partition of Palestine between two, Jewish and Arab, states, the internationalizationof Jerusalemand the return of Arab refugees to their homes. In short, Nuri supported this plan, the ambassadorreported,because (i) objectives of Turkey-Pakistan Pact would be achieved more quickly and Arab world broughtinto Middle East defence; (ii) plan would accomplish objective of M.E.D.O. but would have the advantage of being put forwardby Arabs; (iii) Israel reaction had been considered. UK accession to the amended pact, said Nuri, would renderthe 1930 treaty obsolete. New arrangements could be negotiated under which the alShu'aybah and al-Habbaniyyah air bases would revert to Iraq, but agreements draftedby technical experts would regulate their use by Britain, as well as all other signatories. As regards French participation, Nuri preferrednot to invite them, because, he said, 'Frenchinfluence in Syria and North Africa [were] distasteful to all Arabs', and also because France, as he later told British ambassador Sir John Troutbeck, 'could make no contribution to Middle East defence'. Nuri's proposal seemed to have the general consent of Prince Abdul-Ilah. The latter, however, was more flexible on the issue of French adherence. He thought there would be no difficulty about including France if Britain insisted.60 Dulles, however, was reportedly 'greatlydisturbed'at this apparentmoving away by Iraqfrom the Turkish-Pakistanipact and even entertained the idea of reminding Iraq of the provisions of the above-describedmilitary aid agreement.6" In order to continue to build on the understandingreached in Sarsank, Nuri visited Cairo and had a meeting on 14 September with the Egyptian prime minister,Gamal Abdul Nasser. By then, it should have been apparent to him that Salim's enthusiasmin Sarsankwas not sharedby his superiors.62 The Nuri-Abdul Nasser meeting turned out to be crucial. No verbatim record of this encounter has been published, and both parties seem to have left the meeting with differing perceptions of each other's position. However, the accounts of some of the junior participantsin this meeting indicate that Nuri did most of the talking. Abdul Nasser, in the end, told the latter that he was free to do whatever he wished.63 What he really meant is still a matter for speculation, although its importance, for the purpose of



understanding and evaluating future Egyptian foreign policy, cannot be underestimated. Nuri himself understood it to be a green light, albeit a somewhat reluctant one. He told Sir Ralph Stevenson, the British ambassadorin Cairo, that the line he had taken with Abdul Nasser had been that Egypt, having reached an agreement with Britain over the Suez Canal base, which affected all the signatories of the ALCSP, should now work for the modification of that pact so as to improve the general defence of the Middle East with Western assistance. Egypt would thus be able to counteract the criticism among the Arab states that she had gone and concluded with Britain an agreement concerning them with no prior consultation. However, Nuri continued, if Egypt decided that the moment was yet inopportunefor such a move, Iraq would feel obliged to go ahead with her separate arrangements with Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. He understoodthat Abdul Nasser was cautious because of his worries that the internal situation in Egypt was not yet ripe for any advance towards organized Middle East defence and because of his belief that an Iraq-Pakistanpact would lead to the complete side-tracking of Egypt and other Arab states.' 'The Egyptians for domestic reasons were unwilling for the next two years or so to consider his ideas for a regional pact,' said Nuri. He felt, however, that he would be left free to work for some form of regional grouping, which would allow Egypt to join later, if it so desired.65 Nuri's optimism was probably not groundless, for, in an off-the-record interview with a representativeof the Arab News Agency on 16 December 1954, the British embassy in Cairo reported,Abdul Nasser had admitted to have told Nuri that Egypt had no alternative but to be on the side of the West, but was unable to accept his arguments that Iraq should join the Turkish-Pakistani pact. He further confessed that 'he had, however, indicated that if Iraq insisted on going ahead, Egypt would raise no objection. He had promised that there would be no attacks on Iraq in the Egyptianpress but had made it clear thatEgypt would not be able to support such a move by Iraq in the Arab League' [emphases added]. He also admitted that he had favoured the idea of including Iran in the basereactivationclause of any revised Anglo-Iraqi treaty.' With the amended ALCSP option having reached a dead end, Nuri returnedto some of his previous options. Immediately after leaving Egypt, he paid a lengthy visit to London, where he told Foreign Office Levant Department officials that he was now thinking of various possible arrangements: one, including Iraq,Turkey,Syria, Iranand Britain;a second, embracing Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Britain; and a third, limited to Iraq, Pakistan and Britain.67He thought that the third option was the most practical, and had even prepareda draft of an agreement with Pakistan with its Article 1 stating that 'Pakistan would come to the assistance of Iraq by




all possible means if Iraq or any of its neighbours was the victim of aggression'. Whilst in London, Nuri also had talks with the Pakistani Premier on this topic.68 It is evident that throughouthis negotiations Nuri emphasized different aspects of his projected pact to different parties. To the Americans, he stressed the Communist threat and tried to show the projected pact as a means to overcome the Arab conflict with Israel; with Turksand Pakistanis, he sought their supportagainst Israel; with Britain, he pushed forward the idea of revising the 1930 treaty. The US charge d'affaires in Baghdad, Phillip W. Ireland, reportedon 2 November that Nuri was 'adept [to] any tailoring [of] his argument to fit [the] listener on hand'.69 Future developments unmistakablyshow, however, that, besides the strengthening of his regime's standing at home, the treaty revision and the improvement of the general Arab position vis-ai-vis Israel were primarilywhat concerned him.70 Nuri could have, after all, simply allowed the 1930 treaty to lapse in 1957. He understood well, however, that the continuation of the British connection was essential for the survival of the Hashemite monarchy and the corresponding status quo in Iraq. By claiming to have terminated the unpopulartreaty,he could present it as a major national achievement, but it was extremely improbablethat he would be able to get any converts from the ranks of his opponents. Even after having forced the opposition underground,he was anxious, like al-Jamali before him, not to be obliged to pass the new arrangementswith Britain throughParliament,probably to prevent the repetition of the 1948 PortsmouthTreaty fiasco. Nuri told the British that 'his plan was to get the Iraqi Parliamentto ratify the [initial] agreement [preferablywith Pakistan] and thereafterto obtain the adherence of other Powers, including the UK. Once the UK had joined, he would declare the termination of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The military facilities which we [i.e. Britain] requirein Iraq could be negotiated between general staffs ... and would not need to come up for political ratification at any stage.' Nuri told the British Chief of the ImperialGeneral Staff and Chief of Air Staff that he envisaged the future facilities British forces would enjoy in Iraq to be on the lines of the Portsmouth treaty.7' Furthermore, a comparative analysis of his actions and various proposals show that Nuri, thus far, was consistently unwilling to enter an agreementlimited regionally to Iraq and Turkey, as well as against the inclusion of France in any final arrangement. The absence of Iranfrom Nuri's informal soundings should be explained only in terms of timing. Nuri made no secret of his desire to involve the Iranians in Middle East defence.72Indeed, after the 1953 western-inspired military coup against the nationalist Iranian Premier, Muhammad Musaddiq, the Shah had reasserted effective control over Iranian foreign



policy; resumed diplomatic relations with Britain, and was negotiating a new oil agreement with a consortium of eight western companies. He had also expressed a wish to join the 'Northern Tier'. Both Britain and the United States, however, thought that Iran, weakened economically because of the internationaloil boycott against Musaddiq's regime, could not yet support a large army, and hence could not contributeeffectively to Middle East defence.73 Although Nuri undeniably preferred to conclude the initial deal with Pakistan, he had overlooked the fact that, among all his candidatesto enter the regional treaty he envisaged, only Turkey shared his determinationto conclude an early agreement. Menderes had already sensed that Nuri was not only reluctantto join the Turkish-Pakistanipact outright, but 'seemed anxious to set up a rival grouping' to the latter, thus 'making a not very positive contribution to Middle East defence'.7 When Prince Abdul-Ilah visited Istanbul privately to enquire about the health of his first cousin, Talal, the ex-King of Jordan, Menderes insisted that he should stay as a guest of the Turkishgovernment and took the opportunityto engage him in some political discussions.75Menderes emphasized that it was absurd to think that the Arab states could constitute among themselves the basis of a defence system for the Middle East. No such system could be effective without Turkey and Britain. Finally, both agreed that if Nuri continued to refuse not to adhere to the Turkish-Pakistanipact, Iraq and Turkey should, instead, explore the possibilities of entering into a separate bilateral arrangementwhich could laterbe combined with the said Turkish-Pakistani

Nuri visited Istanbulhimself on his way home from London in October and extended his visit to ten days, reportedly to be present at the arrivalof a Pakistani military delegation.77 Menderes was determinednot to miss this opportunity, and his series of meetings with the visiting Iraqi Premier proved decisive. According to Turkish sources, it took several days of bruising exchanges to make Nuri retreat from his preoccupation with the Israeli threat to regional security.78Finally, both sides agreed that they sharedthe same objectives to establish 'a grouping to include all Arab states plus Persia and Pakistan, preferably with, but if necessary without Syria ... in close association with the U.K. and the U.S.' Menderes did not press Iraq to join the Turkish-Pakistaniagreement and made it plain that 'Turkeywas quite ready to modify it, or incorporateit in something else'. He also 'fully accepted' the principle 'that Iraqi forces should not be employed outside Iraq'.7 Menderes suggested that Turkey and Iraq should sign a pact engaging each country to come to the assistance of the other in the event of being attacked. This proposal did not immediately please Nuri because of his suspicion of Turkishirredentistdesigns on Mosul.80 agreed, however, He



that contactsshouldcontinueand that both sides shouldpursuecontacts with other Arab countriesas well. Menderesacceptedan invitationto He Baghdad,later fixed for 6 January. encouragedNuri that any new regional agreementshould allow Britainto continue enjoying defence that too, facilitiesin Iraq,andsaidthatTurkey, was mostconcerned Britain should not withdrawfrom the Middle East. 'In presentcircumstances,' in Menderes,'if therewere a choice betweenCyprusremaining continued to Britishhandsor being returned Turkeyhe would preferthat it should of Britain'soccupation Cyprus remainin Britishhands'for 'he regarded Nuriasked in essentialfor herparticipation MiddleEastdefence'.In return, that Turkey supportthe principle of the fulfilment by Israel of UN minister stateFatinRusstu of on to According Turkish resolutions Palestine. Zorlu, 'generallyspeakingthe talks had been very useful in dissipating entertainedby Nuri about Turkey's suspicions and misapprehensions with positionandaims,andin establishing hima basisof commonapproach of The to the problem MiddleEastdefence'."8 Britishembassyin Baghdad, reported Troutbeck was over-optimistic. however,thoughtthis appraisal aimsin to of that,even afterthe visit, Nuricontinued be suspicious Turkish Iraqi-Pakistani to opposition anyfuture northern andattributed Turkish Iraq however,was not a politicianwho jealousy'.8 Menderes, pactto 'a certain his to missedwhathe thoughtto be even the slightestopportunity further as aims. His sheer determination, well as the lack of any practical for alternatives Nuri, proveddecisive for the conclusionof the Baghdad Pactearlyin the followingyear. with After this breakthrough Nuri, Mendereshad good reasonto feel that He confident. told Bowkeron 11 December relatively in the atmosphere the MiddleEast was improving. Until recentlyit hadbeen a case of tryingto urgethe ArabStatesalonga roadwhich they were reluctantto take. Now they themselveswere showing
willingness to follow it on their own free will ... The Turkish

regionaldefence, Government considered progress organising that in the by increasing confidenceof the ArabStates,would reducetheir to fearof aggression fromIsraelandso to engender readiness accept a the fact of Israel'spermanent existenceand the idea of a settlement withher.83 on even whenMenderes caughtthe planefor Baghdad 6 January However, Premier himself,was expectinghim to 1955, nobody,not even the Turkish duringhis visit, nor did he take with him any draft. sign an agreement with Nuri, Mendereshad been negotiations Besides his above-mentioned and relations thawin Turkish-Egyptian by encouraged the recentapparent hadproposed have a meetingwith AbdulNasser 'at any time andplace to



he might choose' to try to get from him some sort of statementto the effect that a bilateral agreementbetween Turkeyand Iraqwould not be at variance with the Arab League.84 The delays over his projected meeting, however, and the unlikelihood of any rapid progress being made as regards persuading the majority of Arab states to join any defence arrangement against Egyptian wishes had convinced him by now that he should first focus on signing with Iraq a bilateralpact similar to the Turkish-Pakistani He agreement.85 hoped that the Baghdadvisit would enable him to capitalise on his achievements in the past few months, clarify Nuri's current intentions, encourage the latterto make up his mind and thus inevitably take a furtherstep towards his much desired agreement.86 Nuri, too, did not have any immediate plan to sign an agreement with Turkey during Menderes's visit. He did not underestimatethe difficulties posed by the sceptical state of opinion in other Arab countries and further thought that he was not yet sufficiently informed about the commitments which the US and UK governments were prepared to accept.87 Nuri still thought that March or April would be ideal to sign a new regional pact and thereafterterminatethe 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty.88 Nevertheless, the Iraqigovernmenthad arrangeda strenuousprogramme of visits, banquetsand receptions for their guests.89 actual political talks No took place until 9 January.Menderes,however, was immediately impressed by the influence of those Iraqis who were preoccupied with Israel to the exclusion of every other internationalproblem. So, he changed his cautious plan, thinking that the time had come to press the Iraqi govemment more strongly. Menderes, the first foreign statesman ever invited to address the IraqiChamberof Deputies, now refused to fulfil this engagement until Nun agreed to publish a communique to the effect that a pact would be signed soon, while the assembled deputies were waiting.90 Were the signing of a regional pact delayed until just before the expiration of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty, Menderes now believed, the former would look suspiciously like a cover for the latter,9' and its appeal for other future potential Arab adherents would certainly diminish. Moreover, Turkishleaders had begun to suspect that Israel was increasingly trying, by indirect methods, to obstructTurkey'sattemptsto improve its relations with Arab states. They feared that the effects of these efforts might become more serious if some definite progress was not made immediately.9-Indeed, Israel, which had been delighted at Turkey's involvement in the Balkans in 1953, was showing serious misgivings about the Turkish determinationto improve its ties with Iraq and Pakistan. Israeli diplomats had tried to convince Turkey that any alliance with Iraq would be worthless because of the latter's military weakness. It would be safer and cheaper to occupy Iraq in the event of a Soviet aggression, ratherthan arm the country and expect




it to defend itself. Furthermore,any alliance with Iraq and Pakistan might adversely affect Turkey's secular and pro-Europeancharacter,embroil it in confrontationwith India and Israel; and, finally, weapons delivered to Iraq Turkey, which could fall into the hands of Kurdish insurgents in Turkey.93 had always hoped that good relations with Israel would ensure it, through the internationalZionist lobby, a good press in the West and particularlythe United States, now suspected that the same lobby was behind articles, published in the Western press, which were critical of the Turkish government's domestic economic policies. Nuri had previously envisaged proposing to the Turks the eventual conclusion of a limited agreement covering exchange of information between the two army staffs about progress made by the two sides in their respective defence arrangements,and free transitthroughboth countries of defence material for the other for a five-year period, with their possible extension to the United Kingdom, United States and other friendly powers.94 Under pressure from Menderes, however, he finally succumbed and put his signature under a statement much broader in scope. What also made Nuri acquiesce was the warning sounded by his Minister of the Interior,Said alQazzaz, that from the security point of view, the best period to settle all outstandingexternal affairs would be the first few months of 1955, because the radicalinternalopponents of the Iraqiregime had not yet recovered from Nuri's recent harsh measures.9' On 13 January 1955 a communique was published in Baghdad stating that Turkey and Iraq had decided to conclude in the immediate future a broad treaty of co-operation, based on Article 51 of the UN Charter, to safeguard the stability and security of the Middle East and to repel any aggression committed against them either from within the region or from outside. The communique expressed hope that other states 'which have given proof of their determinationto serve the objectives mentioned above, and are in a position to do so by virtue of their geographicalposition and the forces at their disposal' might sign the treaty concerned at the same time with themselves. Otherwise, the communique made clear, Turkey and Iraq would go on and sign a bilateral treaty 'as rapidly as possible' and would only then continue their efforts to persuade the powers with the abovedescribed criteria to join the treaty at a later date.96On 18 January Iraq issued a separatecommunique reaffirmingits loyalty to the UN Charterand the ALCSP and stating that the proposed Turkish-Iraqi treaty would not conflict with either of them.97 British and American foreign policy-makers were pleasantly surprisedat this unexpected announcement. Both, however, did not wish to appear overjoyed, despite the fact that, on the day of the publication of the communique, Menderes had requested the French, British and US



ambassadors in Baghdad to suggest that their respective governments should issue some form of public endorsementof its supposed constructive The spirit.98 Westernpowers understoodthat some of their other friends and allies in the Middle East would not share their optimism toward the projected Turkish-Iraqialliance.99 Indeed Egypt confrontedthe said communique with fury. It appearsthat Egyptian leaders had been convinced, since Nuri's Cairo visit the previous September, that Iraq would not go alone in signing a defence pact with the West."' They had anticipatedIraq's next move to be a treaty with Britain, bringing in Turkey in the same way as the latter had been brought into the Anglo-Egyptian agreement,and now said they would have had no objection even to Iraq bringing in Iran in the same way."0' Cairo protested that Nuri's latest move had gone counter to the normal sequence of events, for Abdul Nasser had expected to be given time to build an Arab regional organization, 'not linked openly with the West but so constructed that it could quickly fall in line with Western plans should a common danger arise'.102 It also probably felt let down by Turkey, for the Egyptian ambassadorin Ankarahad seen Birgi before the Turkishdelegation's flight to Baghdad and, after waming him against any attempt to deal with Iraq apartfrom the rest of the Arab League, had received the assurance that the delegation would keep in close touch with the Egyptian embassy in Baghdad.'03 Hence, an editorial of the Egyptian newspaper al-Akhbar had welcomed Menderes's visit to Baghdad as a further sign of increasing friendship between Turkey and the Arab states.'04 The Turks, however, saw Egyptian embassy officials in Baghdad only once, and that only an hour or two before the publication of the joint communique."' The prospect of a Turkish-Iraqi alliance left Egypt in a mood of isolation and weakened its bargaining power vis-ai-vis the West. It feared that it could not now count upon Iraqi assistance in any future Arab-Israeli conflict. There was also a distinct apprehension that the proposed treaty might be the prelude to an eventual partition of Syria between the two signatories, and hence significantly increase Iraq'sstandingand influence within the Arab world."'"6 Egypt embarked, therefore, on a campaign to force Iraq to retreat from commitments it had made in the 13 Januarycommunique or, failing that, to isolate it from the rest of the Arab world. Abdul Nasser called for an immediate meeting of Arab prime ministers in Cairo to discuss future common Arab defence policy following the Turkish-Iraqicommunique.'07 Nuri feared that the projected Cairo meeting would resemble a court session with Egypt sitting at the prosecutor's chair. His fortuitous illness provided him with a timely excuse not to attend. Under pressure from London - which had not entirely discounted yet the possibility of eventually bringing Egypt into a regional defence arrangementand thought that Cairo




might only be contesting the timeliness, and not the strategic aims of the Turkish-Iraqicommunique - and some Arab capitals, Nuri later agreed to send al-Jamali to Cairo, but gave him no authority at all to negotiate a compromise deal. Al-Jamali was asked to keep Syria, Lebanon and Jordan away from bowing to Egyptian pressure, ratherthan make explanations to the latter. If Egypt became more co-operative, Nuri planned, he would be willing to take a little time to help it forward, but if it persisted in opposing Al-Jamali told the or remaining aloof, he would move on very quickly.108 Cairo meeting that the proposed Turkish-Iraqiagreementwas nothing more than a practical projection of the traditionalIraqi policy and of its existing treaty relationship with Turkey. The draft agreement, which Iraq would propose to the Turks, contained only two innovations: exchange of information on defence dispositions and preparations,and free passage of military supplies througheither party's territoryto the other.'09 The Arab delegations in Cairo failed to reach a consensus and sent a very high-level four-man delegation to Baghdad as a last attemptto bridge the existing differences."0No furtherprogress was made, however, and the delegation returnedempty-handedto Cairo."'Nuri made clear that he would proceed with the proposed pact and firmly declined all suggestions for postponement."' The Cairo Conference thus ended inconclusively on 6 February.Despite its failure to produce a resolution or even a final communique, however, it proved significant in shaping the balance of power in the Arab world. Smaller states like Syria, Jordanand Lebanon were left in no doubt on the strength of Egyptian (and Saudi) feeling against the projected pact. The mood in Cairo also convinced Nuri that it would serve absolutely no purpose to postpone negotiations and the conclusion of the proposed pact with Turkey,thus bringing him in line with Menderes's thinking. From then on, Turkey and Iraq proceeded at full speed towards the conclusion of the promised pact. Menderes wished to see the treatyconcluded by mid-February."3 was He now convinced, based on his past experience, that the best way to deal with Nuri was to maintainconstantpressure.Therefore,he reportedlysent Nuri an average of two messages a day insisting on the necessity for utmost speed."' In the meantime, the Turkish ambassadorin Cairo, Rifki Zorlu, was very active on the fringes of the Arab Premiers' Conference trying to recruit as many Arab states as possible to adhereto the proposed treatyor at least take a position independentof Egypt. Both Iraqand Turkey wanted to extend the provisions of the future treaty as soon as possible to the United States and Britain, as well as to other Middle Eastem countries such as Iran, Pakistan and possibly Syria. Both preferred have the two Westernpowers as original to signatories,althoughthey would not object to them joining a little later.



Nuri had initially had a more relaxed time-table in mind. He had told the new British ambassador,Sir Michael Wright,that he would prefer signature to take place during President Bayar's projected official visit to Iraq at the end of March."5The Egyptian threat, however, expressed during the Cairo Conference, to withdraw from the ALCSP encouraged him to quicken the pace. He hoped that a hasty conclusion of the treaty would put great pressure on Abdul Nasser to carry out his vow to leave, thus self-inflicting serious political isolation from the rest of the Arab world."6 The actual negotiations began in early February.They were conducted in complete secrecy through the embassies in Baghdad and Ankara. Both sides kept in close touch with the British and American diplomats accredited in their respective capitals as representatives of two very influential possible future members of the proposed pact. Another not less important,albeit practical, reason was that the text of the treaty was to be written in English, and neither side had cipher facilities in that language in their respective embassies. It is through the telegrams and reports sent to and from the British Foreign Office and the British missions in Iraq and Turkey,kept at the Public Record Office in London, that an accurate stageby-stage picture of these negotiations can be reconstructed. Nuri had presented to the Turkishdelegation, before its departurefrom Baghdad on 14 January,a rough draft (NI), giving them also a free hand to propose any amendment they considered necessary."7 The draft (NI) consisted of a preamble and five articles and was based on Nuri's original ideas of quite limited defence co-operation between Iraq and Turkey.In the preamble, both sides stressed their conviction of the necessity to conclude a treaty based on the principles enshrined in the 1946 Turkish-IraqiTreaty of Friendshipand Good-Neighbourliness, Article 51 of the UN Charterand the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, which, said the draft (NI), 'considered that any attack on Turkey or any other member State of the Arab League should necessitate taking defensive measures to preserve peace and security in this region'. Its main provisions, stipulated in Articles 1 and 2, stood as follows:

Article 1
Consultations and discussions shall be held between the respective competent military authoritiesof the two high contractingparties for the purpose of obtaining reciprocal information regarding security measures and defence plans in countries of the high contracting parties. Exchange of views and information shall also be carried out for the sake of benefiting from the technical experience and progress achieved by any of the two high contracting parties in the field of defensive armaments.



Article 2
The high contracting parties undertake to furnish all facilities and assistance for the passage of arms, military equipment, supplies and other material used for defensive purposes pertaining to their respective armies, through the territory of the other party without being subject to customs and any other duties. Article 3 stipulated that the treaty should be open for accession to any member state of the Arab League or any other state concerned with security and peace in the region, while Article 4 set the period during which the treaty would remain in force as five years, automatically renewable to successive five-year periods unless one of the signatories notified its desire to terminateit six months before the date of expiration.The last article dealt with the conditions for ratification and exchange of ratified documents."18 Nuri later told Wright that one of his reasons for proposing a five-year period was his desire to see the first renewal of the projectedpact before the Anglo-Egyptian agreementexpired in 1961 so as to set a patternfor renewal before the future of the latter agreementcame into question."'9 This draft (NI) was unsatisfactory to the Turks. They had always contemplated a treaty very much on the lines of the 1954 Turkish-Pakistani pact and perhaps even more precise, owing to the existence of a common frontier between the contracting parties.120They, therefore, produced an amended, stronger and more specific text (MI) and dispatched it, on 6 February,to Baghdad, as well as to the British and American governments. The Foreign Office had, meanwhile, brought into the attention of the negotiating sides that the draft (NI) did not provide the 'umbrella', under which Nuri had promised to revise the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty.'2' The amended Turkishdraft (MI) omitted in its preamble the reference to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and completely redrafted Article 1, inserting two additionalnew articles to give it the following appearance: Article 1. The contractingparties undertaketo cooperate in accordancewith the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations in confronting any armed aggression against one of them inside or outside the Middle East region.

Article 2.
In order to ensure effective realization and application of cooperation envisaged in Article 1 above the competent authorities of the contracting parties shall establish military plans and determine the requisite measures immediately after entry into force of the present treaty. These plans and measures shall be operative as soon as they



have been approved by the Governments of the contracting parties and may moreover be the subject of special agreements.

Article 3.
Exchange of views and information shall be carried out between the respective competent military authoritiesof the contractingparties for the purpose of benefiting from the technical experience and progress achieved by either of the parties in the field of defensive armament. The contracting; parties shall consult and cooperate together in order to satisfy, as far as possible, the needs of each of them in the production of arms and munitions as well as in military training and education. Article 2 of the Iraqi draft (NI) was kept as the new Article 4. Article 5 stipulated that the provisions of the treaty did not contradict their past internationalengagements and that the contractingparties would undertake not to conclude any futureinternationalengagements incompatible with the proposed treaty, while Article 6 added the new provision that any new accession should take place after agreementbetween the contractingparties and the state applying for accession.122 Both the British and American governments preferredthe Turkish text (MI). The Foreign Office was especially satisfied because it did provide the necessary 'umbrella'."3It was also at this stage that the UK definitely informed the two negotiating parties that she 'would prefer to accede to the proposed treaty at a later date,' after the completion of the revision of the treaty with Iraq.'24 Nuri did not consider this amended draft (Ml) proper for a bilateral treaty with Turkey.He considered it very importantto have a reference, in the preamble, to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement, because he could thus convince all doubters that his policies did not differ in essence from those pursued by Egypt. He could not accept Article 1 in its amended form, because, he thought, the clause 'in confronting any armed aggression against one of them from inside or outside the Middle East region' was a clear reference to Israel, which could not, according to Nuri, be a matterof bilateral concern between Iraq and Turkey. Article 2 of the Turkish draft (M1) was far beyond what Nuri was preparedto concede to the Turks.Also unacceptable was the newly-added provision in Article 6. With all these objections in mind, Nuri put to Menderes a clear choice: either to give more time for bilateral negotiations to continue or to agree to the original Iraqi draft (NI).'25 Menderes was upset. The original Iraqi draft (NI) had been quite unacceptable to his government. To sign it now would mean a retreatfor Turkey from the provisions of the 13 Januarycommunique. Furthermore,



Nuri's draft did not contain the 'umbrella' clause insisted upon by London. With Britain and America concurring that Turkey should be prepared to give more time to Iraq rather than sacrifice the chance of a workable agreement for the desirability of a quick conclusion, the Turks asked them both to instruct their representatives in Baghdad to try to soften Nuri's

In this, Wright succeeded. Nuri backed down a little. Late on the night of 9 Februaryhe presented to his cabinet for approval a new compromise draft (N2) he had worked out with Wright that afternoon, as well as an alternativetext somewhat like the compromise draft (N2) but nearer to the Turkish wording. Discussion in the cabinet was not detailed, but a general agreement was reached to send both texts to Ankarathe following day.'27 The compromise draft(N2) restoredthe reference to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement in the preamble. New Articles 1 and 2 were inserted to replace Articles 1 and 2 of the Turkishdraft (MI). They read as follows:

Article 1.
The high contracting parties will cooperate for their defence and security in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Such measures as they agree to take to give effect to this cooperation may form the subject of special agreementwith each other.

Article 2.
The measures which will be taken between Turkey and Iraq will be -those contained in Articles 3 and 4 below. The Articles 3 and 4 mentioned above were the Articles 1 and 2 of the original Iraqi draft (NI) calling only for consultations and discussions between the military authorities and free passage of military equipment. Article 5 was the same Article 5 of the Turkishdraft (MI) stipulating that the treaty did not contradict the past international engagements of the contractingparties and that the latter would not conclude any future treaty incompatible with the one being negotiated. Article 6 kept only the first sentence of the corresponding article of the Turkish draft (MI), thus eliminating the provision that any new accession should first be agreed by the members of the pact.'28 It was this compromise text (N2) that was communicated eventually by Nuri to the Turkish government. He ultimately decided to keep the alternative draft in reserve.'29 The Turkish government received the new proposals by telephone from their ambassadorin Baghdad in the morning of 10 February.'30 Nuri hoped that, provided the Turksagreed, signature could take place in Baghdad within the next few days.'31 It was not to be. Menderes, Birgi and their assistants found Articles 2, 3 and 4 discriminatory against Turkey,since they imposed a severe limitation on the scope of future



defence co-operation between Turkey and Iraq, while grantingthe latter, at the same time, a free hand to negotiate broaderagreementswith other future members under the 'umbrella'provided in Article 1. Birgi told Bowker that Menderes realized that Nuri's reason for inserting Article 2 was his morbid suspicions of Turkish designs on northern Iraq. Menderes was ready, continued Birgi, to give Iraq a fresh categorical guarantee of respect of territorial integrity, although, according to the Turkish government, that would in fact be a repetitionof Article 1 of the 1946 Turkish-Iraqitreaty.132 It seemed for a moment that the negotiations had reached a deadlock. The only concession Nuri was preparedto make at that stage was to omit Articles 2, 3 and 4 of the draft (N2) from the pact itself and embody the substance of its Articles 3 and 4 in a protocol or annex, but even that proposal he wanted to be made to the Turksindirectly throughthe British.'33 By now, the British government had remained the only potential mediator. Washingtonindicatedthat while strongly supportingthe pact, it did not wish to be an original signatory to or join the pact at an early date because that might be interpretedas suggesting that the pact had been imposed from outside the area." The Foreign Office preferred not to interfere to try to patch up this latest disagreementbetween Turkey and Iraq,except to inform both sides that the new Article 1 proposed in Nuri's latest draft (N2) was And in order not to complicate matters satisfactory from its point of view.'35 further,it did not even inform the British embassies in Ankaraand Baghdad that during secret UK-US-Turkish staff talks that had begun in London on 18 Januarythe Turkishdelegation had put forward a plan whereby Turkish forces would enter Iraq on or before the outbreakof a general war with the Communist Bloc to take over responsibility for the defence of the Rowanduz and Penjwin passes in the Zagros mountains.'36 Menderes made a fresh attemptto break the deadlock. He sent his Iraqi counterpartwhat he called a friendly message, asking whether it was really Nuri's intention that their work together over the last weeks and months should culminate in a treaty on the lines of the revised draft (N2). If it was so, Menderes continued, then there must be some thought in Nuri's mind which the latter had not expressed. Menderes said that the Turkish government would look ridiculous if it signed such an agreement, and went on to point out that 'Articles 3 and 4, though inessential, were acceptable when following after the Turkish Article 2 [of the draft (Ml)]'. In Nuri's revised draft (N2), however, they had fixed the limit to which defence co-

betweenTurkey Iraqshouldgo. and operation


Nuri was unmoved. He was reportedly in a mood of suspicion of the Turks, nervous that the latter were trying to inveigle him into some wording which could subsequently be interpreted as permitting entry of Turkish forces into Iraq in wartime. He even spoke of abandoningthe idea of a pact



with Turkey altogether.Prince Abdul-Ilah, who was in all probability less suspicious of Turks than Nuri, and the Turkish ambassador, Muzaffer Goksenin, appealed to Wright to try and calm Nuri. Accordingly, Wright had a long talk with Nuri on 15 February.Nuri reaffirmed that he would never agree to any clause which could be interpretedas permittingentry of Turkishforces in Iraqin any situation. He even proposed at one stage in the said meeting to write in the pact itself a provision that neither country should send forces into the opposite country in time of war. Wright tried to persuade Nuri that Turkey's main preoccupation was to avoid a wording that appeared discriminatory against or derogatory to herself. In the end, Nuri promised to propose to Goikseninthe following day a revised draft (N3) which omitted Articles 2, 3 and 4 of his previous draft (N2), thus leaving to both sides freedom to conclude a special agreement between them derived from Article 1 of the pact in the same way as any future agreement between Iraq and Britain. He stated that if Turkey could not accept his latest proposal (N3), he would have to give up the idea of a bilateralpact altogetherand seek instead a pact with Britain and Pakistan.'38 The acting Iraqiforeign minister, Burhanal-Din Bash A'yan, handed the The new proposal (N3) to Goksenin in the morning of 16 February.'39 next day, the Turkish Foreign Ministry informed their ambassadorthat Nuri's latest draft was acceptable to them, subject to minor points which could be settled when Menderes revisited Baghdad to sign the treaty.The points the Turks had in mind were the references in the preamble to the AngloEgyptian agreementand the ALCSP. They thoughtit would be inappropriate that an agreement between Turkey and Iraq should refer to agreements to which Turkey was not a party or to Iraq's obligations under the ALCSP under Article 4 of Nuri's latest draft (N3). They also claimed that any referenceto the Anglo-Egyptian agreementwould almost certainlybe seized by Egypt 'to cause furthertrouble'."' The British had also been worried by the reference to the Anglo-Egyptian agreement and had previously unsuccessfully tried to persuadeNuri to omit it.'4'Foreign Minister Kopruilu assured Bowker that Menderes, once in Baghdad, would do his best to induce Nuri to drop these points, but he preferred not to refer to them specifically before departingfor Baghdad lest it might cause furtherdelay.'42 Nuri, however, had another major surprise to pull out of his hat. On 18 February,the Iraqigovernmentpassed to Goksenin two furtheramendments to the proposed text of the pact. The first was an alternativewording of the paragraph4 of the preamble, referringto the Anglo-Egyptian agreement.It read as follows: And whereas the Agreement concluded between Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Egyptian Governmenthas considered



that any armed attack or a threat on Turkey or any member State of the Treaty of Joint Defence between the Arab League States should necessitate the affording by Egypt to the United Kingdom of such facilities as may be necessary in orderto place the Suez Canal base on a war footing to operate it effectively. The second proposed amendmentwas an addition at the end of Article 5 of the draft (N3) specifying that any state 'concerned with security and peace in this region' that wanted to accede to the treaty must be 'fully recognised by both of the High Contracting Parties', a clear indication that Israel (which was not recognized by Iraq) could not accede to the treaty. In addition, Nuri proposed drafts of two letters to be exchanged between Menderes and himself in connection with the pact. In the first letter (LI), addressedby Nuri to Menderes, the IraqiPremier stated he had 'the honour to place on record that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region, and to eliminate the causes of friction in the said region, we have agreed to work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.' The second proposed letter was to be addressed by Menderes to Nuri acknowledging the receipt of the first letter and confirming its content.143 The Turkish government was not surprised. On 19 February it telegraphed Baghdad expressing agreement with Nuri's new proposals and informing him that they too had a few amendments on some 'technical points', which Menderes would be glad to discuss in Baghdad. It also asked in particularthat the visit should be kept secret and not announced before Menderes's arrival."44 The reference in the 13 Januarycommuniqueto resisting any aggression from inside the Middle East region had given rise to some disquiet in Israel.'" Israeli diplomats did not agree with the theory that any Turkish-Arab rapprochementwould bring benefits to their country. On the contrary,they feared (rightly as it turned out eventually) that Arabs would influence Turkey away from friendship with Israel. Israeli leaders believed that the references concerned were undoubtedly inserted in the 13 January communique on Nuri's insistence in order to reinstate himself with other Arab states. They feared, however, that in the future, countries like Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, which were quite unconcerned about Soviet aggression and were obsessed by Israel, would do their best to see that the said references were given more significance than was originally intended.'"When the Israeli ministerin Ankarahad communicatedhis fears to Menderes - before the final negotiations had got under way - and asked him if it was intended to incorporatethese references in the futurepact, the latter had replied that it was not his wish that they should be incorporated,



but had only given a 90 per cent assurance that in the event of Iraq asking that they should, he would refuse.'47 London and Washingtonwere worried too about the futurerepercussions of any reference to Palestine in the pact. The Foreign Office thought that Nuri's proposal would prejudice the prospects of their ongoing efforts to secure a settlement to the Palestine question,'48which were based on supporting the armistice regime established in 1948-49, as well as on putting forward, when possible, practical suggestions designed to reduce frontiertension, in the hope that a prolonged period of calm on the frontiers might create an atmospherefavourableto a settlement.'49 Dulles, in turn,had told Abba Eban, the Israeli ambassadorin Washington,that he considered the Turkish-Iraqi pact would tend to weaken the solidarity of the Arab League against Israel and was confident that, as things developed, Israel would realise that this trendwas to her benefit.'50 Now, the State Department instructed American embassies in Baghdad and Ankara to inform their respective governments that, in the US view, the text of the pact should be without any referenceto Palestine; and that, if there must be some reference, it should be in a separateinstrumentquite distinct and without reference to the pact.'5'A Foreign Office telegram to the British embassy in Ankara underlinedthat the 'main value of pact, from the point of view of building up under defence arrangements, is that it turns Arab eyes away from Palestine towards the outside danger .'52 Menderes had expected Nuri to propose inserting some provision on the Palestine question all along and was convinced that this would be a reasonable price to pay in returnfor the gains to be made by establishing a regional anti-Communist defence pact. He thought the letters were importantto boost Nuri's position.'53 The acting Secretary-Generalof the TurkishForeign Ministry,Melih Esenbel, arguedto Bowker that the letters were not part of the pact; that they went no further than the Baghdad communique and merely repeated previous statements by the Turkish government of general support for the 1947-49 UN resolutions on

Palestine. '54
Once the Turkish government had agreed to the proposed exchange of letters, however, the Iraqis began to ask that they should be included as an annex to the pact. This latest proposal made the Turksunhappybecause of all its complications both for their future bilateral relations with Israel and for the prospects of UK and US accession to the pact. The Foreign Office, too, felt obliged at this juncture to remind the negotiating parties that if the exchange of letters in their present form should form an annex or partof the pact Britain could not accede to the pact itself in the future.'55 Under pressure, Nuri retreatedto his old idea of exchanged letters referringto the pact, but quite separateand distinct from it.'16



assured that Menderes Bowker,the day beforehis visit to Baghdad, he would first try to defer the questionof an exchangeof letters for later a but consideration, failing to do this, he would then put forward revised down draftletter(L2) suggested Bowkerhimself,whichclearlywatered by the concealedanti-Israeli of wording Nuri'stext by statingonly that: Sir, I have the honourto place on recordmy understanding the that treaty signed between us today will enable our two countriesto cooperatein resistingany aggressiondirectedagainsteitherof our countrieswhetherfrom outsideor inside the MiddleEast area,and will thatthe Treaty serveto establish stabilityin the MiddleEastin a of in withtheprinciples the Charter the United of manner conformity Nationsandthe decisionsbasedon thoseprinciples.'57 civil servantsconsideredthat the The ForeignOffice LevantDepartment as revisedtext was 'as innocuous we can hope for', but still wantedto try omit the words'andthe decisionsbasedon thoseprinciples'.In to further that case, they reasoned, although the Israeli government would still see what was behind those assertions,it might take undoubtedly fromthefactthattherewas no directreference theresolutions on comfort to reacttoo violently.'58 Palestineandnot therefore adamant. told Wright he hadreceived He Nuri,however,remained that the unanimous of support his cabinetandthe elderstatesmen Iraqon 21 in for February the final text of the pact,so he wouldrisklosing his backing in Parliament by consenting to substantial alterations or to the of he postponement the exchangeof letters.Furthermore, said,he believed thatthe exchangeof lettersmightbe decisivein inducingthe SovietUnion andtheArabcountries refrain to fromattacking pact,andperhaps one the in or two cases, inducethemto join it.'59 On 23 February Menderes returned Baghdad, to accompanied Zorlu, by Koprulu Esenbel.'1 and Theysucceeded only in convincing Iraqiside to the to dropfinallythereference theAnglo-Egyptian agreement thepreamble. in Nurirefusedto makeany further major concessions. Hence,the discussions were mainlylimitedto sortingout some still unresolved'technicalities' in the text.Nurialso refusedcategorically consider new version(L2) of to the thelettersto be exchanged without, course,knowingthatits drafter of had beenBowker. Turkish The delegation camefinallyto the conclusion to that postponethe exchangewouldmeanpostponing pactitself, andperhaps the even losing it altogether. They were only able to make Iraq agree on a wording, whichthe Turkish considered be 'a slightimprovement side to on the originaltext'. The finalversionreadas follows: Sir,in connexionwiththe Pactsignedby us today,I havethe honour



to place on record our understandingthat the Pact will enable our two countries to cooperate effectively in resisting any aggression directed against either of them, and that, in order to ensure maintenance of peace and security in the Middle East region, we have also agreed to work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine. The British and American ambassadors were in agreement that, in the prevailing circumstances,Menderes could not have obtained a betterdeal."' Some of the discussed 'technicalities' were related to the Iraqi desire to have one text of the pact to be in Arabic. Thus, difficulties were generated because of the existence of a dual case in Arabic, in translatingsome of its clauses, for the agreement although negotiated originally on a bilateral level, was actually intended to serve as the basis for a future multilateral The arrangement.'62 Iraqi side also convinced the Turks to use the word 'pact' (mithaq) instead of 'treaty' (mu'ahadah), partly because the term mu'ahadah comes from the root 'ahd, meaning a 'pledge' or 'undertaking', while the word mithaq comes from the root wathq, meaning 'trust' or 'confidence,' but even more importantlybecause both previous 'unequal' and highly unpopularAnglo-Iraqitreaties of 1930 and 1948 had been styled as mu'ahadah-s.'63 only new provision of significance was the addition, The on Turkish insistence, of a new article that a permanent council at ministerial level would be set up when the numberof member states of the pact reached four. The Iraqi side did not like a Turkish suggestion that unequivocally stated that the treatyshould remain valid if one member-state (assuming there were more than two at that stage) withdrew,'" but, in the end, a compromise was also reached on that point. The marathon of intensive discussions and consultationsended in the evening of 24 February, and the pact was signed at 11.30 p.m.'65 Menderes returnedto Ankara the next morning. In its final form, the Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey referredin the preamble to the 1946 Turkish-Iraqitreaty,Article 11 of the ALCSP and Article 51 of the UN Charter.It specified in Article 1 that the signatories would co-operate for their security and defence in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and to conclude special agreements to that effect. Accordingly, the competent authorities of the member-stateswould determinethe measures to be taken as soon as the pact went into force. These measures would become operative just after being approvedby the respective governments. The contractingparties undertook to refrain from interferingin each other's internal affairs and to settle their disputes peacefully in accordance with the UN Charter.Article 4 declared that the pact was not in contradiction with any of the international



parties the alreadyhad,andthatthe contracting obligations member-states with not had undertaken to enterinto any futureobligations incompatible the pact. Article5 left the pact open for accessionto any memberof the and ArabLeagueor anyotherstateactivelyinvolvedwiththesecurity peace A parties. by in the regionandwhichwasfully recognized bothcontracting Council would be set up as soon as at least four Ministerial Permanent in of powersbecamemembers the Pact.Thepactwas to remain forcefor a for five-yearperiod,renewable otherfive-yearperiods.Any member-state had in thatwishedto withdraw to notifythe othermembers writingof her desireto do so six monthsbeforethe pact was due to expire.In thatcase, The the pact would remainvalid for the othermember-states. last article, the and of Article8, specifiedtheprocedure ratifying tr.eaty theexchangeof

wereanxiousto ratifythepactas soon as possible,so Bothgovernments only two days afterthe signature. ratification took place on 26 February, to overcome criticism from their respective Both, however, had criticsthatthe provisionsof the pactdealingwith the extent parliamentary wereambiguous. of co-operation In the TurkishGrandNationalAssembly,the vote of approvalwas of unanimous.167 however,hadto assuremembers the opposition Menderes, for beyondher obligations Turkey RPPthatthepactdidnotmeanadditional of obligation under wording the treaty the frontiers. Therewas no automatic to give military to Iraqin theeventof anattack thelatter, said.The aid he on pact was an alliance for defence and, once it had been ratified, the would have the power to negotiateand concludenecessary government On contended measures. the issue of the exchangedletters,the opposition thatthey were bindingonly to the government power,while Menderes in that Israel.Turkey, policytowards argued theyimpliedno changein Turkish as of the he said,hadalwayssupported, a matter principle, UnitedNations, on its including, implication, resolutions Palestine.'68 by In Iraq,Nuritriedto avoidan open debateas muchas possible,despite the fact thathe hadto deal only with a Chamber Deputieshe hadalmost of the He 'appointed' previousautumn. askedthatthe bill to ratifythe pact shouldfirstbe discussed theForeign in whichsubmitted AffairsCommittee, a unanimous recommendation approval. of session,he Later,in the plenary stressedthat the pact did not contradictIraq'straditional policy of cowith the otherArabstates.Iraqwas undertaking obligations no operation and for beyondher frontiers would be solely responsible her defence.No states could dictate upon Iraq the conditionsor extent of defence cooperationas Article 1 provided that separateagreementsmay and not 'must' be concluded betweenthe member-states. expressedthe hope thatIran, He the UnitedStatesandBritain- the latter,afterthe termination the 1930 of



In treaty wouldaccedeto the new pactin the nearfuture. the eventof any or all Arabstatesaccedingto the pact, co-operation betweenthem would differas it hadalready beendefinedin theALCSP. Turkey's policy,he said, was not contradictory the interestsof the Arabstates and Turkeywas to sincereand honest in pursuingthis direction.Only threedeputiesspoke fears thatIraqwas distancing herselffrom againstratification, expressing the Chamber votedin favourof ratification 112 the ArabLeague.Still, by in votes againstonly four.The sameevening,the pactwas also debated the vote of 25 against Senate,the upperhouse, and receivedan affirmative of were exchangedin Ankaraon 15 April one."69 Instruments ratification and 1955betweenthe Turkish ForeignMinister the Iraqiambassador.'70 embarked the secondstageof his preon Nurihadalready Meanwhile, conceivedplan, i.e. the negotiationwith the UK of a new militarycoto 1930 treaty.The agreement operation agreement replacethe unpopular and was signedon 30 March cameintoeffecton 5 April,the day of official UK accession to the Turkish-Iraqi pact. Iraq formally assumed for responsibility her own defence and took over the two air bases at aland The agreement, Habbaniyyah al-Shu'aybah. however,continuedto provide so-called close defence co-operationbetween both countries, includingplanning,combinedtraining,and the provisionby Iraq of all facilitiesagreed uponbetweenthetwo governments thedeclared for purpose of maintaining Iraq'sarmedforces in a state of efficiencyand readiness. Britain agreedto withdraw fully fromthe baseswithina year,but a unitof 850 personnel to staybehindafterthewithdrawal helpin maintaining was to thebasesandto assistin training aircrewandservicing aircraft. the the The agreement stipulated that,in the eventof an attack Iraqor a threat it, on of at of Britain, the request Iraq,wouldassistherally andeven providearmed In forcesif necessary. return, Iraqconcededto Britishmilitaryaircraft the rightof landing,overflying servicing its territory.'7' and on Nuri had originallyhopedthatthis indirectapproach would save him fromputtingthe new agreement beforethe IraqiChamber wouldthus and the greatlydiminish chancesof repetition theriotsthatled to thecollapse of of the Portsmouth treaty.At some late stage before the final signature, his legal adviserstold him that the IraqiConstitution however, made it bindinguponhim to presentthis agreement parliamentary to scrutiny. So, on 30 MarchNuricalled a joint sessionof bothHousesof Parliament and bulldozedthrough unanimous a decisionof approval, when,undernormal he procedure, should have presentedthe bill to each House separately. he Furthermore, took the precaution presenting scrutinythe text of of to only the Special Agreementand not those of the accompanying two memoranda, definingthe conditions militaryco-operation, of although the lattertexts hadalready beenmadepublicin London.'72



The Anglo-Iraqi Special Agreement, despite having striking similarities with the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal base signed a few months before, went furtherin defining the areas of defence co-operation between the two signatories. This is understandable,as Nuri, unlike the Egyptians, was convinced of the necessity of prolonging Iraq's alliance with Britain. In real terms, the Special Agreement was only a slight improvement on the abortive Portsmouth treaty of 1948 as regards safeguarding Iraq's sovereign rights to manage her foreign and defence policy, but unlike the latter, the legal basis of the Special Agreement's continued implementation was now tied completely to Iraq's wish to remain a member of the Baghdad Pact, and was hence annulled when Iraq eventually left the pact in 1959. Nuri could not get any British concessions as regards the Palestine question, however. On the contrary,Eden told the House of Commons on 30 March that the Anglo-Iraqi agreement was likely to be, from the point of view of Israel, a desirable development because 'it is the first time an Arab state is looking in other directions than simply towards Israel' .'3 Nuri thus secured the continuation of the British alliance with the Hashemite monarchy. By the end of 1955 Iran and Pakistan, too, had subscribed to the Turkish-Iraqipact (now officially renamed the Baghdad Pact), making it possible to set up the envisaged multilateralpact structures. The United States, however, never joined the pact officially, which proved a major point of weakness for the latter. No separate Turkish-Iraqispecial agreementswere concluded as foreseen underthe pact's provisions, proving thatboth countrieshad enteredit as a tacticalmove and not as an end in itself. In fact, three weeks after the signatureand ratificationof the Pact, Nuri was telling the visiting Syrian Foreign Minister, Khalid al-'Azm, that the pact would be confined only to the exchange of informationandprovidingfacilities for transportof military equipment.'74 Turkey always advocated turningthe defence organization,but she also BaghdadPact into an elaboratemultilateral Jordan recognized the need to bring in additionalArab members (particularly and Syria) into the pact to make the latter viable and frustrateEgypt's desire to isolate Iraqfrom the rest of the Arabworld. Nuri, however,failed to win the heartsand minds of any of his Arabcritics at home or abroad.The Anglo-Iraqi Special agreementhad re-enforcedthe link in Arabeyes between the Baghdad Pact and previous 'unequal' military alliances imposed by former colonial powers and made futureArabadherencesto the pact extremelyunlikely.Nuri, therefore,remainedalways cautious in immersing his country into elaborate regional defence structureswithout open Arab support. These particularist interests and the differing approachesemanating therefromcreated tensions within the pact to the extentthatIraq'smembershipeventuallycame to be seen as a burdenby other members in the pact and her withdrawalafter the 1958 revolutionwas not much regretted.




See printedextracts from Dulles's 1 June 1953 television address in J.C. Hurewitz (ed.), Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, Vol.Il: 1914-1956 (Princeton,Toronto,New Yorkand London, 1956), pp.337-42. 2. AyeshaJalal, 'Towardsthe BaghdadPact:South Asia and MiddleEast Defence in the Cold War, 1947-1955', InternationalHistory Review, Vol.11, No.3 (Aug. 1989), p.428. 3. Ibid., p.418. 4. David R. Devereux, The Formulationof British Defence Policy Towardsthe Middle East, 1948-56 (London, 1990), p. 118. 5. Ibid., pp.156-7. 6. F0371/130179/RK1022/1, Bowker to Lloyd, 7 Jan. 1957. 7. F0371/136456/RK1022/2, Chancery,Ankarato SouthernDepartment, FO, 11 Feb. 1958. 8. F0371/11292 1/WK1O 10/1, Helm to Eden, 1 Jan. 1954;F0371/124005/RK1022/2, Bowker to Lloyd, 5 March 1956. Middle East Connection:How the Truman 9. George C. McGhee, The US-Turkish-NATO Doctrine Containedthe Soviets in the Middle East (New York, 1990), p.106. 10. Ferenc A. Vali, Bridge across the Bosphorus:TheForeign Policy of Turkey (Baltimoreand London, 1971), pp.199-200. in 11. Bulent Ali Riza, 'TurkishParticipation Middle East Defence Projectsand Its Impacton Turco-Arab Relations,May 1950-June 1953' (unpublishedPh.D. dissertation,St. Antony's College, Universityof Oxford, 1982), p.16 ff. 12. F0371/112922/WK1013/4 and 12. 13. Department of State. Washington. Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-1954 [hereafter: FRUS], Vol.IX, Part 1, p.147. 14. Ibid., p.391. See also McGhee, Connection,pp.159-60; F0371/104187/E1033/22, British 4 Middle East Office weekly political summaryby McCarthy, June 1953. 15. Devereux, Formulation,p.69; F0371/110788/V1073/54, Bowker to FO, 6 Oct. 1954. 16. McGhee, Connection,p.138. 17. F0371/112921/WK1011/1, Helm to Eden, 1 Jan. 1954. 18. Riza, Participation, p.226. 19. S. M. Burke and Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis, second edition (Karachi,1990), pp. 164-5. 20. F0371/1 10787V 1073/7, Mackenzie to Eden, 24 Feb. 1954. 21. F0371/112922/WK1013/5, Political Summary,Ankaraby Scott-Fox, 11-24 Feb. 1954. 22. Ismail Soysal, 'The 1955 Baghdad Pact', Studies on Turkish-ArabRelations (Istanbul), Vol.5 (1990), p.51. 23. Soysal, 'Baghdad Pact', pp.53-7. See also F0371/110774/V1025/1, Bowker to Eden, 3 Aug. 1955. 24. See details in Feroz Ahmad, The Turkish Experimentin Democracy 1950-1975 (London, 1977), pp.52-3, 135, 138; Ergun Ozbudun (ed.), Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey (Ankara, 1988), p.76. 25. Frederick W. Axelgard, 'U.S. Policy Toward Iraq, 1946-1958' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, April 1988), p.121; Devereux, Formulation, p.144; F0371/104189/E1061/1, Mackenzie to Baker, 19 Aug. 1953. 26. See full text of this treatyin Hurewitz,Diplomacy, II, pp.178-81. 27. F0371/110986NQ1011/1, Troutbeckto Eden, 11 Jan. 1954; F0371/115496N1073/463, Wrightto Eden, 9 March 1955. 28. F0371/110986NQ011/1, Troutbeckto Eden, 11 Jan. 1954. 29. Donald James Decker, 'U.S. Policy Regarding the Baghdad Pact' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,the AmericanUniversity, 1975), pp.82, 127, 207. 30. F0371/1 10994NQ1022/1, FO minute by Falla, 15 Jan. 1954. 31. FRUS 1952-1954, Vol.IX, Part 2, p.2375; F0371/110841/V1782/2, FO Research Departmentmemo, 6 April 1954. 32. F0371/110787N 1073/20, Troutbeckto FO, 23 March 1954. 1.

262 33. 34. 35. 36.

MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES Soysal, 'Baghdad Pact', pp.52-3. Axelgard, 'U.S. Policy', p. 151. FRUS 1952-1954, Vol.IX, Part2, p.2384. F0371/110995/VQ1023/5, Troutbeckto Allen, 28 April 1954; F0371/10787N1073/41, Troutbeckto Eden, 10 May 1954; F0371/110988/VQ1015/7, CommonwealthRelations Office (CRO) outwardtelegram, 11 May 1954. Axelgard, U.S. Policy, p.145; F0371/110787NV1073/40,Scott Fox to Falla, 10 May 1954. F0371/1 10787N1073/47, Bowker to Eden, 18 June 1954. Ibid., -/45, FO minuteby Brewis, 12 July 1954. F0371/110788/V1073/51, Aide-memoire by Pakistani Cabinet Secretary, 11-12 June 1954. Menderes was not alone in Turkey to claim that Turkey was the first and most importantline of defence againstthe Soviet Union. This view was widely sharedby many tense moment in Turkish-Egyptianrelations, others. On 8 Jan. 1954, duringa particularly the Turkishdaily Vatanwrote: 'Even today, if there were not a strong Turkey in front of Suez, a Soviet puppet would have been sitting in General Nagib's place. Egypt's independence is preservedthrough Turkishhonour and self-respect', quoted in Bedi N. Sehsuvaroglu,HekimBir SiyasimizinPortresi: Buyiikelfi Dr A. Hulasi Fuad Tugay [The Portraitof One of OurWise Politicians:AmbassadorDr. A. Hulusi Fuad Tugay] (Istanbul, 1972), p.203. F0371/110788N 1073/49, Bowker to FO, 15 July 1955. Phebe Marr,The ModernHistory of Iraq (Boulderand London, 1985), p.1 15. F0371/110787/V1073/1 1, Troutbeckto Eden, 10 March 1954; F0371/110791N1076/34, Troutbeckto Shuckburgh,10 Sept.1954. Soysal, 'BaghdadPact', p.54; F0371/110787/V1073/35, Hooper to Allen, 14 April 1954; ibid., -/37. F0371/1 10990/VQ1015/55, Hooperto FO, 5 Aug. 1954. See details in Marr,Iraq, p.1 15; F0371/1 15475/VQ1011/1, Hooperto Eden, 30 Dec. 1954. Abdul-AmirHadi al-'Akam, Ta'rikhhizb al-istiqlal al-'iraqi 1946-1958 [The History of the Iraqi IndependenceParty](Baghdad, 1980), p.78; George Grassmuck, 'The Electoral Process in Iraq, 1952-1958', Middle East Journal, Vol.14, No.4 (Autumn 1960), pp.409-12; F0371/110990NQ1015/61-62 and 74. See details in F0371/111051 and F0371/115803. to F0371/1 10788/V1073/52, Shuckburgh Hooper,20 July 1954. F0371/1 10788/V1073/69, Troutbeckto Falla, 27 Oct. 1954; F0371/1 10791/V1076/16, 26 and 44; F0371/110991/VQ1015/83, Troutbeckto Eden, 11 Sep.1954. 20 July 1954; Hooper, Shuckburgh to F0371/110788/V1073/52, F0371/110791/V1073/69, Troutbeckto Falla, 27 Oct. 1954; F0371/1107871V1073/39, Troutbeckto Allen, 27 April 1954. to F0371/1 10788/V1073/52, Shuckburgh Hooper,20 July 1954. Jalal, 'BaghdadPact', pp.43-31. F0371/1 10788/V1073/56, CRO outwardtelegram[n.d]. Devereux, Formulation,p.166. F0371/1 10996/VQ10316/2, Hooperto Falla, 28 July 1954. 2 F0371/110791/V 1076/16, Troutbeckto Shuckburgh, Sept.1954. F0371/1 10996/VQ10316/3, Stevenson to FO, 10 Aug. 1954. F0371/110788/V 1073/56, CRO outwardtelegram[n.d.]. For Nuri previously advocatinga very similar scheme, see F0371/104236/El 197/1, Troutbeckto FO, 16 Feb. 1953. 24 F0371/110791/V1076/1, Shuckburghto Kirkpatrick, Aug. 1954; ibid., -/3, Hooper to FO, 20 Aug. 1954; F0371/110791/V1076/7, Troutbeckto FO, 1 Sept.1954. FRUS 1952-1954, Vol.IX, Part 1, pp.545-6. MuhammadFadil Al-Jamali, review of 'Iraq under General Nuri', Middle East Forum (Beirut), Vol.XL, No.7 (October 1964), p.17. Marr,Iraq, p. 117. F0371/1 10791/V 1076/22, Stevenson to FO, 16 Sept.1954. F0371/1 10788/V1073/56, CRO outwardtelegram[n.d.]. Ibid., -/88, Murrayto FO, 17 Dec. 1954.

37. 38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47.

48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.



F0371/1 10791/V1076/36, Falla to Troutbeck,24 Sept.1954. F0371/110788/V1073/57, Falla to SouthernDepartment, FO, 2 Oct. 1954. FRUS 1952-1954, Vol.IX, Part2, p.2390. See also Muhammad Fadil al-Jamali,Dhikrayatwa 'ibar: karithatFilastin wa-atharuhafi of al-waqi' al-'arabi [Memoirsand Lessons: The Catastrophe Palestine and Its Impacton the Arab Reality], second edition (Beirut, 1965), p.114. 71. F0371/110791V1076/43, FO to Baghdad,6 Oct. 1954. 72. FRUS 1952-1954, Vol.IX, Part 1, p.549. 73. John W. Young (ed.), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration 1951-1955 (Leicester, 1988), pp.170-i1. 74. FO371/110769NV1015/3, Bowker to Shuckburgh,27 Aug. 1954. 75. F0371/1 12922/WK1013/20, Political Summary, Ankara by Bowker, 26 Aug.-1 Sept.1954. King Talal of Jordan had abdicated in 1952, after having been pronounced mentally unfit to reign. He stayed in a mental asylum in Istanbuluntil his death in 1976. 76. FRUS 1952-1954, Vol.IX, Part 1, p.551; F0371/110791/V1076/20, HM Consul-General, Istanbulto FO, 14 Sept.1954. The first source ascribes the original proposalto this effect to Abdul-Ilah;the second, to Menderes. 77. Decker, U.S. Policy, p.84. 78. Axelgard, U.S. Policy, p.152. 79. F0371/110788NV1073/63,Bowkerto FO, 21 Oct. 1954. 80. Ibid., -/69, Troutbeckto Falla, 27 Oct. 1954. 81. Soysal, 'Baghdad Pact', pp.58-61; FO371/1107881V1073/63, Bowker to FO, 21 Oct. 1954; . 82. FO371/110788/V1073/67, Troutbeckto FO, 21 Oct. 1954; ibid., -/69, Troutbeckto Falla, 27 Oct. 1954. 83. FO371/110783/V1056/34, Bowker to Eden, 11 Dec. 1954. 84. FO371/110791/V1037/27, Bowker to Eden, 14 Sept.1954; FO371/110783N1056/23, Bowker to Ward,16 Nov. 1954. 85. F0371/1 10788N/1073/80, Scott Fox to FO, 27 Nov. 1954. 86. Ibid., -/93, BowkertoFO, 31 Dec. 1954. 87. F0371/1 15484/V1073/3, Beeley to Falla, 30 Dec. 1954; ibid., -/4, Hooper to FO, 5 Jan. 1955. 88. Marr,Iraq, p.117. 89. F0371/1 15486/V1073/90, Hooperto Eden, 18 Jan. 1955. 90. Ibid., -/90, Hooper to Eden, 18 Jan. 1955; F0371/11590/N1073/219, Bowker to Eden, 8 Feb. 1955. See full Arabic translationof Menderes's speech in the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies in Major Shakir (Sabir), Tarikh al-sadaqah bayn Turkiyyawa-l-'Iraq [The History of Turkish-Iraqi Friendship](Baghdad, 1955), pp.179-80. 91. F0371/115484/V1073/6, Hooperto FO, 1OJan. 1955. 92. Ibid., -/5'A', Bowker to Falla, 7 Jan. 1955. 93. Amikam Nachmani, Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean(London, 1987), pp.72-3. 94. F0371/115484N 1073/11, Hooper to FO, 12 Jan. 1955. 95. F0371/115748/VQ1015/2, Hooperto Eden, 12 Jan. 1955. 96. See full text of communiquein Soysal, 'BaghdadPact', p.63; F0371/1 15487NV1073/137. 97. See full Arabic text of Iraqicommuniquein Shakir,Tarikhal-sadaqah, pp.176-7; its full English translation,in F0371/1 15485/V1073/43, Hooper to FO, 19 Jan. 1955. 98. Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres. Commission de Publication des Documents Diplomatiques Frangais. Documents Diplomatiques Fran,ais, 1955, Tome I: ler janvier-30 juin (Paris, 1987), pp.90-91; F0371/115484/V1073/13, Hooper to FO, 13 Jan. 1955; F0371/115486/V1073/67, FO minute by Shuckburgh,17 Jan. 1955. 99. See details in Soysal, 'BaghdadPact', p.63; F0371/1 15484/V1073/13, Hooper to FO, 13 Jan. 1955; ibid., -/32, FO to UK embassy, Washington, 18 Jan. 1955; F0371/115486/V 1073/62, Bowker to FO, 18 Jan. 1955 100. Gordon H. Torrey,Syrian Politics and the Military 1945-1958 (Columbus, 1964), p.273; Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958


MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES (London, 1986), p.211; F0371/110788N11073/84, Murrayto FO, 7 Dec. 1954; ibid., -/90, Hooper to Falla, 21 Dec. 1954; F0371/115483NV1072/1,Murrayto Eden, 28 Dec. 1954; F0371/115484N 1073/32, FO minute by Kirkpatrick, Jan. 1955. 19 F0371/1 15486/V1073/74, Stevenson to FO, 22 Jan. 1955. Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations: The Amoralityof Power Politics (London, 1969), p.177. F0371/115489/V1073/187, Stewartto Bromley, 1 Feb. 1955. F0371/115750/VQ10344/1, Stevenson to FO, 11 Jan. 1955. F0371/115489/V 1073/187, Stewartto Bromley, 1 Feb. 1955. Evelyn Shuckburgh,Descent to Suez: Diaries 1951-56, selected for publicationby John Charmiley (New Yorkand London, 1986), p.249. F0371/115484/V1073/25, Stevenson to FO, 17 Jan. 1955. F0371/115487/V1073/102, Wrightto FO, 26 Jan. 1955. Ibid., -/108, Stevenson to FO, 27 Jan. 1955. Ibid', -/125, Stevenson to FO, 30 Jan. 1955. Ibid., -/143, Hooper to Eden, 8 Feb. 1955. F0371/115488/V 1073/152, Wrightto FO, 3 Feb. 1955. Ibid., -/166, HM Consul General, Istanbulto FO, 6 Feb. 1955. F0371/115490/V1073/219, Bowker to Eden, 8 Feb. 1955. F0371/115488/V1073/171, Wrightto FO, 5 Feb. 1955. Ibid., -/182, Wrightto FO, 8 Feb. 1955. The referencecharactersNI, N2 and N3, standingfor Nuri's first, second and thirddrafts, have been assigned by the authorto make the text easierto follow. The same applies to M 1, standingfor Menderes'sfirst draft,as well as to LI and L2, standingof the first and second draftsof the exchanged letters. See full text of draft(N1) in F0371/1 15488/V1073/165G, Wrightto FO, 6 Feb. 1955. F0371/115495NV1073/396,Wrightto FO, 5 March 1955. F0371/115487/V1073/104, Bowker to FO, 27 Jan. 1955. F0371/1 15488/V1073/166, HM Consul-General,Istanbulto FO, 6 Feb. 1955. See full text of amended draft (Ml) in F0371/115488/V1073/167, HM Consul-General, Istanbulto FO, 6 Feb. 1955. F0371/115489/V1073/209, FO to Ankara, 8 Feb. 1955; F0371/115488/V1073/166, Makins to FO, 9 Feb. 1955. F0371/115489/V1073/209, FO to Ankara,8 Feb. 1955. Ibid., -/182, Wrightto FO, 8 Feb. 1955; ibid., -/192, Bowker to FO, 9 Feb. 1955. Ibid., -/192, Bowker to FO, 9 Feb. 1955. Ibid., -/198, Wrightto FO, 10 Feb. 1955. Ibid., -/194, Wrightto FO, 9 Feb. 1955. The only significant difference in the alternativetext from draft (N2) was the breaking down of Article 1 of (N2) into two separateArticles 1 and 2 as follows:

101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117.

118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129.

The High ContractingParties will cooperate for their defence and security in accordancewith Article 51 of the UnitedNations Charter will supporteach otheragainstany aggression and in violation of the United Nations Charter. Article 2. In orderto ensure the realizationand effect applicationof cooperationprovided for in Article 1 above, the competent authorities of the High Contracting Parties will determine the measuresto be taken as soon as the present treatyenters into force. These measureswill become operative as soon as they have been approvedby the Governmentsof the High ContractingPartiesand may form the subject of special agreements. 130. F0371/115489/V1073/2-1, Bowker to FO, 1OFeb. 1955. 131. Ibid., -/194, Wrightto FO, 9 Feb. 1955. 132. Ibid., -/211, Bowker to FO, 10 Feb. 1955. Article I of the said treatystated: 'Chacunedes HautesPartiesContractantes s'engage a respecterleur integriteterritoriale leur frontieres et communes telles qu'elles sont definies et tracees dans le Traiteconclu en 1926'. 133. F0371/115490/V 1073/220, Wrightto FO, 11 Feb. 1955.



134. F0371/115489/V1073/196, Makinsto FO, 9 Feb. 1955. 135. F0371/115490/V1073/223G, FO to Ankara, 11 Feb. 1955. 136. Compareibid., the drafttelegram first preparedin the FO with the final text actually sent to the respective embassies. 137. F0371/1154901V1073/223, Bowker to FO, 16 Feb. 1955. 138. F0371/115491N1073/245 and 247, Wrightto FO, 16 Feb. 1955. 139. Ibid., -/250, Wrightto FO, 16 Feb. 1955. 140. F0371/115492/V 1073/273, Bowker to FO, 18 Feb. 1955. 141. F0371/115490N1073/234, Stevenson to FO, 14 Feb. 1955; F0371/115492/V1073/267, FO minuteby Rose, 15 Feb. 1955; ibid., -/269, FO to Baghdad, 17 Feb. 1955, etc. 142. F0371/115492NV1073/273,Bowker to FO, 18 Feb. 1955. 143. Ibid., -/276, Wrightto FO, 18 Feb. 1955. 144. Ibid., -/287, Bowker to FO, 20 Feb. 1955. 145. F0371/115488N 1073/156, Nicholls to Eden, 1 Feb. 1955. 146. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol.XII, p.9; F0371/115487N1073/130, Bowker to Shuckburgh,25 Jan. 1955. 147. F0371/1 15489N 1073/180, Bowker to Shuckburgh,1 Feb. 1955. 148. F0371/1 15492NV1073/28 FO minuteby Brewis, 19 Feb. 1955. 1, 149. F0371/1 15496/V1073/418, brief preparedby Levant Department,FO, 3 March 1955. 150. FRUS 1955-1957, Vol.XII,p.10. 151. F0371/115493N 1073/326, FO minuteby Powell, 22 Feb. 1955. 152. F0371/115492N/1073/281, FO to Ankara, 19 Feb. 1955. 153. Abubaker M. Saad, 'Iraq and Arab Politics: The Nuri as-Said Era, 1941-1958' (unpublishedPh.D. dissertation,University of Washington,1987), p.409. 154. F0371/1 15492N/1073/287, Bowker to FO, 20 Feb. 1955. 155. Ibid., -/282, Wrightto FO and FO to Ankara,20 Feb. 1955. 156. Ibid., -/300, Bowker to FO, 22 Feb. 1955. 157. F0371/115493/V1073/301, Bowker to FO, 22 Feb. 1955. 158. F0371/115492/V1073/300, Bowker to FO, 22 Feb. 1955. 159. F0371/115493N/1073/314, Wrightto FO, 23 Feb. 1955. 160. Ibid., -/304, Bowker to FO, 22 Feb. 1955. 161. Ibid., -/331 and 332, Wrightto FO, 23 Feb. 1955. 162. Ibid., -/315 and 333. 163. F0371/115496/V1073/424, Hooper to Rose, 1 March 1955. 164. F0371/115493/V1073/316, Wrightto FO, 24 Feb. 1955. 165. Ibid., -/334, Wrightto FO, 25 Feb. 1955. 166. See full text in Hurewitz,Diplomacy, II, pp.390-1; Noble Frankland(ed.), Documents on InternationalAffairs, 1955, pp.287-9. 167. F0371/1 15494V 1073/342, Bowker to FO, 26 Feb. 1955. 168. Soysal, 'BaghdadPact', p.66; F0371/115495/V 1073/389, Bowker to Eden, 1 March 1955. Esenbel had also told the counsellor of the British embassy that in 'any case the exchange of letters was of no significance, first because Turkeyrecognised the impossibility of the literal applicationof the Resolutions, and secondly because Nuri Pasha,in insisting on the letters, had made it clear that he did not expect Turkey to take furtheraction and only requiredthem in orderto reinforcehis position with the other Arabcountries';see ibid. 169. Saad, Iraq and Arab Politics, p.410; F0371/115494/V1073/345, Wrightto FO, 27 Feb. 1955; F0371/1154971V1073/463, Wrightto Eden, 1 March 1955. 170. F0371/115507/V1073/717, Bowkerto FO, 16 April 1955. 171. Majid Khadduri,Independent'Iraq 1932-1958: A Study in 'IraqiPolitics, second edition (London, New Yorkand Karachi, 1960), pp.349-50; James Morris,The HashemiteKings (London, 1959), p.185; John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of AmericanPolicy, revisededition (New York, 1960) p.58; Seale, Struggle,p.228; Devereux, Formulation,pp.166-7. 172. F0371/1 15748/VQ1015/8,Wrightto Macmillan,7 June 1955. See text of main instrument and the two subsidiarymemorandain Hurewitz,Diplomacy, II, pp.391-5. 173. Quoted in Elizabeth Monroe, Britain'sMoment in the Middle East 1914-1956 (London,



1965), p.184. See also Aptiilahat Aksin, Tiirkiye'nin 1945 den SonrakiDis Politika Orta Gelismeleri: DoguMeseleleri in [TheDevelopments Turkey's Foreign Policyafter of 1945:Problems the Middle East](Istanbul, 1959),p.102;Mamduh al-Rusan, Al-'Iraq wa qadaya al-'arabi al-sharq al-qawmiyyah Causesof 1941-1958[Iraq the National and theArab East](Beirut, 1979),p.306. 174. Mudhakkarat Khalidal-'Azm[The Memoirsof Khalidal-'Azm],Vol.II,first edition (Beirut, 1972),p.395-9.