A Literature Review of

Cooperation and Partnerships Between

Law Enforcement and
Private Security Organizations
Prepared for the
Bureau of Justice Assistance
U.S. Department of Justice
By
Institute for Law and Justice
and
Hallcrest Division of
Science Applications International Corporation
Edward F. Connors
William C. Cunningham
Peter E. Ohlhausen
1999

Introduction
In a project that studies the nature of cooperation between law enforcement agencies and
private security operations, a literature review unearths academic papers, periodical arti-
cles, books, and written agreements governing cooperative programs. Those sources pro-
vide useful information on the need for cooperation, the history of cooperation, and rele-
vant issues, forms, examples, and trends. In fact, the research for this paper examined
well over a hundred such sources. However, most of the work in law enforcement–
private security cooperation is expended in actually participating in cooperation, not writ-
ing about it. Across the country, there are many cooperative programs, both formal and
informal, about which no literature exists. Therefore, this literature review should be seen
as offering a synopsis of the key concepts in law enforcement–private security cooperation
and not as providing a comprehensive list of cooperative programs.
Definitions
In law enforcement–private security cooperation, terms are important. Both law enforce-
ment and private security are comprehensive terms. In this context, law enforcement con-
sists of a wide range of local, state, and federal agencies, including police and sheriffs’ de-
partments and various investigative and enforcement bureaus. Employment in law en-
forcement is estimated at 738,000 full-time sworn law enforcement officers,
1
and expendi-
tures in that field run to about $45 billion annually.
2
Law enforcement agencies typically
prevent and respond to criminal activities, yet for the most part “are not concerned with
corporate internal problems; they are concerned primarily with street crimes. In many
cases, the internal crimes of fraud and theft are not even reported to the police by the cor-
porations.”
3
Private security shares some of the missions of law enforcement but is substantially differ-
ent in many ways. In fact, “labeling private security the ‘private police’ unfairly and incor-
rectly restricts their scope and invites comparisons from a police perspective rather than
from the comprehensive framework of protective functions.”
4
The two main divisions in private security are (1) proprietary or corporate security, which
consists primarily of security departments within businesses and various institutions, and
(2) contract and other private security firms, which are businesses that provide security
goods and services to businesses, institutions, and homeowners. The former “encom-
passes such sophisticated and diverse concerns as assets protection, loss prevention, coun-

termeasures for industrial espionage, drug testing in the work environment, extortion,
product tampering, dignitary and facility protection, and communications security, to
name a few examples.”
5
Firms in the latter category “provide guard and patrol services to
business, industry, and residential areas; develop, sell, lease, and monitor simple to sophis-
ticated communications and alarms systems; provide investigative, intelligence, and body-
guard equipment and services—among other services.”
6
Both proprietary and contract
security organizations conduct “a significant amount of the investigations involving credit
card theft and fraud, check cases, shoplifting, embezzlement, employee theft, computer
hacking, and other criminal enterprises.”
7
By the year 2000, the private security industry is expected to employ 1.9 million persons,
and annual spending for private security products and services is estimated at about $100
billion.
8
Distinctions
The distinction between law enforcement and private security, especially as regards their
ability to cooperate effectively, has been drawn thus:
[G]enerally, a corporate security manager is employed by a firm whose in-
terests cross not only city, county, and state lines but international borders
as well. The security manager often cannot form policy that would dra-
matically affect overall corporate operations, nor does he have direct ac-
cess to the chief executive officer or the senior executive vice-president. In
the main, security policy changes must pass through a variety of corporate
staff reviews.
In contrast, the law enforcement executive’s principal sphere of concern is
the comparatively small geographic area whose safety he must superintend;
he also enjoys both relative autonomy from and reasonable access to his ju-
risdiction’s senior public officials. Additionally, the law enforcement man-
ager works openly with civic groups and the media on a broad range of
community issues. Bureaucrats who want to affect the public safety
agency, as in the case of budget decisions, cannot make unilateral incur-
sions but must follow a typically well-publicized budget hearing process.
These differences help explain why, over the years, it has been difficult for
law enforcement officials to establish common protocols to be followed
throughout the business community.
9
5
Terence J. Mangan and Michael G. Shanahan, “Public Law Enforcement/Private Security: A New
Part-
nership?” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Jan. 1990, p. 19.6
Mangan and Shanahan.7 Mangan and Shanahan.8 Hallcrest Report II, p. 229.
LITERATURE REVIEW
One last term to define is cooperative effort. Operation Cooperation, the effort of which
this literature review is a part, examines the following types of cooperation: ongoing, for-
mal or informal meetings between law enforcement and security organizations to resolve
common problems; promotion and recognition of professionalism in the training for both
security and law enforcement; sharing of information in criminal investigations; joint plan-
ning for special events and emergencies in the community; sharing of research and re-
sources; and collaboration in prosecuting and convicting perpetrators.
Need for Cooperation
The number of cooperative programs around the country testifies to the perceived impor-
tance of such programs. Why, in particular, is law enforcement–private security coopera-
tion needed? These are a few of the reasons:
• Calls for police service have increased significantly over the years.
10
• “Resources to meet the increasing demand have dwindled. In most major cities, police
personnel have declined . . . .”
11
• Although some crime rates have declined in the last few years, overall rates are still
relatively high, and it seems to “take more officers to make the same number of arrests
as [in the ’70s] . . . . The result is that police necessarily tend to focus more narrowly
on serious crimes, reducing or even eliminating the watchman and service functions
which they traditionally provided.”
12
• Some types of economic crime are beyond the scope and jurisdiction of most local law
enforcement agencies. “Local police do not have sufficient investigative resources,
nor do they have the expertise to track down sophisticated criminals. Again, private
security is the immediate recourse open to corporations to prosecute criminals who
threaten the jobs and finances of thousands of individuals.”
13
• High-tech crimes tend to be “unusually difficult for law enforcement agencies to pre-
vent and investigate”
14
because they are often unfamiliar, complex, and transjurisdic-
tional. A cooperative arrangement can “provide a central point of contact between
government and the high-tech industry, which is eager to lend its assistance,”
15especially expertise and material resources.
• “When businesspeople are familiar with law enforcement agents, they are more likely
to report crimes—it’s a matter of knowing who to contact. Also among the benefits
of increased reporting are increased leads into other . . . crimes.”
16 • The business community is a great untapped resource for solving community prob-
lems. Law enforcement should break away from its old mindset that cooperation with
the private sector brings unwanted baggage. When businesses are encouraged by law
enforcement to become active corporate citizens, they can make the community safer
and create a better environment for their employees.
Each sector can help the other fulfill its mission. In fact, given the large overlap of their
concerns, “A failure to communicate is a nonsensical policy that can only hinder the social
order.”
History of Cooperation
A certain amount of informal cooperation between law enforcement and private security
practitioners has probably taken place since the beginning of formal law enforcement. The
earliest examples of formal cooperation may be those between the federal government and
security practitioners in the defense industry. Certainly that issue was the driving force
behind the formation of the American Society for Industrial Security in 1955.
A subsequent example of formal cooperation developed in the era of skyjacking. “Local
police were stationed at security checks at concourse entrances and arrested many armed
suspects before they reached the planes. Police officials confronted by manpower crises
had to make a choice between staffing beats or positioning officers at airline security
checkpoints. Today, passenger and baggage screening is generally carried out by private
security firms that operate under contract to the airlines and who can communicate quickly
with law enforcement agencies if assistance is needed.”
Later, the Private Security Advisory Council was chartered by the Law Enforcement As-
sistance Administration from 1972 to 1977 “to improve the crime prevention capabilities
of private security and reduce crime in public and private places by reviewing the relation-
ship between private security systems and public law enforcement agencies, and by devel-
oping programs and policies regarding private protection services that are appropriate and
consistent with the public interest.”
Among other projects, the council published advisory reports on false alarms, regulation of private
security services, crime prevention
through environmental design, ethics for security managers and employees, prevention of
terrorism, “law enforcement and private security sources and areas of conflict and strate-
gies for conflict resolution,” scope of legal authority of private security personnel, model
security guard training curricula, and more.
By the 1980s, several formal cooperative programs were in place. In the early 1980s, the
Washington Law Enforcement Executive Forum was formed to address problems facing
both law enforcement and the business community in that state. In 1983, the Dallas Po-
lice/Private Security Joint Information Committee was formed. In 1986, the public sec-
tor–private sector liaison committees of the National Sheriffs’ Association (NSA), the In-
ternational Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and American Society for Industrial
Security (ASIS) formed a Joint Council of Law Enforcement and Private Security Asso-
ciations. By 1989 the Detroit area boasted at least four formal cooperative programs.
20
In the early 1990s, the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center’s Operation Partnership
brought together teams of two to four law enforcement and private security operations
from given jurisdictions for three-day training courses. On returning home, they were
asked to submit quarterly reports on the progress of their cooperative programs. Opera-
tion Partnership training covers the history of law enforcement and private security, busi-
ness and economics, future trends in law enforcement and private security, exemplary pro-
grams, identification of resources, scanning and assessing the environment, legal and ethi-
cal issues, and how to develop, evaluate, modify, present, and market an action plan.
21
Academia has expressed interest in its own form of cooperation for some time. A 1980
paper by a professor of criminal justice called for academic programs in security studies
that would be the equal of criminal justice studies. “Security and crime prevention studies
can make numerous contributions to improved effectiveness in the control of crimes com-
mitted in the private sector. Accordingly, these topics should be perceived as fully interac-
tive elements of criminal justice and fully coequal partners.”
Issues in Cooperation
A recurring theme in the literature is conflict between law enforcement and private secu-
rity. “Historically there has been a tension between public police and private security
agents. This tension has several components. First, the roles and functions of public and
private police are often unclear or poorly understood. While much public attention has
been focused on the ‘police’ in recent years, there has been little public assessment of the
private police, despite the fact that private policing has been growing exponentially over
the past decade.”
As early as 1978, the Private Security Advisory Council was able to
outline such areas of conflict as lack of mutual respect, lack of communication, lack of
cooperation, lack of law enforcement knowledge of private security, perceived competi-
tion, lack of standards in security, and perceived corruption on both sides.
24
Status
Security officers have long been known by the unflattering term “rent-a-cops,” and law
enforcement officers often hold them in contempt; by contrast, the stature of police has
been high since the professionalization efforts of the 1960s.
25
The low esteem is partly
due to the “lack of selection standards for private guards, resulting in guards [who] are
not respected by the law enforcement officer, [and the] lack of standards for training of
private guards, resulting in a lack of confidence on the part of the law enforcement officer
that the guard would not be a problem during a criminal incident.”
26
In sum, “Many of the
problems in communication between police and private security are rooted in the working
officer’s perception of the security guard.”
27
Law enforcement officials sometimes state that private security is not accountable to any-
one. Others disagree. Private security is accountable to customers, regulators, and the
market, which penalizes them for failing to meet specific obligations. Also, private secu-
rity practitioners can be fired for sub-optimal performance, a threat that few law enforce-
ment officials face. Like the police, they are also accountable to civil and criminal law and
the media.
28
In fact, private security sometimes sees law enforcement as the agency that
always comes after the fact, has little accountability for crime, and shows disdain for pri-
vate security.
29
Private security officers indeed receive less training than most police, but even law en-
forcement practitioners observe that “the key is to ensure that professional level training
for the specific duties and jobs to be undertaken by the private sector is provided.”
30
Before law enforcement would feel comfortable contracting out some of its service to private
security, “the private sector security industry must be prepared to accept that only its pro-
fessional members will be asked to share in the work of the public police.”
The status problem is not new. In a national study during the early 1980s, “Law enforce-
ment executives and line officers (patrol and detective personnel) both rated the perform-
ance of private security personnel as fair to poor and the overall contributions of private
security as only somewhat effective . . . . Private security was not perceived as an equal
partner in crime prevention and control, but rather as a junior or silent partner.”
32
However, some evidence suggests that the relationship may be improving:
A recent survey of 127 police officers and 109 security professionals in
Michigan revealed interesting findings on the relationship between public
law enforcement and private security . . . . Nearly two-thirds of all security
respondents have prior law enforcement experience while 43 percent of po-
lice officers worked in the security field before joining law enforcement
agencies . . . . Security professionals were more likely to believe they were
equal partners than were police officers. Police officers were more likely
than security professionals to rank the police/security relationship positively
. . . . Security professionals appear more optimistic and hopeful than police
officers in evaluating various strategies for improved relations. The strate-
gies considered include, among others, improving interagency communica-
tions, creating joint databases, training exchanges, and conducting regular
meetings of agency representatives . . . . Both police and security profes-
sionals predicted greater cooperation between the two sectors in the fu-
ture.
33
Competition
Another barrier comes from market competition. Some observers feel that as private se-
curity grows, law enforcement (especially overtime and off-duty work) may have to
shrink.
34
Thus, law enforcement practitioners may fear that cooperating with private secu-
rity will erode their own responsibilities and opportunities.
35
In fact, the knife cuts both ways. When police provide guard duty for pay, some security
companies see that practice as government-subsidized competition. A 1996 lawsuit filed
in federal court by four private security companies in Virginia accused the state and seven
localities of violating the Sherman Antitrust Act and of price-fixing. “Since the police of-
ficers are using their uniforms, badges, guns, and cars supplied by the government [for off-
duty private security work], it creates unfair competition. The government basically is
subsidizing private business,” said a lawyer representing the security companies. The suit
William C. Cunningham and Todd H. Taylor, Private Security and Police in America: The
Hallcrest
Report I (Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1985), p. 189.
Mahesh K. Nalla and Donald Hummer, “Relations Between Police and Security in Michigan,”
report
published by the School of Criminal Justice, Michigan State University, 1997.
Greene, Seamon, and Levy, p. 6.
 “Summary of a Feasibility Conference,” p. 12.
was dismissed but at this writing is on appeal in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Richmond.
Ignorance
To a great extent, law enforcement practitioners are unaware of the role and resources of
private security. Why? “The private sector has put forth little effort to educate the police
as to the impact of corporate losses and how the impact is passed on to the citi-
zen/customer, nor the loss/benefit ratios utilized in determining the acquisition and com-
mitment of security resources.” Further, “there is a definite perception of differing moti-
vating factors (profit vs. the protection of citizenry), when, in actuality, both [law en-
forcement and private security] are motivated by a very common factor—loss preven-
tion.”
False Alarms
False alarms both divide and unite law enforcement and private security. On one hand,
alarms are a private security activity that has become a law enforcement headache. “Un-
necessary calls for police service due to false burglar alarms have grown into a tremendous
problem. Burglar alarms serve as useful deterrents to crime, but the amount of time and
money police spend responding to the 7 million to 15 million or more false alarm calls
every year has become intolerable to many law enforcement agencies. Projected growth in
the use of alarms portends a worsening problem.”
On the other hand, the issue has cre-
ated several occasions for cooperation among local law enforcement agencies, alarm com-
panies, International Association of Chiefs of Police, National Burglar and Fire Alarm As-
sociation, Central Station Alarm Association, and Security Industry Association.
Refusal to Recognize Authority
Sometimes private security would like to participate more fully in stopping crime but is
prevented from doing so. “Armed private security officers in Northern Virginia have the
power of arrest, yet are prevented from carrying out that authority by magistrates and
commonwealth attorneys who are reluctant to accept an official summons issued by a se-
curity officer. [Security is] a legitimate crime-fighting body—separate from public law
enforcement yet dependent on its cooperation.”
Government’s Relationship with Business
In some places, government is unfriendly to business; in others, the relationship is more
cooperative. The latter type of relationship led to the development of one of the most
successful, longest-lived law enforcement–private security cooperative programs, the
Washington Law Enforcement Executive Forum (WLEEF), which includes law enforce-
ment leaders of that state’s major cities and counties, state and federal law enforcement
professionals, and “captains of industry.” The rationale behind WLEEF is that “although
there are those who would impugn it and attach negative images to the concept, ours is a
democracy supported by capitalism in a free enterprise system. Therefore, it is important
that law enforcement be sure that its relationships transcend not only our neighborhoods
and various units of government, but that we develop a viable interface in the commercial
sphere in the State of Washington.”
Constitutional Issues
An issue that does not necessarily cause conflict but may complicate cooperation has to do
with legal accountability. In some ways, private security’s legal accountability may not be
as great as that of law enforcement.
On the other hand, when private security acts
alongside or under the direction of law enforcement, it may be acting under “color of state
law,” meaning it must meet the same legal standards that apply to law enforcement.
Joint Council’s Issues
Finally, the Joint Council of Law Enforcement and Private Security Associations raises
important issues by asking the following questions, to which it suggests all the answers are
“yes”:
• Should the law enforcement officer see his or her private security
counterpart as a peer professional?
• Should the law enforcement and property protection objectives of
law enforcement be supported by involved corporate and private
security agency leaders?
• Can the net cost for both private and public security be reduced
through coordinated actions?
• Can the corporation’s profit line be increased through cooperative
relationships with law enforcement?
• Can corporate citizenship be enhanced through cooperative actions
with law enforcement?
• Is there an element of risk on the part of a corporation in joining
hands with a law enforcement agency?
• Is there an element of risk on the part of the law enforcement
agency in providing police resources and criminal history record in-
formation to the private sector?
Types of Cooperation
Cooperative programs fall into the following broad, somewhat overlapping categories:
informal, formal, contractual, familiarity/goodwill, topic-specific, and umbrella.
Formal versus Informal
Setting up by-laws, sectors, committees, and funding is very difficult and time-consuming.
For that reason, some groups of law enforcement and private security officials opt to co-
operate informally. For example, a New Jersey partnership created by AlliedSignal, Inc.,
is informal and unnamed. “Begun in 1996, the partnership has evolved into an informal
network that allows local, state, and federal law enforcement officials based in the area to
meet with security professionals and top executives in some of the county’s [Morris
County, NJ] Fortune 500 companies.” The partnership holds three to four breakfast
meetings or other get-togethers per year. “The sessions have no formal agenda. [After a
speaker speaks, participants] can give or receive advice on security projects or discuss
how corporate security professionals can help police solve or prevent criminal activity . . .
. The meetings have also been used by security professionals to discuss common problems,
such as how several companies with employees overseas could work together if their
workers had to be suddenly evacuated from international trouble spots.”
By contrast, some groups opt to organize formally, usually in the hope that structure will
increase longevity. One such group is the Virginia Police and Private Security Alliance
(VAPPSA), which sponsors educational presentations at its meetings, works to apply
problem-solving approaches to public safety issues, conducts shared training programs,
maintains a public/private information and resource network, and tracks and tries to influ-
ence legislation. VAPPSA features by-laws, membership dues, voting and nonvoting
membership categories, a board of directors, and half a dozen formal committees. Inter-
estingly, “the VAPPSA members who initiated the group did not realize how much time it
would take to establish by-laws, create a formal structure, remedy legal entanglements,
and create momentum . . . . The founders realized early on that their attention could easily
be diverted from the original vision and get lost in the swamp of organizational develop-
ment.” On the plus side, VAPPSA has remained in existence since 1991.
42
Minutes and statements from the Joint Council of Law Enforcement and Private Security
Associations,
1986-87.
43
David R. Green, “Joining Forces Against Crime,” Security Management, May 1998, pp. 95-98.

Contractual
Some cooperative programs go beyond being formal to being literally contractual. Such
programs are typically business improvement districts (BIDs) or other forms of privatiza-
tion.
BIDs can be formed in several ways. “In New York, the formation of a BID can be initi-
ated by property owners, by a local development corporation or a Chamber of Commerce,
by a local Community Board or that area’s City Council member, or by the mayor or a
mayoral agency. Any commercial, retail, or industrial area in New York city may apply
for BID status through any such sponsor.”
44
Once the BID is approved by the govern-
ment, a special assessment is added to the property tax bills of all businesses within its
geographical area. The money is collected by the government, then returned to the BID
for the purposes stated in the BID’s official plan. Typically, BIDs use the money for capi-
tal improvements, marketing of the area, sanitation, and security. Often, the security con-
tractor hired by the BID contacts the police when an arrest needs to be made, and its secu-
rity officers serve as extra eyes and ears for the police. In return, the police sometimes
provide training and crime information to the security contractor or to in-house security
departments of businesses that belong to the BID.
BIDs divide public safety responsibilities in this way: “The public police have typically
regulated social order outside of buildings, while the private police have typically regu-
lated order within a building or within building complexes. More importantly, whether
recognized or not, these groups interact in fundamental ways all of which contribute to the
‘security net’ within central business districts. In essence the ‘horizontal and vertical’
safety of any center city business area is greatly enhanced with cooperative public and pri-
vate police arrangements.”
In other cases, law enforcement agencies or local governments actually contract out work
that was formerly performed by law enforcement. Such arrangements necessarily involve
cooperation between law enforcement and private security. For example, to relieve its
police department from the burden of investigating some 500 bad-check complaints each
year, the city of Kentwood, Michigan, contracted with a private firm to do the work. The
result is that investigations are no longer backlogged, merchants have an effective means
for recovering their losses, and police have more time for their other duties.
One of the
most famous instances of contracting out involves the Corrections Corporation of Amer-
ica, which builds and operates prisons.
One observer notes that “contracting out enables police officers to concentrate on the tasks for
which they are trained and can be most effective . . . [freeing up] a well-trained, professional police
force from administrative and
routine duties to concentrate on tackling crime . . . .”
Familiarity and Goodwill Programs
Some cooperative programs exist mainly to familiarize individual law enforcement and
private security professionals with each other.
Law Enforcement Appreciation Nights
Typically, the liaison committee in a private security organization will host an annual law
enforcement appreciation night. For example, the Law Enforcement Liaison Committee
of the Greater Milwaukee Chapter of the American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS)
holds annual law enforcement appreciation nights for about 100 police chiefs, sheriffs, and
executives of federal law enforcement agencies in southeastern Wisconsin. The first bene-
fit of such meetings is that key parties get to know each other. The second benefit is the
actual cooperative work that develops from those relationships. For example, a member
of the chapter assisted the Milwaukee County Sheriff’s Department on security surveys,
security policies and procedures, and security awareness to help the department in its new
role of providing security at several county facilities.
Directories
The ASIS Greater Milwaukee Chapter publishes a directory of all Wisconsin police chiefs
and state and federal law enforcement contacts. The chapter distributes the directory to
ASIS members and law enforcement agencies.
Awards
An effort similar to law enforcement appreciation nights is the awarding of honors by se-
curity organizations to law enforcement. It is cooperation in the sense that security
thereby encourages law enforcement to perform in ways that benefit private security. For
example, the John J. Duffy Memorial Award, given by the National Council of Investiga-
tion and Security Services to the Threat Management Unit (TMU) of the Los Angeles Po-
lice Department in 1997, “spotlighted the effectiveness of the police program. But it also
underlined the necessary dialog between law enforcement and private security and the
complexities of stalking crimes.” NCISS lauded the TMU for aggressively enforcing the
anti-stalking laws on the books instead of working for the closure of public records, which
would hinder private investigations.
51
48
Bob Stewart, p. 14.
49
Ronald L. Kuhar and Jon C. Paul, “The Milwaukee Experience,” ASIS Dynamics, July/August
1996,
pp. 5-7.
50
Directory, ASIS and Wisconsin Chiefs of Police Association, 1995.
51
“Security Group Honors Anti-stalking Police Unit,” SECURITY, July 1997, pp. 7-8.

Umbrella Programs
Many cooperative programs are best described as umbrella programs, as they are designed
to develop law enforcement–private security relationships, teams, and task forces that ad-
dress a wide range of concerns.
One of the most notable is the Washington Law Enforcement Executive Forum, men-
tioned earlier, which, among other activities, funds a statewide loaned-executive program
to enhance management of local police agencies; provides support for the Law Enforce-
ment Executive Journal, the nation’s first law enforcement/business publication; spon-
sored legislation on the regulation and training of private security personnel and on com-
puter crime; and created an “Economic Crime Task Force to assess the nature and extent
of white-collar crime in the state, develop strategies to reduce such crime, promote appro-
priate legislation initiatives and revisions, and collect and disseminate information on eco-
nomic crime.”
Similarly, the Downtown Detroit Security Executive Council (DDSEC), which includes
corporate security executives and local, state, and federal law enforcement professionals,
tackles such projects as identifying security problems from police reports and incidents
reported to private security and promoting crime prevention through environmental design
in new construction and renovation projects.
Likewise, the Business/Law Enforcement Alliance (BLEA), created in 1994, is a formal
partnership between California businesses and city, county, state, and federal law en-
forcement agencies. An arm of the California Peace Officers Association, it includes some
200 participants from various industries and law enforcement and has a 10-member board
of directors. BLEA’s purpose is to create a link between the California business commu-
nity and law enforcement so that both can work together to solve specific problems in the
state. “The organization’s leadership recognizes, for example, that some law enforcement
agencies do not have the specialized expertise, tools, or time to investigate and prosecute
certain high-tech offenders.” BLEA is currently working on three projects: reducing
check fraud, stopping the theft of rental equipment, and reducing false alarms. It may
soon develop alliances with trade organizations to combat audio and video piracy.
Another umbrella program is the Baltimore County Police and Private Security Associa-
tion, which meets once a month, has a newsletter, organizes joint training, works on legis-
lation and reducing false alarms, addresses specific crimes (such as graffiti), organizes
training of security officers to make better witnesses, and conducts other activities.
The Area Police–Private Security Liaison Program (APPL), formed in 1985, consists of
high-ranking New York City Police Department members and respected security directors
in New York City. “The program’s main goals are to engage in cooperative efforts to
protect people and property, exchange information to aid in the accomplishment of mutual
goals, [and] eliminate the ‘credibility gap’ between police and private security.” Police
members provide information on local crime trends, patterns, and incidents; offer expertise
to help private security protect assets and clientele; and provide an atmosphere conducive
to trust and cooperation. Private security members learn how to cooperate with and help
the police, and they offer expertise in technology, building security, and asset protection.
The group holds quarterly regional meetings with speeches on specific topics. Members
train each other and work together on legislation.
In Missouri, the Creve Coeur Joint Crime Prevention Program consists of the Creve
Coeur Police Department, Monsanto Corporate Security, and St. John’s Mercy Medical
Center Safety and Security Department. It has initiated a community-wide project to de-
velop a mobile crime prevention display and command center trailer for the education and
safety of the community. It holds Neighborhood Watch appreciation awards dinners to
recognize citizens of the community for their efforts in assisting the police and preventing
crime. Other activities include a bike rodeo with a crime prevention theme; crime preven-
tion booths at local festivals; participation in National Night Out; Halloween parties for
children; crime prevention displays at program members’ sites; one-day seminars at pro-
gram members’ sites on sexual assault, burglary prevention, drug and alcohol abuse, traffic
safety, vacation safety, and security checks; and a phone notification system to alert
neighborhood and business watch groups about crimes.
Some umbrella programs operate on the national level. For example, the Private Sector
Liaison Committee of IACP has produced, for national distribution to law enforcement
and private security practitioners, several resource and guideline documents. Examples
include “Non-Sworn Alarm Responder Guidelines: Guidelines for Employers and Law En-
forcement” and “False Alarm Perspectives: A Solution-Oriented Resource.” Other papers
have addressed product tampering, workplace drug crimes, and workplace violence. Re-
cently, such efforts have been able to reach a wider audience by being posted on the Inter-
net (www.amdahl.com/ext/iacp), which was itself an instance of cooperation, as the site
space was donated by Amdahl Corporation.
Similarly, since the early 1980s, the Law Enforcement Liaison Committee (LELC) of
ASIS has promoted cooperation by sponsoring seminars and presentations on (1) security
and police issues, such as improving communications and working relationships; (2) trends
in outsourcing and privatization; (3) training law enforcement personnel about private se-
curity functions; and (4) encouraging the establishment of law enforcement and security
partnerships. In the late 1980s the LELC produced a video describing the roles and typi-
cal functions of private security. The video was distributed to virtually every major police
training academy in the United States. The LELC has also worked to develop a closer
association with such law enforcement organizations as IACP and the National Sheriffs’
Association. In 1997, the LELC provided the initiative for a national project (supported
Anthony M. Voelker, “Area Police–Private Security Liaison Program,” New York City Police
Department document. Circa 1988.
“1991 Annual Report,” Creve Coeur (Missouri) Joint Crime Prevention Program.

by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice) to develop guidelines for
establishing and improving partnerships between public law enforcement and private secu-
rity.
Trends
The literature reflects a number of trends that are affecting or will affect cooperation be-
tween law enforcement and private security.
The most powerful trend is the continued growth of the private security industry, both in
real terms and relative to law enforcement. In 1987 the director of the U.S. Justice De-
partment’s National Institute of Justice (NIJ) wrote that “cooperation becomes increas-
ingly essential with the growth of the private security industry.”
75
In policing, “resources
to meet the increasing demand have dwindled. In most major cities, police personnel have
declined, and the number of police employees per 1,000 population dropped 10 percent
between 1975 and 1985. Shrinking tax revenues throughout the country and outright tax-
payer revolts . . . have curtailed growth in government. Police, like other public adminis-
trators, have become familiar with cutback management.”
Another trend is the change in law enforcement’s approach to much of its work. The phi-
losophies of community policing, neighborhood-oriented policing, and problem-oriented
policing all call on law enforcement to cooperate with the community, which includes pri-
vate security. Similarly, “where law enforcement is actively involved in crime prevention
activities, cooperation with private security is better because the interests of the two agen-
cies are more closely aligned.”
For example, at the Detroit Police Department, security
industry representatives sit on the Chief’s Crime Prevention Advisory Committee.
In addition, increasing professionalism in private security has slowly been improving law
enforcement’s attitude toward security practitioners, and “each successful contact aids in
establishing further ties and acts as a building block for increased communication and joint
programs.”
Another trend is the private sector’s increasing need to prosecute. “[C]orporations have
been deterred from criminally prosecuting their employees by the prospects of bad public-
ity, unsympathetic juries, counter lawsuits, and other real and perceived problems. In-
stead, employers frequently settle for the offender’s dismissal or resignation. The current
reluctance of the business world to fight its internal crime wave with a joint private-public
offensive cannot last forever, however. The entrance of the high-tech white-collar crimi-
nal, whose skillful predations can prove disastrous for a corporation, will likely be the
most significant catalyst bringing together the private sector and the various components
of the criminal justice system for mutual assistance.”
Also driving cooperation is the evolutionary loss of preexisting relationships. “Informal
levels of communication and cooperation are dissipating as private security firms promote
managers more from within rather than from the field of law enforcement. The ‘good ole
boy’ network cannot be relied upon for communication in future years.”
Finally, the issue of privatization is likely to continue to drive cooperation. According to
a former director of NIJ, “nearly as much money is now paid by governments to private
security companies as is spent for public law enforcement by the federal and state govern-
ments combined.”
There are many examples of privatization requiring cooperation be-
tween law enforcement and private security. “[I]nstead of using regular police officers for
security and crowd control at its civic center and other city-owned buildings, Phoenix con-
tracts that service to Anderson Agency, Inc. . . . The company’s marketing director says
lower costs are not the only benefit the city receives from its private security force. ‘Our
men are trained to prevent things from happening, while police officers are trained to stop
crimes in progress or solve them after they have happened.’ . . . In New York City, badge-
wearing employees of a private company patrol streets in search of cars with outstanding
parking tickets.”
The Future
An experienced participant in law enforcement–private security collaborations makes these
comments about the possible future of cooperation:
This interaction will probably produce different benefits for each partici-
pant, including enhanced professionalization of public law enforcement.
Corporate people eventually will learn to operate more comfortably with
some of the openness and public accessibility required of criminal justice
agencies. Private sector executives will also learn to interact with people
who are action-oriented, who show a great deal of initiative, and whose
freshness in attacking problems is devoid of some of the intrigue and sub-
tleties that frequently are found in the corporate bureaucracy.
On the other side, law enforcement officials will be exposed to a higher de-
gree of organizational sophistication. They will learn to view corporate
problems through the eyes of chief executive officers, upwardly mobile
corporate managers, and stockholders . . . . They will learn, too, that realis-
tic planning and effective marketing are basic to survival. The police man-
agers also will become sensitized to the fact that corporate entities, unlike
police agencies, must measure up to competing firms or go out of busi-
ness.
Peter A. Holmes, “Taking Public Services Private,” Nation’s Business, August 1985, pp. 20-22.
84
Shanahan, “Private Enterprise and the Public Police: The Professionalizing Effects of a New
Partner-
ship,” p. 455.

.
GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS
OF SECURITY GUARDS AND SIMILAR PERSONNEL IN THE PRIVATE SECURITY
INDUSTRY.
.

For the purpose of ensuring the private security personnel of their rights to the minimum benefits
mandated by law, these guidelines are hereby issued for compliance of all concerned.

SECTION 1. Coverage. - This issuance shall apply to all private security agencies or operators,
their principals or clients, all companies allowed to directly employ security guards and to all
security guards, whether agency or company employees, for compliance and entitlement,
respectively, to existing labor standards laws and benefits.

Sec. 2. Definition of terms. - For the purpose of this Guidelines, the following terms are defined:

a. "Principal" refers to any employer, company or establishment to whom a security job, service or
work is provided by a security service contractor, whether or not the arrangement is covered by a
written contract.

b. "Security service contractor" is synonymous with a private security agency which means any
person, association, partnership, firm or private corporation, who contracts, recruits, trains,
furnishes or posts any security guard or similar personnel to individuals, corporations, offices and
organizations, whether private or public, for their security needs as the Philippine National Police
may approve.

Sec. 3. Employment status. -

3.1 Employer-employee relationship. - The security service contractor is the employer of its
security guard and similar personnel. The principal where the security guards are as-signed is
considered an "indirect employer" for unpaid wages and other wage related benefits based on the
joint and several liability of the principal with the service contractor under the Labor Code, unless
the private security agency is owned, managed or controlled by the prin-cipal or the facts show that
the principal controls the manner by which the security service is performed or where the security
guard is directly hired by the establishment.

3.2 Probationary employment. - The probationary period of a newly hired security guard or similar
personnel in the private security industry shall not exceed six (6) months. While engaged on
probationary basis, his/her services may be terminated for failure to meet the reasonable standards
or criteria made known by the security agency/employer to the guard at the time of engagement or
for just cause/s.

3.3 Regular employment. - Any security guard or similar personnel in the private se-curity industry
who is allowed to work after the probationary period shall be considered a regular employee.

Sec. 4. Service contracts. - The security service contractor and/or the principal shall produce or
submit the original copy of their service contract when directed to do so by the Regional Director
or his/her duly authorized representative. The service contract shall stipulate, among others:
a. A statement that the security guards/personnel shall be paid not less than the minimum wage and
other benefits under the Labor Code and other existing laws;

b. An escalation clause to immediately effect the common provision in the wage orders that the
prescribed increase in the wage rates of the workers shall be borne by the principal or client of the
service contractors and the contracts shall be deemed amended accordingly.

c. A statement that security service contractor and/or the principal shall comply with Social
Security, Employees Compensation, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation and Home
Development Mutual Fund laws on employees' coverage or membership.

d. The kind or nature of security service.

e. The schedule of payment of 13th month pay per P. D. 851 and re-tirement pay per R. A. 7641.

Sec. 5. Employment contracts. -

5.1 The security service contractor shall provide his security guards, detachment
commanders/supervisors and other security personnel, a copy of the employment contract duly
signed by the parties which shall contain the terms and conditions of employment, such as those
provided under Section 5 hereof.

5.2 For every assignment of a security guard/personnel to a principal, the duty detail order shall
contain the following, among others:

a. Description of job, work or service to be performed

b. Hours and days of work, work shift and applicable premium, overtime and night shift pay rates.

Sec. 6. Terms and conditions of employment. -

6.1 The security guards and similar personnel in the employ of any private security agency or
company should be duly licensed and must have passed the physical and neuro-psychiatric
examinations required by the PNP. They are entitled to the mandatory benefits under the Labor
Code and other existing laws, including coverage by SSS, ECC, Philhealth and HDMF.

6.2 The basic wage rate of a security guard/personnel shall not be less than the minimum wage rate
for the non-agricultural sector in the Region where he/she is assigned, regardless of the nature of
business of the principal, or in the Region where the security guard has been engaged, whichever is
higher.

Where a security guard/personnel is recruited through a branch office in another Region where the
principal is likewise located, the non-agricultural minimum wage rate applicable in the workplace
of the principal shall govern.

Security guards or other personnel employed and/or assigned by a security service contractor in
one Region but who are transferred, moved or assigned to another Region shall be paid based on
the more beneficial wage rate.

In case of transfer or reassignment to another principal within a Region, the wage rates may be
adjusted provided that the same shall not be less than the applicable regional minimum wage rate.

6.3. Statutory Benefits. - The security guards/personnel are entitled to not less than the following
benefits depending on the working hours, work shift and workdays under the given conditions,
which benefits should be included in the cost distribution in the service contract:

a. Basic salary for all actual workdays and for the ten regular holidays (as holiday pay) which must
not be lower than the minimum wage rates above described and to be computed by using the
factors recommended herein or by more favorable practice of the employer. In addition, one
hundred percent (100%) of the basic salary is due whenever work is rendered on a regular holiday.

b. Allowance in addition to the basic salary, if any, is prescribed by the applicable Regional Wage
Order.

c. Premium pay of 30% of the daily rate for work on special days and rest days, which is increased
to 50% whenever work is performed on coinciding rest days and special days.

d. Overtime pay for work rendered in excess of eight (8) hours a day, equivalent to at least 25% of
the regular wage rate on ordinary days and 30% on regular holidays, special days and rest days.

e. Night shift pay equivalent to 10% of the regular hourly rate for work rendered between 10:00
pm to 6:00 am of the following day.

f. Five (5) day service incentive leave for every year of service which benefits can be availed of
during days of absence and, if not used, are convertible into its cash equivalent. A proportionate
leave benefit per month may be derived by dividing 5 days by 12 months times the daily rate.

g. Paternity leave of seven (7) days with full pay. This leave shall be granted before, during or after
childbirth or after spontaneous miscarriage by his legal spouse. The paternity leave with pay is
granted for only four deliveries, including miscarriage.
h. 13th month pay which is 1/12 of the total basic salary earned within a calendar year.

6.4 Recommended Computation of Equivalent Monthly Rates

Using the applicable daily wage rate (ADR) and a factor representing the number of paid days in a
year, the following procedures are recommended to facilitate computation of equivalent monthly
rates (EMR).

For those who are required to work everyday including Sundays or rest days, special days and
regular holidays:

EMR = (ADR x 391.5) / 12

where 391.5 is derived from:

302.0 - ordinary working days

18.0 - 9 regular holidays x 200%
2.6 - a regular holiday on last Sunday
of August x 200% + (30% of 200%)
66.3 - 51 rest days x 130%
2.6 - 2 special days x 130%
391.5 days considered paid in a year

For those who are considered paid on all days including unworked Sundays or rest days, special
days and regular holidays:
EMR = (ADR x 365) / 12

where 365 days derived from:

302 - ordinary working days

2 - special days
51 - rest days
10 - regular holidays
365 days

For those who do not work and are not considered paid on Sundays/ rest days:
EMR = (ADR x 314.6) / 12

where 314.6 is derived from:

302.0 - ordinary working days
2.6 - 2 special days (if worked) x 130%
10.0- regular holidays
314.6 days considered paid in a year

For those who do not work and are not considered paid on Saturdays and Sundays or rest days
EMR = (ADR x 262.6) / 12

where 262.6 is derived from:

250.0 - ordinary working days
2.6 - 2 special days (if worked) x 130%
10.0 - regular holidays
262.6 days

By using the above indicated factors, the basic wage for the worked days and holiday pay for the
10 regular holidays are included in the monthly rates. Thirty percent (30%) rest day premium has
been integrated in factor 391.5 for all the Sundays/rest days in a year includ-ing the last Sunday of
August and in factors 314.6 and 262.6 for the two special days (November 1 and December 31)
under Executive Order No. 203 of 1987.

Not included in the above formula is the premium pay due an employee whenever work is
rendered on an ordinary working day proclaimed by the President as a special day (that is other
than Nov. 1 and Dec. 31).

6.5 Other Mandatory Benefits. In appropriate cases, security guards/similar per-sonnel are entitled
to the mandatory benefits as listed below, although the same may not be included in the monthly
cost distribution in the contracts, except the required premiums for their coverage:

a. Maternity benefit as provided under the SS Law;

b. Separation pay if the termination of employment is for authorized cause as provided by law and
as enumerated below:

Half-Month Pay Per Year of Service, but in no case less than One Month Pay, if separation is due
to:
1. Retrenchment or reduction of personnel effected by management to prevent serious losses;

2. Closure or cessation of operation of an establishment not due to serious losses or financial

reverses;

3. Illness or disease not curable within a period of 6 months and continued employment is
prohibited by law or prejudicial to the employee's health or that of co-employees; or

4. Lack of service assignment for a continuous period of 6 months.

One Month Pay Per Year of Service, if separation is due to:

1. Installation of labor-saving device, such as replacement of employees by equipment/machinery;

2. Redundancy, as when the position of the employee has been found to be surplusage or
unnecessary in the operation of the agency;

3. Impossible reinstatement of the employee to his/her former position or to a substantially

equivalent position for reasons not attributable to the fault of the employer, as when the
reinstatement ordered by a competent authority cannot be implemented due to closure or cessation
of op-erations of the establishment/employer, or the position to which the employee is to be
reinstated no longer exists and there is no substan-tially equivalent position to which he/she can be
assigned.
c. Cash income benefits under the State Insurance Fund in case of work-related sickness or other
contingencies.

d. Retirement pay granted by R. A. 7641 to any security guard/personnel who retires under an
applicable employer plan or policy.

For this purpose, the security service contractor shall create or put up a trust fund for retirement
benefit. The Trust Fund Agreement shall be executed by and between the trustor and trustee in
favor of the employee-beneficiary for payment of re-tirement benefit in accordance with R. A.
5487 and R. A. 7641.

The Fund shall be administered and maintained by a trust company, bank, in-vestment house, pre-
need company or corporation duly authorized to perform trust function exclusively for collective
investment or re-investment of certain money received in its capacity as trustee, or similar
arrangement as may be agreed upon in ac-cordance with law.

As such, any payment for retirement benefits collected in advance by the contractor from the
principal/s shall be deposited by the contractor/trustor to the trustee in favor of the security guard
as benefit upon retirement or when his/her employment is terminated due to authorized causes.

e. Other benefits granted by law, individual or collective agreement or company policy or practice.

Sec. 7. Deductions from salary, - No deduction shall be made from the salary of the security
guards/personnel, except for:
a. SSS contribution
b. EC contribution
c. HDMF contribution
d. Philhealth contribution
e. Withholding tax from income, provided a proper withholding tax receipt is issued to the
employee before the filing of income tax return every year
f. Union dues, if applicable
g. Other deductions authorized by
Sec. 8. Liability and responsibilities of contractors and clients/principals. -
8.1 Joint and several liability. - When the security service contractor fails to pay the wages of its
security guards/personnel, the principal shall be jointly and severally liable with the security
service contractor to the extent of the work performed by such em-ployees under the contract, in
the same manner and extent that the principal is liable to its direct employees.

If there are wage increases or adjustments after the execution of the service contract, the prescribed
increases in the wage rates of guards shall be borne by the principal and the service contract shall
be deemed amended accordingly. In the event that the principal fails to pay the prescribed
increases, the security service contractor shall be jointly and severally liable with the principal.

The security guards' contractual relationship is with their employer, the security ser-vice
contractor. Thus, their immediate recourse for payment of wage increase before litigation is with
their direct employer, the security service contractor. In order for the security service contractor to
comply with the new rates, the consideration paid by the principal for the security guards' wages
has to be adjusted in conformity with the mandated wage increase.
In case of finding of violations on wages and other labor standards due the security guards, the
DOLE Regional Director shall serve summons to both the security service con-tractor and the
principal to determine the extent of liability of the parties.

8.2 Solidary liability. - For purposes of immediate relief, the principal shall be deemed as the direct
employer of the security guard/personnel in any of the following cases, and therefore shall be
solidarily liable for whatever monetary claims the security guard/personnel may have against his
employer:

a. When the security service contractor is found to be engaged in labor-only contract-ing;

contracting out of work which will either displace its employees or reduce their regular work hours
or any other prohibited activity;

b. When the security service contractor is declared guilty of unfair labor practice, i.e., contracting
out of a job, work or service being performed by union members when such will interfere with,
restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their rights to self-organization; or

c. When a violation of the relevant provisions of the Labor Code has been established by the
Regional Director in the exercise of his/her enforcement powers.

The principal shall also be deemed solidarily liable with the security service contractor to the
extent of accrued claims and benefits that the latter may owe to its security guards/personnel in the
following instances:

a. When the license or business permit of the security service contractor is cancelled, revoked or
not renewed by the competent authority, or

b. When the contract between the principal and the security service contractor is preterminated for
reasons not attributable to the fault of the latter.

8.3. Responsibilities and Obligations of Security Service Contractors and Principals in the
Execution of Service Contracts. - The service contracts or agreements between a security service
contractor and its principal/s shall ensure compliance with the minimum wage and other labor
standards under the laws, including the mandatory coverage by the SSS, EC, Philhealth and
HDMF.

Government agencies or instrumentalities engaging security services from private security

agencies shall likewise observe compliance with all labor laws and shall require the security
service contractor to submit, among others requirements and as part of their bid, an under-taking to
pay their workers the above benefits.

8.4. Keeping of records. - The principals as indirect employers shall keep and maintain their own
separate records or files on the assignment of security guards in their premises during the period of
the service contract, which shall be open for inspection and verification by this Department. The
security agency, however, as the direct employer shall observe the rule on general record keeping
under the Labor Code, as amended.

Sec. 9. Right to security of tenure and due process. -

9.1 Security guards and similar personnel who have become regular employees shall enjoy security
of tenure in their employment as provided by law. Their services can only be terminated for just or
authorized causes after due process.

Termination for a just cause or causes as stated in Art. 281 of the Labor Code does not entitle the
security guard/personnel to separation pay, unless otherwise provided in the em-ployer policy or
individual contract or collective agreement.

9.2 Notice of Termination. - In case of termination of employment due to authorized causes

provided in Art. 283 and 284 of the Labor Code and in the succeeding subsection, the employer
shall serve a written notice on the security guard/personnel and the DOLE at least one (1) month
before the intended date thereof.

9.3 Reserved Status. - A security guard or similar personnel may be placed in a workpool or on
reserved status due to lack of service assignments after expiration or termination of the service
contract with the principal where he/she is assigned, or due to the temporary suspension of agency
operations.

No security guard or personnel can be placed in a workpool or on reserved status in any of the
following situations: (a) after expiration of a service contract if there are other principals where
he/she can be assigned; (b) as a measure to constructively dismiss the security guard; and (c) as an
act of retaliation for filing complaints against the employer on violations of labor laws, among
others.

If, after a period of 6 months, the security agency/employer cannot provide work or give an
assignment to the reserved security guard, the latter can be dismissed from service and shall be
entitled to separation pay as described in subsection 5.6.

Security guards on reserved status who accept employment in other security agencies or employers
before the end of the above six-month period may not be given separation pay.

9.4. Preventive suspension. - Subject to the constitutional rights of the workers to security of tenure
and the right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Art. 282 of the Labor Code, a security guard/personnel
may be preventively suspended if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat
to life or property of the employer, its principal or the guard's co-workers.

No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty (30) days. The security agency shall
thereafter reinstate the security guard/personnel in his/her former position or it may extend the
period of suspension, provided that during the period of extension, the agency pays the wages and
other benefits due the guard/personnel.

The employer shall designate a day, time and place within the period of preventive suspension,
with notice to the employee, to hold a fact-finding investigation thus enabling the suspended
employee to be heard and assisted by a counsel or representative, if he/she so desires, of the charge
against him/her and thereby be exonerated; or, upon the employee's failure to vindicate
himself/herself, to find the employee guilty and thereby, to terminate his/her employment. Such
termination, however, shall not prejudice the right of the employee to ques-tion the severance of
relationship in the appropriate forum.

The above procedure shall likewise be observed by the employer/agency in case the employment is
terminated due to any of the just causes.

9.5. Report of dismissal, termination or retirement. - The security service contractor shall submit a
monthly report of all dismissals or termination, including retirement, effected during the month to
the DOLE Regional Office having jurisdiction over its main or branch office using the prescribed
form and indicating all information as required by DOLE for policy and statistical purposes.

Sec. 10. Right to self-organization and collective bargaining. -

The security guards and other personnel employed by the security service contractor shall have the
right to form, join or assist in the formation of a labor organization of their own choosing for
purposes of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted activities which are not contrary to
law including the right to strike.

Sec. 11. Penal provision. - Violation of any of the provisions of this Guidelines which are declared
unlawful or punishable by law shall be punished accordingly.

Sec. 12. Effect on existing issuances and agreements. -

This issuance shall serve as a guide for the DOLE and its agencies in the administration and
enforcement of applicable labor and social legislations and their implementing regulations.

Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize diminution or reduction of benefits being enjoyed
by the security guards and similar personnel at the time of issuance hereof.

This Guidelines supersedes Department Order No. 40 s. 1994 and other existing orders which are
inconsistent hereto and shall take effect immediately.

Manila, Philippines, December 18, 2001.

CLIENT
SATISFACTION
GUARANTEED
History of the Civil Security Group
CSG the birth . . .
The Civil Security Group started as the Civil Security Force Command (CSFC) in 1980 and was
tasked to
exercise administrative and operational control in the regulation of the firearms,
explosives, and security agency industries. Following offices were placed under its
command and control: Firearms and Explosives Unit (FEU); Supervisory Unit for Security
and Investigation Agency (SUSIA); Reserve Affairs Unit (RAU); Integrated Constabulary
Home Defense Force (ICHDF); and Regional Civil Security Force Districts (RCSFDs).
With the establishment of the Philippine National Police (PNP) in 1991, the Civil
Security Force Command was renamed Civil Security Command (CIVISCOM). It took
control over the following: Firearms and Explosives Division (FED); Security and Guards
Supervision Division (SAGSD); sixteen (16) Regional Civil Security Districts (RCSDs) with five
(5) subdistricts in NCR; and
Law Enforcement Training Affairs Division (LESTAD).
In line with the civilianization thrust of the PNP, the CIVISCOM was renamed as the Civil
Security Group (CSG)
in 1996. Today, only the two (2) regulatory divisions namely: the Firearms and Explosives
Division (FED) and the
Security Agency and Guards Supervision Division (SAGSD), remained under the Group.
CSG Vision
CSG is committed to the vision of a highly dynamic, professional, and responsive entity attuned to
the ever
changing demands of the Firearm, Explosive, and Security Agency Industries.
CSG Missions
1. To provide administrative services and general supervision over the organization, business
operations, and
activities of all organized private detectives, watchmen, security guard agencies, and company
security forces.
2. To supervise the licensing and registration as regards to firearms and explosives.
3. Perform other duties as directed by the Chief, PNP.
Organization
The Civil Security Group is headed by a Director with the rank of Chief Superintendent. Assisting
the Director
are two (2) working Deputies and a dedicated Chief, Directorial Staff with the ranks of Senior
Superintendent. The
Directorial Staff consists of the Assistant Directors for Personnel, Human Resource and Doctrine
Development,
Intelligence, Comptrollership, Operations, Logistics, and Community Relations. The operating
divisions of the Group
are FED and SAGSD.
CSG Functions
1. Responsible for planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling the issuance of
permits and licenses
regarding firearms, ammunition, explosives, firecrackers/pyrotechnic devices, private security
forces, and private security guards.
2. Exercise command and control over the Firearms and Explosives Division (FED) and the
Security and Guards Supervision Division (SAGSD).
3. Supervise the enforcement of laws on firearms, ammunition, explosives,
firecrackers/pyrotechnic devices, private
security agencies, and company guard forces.
4. Act as technical staff of Chief, PNP to provide technical supervision in the enforcement of laws
on firearms, ammunition, explosives, firecrackers/pyrotechnic devices, and private security
industry law.
5. Responsible to the Chief, PNP in the issuance of permits and licenses as regards to firearms,
ammunition,
explosives, firecrackers/pyrotechnic devices, private security agencies, company forces, and the
practice of
profession of the private security personnel.
6.
Perform related functions as directed by Chief, PNP
Legal Mandate of FED and SAGSD
The Firearms and Explosives Division (FED), under the pertinent provisions of Republic Act 6975
otherwise
known as the “PNP Law”, is primarily tasked to administer, enforce, and implement the firearms
and explosives laws,
rules, and regulations.
On the other hand, the Security Agencies and Guards Supervision Division (SAGSD), whose
authority
emanates from Republic Act 5487 otherwise known as the “Private Security Agency Law”, is
charged to exercise
administrative services and general supervision over the management and operations of all
organized company
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 82823-24 July 31, 1989

AGRO COMMERCIAL SECURITY SERVICES AGENCY, INC., petitioner,

vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER
BIENVENIDO V. HERMOGENES and MANUEL JIMENEZ. ET AL., respondents.

San Juan, Gonzalez, San Agustin & Sinense for petitioner.

Mauricio Law Office for private respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

Is there an employer-employee relationship between a security agency and its security guards? Is
the so-called "floating status" of a security guard lawful and could such prolonged status amount to
illegal dismissal? These are the issues raised in this petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction questioning the resolution dated January 20, 1988 of public respondent
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirming the decision of public respondent labor
arbiter Bienvenido V. Hermogenes dated March 19, 1987 finding private respondents to have been
illegally dismissed and ordering petitioner to pay them separation pay of one-half (1/2) month
salary for every year of service, 13th month pay for the year 1986 and the money value of their
respective service incentive leave amounting to fifteen (15) days salary each with allowances. The
petition also assails the resolution of the respondent NLRC dated April 18, 1988 denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Private respondents, numbering forty-six (46) in all, worked as security guards and/or janitors
under individual contracts with petitioner. They were assigned to firms and offices where petitioner
had contracts providing security and janitorial services. Their service period and last rates of salary
are stated in the decision of the labor arbiter. 1 Their individual contracts of employment provide,
among others, as follows:

3.d. That the security guard, agrees to temporary suspension of his employment
completely to include such changes in his employment status with the Agency, in
case of termination of contract between the Agency and its Client, or reduction in
force of same;

In the early part of 1986, petitioner's service contracts with various corporations and government
agencies to which private respondents were previously assigned had been terminated generally due
to the sequestration of the said offices by the Presidential Commission on Good Government.
Accordingly, many of the private respondents were placed on "floating status" on September 16,
1986. A number of them had been put on that status even earlier. "Floating status" means an
indefinite period of time when private respondents do not receive any salary or financial benefit
provided by law. A number of them later obtained employment in other security agencies.

On account of the uncertainty of their employment with the petitioner, on July 25, 1986, private
respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the Arbitration Branch of the Department of
Labor and Employment against petitioner. They sought the payment of their respective separation
pay, 13th month pay for 1986 and service incentive leave pay. After due' proceedings where the
parties were required to submit their position papers and stipulation of facts, the respondent labor
arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondents whose decision as above-related was affirmed by
the NLRC.

Hence, the herein petition alleging that the petitioner was denied due process of law by the NLRC
and it committed a grave abuse of discretion in considering private respondents as employees of
petitioner, in ruling that the "floating status" of private respondents amounted to an illegal
dismissal, and in causing the execution of the judgment pending a complete and full adjudication
of the issues.

Forthwith, the allegation of denial of due process is without basis. Petitioner was afforded the
opportunity to file its position paper. It even entered into a stipulation of facts with private
respondent.

As to the issue of employer-employee relationship, an examination of the records shows that

private respondents are regular employees of petitioner. Their individual length of service ranges
from four (4) to more than ten (10) years. In accordance with the stipulation of facts, it appears that
private respondents worked with petitioner as security guards/janitors Their employment contracts
provide, among others:

1. That the AGENCY hereby undertakes to look for, procure, and/or furnish the
services of the SECURITY GUARD, with any individual, business establishment,
residential houses or any entity whatsoever, and the SECURITY GUARD agrees to
supply his services, assignments, position and undertaking, subject to the following
conditions:

a) That the SECURITY GUARD upon acceptance of his

position or undertaking for employment, shall observe,
follow and obey all rules, regulations, code of conduct
required by the AGENCY and any of its contracted client, in
accordance with the provisions of RA 5487 and its implement
Rules and Regulations;

b) That the AGENCY shall pay the SECURITY GUARD a monthly salary of P
_______/day payable on the 5th and 20th of the month;

c) That the AGENCY shall have the exclusive right to

withdraw or re-assign the SECURITY GUARD;

d) That the SECURITY GUARD, agrees to temporary

suspension of his employment completely to include
 such changes; in bis employment status with the
AGENCY, in case of termination of contract between
the AGENCY and its client, or reduction in force of
same;

e) That the AGENCY may terminate or dismiss the

SECURITY GUARD, if, after proper and due
investigation it is shown that the SECURITY
GUARD has violated any rule, regulation, code of
conduct and discipline, imposed by the AGENCY;

f) That the terms and conditions pertinent to service

and discipline embodied in the Agreement executed
between the AGENCY and any person, establishment,
or entity with whom the SECURITY GUARD is
going to serve or is assigned shall be considered part
of this Agreement and therefore binding on
SECURITY GUARD. 2

It was petitioner who determined how much private respondents received as their monthly salary,
overtime/night differential pay, mid-year and Christmas bonus and 13th month pay, uniforms and
meal allowances and other benefits mandated by law. Private respondents were reported by the
petitioner as its employees for purposes of social security coverage. Petitioner remitted their
withholding taxes to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and made monthly contributions to the Pag-
ibig fund for their benefit. It was petitioner who determined and decided on the assignments,
promotions and salary increases of private respondents, their working hours, the firearms to be
issued to them and janitorial devices and tools to be used. Likewise, it was petitioner who imposed
the appropriate disciplinary measures on private respondents by way of reprimand, suspension and
dismissal.

In determining the existence of an employee-employer relationship, the following elements are

generally considered:

1) the selection and engagement of the employees;

2) payment of wages;

3) the power of dismissal and

4) the power to control the employees' conduct . 3

It is clear, therefore, that private respondents are petitioner's regular employees who enjoy security
of tenure and who cannot be dismissed except for cause . 4

As to the alleged illegal dismissal of private respondents, the records show that they filed their
complaint against petitioner on July 25, 1986. At the time they filed their complaint, most of them
were still on the job or on assignments and it was only in September 1986 when most of them were
placed on "floating status."
Obviously, the filing of the complaint was premature. Apparently, this issue was not raised at all
and so it is deemed waived. Thus, when the labor arbiter rendered his decision, he considered those
who have been out of work or "floating status" for a period exceeding six (6) months to have been
terminated from the service without just cause thus entitling them to the corresponding benefits for
such separation. We agree.

Under Article 286 of the Labor Code it is provided as follows:

ART. 286. When employment not deemed terminated. � The bonafide suspension
of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six months,
or the fulfillment by the employee of a military or civic duty shall not terminate
employment. In all such cases, the employer shall reinstate the employee to his
former position without loss of seniority rights if he indicates his desire to resume
his work not later than one month from the resumption of operations of his
employer or from his relief from the military or civic duty.

From the foregoing it is clear that when the bonafide suspension of the operation of
a business or undertaking exceeds six (6) months then the employment of the
employee shall be deemed terminated. By the same token and applying the said rule
by analogy to security guards, if they remained without work or assignment that is
in "floating status" for a period exceeding six (6) months, then they are in effect
constructively dismissed.

The labor arbiter disagreed with the representations of petitioner that the private respondents who
accepted assignments in other security agencies without previously resigning should be considered
to have been dismissed with just cause. In the stipulation of facts, the parties admitted that the
disciplinary rules promulgated by petitioner for its employees provide that acceptance by an
employee of other employment without first resigning from the agency is a cause for dismissal.

In this case, it appears that twenty-seven (27) of the private respondents violated this rule by
accepting employment in other security agencies without previously resigning from employment
with petitioner. No doubt, this is a just cause for termination of their services and as such they are
not entitled to any separation pay. 5

As regards the other seventeen (17) private respondents, they admittedly remained in "floating
status" for more than six (6) months. Such a 'floating status" is not unusual for security guards
employed in security agencies as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into
by the agency with third parties. Such a stipulated status is, therefore, lawful.

The "floating status" of such an employee should last only for a reasonable time. In this case,
respondent labor arbiter correctly held that when the "floating status" of said employees lasts for
more than six (6) months, they may be considered to have been illegally dismissed from the
service. Thus, they are entitled to the corresponding benefits for their separation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as the twenty- seven (27) private respondents
are concerned who have accepted employment elsewhere. The questioned resolutions of the NLRC
dated January 29, 1988 and April 18, 1988 are hereby modified as to said twenty-seven (27)
private respondents in that their complaint is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. The questioned
resolutions are hereby affirmed in all other respects as to the other private respondents. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 5487

AN ACT TO REGULATE THE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE

DETECTIVE, WATCHMEN OR SECURITY GUARDS AGENCIES.
(Rep. Act No. 5487, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 11.)

Section 1. Short Title of Act. This Act shall be known as "The Private Security Agency Law."

Section 2. Scope of this Act. The organization, operation, business and activities of private
detectives, watchmen or security guards agencies shall be governed by the provisions of this Act.

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) Person. As used in this Act, person shall include not only natural
persons but also juridical persons such as corporation, partnership, company or association duly
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and/or the Bureau of Commerce. (b)
Private Detective Agency. A private detective agency is any person, who, for hire or reward or on
commission, conducts or carries on or holds himself or itself out as conducting or carrying on a
detective agency, or detective service. (c) Private Detective. A private detective is any person who
is not a member of a regular police agency of the Armed Forces of the Philippines who does
detective work for hire, reward, or commission. (d) Watchman or Security Guard, Watchman or
Security Guard Agency. Any person who offers or renders personal service to watch or secure
either residential or business establishment, or both, or any building, compound, or area including
but not limited to logging concessions, agricultural, mining or pasture lands for hire or
compensation, or as an employee thereof shall be known as watchman or security guard; and any
person, association, partnership, or corporation, who recruits, trains, muster, furnishes, solicits
individuals or business firms, private or government-owned or controlled corporations to engage
his service or those of its watchmen, shall be known as Watchman of Security Guard Agency. (As
amended by Pres. Decree No. 11, October 3, 1972.)

DEFINITION OF TERMS
1 Individual applicant (License to Possess) – any person who is applying for or renewing a license
to possess firearms as well as permit to carry firearm outside residence.

2. Juridical Entity (License to Possess) – refers to any entity applying for a license to possess
firearms through its duly authorized representative who is either the proprietor, manager and/or
operator.
3. License – an authority or permit to possess, own, carry, deal, and manufacture firearms. In the
case of private security agencies, company guards and government security units, this refers to an
authority to operate.

4. Authorized Representative – any person designated and authorized by a business entity or law
enforcement unit to apply for and obtain a license to possess, deal and/or manufacture firearms.
With regard to Private Security Agencies, Company Guards and Government Security Units, this
person is the designated proprietor, operator and/or manager.

5. Warehouse Personnel – any person who is designated and authorized to manage a private
warehouse or storage area of firearms and ammunition or the different vaults of the firearms dealer
and to conduct inventory thereof.

6. Vault Keeper – any person who is designated and authorized by a firearms dealer to secure and
manage his or her own vault in the PNP-CSG-FED warehouse.

7. PNP-CSG-FED Supervised Storage and/or Warehouse – refers to a CSG, FED supervised and
managed warehouse or storage where the different vaults of firearms dealers are safekept.

8. PTCFOR – a written authority issued to a person by the Chief of the Philippine National Police
or his duly authorized representative which entitles him/her to possess and carry firearm outside of
residence for the duration and purpose specified therein.

9. Security Guard or Watchman – any person who is licensed to render personal service to secure
or watch over a private residence, business establishment, or buildings, compounds, and other
areas and to conduct security inspection thereon. The terms, “Security Guard and Watchman” are
generic and synonymous as far as this definition is concerned.

10. Security Officer – any person designated by the management of a security agency to supervise
security guards/watchmen detailed in private residences, business establishments, buildings,
compounds or other areas.

11. Private Detective/Investigator – any private individual who does detective or investigative
work in behalf of another person or entity for compensation, reward or commission, other than
members of the AFP, the PNP, the guards of BJMP, municipality or city jail guards or of any other
law enforcement agencies of the government.

12. Private Security Agency – any entity which is either a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a
private corporation which is licensed to recruit, train, and provide security guards to any person or
entity to perform security services or consultation for a compensation.

13. Company Guard – is a security force maintained and operated by any private
company/corporation utilizing any of its employees to watch, secure or guard its business
establishment premises, compounds or properties.

14. Government Security Unit – is a security unit maintained and operated by any government
entity other than the military or police, which is established and maintained for the purpose of
securing the office or compound and/or extension of such government facility or utility.

15. Training Instructor – an individual who is accredited by the Philippine National Police-Civil
Security Group-Security Agencies and Guards Supervision Division (PNP-CSG-SAGSD) to teach
security and related subjects in the Commission on Higher Government (CHED) institutions
offering Bachelor of Science in Criminology Courses (BS Crim Courses), and/or in the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) licensed Security Guard Training Schools.

16. Training Officer – an individual who is accredited by PNP-CSG-SAGSD responsible in

making training programs for the Security Guard Training Schools and/or CHED institutions
offering BS Crim. Courses.

17. Training Director – an individual accredited by PNP-CSG-SAGSD and responsible in

managing the Security Guard Training Schools and/or CHED institutions offering BS Crim.
Courses.

18. Security Guard Training School – an institution licensed by TESDA and accredited by SAGSD
to conduct pre-licensing, in-service training, supervisory training and other special courses to and
for security guards in private agencies, companies and government units.

19. End-User or consumer – any person or agency or a business entity which requires the
mandatory drug test. At CSG, it refers to either CSG-FED or CSG-SAGSD or both when
processing applicant for license and renewal thereof.

20. Mandatory Drug Test – refers to compulsory submission of an applicant for license to undergo
a drug testing as required by RA 9165.

21. Random Drug Test – refers to compulsory submission of a licensed warehouse personnel
and/or vault keeper, private security personnel and security training personnel after having been
employed to undergo drug testing as required by RA 9165. This is being conducted to selected
individual or group of individuals without following a specific pattern and without prior notice.