THIRD DIVISION G.R. No. 156302 THE HEIRS OF GEORGE Y. POE, Petitioners, MALAYAN INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Respondent.

George Y. Poe (George) was run over by a truck which was insured with respondent MICI . Georges widow Emercelinda, and their children Flerida and Fernando, filed with the RTC a Complaint for damages against Rhoda and respondent MICI. RTC rendered decision in favor of plaintiffs. Respondent MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari[33] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals. The Petition assailed, for having been rendered by the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the denial of the notice of appeal of respondent MICI and the issuance of writ of execution in favor of petitioners. The Court of Appeals granted the Petition of respondent MICI. Petitioners sought relief in SC, alleging that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that private respondent could file a Petition for Certiorari even though its Motion for Reconsideration was still pending resolution with the lower court. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled that the private respondent had filed its Notice of Appeal with the trial court within the reglementary period.
[36]

Held: No. The respondent filed within the proper time its notice of appeal. It is clear under the Rules that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. In Neypes v. Court of Appeals, laid down the fresh period rule: To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.[40] With the advent of the fresh period rule, parties who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that motion.[41]

G. R. No. 150922 - September 21, 2004 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE VILLAGE HOTEL, INC., Respondent. Respondent] Philippine Village Hotel, Inc. (PVHI) has several outstanding accounts totalling P152 million in favor of [petitioner] Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Due to PVHIs default in its monthly amortization, [petitioner] filed separate applications for extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages securing said obligations Page 1 of 4

"Meanwhile, the PVHI and GSIS amicably settled their dispute via a Memorandum of Agreement by virtue of which the accounts of PVHI in favor of the GSIS were completely settled. PVHI incurred delay in the payment and sought for the rescission of the MOA. PVHI filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages with the court a quo seeking for a judicial declaration of the validity and effectivity of the MOA. The proceeding went its normal course until the PVHI has presented its evidence and rested its case. At this stage of the proceeding, PVHI filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. the court a quo rendered a Partial Summary Judgment in favor of PVHI. Petitioner interposed an appeal to the CA but was denied and ruled that the appeal was an improper remedy, and that the proper mode of review was certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: Whether appeal is the proper remedy. Held: No. Partial Summary Judgment is therefore not reviewable by ordinary appeal to the CA A partial summary judgment does not finally dispose of an action. A partial summary judgment is merely an interlocutory order, not a final judgment. What the rules contemplate is that the appeal from the partial summary judgment shall be taken together with the judgment that may be rendered in the entire case after a trial is conducted on the material facts on which a substantial controversy exists.The. Contrary to petitioners contention, a strict application of the rule on interlocutory orders will not frustrate substantial justice. What has delayed this case is not the application of the proper rules of procedure, but petitioners wrong mode of redress. The RTC was gravely mistaken in allowing the elevation to the CA of the entire records of the case, on which the trial court had not yet rendered a complete and final judgment.

SPECIAL [G.R. No. 173942,

SECOND June 25,

DIVISION 2008]

FIL-ESTATE PROPERTIES, INC. AND FAIRWAYS AND BLUE-WATERS RESORT AND COUNTRY CLUB, INC., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. MARIETTA J. HOMENA-VALENCIA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 1, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KALIBO, AKLAN, AND SULLIAN SY NAVAL, RESPONDENTS. RESOLUTION TINGA, J,: Private respondent Sullian Sy Naval filed a complaint [3] against petitioners, seeking the recovery of a parcel of land. Counsel for petitioners failed to attend the pre-trial, and only private respondent presented evidence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan which heard the complaint. The RTC rendered a decision [4] in favor of private respondent of which petitioners moved for reconsideration. The crux of the present matter lies with the facts surrounding the motion for reconsideration. The motion was filed on 10 May 2000. thirteen (13) days after petitioners received their copy of the RTC's decision. On 26 July 2000, the RTC issued an order[6] of even date denying the motion. Petitioners alleged in their petition that they received the order denying the motion for reconsideration on 9 August 2000. They filed a Notice of Appeal on 11 August 2000,[7] but the postal money orders purchased and obtained to pay the filing fee were posted only on 25 August 2000, or beyond the reglementary period to perfect the appeal. Consequently, the RTC denied the appeal[8] and such denial was sustained by the Court of Appeals after petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari[9] assailing the RTC's refusal to give due course to the appeal. Issue: Whether the notice of appeal was perfected on time. The "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. the general rule that procedural laws may be Page 2 of 4

given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure. The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescribes a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may be made in the event that the motion for reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should be applied to pending actions, such as the present case.

G.R. No. 172776

December 17, 2008 HIGHER EDUCATION, petitioner,

COMMISSION ON vs. ATTY. FELINA S. DASIG, respondent. DECISION PER CURIAM:

Respondent Felina Dasig (Dasig) was alleged to have tried to exact money from them under the pretense of attorney's fees in connection with their requests for correction of names in their academic records. The CHED formed a hearing committee and designated the members to investigate the complaints against Dasig. The hearing committee and CHED concluded that there was substantial evidence on record to hold Dasig liable and recommended that she be dismissed. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) upheld the decision of the CHED12 and denied Dasig's motion for reconsideration.13 Dasig filed a petition for review under Rule 43 with the Court of Appeals. Despite the Court's findings in the disbarment proceeding, the Court of Appeals, however, gave a different assessment of the evidence on record as it found that Dasig was only "moonlighting" when she offered her legal services to the students. Court of Appeals ruled that Dasig was liable only for simple misconduct. Hence this petition for review. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals ruling was proper. Held: No. the appellate court erred when it disregarded the factual findings of the CHED. It ignored the well-settled rule that by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment thereon; hence, factual findings of quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded not only great respect but even finality by this Court when they are supported by substantial evidence.31 The gauge of substantial evidence,32 which is the least demanding in the hierarchy of evidence, is satisfied since there are reasonable grounds to believe that Dasig is guilty of the charges against her which led to her dismissal from service.

[G.R. No. 139895. August 15, 2003] CIPRIANO M. LAZARO, petitioner, vs. RURAL BANK OF FRANCISCO BALAGTAS (BULACAN), INC. & THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF VALENZUELA CITY, respondents. Petitioner Cipriano M. Lazaro obtained a loan from respondent Rural Bank of Francisco Balagtas (Bulacan), Inc., (RFBI for brevity). Apparently, Lazaro failed to pay said loan. RFBI sued him before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan, for collection of deficiency in the payment of the loan. Summons was accordingly served upon petitioner at said address. Petitioner did not answer, hence, the trial court declared him in default. An exparte hearing then proceeded RTC ruled in its favor. RFBI instituted another suit against petitioner before the Page 3 of 4

RTC of Valenzuela City. Summons was again served accordingly but again Lazaro failed to file an answer or responsive pleading and the trial court declared him in default. Lazaro filed a petition, for declaration of nullity of judgments in all his cases were based on grounds of fraud and misrepresentation. Lazaro alleged that RFBI did not indicate in its complaints his true address thereby depriving him the opportunity to participate in the hearing of said cases. Hence, his right to due process was violated and this rendered the judgments in the trial courts void ab initio. On June 15, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. The appellate court pointed out that Lazaro failed to justify why he did not avail of the other ordinary and appropriate remedies provided in Section 1,[9] Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, before filing at appellate court. Issue: Whether petitioners petition for annulment of judgment will prosper. Held: No. Let it be stressed at the outset that before a party can avail of the reliefs provided for by Rule 47, i.e., annulment of judgments, final orders, and resolutions, it is a condition sine qua non that one must have failed to move for new trial in, or appeal from, or file a petition for relief against said issuances or take other appropriate remedies thereon, through no fault attributable to him. If he failed to avail of those cited remedies without sufficient justification, he cannot resort to the action for annulment provided in Rule 47, for otherwise he would benefit from his own inaction or negligence. In the instant case, not only did petitioner fail to avail of the ordinary and appropriate remedies in assailing the questioned judgments of the trial courts, but he also failed to show to the satisfaction of this Court that he could not have availed of the ordinary and appropriate remedies under the Rules.

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