Project Brazil

Brasil
High speed line Sao Paulo Rio de Janeiro
Feasibility study
Signalling and Telecommunication

February 2009
Brasil

Feasibility studyl
Feasibility study

Project Brazil

Index
Brasil

General...................................................................................................................... 4

1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
1.1.4
1.1.5
1.1.6

Stations ...............................................................................................................................................................4
Speed...................................................................................................................................................................4
Headways.............................................................................................................................................................4
Level crossings ...................................................................................................................................................4
Rooms................................................................................................................................................................. 5
Points.................................................................................................................................................................. 5

Train protection systems.......................................................................................... 5

2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.5.1
2.5.2

Suitable ATP systems for this project. .............................................................................................................. 5

Suggested ATP system....................................................................................................................................... 5
Overview of ETCS................................................................................................................................................ 5
Recommended ETCS Level...................................................................................................................................7
ETCS Level 2 in this project................................................................................................................................ 8
Trackside ............................................................................................................................................................ 8
Onboard .............................................................................................................................................................. 8

Operational Philosophy / System functions ............................................................. 8

3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.5.1
3.5.2
3.5.3

Assumptions / preconditions ............................................................................................................................ 8

Standard operation ............................................................................................................................................ 8
Starting process ................................................................................................................................................ 8
Regular train movements .................................................................................................................................. 9
Train movements in specific situations............................................................................................................. 9
Degraded Operation ........................................................................................................................................... 9
Depots / Shunting ............................................................................................................................................. 10
Telecom / SCADA .............................................................................................................................................. 10
Railway Operation Telecommunication System (ROTS) ................................................................................... 10
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)......................................................................................... 10
Passenger information, Ticketing and Closed Circuit Television ...................................................................... 11

System Technologies ................................................................................................ 11

4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
4.2
4.3
4.3.1
4.3.2
4.3.3
4.3.4
4.4
4.4.1
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.5
4.6
4.6.1
4.6.2
4.7
4.7.1

Signalling / Interlocking..................................................................................................................................... 11
CTC...................................................................................................................................................................... 11
CBI....................................................................................................................................................................... 11
ACC / OSM ......................................................................................................................................................... 12
Trackside elements ........................................................................................................................................... 12
Automatic Train protection ............................................................................................................................... 13
Telecom ............................................................................................................................................................. 13
ROTS .................................................................................................................................................................. 13
Passenger Information Systems (TD, Clock, PA).............................................................................................. 14
CCTV................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Ticketing ............................................................................................................................................................ 14
SCADA ................................................................................................................................................................ 15
Hot axle box detection (HABD) .......................................................................................................................... 15
Fire and Intrusion detection systems............................................................................................................... 15
Structure gauge detection................................................................................................................................ 16
GSM-R ................................................................................................................................................................ 16
Overall system components.............................................................................................................................. 16
Power Supply..................................................................................................................................................... 16
Transmission ......................................................................................................................................................17
Required rooms / Land take............................................................................................................................. 18
CTC..................................................................................................................................................................... 18

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4.7.2
4.7.3
4.7.4

CBI..................................................................................................................................................................... 20
ACC ................................................................................................................................................................... 20
Land take ........................................................................................................................................................... 21

Summary / Remarks .............................................................................................. 22

List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................... 23

List of Figures ......................................................................................................... 24

Version

Date

Designed

Approved

State / changes

1.0

2009/02/13

Baethge

Gnther

Handover phase 1, overview and document

structure

1.1

2009/02/20

Baethge

Gnther

Subchapter 4.8 added

1.2

2009/03/13

Baethge

Gnther

Delivery: draft report

1.3

2009/03/23

Baethge

Gnther

Revised study without Jundiai, Resende,

Aparecida

1.4

2009/05/18

Baethge

Gnther

Japanese ATP system added

2.0

2009/06/15

Baethge

Gnther

Delivery: Review after comments P.Grant

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General

The purpose of this study is to broadly describe the requirements and forecast costs needed to ensure a safe and
reliable traffic operation. For this, the high speed line system has to fulfil the following three tasks:
1.

For safety reasons high speed operation requires an automatic train protection system which will underpin
the operation of trains.

2.

The train protection system directly affects the protection and supervision of the track side equipment, which
is to be operated by the signalling/interlocking system.

3.

To allow a safe, efficient and convenient passenger operation, appropriate telecommunication systems have
to be considered.

This section is prepared as a high-level functional study. It is based on the information and assumptions listed in item 1.1.1
to 1.1.5 and mentioned in the appropriate subchapters.
Costs estimated for signalling and telecommunication equipment are listed in TAV Volume 5. In this report it will be
referred to in the respective paragraphs in chapter 4 with a remark, e.g. ( D.12).
1.1.1

Stations

The stations proposed to be equipped with telecommunication and signalling technique for this assessment are:
Rio de Janeiro / Barao de Maua

km 0,,0

Galeao Airport:

km 15,2

Barra Mansa/Volta Redonda:

km 118,3

Sao Jose dos Campos:

km 328,7

Guarulhos Airport:

km 390,4

Sao Paulo:

km 412,2

Viracopos Airport

km 487,6

Campinas

km 510,7

1.1.2

Speed

The system should be capable operating at speeds up to 330 km/h

1.1.3

Headways

The study is based on the assumption of 3 min headway.

A reliable statement can only be made with more information available, e.g. braking curves of the respective vehicles,
gradient of tracks.
1.1.4

Level crossings

It is assumed that no level crossing will be installed on the whole line.

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1.1.5

Rooms

It is assumed that due to the appropriate requirements new station buildings will be erected ensuring enough space to
install signalling and telecommunication equipment and working places for technical operation.
1.1.6

Points

It is assumed that on the main line high speed points for crossings and junctions will be installed. This kind of point allows
speeds greater than 200 km/h in the facing direction.

Train protection systems

All over the world there are several different train protection systems in use. This chapter is to discuss and decide which
system is likely to be the most suitable for the new Brazilian high-speed line.
The key parameters which reduce the variety of possible systems to a small number are the required speed, which shall
be, as mentioned in 1.1.2 at least 330km/h and the tight time schedule of 3min headway.

2.1

Suitable ATP systems for this project.

Presently, amongst others, the following automatic train protection systems are capable of operating with speeds up to
330 km/h:

2.2

LZB Linienfrmige Zugbeeinflussung (German) = continuous automatic train control

(installed for instance in Germany, Austria, Spain)
TVM - System based on coded track circuits
(installed for instance in France and Japan)
ETCS
(installed in various European countries as well as in countries outside of Europe e.g. in Australia, Taiwan,
Korea)

Suggested ATP system

For this study ETCS as the most future oriented train protection system has been chosen. ETCS meets the requirements
for high speed lines in the most suitable way. ETCS is a European standard, used in many European and also other railway
companies all over the world.
Since at least 6 signalling companies are ETCS-suppliers, the implementation of ETCS will result in cost saving due to
competition between the suppliers.
Due to the above mentioned facts, a considerable advantage for future tendering is that all established signalling
companies are able to submit an offer for the future ATP system based on ETCS.

2.3

Overview of ETCS

ETCS supports five general levels:

Level 0, level STM, Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3.

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Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 will be described below. Level 0 and Level STM are used only for areas not equipped with ETCS
and will not be considered here.
Level 1: Equipment with lineside Signals, lineside Electronic Units (LEU), switchable and non-switchable balises
(transponders, mounted on the track between the rails), transmission of Movement authorities via switchable balises.

Interlocking

ETCS
LEU

Eurobalise

end of track segment

Figure 1: Characteristics of ETCS Level 1 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0

Level 2: Equipment with Marker Boards (optional line side Signals if required for operational reasons), Radio Block
Centre (RBC), non-switchable balises only, transmission of Movement authorities via Radio Block Centre

Radio Block Centre

Interlocking

Optional
ETCS

Eurobalise

end of track segment

Figure 2: Characteristics of ETCS Level 2 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0

Level 3: In general the same characteristics as level 2 with the following specifics:

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Train integrity proving system replaces trackside vacancy detection,

It is not imperative to have an underlying signaling system

Remark:
Since a reliable train integrity proving system does not exist yet, ETCS Level 3 is not installed in any country so far.

Radio Block Centre

Interlocking

train
integrity

ETCS

Eurobalise

Figure 3: Characteristics of ETCS Level 3 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0

2.4

Recommended ETCS Level

Based on our experience and the features outlined below, we recommend that ETCS Level 2 is implemented for the high
speed line Rio de Janeiro - Sao Paulo - Campinas:

A 3 min headway requires a short block distances, it consequently also requires a huge amount of block posts
on the open line. Compared to Level 1, Level 2 requires a reduced amount of track side equipment (e.g. no
Lineside Electronic Units and switchable balises. Light signals are not necessarily required), which is,
regarding the prime costs, a great economical advantage.
Reduced line side equipment (including cabling) also reduces maintenance costs and costs resulting from
theft and vandalism.
In Level 2, movement authorities for the trains are generated by Radio Block Centres (RBC) and transmitted
by radio. Thus a continuous update/ extension of a movement authority is possible. Therefore the operational
capacity of the line is higher than for a Level-1-Line.

In case of future extension of the line, ETCS level 2 allows the integration of further block posts or stations by adjusting
the data base for the field elements; there is therefore no need for a complete programming of the system.
Since no reliable train integrity proving system exists at present, a level-3-solution is not considered here. ETCS Level 3
has not been installed in any country so far.

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2.5

ETCS Level 2 in this project

2.5.1

Trackside

The double track high speed line will be divided into several block sections. The length of every section will be
approximately 1,5 km.
Every block section will be

defined by an axle counter system

announced to the driver with stop marker boards (SMB)
equipped with fixed balise groups to determine the trains position

In stations where trains start regularly there should be SMBs with "overrun light". This ensures a simple start up
procedure for ETCS-guided trains. Also, SMBs with white overrun lamps should be placed at certain locations to use in
case of fall back/fall safe and degraded operation. See chapter 3.3 degraded operation
2.5.2

Onboard

The train driver does not receive information from lineside signals. The train will be equipped with in cab signalling; this
is achieved by arranging that the onboard equipment communicates with the Radio Block Centre via GSM-R to supervise
the train movements.
The train sends its position to the Radio Block Centre, based on the balise groups it has passed.
The Radio Block Centre analyses these data and sends movement authorities (MA) with instructions how to proceed.

Operational Philosophy / System functions

3.1

Assumptions / preconditions

In the following subchapters the proposed operational philosophy is described. In order to implement such kind of
operation the following assumptions/ preconditions have to be fulfilled:

All trains have to be equipped with ETCS-L2. Mixed operation (ETCS and non ETCS trains) should not be allowed
in regular operation.
The necessary equipment of the Radio Block Centre (RBC) should be placed in the main control centre.
The trackside elements belonging to the signalling system will be controlled and operated from a Central Train
Control (CTC). The CTC has to be occupied permanently. In standard operation controlling of the whole high
speed line from one CTC is possible.
There will be a local Computer based interlocking (CBI) in every station. The CBI is not occupied in standard
operation.
There will be an area control computer (ACC) supervising a certain number of the blocks sections
At every block post there is an operating and supervision module (OSM).

Please see Configuration 001.-0.1 page 4

3.2

Standard operation

3.2.1

Starting process

For starting trains in the stations the stop marker board (SMB) in regular direction of running shall be equipped with
SMBs with overrun lights. This light has the function of a proceed aspect, it is to allow the driver to run over the balise
placed in front of the next SMB. Now the onboard equipment can send its position to the RBC to receive further
instructions.

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All other SMBs shall be constructed as a metal plate with a reflective foil. The sign on the plate shall be according to
international rules for ETCS. These SMBs are to show the virtual signals used in the RBC to define the track section.
3.2.2

Regular train movements

The operator in the CTC will determine train movements from the signalling side. Here, in correspondence with the
trackside equipment, routes are set according to the required timetable or to react in exceptional cases.
As the route is set in standard operation, the train movements are guided in ETCS full supervision mode after the
entrance of the train into the ETCS area or after the start procedure described in 3.2.1 above. In Full Supervision mode
the ERTMS/ETCS on-board equipment is fully responsible for train protection, thus the highest level of safety is ensured.
The train receives movement authorities from the RBC which include the speed allowed and other important information
for the following block sections e.g. gradient profile, track conditions. The RBC receives route setting information from
the signaling (interlocking) and position of trains from the appropriate onboard equipment to supervise the train
movements.
As shown in the overall configuration (sheet 001-0.1) the track equipment is designed for two way operation, to ensure a
high operational flexibility.

3.2.3

Train movements in specific situations

Train movements in specific situations, such as joining and splitting of trains; reversing movements; operation inside of
tunnel areas in case of hazardous situations etc, require detailed operational procedures to be defined by the rail
operator. ETCS offers different operational modes to cover such specific situations.
In order to prepare suitable ETCS modes for these circumstances, specific operational rules have to be defined. These
rules ensure that movements which cannot completely be technically supervised by ETCS are still operable in a safe
manner.

3.3

Degraded Operation

3.3.1 Degraded Operation in case of disturbed connection to the CTC

For fallback situations a local control from the station interlocking shall be possible (see configuration sheet 001-0.1 page
3). In these situations every stations interlocking has to be staffed with operators. Once the station interlockings are
staffed, a regular traffic is possible except some overall functions, e.g. train dispatching, timetable management and
rolling stock management, which will not be available.

3.3.2 Degraded Operation in case of failed trackside equipment

In case of failed trackside equipment (e.g. failed track circuit), the interlocking is not able to set a regular route. Thus the
RBC cannot generate movement authorities for the failed section.
It is in the responsibility of the operator, working within pre-determined procedures, to permit the train to enter into
such a section. If he cannot ensure that the track is free, he can give the order to the train driver to drive with a reduced
speed, ensuring that the train can stop before an obstacle.
For such operational situations the ETCS onboard equipment can switch into the following ETCS modes:

Staff Responsible This mode allows the end of a movement authority to be overridden and to continue train
movement without a movement authority. The admissible speed is restricted by a predetermined value
these are called ETCS National Values.

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On Sight In this mode the RBC sends the train a mode profile with a certain speed (e.g. 40 km/h). The driver
is responsible for stopping the train before any obstacle, since the track may be occupied. Additionally the
admissible speed is restricted by a predetermined value so called ETCS National Values.

3.3.3 Degraded Operation in case of disturbed ETCS onboard equipment

In case of a disturbed ETCS onboard equipment the driver has to isolate it. In such situation only an operation without any
train protection is possible. For these cases the SMB with the overrun lights act as a simplified trackside signalization.
In this case an operation with a reduced headway and a reduced speed is possible (e.g. 100 km/h).

3.4

Depots / Shunting

The depots are not to be equipped with ETCS Level 2. At the border between the regular line and the depot, the
installation will have border balises, transmitting a level transition order for operation in the depot or yard.
Due to expected busy operation and a large amount of rolling stock in the depots, these areas shall be controlled by local
interlocking systems with separate operation control centers (OCC) on site.
Similar to the main line, the depot shall be equipped with a track vacancy detection system based on axle counters. For
signaling purposes the depot / shunting areas shall be equipped with shunting signals.

3.5

Telecom / SCADA

3.5.1

Railway Operation Telecommunication System (ROTS)

For railway operation, specific communication networks are required which, on the one hand, correspond with the
continuous character of railways and, on the other hand, ensure that more than two staff members can communicate.
These communication networks have the following fundamental properties:

3.5.2

Continuous connections along the line,

A connection for several subscribers (party telephone line),
Appropriate telephone connection for each case of application or operational task.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)

The SCADA-System is to be provided for both, remote control and supervision of alarms for:
Smoke/fire and burglary detection systems,
Hot axle box detection (HABD)
communication systems ( e.g. transmission, CCTV)
power supply equipment.
All relevant status indications shall be monitored continuously. When tolerable limits are exceeded or other irregularities
are indicated, an alarm shall be raised at the relevant S+D terminal (at the local station control and/or in the CTC
centre). From there it is possible to diagnose the detailed status and establish a correction and maintenance strategy.
Specific to every station, indication and recording shall always be available.

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3.5.3

Passenger information, Ticketing and Closed Circuit Television

Train Destination Indication System (TD): Each platform in every station has to be equipped with train destination
indicators to inform the passengers about current train status information.
Public Address System (PA): All passenger stations and halts shall be equipped with a public address system. For each
platform one loudspeaker circuit is to be provided. With this system the operator in the CTC or the local traffic manager
can make normal or emergency announcements. In addition, an automatic announcement system has to be provided.
Ticketing: Every station shall be equipped with an automatic ticketing system. These systems have to be connected via a
data network with a central computer located in the CTC for accounting services.
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) System: Every station shall be equipped with a CCTV system, on every platform there
shall be two cameras installed. Also, the technical equipment in the stations shall be supervised by one camera pointing
at the entrance of the building in which it is located.
In the CTC all supervisory information shall be available.

System Technologies

4.1

Signalling / Interlocking

All block posts shall be controlled by Area Control Computer (ACC). In every station there shall be a Computer Based
Interlocking system (CBI) to control the ACCs. All CBI shall be controlled remotely, since the entire network shall be
dispatched and controlled from a Centralised Traffic Control (CTC).
4.1.1

CTC

( D1-1) For fallback reasons there are two CTCs required. Both shall be placed in the main station building but in
different rooms. The main station building is suggested to be placed in Sao Paulo.
The CTCs main functionalities are:

4.1.2

Dispatching of all trains on the whole line (excluding depots and yards);

Controlling and monitoring of all signalling devices including having an overview of the complete line and train
tracking system

Rolling Stock Management (fault detection management in cooperation with the operation control centers
(OCC)of the depots;

Automatic route setting in connection with timetable management / time line Graph;

Service and diagnostics (S&D);

Event recording;

Facility management / supervision of the stations and platforms (Safety and Security);
CBI

( D1-2 ) The CBI contains the interlocking logic for a defined track area (Configuration page 4) and is responsible for
controlling and monitoring of a certain area of ACC.
The CBI are occupied only as required.

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4.1.3

ACC / OSM

(included in D1-2)
The ACC (area control computer) are responsible for the control of point machines, signals and to obtain information
about the track vacancy. Furthermore, it is to set the routes according to CBI demands.
An OSM (Operating and supervision module) can be considered as a subsystem of the ACC used as decentralized device
not needing an individual power supply
4.1.4

Trackside elements

Points ( D1-2)
All points in tracks used by regular trains will be operated electrically and equipped with point detectors to ensure that
the switch blades are fully in place before a train can be allowed to pass the point. High speed points require up to 10
point machines which will be controlled as one point.
Axle Counter ( D1-2)
The Axle counter (AXC) is a system using counting heads (double wheel detectors) and an evaluator to monitor the status
of a track section by comparing the number of wheels (axles) which enter the section with the number of wheels which
leave the section. Parity of the numbers is essential to provide a not occupied-output.
Stop marker board (SMB) ( D1-2)
SMBs with and without overrun lights are placed on the borders of block sections and are the places where a Stop can
be imposed.
Signals ( D1-2)
Signals are placed in the depots to control local shunting movements.
Balise ( D1-3)
A Balise is a passive or active device normally mounted in proximity to the track for communications with passing trains.
In this project passive balises for ETCS Level 2 are required. Balises are standardized according to European regulations.

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Figure 4: Example of an SMB and Balises (HSL Zuid, Netherlands)

4.2

Automatic Train protection

( D1-3, except onboard equipment, which is part of the loco suppliers delivery)
As already described in chapter 2.4, the ATP system ETCS Level2 provides cab signalling and works in general without any
line-side signals. The train operation on the line is controlled directly via radio from the RBC.
To initiate a train movement the RBC is to provide Movement Authorities (MA) to the train. Whilst moving the train is to be
protected against exceeding of the maximum line speed limits or of temporary and permanent speed restrictions.
ETCS protects the train against passing an End of Authority (virtual signal in stop position) or initiates service brakes /
emergency brakes in case of non-compliance with restrictions given to the driver.

4.3

Telecom

4.3.1

ROTS

( D2-3) In every station and at every depot, a telephone system shall be installed. It shall mainly be used for
operational demands and for connecting the station and the depots with the CTC. At the CTC, each operator work place is
equipped with a console, which enables the operator to directly connect to every station and depot subscriber without
requiring a connection over the public network.
In the station areas, every relevant location such as platforms, technical rooms, local control room and/or substations
will be equipped with telephones for direct calling and maintenance conference calling (collecting lines). Regarding
weather and noise protection, the equipment will be different between indoor and outdoor installation.
Interactions between the stations will be realized via ROTS trunk lines switched via the transmission system. The trunk
lines are connected redundantly. Also, trunk lines from ROTS to the public phone network will be provided to allow a
direct telephone connection outside the Railway network.

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4.3.2

Passenger Information Systems (TD, Clock, PA)

For the passenger information on the platforms there are different systems for different types of information.
The trains destination (TD) will be monitored via two displays per track side on each platform. The display indicates the
trains destination with intermediate stations, the track number and wagon arrangements (class, numbers). At the main
stations an additional display board indicating all trains with their next departures is to be installed. These displays will
be controlled based on programmed time tables and the actual train traffic. The operator in the CTC can modify the
displays indication manually. ( D2-9)
In addition to the destination indicator one clock will be installed on each platform. This clock is connected to the main
clock of the station, controlled via GPS-signals. A master clock system will provide a synchronized signal for all systems
(signalling, train destination, transmission system etc.) throughout the railway. ( D2-7)
Furthermore in each station one public address (PA) system is necessary for passenger information ( D2-10). This is
done by loudspeakers which are to be installed every 4m. The control of this public address system is done by either the
local station master or by the costumer information operator of the CTC centre. In this system precast text and voice
messages will be integrated which will be controlled via the movement of the train. Due to the speed of the trains the
public address system should be planned in accordance with the guide line for emergency announcement systems EN
60849 or similar rules.

4.3.3

CCTV

( D2-6) Supervisory cameras are installed for surveillance of platforms and accesses to technical rooms. Thus, on
the platform, passenger movements on the train and platform surveillance against vandalism shall be monitored. All
camera installations shall be fixed installations (no Pan&Tilt or Zoom). The advantage is that the camera has the same
picture for operation observation every time (no manipulation possible).
The output of all cameras can be evaluated by the operators in the CTC. On the monitors pictures can be changed due to
the view required, also, several pictures can be showed on one monitor (quadruple or more).
The controlling of the camera picture can be done automatically or via manual controlling through the operators console.
The camera live stream will be compressed and transmitted via the Backbone network from the stations to the CTC.
Outside of the rail operational areas, such as passenger circulation areas, building exteriors and approaches, parking
and drop-off areas etc. CCTV will be provided as agreed with the client.
Key lineside installations, depots and yards shall also have CCTV facilities to allow security monitoring.
Yards and Depots will also require operational CCTV to allow supervisory staff to monitor time critical activities such as
train washing and movements.

4.3.4

Ticketing

( D2-11) The ticketing system should be an automated fare collection system. This kind of system is being used in many
public transport systems, e.g. London, Paris or Moscow. Such a system reduces the count of free-riders and other
causes of fraud. This system works as a closed system with gates or turnstiles.
The system itself has a central system for administration of ticketing and fare collection and decentralised systems for
the supervision of gates, the ticketing counter and automatic ticket machines.
The system for fare collection is standardised.
Please see below the following standards describing the systems or the components for the electronic fare collection
system:

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ISO/EN 24014-1

EN 15320 Identification Card Systems

ISO/IEC 7816 and 14443 Specifications for identification cards, especially smart cards

4.4

Public transport -- Interoperable fare management system -- Part 1: Architecture

SCADA

SCADA monitors power supply of the system and the following trackside equipment ( D2-8)
4.4.1

Hot axle box detection (HABD)

( D2-12) The HABD System will ensure early detection of a hot axle or hot bearing to prevent the danger of derailment
or damage to trains by the consequences of a bearing failure at speed. The HABD system itself is not required to be fail
safe in railway signalling terms. It does nevertheless play an important part in the safe operation of railways and shall
thus be reliable and trustworthy and comply with the relevant CENELEC standards.
HABD will be installed approaching large stations such as Campinas, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo and additionally
between the stations Sao Jose dos Campos and Barra Mansa / Volta Redonda. The distance between the HBAX and the
station should be more than 10 km.
The HABD will be normally dormant, activated by an approaching train.
The axle boxes of passing vehicles (powered and unpowered) shall be scanned by a direction discriminating system to
avoid spurious alarms. Alarms will be displayed in the CTC to give the operator the opportunity to change the route of the
train, or other action as appropriate.
The HABD system must have a connection to the transmission network for monitoring on the SCADA system in the CTC.

4.4.2

Fire and Intrusion detection systems

( D2-5)
4.4.2.1

Station fire detection system

Fire and intrusion detection is to be provided for all technical rooms on each station, all depots and the CTC. In case of
detecting fire an alarm message will be showed in the CTC on the SCADA system. The same procedure will be used for the
burglary alarm. In addition one camera will be installed for observing the access to the technical room. With access of
persons to these technical rooms by using the access code at the door the camera picture in the CTC will be activated
Additional warning signals (alarm and flashing light) shall be installed directly on the protected building to inform the
local fire brigade and police. The alerting of the fire brigade shall be performed through the operator in the CTC.
4.4.2.2

Tunnel fire detection system

The high speed line leads through 181 tunnels, with an overall length of 502 metres. For every tunnel exceeding a length of
500m a fire detection system shall be installed. In this project 21 tunnels are affected.
In these tunnels a fire detection system is to be installed, which requires a sensor cable to be led along the complete
length of the tunnel. The alerting of the fire detection system shall be connected to the SCADA system in common with
other station installations. The alarm signal will be monitored on the SCADA operator console. (See Supervision SCADA
on layout 001-0.1, page 3).

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4.4.3

Structure gauge detection

Due to the fact, that there will be no goods traffic in this project to be considered, no structure gauge detection is
required.

4.5

GSM-R

( D2-4) For communication between the traffic manager / dispatcher and the train driver or the train conductor it is
planned to build a radio system along the line. The standard of the new radio system shall be GSM-R regarding the
European specification EIRENE - MORANE which guarantee performance at speeds up to 500 km/h (310 mph), without any
communication loss.
GSM-R permits new services and applications for mobile communications in several domains:

control and protection (Automatic Train Control/ETCS and ERTMS)

communication between train driver and control centre,

communication between on-board staff

communication between train stations and maintenance staff

The GSM-R equipment contains three main components:

BTS (base transceiver station) responsible for radio supplying on the line without signal loss

BSC (base system controller) responsible for handling of several BTS and with connecting to the MSC

MSC Mobile switching centre with different local databases administrating and managing the data and
connection between the GSM-R users

The connection between the BTS and the BSC will be performed via the fibre optic cable. The data from the BSC to the
MSC will be transmitted via the Backbone transmission system. The location of the MSC should be in the CTC.

4.6

Overall system components

4.6.1

Power Supply

The choice of an appropriate solution for the power supply system depends on mains availability.
Stations
In the station buildings it is assumed, that the local mains is capable of providing the required power for the signalling
and telecommunication equipment.
An uninterrupted power supply shall be guaranteed from local mains. For fallback batteries and diesel generator shall be
used.

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Figure 5: Power supply at stations

Open line
On the open line in rural areas it is assumed that there will not be a connection to the local supply network.
An uninterrupted power supply shall be guaranteed from solar-power which will be implemented on the container that is
housing the ACC devices. For fallback batteries and diesel generator shall be used.

Figure 6: Power supply on the line

Supervision and controlling

The supervision and controlling for the local power supply to the interlocking system will be made by the interlocking
system itself. Error and fault messages will be transmitted to the CTC via digital transmission network.
The controlling and supervision of the power supply for the catenary or other consumer should be controlled and
supervised from a separate technical control centre.
4.6.2

Transmission

( D1 / D2) The Digital Transmission Network has to provide the most reliable and speedy transmission of data for
different purposes for the needs of the railways. For these needs a dedicated OFC based Network is to be provided

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4.6.2.1

Signalling / ATP

Operational line side and station data, such as signalling and telecommunication information from the local interlocking
(CBI) and block posts, will be transmitted by optical fibre cable (OFC) (as described below: telecommunication system) to
the centralized train control (CTC) and radio block centre (RBC).
Resulting operational information from the CTC will be transmitted back to the local interlocking (CBI) by OFC.
Resulting onboard information will be transmitted from the RBC to the train by GSM-R.
4.6.2.2

Telecommunication

For the transmission of communication signals along the complete line (Rio de Janeiro Campinas) one Backbone
network with fibre optic cable, laid on both sides of the track to provide redundancy will be installed. To provide access
to this Backbone each station will be equipped with one access. The transmission rate should be 622MBit/s or more. For
collecting of all signals in each station it is necessary to install a Crossconnect-Multiplexer on each station. The following
signals will be transmitted via the transmission system ( D2-1):

Communication connections for ROTS/PABX

Data connections for PIS (Passenger information system)Ticketing, SCADA and CCTV

Data connections for supervision and controlling of the whole power supply (excluding interlocking) and also

Signalling data from CBI to CTC (see chapter 4.6.2.1)

The CTC is to provide one management centre computer terminal for monitoring and remote controlling of the lines
complete transmission system.

4.7

Required rooms / Land take

4.7.1

CTC

The CTC is to be placed in the building of the main station in Sao Paulo.
According to our experience in similar projects and basked on the dimension of the line and the forecast number of
passengers we suggest the following structure of working places to be considered:

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Figure 7: Structure of the CTC / building

For central operation all working places shall be located in one room in the CTC. This room will be equipped with
workstations and corresponding MMI. Each working place for an operator shall include up to 6 monitors. For central
operation, including RBC operation, there shall be 4 working places.

At regular operation the line will be operated by 2 members of staff.

At peak hours we suggest 3 operators (working places) for operating of the whole line

There should be a fourth working place to ensure operational stability in special situations with advanced
traffic.

For the whole overview with train tracking, which will be provided from the interlocking system, and presentation of the
count of the passenger, which will be provided from the ticketing system, we suggest an extra panorama wall.
For the Security task the CTC shall have an open booth with approx. 30 m. This booth will be equipped with an additional
panorama wall for a fast overview of the data of the CCTV. The detailed view of the CCTV will be displayed on the
workstation of the working place of the security staff. The booth shall be closed for emergency task.
Under consideration of the staff and the dimension of the working places we suggest a room for the CTC with about
minimum 150 m space. Additional rooms will be smaller.
It is suggested that in the CTC building a separate room for fallback situation is provided. The room shall not have the full
functionality of the CTC, for this room two work places for operation are sufficient.

For central dispatching we suggest separate rooms closed to the CTC.

1 Room for Rolling stock management technicians (approx. 15-20 m)

1 Board room (approx. 50m)

1 Room for data batch processing (approx. 20m)

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1 Room for dispatcher (including management of costumer information) (approx. 25m)

For technical rooms, including maintenance access via PC and supervision, we suggest:

4 Rooms for Rolling stock ( each approx. 20m)

3 Rooms for background equipment signalling, telecommunication and RBC (each approx. 25m)

1 Room for SCADA (approx. 20m)

Management of operations for the overhead line and power supplies requires to be closely co-ordinated with the rail
operations. This room should therefore be placed adjacent to or be part of, the CTC and will require approximately 40m.
All rooms must be air conditioned and connected to an uninterruptable power supply.

4.7.2

CBI

The CBI is to be placed in the local intermediate station building. It is to be provided with the following rooms:

4.7.3

Stationmaster (approx. 20 m)

Technical room for signaling and telecom, including work place for S&D (approx. 30 m)

Battery (approx. 15 m)

Power supply (approx. 15 m)

Diesel Generator (approx.15 m)

ACC

The ACC is to be placed in containers along the line. In case the pattern of the BTS masts meets the location of an ACC
both shall be combined in one shelter ( D1+D2 Housing). Example including fall-back power supply see above (4.6.1).

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Figure 8: ACC Shelter with BTS mast, Container with Equipment

4.7.4

Land take

In station area
It has to be considered that for power and data transmission there has to be copper ( D1+D2 cable plant) and optical
fibre cables ( D2-2) led in cable ducts.
The distance cable duct to centre of track is to be 2.50 m 5.00 m.
Along the line
It has to be considered that for data transmission reasons there has to be an optical fibre cable (OFC) ( D2-2) laid
along the line.
For redundancy reasons, on both sides of the track with a distance of at least 3.10 m from the track centre a cable
trench has to be excavated. The cable will be laid on a sand layer and the trench will be refilled.
Every 50m a concrete cable marker shall mark the position of the trench.

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Summary / Remarks

This study gives an overview on how the new TAV line can be equipped with signaling and telecommunication systems
which not only ensure safe, fast and convenient operation but also provide state of the art systems that can easily be
adjusted to changing requirements or future demands.
Furthermore it is designed to help all parties to understand the complex of requirements, which have to be taken into
account in planning the technology systems for a high speed operation in railway service.
For train protection we have suggested ETCS Level 2 to combine fast and safe service with an economical and future
oriented system, which minimizes the outside equipment to only that which is absolutely necessary.
For the signaling part we have suggested a decentralized electronic interlocking system, to efficiently combine the block
post into the interlocking logic. The possibility of remote controlling this interlocking system from the CTC allows very
economic and flexible operation.
For the telecommunication part we have suggested systems which are state of the art in modern railway operation,
using the large range of transmission media available in cable based and wireless transmission.
The cost estimation is necessarily based on a high level approach.

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List of Abbreviations

Abbreviation

Description

ATP

Automatic train Protection

ACC

Area Control Computer

BSC

Base station controller

BTS

Base tranceiver station

CBI

Computer Based Interlocking

CCTV

Closed Circuit Television

CENELEC

Comit Europen de Normalisation Electrotechnique

CTC

Centralized Traffic Control

DG

Diesel Generator

EN

European Norm

ERTMS

European Rail Traffic Management System

ETCS

European Train Control System

GSM-R

Global System for Mobile communication Rail

HABD

Hot axle box detection

ISO

International Organization for Standardization

LEU

Line side Electronic Units

MA

Movement authority

MMI

Man Machine Interface

MSC

Mobile switching centre / Main system controller??

OFC

Optical fibre cable

OCC

Operation Control Centre

OSM

Operating and supervision Module

PA

Public address

PS

Power supply

RBC

Radio Block Center

ROTS

Railway Operation Telecommunication System

SMB

Stop marker board

SCADA

Supervisory control and data acquisition

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TD

Train destination

TVM

Transmission voice-machine

UNISIG

Union Industry of Signaling, working group of the UNIFE (Union des Industries
Ferroviaires Europenne)

UPS

Uninterrupted power supply

List of Figures

Figure 1: Characteristics of ETCS Level 1 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0........................................................................ 6

Figure 2: Characteristics of ETCS Level 2 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0...................................................................... 6
Figure 3: Characteristics of ETCS Level 3 Source: UNISIG SRS Version 2.3.0.......................................................................7
Figure 4: Example of an SMB and Balises (HSL Zuid, Netherlands).......................................................................................... 13
Figure 5: Power supply at stations............................................................................................................................................17
Figure 6: Power supply on the line ............................................................................................................................................17
Figure 7: Structure of the CTC / building................................................................................................................................. 19
Figure 8: ACC Shelter with BTS mast, Container with Equipment............................................................................................ 21

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