G.R. No.

L-16922

April 30, 1963

IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE, MARVIN G. ELLIS and GLORIA C. ELLIS, petitionersappellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.
Nature Appeal taken by the Government from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga granting the petition of Marvin G. Ellis and Gloria C. Ellis for the adoption of a Filipino baby girl named Rose.

FACTS Petitioner Marvin G. Ellis, a native of San Fransisco, California, is 28 years of age. On September 3, 1949, he married Gloria G. Ellis in Banger, Maine, United States. Both are citizens of the United States. Baby Rose was born on September 26, 1959, at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital. Four or five days later, the mother of Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa an institution for unwed mothers and their babies stating that she (the mother) could not take of Rose without bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's family.). Being without issue, on November 22, 1959, Mr. and Mrs. Ellis filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for the adoption of the aforementioned baby. At the time of the hearing of the petition on January 14,1960, petitioner Marvin G. Ellis and his wife had been in the Philippines for three (3) years, he being assigned thereto as staff sergeant in the United States Air Force Base, in Angeles, Pampanga where both lived at that time. They had been in the Philippines before, or, to exact, in 1953. This, perhaps, is the reason why our Civil Code does not permit adoption by non-resident aliens, and we have consistently refused to recognize the validity of foreign decrees of divorce regardless of the grounds upon which the same are based involving citizens of the Philippines who are not bona fide residents of the forum, even when our laws authorized absolute divorce in the Philippines (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855; Gonayeb v. Hashim, 30 Phil. 22; Cousine Hix v. Fleumer, 55 Phil. 851; Barretto Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67; Recto v. Harden, L-6897, Nov. 29, 1955)". Inasmuch as petitioners herein are not domiciled in the Philippines and, hence, non-resident aliens - we cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status, under either the nationality theory or the domiciliary theory. In any event, whether the above quoted provision of said Art. 335 is predicated upon lack of jurisdiction over theres or merely affects the cause of action, we have no authority to grant the relief prayed for by petitioners herein, and it has been so held in Caraballo v. Republic, L-15080 (April 25, 1962) and Katansik v. Republic L15472 (June 30, 1962). WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered denying the petition in this case.

ISSUE Whether not being permanent residents in the Philippines, petitioners are qualified to adopt Baby Rose. Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, provides that: "The following cannot adopt: xxx (4) Non-resident aliens;". xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

This legal provisions is too clear to require interpretation. In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latters' nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners. Under our political law, which is patterned after the Anglo-American legal system, we have, likewise, adopted the latter's view to the effect that personal status, in general, is determined by and/or subject to the jurisdiction of the domiciliary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714).

G.R. No. L-20169

February 26, 1965

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YU KIAN CHIE TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. YU KIAN CHIE, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

lucrative income. As a starter on this point, We quote a portion of the argument of counsel for petitioner-appellee, which states: ... . He received a uniform living allowance of P150.00 a month, aside from the yearly bonus which the company gives him, depending of course, on the profit which said company realizes every year from its business. (p. 3, brief.) And the living allowance is given regularly from the time the petitioner started working with the Republic Hardware in 1959 up to the present. In other words, it (living allowance) has assumed its regularity as a part of the salary in consideration of the services rendered by the petitioner. ... The above-quoted portion of the arguments of petitioner's counsel is a clear indication that as far as salary is concerned, his client, appellee herein, was only receiving P150.00, the rest being in the form of allowances and bonuses which may or may not be given to appellee. In other words, petitioner's employer was not duty bound to give such allowances and bonuses, but must spring from purely voluntary actuations, conditioned to the circumstance that the employer was making profits. When there are no profits, the allowances and the bonuses are not given. It is not, therefore, safe to consider that the income of petitioner is P3,000.00 yearly, or more. Insofar as the evidence is concerned, it becomes indisputable that petitioner's true income is only P150.00, any additional thereof being purely contingent, accidental or incidental, which amount does not come up to the category of a lucrative income, considering that the petitioner is now a married man. Furthermore, We are not convinced that petitioner's employee could be that generous to him. It will be noted that the Republic Hardware did not present its books to show that it was making a good profit, as to enable it to give such big allowance and bonus to appellee, and considering that the raise in salary was given during the pendency of his naturalization case. But even granting, for purpose of argument, that petitioner started to receive a fixed salary of P400.00 a month in 1962, still this amount cannot be considered lucrative in the face of the fact that in 1961 he got married, as pointed out in his Income Tax Return for 1961 (Exh. P-4). PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from, should be, as it is hereby reversed and another entered denying Yu Kian Chie's petition for Philippine citizenship. Costs against petitioner-appellee.

FACTS Yu Kian Chie, a citizen of the Republic of China, presented with the CFI of Manila, on February 4, 1960, a petition for naturalization, containing all the jurisdictional requirements, the pertinent portion of which is hereby reproduced: THIRD. My trade or profession is that of an employee in which I have been engaged since 1957 and from which I derive an average annual income of P3,000.00. Attached to the petition were affidavits of Marcelo de la Cruz and Federico G. Santos, who acted as character witnesses; Declaration of Intention and Certificate of Arrival. After the trial, the Office of the Solicitor General on October 4, 1961, filed an "Opposition" claiming that the two witnesses of petitioner are not credible and did not testify as to petitioner's good reputation and moral irreproachability. On December 18, 1961, the lower court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states: xxx xxx xxx

In view of the foregoing, this Court finds that petitioner has all the qualifications required by, and none of the disqualifications specified in, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 535, and has complied with all the requisites established therein.. WHEREFORE, the said petition of Yu Kian Chie to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines is hereby granted, and let the proper naturalization certificate be issued in his favor and the registration thereof in the proper civil registry, this decision to become executory in accordance with the provisions of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 53. After the Solicitor General has perfected his appeal from the above judgment, but during the pendency of the approval of the record on appeal, petitioner-appellee herein presented with the lower court a "Motion to Reopen Case to Enable Petitioner to present Additional Documentary Proof of his Income," claiming that his income has risen from P3,000.00 in 1957, to P5,100.00 in 1960 and P5,200.00 in 1961. The increase in the income had been due to a little increase in the salary, plus, the bonuses of P100.00 in 1960 and P1,000.00 in 1961. The motion was heard, and on July 18, 1962, the court a quo rendered a "Supplemental Decision." Both the original and the supplemental decisions are the subjects of the instant appeal, the Solicitor General urging a reversal thereof on a singular assignment of error, allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit: in not finding that the petitioner failed to prove that he has a lucrative income. There seem to be no question regarding the fact that there has been an increase in the income of petitioner, from the time he presented his petition, to the rendition of the Supplemental Decision. In 1961 also, there has been a change in the status of petitioner, from single to married. Even granting, for purposes of argument, that the figures appearing in the documentary evidence submitted are correct, although We entertain serious doubts regarding their veracity a point which We will discuss later the overriding issue would be, the same