Anda di halaman 1dari 25

Journal of Conflict Resolution http://jcr.sagepub.

com/

Threat, Dehumanization, and Support for Retaliatory Aggressive Policies in Asymmetric Conflict
Ifat Maoz and Clark McCauley Journal of Conflict Resolution 2008 52: 93 DOI: 10.1177/0022002707308597 The online version of this article can be found at: http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/52/1/93

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of:
Peace Science Society (International)

Additional services and information for Journal of Conflict Resolution can be found at: Email Alerts: http://jcr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://jcr.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav Citations: http://jcr.sagepub.com/content/52/1/93.refs.html

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Threat, Dehumanization, and Support for Retaliatory Aggressive Policies in Asymmetric Conict
Ifat Maoz
Department of Communication Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

Journal of Conict Resolution Volume 52 Number 1 February 2008 93-116 2008 Sage Publications 10.1177/0022002707308597 http://jcr.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com

Clark McCauley
Department of Psychology Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania
Public opinion can permit or encourage retaliatory aggressive state policies against vulnerable but threatening out-groups. The authors present a model in which public support for such policies is determined by perceived threat from and dehumanization of the target group. This two-factor model predicts Israeli Jews support for two retaliatory aggressive policies: the more hypothetical notion of Palestinian population transfer and concrete, coercive actions toward Palestinians. The authors nd (1) that threat and dehumanization are distinct constructs, each having unique contributions to explaining support for aggressive retaliatory policies, (2) that threat and dehumanization signicantly explain support for aggressive retaliatory policies when respondents hawkishness, socioeconomic status (SES), and education level are taken into account, and (3) that the association of hawkishness and SES with support for aggressive retaliatory policies is largely mediated by threat perception. Results are highly consistent across two studies, suggesting the two-factor model may be useful for understanding support for aggressive action in situations of asymmetric conict. Keywords: asymmetric conict; IsraeliPalestinian conict; public opinion; perceived threat; dehumanization

he beginning of the third millennium is accompanied by an increase in localized conicts and violence and an intensication of terror attacks. These are often asymmetrical conicts, in which one state or group has markedly more power

Authors Note: This research was supported by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (Grant N00140510629). However, any opinions, ndings, and conclusions or recommendations in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily reect views of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Data les and coding manual will be made available at http://jcr.sagepub.com/supplemental. Results are reproducible using SPSS 12.0 and Amos 6.0 software, as detailed in methods sections of studies 1 and 2. 93
Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

94

Journal of Conict Resolution

than its rival (Friedman 2005). Often the response to asymmetric violence is increased support, within the stronger party, for retaliatory aggression against the weaker, vulnerable, and often dependent out-group (Bar-On 1998; Bar-On and Kassem 2004). Thus, public opinion surveys found that, in response to the terrorists attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, two-thirds of Americans reported that they were willing to sacrice some civil liberties to ght terrorism, and one in four thought that the Bush administration had not gone far enough in restricting civil liberties in the months immediately following the attacks (Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos 2002). Similarly, a study conducted during the second Palestinian intifadah (uprising) against Israel indicated that 27 percent of Israeli Jews thought it justied to violate human rights of Palestinians in the territories because Palestinians perform terror acts (Maoz 2006). Especially in democratic regimes, public support for aggressive policies aimed at vulnerable but threatening out-groups can permit or even encourage the enactment of such policies. Thus, it is important to better understand the sources of such support. As we discuss below, considerable research has focused on threat perception to explain support for milder forms of aggression such as the restriction of out-group civil liberties. The goal of our study is to explore factors that underlie public support for more extreme forms of aggressive retaliatory state policies. We introduce a two-factor model in which support for such policies is determined by perceived out-group threat and by dehumanization of the out-group (as expressed by disgust and contempt toward this out-group). This model is tested in the context of the asymmetrical conict between the state of Israel and the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza. Two studies use structural equation modeling (SEM) to analyze Jewish Israeli attitudes regarding retaliatory aggressive policies toward Palestinians. We begin by reviewing the conceptual basis for our model.

Out-Group Threat and Support for Aggressive Policies


Consistently linked with support for aggressive and belligerent retaliatory policies against out-groups is perception of collective threat (i.e., perception of realistic threat to ones own group or state posed by another group or state; Gordon and Arian 2001). The tendency to become more politically intolerant under conditions of out-group threat is well documented (Gibson 1992; Marcus et al. 1995). Threat has also been found to increase support for punitive and aggressive actions against the threatening out-group (Arian 1989; Hermann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999). Recent attention to local conicts and terror attacks has brought a resurgence of academic interest in the link between threat perception and support for state action against vulnerable out-groups. For example, studies done in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks found that perception of a high threat of future

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

95

terrorism was associated with increased American support for U.S. overseas military intervention and support for restricting immigration and intensied surveillance directed at Arabs and Arab Americans (Huddy et al. 2005). Similarly, perceived threat of future terrorist attacks following 2001 predicted American citizens support for government policies such as phone tapping, detaining without criminal charges, and blocking gun ownership for Arab Americans, Muslims, or rst-generation immigrants (Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004). In the same vein, studies conducted during the second Palestinian intifadah found that Israeli Jews perception of Arab threat was signicantly linked with support for state violation of the civil rights of Israeli Arabs (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006). These ndings are highly consistent with realist theory in international relations, which poses power and comparative assessments of power as major explanatory factors of individual and collective actions (Jervis 1976; Waltz 1979).

Out-Group Dehumanization and Support for Aggression


Perceived threat, including competition for scarce resources, clearly plays a major role in the development of negative dispositions toward an out-group (Gordon and Arian 2001). However, especially in asymmetric conicts, support of aggressive retaliatory policies toward an out-group can also result from perceiving the outgroup as essentially and morally inferior to ones own groupas inhuman or subhuman and thus not within ones realm of moral consideration (Opotow 1990). Disgust and contempt are clear expressions of seeing the out-group as morally inferior to ones own group (Fiske et al. 2002) and as subhuman (Haslam 2006). Disgust and revulsion feature prominently in images of dehumanized others who are often perceived as contaminating and despised (Haslam 2006; Rozin et al. 1999). Contempt, a kindred emotion, plays a similar role, locating the other below the self or in-group (Haslam 2006). Dehumanization often occurs in social contexts of ethnic or national conict and is described as related to an increased tendency to aggress against the dehumanized others (Kelman 2005). Opotows (1990, 1) theory of moral exclusion describes a process by which people are placed outside the boundary in which moral values, rules, and considerations of fairness apply. Causing or allowing harm to those outside of ones moral community is justied and rationalized on the premise that they are expendable, undeserving, exploitable, and irrelevant. Severe instances of moral exclusion may include systematic violations of human rights, political oppression, slavery, and genocide (Staub 1989, 1990). Though out-group dehumanization is described as a major instigator of extreme interethnic violence, ethnic cleansing, and genocide (Kelman 1976; Chirot and McCauley 2006; Staub 1989, 2000), there has been, to our knowledge, no direct empirical examination of the unique effect of dehumanization of an out-group on public support for aggressive retaliatory policies against it. Thus, the rst aim of

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

96

Journal of Conict Resolution

our study is to examine the extent to which perception of threat from Palestinians and dehumanization of Palestinians (as expressed by disgust and contempt toward them) are two distinct dispositions of Israeli Jews toward Palestinians. A further aim is to determine the extent to which each makes a unique contribution to predicting support of aggressive retaliatory policies toward Palestinians. In sum, we suggest that threat and dehumanization are distinguishable but related negative perceptions of a weaker (but still threatening) out-group in an asymmetric conict. Thus, Jewish Israeli views of Palestinians can contain, at the same time, a perception of collective threat from Palestinians ability to carry future terror attacks against Israel (Gordon and Arian 2001) and dehumanization manifest in contempt and disgust toward Palestinians, who are seen by many Israeli Jews as inferior and even as subhuman (Bar-Tal 2000; Bar-Tal and Tiechman 2005). We hypothesize that each of these two factorsthreat and dehumanizationwill have an independent contribution to explaining Israeli Jewish support for aggressive retaliatory policies toward Palestinians.

The Social Context of Threat and Intolerance: Hawkishness, Socioeconomic Status (SES), and Level of Education
While considerable research deals with the effect of psychological variables such as threat perception on political intolerance and policy preferences, the social context of such variables is often neglected. However, threat perception and political intolerance and other policy preferences are often inuenced by respondents political positions and by other sociodemographic characteristics. For example, it has been repeatedly found that Israeli Jews who hold more hawkish or right-wing ideologies in the IsraeliArab conict (i.e., favor more militant and less reconciliatory policies; see Bar-Tal, Raviv, and Freund 1994; Shamir and Shamir 2000) perceive higher threat from Palestinians, indicate more negative attitudes toward them, and are less willing to compromise with them (Arian 2003; Bar-Tal 2001; Maoz and McCauley 2005; Shamir and Shamir 2000). Hawks also express more political intolerance toward Israeli Arabs (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006). Lower levels of education and lower SES of Israeli Jews were also found to be related to more negative and less compromising attitudes toward Palestinians (Arian 2001; Yuchtman-Yaar and Herman 1997) and to higher political intolerance toward Arabs (Shamir and Sagiv-Schifter 2006). In addition, lower level of education was associated with decreased support for compromise and peace in Israeli and Palestinian samples (Nachtway and Tessler 2002). In spite of the demonstrated importance of ideological and sociodemographic variables in predicting threat and policy support, rarely do we nd an analysis that includes, at the same time, psychological, ideological, and demographic measures as predictors of belligerent policy preferences toward an out-group. Thus, another

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

97

aim of our study is to present a comprehensive multilevel model in which respondents degree of Hawkishness, SES, and education level are added to threat and dehumanization as predictors of support for aggressive retaliatory policies. Two studies test our models predictions on Jewish Israeli public opinion support for two types of retaliatory aggressive policies: the more hypothetical notion of Palestinian population transfer (study 1) and concrete, coercive acts toward Palestinians, ranging from administrative detention to torture (study 2). The results provide important insights into how both threat from vulnerable out-groups and dehumanization (as expressed by disgust and contempt toward these groups) independently contribute to public support for retaliatory aggressive state policies toward vulnerable out-groups.

Study 1
Population transfer refers to a policy by which a state, or international authority, forces the movement of a large group of people out of a region, most frequently on the basis of ethnicity or religion. The view of international law on population transfer underwent considerable evolution during the 20th century. Underlying the change was the trend to assign rights to individuals, thereby limiting the rights of states to make agreements that adversely affect them. There is now little debate that involuntary population transfer is a violation of international law. The 1997 nal report of the United Nations Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities invokes a large number of legal conventions and treaties to support the position that population transfers contravene international law unless they have the consent of both the moved population and the host population. This consent has to be given free of direct or indirect negative pressure. Despite its controversial legal and moral status, the idea of population transfer has been part of Jewish Israeli political discourse since the early 20th century. Following the Peel Report, which included a recommendation of transfer, this notion was openly endorsed by mainstream Zionist leadership in the late 1930s and early 1940s (Morris 1999; Shapira 1992). However, other Zionist leaders identied with both labor and more left-wing ideologies were vehemently opposed on moral grounds to what came to be understood as forceful displacement of the Palestinian population (Shapira 1992). The discussion of transfer subsided after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, but it returned to prominence in the early 1980s and became even stronger with the eruption of the rst Palestinian intifada (1987 1993; Morris 1999; Shamir and Shamir 2000). Transferring the Palestinian population out of Israel has consistently received support from signicant parts of the Israeli Jewish public during the past two decades. Strong support was found in Jewish Israeli public opinion surveys conducted during the rst Palestinian intifada. For example, a survey conducted in 1991 found

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

98

Journal of Conict Resolution

that 36 percent of Israeli Jews supported such transfer (Shamir and Shamir 2000). However, it is important to note that this support is for a hypothetical notion that has not been, nor is likely to be, implemented. Thus, both Shamir and Shamir (2000) and Arian (1996) note that while transferring Palestinian population out of Israel is supported by a considerable percentage of the Jewish Israel population, it is seen as likely to occur by a much lower percentage. Jewish Israeli support for transfer decreased to some extent in the mid to late 1990s with the end of the rst intifada and the onset of the Oslo peace process (Arian 1998): of the Jewish Israeli population, 15 percent supported annexation of the territories and transferring Palestinians in 1995, 9 percent in 1996, 7 percent in 1997, and 10 percent in 1998. However, with the eruption of the second intifada in October 2000, support for Palestinian population transfer among Israeli Jews was renewed in 2002 (46 percent) and in 2003 (46 percent) (Arian 2003). In the long term, this support contributes to the intractability of the Israeli Palestinian conict (Maoz and Eidelson 2007). The ability of leaders to resolve protracted ethno-national conictsespecially in democratic regimesconsiderably depends on the weight of public opinion. Such support enables policy makers to negotiate and then implement mutually acceptable compromise solutions to the conict. When there exist subgroups of hardliners or spoilers who oppose compromise and endorse belligerent, coercive policies toward the out-group, it becomes much more difcult and sometimes impossible for leaders to reach agreements and make concessions to the other side (Maoz and Eidelson 2007). The goal of our rst study is to explain the factors underlying the support, among some Israeli Jews, for the notion of transferring Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to neighboring Arab countries.

Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Perception of out-group threat from Palestinians and dehumanization of Palestinians (as expressed in disgust and contempt toward them) will be found as two distinct factors representing different aspects of Israeli Jews negative attitudes toward Palestinians. Hypothesis 2: Threat perception and dehumanization will each make an independent, signicant contribution to predicting Jewish Israeli support for Palestinian population transfer. Hypothesis 3: Threat perception and dehumanization will still signicantly predict support for transfer, even when degree of hawkishness, SES, and education level are added to the model as predictors of support for Palestinian population transfer. Hypothesis 4: Threat perception and dehumanization will signicantly mediate the associations of hawkishness, SES, and education level with support for transfer.

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

99

Table 1 Study 1: Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Criterion Measure and Predictor Variables
2 1. Support for transfer 2. Threat 3. Dehumanization 4. Hawkishness 5. Socioeconomic status (SES) 6. Education .48 ** 3 .37 ** .37 ** 4 .49 ** .51 ** .39 ** 5 .12 ** .16 ** .16 ** .18 ** 6 .08 .14 ** .14 ** .13 ** .12 ** M 3.51 4.31 2.87 4.55 2.63 14.17 SD 2.09 0.95 1.47 1.74 0.88 3.28

Note: N = 504. Threat, dehumanization, and SES are based on the computed average of the indicators used to measure each of these variables (see text). Support for transfer, threat, and dehumanization are measured on a 1 to 6 scale, hawkishness on a 1 to 7 scale, and SES on a 1 to 5 scale. Education is measured in number of years of formal education. ** p < .01.

Method
Survey design and participants. Results are based on a nationally representative random-digit dialing telephone interview survey of 504 Jewish Israeli adults (aged 18 and older) conducted by the Machshov Research Institute, a professional polling agency in Israel, during June 2003. Respondents were randomly sampled from a CD used by Israeli polling agencies that contains all of the listed phone numbers of Israeli households. The response rate in surveys of the Jewish Israeli population, including this one, is estimated at between 20 percent and 30 percent. The survey was conducted in Hebrew, but items are reproduced here in English translation. The demographics of this sample were comparable to those of the general Israeli Jewish population. Measures. Here, we briey describe the measures used in our analyses (see table 1 for means and standard deviations of the measures and the intercorrelations among them). Threat perception was measured by asking respondents to rate their agreement with the following three items on a 6-point scale that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree: I am concerned that the State of Israel will suffer from waves of Palestinian terror attacks, In my opinion, the majority of Palestinians would have destroyed the State of Israel if they could, and It is possible to trust Palestinians (reversed). Although the average of these items is reported in descriptive analyses (see table 1), each item was used as a manifest indicator of the latent construct of perceived realistic threat in SEM. Cronbachs alpha coefcient for these items was .60.

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

100

Journal of Conict Resolution

Dehumanization was assessed by asking respondents to rate the degree that they felt disgust and contempt toward Palestinians on 6-point scales that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The average of these items was reported in the descriptive analyses (see table 1), but each item was used separately as a manifest variable, indicating the latent construct of dehumanization in SEM. Cronbachs alpha coefcient for these items was .89. Support for Palestinian population transfer was measured by asking respondents to rate their agreement with a single item, Transfer: The territories will be annexed to Israel and most of the Palestinian population living there will be transferred to neighboring Arab countries, on a 6-point scale that ranged from strongly disagree to strongly agree. This item was used as a manifest variable indicating support for Palestinian population transfer in the SEM. Regarding hawkishness, respondents were also asked to place themselves on a 7-point bipolar hawkdove scale as follows: In the scale presented to you, 1 represents full identication with right-wing (hawkish) attitudes, 7 represents full identication with left-wing (dovish) attitudes, and 4 represents middle/center attitudes in Arab-Israeli relations. Where would you place yourself on this scale? In our data analysis, we recoded this variable so that higher scores represented more hawkish attitudes. This item was used as a manifest variable indicating level of hawkishness in the SEM. Level of education was measured by asking respondents to indicate their number of years of formal schooling. This item was used as a manifest variable in the SEM. SES was measured by two variables. First, for level of expenditure, respondents rated their household average monthly expenditure relative to the average household monthly expenditure in Israel on a 4-point scale ranging from a lot below the average to a lot above the average. Second, for societal status, respondents rated their SES in Israeli society on a 4-point scale ranging from in the upper quarter of the population to in the fourth (lowest) quarter of the population. In our data analysis, we recoded this variable so that higher scores represented higher societal status. The averages of the level of expenditure and societal status items were reported in the descriptive analyses, but each of these items was used separately as a manifest variable, indicating the latent construct of SES in SEM. Cronbachs alpha coefcient for these items was .61.

Results
Descriptive analyses. Table 1 presents means and standards deviation for our measures and the zero-order correlations among them. These data indicate that Israeli Jews expressed high perception of collective threat from Palestinians (M = 4:3, SD = 0.95), with 68 percent of our respondents indicating that they are threatened by Palestinians (ratings of 4, 5, or 6 on the 1 to 6 scale). Some 27 percent

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

101

of the Israeli Jewish respondents indicated dehumanization of Palestinians (M = 2:9, SD = 1.47), and 47 percent expressed support for Palestinian population transfer (M = 3:5, SD = 2.0). Support for transfer here closely mirrors ndings of other public opinion studies conducted in 2002 and in 2003 that indicate that about 46 percent of Israeli Jews support Palestinian population transfer (see Arian 2003). The analyses below were conducted to uncover the sources for this support. Hypotheses testing using SEM. To test our hypotheses, we conducted SEM analysis using the AMOS 6.0 statistical program (Arbuckle 2005). SEM uses conventional regression equations that calibrate the most inuential statistical associations (which may be causal connections). However, SEM also represents the impact of several variables on one or more outcomes (the structural relations) with a graphical model. This method has several advantages over path analysis and multiple regression. First, it takes into account the interrelationships among the independent variables, and, second, it provides adequate tests of the effects after adjustments for the unreliability of the measures (Kline 2005). An analysis using SEM has two elements, a measurement model and a structural model. The measurement model was used here to conrm the existence of two separate dimensions of negative orientations toward the out-group: (1) perception of out-group collective threat and (2) dehumanization of the out-group. The structural model was employed here to examine (1) the association of threat and dehumanization with support for Palestinian population transfer, (2) the relation of hawkishness, SES, and education to threat, dehumanization, and support for transfer, and (3) the extent to which threat and dehumanization mediate the effect of hawkishness, SES, and education on support for Palestinian population transfer. Model t was assessed by four indices: the normed t index (NFI), The TuckerLewis index (TLI), the comparative t index (CFI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Models with NFI, TLI, or CFI greater than .90 have good t, and models with t greater than .95 have excellent t to the data (Kline 2005). A good t is also indicated by RMSEA values of less than or equal to .06. Analyses of measurement models. Our rst hypothesis was that threat perception and dehumanization are two distinct factors, each describing a different negative perception of the out-group. To test this hypothesis, we compared the hypothesized measurement model (model 1, gure 1), in which threat perception and dehumanization are specied as two separate latent factors, to an alternative measurement model (model 2), in which threat and dehumanization are merged into one construct factor. Figure 1 indicates that the correlation between threat and dehumanization is substantial (r = :50). Therefore, it is crucial to show that these two measures actually assess constructs that are distinguishable from one another. As hypothesized, model 1 proved to have a better t to the data. Model 1 indices all indicated good t (NFI = .98, TLI = .98, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .047, 90 percent condence

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

102

Journal of Conict Resolution

Figure 1 Study 1: Measurement Model as Hypothesized (Model 1)

Threat

.61 (Model 2 = .43)

.50
Support for Transfer

.39
Dehumanization

Note: The gure shows the standardized values of the coefcients (all p values <:05). To keep the gure simple, only latent constructs are shown for threat and dehumanization, and manifest indicators are omitted for these variables.

interval RMSEA = .009 .080). In contrast, the alternative model (model 2) revealed low and unsatisfactory model t (NFI = .79, TLI = .52, CFI = .79, RMSEA = .20, 90 percent condence interval RMSEA = .179 .229). Thus, our results show that threat and dehumanization should be separately modeled, as hypothesized. Analyses of the structural models. A series of structural equation models tested hypotheses 2 to 4. Hypothesis 2 was that threat perception and dehumanization of the out-group will each independently and signicantly predict support for transfer. To test this hypothesis, we produced a structural model in which threat and dehumanization were entered as two separate predictors of support for transfer (model 3, gure 2). The resulting regression coefcients indicate that, as hypothesized, threat does strongly predict support for transfer (b = :56). Also as expected, dehumanization has a signicant (albeit small) separate effect on support for transfer (b = :11). Hypothesis 3 was that threat and dehumanization will continue to predict support for transfer, even when hawkishness, SES, and education are entered into the structural model as predictors of support for transfer. Hypothesis 4 predicted that threat perception and dehumanization would signicantly mediate the effects of

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

103

Figure 2 Study 1: Threat and Dehumanization as Predicting Support for Transfer (Model 3)
.56

Threat

.50

Support for Transfer

R2 = .38

.11
Dehumanization

Note: The gure shows the standardized values of the coefcients (all p values <:05). To keep the gure simple, only latent constructs are shown for threat and dehumanization, and manifest indicators are omitted for these variables.

hawkishness, SES, and education on support for transfer. To test these hypotheses, we produced a structural model (model 4, see gure 3) in which hawkishness, SES, and education were entered as exogenous variables, with both direct and indirect (through threat and dehumanization) paths to support for transfer and in which threat perception and dehumanization were entered as endogenous variables, each with a direct path to support for transfer. In line with hypothesis 4, model 4 (see gure 3) indicates that indeed threat (b = :49) and dehumanization (b = :10) remain signicant predictors of support for transfer after adding hawkishness, SES, and education to the structural equation. This model also showed very good t to the data (NFI = .96, TLI = .95, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .050, 90 percent condence interval RMSEA = .032 .068) Mediation analysis. Finally, we tested the extent to which threat and dehumanization mediate the link between hawkishness, SES, and education and support for transfer. To establish mediation, three conditions must be fullled (Baron and Kenny 1986). First, the predictors (hawkishness, SES, and education) must be correlated with the dependent variable (support for transfer). As table 1 indicates, hawkishness and SES signicantly correlate with support for transfer (r = :49 and r = :12, respectively, p values <:01). However, education has an insignicant

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

104

Figure 3 Study 1: Combined Mediation Model (Model 5)

Hawk

.65

.13

.37
Threat R2 = .48

.13 .48 .01

SES

.13 .10
Dehuman R2 = .19

Support for Transfer R = .39


2

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

.09

.08

Education

.04

Note: The gure shows the standardized values of the coefcients (p values <:05 in bold). Insignicant links are dotted lines. To keep the gure simple, only latent constructs are shown for threat, dehumanization, and socioeconomic status, and manifest indicators are omitted for these variables.

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

105

link (r = :08) with support for transfer and thus cannot be considered further as mediated by threat and dehumanization. The second condition for mediation is that the predictors (in our case hawkishness and SES) must correlate with the mediators (threat perception and dehumanization). As table 1 also indicates, hawkishness signicantly correlates with threat perception and with dehumanization (r = :51 and r = :39, respectively, p values <:01), and SES signicantly correlates with threat perception and dehumanization (r = :16 and r = :16, respectively, p values <:01). The third condition for mediation is that the mediators (in our case threat perception and dehumanization) must affect the dependent variable (support for transfer) when controlling for the predictors. As already described, gure 3 (model 4) indicates that the threatsupport for transfer and dehumanizationsupport for transfer links are still substantial when controlling for hawkishness, SES, and education. To test for signicance of the mediation effects, we used the Sobel test (Preacher and Hayes 2004). Mediation was signicant for both hawkishness (p < :001) and SES (p < :05). Computations of the magnitude of the mediation effects (full details on these analyses can be obtained from the rst author) indicated that threat perception and dehumanization mediate 73 percent of the association of hawkishness with support for transfer and 100 percent of association of SES with support for transfer (full mediation). We conducted a further decomposition of the mediation effects to clarify the relative role of threat and dehumanization as mediators. Results indicate that for both hawkishness and SES, threat is the signicant mediator, accounting for 66 percent of the association of hawkishness with support for transfer and for 89 percent of the association of SES with support for transfer, while dehumanization accounted for only a small and insignicant part of the associations of both hawkishness and SES with support for Palestinian population transfer.

Discussion
As hypothesized, study 1 found that threat and dehumanization are distinct negative orientations toward the out-group. Also consistent with our hypotheses, perception of threat from and dehumanization of Palestinians (as manifested in disgust and contempt toward them) both made a signicant contribution (with dehumanization making a smaller contribution) to Jewish Israeli support for Palestinian population transfer. These nding are consistent with analyses that describe dehumanization as an instigator of support for interethnic violence (Opotow 1990; Chirot and McCauley 2006; Staub 1989), but, to our knowledge, this is the rst study to empirically and directly demonstrate this relationship. In addition, we found that threat and dehumanization still continued to signicantly predict support for Palestinian population transfer even when hawkishness, SES, and level of education were entered into the model as predictors of support for transfer. Furthermore, perception of Palestinian threat mediated around

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

106

Journal of Conict Resolution

70 percent of the association between hawkishness and support for transfer. SES had a small but signicant association with support for transfer that was highly (88 percent) mediated by threat perception, and education level was not signicantly associated with support for transfer. To avoid repetition, these results will be further discussed in the general discussion. Overall, the results of study 1 indicate that our model was successful in explaining (R2 = :39) Jewish Israeli support for Palestinian population transfer. However, an obvious test of the validity of our model is its applicability to new data and its ability to explain support for different types of retaliatory aggressive policies toward threatening out-groups. The issue of Palestinian population transfer is hypothetical, and thus support for transfer may not fully reect support for actual and concrete aggressive acts against Palestinians. Thus, in study 2 we examine, with an additional set of Israeli Jewish public polling data, the extent to which our model predicts support for concrete, specic coercive acts toward Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza.

Study 2
Since the early 1980s a large body of research has been dedicated to better understanding why and under what circumstances governments violate human rights. These studies found that certain state characteristics such as democracy, economic development, and population size are strongly (negatively) associated with human rights violation (Poe, Rost, and Carey 2006). Another important determinant of state violation of human rights, especially in democratic states, is public support. To the extent that violations are legitimized by the electorate in democratic regimes, their enactment by the government is facilitated or even encouraged. On the other hand, public objection to human rights violations can highly limit the state capability to enact them or, at least, signicantly increase their political price tag. Study 2 examines the extent to which our model of threat and dehumanization can explain the support of parts of the Jewish Israeli public for concrete coercive acts (CCA) toward Palestinians that are considered violations of human rights (e.g., United Nations 2002), ranging from administrative detention to torture.1

Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: Perception of threat from Palestinians and dehumanization of Palestinians will each make an independent, signicant contribution to predicting Jewish Israeli support for CCA toward Palestinians. Hypothesis 2: Threat perception and dehumanization will still signicantly predict support for CCA toward Palestinians, even when hawkishness, SES, and education level are added to the model as predictors of Support for CCA.

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

107

Table 2 Study 2: Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Criterion Measure and Predictor Variables
2 3 4 5 .10 * .19 ** .04 .13 ** 6 .09 .14 ** .21 ** .29 ** .08 M 2.51 4.51 2.66 3.50 2.67 13.9 SD 0.70 1.25 1.87 1.72 0.75 3.04

1. Support for concrete coercive acts (CCA) .42 ** .39 ** .44 ** 2. Threat .34 ** .54 ** 3. Dehumanization .41 ** 4. Hawkishness 5. Socioeconomic status (SES) 6. Education

Note: N = 501. Support for CCA, threat, and SES are scales based on the computed average of the indicators used to measure each of these variables. Support for CCA is measure on a 1 to 4 scale; for other items, see note to Table 1. * p < .05. ** p < .01.

Hypothesis 3: Threat perception and dehumanization will signicantly mediate the association of hawkishness, SES, and education level with support for CCA toward Palestinians.

Method
Survey design and participants. Results are based on a nationally representative random-digit dialing telephone interview survey of 501 Jewish Israeli adults (age 18 and older) conducted by the Machshov Research Institute, a professional polling agency in Israel, during May 2005. Respondents were randomly sampled from a CD used by Israeli polling agencies that contains all of the listed phone numbers of Israeli households. The response rate in this survey was 23 percent. The survey was conducted in Hebrew, but items are reproduced here in English translation. The demographics of this sample were comparable to those of the general Israeli Jewish population. Measures. The following measures used in this study are the same as those used in study 1: threat perception (Cronbach a for study 2 = :65), hawkishness, SES (Cronbach a for study 2 = :42), and education. Dehumanization was measured by the extent of feeling disgust toward Palestinians (see study 1). Table 2 presents means and standard deviations of all the measures used in study 2 and the intercorrelations among them. Support for CCA toward Palestinian. This measure was developed for study 2. Respondents were presented with seven items describing CCA toward Palestinians

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

108

Journal of Conict Resolution

that are considered as violations of human rights (e.g., United Nations 2002), ranging from administrative detention to house demolition to torture (see study 2 results for full wording, means, and standard deviations of items). Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which, in their opinion, it is allowed or forbidden to perform each of the acts described on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (always forbidden) to 4 (allowed in very many cases). Although the average of these items is reported in descriptive analyses (see table 2), each item was used as a manifest indicator of the latent construct of support for CCA toward Palestinians in SEM. Cronbachs alpha coefcient for the seven-item scale was .87.

Results
Descriptive analyses. Table 2 presents the means and standards deviation of study 2 measures and the zero-order correlations among them. These results indicate that Israeli Jews expressed high perception of Palestinian threat (M = 4:5, SD = 1.25), with 66 percent of our respondents indicating that they are threatened by Palestinians (ratings of 4, 5, or 6 on the 1 to 6 scale). Also, 29 percent of our Israeli Jewish respondents indicated dehumanization (disgust) toward Palestinians (M = 2:7, SD = 1.47). These ndings are similar to our study 1 results (see table 1), indicating the consistency and reliability of our measures across different sets of public opinion data collected at different points of time (2003 for study 1 and 2005 for study 2). As for our new criterion measure, 46 percent of respondents indicated support for CCA toward Palestinians (ratings of 3 or 4 on the 1 to 4 support scale; M = 2:5, SD = .70). The intercorrelations among the seven CCA items were all signicant (p < :001) and ranged from .37 to .61. The CCA items that received the highest support were Detaining Palestinians by Israeli army check points as they move between different locations in the territories (M = 2:75, SD = 0.95, 55 percent support) and Holding Palestinians under curfew or closure (M = 2:62, SD = 0.91, 51 percent support). CCA items that received medium support were Shooting Plastic and Rubber bullets at Palestinians to disperse demonstrations (M = 2:58, SD = 0.95, support = 50 percent), Putting Palestinians in administrative detention (M = 2:56, SD = 0.92, 46 percent support), and Demolishing houses of Palestinians in the territories (M = 2:52, SD = 0.99, 47 percent support). Lowest support was indicated for Enforcing curfew of Palestinians by shooting (M = 2:27, SD = 0.92, 36 percent support) and Torturing Palestinians in interrogations of the Israeli security forces (M = 2:25, SD = 0.94, 34 percent support). In the next sections, we examine the sources of support for CCA toward Palestinians. Analyses of the structural models. Again, we used SEM through AMOS 6.0 statistical program (Arbuckle 2005) to test our hypotheses.

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

109

Figure 4 Study 2: Threat and Dehumanization Predicting Support for Concrete Coercive Acts (CCA; Model 1)

.46
Threat

.43

Support For CCA

R 2 = .36

.23
Dehumanization

Note: The gure shows the standardized values of the coefcients (all p values <:05). To keep the gure simple, only latent constructs are shown for threat and support for CCA, and manifest indicators are omitted for these variables.

Hypothesis 1 was that perception of threat and dehumanization of Palestinians will each independently and signicantly predict support for CCA toward Palestinians. To test this hypothesis, we produced a structural model in which threat and dehumanization were entered as two separate predictors of support for CCA (model 1, see gure 4). The resulting regression coefcients indicate that, as hypothesized, threat does strongly predict support for CCA (b = :46). Also as expected, dehumanization has a signicant separate effect on support for CCA (b = :23). This model had a good t to the data (NFI = .94, TLI = .94, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .057, 90 percent condence interval RMSEA = .044 .070). Hypothesis 2 was that threat and dehumanization will still continue to predict support for CCA toward Palestinians, even when hawkishness, SES, and education level are entered into the structural model as predictors of support for CCA. Hypothesis 3 predicted that threat perception and dehumanization would signicantly mediate the effects of hawkishness, SES, and education on support for CCA. To test these hypotheses, we produced a structural model (model 2, see gure 5) in which hawkishness, SES, and education were entered as exogenous variables, with

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

110

Journal of Conict Resolution

Figure 5 Study 2: Combined Mediation Model (Model 3).


Hawkish

.14 .38 .67

.20
SES

Threat R2 = .51

.39 .03
Support for CCA R2 = .38

.01 .21 .04 .10


Dehuman R2 = .18

Education

.06

Note: The gure shows the standardized values of the coefcients (p values <:05 in bold). Insignicant links are dotted lines. To keep the gure simple, only latent constructs are shown for threat, socioeconomic status, and support for concrete coercive acts, and manifest indicators are omitted for these variables.

both direct and indirect (through threat and dehumanization) paths to support for CCA and in which threat and dehumanization were entered as endogenous variables, each with a direct path to support for CCA. In line with hypothesis 3, model 2 (see gure 5) indicates that indeed threat (b = :39) and dehumanization (b = :21) remain signicant predictors of support for CCA, after adding hawkishness, SES, and education to the structural equation. This model also proved to have a good t to the data (NFI = .92, TLI = .93, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .050, 90 percent condence interval RMSEA = .040 .060). Mediation analysis. Finally, we tested the extent to which threat and dehumanization mediate the links between hawkishness, SES, and education and our dependent measure, support for CCA toward Palestinians. As table 2 indicates, hawkishness and SES signicantly correlate with support for CCA (r = :44, p < :001 and r = :10, p < :05, respectively). Level of education has an insignicant association with support for CCA and thus cannot be further considered as mediated by threat and dehumanization (Baron and Kenny 1986).

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

111

The second condition for mediation is that the predictors (in our case hawkishness and SES) must correlate with the mediators (threat perception and dehumanization). As table 2 also indicates, hawkishness signicantly (p values <:001) correlates with threat perception and with out-group dehumanization (r = :54 and r = :41, respectively), and SES signicantly (p < :001) correlates with threat perception (r = :19). The third condition for mediation is that the mediators (in our case threat perception and dehumanization) must affect the dependent variable (support for CCA) when controlling for the predictors. As also described above, gure 4 (model 3) indicates that the threatsupport for CCA and the dehumanizationsupport for CCA links are still substantial when controlling for hawkishness, SES, and education. To test the signicance of the mediation effects, we used the Sobel test (Preacher and Hayes 2004). The mediation effect was signicant for both hawkishness (p < :001) and SES (p < :05). Computations of the magnitude of the mediation effects (again, full details on these analyses can be obtained from the rst author) indicated that threat perception and dehumanization mediate 71 percent of the association of hawkishness with support for CCA and 73 percent of association of SES with CCA (full mediation). We conducted a further decomposition of the mediation effects to clarify the relative roles of threat and dehumanization as mediators. Results indicate that for both hawkishness and SES, threat is the major mediator, accounting for 54 percent of the association of hawkishness with support for CCA and for 73 percent of the association of SES with CCA, while dehumanization accounted for 17 percent of the association of hawkishness with support for CCA.

Discussion
In line with our hypotheses, and similarly to study 1, study 2 found that threat and dehumanization both make a signicant distinct contribution to Jewish Israeli support for CCA toward Palestinians. In addition, and also similarly to study 1, threat and dehumanization still predict support for such actions, even when hawkishness, SES, and level of education were entered into the model. Perception of Palestinian threat and dehumanization of Palestinians highly mediated (71 percent) the association between hawkishness and support for CCA toward Palestinians. SES had a small but signicant association with support for such actions that was highly mediated (73 percent) by threat perception. Again, education level was not signicantly associated with support for CCA toward Palestinians.

General Discussion
Previous analyses have mainly focused on perception of out-group threat to explain support for milder forms of aggression such as the restriction of out-group

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

112

Journal of Conict Resolution

civil liberties. Here, we propose a two-factor modelof out-group threat perception and dehumanization of the out-groupto predict public opinion support for more severe retaliatory aggression toward vulnerable but threatening out-groups. The two-factor model was highly successful in explaining Jewish Israeli public opinion support for two types of retaliatory aggressive policies: the more hypothetical notion of Palestinian population transfer (study 1, R2 = :39) and actual CCA toward Palestinians violating Palestinian human rights, ranging from administrative detention to torture (study 2, R2 = :38). In line with our hypotheses we found that (1) threat and dehumanization are two distinct constructs, each having a unique contribution to explaining support for aggressive retaliatory policies; (2) threat and dehumanization still signicantly explain support for aggressive retaliatory policies toward the out-group, even when respondents hawkishness, SES, and level of education are taken into account; and (3) the relation of hawkishness and SES with support for aggressive retaliatory policies is largely mediated by threat perception. These results were highly consistent across the two studies. Replication is relatively rare in SEM. That is, the same model is seldom estimated across independent samples. However, it is critical to replicate a structural equation model if it is intended to represent a meaningful explanation of a phenomenon and not just a statistical exercise (Kline 2005, 65). Thus, the validity of our model is bolstered by its success in predicting support for aggressive policies in two different sets of public opinion data. Our model also proved more powerful than a previous attempt to explain preference for transfer over compromise: individual differences in Jewish Israeli personal beliefs about their group and its circumstances (Eidelson and Eidelson 2003) achieved an explanatory power of R2 = :21. An important contribution of our research is in identifying threat and dehumanization as two linked but clearly distinct predictors of support for aggression. Perceived out-group threat is often studied as a correlate of political intolerance or restriction of civil liberties (Huddy et al. 2005; Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004) or of uncompromising attitudes in conict (Maoz and McCauley 2005). Dehumanization is more often described as contributing to extreme ethnic violence, including ethnic cleansing and genocide (Staub 1989, 2000; Chirot and McCauley 2006). Our research demonstrates how bringing these two predictors together can increase success in explaining support for different forms of aggression toward a vulnerable out-group. Future research can extend and examine the utility of this two-factor model in predicting support for other forms of inter-group aggression in various settings. Interestingly, the weight of dehumanization in explaining support for CCA toward Palestinians (study 2 b = :21) was larger than its weight in explaining support for Palestinian population transfer (study 1 b = :10). It seems possible that dehumanization is more related to support for extreme, concrete forms of retaliatory

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

113

aggression (in our case, specic CCA toward Palestinians) than to more abstract and hypothetical forms of aggression (in our case, population transfer). This possibility has to be examined more systematically in further research. Another important contribution of our study is in showing the working of threat and dehumanization in social context, when other major potential predictors of support for aggressive policies such as hawkish political positions, SES, and level of education are taken into account. Our ndings indicate that threat (and to a much lesser extent dehumanization) acts as a mediator and in fact explains most of the association (70 percent and more) of hawkishness and SES with support for retaliatory aggressive policies. Contrary to our expectations, level of education did not have a signicant association with support for aggressive action. This may be because education in Israel tends to come in diversied forms and contents that are not necessarily liberalizing (Friedman 2005). Finally, our research also offers a methodological contribution. Measures of political intolerance and support for restriction of civil rights (Cohrs et al. 2005), and measures of general support for human rights (McFarland and Mathews 2005), are familiar in studies of inter-group relations. However, our research introduces a new measure of support for concrete and specic coercive acts that are considered by some quarters as violations of basic human rights. These acts, ranging from administrative detention to torture, are unfortunately all too common in inter-group conicts (Coleman 2003; Kelman 2005). Our measure has good internal consistency (Cronbachs a in the .80s), and its association with other measures such as threat, dehumanization, and hawkishness is initial evidence of construct validity. This measure may be useful, with adaptations, for research in other situations of asymmetric violence. In summary, the results of our two studies indicate that part of the support of some of Israeli Jews for retaliatory aggressive policies against Palestinians can be explained (and by certain perspectives even justied) by Jewish Israeli perception of Palestinians as a realistic threat to the state of Israel. These ndings are consistent with realist theory (Jervis 1976; Waltz 1979). However, dehumanization of Palestinians (as expressed by disgust and contempt toward them) provides an additional explanation of support for retaliatory aggression toward Palestinians. The importance of dehumanization, as a distinct predictor of support for aggressive policies, suggests the utility of linking two kinds of peace education: education for human rights will likely be more successful when combined with programs that attempt to humanize a threatening out-group (Bar-On, forthcoming; Bar-on and Kassem 2004; Salomon 2004). The dynamic of threat perception and dehumanization of the out-group as predicting support for aggressive policies is not unique to the IsraeliPalestinian context but is likely to occur in other settings of asymmetrical conict. Indeed, support for violation of out-group civil rights has been repeatedly found as characterizing

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

114

Journal of Conict Resolution

the attitudes of otherwise democratic publics in the United States and in Europe (Hello, Scheepers, and Sleegers 2006; Huddy et al. 2005). Our ndings point to a vulnerability of democracies under stress that may underlie such support. It seems that even publics that normally endorse democratic norms and observance of human rights can be induced by leaders and discourse emphasizing out-group threat and out-group dehumanization to support and legitimize aggression against vulnerable out-groups.

Note
1. Some condemn these actions as violations of human rights, while others consider them as necessary procedures to ensure the safety of innocent civilians.

References
Arbuckle, J. L. 2005. Amos 6.0 users guide. Chicago: SPSS. Arian, A. 1989. A people apart: Coping with national security in problems in Israel. Journal of Conict Resolution 34 (4): 605-31. Arian, A. 1996. Israeli security opinion, February 1996. Tel-Aviv, Israel: Tel-Aviv University, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Arian, A. 1998. Israeli public opinion on national security 1998. Tel-Aviv, Israel: Tel-Aviv University, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Arian, A. 2001. Israeli public opinion on national security 2001. Tel-Aviv, Israel: Tel-Aviv University, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Arian, A. 2003. Israeli public opinion on national security 2003. Tel-Aviv, Israel: Tel-Aviv University, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. Bar-On, D. 1998. The Israeli society between the culture of death and the culture of life. Israel Studies 2 (2): 88-112. Bar-On, D. forthcoming. The other within us: Changes in the Israeli identity from a psychosocial perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bar-On, D., and F. Kassem. 2004. Storytelling as a way to work-through intractable conicts: The TRT German-Jewish experience and its relevance to the PalestinianIsraeli context. Journal of Social Issues 60 (2): 289-306. Baron, R., and D. Kenny. 1986. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (6): 1173-82. Bar-Tal, D. 2000. Shared beliefs in society: Social psychological analysis. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Bar-Tal, D. 2001. Why does fear override hope in societies engulfed by intractable conict, as it does in the Israeli society? Political Psychology 22:601-27. Bar-Tal, D., A. Raviv, and T. Freund. 1994. An anatomy of political beliefs: A study of their centrality, condence contents and epistemic authority. Journal of Applied Social Psychology 24:849-72. Bar-Tal, D., and Y. Tiechman. 2005. Stereotypes and prejudice in conict: Representations of Arabs in Israeli-Jewish society. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chirot, D., and C. McCauley. 2006. Why not kill them all? The logic and prevention of mass political murder. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Cohrs, C., S. Kielman, J. Maes, and B. Moschner. 2005. Effects of right-wing authoritarianism and threat from terrorism on restriction of civil liberties. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy 5 (1): 263-76.

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

Maoz, McCauley / Retaliatory Aggressive Policies

115

Coleman, P. 2003. Characteristics of protracted, intractable conict: Toward the development of a metaframework-I. Peace and Conict: Journal of Peace Psychology 9:1-37. Eidelson, R. J., and J. I. Eidelson. 2003. Dangerous ideas: Five beliefs that propel groups toward conict. American Psychologist 58:182-92. Fiske, S., A. Cuddy, P. Glick, and J. Xu. 2002. A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 82:878-902. Friedman, G. 2005. Commercial pacism and protracted conict: Models from the Palestinian-Israeli case. Journal of Conict Resolution 49 (3): 360-82. Gibson, J. 1992. The political consequences of intolerance: Cultural conformity and political freedom. American Political Science Review 86:338-56. Gordon, C., and A. Arian. 2001. Threat and decision making. Journal of Conict Resolution 45:196-215. Haslam, N. 2006. Dehumanization: An integrative review. Personality and Social Psychological Review 10 (3): 252-64. Hello, E., P. Scheepers, and P. Sleegers. 2006. Why the more educated are less inclined to keep ethnic distance: An empirical test of four explanations. Ethnic and Racial Studies 29 (5): 959-85. Hermann, R., P. Tetlock, and P. Visser. 1999. Mass public decisions to go to war: A cognitiveinteractionist framework. American Political Science Review 93 (3): 553-73. Huddy, L., S. Feldman, C. Taber, and G. Lahav. 2005. Threat, anxiety, and support of antiterrorism policies. American Journal of Political Science 49:593-608. Huddy, L., N. Khatib, and T. Capelos. 2002. The polls-trends: Reactions to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Public Opinion Quarterly 66 (3): 418-50. Jervis, R. 1976. Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Kelman, H. 1976. Violence without restraint: Reections on the dehumanization of victim and victimizers. In Varieties of psychohistory, ed. G. M. Kren and L. H. Rappoport, 282-314. New York: Springer. Kelman, H. 2005. The policy context of torture: A social-psychological analysis. International Review of the Red Cross 87:123-34. Kline, R. 2005. Principles and practices of structural equation modeling. New York: Guilford. Maoz, I. 2006. Jewish-Israeli attitudes in the Israeli-Palestinian conict [in Hebrew]. Maoz, I., and R. Eidelson. 2007. Psychological bases of extreme policy preferences: How the personal beliefs of Israeli-Jews predict their support for population transfer in the Israeli-Palestinian conict. American Behavior Scientist 11:1476-97. Maoz, I., and R. McCauley. 2005. Psychological correlates of support for compromise: A polling study of Jewish-Israeli attitudes towards solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conict. Political Psychology 26:791-807 Marcus, G., J. Sullivan, E. Theiss-Morse, and S. Wood. 1995. With malice toward some: How people make civil liberties judgments. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. McFarland, S., and M. Mathews. 2005. Who cares about human rights? Political Psychology 26 (3): 365-85. Morris, B. 1999. Righteous victims: A history of the Zionist-Arab conict 1881-2001. New York: Random House. Nachtway, J., and M. Tessler. 2002. The political economy of attitudes towards peace among Palestinians and Israelis. Journal of Conict Resolution 46 (2): 260-85. Opotow, S. 1990. Moral exclusion and injustice: An introduction. Journal of Social Issues 46:1-20. Poe, S., N. Rost, and S. Carey. 2006. Assessing risk and opportunity in conict studies: A human rights analysis. Journal of Conict Resolution 50 (40): 484-507. Preacher, K., and A. Hayes. 2004. SPSS and SAS procedures for estimating indirect effects in simple mediation models. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments and Computers 36 (4): 717-31.

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011

116

Journal of Conict Resolution

Rozin, P., L. Lowery, S. Imada, and J. Hadit. 1999. The CAD triad hypothesis: A mapping between three moral emotions (contempt, anger, and disgust) and three moral codes (community, autonomy, and divinity). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 76:574-86. Salomon, G. 2004. Does peace education make a difference in the context of an intractable conict? Peace and Conict: Journal of Peace Psychology 10 (3): 257-74. Shamir, M., and T. Sagiv-Schifter. 2006. Conict, identity, and tolerance: Israel in the Al-Aqsa intifada. Political Psychology 27 (4): 569-95. Shamir, J., and M. Shamir. 2000. The anatomy of public opinion. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Shapira, A. 1992. Land and power: The Zionist resort to force 1881-1948. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Skitka, L., C. Bauman, and E. Mullen. 2004. Political tolerance and coming to psychological closure following the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 30:743-56. Staub, E. 1989. The roots of evil: The origins of genocide and other group violence. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Staub, E. 1990. Moral exclusion, personal goal theory, and extreme destructiveness. Journal of Social Issues 46:47-64. Staub, E. 2000. Genocide and mass killings: Origins, prevention, healing, and reconciliation. Political Psychology 21:367-82. United Nations. 2002. Human rightsA compilation of international instruments. New York: United Nations. Waltz, K. 1979. Theory of international politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Yuchtman-Yaar, E., and T. Herman. 1997. The Peace Index Project: Findings and analyses, June 1996May 1997 [in Hebrew]. Tel Aviv, Israel: Tel Aviv University, Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research.

Downloaded from jcr.sagepub.com at Jewish National and Univ Lib on August 19, 2011