Does a line make a difference? Testing robustness with alternative regime classification.

Abstract The paper is organized as follows. In the first paragraph, a short review of the main issues that scholars face when dealing with the operationalization of the notion of democracy will serve to introduce the puzzle that this work would like to address: the proliferation of measures of democracy and the uncertainty they raise. In the second paragraph, the two most frequently used indexes of democracy will be described and some of the political regime classifications drawn on those continuous measures will be presented. On their basis, the results of an article picked from the long-standing debate on democracy and development will be re-tested. The analysis will contribute to reflect on the concrete effects of decisions concerning the categorization of the regime variable.

Introduction. The measurement of democracy, how and how many. Since the publication of Dahls seminal work in 1971, the notion of political democracy seemed to have achieved a clear and specific meaning. A democracy is a political regime characterized by high levels of both contestation and inclusion. Unfortunately the almost universal agreement of the academic community on this definition has not brought about a similar agreement on how to deal with democracy in empirical research. On the contrary, the debate on the conceptualization and measurement of democracy has always been heated and presumably will never end. Many puzzles still hinder the path. Among them, two major issues come immediately at stake, which refer respectively to the breadth and to the relative position of this notion. As a consequence of the decisions taken with respect to those and a number of further issues such as the selection of the indicators and of the re-aggregation rules (Munck and Verkuilen, 2002) a plurality of measurement solutions finds room. Concerning the conceptual breadth of the notion, the main distinction is between a minimalist and a substantive view of democracy (Morlino, 2003). The former focuses only on the institutions and procedures of a political regime, while the latter tends to take into account also the outcomes that a political regime produces. Generally speaking, the appropriateness of each of these views largely depends on the research question under examination. Still, despite of the risk of identifying too few attributes, minimalist definitions tend to better suit the aim of clearly isolating causal processes; that is why they are more frequently used by the literature (Clark et al., 2009). Whatever option a scholar might prefer, he will face nonetheless a second, more fundamental issue, which concerns the position that democracy should occupy within the broader spectrum of political regimes. The point is whether to consider democracy as the pole of a simple dichotomy or as the extreme of a continuum along which each regime can be ideally assigned a specific position, i.e. a degree. Even a glance at the literature would be enough to realize that there is neither agreement nor ultimately an hard and fast rule for preferring the former or the latter conception. We can easily find both authors which favor a graded approach to the conceptualization of democracy such as Dahl, for instance, which defines the concept of Polyarchy as the end of a scale which serves as a basis for estimating the degree to which various political systems approach this theoretical limit (1971) or Bollen and Jackman (1985) which consider democracy always a matter of degree and authors which reject a graded approach as analytically stultifying (Sartori, 1984) and adopt a dichotomous classification because democracy, they argue, is a natural zero point (Przeworski et al., 1996). At the conclusion of an interesting work on this topic, Collier and Adcock (1999) claims that their analysis does not allow to take a specific position in favor of one or the other. Given the lack of a universal rule, they opt for a commonsensical pragmatic guideline. Accepting the fact that the adequate conceptualization of democracy will always depend on the research purposes but recognizing that whatever conceptual decisions is a real choice that should be explicitly justified.

During the last decades, following the thrilling worldwide democratic trend that Huntington has described with the successful metaphor of the third wave of democratization (1991), the interest toward democracy and democratization has dramatically increased. As a consequence, many researchers have matched against the troublesome task of measuring democracy. For a long time, say approximately until the middle of the 90s, the main methodological concerns referred to the previous issues. Approaching the end of the 20th century a more skeptical approach to the actual outcome of many recent transitions to democracy has risen into the debate. An increasing number of analysts recognized that, rather than representing a simple general shift towards democracy, the third wave has shaped a more complex international system, and that a political gray zone between democracy and dictatorship has emerged (Carothers, 2002). This awareness resulted in many new classificatory proposals in order to better take into account this unusual heterogeneity, and to include these new intermediary types of political regime into a comprehensive analytical framework. These attempts use to work on continuous measures as a basis, along which two or more cut-off points are fixed and a correspondent number of regime categories are drawn. In other words, scholars attention shifted from the dichotomy-versus-continuum dispute to the question how to go from degrees to types. Quite surprisingly, however, this task has received little systematic attention so far. Apparently, most of the literature seems to regard such a decision as basically pragmatic and arbitrary, as it was for the previous issues. Unfortunately, when applied to the study of democracy-related phenomena, such arbitrariness casts doubts on the very validity of a researchs empirical results. More than to its advancement, the proliferation during the last years of these alternative regime classifications seems to have contributed to the mess of the debate. This raised a increasing skepticism and need for clarity. In a recently published article, Matthijs Bogaards (2010) makes a first attempt to explore the consequences of the lack of consensus on a common analytical framework of the regime variable. In order to demonstrate the importance of regime classification, the author investigates how apparently harmless changes in the thresholds along a continuous measure of democracy may affect empirical results. Persuaded of the appropriateness of such an effort, this paper aims at repeating the exercise proposed by Bogaards on an article by Larry Diamond about the relationship between democracy and development. Given the age of the article, which was published in 1992, this can be the occasion for both an update and a test of the robustness of his results. Diamonds analysis will be repeated according to a few alternative classifications of political regimes recently proposed by the literature. Since all of them have been drawn one of two very common indexes of democracy, the Freedom in the World and the Polity, a brief description of these measures is a necessary preliminary step of the analysis.

Indices and typologies The number of indices of democracy elaborated by the literature during the last decades is quite large, but most of them are ad hoc. They suit the purposes inevitably limited in geographical and historical scope of specific research projects, then they usually do not provide other researchers and students with a tool easy to handle for further inquiries. Among them, Freedom in the World and Polity represent an exception. The Freedom in the World index has been originally elaborated by Raymond Gastil1 and subsequently developed by Freedom House. It is a continuous measure of democracy, ranging from 0 to 7, where 0 represents the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. The overall score is the result of the simple average between the scores of the two attributes it is composed of: Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL). The score of each component is computed according to a list of questions (ten for PR and fifteen for CL), each of them being assigned 0 (very bad) and 4 (very
1

A direct description of the original structure is available in Inkeles Alex (ed.), On measuring democracy: Its consequences and concomitants, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991.

good) points. Whatever score a country get (out of 40 for PR and out of 60 for CL), it is then converted to a correspondent seven-point scale, similar to the overall one. The Political Rights attribute covers three dimensions: electoral process; political pluralism and participation; functioning of the government. The Civil Liberties attribute covers four dimensions: freedom of expression and belief; associational and organizational rights; rule of law; personal autonomy and individual rights. Freedom House explicitly assigns greater emphasis to the on-the-ground fulfillment of these rights, therefore it clearly refers to a substantive definition of democracy. In addition to the continuous measure, Freedom House provides two additional regime variables, one categorical and one dichotomous. On the basis of the overall score, the former assigns a country the status of Free (from 1.0 to 2.5), Partly Free (from 3.0 to 5.0) or Not Free (from 5.5 to 7.0). The latter, in evident contrast with Freedom Houses own outcomes-oriented approach, fixes a minimal threshold above which a country can be considered as an Electoral Democracy. An electoral democracy is a country that gets a subtotal score of 7 out of 12 or better for the PR subcategory Electoral Process, plus an overall PR score of 20 out of 40 or better, so that this category includes all the Free countries as well as some of the Partly Free ones. The Polity index has been initially created by Ted Gurr and Keith Jaggers2 and subsequently developed by Jaggers and Marshall within the Polity Project. Also the Polity IV (i.e. the latest version) is a continuous measure of democracy. The overall score is calculated as the difference between a Democracy score and an Autocracy score, which both range from 0 to 10. As a consequence, it is a 21-points index, ranging from -10 (as dictatorial as possible) to +10 (as democratic as possible). Differently from the previous index, the Polity measure corresponds to a procedural minimalist definition of democracy. It is composed of five attributes, all of them referring to the institutional features of a political regime. The five components are: competitiveness of political participation; competitiveness of executive recruitment; openness of executive recruitment; constraints on the chief executive; regulation of political participation. Each attribute is assigned a score according to the performances of a country. As an example, a political regimes competitiveness of political participation may be labeled as competitive, transitional, factional, restricted or suppressed. Each attributes score contributes a different number of points to a countrys Democracy and Autocracy scores. As to the previous case, if in country X the political participation is considered competitive, then country X will be given 3 points for its Democracy score and 0 points for its Autocracy score, and so on. In addition to the continuous measure, a three-categories classification of political regimes is also provided by introducing two thresholds in the Polity score. A country is therefore classified as an Autocracy (from -10 to -6), as an Anocracy or mixed regime (from -5 to +5), or as a Democracy (from +6 to +10). According to an attempt of systematic assessment of existing large-N datasets on democracy by Munck and Verkuilen (2002), both Freedom House and Polity indexes present several shortcomings. The former, has been extensively criticized for the non-availability of clear coding rules and of disaggregated data and for its inadequate internal organization (especially the equal weighting of each attribute). The latter, while appreciated for its detailed coding rules and for the availability of disaggregated data which allow replicability, does not provide any justification for its quite convoluted aggregation rules and have some problems of redundancy. Still, their extended geographical and historical coverage and their annual updating make these indexes two invaluable instruments and without any doubt the most frequently used by the recent literature. In his work, Bogaards lists a number of alternative ways in which scholars have used Freedom House data to construct regime typologies, approximately as much as the existing different classifications drawn on Polity. Tables 1 and 2 provide a selection of them.

For direct description of its original structure see, again, Inkeles, 1991.

Table 1

Regime Typologies Based on Freedom House Author(s) Categories Liberal Democracy Competitive Pluralist Competitive Illiberal Diamond, 1991 Semi-competitive partly Pluralist Non-competitive partly Pluralist Hegemonic Open Hegemonic Closed Electoral Democracy Freedom House, 1997 Non Democracy Liberal + Electoral Democracy Howard & Roessler, 2006 Competitive Authoritarianism Closed Authoritarianism Liberal Democracy Lindberg, 2006 Electoral Democracy Electoral Authoritarianism

Score

FH

Threshold(s) 1 1.5 - 2 2.5 - 3 3.5 - 4.5 5 5.5 - 6 6.5 See above 2 3.0 - 6.0 7 2 2.5 - 3.5 4

PR PR

FH

Table 2

Regime Typologies Based on Polity IV Author(s) Categories Democracy Mansfield & Snyder, 2005 Incoherent Regime Autocracy Democracy Wade & Reiter, 2007 Mixed Regime Authoritarian Democracy Zanger, 2000 Anocracy Autocracy Full Democracy Epstein et al., 2006 Partial Democracy Autocracy

Score POL

DEM

POL

POL

Threshold(s) +7 within -6 and +6 -7 within 8 and 10 within 3 and 7 2 +4 within -3 and +3 -4 +8 within +1 and +7 0

As we can see, authors using the Freedom in the World index use either the combined score (FH) or the Political Rights score (PR). Similarly, authors using the Polity dataset use both the single Democracy score and the overall Polity score. This survey is far from complete, but it might serve as a basis for the present purported analysis. By repeatedly substituting the original regime variable (Diamond, 1991) with those alternative classifications, it will be possible to test the robustness of the results attained by Diamonds research, which will be presented in the next paragraph.

Development and Democracy Reconsidered: a review. Since the publication in 1959 of Lipsets seminal article Some social requisites of democracy, few questions in political science have been studied as extensively as the impact of socio-economic development on political democracy. Lipsets argument can easily be summarize by its own words: the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy. During the past decades this thesis has been the object of about an hundred of increasingly sophisticated statistical tests, using a variety of development indicators and working on differently

composed samples of countries (Cutright, 1963; Olsen, 1968; Dahl, 1971; Jackman, 1973; Bollen, 1979; Bollen & Jackman, 1986; and more recently Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Barro, 1996; Przeworski et al. 1996; Boix & Stokes, 2003). Most of them attempted to introduce some corrections or further specifications of the original findings. Often, we should acknowledge, these efforts did not succeed, but in fact all of them contribute to nourish the debate and to keep it alive. Jackman (more recently followed by Huntington, 1991 and Przeworski et al., 1997) claimed that the threshold hypothesis, according to which there is a threshold of wealth above which the impact of economic development does not produce any further effect on democracy, fits the data much more closely than the linear hypothesis does. According to Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, economic development substantially improves a nations democratic prospects, but in fact the magnitude of the effect depends on the location of that nation in the world system: as it moves from the core to the periphery, the magnitude tends to diminish. Barro was the first to support the democracy as a luxury thesis: rich countries tend to be more democratic simply because they can afford the negative pay-off of political freedom on economic growth. Up to now, Przeworski and colleagues contribution probably remains the most remarkable, at least for the criticisms that followed. They disentangled the relationship between development and democracy by arguing that development is pretty much irrelevant for a democratic transition to occur but it does help democracy to survive once it has been already established throughout some exogenous, random, cause. Of course, theres no lack of replies. Just a few years later Boix and Stokes pointed out a misinterpretation of Przeworski et al. results and obtained opposite outcomes by extending the same analysis to the prewar period. More recently, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) found no significant effect of economic development on the emergence of democracy, but a simple covariance that should be better explained by some omitted variable. Surprisingly or not, the idea of socioeconomic development as a requisite of democracy has survived for some fifty years. Democracy seems to actually be more likely in more developed countries, although we do not know why (Geddes, 1999). This last remark is far from being irrelevant. The explanatory side of the development-and-democracy puzzle is without any doubt the weak point of the model. For decades the debate has been dominated by the modernization theory. The basic assumptions of this theory are the existence of a strong interrelation between the economical, social, cultural and political dimensions and of a comprehensive developmental process of which democratization represent the final stage. In very general terms, the argument goes as follows. Economic development, when accompanied by industrialization, triggers some fundamental social and organizational transformation that are crucial for democracy, such as an increase in the resources available for investments in education, economic security, the lessening of social conflict, the enlargement of the middle class (i.e. democracys natural ally, according to the classic Aristotelian argument). At present, modernization theory remains the main reference point of the debate. Whether we find it complete and efficacious or not, the point is that too often it has remained in the background of the empirical works on development and democracy. Too often, in other words, such complex a process has been reduced to the mere growth of per capita income. Only by the early 90s a systematic re-discussion of the concept of development has started both in academic and international institutions circles. Quite remarkable is the notion of human development elaborated by the economist Mahbub un Haq within the United Nations Program for Development (UNDP Global Report, 1990). The aim is to re-focus scholars and policymakers attention on the ultimate target of development, that is the improvement of life. This view patently challenges the mainstream narrow equation between development and economic growth. Development is something more than economic growth, which should be considered as a simple means of enlarging peoples potential and possibilities. The most basic of them are to lead a long and healthy life, to have access to education and the resources needed for a decent standard of living. On the basis of the notion of human development, the UNDP has elaborated a Human Development Index (HDI). This measure, which has been often criticized, is probably far from being the ultimate solution to the problem of measuring development. Nonetheless it may represent

a starting point for translating the notion of human development into operative terms (as Welzel and Inglehart have already started to do in their reflection on a human empowerment path to democracy). In an early attempt to include the concept of human development into the debate on democratization, Diamond (1992) published an article in which he re-tested Lipsets thesis with 1990 data and on a larger sample of 152 countries by using the HDI instead of per capita income. After having recoded the Freedom House combined 13-points scale in a 7-types regimes classification and the UNDP Index in a 5 ordinal categories (different from the usual UNDP categorization), the author cross-tabulated these two variables. Results are quite interesting. Table 3 shows a strong relationship both between high levels of development and democracy and, at the opposite pole, between low levels of development and absence of political freedoms. All the most developed countries are concentrated into the two most democratic regime types and almost all the less developed countries fall into the two less democratic categories. Moreover, an almost perfect step pattern of association might be identified. Medium/high-HDI countries have a higher proportion of democracies than do medium-HDI countries (which actually appear scattered across all regime type). Medium/low-HDI countries, in turn, are less democratic than the medium-HDI ones but are still more democratic than the low-HDI countries. The test confirms that there is a strong positive relationship between democracy and socioeconomic development, as measured by the HDI (significant at the .0001 and with a degree of association of .77). Diamonds quite simple test show that the improvements in the physical quality of peoples lives are more important than economic development per se. Then, Diamond can rightfully reformulate Lipsets thesis as follows: the more well-to-do the people of a country, on average, the more likely they will favor, achieve and maintain a democratic system for their country (Diamond, 1992). Do these findings hold, twenty years after? How robust are they? Does a line along the regime continuum really make a difference for empirical results? These are the questions that the next paragraphs analysis will try to answer.
Table 3 Human Development and Regime Type (Diamond, 1992)

Testing the robustness According to the previous questions, the task is twofold. First, I will repeat Diamonds test using 2009 data. This updating is a necessary preliminary step as the article is aged and a re-assessment of the relationship between development and democracy in 1990 would be quite valueless. Second, I will re-do the analysis as many times as the alternative typologies listed above. Before presenting the analysis, a few words on the recent corrections introduced in the measurement of each dimension of the HDI might be needed. Health is still measured by life expectancy at birth indicator. Educations measure has been recently modified as the mean years of schooling and the expected years of schooling. The old GDP per capita (PPP US $) wealth indicator has been replaced by the GNI per capita (PPP US $). The measurement of the overall index is no longer the simple average of the three components, but rather the cubic root of their sum. The categorization of the HDI variable is also changed from absolute to relative thresholds: the very high, high, medium, low, categories now correspond respectively to the first, second, third and fourth quartile. I will use these thresholds instead of Diamonds natural breaking points, which sounds quite an arbitrary choice3. The updating of Diamonds original test represents the key of the analysis, as on the one hand it let us see how strong the relationship between development and democracy is today and, on the other, it is the reference point of the further tests4. The first thing to notice is the larger number of countries which populate the intermediate categories of political regime, where the number of democracies (liberal and competitive pluralist) is almost identical. The new test confirms a quite strong, but weaker than in 1990, association between very high levels of development and democracy and the presence of a fairly good step pattern of association. The very high HDI category contains an higher proportion of democratic countries than the high HDI category, which displays an higher proportion of democracy than the medium HDI category that, in turn, has an higher proportion of democracy than the low HDI category. At the opposite pole of the table things change. Low levels of development do not correspond to low or null levels of democraticness. And even if we look into the middle, a clear relationship between development and regime type is hardly observable. With the exception of very high levels of HDI, in each category countries are quite scattered across all regime types, with a slight tendency to converge toward the intermediate categories (competitive illiberal, semi-competitive, non-competitive). More precisely, whether a country has an high or a medium level of development does seem to make a (slight) difference, whether a country has a medium or a low level of development does not, as in both cases it is likely to be a semi-competitive regime. To conclude, the association between very high levels of development and democracy notwithstanding, the relationship between development and political regime today appear weaker that twenty years ago (both the tau-c, .49, and the gamma, .56 are smaller than in 1990, and even smaller respectively .19 and .34 when the very high category is excluded from the cross-tab)5 but still working. As from tables 1 and 2, the re-assessment of these updated results is based on three alternatives typologies drawn on the Freedom in the World index and four alternative typologies drawn on the Polity. Lets start with the Freedom Houses dichotomous variable Electoral Democracy, which may represent the opposite of Diamond 7-categories classification. Results confirm a strong association between very high levels of HD and Democracy, but shows also a similar, weaker, association
3

In the last UNDP Report an inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI) has been proposed. The average value of each HDI dimension is discounted according to its level of distributional inequality, so that the IHDI equals the HDI when there is no inequality across people but is less than the HDI as inequality rises. For a further test, it would also be interesting to see how results change by using this measure, as it represents a small but significant progress toward a more fine-grained operationalization of human development. 4 All the tables used in the analysis, from Table 4 to Table 11, are in the Appendix. 5 The association degree of the original test is .77, but actually Diamond does not specify what test he did. Since it is a multiple entry tabulation with ordinal categories, I presume he chose either the tau-c or the gamma test of association, then I always check for both of them.

between low levels of HD and Non-Democracy. The Howard & Roessler and the Lindbergs classifications are based on three categories. The first, based on the Political Rights index, tends to enlarge the hybrid type. The strong association between very high-HD and democracy holds and, similarly to Diamonds results, there is no correspondence between low-HD and authoritarianism. Quite strikingly, however, the absolute majority of high, medium and low development countries fall into the intermediate category of regime. Then, it seems that only very high levels of HD significantly increase the probability of a country to be democratic. The outcome of the second typology, which displays quite a large authoritarian class, is similar to that of the dichotomous variable. Additionally, we have to notice that the mode of both high-HD and medium-HD countries is authoritarian, which seems to mean that intermediate socioeconomic performances have no positive effect on the likelihood of a country to be at least partially democratic. All the four Polity-based typologies fix two thresholds along the continuum, but in very different points. Mansfield & Snyder draw a quite large incoherent regime type. First thing to notice, the strong association between very high-HD and democracy has no counterpart at the opposite side of the cross-tab. The low-HD countries are all clustered in the intermediate (78%) and democracy (22%) categories. Moreover, the simple majority of both the high-HD and the medium-HD countries are democratic, thus provoking a low overall level of association. Even weaker (tau-c .19; gamma .33) is the association measured by using Zanger classification, where the thresholds divide the continuum in three perfectly equal types. The development variable shows perfect step pattern of association with respect to the Democracy category and, in the opposite direction, to the Anocracy class, but, quite, strikingly, the mode of each development category corresponds to Democracy. If we exclude the countries with a very high level of HD, the association between the two variables under examination is almost null (tau-c .08; gamma .14). Epstein et al.s regime typology is particularly strict in defining a country as fully democratic. In this case, not only the association between very high levels of development and democracy holds, but it is also possible to observe a fair correspondence between high-HD and democracy and, more interesting, between low levels of HD and autocracy (even if exactly the same percentage of low-HD, 46%, countries fall into the hybrid category). The medium-HD category, in turn, is scattered across the three regime types. Despite of an only moderate overall association, it is possible to identify an increasing step pattern with respect to the democracy category and a decreasing one with respect to both the mixed and the authoritarian regime categories. Finally, although Wade & Reiter draw their regime typology on the Politys single Democracy score, the results are almost perfectly equal to the previous one.

Conclusion The question of the heading can finally be addressed. Does a line make a difference? The aim of this paper was inquiring the consequences of the proliferation and accumulation over time of alternative typologies of political regime. The comparison between the results obtained with Diamonds classification and those achieved throughout the other seven alternatives leads to the following remarks. With only one exception, the association between the two variables sways around weak and moderate levels. All the tests confirm the existence of quite a strong correspondence between very high levels of development and democracy (about the 86% of the countries with very high levels of HD are democratic). This evidence can be rightfully considered as the responsible of the overall force of the association, as it decreases to almost null degrees when the tests are repeated without the very high HD category. Whether a similar correspondence between low levels of human development and autocracy exists or not seems to depends on how we operationalize the latter (even if that correspondence is never particularly strong). Clear and opposite step patterns of association can be almost always observed between HD and Democracy and between HD and ambiguous regime categories. As for high, medium and low levels of development, in general it is possible to claim that they can hardly be associated to different

political regimes, but not always for the same reason. According to the classification of the regime variable, they might be grouped into either the intermediate, or the democratic or even the autocratic type. Bogaards concluded his article saying that in the recent literature on democracy and democratization, the regime variable is often used in a loose fashion. This new re-examination shows that the empirical association between human development and democracy might be highly dependent on how an analyst goes from degrees to types. Any regime classifications yields sometimes slight, sometimes patently different results. There is no agreement on where to draw the line in continuous measures of democracy. This paper neither provides a complete review of all the existing alternative typologies, nor it contributes to advance any hypotheses on a best i.e. empirically neutral and theoretically correct and universal classification of political regimes. Rather it confirms once more the importance of choices made in the conceptualization and measurement of democracy and the way in which regime types are derived from continuous measures of democracy (Bogaards, 2010).

Appendix

Table 4

Development and Democracy today using Diamond, 1991.

HDIcat Very High High 2 5,3% 9 23,7% 9 23,7% 5 13,2% 2 5,3% 7 18,4% 4 10,5% 38 100,0% Medium 0 ,0% 4 10,5% 7 18,4% 13 34,2% 0 ,0% 9 23,7% 5 13,2% 38 100,0% Low 0 ,0% 2 5,1% 4 10,3% 16 41,0% 5 12,8% 8 20,5% 4 10,3% 39 100,0% Total 29 19,0% 21 13,7% 20 13,1% 36 23,5% 7 4,6% 27 17,6% 13 8,5% 153 100,0%

Diamond

Liberal Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

27 71,1% 6 15,8% 0 ,0% 2 5,3% 0 ,0% 3 7,9% 0 ,0% 38 100,0%

Competitive Pluralist

Count % within HDIcat

Competitive Illiberal

Count % within HDIcat

Semicompetitive partly Pluralist Noncompetitive partly Pluralist Hegemonic Open

Count % within HDIcat Count % within HDIcat Count % within HDIcat

Hegemonic Closed

Count % within HDIcat

Total

Count % within HDIcat

Table 5

Development and Democracy today using Freedom House, 1997

HDIcat Very High High 15 39,5% 23 60,5% 38 100,0% Medium 21 55,3% 17 44,7% 38 100,0% Low 26 66,7% 13 33,3% 39 100,0% Total 67 43,8% 86 56,2% 153 100,0%

ED

Non Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

5 13,2% 33 86,8% 38 100,0%

Electoral Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

Total

Count % within HDIcat

Table 6

Development and Democracy today using Howard and Roessler, 2006

HDIcat Very High High 14 36,8% 19 50,0% 5 13,2% 38 100,0% Medium 8 21,1% 23 60,5% 7 18,4% 38 100,0% Low 3 7,7% 32 82,1% 4 10,3% 39 100,0% Total 58 37,9% 79 51,6% 16 10,5% 153 100,0%

Howard

Liberal and Electoral Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

33 86,8% 5 13,2% 0 ,0% 38 100,0%

Competitve Authoritarianism Count % within HDIcat Closed Authoritarianism Count % within HDIcat Total Count % within HDIcat

Table 7

Development and Democracy today using Lindberg, 2006

HDIcat Very High High 11 28,9% 11 28,9% 16 42,1% 38 100,0% Medium 4 10,5% 12 31,6% 22 57,9% 38 100,0% Low 2 5,1% 11 28,2% 26 66,7% 39 100,0% Total 50 32,7% 34 22,2% 69 45,1% 153 100,0%

Lindberg

Liberal Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

33 86,8% 0 ,0% 5 13,2% 38 100,0%

Electoral democracy

Count % within HDIcat

Electoral Authoritarianism

Count % within HDIcat

Total

Count % within HDIcat

Table 8

Development and Democracy today using Mansfield and Snyder, 2005

HDIcat Very High High 20 54,1% 11 29,7% 6 16,2% 37 100,0% Medium 17 44,7% 15 39,5% 6 15,8% 38 100,0% Low 8 21,6% 29 78,4% 0 ,0% 37 100,0% Total 78 52,0% 56 37,3% 16 10,7% 150 100,0%

Mansfield

Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

33 86,8% 1 2,6% 4 10,5% 38 100,0%

Incoherent Regime

Count % within HDIcat

Autocracy

Count % within HDIcat

Total

Count % within HDIcat

Table 9

Development and Democracy today using Zanger, 2000

HDIcat Very High High 25 67,6% 3 8,1% 9 24,3% 37 100,0% Medium 24 63,2% 5 13,2% 9 23,7% 38 100,0% Low 17 45,9% 15 40,5% 5 13,5% 37 100,0% Total 99 66,0% 24 16,0% 27 18,0% 150 100,0%

Zanger

Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

33 86,8% 1 2,6% 4 10,5% 38 100,0%

Anocracy

Count % within HDIcat

Autocracy

Count % within HDIcat

Total

Count % within HDIcat

Table 10

Development and Democracy today using Epstein et al., 2006

HDIcat Very High High 17 45,9% 9 24,3% 11 29,7% 37 100,0% Medium 13 34,2% 14 36,8% 11 28,9% 38 100,0% Low 3 8,1% 17 45,9% 17 45,9% 37 100,0% Total 66 44,0% 40 26,7% 44 29,3% 150 100,0%

Epstein

Full Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

33 86,8% 0 ,0% 5 13,2% 38 100,0%

Partial Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

Autocracy

Count % within HDIcat

Total

Count % within HDIcat

Table 11

Development and Democracy today using

HDIcat Very High High 18 48,6% 8 21,6% 11 29,7% 37 100,0% Medium 13 34,2% 13 34,2% 12 31,6% 38 100,0% Low 4 10,8% 17 45,9% 16 43,2% 37 100,0% Total 68 45,3% 38 25,3% 44 29,3% 150 100,0%

Wade

Democracy

Count % within HDIcat

33 86,8% 0 ,0% 5 13,2% 38 100,0%

Mixed Regime

Count % within HDIcat

Authoritarian

Count % within HDIcat

Total

Count % within HDIcat

References

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