ACPO Manual Guidance Keeping Peace

Contents
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Manual of Guidance
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National Police Training
ACPO CONTENTS
MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE
Page No FOREWORD.............................................................. 5 1. ABOUT THE GUIDE .................................................................7

What is its status? .....................................................................7 Who is it for? ..............................................................................7 What does it do? ........................................................................7 What does it not do? ..................................................................8
2.
KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW
...............................9 Keeping the peace .....................................................................9 The principles of human rights ................................................15 Community information management .....................................19 Nature and scope of disorder ..................................................21 A disorder model ......................................................................23 Strategic principles ..................................................................29
3.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ............................................ 31

Strategic considerations : the key points .................................31 Command ................................................................................35 Planning ..................................................................................43 Intelligence and information .....................................................49 The role of the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) and Crime Management ............................................................................55 Public Relations strategy .........................................................61 Mutual aid .................................................................................65 Traffic management .................................................................67
4.
TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ..............................................69

Tactical considerations: the key points ...................................69 Tactical advice .........................................................................73 Tactical options .......................................................................75 Warning messages ..................................................................97
5.
SUPPORT ELEMENTS ............................................................99

Training principles ....................................................................99 The National Operations Faculty ...........................................101 Briefing and debriefing ...........................................................103 Welfare issues ..........................................................................107
INDEX ................................................................. 109
CONTENTS AND FOREWORD
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FOREWORD
For many police officers the term disorder no longer reflects the serious urban violence seen in the 1980s. Instead, at the start of this new millennium, we may be facilitating the right to engage in or protest against lawful activity, or helping to ensure safety at large scale public celebrations. Our commitment to the law however requires us to be capable of dealing with significant disorder should it arise. Across this wide scope of expectation, Government now demands that we engage with our partner agencies and the community in preventing and reducing crime and disorder, thereby keeping the peace. Whilst pursuing and achieving this vital objective, we must retain the capacity to respond to disorder and restore the peace should the need arise. This Manual has been produced as a result of wide consultation both in and outside the service. A needs analysis was carried out on a national basis, and included inputs from advisory bodies such as Her Majestys Inspectors of Constabulary. The findings of that survey were used by a team of public order practitioners, with assistance from National Police Training, to write the guide as it appears today. In producing this guide, the style, purpose and focus had to incorporate modern ideas and practice, and this is reflected in the title. It is not intended to be an all-encompassing everything you need to know about public order policing manual. It is meant to help planners, advisors and commanders prepare for and manage events and incidents where there is a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder both spontaneous and pre-planned. Details of specific tactics can be found in the ACPO Public Order Tactical Trainers Manual and information and intelligence on current operational practice can be obtained from the National Operations Faculty at Bramshill. Above all else it is intended to help the officers of the police service discharge their duties and responsibilities, thereby helping to ensure that the police forces of the country are ready to meet future crime and disorder problems.
Sir Ronnie Flanagan, OBE Chief Constable Royal Ulster Constabulary Chairman, ACPO Public Order Sub-Committee
CONTENTS AND FOREWORD
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Manual of Guidance
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WHAT IS ITS STATUS?

This is an ACPO sponsored document, which replaces the ACPO Guide to Public Order Policing. It should be read in conjunction with: The ACPO Public Order Tactical Trainers Manual HMIC thematic inspections and guidance on good practice Home Office Circulars in relation to crime and disorder, public safety and public order management ACPO and force policy documents.
It is a central reference providing a framework of guidance and advice to aid strategic thinking and tactical deployment. It is aimed at those involved in the planning and management of public safety and public order.
WHO IS IT FOR?
Persons who require an understanding of the framework for the management of public order, particularly: gold, silver and bronze commanders tactical advisors event planners managers trainers and training designers those who work in partnership with the police
to aid them in the planning and delivery of policing where there is a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder.
WHAT DOES IT DO?

It places crime and disorder in the context of mainstream policing activity. It links and reinforces the need for a partnership-based approach compatible with community safety and crime reduction initiatives. It emphasises the need for locally based initiatives to all aspects of public safety and public disorder policing, whilst recognising the need for a corporate approach to policing and training within an agreed framework. It provides a structure for the planning and management of local, regional and national events and incidents where there is a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder.
ABOUT THE GUIDE
CHAPTER 1
It provides a reference as to where and how relevant specialist skills and knowledge can be sourced through: the National Operations Faculty the National Crime Faculty the National Public Order Intelligence Unit.
WHAT DOES IT NOT DO?

This document is not exhaustive. It is not intended to restrict individual innovation within the general principles of this document. It does not replace the need for the correct selection and provision of specialist training as identified by individual services. It is not a prescriptive document, and does not remove the responsibility of individual services to determine their own needs for the policing of public disorder. It does not provide a list of tactics and responses to individual event requirements. It does not preclude any partnership being formed to assist in the resolution of any incident or issue, which may affect the overall outcome of the event, nor does it remove the need to consult.
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Manual of Guidance
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KEEPING THE PEACE

Crime and disorder within society: adversely affects the publics quality of life reduces opportunities for economic and social regeneration violates peoples freedoms and rights.
Crime and disorder reduction is therefore a major role for the police. This guide focuses on its three principal components: 1. identifying and assessing the risk 2. minimising and managing the risk 3. the polices reasonable, proportional and effective response. These three points are inextricably linked to all aspects of police work within the community. They encompass the protection of human rights, the recognition of diversity within society, the law governing the use of force and the partnership work set out in crime and disorder reduction strategies. Intelligence obtained from within the community and other sources, is pivotal to effective crime and disorder reduction.
Crime and disorder: a strategic model

The model below illustrates how, through a partnership approach, strategic action in four key areas will reduce crime and disorder.
Hot Spot management

Identify locations Tackle the aggressors Partnership approach
Behaviour management
Link crime and disorder Identify patterns Focus resources Analyse methods - learn
Crime and Disorder Reduction

Targeting
The profiling of offenders The career criminal The criminal network
Preventative measures
CCTV overt - covert Target hardening Community action plans Design out crime and disorder
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The strategic approach advocated seeks to limit the threat to peace by correct identification of problems and suitable measured action against the root causes of these problems. It supports a balance of prevention and preparation. None of the items within the model should be viewed as being the sole domain or responsibility of the police. The police and partners have a range of measures for dealing with a wide variety of conflict. These include strategic direction, keeping the peace in the longer term, prevention of disorder and managing the return to normality. Some crime and disorder is predictable. Through positive action by police in conjunction with partner agencies, much can be done to keep the peace and limit opportunities for crime and disorder.
The nature of tensions and conflicts

Tensions in relationships are part of daily life and most conflicts arising from them are managed by a complex web of social interactions, thus preventing conflict from escalating into something more damaging. Tensions and conflicts in communities are often driven by recognisable circumstances. Unacceptable or inappropriate behaviour by some individuals, or an absence of stability in a location, can be an indicator of a slow deterioration of the quality of life in that area. This situation can often be exacerbated by criminal behaviour. Failure by anyone to recognise and address the causes and symptoms of conflict and resulting tension will often be an aggravating factor in any subsequent difficulties. Spontaneous or sudden violence, disorder and damage are manifestations of unresolved tensions. The cumulative effect is a reduction in a communitys quality of life. Tension is increased within a community when peoples concerns or fears are not resolved. This has an adverse effect on the quality of life of individuals and communities. Conflict may occur when behaviours causing the tensions are challenged. Behaviours associated with low level disorder do not generally attract the status of recordable crime and traditionally have not been seen as a priority for police activity. Targetting resources at this significant, albeit lower end of the disorder scale is very important, as it should be the starting point for managing the conflict in an attempt to avoid more serious incidents requiring police attention.
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Building, keeping and restoring the peace

The police, working with others, have two overlapping roles which should be in constant use: 1. the building and keeping of peace in the community 2. the restoring of peace, in the short term through local negotiation and critical intervention to minimise the effects or risks from violence. Understanding the nature and context of conflict and what behaviours are manifested by the different parties involved (including the police), goes some way towards explaining why perceptions give way to misunderstandings and fears.
Building and keeping the peace

Local communities and agencies have a view of what is normal in their communities. Local people and agencies recognise when things are getting better or worse. The police role, by means of information and intelligence management, is to: consult with communities provide services which preserve the peace and work for improvement be proactive with the public and other agencies in maintaining a peaceful society respond appropriately to threats of crime and disorder ensure that, if required, the use of force is within the law and is proportionate to the harm which is being prevented.
Diversity in communities makes it incumbent on the police and their partner agencies to have a good understanding of sensitive issues and the local significance of events and places. This cannot be done unless communities assist the police in understanding what is important to them. Community information management is a key element in this process.
Restoring the peace

The police and other agencies need to be proactive in dealing with unforeseen conflict. In the short term the police may have to restore peace within a community. This may range across giving advice to rowdy people, dealing effectively with domestic abuse, successfully resolving incidents involving firearms or major public disorder. The objective must be a reduction of tension and a return to normality. In certain circumstances the action(s) to combat a problem will, by necessity, be police led.
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Throughout the peace-restoring process the community still require normal policing services. During such periods there are two aspects of policing: Normal policing: the use of local officers in the maintenance of the peace. The activities associated with reducing tension and causes of conflict should be a priority in areas that have been made safe. Specialist tactics: police resources (who may be specially equipped and trained) whose role it is to restore order in the most appropriate manner to prevent violence and minimise risk, reduce tension and speed the return to normality.
The restoration of peace is closely linked to the efforts made in building and maintaining peace. Local commanders should recognise the priorities of the community and incorporate them in the crime and disorder reduction strategies. The tactics used in an operation to restore peace should support this longer-term strategy as much as possible. The rationale for the restoration of peace should be communicated via the public relations (PR) strategy. The local police commander should set a policing style and consider which operational tactics and resources are appropriate within a given community. The crime and disorder reduction strategy should specifically consider implementation of community initiatives aimed at promoting cultural diversity, addressing racism and protecting human rights. Policing is not the sole preserve of the police. The promotion of good order and citizenship is dependent upon truly inclusive partnership where all in society work together to achieve a safe environment. Resolving and managing conflict requires appropriate and timely intervention. Tension and conflict may be present in every community and social grouping. It can be both positive and negative but always requires to be managed. It is essential that the management of conflict be regarded as a continuous process and not as crisis intervention.
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A Conflict Management Model

The community and its agencies, including the police, will still have to deal with crime and disorder situations that have not been successfully resolved or are unforeseen. The model illustrated below seeks to counter any conflict by logical progression through five key stages. None of the stages can be seen as the sole responsibility of the police. Indeed, restoration of normality in the community is a truly multi-agency strategy. Although the five stages have titles which fit comfortably with police procedures, they clearly map onto activities which are the responsibility of other agencies or can be achieved by groups within the community. Information and intelligence received leads to a threat assessment, then consideration of the relevant powers and policy, combined with choice of the appropriate tactical options to manage the threat and resolve the conflict. Risk assessment applies to the whole model and in particular at the threat assessment stage (hazards and level of risk), and the powers and policy, and tactical options stages (suitable control measures). The cyclic nature of the model allows for constant re-assessment of the situation and for appropriate action to be taken on the basis of the most up to date information or intelligence available.
Information/ intelligence received
Threat assessment
Action(s)
Powers
Powers and policy
Tactical options
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The model illustrates the resolution of conflict by the individual patrol officer through to several officers on a firearms operation or a substantial number of officers during large-scale disorder. It can be applied equally to spontaneous incidents or planned events. From the police point of view, choice of the appropriate tactical options would be made from the relevant public order, firearms or personal safety manuals. Equally, the model highlights the importance of the information available within the community, threats to the wider community and our partner agencies and the legal powers, capabilities and actions available to our partners. It is this shared recognition and joint action within the community which facilities the return to normality. Police action(s) must be lawful and supported by a statutory or common law power. Individual officers may be called upon to account for their actions. They will need to show that any force used was necessary and reasonable on the basis of their honestly held belief of the information or intelligence available to them. In line with human rights legislation, the test, which will be applied in such cases, will be one of proportionality in terms of the action taken and the legitimate aims pursued. The ACPO manuals of guidance relating to public order, police use of firearms and the Personal Safety Programme are designed to assist planners, advisors and commanders in managing their response to conflict in a reasonable and proportional way.
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THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Respect for peoples human rights is one of the principal factors that should be borne in mind throughout the entire process of policing. This respect derives as much from a moral obligation as it does from legal requirement. There is an obvious expectation that all policing will be conducted reasonably and within the bounds of the law. The legal parameters within which police work can be found are: 1. The domestic law of the United Kingdom. This is based in: (a) statutes such as the Public Order Act 1986 and the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (b) the common law, which is a mixture of legal conventions and the case law of the courts, and 2. International law and especially the provisions of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Some of the provisions of the ECHR have been given legal effect within the United Kingdom by virtue of the Human Rights Act 1998.
All officers have an individual responsibility for ensuring that they are properly educated and informed about the extent of their legal powers and the context within which those powers can properly be exercised. It is unacceptable for a police officer to claim ignorance of the law. In addition to having a comprehensive knowledge of United Kingdom laws, it is now extremely important for all officers to understand the applicability and scope of the provisions of the ECHR that have been given effect under the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Act has two basic purposes: 1. The law of the European Convention on Human Rights and specifically the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention will be actionable before UK courts, and 2. Courts and tribunals, public authorities and Government Ministers have to act in a way that is compatible with the law of the convention. Failure to do so may be unlawful although it is not a criminal offence.
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The rights and freedoms of the Convention that may be relevant to policing include: Article 2 Article 3 Article 5 Article 6 Article 7 Article 8 Article 9 Article 10 Article 11 Article 14 the right to life prohibition from torture, inhumane or degrading treatment the right to liberty and security of person the right to a fair hearing protection from punishment without legal basis the right to respect for private and family life freedom of thought, conscience and religion freedom of expression freedom of assembly and association freedom from discrimination.
A full explanation of the Articles can be found in the Human Rights Act 1998. It is generally recognised within ECHR law that the responsibilities of the likes of police extend not only to taking positive action to protect these rights and freedoms but also includes a failure to act or to take steps to protect them. It is therefore vitally important that the legal parameters of each of these rights and freedoms must be carefully considered by all officers and at every stage of policing. There is a presumption too that convention rights can only be interfered with by any kind of state action where the Convention expressly allows it. These conditions are set out within the wording of each of the Articles. The rights provided for in Article 8 the right to privacy, Article 9 freedom of thought, conscience and religion, Article 10 freedom of expression and Article 11 freedom of assembly and association each has qualifications attached to them. The first part of the respective Article provides the right and the second specifies permissible qualification. In general terms, the rights can only be interfered with: 1. Where the action is prescribed by law, and 2. It is necessary in a democratic society and for one of the following reasons: national security territorial integrity
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public safety preventing disorder or crime protecting health protecting morals protecting the rights of others.
In deciding whether the action was necessary in a democratic society it will be necessary to show that the action: (i) (ii) (iii) fulfilled a pressing social need, and pursued a legitimate aim, and there was a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. This means that the action was designed to:
(a) impair as little as possible the right or freedom in question (b) meet the objectives of the domestic law in question and (c) not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations, and (d) be balanced against the severity of the effect that the measure has on the individual or group. The more severe the adverse effects of the measure, the more important the object must be if it is to be classified as legitimate. The ECHR is a living instrument and seeks to take account of changes in society and its values. Therefore, action which was considered unreasonable 10 years ago may be viewed as reasonable today.
Use of force
The law regarding use of force is contained within: Section 3, Criminal Law Act 1967 Section 117, Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 common law.
The ECHR and Human Rights Act complements and gives direction to the lawful application of force under the above legislation. The subjective tests of necessity and proportionality should be applied when considering whether action taken is reasonable.
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COMMUNITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

Communities are varied entities and may be permanent or transient in nature. Any policing activity carries the potential to impact positively or negatively on the community. Community monitoring allows for the gathering of social, economic, political and environmental information. The potential for disorder or threat to public safety may be depicted by a variety of behaviours which can be classified in two ways. The first is a slow deterioration in quality of life. This may manifest itself as minor crime, graffiti or neglect to the infrastructure of a community. The second is the existence of open hostility and violence. There are a number of sources which may provide valuable information and intelligence to indicate and monitor the mood of a community, including: patrolling officers community beat officers police managers community liaison officers the media consultative groups (statutory or voluntary) IT systems Watch schemes pressure groups partnership agencies other emergency services intelligence systems criminal justice system.
Information obtained may indicate changes in attitude or levels of hostility towards police and their partners. An increase in tension within or between groups manifested by antisocial behaviour, may be linked to external social, economic and political factors.
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A system should be in place to analyse this information and produce intelligence in order to indicate the mood of the community. This may also form part of the threat and risk assessment procedure for an event, incident or specific operation and can be categorised as a Community Impact Assessment. This process forms an integral part of the national intelligence model and intelligence structure example (both illustrated and explained in Chapter 3 Strategic considerations - intelligence section), which should operate continuously and as part of an intelligence-based problem solving policing style. Staff at all levels will have, through an effective briefing and debriefing process, a heightened awareness of the mood of the community. Community information management should be at the core of crime and disorder reduction strategies for all police forces. It must be considered when planning and undertaking operations where there is a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder and included in the audit trail. All forces, through an effective performance management system, should be able to gauge if their community information management schemes are contributing towards a reduction in crime and disorder. The aims of this monitoring strategy are: to prevent and reduce crime and disorder to determine the most appropriate police action to reassure the public that the police are actively seeking to prevent disorder through effective internal management, partnership and consultation with all sections of the community including the following groups: hard to reach alienated vulnerable youth minorities.
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NATURE AND SCOPE OF DISORDER

The information contained in this guide deals with events and incidents ranging from routine operational policing through to major disorder. The scope of disorder refers to its category, size, impact and frequency. Trends, influences, pressures and changes can be identified by community information management. Policing activity can then focus on preventing and reducing crime and disorder. Disorder can be generally categorised into four broad areas:
Disorder associated with spontaneous incidents, for example:

community issues criminal activity police activity. direct action groups industrial disputes environmental issues. sporting events concerts organised marches. illegal raves illegal gatherings.
Single issue protests, for example:
Lawful public events, for example:
Unlawful public events, for example:
Whatever the nature and scope of disorder it can be addressed by the principles contained within this Manual of Guidance.
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A DISORDER MODEL
Introduction
Keeping the peace should be achieved through partnership with the community, this principle continues when tension rises and conflict and disorder occur. A model may assist in understanding disorder, and help advisors, planners and commanders to manage events and incidents where there is a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder.
Disorder model the stages explained

State of normality: The day-to-day state of order and provision of policing services within a community. This can vary widely from one area to another and even by time of day. Community information management will provide accurate information as to the current state. Communities are varied entities and may be permanent or transient in nature. Tension: A level of increased concern or feelings in a community. A trigger incident can result in movement from a state of heightening tension to disorder; such incidents can be instigated by the police, the community or a third party. Disorder: This represents the stage at which mood is supplemented by action, whether isolated or sustained. It manifests itself in disruption, damage or violence. Such disorder may occur following a single or series of trigger incidents. At this level, unchecked or uncontrolled activity may encourage serious disorder. Serious disorder/riot: Escalation into violent or disruptive behaviour. This stage may by typified by extreme conflict. This could take the form of violent protest, the act of rioting, criminal damage, looting, or the use of weapons of offence. Unrest: This is the period, sometimes prolonged, when the rebuilding of relationships takes place. Sensitivity and trust are key factors in this process. Police activity must focus on a structured return to a state of normality, and commanders should be aware that it is possible to return or cause a return to disorder or riot by excessive or inappropriate action.
These stages are shown in diagramatic form overleaf.
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A disorder model
Disorder is a dynamic process. The model is a flexible framework in which serious disorder or rioting may be viewed and may assist in understanding and managing disorder.
State of Normality
Tension
Disorder
Serious Disorder/Riot
Unrest
Note: As can be seen, progression through all levels is not necessary, in some circumstances it may be possible to return to the state of normality from any level. The stages from state of normality through to serious disorder/riot can be viewed in terms of an increase in tension and conflict. A return to the state of normality from any other stage can be viewed as a decrease.
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Disorder model - considerations

The desired outcome should be the return to a state of normality. The state of normality before and after disorder may differ. It is possible that the police and the community will have different perceptions of the level of conflict or disorder. Community information management and liaison assist in reducing this disparity. The use of intelligence to identify community tensions or hotspots may prevent escalation. Rumours or misinformation relating to the activities of the parties to a dispute or disorder may circulate. These may include the actions or response of the police. They should be clarified as quickly as possible. Good liaison and a sound public relations strategy are key factors for success. During periods of disorder there is still a need to provide policing services to the community. At all levels within the model, police activity must be based upon the strategic principles of initial response, effective resourcing and tactical deployment. Force used by police must be lawful and proportionate to the threat. Activities by the community, other agencies and the police in partnership are key elements in the prevention of disorder.
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Crowd behaviour
There has been considerable research into trends in crowd behaviour. When planning, commanding or advising on operations where there is a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder the following behavioural patterns may be present in any crowd: Crowds will contain many different attitudes and behaviours. It is likely therefore that there will be different levels of participation in crowd activities. A trigger incident may affect levels of involvement. A trigger incident may be a result of actions by crowd participants, the police, or as a result of altered perceptions arising from the interactions between them. Information about external events received accurately, or inaccurately by the crowd or policing organisation, may also heighten, diminish, or alter perceptions of circumstances. Members of a crowd do not necessarily get carried away by crowd hysteria. Each person in a crowd has a different perception of events based upon their ability to see, hear and move. This may affect their behaviour. When crowd members become highly emotional or aggressive their visible behaviour can spread and become regarded as acceptable by those around them. It can be an opportunity for an anti-social minority to influence and mobilise others around them. Anonymity removes the fear of identification and sanction from crowd members and may lead to the breakdown of legal and moral constraints. This also applies to the police, who should ensure that all identification markings are clearly visible. During crowd migration, non-directed crowds will follow routes of least effort. Highly motivated crowds will attempt to follow the most direct route to achieve their objective. If it is desired to apply direction to crowds, exits and escapes must be considered. The higher the crowd density, the higher the likelihood of interaction within the crowd, and action by the crowd. The higher the density of the crowd the more difficult it becomes for crowd members to leave.
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The less informal control there is within the crowd in relation to the crowd members, the more likelihood of the need for police control. Policing crowds is a dynamic and interactive process. Members of the police service as individuals, or groups may also be subject to influences received from the crowd, or by being party to events generally. It is here that considerations of planning, communication and leadership are of particular importance.
Crowd management principles

The following key principles should be considered during the planning, briefing and deployment stages of any policing operation involving the management of crowds: Intelligence: Prior to any event, the police should identify the groups that might be involved; their intentions, their tactics, their notions of acceptable behaviour, together with their views of other groups. Intelligence may also indicate the proportion of activists within a crowd, and how homogenous that crowd might be in its intention, for example the balance of those prone to violence and those who are peaceful. Facilitation: The police should seek to facilitate any lawful and legitimate aims of groups that are present especially when conflict breaks out. The aim should be to permit the pursuit of lawful aims whilst dealing with groups acting illegally. Communication: The police should communicate to the crowd how they are seeking to facilitate the crowds legitimate aims and how the illegitimate actions of some in the crowd may serve to impede those aims. Communication should be through figures respected by crowd members. Liaison should be established at an early stage. Identification: The police commander should encourage officers not to treat all crowd members in the same manner. When violence starts there is a tendency to treat everybody with hostility. However, especially in such situations, it is crucial to treat people with respect and win them to your side, not the side of those already promoting conflict. It may be necessary to facilitate the desires of the many, such as the wish to peacefully protest, so that they may assist the police with their overall intention which is to prevent disorder.
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STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES
Partnerships and links with the community are means by which potential problems are identified and effectively managed. While this is the most desirable state of affairs, there are times when tensions rise suddenly and unexpectedly, day-to-day policing methods are insufficient, and the restoration of peace is necessary. It is therefore necessary for police to base their response to incidents that may arise upon the following set of principles: initial response effective resourcing tactical deployment.
In managing any incident or event that threatens public safety or has the potential for disorder, the strategy should: define the overall intention(s) determine the tactical parameters set the policing style.
Tactics should: reflect the strategy be appropriate to the level of threat be applied to achieve the intention(s).
Initial response
Where there is a threat to public safety or potential for disorder, the initial police response should support and complement routine operations. The strategic intention should be to restore normality as soon as practicable by measures and appropriate interventions. It may be suitable to pursue an early resolution of the situation, whether by information or action. Police should involve their partners wherever possible at an early stage. In order to establish and maintain any advantage, a number of options should be considered, from low key to highly impactive activities. Those used will be guided by intelligence and community information management. The potential for trigger incidents must be considered.
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Effective resourcing
In order to maintain or restore the state of normality, effective resourcing is a key principle. The ability to mobilise police, and where appropriate, partner agencies, is based upon agreed protocols, sound planning and regular training. The level of resources should reflect the ongoing threat to public safety and the potential for disorder. The welfare of those involved should be considered. Failure to do so may affect their ability to perform effectively and efficiently.
Tactical deployment
This is the method of converting strategy into tactics by the use of appropriate and risk assessed options, within set parameters. The overall intention should be to keep or restore the peace. These strategic principles must be read and used in conjunction with tactical considerations which are detailed in Chapter 4.
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STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS: THE KEY POINTS

When planning for and managing events and incidents where there is a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder, there are a number of key areas that require consideration. This list is not exhaustive, but is offered as a framework to aid the decision-making processes.
What is the situation?

This may be determined by consideration of the following impact factors: location, scale, size, timing participants, numbers, motivation spontaneous or pre-planned community feeling community representatives other agencies involved media interest political implications (local, national and international) wider policing implications preferred outcome for police, agencies and participants risk assessment.
Developing partnerships
Identify all stakeholders, both internal and external. Produce statement of intent and protocols to aid joint working. Consider forming multi-agency/emergency services group which will be co-ordinated by police. Keep all relevant partners informed and updated. When non-Home Office policing services are a stakeholder in the event they must participate in the strategic and tactical planning.
Intelligence and how can it be obtained?

Locally
Local intelligence structures Identified local intelligence officer
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Community feeling Previous event/litigation debriefs in-force or external Use of informants.
Regional and national level

North and South Intelligence Units National Public Order Intelligence Unit.
Other agencies
Intelligence available to stakeholders Security services Outside agencies Environmental scanning, including Internet and relevant databases.
What are the preferred outcomes?

for police? for the participants? for our partners?
Are they compatible? The following rationale may be of benefit when making decisions: 1. 2. 3. What is my preferred outcome? What is an acceptable outcome? What is an unacceptable outcome?
The ethical considerations

Identify the ethical basis for the strategy. It should be agreed, shared and easily communicated. Take the moral high ground when formulating strategy. Devise processes for checking actions against agreed strategies. Avoid a quick fix that may compromise the strategy. Be aware that our actions may unnecessarily align the service with other stakeholders.
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What are the resourcing considerations?

Resources
Current operational capability. Command and operational resilience. Operational readiness (should be tested on a regular basis). Command structure and facilities. Skills profile. Equipment needs and availability. Communication requirements. Mutual aid.
Skills
Planning team, logistics, support services, risk assessor. Tactical advisor(s). Training of command team. Designated senior officers. Intelligence co-ordinator and intelligence cell. Evidence gathering and forward intelligence teams. Senior Investigating Officer and support. Press liaison. Specialist skills, for example roped access. Security co-ordinator.
Financial
Use a predictive costing model to inform the police authority and command of anticipated expenditure. Investigate all possible sources of finance, and cost recovery. All stakeholders must be aware of the statement of intent and their commitment to it, in particular the financial implications. Be aware that costing may be affected by other agencies actions.
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What are the legal considerations?

European Convention on Human Rights, as incorporated into the Human Rights Act 1998. Criminal Justice strategy in conjunction with criminal justice partners, CPS, legal experts and the courts. Organisational and individual liability. Access to a barrister and/or solicitor prior to, during and after an event. Correct use of appropriate legislation and powers to aid strategy.
Planning considerations
Are planners suitably skilled? Develop a clear audit trail for decisions reached. Risk assessment and control measures. Ensure plan meets needs of event and remains effective over time. Contingencies within the operation order should address the what ifs?. Contingency plans should take into account any cross border/boundary implications and if so protocols must be developed to deal with any situation that may arise. Contingency plans should be tested and reviewed. Protocols should exist within the same working group, for one member of that group to assume the lead for that area of speciality, for example, fire, press. Ensure planning reflects the specialist need of all participants, for example arrested persons diets and clothing requirements, needs of police and other specialists. Check that all agencies plans dovetail, and resolve disparities. The requirements of any post incident investigation. Resources are correctly selected, trained, briefed and available. Recognise that the location of the event may well become a major crime scene. Debriefing to identify improvements to systems, equipment and resources. Review of tactical options selected and dissemination of lessons learned to National Operations Faculty. Consider and incorporate the principles of best value.
ACPO COMMAND
35
Introduction
There is a long established and nationally accepted structure within the police service and amongst our partner agencies for the effective command of incidents and events. The structure has three levels: strategic, tactical and operational. The command functions of these are commonly referred to as Gold, Silver and Bronze respectively. These commanders need to be carefully selected, trained and updated. This structure is widely used for both pre-planned and spontaneous events and can offer the degree of flexibility required to cope with a varied and developing range of incidents. The decision to implement the command structure should be taken with regard to the threat and risk assessment available for an event or incident. The command structure relies on the paramount principle of flexibility and as such is role specific and not rank-related. It requires all commanders to recognise the parameters of their own role, whilst accepting their relationship with others in the command team. Officers of a senior rank to the commander whether that be Gold, Silver or Bronze cannot assume primacy, solely on the basis of rank or territorial responsibility, without taking up the appropriate role within the command structure. This type of change should be consulted upon and must be documented for the audit trail. There is a need on protracted operations for command resilience to be addressed. Suitably qualified replacements should be identified and briefed in good time.
Strategy and tactics

Strategy - definition
Is the overall intention(s) to combine resources towards managing and resolving an event or incident.
The Gold Commander

is the officer in overall command and has responsibility and accountability for the incident or event is required to resource the event chairs the strategic co-ordinating group in the event of a multi-agency response to an incident is required to set, review and update the strategy
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must be so located as to be able to maintain effective strategic command of the operation is required to consult with partners when determining strategy must maintain objectivity and as such should not become drawn into tactical level decisions must remain available to the Silver Commander(s) if required must ensure that the strategy for the event is documented in order to provide a clear audit trail, including any changes to that strategy needs to approve the Silver Commander(s) tactical plan and ensure that it meets the strategic intention for the event or incident is responsible for ensuring the resilience of the command structure and the effectiveness of the Silver Commander(s).
Gold support
Gold support are organisational structures that support the command of the operation and may include:
Personnel
event controller channel controllers radio operators plotters/logist(s) call handlers media support staff officer tactical advisor inter-agency representatives intelligence co-ordinator logistics co-ordinator.
Resources
mapping system air support link inter-agency communications intelligence cell telephones and IT separate conference room CCTV monitoring/recording deployment boards stationery contingency plans command log.
Tactics - definition
Tactics are the way resources are used to achieve the strategic intentions, within the range of approved tactical options.
The Silver Commander

is responsible for developing and co-ordinating the tactical plan in order to achieve the strategic intention of the Gold Commander must be so located as to be able to maintain effective tactical command of the operation
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must ensure that all decisions are documented in the command log in order to provide a clear audit trail provides the pivotal link in the command chain between Bronze Commanders and the Gold Commander. This ensures all other commanders are kept apprised of continuing developments is responsible for ensuring that all staff are fully briefed has the responsibility to review, update and communicate changes in the tactical plan to Bronze Commanders and the Gold Commander is responsible for ensuring the tactics employed by Bronze Commanders meet the strategic intention and tactical plan.
Consideration should be given to the appointment of more than one Silver if there are linked events in remote geographic locations. If the duration of the event is likely to be protracted, command resilience must be considered.
Silver support
Silver support is the command post and as such plays an essential role in the command chain and may include:
Personnel
call handlers staff officer tactical advisor plotter/logist(s) controllers briefing officer(s) risk assessor press officer representatives of other agencies when appropriate.
Resources
mapping system air support link stationery IT deployment boards media support CCTV monitoring/recording command log contingency plans communications briefing facilities.
The Bronze Commander

is responsible for the implementation of the Silver Commanders plan by the use of appropriate tactics within their geographical or functional area of responsibility must have knowledge and clear understanding of the Silver Commanders tactical plan and their role within it ensures staff within their area of responsibility are fully briefed
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keeps the Silver Commander updated on current developments including any variation in agreed tactics within their geographical or functional area of responsibility must be so located as to be able to maintain effective tactical command of their area of responsibility must be available to unit commanders. However, they must allow them the independence to carry out their role in accordance with strategy and the tactical plan decisions taken by Bronze Commanders must be documented in a command log to ensure a clear audit trail exists.
Bronze support
This may include a staff officer, tactical advisor and runner/logist.
Communications
There is a need, in appropriate circumstances, to establish a special operations room, to manage pre-planned and spontaneous events. This ensures that operational events and major disorder does not impinge on day-to-day policing activity. The room must be staffed by specially trained personnel. The scale of policing operation will dictate the number of radio channels necessary. The minimum requirement is an operational channel and a command channel. Air support is valuable in providing immediate, visual and radio information to assist commanders in making tactical decisions. Care should be taken to ensure this information is not used in usurping the strategic and tactical plan. If it is intended to use a command vehicle it must have a communication link with the events control room. Where mutual aid is requested, call signs should be allocated in accordance with ACPO guidelines.
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A COMMAND STRUCTURE
THIS ILLUSTRATION PROVIDES A PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR A COMMAND TEAM TO MANAGE AN EVENT. IT MUST NOT BE REGARDED AS EXHAUSTIVE.
Gold Commander
Gold Support
Silver Commander(s)
Silver Support
Bronze Territorial
Bronze Functional
PSU(s) as required
Functional Units as required
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Command protocols
Events and incidents which involve a threat to public safety or a potential for disorder may escalate to assume the proportions of a major incident. Similarly they may involve criminal use or possession of firearms and therefore crime investigation, or may include resourcing and command by a partner agency such as at a major fire. Operations with more than one area of activity requiring the introduction of a command structure, will contain potentially competing demands. For example, a firearms commander may wish to pursue a tactic which requires more time than the public order commander, responsible for the outer cordon, can sustain. Likewise the leader of a surveillance team would need to co-operate closely with the firearms commander on a static or mobile operation to co-ordinate an armed contact. Similarly, the senior investigating officer may require time to investigate a scene during disorder and the public order commander cannot protect that scene with current resources. It is the Gold Commanders responsibility to manage the assessment of the situation, consider the resources available and ultimately make the decision about balancing competing demands, to achieve the desired outcomes. Command protocols reduce risk and inform and direct decision making by allowing commanders to know what they are expected to achieve and how they will do it. The key principle is that the commanders involved know: (a) (b) (c) Who is responsible for achieving each OBJECTIVE. Who is responsible for minimising each RISK identified. Who controls each of the RESOURCES available.
A command protocol will identify: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) The desired outcomes of the operation. Who is responsible for achieving each objective which will lead to the desired outcomes. Who is responsible for minimising each risk identified. Who controls each of the resources available. Who commands each separate geographical or functional area (if relevant).
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(vi)
How the individual objectives are dependent on each other, for example the firearms silver commander is unable to operate until the public order silver commander has achieved the objective of securing the scene. What instigates the transfer of command from one commander to another. This includes how this is defined, communicated and recorded. Such prompts are likely to be the achievement of an objective or the decision that an objective can or cannot be achieved, for example the public order silver commander who can state that a scene has been secured, and can then transfer command of the inner cordon area to the firearms commander.
(vii)
Firearms operations within disorder extend the command structure. The officer commanding the scene of a firearms operation is at Silver level. It is vital that command protocols are agreed. NB Specific guidance on the use of baton rounds and firearms in situations of disorder, is contained in the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms.
Command protocols can be summarised as Who owns what and when.
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ACPO PLANNING
43
Introduction
The success or failure of any notified event or contingency plan for spontaneous events is dependent on a thorough, competent planning process. Failing to plan is planning to fail. This section is intended to provide, within nationally accepted guidelines, a framework to assist police services in the planning arrangements for events. It should not be regarded as exhaustive. Experience has shown that a community and multi-agency approach to problem-solving often enhances the overall policing plan. If a non-Home Office police service is involved in an incident or event, they must be full participants in the planning process. A protocol should exist between the police services as to the respective responsibilities, for example, security of locations and loads in transit. When planning events due regard must be paid to the contents of the respective HMSO publications: Guide to Health, Safety and Welfare at Pop Concerts and Similar Events (purple guide) and the Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds (green guide). During spontaneous incidents these principles may be subject to the time available and the dynamics of the situation. A workable plan within the available timescale is preferable to a perfect plan too late.
Liaison with organisers

Notification of an event
Upon receipt of the initial information of an event, it is important that a meeting takes place to ensure as much information as possible is obtained, in order to facilitate the police planning process for the event. The following gives an indication of the requirements: the name of the organisation and details of the principal planner details of the event numbers and profiles of participants.
There is a need to ensure that details obtained are documented and circulated to the appropriate heads of departments. The appointment of an intelligence co-ordinator at this stage is important to ensure that all relevant information/intelligence is collated and assessed. This will assist the planning process.
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The early appointment of a planning team and identification of gold, silver and bronze commanders ensures the cohesion of the pre-event, event and post-event phases. Regular meetings with event organisers, should facilitate the production of a statement of intent, ensuring that each party is aware of their particular responsibilities. All policy and planning decisions should be recorded to facilitate the audit trail and are subject to disclosure.
Strategy meeting
A steering group should be formed with the intention of determining the strategic objectives for the event. The group should consist of the following key decision makers: Gold Commander Silver Commander(s) Senior Investigating Officer Intelligence Co-ordinator Press and Public Relations Officer Planning Co-ordinator.
Other specialist representatives may include: human resources training finance security co-ordinator communications Bronze Commander (traffic) tactical advisor legal advisor.
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The meeting should have a fixed agenda prepared in line with the IIRMAC mnemonic:
Information/Intelligence (to include a threat assessment for the

event)
Intention(s) Risk assessment M ethod (in line with risk assessment and health and safety factors) Administration Communications.
Tactical planning meeting

Chaired by the Silver Commander(s) to develop the tactical plan in line with the Gold Commanders strategy. The group may include the following personnel: traffic uniform operations crime tactical advisor planning co-ordinator communications press logistics intelligence support services.
Welfare and staff association representatives should also be invited to attend. At this meeting contingency plans MUST be developed and agreed.
Operational orders
The planning team will be responsible for producing the operational order. This document will include the operational Information, I ntention(s), Risk Assessment, M ethod, Administration and Communication details.
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The order should address the following: resource schedules traffic arrangements security duties communication duties briefing and refreshment arrangements public information plans and maps police powers contingencies what ifs? to be implemented in respect of specific incidents emergency procedures miscellaneous information.
The order should demonstrate resilience and cater for both the expected and unexpected. It must reflect the duration and complexity of the event.
Briefings/debriefings
The deployment of dedicated briefing and debriefing teams enhances the management of an event.
Briefing
The briefing of all those involved in the event must reflect the multiagency and community approach. It is of paramount importance and should include an overview of the whole order as well as a role specific brief for individuals. In collaboration with our partners a proactive public information and reassurance policy should be considered.
Debriefing
A structured debrief will provide an opportunity to identify any improvements to systems, equipment and resources. It should be regarded as the beginning of the process for planning future events. The purpose is not to apportion blame, but to identify the most and least effective aspects of the operation. The briefing and debriefing process must form part of the recorded audit trail, which is subject to disclosure.
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Compliance with ECHR during planning

This must be demonstrated during planning and debriefing in order to display a transparent decision making process. The key elements are: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) defining the aims and objectives determining all relevant information assessing feasible options documenting decisions and actions together with reasons reviewing outcomes.
Threat and risk assessment

An assessment is required and should focus on the following: any threat to the event any risks arising from the event any risk to participants and people policing the event.
Where threat and risk assessments are required: the threat assessment should be co-ordinated by the Intelligence Coordinator, and disseminated the risk assessment must be co-ordinated by a qualified risk assessor, and disseminated.
Five step plan for risk assessment:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Look for hazards. Decide who may be harmed and how. Evaluate risks. Implement control measures. Record findings and review assessment from time to time and revise if necessary.
Contingency and mobilisation planning

Forces may find it valuable, to highlight persistent causes of threats of disorder. Some of these threats will be local and low level and therefore suitable for a locally developed contingency plan.
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Where the threat is likely to require a substantial response there is considerable merit in drawing up both generic plans and specific operational orders. Testing of these plans and training of key staff can ensure a more effective response to disorder and a structured return to normality. This is particularly important when the response involves partners or even a number of different forces. Comprehensive plans should cover strategic elements, including policing style, partners, desired outcomes, command, resourcing, investigation and possible methods to reduce tension. Equally, matters such as tactical options, rendezvous points and vehicle marshalling should be included. Post-event issues such as debriefing should also be given consideration. Plans should be readily accessible. This may indicate an IT-based system of plan retrieval. The above plans cannot be activated without sufficient resource. Mobilisation plans support this activation and also assist in meeting mutual aid commitment. The elements of initial response, effective resourcing and tactical deployment should be covered. A key element in the development of a mobilisation plan is to ensure that the staff expected to activate the plan, at any time of day, are aware of its priorities and procedures.
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INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION
The role of information and intelligence in dayto-day policing

The day-to-day collation of information and intelligence, properly analysed and disseminated, enables steps to be taken for maintaining the peace, minimising disorder, and preventing crime. The correct handling and control of covert human intelligence sources plays an integral part in all areas of policing, not just public order events. There is legislation contained within the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 and codes of practice relating to the obtaining and use of intelligence products. Their use can be a key element in preventing or reducing disorder. Intelligence systems should be capable of gathering information and intelligence from a wide number of sources, for use both at strategic and tactical level within a linked intelligence model. This should enhance resource planning and deployment.
National Public Order Intelligence Unit (NPOIU)

The NPOIU exists to support the police service by providing intelligence on conflict and major areas of disorder. The national group draws staff from UK forces and the access point for any commander is through the local forces Head of Special Branch. The Units terms of reference are: to gather, evaluate, analyse and disseminate intelligence related to criminal activities, or where there is a substantial threat to public order, which arise from political extremism or protest activity. The NPOIU exists to: provide operational support to police forces using that intelligence assist forces in the investigation of any related crime and the prosecution of offenders act as a co-ordination point for Special Branches provide post-event information provide strategic analysis to assess and develop trends assist in the development of intelligence skills act as UK contact point for other national police agencies.
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National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and National Intelligence Model (NIM)
The National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) and the specialist sections within it are available to support and assist policing agencies in the development and use of intelligence. This is primarily by the use of the principles of the National Intelligence Model (NIM), adopted by the police service as a national structure incorporating both systems and personnel for dealing with intelligence processes at all levels of policing: local, cross border and national. At its heart is the direction of resources by both strategic and tactical tasking co-ordination groups. The principles of the model are recommended for use with the management of public order intelligence activity issues, and are outlined below:
STRATEGIC TASKING AND CO-ORDINATING GROUP (SCG)
Responsible for direction and leadership of resources
Identify key intelligence products

Strategic assessment the game plan
Setting intelligence priorities

Sets intelligence requirement what do we want to find out? Examples: identification of - trouble spots - criminal groups - targets
THE INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Responsible for creating intelligence products
Intelligence Products
Can then be used to target individuals, to assist in crowd management, for tactical deployments etc
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Principles of running in-house intelligence units

When managing any pre-planned or spontaneous events which pose a threat to public order or public safety, it is important that intelligence and information is viewed as an integral part of the process. This ensures that the police response is commensurate with strategic and tactical priorities. There is a need to see prevention and reduction of disorder in its widest sense. Community feeling forms an important factor in the collation of intelligence and information. Any event or incident known to police which presents a risk to public safety or could develop into public disorder should be regarded as a trigger for the formation of an intelligence unit. There is need for both information and intelligence to aid planning and tactical deployment. Such information should be seen as a part of the continuum and is relevant at all stages of the disorder model. There are three stages where intelligence/information assists: pre-event during the event post-event.
Pre-event
Gold commanders must employ a suitably skilled Intelligence Manager to co-ordinate the collection, analysis and dissemination of information and intelligence products. The following is a non-exhaustive guide as to the responsibilities of the Intelligence Manager: to brief the Tasking and Co-ordinating Groups for resource decisions, and leadership on prioritisation of work to establish an intelligence unit utilising in-force intelligence gathering mechanisms to ensure intelligence units are staffed by suitably qualified personnel including trained analysts to collate and analyse community feelings to aid the planning process
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to use all intelligence and information held by other agencies, organisations and partners involved in policing the event to brief or cause to be briefed personnel at all levels to ensure protocols exist for the communication of relevant information and intelligence products to assist any post-incident investigation to recognise that some intelligence products may aid planning, but would not be disclosable under any circumstances to identify suitably skilled briefing/debriefing officers to ensure suitably equipped briefing/debriefing facilities are provided to disseminate intelligence products only to those who require them and who are in a position to use them to ensure officers are aware of the need for confidentiality when dealing with information and intelligence products.
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AN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE
THE FOLLOWING DIAGRAM IS OFFERED AS GUIDANCE. IT SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A CONSTRAINT TO LOCALLY PREFERRED STRUCTURES. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL (NIM) ARE INCORPORATED INTO THIS STRUCTURE.
Gold Commander
Media Manager
Strategic
TASKING AND CO-ORDINATING GROUP (TCG)
SIO
Silver Commander
Tactical
Intelligence Manager
INTELLIGENCE UNIT
Intelligence Products
Force Intelligence
Local Intelligence
Evidence Gatherers
Forward Intelligence
Special Branch
Briefing Debriefing
National Public Order Intelligence Unit
Glossary
Intelligence Manager
Is responsible for co-ordinating all intelligence gathering activities, and for briefing the TCG so that resource decisions can be made, and leadership given on prioritisation of work.
Forward Intelligence
Trained personnel who are overtly deployed in teams (FITs) to gather intelligence information and evidence for an event or incident.
Evidence Gatherers
Public order trained officers and audio/visual specialists who can be deployed at all stages of an event to gather intelligence and evidence.
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Intelligence Unit
The role of the intelligence unit is to receive, assess and disseminate all intelligence relating to the event. It should include officers who are experienced in dealing with sensitive intelligence, for example, from covert sources. Real-time intelligence may be subject to caveats, but must be passed to Silver who will decide on its use. When intelligence is passed to the Silver Commander without caveat it may be used freely and the onus of source protection lies elsewhere. It is essential that the intelligence unit be located close to the command structure with full access to all communications, in order to provide the most effective support.
During event
Gold and Silver Commanders should be apprised of all relevant intelligence and information without delay, even though it may not have been researched at length. It is the role of the Intelligence Unit to add value to intelligence products, and produce intelligence briefings in the order of prioritisation as directed by the TCG. A proactive system must be established to seek information and intelligence by debriefing staff involved in the event and ensuring that this is fed into the ongoing briefing system. The scale of operation may mean that there are a number of agencies running intelligence and evidence gathering operations at the same location. Clear understanding between the agencies must be developed.
Post-event
If there is to be an investigation the plans and protocols previously agreed between the Intelligence Manager and the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) should be implemented. This will allow intelligence gathered during the event to be used by the post-event investigation team. The Intelligence Manager or nominee should be a party to the strategic debrief. A summary of this will be disseminated to interested parties, for example in-service intelligence units and the National Operations Faculty.
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THE ROLE OF THE SENIOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER (SIO) AND CRIME MANAGEMENT
Introduction
Events and incidents which present a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder present unique challenges for those responsible for their management and the investigation of crime. These include: the potential scale of investigations the diversity of offences the difficulties of scene management the resource implications the likelihood of high profile court proceedings the management and handling of witnesses and suspects.
Advances in information technology, scientific practice and investigative techniques now applied to criminal investigations should be used when dealing with incidents of serious disorder or public safety. It is recommended that the contents of this section be read in conjunction with the ACPO Murder Investigation Manual.
Appointment of the SIO

The police response to an event is dependent on the threat assessment. With good intelligence and information any risk to public safety should be evident at an early stage of the planning process. A Senior Investigating Officer must be identified, appointed and will be a member of the Gold Commanders strategic group for planning purposes where it is felt that an event may degenerate into disorder or public safety is threatened. The SIO is responsible for ensuring that all crime investigation policy decisions are recorded throughout the event, to ensure that an audit trail exists. During the event the SIO would normally report to the Silver Commander.
SIO: Pre-event responsibilities

determine criminal investigation strategy determine prosecution policy within case disposal guidelines establish liaison with key members of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS)
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determine the available budget in liaison with the Press Officer, determine the crime media policy within the constraints of the overall media strategy ensure communications systems meet the requirements of the investigation determine resources required obtain necessary authority levels develop working protocols and maintain close liaison with the Intelligence Manager identify and brief key staff to ensure investigation can be activated if required decide on contingencies to deal with crime scene management identify file preparation team(s) consider the implications of civil litigation.
The individual circumstances or incident may require the appointment and briefing by the SIO of: hospital teams prisoner reception teams interview teams disclosure and exhibits officer(s) file handling teams.
SIO: During event responsibilities

to be the crime advisor to obtain sufficient quality evidence to successfully bring offenders to justice by making the best use of available resources together with the Silver Commander to decide if the risk of using plain clothes officers on patrol during disorder is justified in the particular circumstances co-ordinate major enquiry, file preparation teams and crime scene managers maintain liaison with the Intelligence Manager liaise with representatives of specialist investigation agencies.
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Hospital teams
A nominated officer should be placed in charge of making arrangements for co-ordinating hospital team(s) with a view to: ensuring injured officers welfare obtaining evidence from victims, statements, photographs, exhibits (forensic and other), crime reports, medical evidence identifying injured offenders liaison with SIO.
Prisoner reception
Ensure clear guidelines exist as to how prisoners are received and handled. A dedicated charge centre(s) should be identified and suitably staffed to ensure the efficient processing of prisoners. This should assist the swift return of operational officers to the event. If a large number of arrests is expected, then a forward reception point should be considered. Standard documentation and arrest pro-formas, together with an early photograph of arresting officer and prisoner, will aid the administration of prisoner processing. Clear procedures are required for the handling and disposal of such photographs.
Interview teams
There is a need for experienced investigators, wherever possible, to interview prisoners irrespective of the grounds for their arrest.
Disclosure and exhibits officer(s)

The implications of disclosure of sensitive material should be considered at an early stage. It is the responsibility of the SIO to decide whether one or more disclosure and exhibit officers should be appointed.
File handling teams

Protocols should be established with the CPS and the courts. Files should be prepared in line with those agreements, by experienced case preparation teams. Early convictions at court may act as a deterrent. Consideration should be given to the opening of dedicated courts to deal with large numbers of arrests. The SIO should, having regard to the scale of the event, decide whether to appoint a manager for the File Handling Team or its local equivalent.
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CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT
SIO
Scientific Support Manager
Scientific Support Control Office
Exhibits Officer(s)
Crime Scene Managers
Home Office Pathologist Crime Scene Examiners Photographic/Video Forensic Scientists Fingerprint Bureau POLSA Search Teams Other Specialists
The preservation of any crime scene must be balanced with the needs of the ongoing police operation as dictated by the Silver Commander. The SIO will advise the Silver Commander on the need to preserve a scene. The Silver Commander will advise on the feasibility of preserving that scene with current resources. The decision must be recorded for the audit trail. It may be prudent to appoint a Scientific Support Manager to liaise with the forensic science, photographic and fingerprint services. Where terrorist involvement is suspected early liaison with Special Branch and the Anti-Terrorist Unit is essential.
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SIO: Post-event responsibilities

Manage the investigation of crime and lead the teams involved. Ensure that evidence is preserved which will assist in the processing of any claims lodged through the Criminal injuries Compensation Authority (CICA) and the Riot (Damages) Act 1886. Ensure that accurate records of damage are kept to combat fraudulent claims. Decide when scenes can be released from police control. Continue liaison with the Intelligence Manager to ensure that all information and intelligence is available to the enquiry. Maintain close liaison with the CPS. Determine arrest policy within the constraints of the agreed strategy. Maintain close liaison with press officer. Ensure close liaison with the appointed Police Complaints Officer. Contribute to the event or incident debriefing process.
Closure
The Gold Strategic Group should decide the extent of any post-event investigation, taking into account such factors as: scale of incident(s) number and types of offences committed media interest public opinion resource implications.
On conclusion of the event all materials should be catalogued and retained in line with service policy.
Events and incidents where loss of life occurs

Contingency liaison
Procedures to be adopted by each emergency service to a major incident should be developed and documented in order to ease their method of working in conjunction with each other. HM Coroner is ultimately responsible for identifying the deceased and establishing the time and cause of death. It is therefore recommended that officers regularly employed as an SIO should have frequent meetings with coroners in their own area to ensure awareness of the coroners needs, for example, bodies not to be moved unless unavoidable.
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Appointment of staff
By appointing another senior detective (known as the identification officer) at an early stage the SIO will be free to concentrate on the investigation. Appointments to be considered are: body and property recovery teams a casualty bureau press and media support mortuary teams scientific support.
The Major Disaster Advisory Team (MDAT), (Operation Goliath), a nationally recognised ACPO operation, is a database containing details of personnel, who can be called upon as required to render assistance in dealing with major disasters. Reference to Operation Goliath can be found in the ACPO Emergency Procedures Manual. The database is retained at the National Operations Faculty, Bramshill and can be activated on an ACPO officers authority.
Control of the scene

The bodies of victims should not be moved unless it is necessary to rescue survivors. Once life-saving activity has ceased the whole area should be preserved as a crime scene, so that vital evidence is not lost or destroyed.
Body recovery
Police should co-operate with the coroner in respect of the following matters: the control of the remains of the deceased the identification of those remains informing the next of kin their release to the next of kin with the coroners consent.
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PUBLIC RELATIONS STRATEGY
Introduction
Any pre-planned or spontaneous event is bound to attract high-profile publicity within the local - and often wider - community. A public relations (PR) strategy will include a media strategy and a plan for locating and involving community mediators. Participants with a cause will seek to use media attention to manipulate public opinion and gain support. They will, if it suits their cause, seek to put the police on the defensive. Events can present powerful photographic and broadcast images that can add to public opinion and may cause alarm. Confrontation is news and longterm environmental protests can see media outlets through many a quiet news day. In these circumstances they will be more than willing to give airtime and column inches to the protestors, however unrealistic their aims may appear to be. Without a carefully structured PR strategy, the police will be forced into a purely reactive role by a seemingly hostile media. In this unenviable environment, the police will appear less than authoritative - having been forced into a defensive stance. The media battle needs to be taken every bit as seriously as the policing operation itself. Police reputation is easily damaged and is a lot harder to repair than physical damage to property. However, with forethought and planning, the media can be used to complement the police operation. The PR strategy needs to address the following issues:
What are our objectives?

Every PR strategy is different and tailored to meet the needs of particular circumstances, but in almost every strategy it is likely that we will want to: demonstrate police integrity offer public reassurance highlight our obligation to enforce the law whilst facilitating the right to demonstrate demonstrate even-handedness proclaim our duty of care illustrate our professionalism
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demonstrate forethought and planning deter criminal activity and arrest offenders address local issues which might contribute to a death, serious injury, or dangerous rescue scenario address local issues which may encourage and sustain unlawful activity win the moral high ground highlight the diversion of local resources.
How are we going to achieve our objectives?

When the potential for serious public disorder arises, or a service is confronted with a long-term event, an off-the-cuff media response is simply not an option. Without careful planning, it is easy to step outside the proper remit of police responsibilities and inadvertently alienate partner agencies. Involve press officers/PR professionals during the planning stages of operations - they must have a good understanding of the issue to provide effective support. Remember internal communications are a vital part of your PR campaign. Involve other agencies/partners in the planning of PR strategy. Agree key messages with partners. Establish a credible frontline spokesperson for each agency. Agree individual agency responsibilities. Do not encroach on each others areas of expertise. Avoid justifications of wider issues for example the need for a new road. Ensure that ownership stays with appropriate authorities. Agree the key messages and areas of responsibility with partner agencies, draft the media strategy for the event or incident. Identify target audiences. Adapt the game plan with closely targeted strategies for specific phases of the operation. Review the strategy as circumstances change. Prepare for the 'media inquest' after a major policing operation.
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Consider pre-briefing of media where specific issues need clarifying. Use experts to support your argument. Anticipate statements and actions of participants/protestors. Anticipate negative perceptions following police action. Rehearse responses. Ensure consistency of message. Consider media training for key spokespersons if their role does not normally bring them under the media spotlight. Consider the media's need and desire for pictures and footage and possible PR benefits that may result.
Target audiences
When preparing a media strategy, you may have a single audience in mind, but it is likely that there will be more than one. The media is not simply an audience in itself, but the vehicle by which you carry messages to a wider audience, which is likely to include: public who support the protest public who are hostile to protestors public who are frightened by the protest public who hold no strong views the protestors themselves journalists who edit your message.
Targets are likely to include audiences touched by parts of the wider policing strategy, such as Members of Parliament or local councillors. It may well be that these audiences are being dealt with at ACPO level. However, it would be wise to link the media strategy into the wider policing plan to avoid repetition of effort or, worse, complete neglect of an important audience.
What to avoid
Mistakes are easily made under pressure, especially when subjected to sustained attacks on competence, integrity and force tactics. With careful planning, it is possible to avoid some common pitfalls that can expose the police to embarrassment or ridicule. Be vigilant. Do not confuse your key messages, thereby reducing their impact.
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Guard against loose cannons. Ensure your staff know the messages, who is and who is not authorised to deliver them. Do not have too many frontline spokespersons and do not allow anyone with a credibility problem to front your operation. Avoid being drawn into criticism of, or blaming partner agencies. Ensure that people who are, have been or may be, involved in intelligence gathering are kept away from the media spotlight. Do not compromise the security and integrity of sensitive intelligence. Challenge inappropriate press behaviour. Avoid the assumption that you can control the media or your relationships with them. Remember that there is no such thing as off the record.
ACPO MUTUAL AID
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Introduction
Mutual aid is the provision of assistance in response to an individual services inability to adequately meet the demands for personnel and resources placed upon them, particularly in situations of public disorder.
Police National Information and Co-ordination Centre

There is a statutory requirement for services to assist each other and this can be co-ordinated through the Police National Information and Coordination Centre (PNICC) which is located at New Scotland Yard and activated through the president of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) or nominee. Services may well have developed local arrangements for mutual aid. However, once PNICC is activated the national arrangements supersede any local ones. When PNICC is operating, the direction and control of police operations within a service area, including the control of officers provided under mutual aid, is the responsibility of the receiving Chief Officer. PNICC is responsible for co-ordinating any request for aid, but is not empowered to take the initiative for moving personnel from one police area to another. The primary function of PNICC is the co-ordination of the provision of personnel. However, it has other roles: to act as a national reference point for the collation and dissemination of information where it would be beneficial, even though mutual aid is not required to be able to support the president of ACPO in keeping the Government appraised of the current situation.
Call sign structure

There is a nationally agreed call sign structure to facilitate mutual aid. Details can be obtained from the National Operations Faculty at National Police Training, Bramshill.
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TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
Introduction
Essential to the overall success of any event is the implementation of a Traffic Management Plan. The objective is to assist in the management of events by maintaining the flow of traffic, thereby minimising disruption to all legitimate transport users, including pedestrians. Traffic should be considered in its widest possible context and may include air, sea and rail. Where the indications are that an event could have a significant impact on the community, the appointed Bronze Commander (Traffic) may need to consider the following:
Pre-event
Consultation with
other police services staff associations local/national roads authorities emergency services (re access routes) air, sea and rail operators motoring and transport organisations utility companies.
Reference sources
local policies and procedures The Standard National Motorway Manual Workbook National Operations Faculty.
Traffic monitoring
Automatic Number Plate Recognition System trafficmaster schemes and driver information systems air support.
Traffic management plan

The Traffic Management Plan must take into account available information/intelligence and be risk assessed. It must complement the Silver Commanders Tactical Plan and the overall event strategy. The following should be considered: traffic diversions and traffic calming measures
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Temporary Traffic Regulation Orders holding areas specific vehicles, and allocation of essential equipment impact on fleet management and ongoing policing operations recovery vehicles production of traffic contingency plans informing the public of congested areas, delays and alternative routes.
NB These lists are not intended to be exclusive or exhaustive.
During the event

managing the Traffic Plan as it develops, including the implementation of any contingency plans advising the Silver Commander on all traffic matters ensuring tactical command is maintained advising the Intelligence Unit and its manager of data obtained from ANPR and other mediums, for example on target vehicles or individuals.
Post-event
managing the co-ordinated and structured return to normal traffic conditions within the community debriefing personnel debriefing the effectiveness of the traffic management plan.
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TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE KEY POINTS
Introduction
The following issues should be considered by Silver and Bronze Commanders in the planning and implementation stage of the management of any disorder. Consideration should be given to the impact that any tactic has on the community. When considering their use, consideration should be given to existing community based partnerships, ECHR guidelines, H&S risk assessments. Tactics and deployments whilst being flexible enough to meet changing circumstances should reflect the overall strategy. The responsibilities of each tier of the public order command structure are outlined in Chapter 3 of this guide and should be read in conjunction with the following sections.
Tactical considerations
1. Negotiation
Negotiation with identified organisers or representatives may minimise or remove the potential for conflict. This may result in a reduction in the level of resources required.
2. Operational parameters
A phased operation allows the commander the flexibility to review and amend tactics as the situation evolves. Consideration should be given to: timings safe entry and exit routes environmental features objectives - geographical or strategic.
These must be clearly identified during briefings.
3. Briefing/debriefing:
effective briefing is essential to the successful completion of any operation debriefing supports intelligence and evidence gathering, addresses welfare and community issues and assists planning future events (see Chapter 5) people have a right to assembly and association. Accurate briefing of the police, based on an assessment of the likelihood or not of disorder helps to protect that right.
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4. Establishing control
In order to maintain or restore normality it may be necessary to protect vulnerable premises or establish control of certain key locations by means of appropriate tactics. Specialist resources may be appropriate.
5. Containment
can keep disorder as a localised incident, or buy time for extra resources may be used to provide intelligence/evidence can be pre-planned to minimise disruption to local community allows police and other agencies to exert control but crowd dynamics may escalate tension, and lead to confrontation can be potentially resource intensive and difficult to maintain control may be used to protect property. priority should be given to flexible and where possible pro-active responses to potential disorder. Every advantage naturally occurring or obtained, should be capitalised upon where possible territorial control should be established or regained in accordance with the strategic objectives it may be appropriate to relinquish ground, whilst maintaining control, in order to create a tactical advantage unlawful activity may be disrupted by appropriate information management.
6. Maintaining and regaining the initiative
7. Diversionary tactics
These may be utilised in order to create an advantage or disrupt unlawful activity. Some alternatives for gaining an advantage or disrupting unlawful activity are: feint/riposte vehicle horns and lights air support.
Other tactics may be used or developed to achieve a similar objective.
8. Withdraw-regroup
the need to withdraw from any public disorder on the grounds of officer safety must be balanced against the need to serve and protect the public
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ongoing assessment of the threat level should determine the tactical response changing circumstances may necessitate a withdrawal and/or the redeployment of resources it is important that a withdrawal is not viewed as a negative step. It may provide the opportunity to reconsider tactics, diffuse the situation, or disengage prior to a planned escalation in the use of force by police. less resource intensive and can be high or low profile is proactive but can be confrontational reduces potential offenders cohesion and resolve may be difficult to control and lack of defined exit routes may impact on crowd safety may displace flash point. can deplete offender numbers and weaken resolve of protagonists, assisting the police to gain or regain the initiative assists intelligence/evidence gathering removes primary offenders, inciters of criminal activity, and establishes acceptable tolerance levels given difficult circumstances it is essential that detention can be justified can be resource intensive, prisoner processing machinery required may trigger adverse response arrest policy must be considered.
9. Dispersal

10. Arrest
11. Reserves
Reserves ensure flexibility and tactical advantage. Where necessary reserves should support any proposed tactical deployment. The absence of such a capability should not prevent a positive response when immediate action is necessary. Consider: mutual aid specialist support other agencies.
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TACTICAL ADVICE
Trained tactical advisors are accredited to the national standard and hold evidence of their competence. Their use should be considered at the planning and implementation stage of every operation. The decision not to involve a tactical advisor must be documented. An advisor can provide information and recommend courses of action/inaction with their potential advantages and disadvantages. The advisors do not make any decisions or take action. The responsibility for the validity and reliability of the advice lies with the advisor, but the responsibility for the use of the advice lies with the commander.
The tactical advisor can assist with:

advice to all levels of the command structure pre-planned or spontaneous events, for example urban, environmental and single issue protest, sporting and public events risk assessment process, including appropriate control measures development of strategy and tactics use of legislation and policy post-event review.
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TACTICAL OPTIONS
Introduction
The following section sets out the identified tactical options approved by ACPO. This list is not exhaustive. Forces may develop these options to suit local need, or the circumstances of a particular event or incident. Commanders wishing to implement a tactic not listed must undertake risk assessment and obtain the views of a qualified tactical advisor. The test for their use should be based on ECHR principles of: legality necessity proportionality transparency.
Whilst listed sequentially, it may be appropriate to utilise a selected option or combination of options at any stage. At a national level it is accepted that in-force capabilities vary. This may impact upon their ability to implement a particular option. Support and assistance may be available from a variety of external sources including mutual aid in the form of personnel and equipment.
Principles
These explain what the tactics are and what they can do.
Considerations
These should be borne in mind when deciding upon the appropriate option(s). Consideration must also be given to local issues, resources and policies.
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List of tactical options

1. Normal policing 2. Community mediators 3. Directed response 4. Tactical support group/task force 5. Protected officers 6. Police support units 7. Stand off/regroup 8. Cordons and intercepts 9. Barriers 10. Batons 11. Arrest teams 12. Mounted police 13. Police dogs 14. Obstacle removal 15. Vehicle tactics 16. Artificial lighting 17. Air support 18. Screening smoke 19. CS agents.
The tactical options of: baton rounds firearms
are contained within the ACPO Manual of guidance on the Police Use of Firearms. These sections must be read before consideration can be given to use of these particular tactical options.
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1. NORMAL POLICING
Principles
1. 2. 3. Promotes close links with the community; it offers support and maintains confidence. Should be maintained for as long as possible, and returned to as soon as possible. Maintains accepted image and appearance.
Considerations
any transition from or to normal policing should take account of the safety and welfare of all persons present where it is necessary to depart from normal policing this may have the effect of weakening links with the community, partners and other agencies and may impair community information management and information/intelligence gathering.
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2. COMMUNITY MEDIATORS
Principles
1. People who can facilitate or establish dialogue thereby: - dispelling rumour - reducing conflict - providing information that supports the intelligence function. 2. Someone who formally or otherwise may: - have influence or authority - be part of the community or represents it, or - be a member of an organisation with statutory responsibilities - have an awareness of community issues. 3. May assist in achieving disorder reduction strategies.
Considerations
using mediators throughout the full range of events formal and informal links with the community including media appeals/public meetings care should be taken not to inadvertently disclose police tactics individuals or groups may have hidden agendas the provision of local arrangements for managing and supporting mediators compare information and intelligence from all available resources to aid decision making disclosure or non-disclosure of sensitive information should be a carefully considered step. It may support an early resolution of an event or incident.
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3. DIRECTED RESPONSE
Principles
1. The positive tasking of patrol officers and other existing resources, based on intelligence, to diminish the threat to public safety and potential for disorder. 2. To offer community reassurance.
Considerations
the use of community links or partner agencies in order to appreciate the mood of the community. This will assist in ensuring that any response is appropriate more specific use of intelligence including targeting individuals and associates. The use of structured briefings ensures the dissemination of intelligence the redeployment of resources to reassure the community and reduce potential for disorder engaging our partners to assist with target hardening initiatives and identifying potential hotspots the use of CCTV, whether fixed or temporary, to provide: - a strategic and tactical overview - intelligence and evidence.
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4. TACTICAL SUPPORT GROUP/TASK FORCE
Principles
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. A competent enhanced specialist resource. Highly trained, better equipped and effectively led. Mobile and flexible, offering support for commanders. A proactive or reactive option. Known by a variety of different names in different forces.
Considerations
ability of these units to perform a variety of roles including: - firearms - baton guns - public order - search - house-to-house units may be available on a full or part-time basis, in force or via mutual aid agreements deployment in the initial stages of conflict may assist in early resolution mode of dress should be appropriate to the threat level and tasks to be undertaken use of comprehensive briefings in order to: - determine policing style - give understanding of local issues - raise awareness of their impact on normal policing in the future deployment of these units to one specialist role may impinge upon their ability to effectively carry out another role.
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5. PROTECTED OFFICERS
Principles
1. 2. Officers wearing public order personal protective equipment (PPE) Are able to work effectively in a particular environment, properly trained and equipped.
Considerations
the impact protected officers may have on the situation, the participants and the public in general level of protection required in prevailing circumstances to increase officer confidence the welfare of officers deployed in full public order equipment in the prevailing circumstances the range of protective measures available including: - public order equipment - shield tactics* health and safety their use must be subject to risk assessment the use of this option in conjunction with protected vehicle tactics (information can be obtained from the National Operations Faculty).
* Contained in ACPO Public Order Tactical Trainers Manual
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6. POLICE SUPPORT UNITS
Principles
1. A nationally agreed unit of: 1 inspector 3 sergeants 18 constables 3 drivers
with protected personnel carriers. 2. Trained and equipped to Common Minimum Standards (CMS).
Considerations
established and tested callout/mobilisation procedures will ensure the effective deployment of PSUs subject to local arrangements, PSUs may be able to provide or require additional equipment, including: - method of entry equipment - hand held lighting complementing PSUs with specialist resources, including: - intelligence and evidence gatherers - local guides PSUs should be deployed as a whole unit, but may be split into serials/sections if operationally necessary.
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7. STAND OFF/REGROUP
Principles
1. 2. 3. Facilitates withdrawal of personnel when under threat. May facilitate reduction in conflict. May be used to disengage from a conflict, regroup, brief and reengage. This may be accompanied by a change in tactical options or an escalation in lawful use of force.
Considerations
the need to afford protection to the public should always be a prime consideration re-deployment of resources as soon as is practicable impact on those present perceived loss of control may reduce levels of disorder and can be used as part of the structured return to a state of normality may be used as a diversionary tactic this is difficult to co-ordinate.
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8. CORDONS AND INTERCEPTS
Principles
1. 2. A flexible human resource which allows the police to manage movement and gather intelligence. A tactic that can be used in conjunction with appropriate legislation to meet strategic or tactical objectives.
Considerations
intercepts can be used independently of cordons effective use of this option is dependent upon appropriate officer protection and sufficient resourcing appropriate use and security of personal protective and safety equipment various resources can be used including: - foot officers - dog units - mounted police - protected vehicles - barriers - automatic number plate recognition systems - traffic patrol officers intelligence and evidence gathering community or crowd safety when using intercepts in conjunction with legislation officers must comply with and record details and decisions.
ACPO 9. BARRIERS
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Principles
1. To control crowd movement.
Considerations
safety barrier use needs to be physically supervised exit points should be established and clearly identified different types of barrier, for example metal, cordon, tape barrier type should reflect intended use clearly define boundaries, routes and sterile areas more appropriate for pre-planned events than outbreaks of spontaneous disorder lack of mobility of barriers limits rapid deployment during outbreaks of disorder, use of mounted sections in conjunction with barriers must be closely monitored is a support option, not a substitute for personnel can become a weapon for hostile crowds. Securing barriers together may reduce the risk, but may trap the crowd and police.
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10. BATONS
Principles
1. 2. Equipment primarily issued for the protection of the public and police officers. Demonstrate a show of strength, facilitate dispersal or arrest.
Authority levels
For use as group tactic: 1. 2. Pre-planned: Silver Commander. Spontaneous: PSU Commander, serial/section supervisor if separated from PSU.
Whilst acknowledging the importance of these authority levels, it must be noted that they do not affect the right of an individual officer to draw and use a baton, to protect themselves, a colleague or member of the public. Any use of a baton to strike must be justified.
Considerations
officer safety warning messages should be given of impending use (Chapter 4 page 97) a show of strength can be intended as a warning message in its own right, dissuading people from violence and encouraging them to disperse level of force should be proportionate to level of threat it is a lawful order to require officers to draw batons or advance with batons. The decision to strike with a baton is for the individual officer and must be justified in the circumstances - the commander deciding to deploy officers with batons drawn must be able to justify the decision to use that group tactic side-handled batons are not suitable for use in situations of serious public disorder in circumstances where officers carry more than one baton at any one time, clear guidelines are required aftercare of injured.
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11. ARREST TEAMS
Principles
1. 2. Suitably skilled personnel acting together with protection, if appropriate. Target unlawful action of ring leaders or agitators with the intention of reducing crime and disorder.
Considerations
use of intelligence the potential effects on the community necessity to arrest arrests before, during and after any event resource availability and potential depletion appropriate training and equipment media interpretation any arrest policy in existence.
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12. MOUNTED POLICE
Principles
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Provide a show of strength and support cordons. Escort marches/groups. Sweep, divide and disperse crowds. May assist with the rapid dispersal of a violent crowd. Monitor crowd dynamics and assist with intelligence/information gathering.
Considerations
it is essential the capabilities and limitations of using police horses be fully understood by the police commander prior to their deployment advice should be sought from the most senior mounted officer available undertaking risk assessments and implementing control measures, including entry and exit routes for police and the public supporting mounted officers by deploying officers on foot, particularly when taking ground issuing a warning message prior to deploying mounted police into a crowd (Chapter 4 Page 97) the use of horses and barriers in close proximity needs careful consideration and close liaison with a senior mounted officer.
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13. POLICE DOGS
Principles
1. Support Police Support Units:
(i) deployed on foot for (a) show of strength behind police lines (b) crowd dispersal (ii) mobile in specially adapted vehicles (dog carrier) for rapid deployment.
2. Protect property:
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) police stations prisoner reception/holding areas vulnerable property and areas prevent looting.
3. Patrol the periphery to:

(i) (ii) (iii) prevent access to the area of disorder contain area of disorder provide high profile policing post disorder.
Considerations
it is essential that the capabilities and limitations of using police dogs are fully understood by the police commander prior to their deployment advice should be sought from the most senior dog officer available specific risk assessments and control measures including protective equipment and public order leads during dispersal tactics, dog handlers should be supported by officers on foot issuing a warning message prior to using police dogs in a dispersal role (Chapter 4 page 97) dogs are unable to discriminate as to who is or who is not is breaking the law.
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14. OBSTACLE REMOVAL
Principles
1. The means of removing anything that is designed to delay or obstruct.
Considerations
the strategic importance of the obstacle and whether or not its removal or disablement is an operational necessity the resources available in order to achieve desired outcome including - police specialists - emergency services - statutory groups - environmental agencies - private contractors contacting the National Operations Faculty for current trends policing measures must evolve in line with new, innovative and unlawful protest tactics must be based on risk assessment which will determine the use of appropriate specialist resources - some protestors are willing to put themselves and others at considerable risk the use of legislation against those persons identified as putting others at significant risk.
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15. VEHICLE TACTICS
Principles
1. The use of a vehicle as a tactic in itself. 2. May be used to: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) provide safe transport of personnel, equipment and prisoners provide physical protection and support for officers act as a physical filter provide a protected platform from which to gather intelligence and communicate with the crowd discourage unlawful behaviour by a show of strength provide lighting.
3. Because the vehicle is used as a tactic in itself drivers must receive the following driver training: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) a standard level course a personnel carrier course a vehicle tactics course appropriate driver refresher training.
4. Should be carried out using suitably equipped and protected vehicles.
Considerations
tactical use of protected vehicles may be a sensitive issue which could have a positive or negative effect on the community undertaking risk assessments and implementing appropriate control measures, including entry and exit routes for police and the public use of emergency warning equipment, including sirens, may affect behaviour patterns issue a warning message prior to deploying vehicle tactics into a crowd (Chapter 4 Page 97) effective communication between the ground commander and vehicles is essential to maintain control information on current vehicle tactics and driver training can be obtained from National Operations Faculty.
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16. ARTIFICIAL LIGHTING
Principles
1. Illuminate an area. 2. Reduce health and safety hazards. 3. Reduce anonymity. 4. Assist intelligence and evidence gathering functions.
Considerations
the lighting systems available include: - night sun - vehicle mounted - hand held - stanchions the prevailing conditions and desired objective(s).
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17. AIR SUPPORT
Principles
1. Assists in providing a strategic and/or tactical overview. 2. May be used for intelligence and evidence gathering. 3. Effective in monitoring of crowd safety and traffic movement.
Considerations
the limitations of using air support should be fully understood prior to deployment seeking advice from the air support staff differing types of Air Support Units available include: - helicopter - fixed wing - airship - balloon availability and cost their use for spontaneous incidents, before, during and after planned events assist in effective deployment of other resources raised noise levels from aircraft can hamper communication.
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18. SCREENING SMOKE
Principles
1. Conceals police movement and/or deployment.
Authority levels
1. Officer of at least the rank of assistant chief constable/commander. 2. Designated officer (inspector or above, suitably selected and trained) who can make an independent assessment at the scene that the situation still justifies the use of the particular tactic.
Considerations
is used when conventional methods of policing have been tried and failed or are unlikely to succeed if tried used in serious public disorder, where there is the potential for loss of life, serious injury, widespread destruction and whether such action is likely to reduce that risk must only be used by trained officers avenues of escape must be identified to avoid panic and minimise the risk of injury allegations may be made that smoke has been used to mask unlawful or questionable police activity may be used as a cover for demonstrators to commit crime wind direction is suitable in situations of serious disorder involving firearms where casualties/bodies need to be recovered issuing a warning message prior to use (Chapter 4 page 97).
ACPO 19. CS AGENTS
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Principles
1. To disperse a riotous assembly in life-threatening situations.
Authority levels
1. Chief officer or, when absent, the acting chief officer. 2. Designated officer (assistant chief constable/commander, suitably selected and trained - if unavailable chief superintendent or superintendent) who can make an independent assessment at the scene that the situation still justifies the use of the particular tactic. Authority can only be given in accordance with Home Office Guidelines. Following operational use of CS agents, the chief officer should submit a written report to the Home Secretary as soon as is practicable. Whilst acknowledging the importance of these authority levels, it must be noted that they do not affect the right of an individual officer to use personal issue CS incapacitant spray, if such use can be justified.
Considerations
atmospheric conditions and wind direction and effect on unprotected persons avenues of escape must be identified to avoid panic and minimise the risk of injury impact on the community and media presentation medical assistance and aftercare procedures including decontamination and subsequent monitoring use in serious public disorder, as a last resort, where loss of life, serious injury and widespread damage are likely to be used when conventional methods have been tried and failed, or are unlikely to succeed and where such action is judged to be likely to reduce that risk require warning messages to be given to inform all persons present of impending use (Chapter 4 page 97) must only be used by trained and suitably equipped officers.
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WARNING MESSAGES
Introduction
Warning messages to the public give a clear indication of the course of action to be taken. The ECHR principles of necessity, lawfulness and proportionality are prime considerations. They may also highlight public safety issues.
Delivery
May include: verbal/public address system/sky shout written/banners/hand bills electronic notice boards.
Audience
Consider: groups of differing sizes non English speaking hearing difficulties physically impaired visually impaired the audience may seek to obstruct or frustrate the delivery of the message. Police should seek to demonstrate that the delivery of the message was genuinely attempted.
Presentation
When giving a warning message the following information must be recorded: i. ii. iii. The situation before. Time, date and place of delivery. Content of message.
iv. Method of delivery. v. Officer giving the warning.
vi. The situation after.
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Method of recording
video audio written. some legislation requires the delivery of a message prior to implementation of a particular legal power.
Statute
Specimen warning messages

In a situation where the police can justify the use of force or an escalation in the use of force, warning messages should be given, if practicable and time permits. If a tactic is to be used over a period of time, or a large area, it may be desirable to repeat the warning message(s).
ATTENTION, ATTENTION, THIS IS A POLICE WARNING

(SEE BELOW)
DISPERSE IMMEDIATELY OR .. WILL BE DEPLOYED. NO FURTHER WARNING WILL BE GIVEN.
Tactical options that require a warning message: firearms baton rounds CS agents screening smoke vehicle tactics dogs horses batons force will be used.
Other warning messages may be appropriate. The contents of which should reflect local circumstances and be recorded.
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TRAINING PRINCIPLES
Training and development has been identified by Government, ACPO and Her Majestys Inspectors of Constabulary as being critical to the achievement of operational outcomes. The following points must be considered: Training should be focused to meet both current and future operational needs and must be considered as an integral part of the risk assessment process. Training should be to a common minimum standard, incorporating nationally recognised terminology. Commanders should attend command level courses recommended by the ACPO Public Order Sub-Committee. The specialist knowledge and skills required by public order commanders must be linked to their respective personal development plans, to ensure vital skills such as leadership, decision-making and strategic planning are enhanced. Workplace assessment and development can be extremely beneficial in enhancing operational effectiveness. Tactical advisors should be trained on the National Public Order Tactical Advisor Programme. Specialist skills areas such as driving and the use of baton guns should be trained in accordance with the relevant ACPO committee guidelines. Training should not be restricted to those commanding or policing an event. Other notable key personnel, for example, briefing and debriefing officers, communications staff, should receive training relevant to their role. Training should not be seen as an activity in its own right and should be designed following a needs analysis. Aims and objectives should be set and closely monitored. Validation and evaluation should form part of the training process. The result of evaluations and operational debriefs should be used to direct and develop future training. Police services should ensure they have in place an effective system for keeping and monitoring training records. There are additional benefits to be obtained from joint exercises, inter agency and inter disciplinary training.
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THE NATIONAL OPERATIONS FACULTY

The National Operations Faculty (NOF) can provide information to assist the police service in its operational police management. One of the focus areas for the NOF is Public Order. The NOF can assist in the preparation for and response to disorder, by identifying trends in disorder, in protestor activity and police tactics and strategy.
The functions of the NOF are:

Training including both structured training events and training specifically designed to meet identified needs which can be delivered in the workplace. Seminars and conferences which address topical issues of current importance. Consultancy that aims to provide training information and support to planners, commanders and advisors who are responsible for events and incidents where there is a risk to public safety or a potential for disorder. NOF officers are available to attend operational debriefs, to research and identify appropriate material for addition to the database. This consultancy can be accessed by making direct contact with the Public Order Section at the NOF. Database and help desk to provide information on ACPO policy, current practice, and the availability of training. The faculty also holds details of specialist resources from within the service and outside. This database is accessible at all times via a 24 hour standby officer. Research including the gathering and analysis of information on current trends in public order policing.
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BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING
Introduction
Good communication is crucial to the organisation and management of events or incidents. Effective briefing and debriefing will act as quality assurance for operational effectiveness and should be performed by suitably trained personnel. It must be borne in mind that disclosure implications may arise in both criminal and civil proceedings in respect of briefings and debriefings.
Briefing
All staff should be thoroughly briefed prior to participation in an event. Briefings should: be concise include relevant information include evaluated intelligence include the strategy and the tactical plan include health and safety information include specific duties include advice on legal implications be recorded. Experience has shown that the adoption of the IIRMAC briefing model: Information Intention Risk assessment Method Administration Communication assists in the communication process.
Debriefing
Debriefing should be regarded as part of the planning process for future events. Its purpose should not be to apportion blame, but to identify the most and least effective aspects of the operation.
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Debriefs should: be carried out in chronological order be structured make use of open questions to encourage participation identify and promote good practice be timely if appropriate (hot debriefs can be a suitable forum for ensuring that all evidence and intelligence has been gathered). The following chart shows a debrief model:
Who attended and where?
What next time?
What happened?
What did we learn?
Why?
Some practical examples of debrief structures (using the model above) are shown below.
Structured agenda one grouping roles and areas of responsibility together for example initial response to scene, cordon officers, communications, casualty bureau debriefing structure i. areas of good practice (what went well)
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ii. iii.
areas to avoid (what did not go well) areas for further research (is there a better way of doing it?)
the formulation of actions in the three areas above to consolidate the debriefing process.
Structured agenda two aims of debrief emerging issues i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. communications equipment human resources planning and briefings command and tactics welfare other issues
key learning points for individuals i. ii. iii. most significant thing learnt during event/incident what would be done differently if facing similar operation? how could operation be improved?
actions.
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WELFARE ISSUES
The welfare of all personnel is of vital importance if an efficient service is to be provided to the community. Personnel suffering from the anxiety of personal problems, whether associated with their private life or their work, cannot function effectively. Responsibility for welfare in the first instance rests with line managers, who may seek assistance from staff associations and occupational health representatives.
Critical incident debriefing

Many events in which police staff are involved are outside the range of normal human experience or may be particularly distressing. The following mechanism exists to allow for such personnel to be sensitively debriefed. The following chart shows a critical incident debriefing model:
Critical incident
Mini debrief by supervisor
Supervisor contacts Welfare Officer or other appropriate body
Yes
Is it critical ?
No
Welfare deploys debriefers Discuss alternatives Debrief 48 to 72 hours after incident
Seriously affected officers. Professional welfare support
One month later. Follow-up by professional welfare support
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SUPPORT ELEMENTS
CHAPTER 5
Critical incident debriefing must be carried out by trained individuals and should be conducted approximately two days after the incident; not immediately or on the same day. Trained welfare professionals are best placed to offer advice. Critical incident defusing which may be best described as initial help and support, is intended to lessen the impact of the incident and restore the individuals equilibrium and may also be considered immediately after an incident.
ACPO
Manual of Guidance
on K ee p
Peace the ing
Index
ACPO INDEX
109
About the guide............................................. 7 What is its status?............................... 7 What does it do? ................................. 7 What does it not do? ........................... 8 Who is it for? ....................................... 7 Air support................................................... 93 Arrest teams ............................................... 87 Artificial lighting ........................................... 92 Barriers ...................................................... 85 Batons ...................................................... 86 Briefing ........................................ 46, 69, 103 Bronze Commander ................................... 37 Bronze support ........................................... 38 Building the peace ...................................... 11 Command ................................................... 35 Command communications..................... 38 Command protocols ................................... 40 Command structure illustration................ 39 Communications ......................................... 38 Community information management ........ 19 Community mediators................................. 78 Conflict management model....................... 13 Contingency and mobilisation planning...... 47 Cordons and intercepts .............................. 84 Crime and disorder: a strategic model ......... 9 Crime management .................................... 55 Crime scene management illustration..... 58 Critical incident debriefing......................... 107 Crowd behaviour......................................... 26 Crowd management principles................... 27 CS agents ................................................... 95 Debrief model illustration ....................... 104 Debriefing...................................... 46, 69, 103 Directed response ...................................... 79 Disclosure and exhibits officer(s) ............... 57 Disorder model ........................................... 23 Considerations .................................. 25 Diagram ............................................. 24 Stages explained............................... 23 Dogs police.............................................. 89 File handling teams .................................... 57 Foreword....................................................... 5 Gold Commander ....................................... 35 Gold support................................................ 36 Horses (mounted police) ............................ 88 Hospital teams ............................................ 57 Human rights......................................... 15, 47 Index .................................................... 109
In-house intelligence units ..........................51 Intelligence and information........................49 During event.......................................54 Pre-event............................................51 Post-event..........................................54 Intelligence structure illustration ..............53 Intercepts ..................................................84 Interview teams...........................................57 Investigation closure ................................59 Keeping the peace..................................9, 11 Liaison with organisers ...............................43 List of tactical options..................................75 Loss of life ..................................................59 Appointment of staff...........................60 Body recovery....................................60 Contingency liaison............................59 Control of the scene...........................60 Mobilisation plans........................................47 Mounted police............................................88 Mutual aid ..................................................65 Call sign structure..............................65 Co-ordination centre (PNICC) ...........65 National Crime Intelligence Service............50 National Intelligence Model.........................50 National Operations Faculty (NOF) ..........101 National Public Order Intelligence Unit.......49 Nature and scope of disorder .....................21 Nature of tensions and conflicts .................10 Normal policing............................................77 Operational orders ......................................45 Obstacle removal ........................................90 Planning ..................................................43 Briefing/debriefings ............................46 Compliance with ECHR .....................47 Contingency and mobilisation............47 Operational orders .............................45 Police dogs..................................................89 Police support unit.......................................82 PR strategy .................................................61 How to achieve objectives .................62 Objectives ..........................................61 Target audiences ...............................63 What to avoid .....................................63 Prisoner reception.......................................57 Protected officers........................................81 Reserves ..................................................71 Restoring the peace....................................11 Screening smoke ........................................94
110
INDEX
Senior Investigating Officer (SIO)...............55 Silver Commander ......................................36 Silver support ..............................................37 SIO ..............................................................55 Appointment of...................................55 During event responsibilities .............56 Role of SIO ........................................55 Post-event responsibilities.................59 Pre-event responsibilities ..................55 Specimen warning messages ....................98 Stand off/regroup.........................................83 Strategic considerations .............................31 Developing partnerships....................31 Ethical considerations .......................32 Intelligence.........................................31 Legal ..................................................34 Planning .............................................34 Preferred outcomes...........................32 Resourcing ........................................33 What is the situation? ........................31 The key points ...................................31 Strategic principles......................................29 Effective resourcing...........................30 Initial response...................................29 Tactical deployment...........................30 Strategy definition........................................35 Strategy meeting .........................................44 Tactical advice ............................................73 Tactical considerations ...............................69 Arrest .................................................71 Briefing/debriefing..............................69 Containment ......................................70 Dispersal............................................71 Diversionary tactics ...........................70 Establishing control ...........................70 Maintaining and regaining initiative ...70 Negotiation.........................................69 Operational parameters.....................69 Reserves ...........................................71 Withdraw/regroup ..............................70 The key points ...................................69
Tactical options ...........................................75 Air support..........................................93 Arrest teams ......................................87 Artificial lighting ..................................92 Barriers ..............................................85 Batons ................................................86 Community mediators........................78 Cordons and intercepts .....................84 CS agents ..........................................95 Directed response .............................79 Introduction ........................................75 Mounted police.................................. 88 Normal policing.................................. 77 Obstacle removal .............................. 90 Police dogs........................................ 89 Police support unit............................. 82 Protected officers.............................. 81 Screening smoke .............................. 94 Stand off/regroup............................... 83 Tactical support/group task force ..... 80 Vehicle tactics ................................... 91 Tactical planning meeting........................... 45 Tactical support group................................ 80 Tactics definition...................................... 36 Task force................................................... 80 The function of the NOF........................... 101 The National Operations Faculty ............. 101 Threat and risk assessment....................... 47 Traffic management ................................... 67 During the event................................ 68 Post-event ......................................... 68 Pre-event........................................... 67 Traffic management plan ........................... 68 Training principles ...................................... 99 Use of force................................................ 17 Vehicle tactics ............................................ 91 Warning messages .................................... 97 Welfare issues .......................................... 107

ACPO Manual Guidance Keeping Peace

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ACPO Manual Guidance Keeping Peace

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Peace the ing

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

Page No FOREWORD.............................................................. 5 1. ABOUT THE GUIDE .................................................................7

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS ............................................ 31

TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS ..............................................69

SUPPORT ELEMENTS ............................................................99

INDEX ................................................................. 109

CONTENTS AND FOREWORD

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

CONTENTS AND FOREWORD

Peace the ing

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

WHAT IS ITS STATUS?

WHAT DOES IT DO?

ABOUT THE GUIDE

WHAT DOES IT NOT DO?

Peace the ing

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

KEEPING THE PEACE

Crime and disorder: a strategic model

Hot Spot management

Crime and Disorder Reduction

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

The nature of tensions and conflicts

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

Building, keeping and restoring the peace

Building and keeping the peace

Restoring the peace

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

A Conflict Management Model

Information/ intelligence received

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

THE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN RIGHTS

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

COMMUNITY INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

NATURE AND SCOPE OF DISORDER

Disorder associated with spontaneous incidents, for example:

Single issue protests, for example:

Lawful public events, for example:

Unlawful public events, for example:

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

Disorder model the stages explained

These stages are shown in diagramatic form overleaf.

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

Disorder model - considerations

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

Crowd management principles

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW

MANUAL OF GUIDANCE ON KEEPING THE PEACE

KEEPING THE PEACE AN OVERVIEW