Brit. J. Phil. Sci.

4I

(I990),

473-49I

Printedin GreatBritain

'Whatplace,then, for a creator?': Hawkingon Godand Creation

WILLIAM LANE CRAIG

1 2 3 4

Introduction God assufficient reason cause first God asmetaphysically mpo fi t God aste rallyrs ca use 4.1 Hawking's critique 4.2 Assessment 5 Conclusion

INTRODUCTION

drawnby the workingin the fieldof cosmologyseemto be irresistibly Scientists ofFredHoyle, the Now StephenHawkinghas followed lead lureof philosophy. Carl Sagan, RobertJastrow,and P. C. W. Davies in speculatingon what modelshave forthe existence currentcosmological implications philosophical A best-seller BriefHistoryof Time[19 88] is of God.Althoughhisrecent,popular the free refreshingly of the acrimonythat characterized worksof some of his that Hawkingis one predecessors, stillmightcome away with the impression to no moresympathetic theismthan they were.A recentarticleon Hawking's tabloidStern, forexample,headlined,'KeinPlatzfurden bookin the German liebenGott',and concluded,'In his systemof thought there is no roomfor a is God.Not that Godis dead:Godnever existed'lThis impression no Creator by doubtabettedby the fact that the book carriesan introduction Sagan,in which he writes,
aboutthe absenceof God.Theword Thisis also a bookaboutGod. . . or perhaps famous on Godfillsthese pages.Hawkingembarks a questto answerEinstein's is Hawking questionaboutwhetherGodhadany choicein creatingthe universe. attempting,as he explicitlystates, to understandthe mind of God.And this makes all the more unexpectedthe conclusionof the effort,at least so far:a universewith no edgein space,no beginningnor end in time,andnothingfora to Creator do. (p. x)
Stern (undated photocopy), p. 209. 'In seinem Gedankengebaude ist fur einen schopferischen

Gott kein Raum. Gott ist nicht einmal tot, Gott hat nie existiert.'

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2 GOD AS SUFFICIENT REASON

Butsuch a characterization Hawking's of position quitemisleading. point is In of fact,it is falsethat thereis no placeforGodin Hawking's systemor that God is absent.Forwhileit is truethathe rejects God's as Creator the universe role of ln the senseof an efficierlt cause producing absolutely temporal an first eSect, rlevertheless Hawkingappears retainGod's as the Sufficient to role Reasonfor the existenceof the universe,the finalanswerto the question,'Whyis there something ratherthan nothing?' distinguishes He betweenthe questionswhat the universeis and whythe universeis, asserting that scientistshave beentoo occupiedwith the formerquestion to be able to ask the latter, whereas philosophers, whose job it is to ask why-questions, have been unableto keep up with the technicalscientific theoriesconcerning originof the universe the and so have shunnedmetaphysical questionsin favorof linguisticanalysis. ButHawking himselfis clearthat having(tohis satisfaction least)answered at the questionwhat the universeis, he is still left with the unansweredwhyquestion:
The usual approach of science of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go to all the bother of existing? Is the unified theory so compelling that it brings about its own existence? Ordoes it need a creator, and, if so, does he have any other eSect on the universe?And who created him? (p. 1 74)

Pursuingthe questionwhy we and the universeexist is a quest that, in Hawking'sview, should occupy peoplein every walk of life. 'If we find the answerto that, it wouldbe the ultimatetriumphof human reason forthen we shouldkrlowthe mind of God'(p. 175). At facevalue,then, GodforHawking servesas the Sufficient Reasonforthe existenceof the universe.Ofcourse,'the mind of God'might well be a mere fon deparler, signifyingsomethinglike 'the mearlingof existence';2 as but, Sagan noted, Hawkingseems very much in earrlestabout determining the proper of Godas traditionally role conceivedirlthe schemeof things.Andit is interestingto note that when a reader of an earlier summary draft of Hawking'sbook in AmericanScientist (Hawking[1984]), complairzed that Hawkingseemedafraidto admitthe existersce a Supreme of Being,Hawking countered that 'I thoughtI had leftthe questionof the existenceof a Supreme Beingcompletely open.... It wouldbe perfectly consistentwith all we know to say that there was a Being who was responsible the laws of physics' for (Hawking[198 5], p. 12). Now it mightseemat firstsomewhatbaffling Hawkingsensesthe need that
2

Cf.the remark Pagels:'Physicists, by regardless theirbelief,may invokeGodwhen theyfeel of issuesofprinciple at stakebecausetheGod thephysicists cosmicorder' are of is (Pagels[1982], p. 83).

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to explain why the universe exists, since, as we shall see, he proposes a model of the universe according to which the universe is 'completely self-contained and not affected by anything outside itself', is 'neither created nor destroyed', but just is (p. 136). On his analysis, the universe is eternal (in the sense that it has neither beginning nor end and exists tenselessly) and therefore has no temporally antecedent cause. But if the cosmos is eternal and uncaused, what sense does it make to ask why it exists? Leibniz,however, saw the sense of such a question (Leibniz[169 7], [1 714a], [1 714b]). He held that it is intelligible to ask why it is that an eternal being exists, since the existence of such a being is still logically contingent. Since it is possible that nothing exists, why is it that an eternal cosmos exists rather than nothing? There must still be a Sufficient Reason why there exists somethirlgeven an eternal something rather than nothing. Leibnizconcluded that this Sufficient Reason can only be found in a metaphysically necessary being, that is, a being whose nature is such that if it exists, it exists in all possible worlds. Hawking would be interested to learn that analytic philosophy in the past two decades has burst the skins of linguistic analysis and that certain analytic philosophers doing metaphysics have defended Leibniz'sconception of God as a metaphysically necessary being (Plantinga [1974], pp. 197-221; Adams [1971], pp. 284-91; Rowe [1975], pp. 202-21). Given the existence of such a being, Hawking need not trouble himself about who created God, since God, being rnetaphysically necessary and ultimate, can have no cause or ground of being.3 Thus, it seems to me that far from banishing God from reality, Hawking invites us to make Him the basis of reality. Indeed, I think Hawking's book may rightly be read as a discussion of two forms of the cosmological argument: the so-called kalamcosmological argument for a temporally First Cause of the universe, which he rejects, and the Leibnizian cosmological argument for a Sufficient Reason of the universe, which he prefers.4In this paper, I am not concerned to evaluate the Leibniziancosmological argument. LikeHawking, I feel the force of Leibniz's reasoning and am inclined to accept it; but unlike Hawking, it seems to me that the kalamargument is plausible as well. Accordingly, we need to ask, has Hawking eliminated the need for a Creator?
3 GOD AS METAPtIYSICALLY FIRST CAUSE

Now at one level, the answer to that question is an immediate No.' For Hawking has a theologically deficient understanding of creation. Traditionally creation was thought to involve two aspects: creatiooriginans and creatio
3

On Godas the groundof being for other metaphysically necessaryentitiessee Morris and Menzel [1986] andMenzel [1987]. TheseboldessaysshouldconvinceHawking the great that tradition metaphysics beenfullyrestored analyticphilosophy! of has in Onthese arguments, well as the Thomistargument,see Craig[1980]. as

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continuans. firstconcerned The God's bringing finiterealityintobeingat a point in time beforewhich no such realityexisted,whereas the second involved (amongotherthings)God'spreservation finiterealityin beingmomentby of moment. Only the first notion involves the idea of a beginning. Creatio continuans could involve a universeexistingfromeverlastingto everlasting, that is to say, a universetemporally infinitein both the pastand the futureat any pointof time.Thus,forexample,ThomasAquinas,confronted the one on hand with Aristotelianand Neo-Platonicargumentsfor the eternityof the world, and, on the other hand, with Arabickalam-style argumentsfor the finitude the past,concluded of aftera lengthyconsideration arguments of both proandcontra that it can be proved neitherthat the universehad a beginning nor that it didnot, but that the questionof the temporal originof the universe must be decidedon the basisof divinerevelation,that is, the teachingof the Scriptures(ThomasAquinas Summacontragentiles2.32-38; cf. idem,De aeternitate mundi contramurmurantes). Giventhis position,it appearsat first paradoxical Aquinasalso heldthat the doctrineof divinecreatio nihilo that ex can be proved(Summa contragentiles2.16). But once we understandthat creationin the sense of creatio continuans involvesno notion of a temporal beginningthe paradox disappears. affirm To that Godcreatesthe worldout of nothingis to affirm that Godis the immediate cause of the world'sexistence, that there is no metaphysical intermediary between(Sodand the unlverse. Actually, what Hawkinghas done is fail to distirlguish from the kalam argumentyet a thirdformof the cosmological argumentt which we may call the Thomistcosmologicalargument,that comes to expressionin Thomas's ThirdWay (Summa theologiae 2. 3) and his Deenteet essentia According la. 3. to Aquinas,all finitebeings,even those like the heavenly spheresor prime matterwhich have absolutelyno potentialfor generationor corruption and are therefore nature everlasting, nevertheless by are metaphysically contingent in that they are composedof essenceand existence,that is to say, their essentialproperties not entailthat such beingsexist.Iftheseessencesareto do beexemplified, therefore, theremustbe a beingin whomessenceandexistence are not distinctand which therefore uncaused,and it is this beingwhich is is the Creatorof all finite beings, which He producesby instantiatingtheir essences.Hence,creatio nihiIo not, in Aquinasts ex does view, entaila temporal beginningof the universe. Evenif we maintain,paceAquinas,that a full-blooded doctrineof creation does entail a temporal beginningof the universe,the pointremainsthat this doctrine entailsmuchmorethanthat,so that even ifGoddidnot bringthe also universeinto beingat a pointof time as in Hawking's model,it is stillthe case thatthereis mllchforHimto do,forwithoutHisactiveandcontinualbestowal of existence to the universe,the whole of finite reality would be instantly annihilatedand lapse into non-being.Thus, any claim that Hawkinghas eliminatedthe Creator seen to be theologically is frivolous.

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But has Hawking succeeded even in obviating the role of the Creator as temporally First Cause?This seems to me highly dubious, for Hawking's model is founded on philosophical assumptions that are at best unexamined and unjustified and at worst false. To see this, let us recall the fundamental form of the kalamcosmological argument, so that the salient points of Hawking's refutation will emerge.5 Proponents of that argument have presented a simple syllogism: (1 ) Whatever begins to exist has a cause. (2) The universe began to exist. (3) Therefore, the universe has a cause. Analysis of the cause of the universe established in (3 ) further discloses it to be uncaused, changeless, timeless, immaterial, and personal.

critique 4.1. Hawking's

Hawking is vaguely aware of the tradition of this argument in Christian, Muslim, and Jewish thought and presents a somewhat muddled version of it in chapter one (p. 7). But it is interesting that, unlike Davies, Hawking does not attack premise (1); on the contrary, he implicitly assents to it. Hawking repeatedly states that on the classical GTRBig Bang model of the universe an initial space-time singularity is unavoidable, and he does not dispute that the origin of the universe must therefore require a supernatural cause. He points out that one could identify the Big Bang as the instant at which Godcreated the universe (p. 9). He thinks that a number of attempts to avoid the Big Bang were probably motivated by the feeling that a beginning of time 'smacks of divine intervention' (p. 46). It is not clear what part such a motivation plays in Hawking's own proposal, but he touts his model as preferablebecause 'There would be no singularities at which the laws of science broke down and no edge of space-time at which one would have to appeal to Godor some new law to set the boundary conditions for space-time' (p. 136). On Hawking's view, then, given the classical Big Bang model, the inference to a Creator or temporally First Cause seems natural and unobjectionable. Hawking's strategy is rather to dispute premise (2). Typically, proponents of supported (2) by arguing against the possibility of an infinite temporal kalam regress of events. This tradition eventually became enshrined in the thesis of Kant's First Antinomy concerning time.6 Hawking's response to this line of argument is very ingenious. He claims that the argument of the thesis and antithesis 'are both based on his unspoken assumption that time continues back forever, whether or not the universe had existed forever', but that this
6

argument,see Craig[1979a, b, cl, [1985]. and 5 Forexposition defenseof the kalam see Fordiscussion, Craig[1979d].

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assumption is false because '. . . the concept of time has no meaning before the beginning of the universe' (p. 8). This brief retort is somewhat muddled, but I think the sense of it is the following: In the antithesis Kant assumes that 'Since the beginning is an existence which is precededby a time in which the thing is not, there must have been a preceding time in which the world was not, i.e. an empty time' (Kant [1 7811, A42 7-28/B45 5-56, p. 39 7). But on some version of a relational view of time, time does not exist apart from change; therefore, the first event marked the inception of time. Thus, there was no empty time prior to the beginning of the universe. In the thesis, on the other hand, Kant states, 'Ifwe assume that the world has no beginning in time, then up to every givexlmoment an eternity has elapsed and there has passed away in the world an infinite series of successive states of things' (Kant (1 781], A42 7-28/B45 556, p. 397). To my knowledge, scarcely anyone has ever thought to call into question this apparently innocuous assumption, but it is precisely here that Hawking launches his attack. Unlike other detractors of Kant's argument, Hawking does not dispute the impossibility of forming an actual infinite by successive addition; rather he challenges the more fundamental assumption that a beginningless universe entails an infinite past. The central thrust of Hawking's book and of his proposed cosmological model is to show that a beginningless universe may be temporally finite. Hence, kalam-style arguments aimed at proving the finitude of the past need not be disputed, for such arguments do not succeed in establishing (2), that the universe began to exist. Therefore, the universe need not have a cause, and God's role as Creatoris circumscribedto that envisioned in the Thomist and Leibnizianversions of the cosmological argument. This is a highly original, if not unique, line of attack on the kalam cosmological argument, and it will be interesting to see how Hawking essays to put it through.7 It is Hawking's belief that the introduction of quantum mechanics into the GTR-basedBig Bang model will be the key to success. Noting that at the Big Bang the density of the universe and the curvature of space-time become infinite, Hawking explains that '. . . there must have been a time in the very early universe when the universe was so small, that one could no longer ignore the small scale eSects of . . . quantum mechanics' and that the initial singularity predictedby the GTR'can disappearonce quantum eSects are taken into account' (pp. 50-1). What is needed here is a quantum theory of gravity, and although Hawking admits that no such theory exists, still he insists that we do have a good idea of what some of its central features
7

Onefeelsa bit diffldent aboutcriticizing someone'sviews as they are expressed a popular in exposition his thoughtrather of thanin his technical papers. the factis thatit is onlyin his But popularexpositionthat Hawkingfeels free to reflectphilosophically the metaphysical on implications his model.Forexample, of imaginary time, which playsso criticala rolein his thought,is scarcely evenmentioned hisrelevant in technical paper (Hartle Hawking 1983], & [ p. 2960). In any case, I have in no instancebasedmy criticism the infelicities on inherent in popular exposition technicalsubjects. of

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will be (p. 133). First, it will incorporate Feynman's sum-over-histories approach to quantum mechanics. According to this approach to quantum theory, an elementary particle does not follow a single path between two space-time points (that is, have a single history), but it is rather conceived as taking all possible paths connecting those points. In order to calculate the probability of a particle's passing through any given space-time point, one sums the waves associated with every possible history that passes through that point, histories represented by waves having equal amplitude and opposite phase mutually cancelling so that only the most probablehistories renzain.But in order to do this without generating intractable infinities, Hawking explains, one must use imaginary numbers for the values of the time co-ordinate. When this is done, it 'has an interesting eSect on space-time: the distinction between time and space disappears completely' (p. 134). The resulting space-time is Euclidian. The second feature which any theory of quantum gravity must possess is that the gravitational field is represented by curved space-time. When this feature of the theory is combined with the first, the analogue of the history of a particle now becomes a complete curved space-time that represents the history of the whole universe. Moreover, 'To avoid the technical difficultiesin actually performing the sum over histories, these curved space-times must be taken to be Euclidean. That is, time is imaginary and is indistinguishable from directions in space' (p. 135). On the basis of these two features, Hawking proposes a model in which space-time is the four-dimensional analogue to the surface of a sphere. It is finite, but boundless, and so possesses no initial or terminal singularities. Hawking writes, there are In the classicaltheoryof gravity,which is basedon real space-time, only two possibleways the universecan behave:either it has existedfor an at infinitetime,or else it had a beginningat a singularity somefinitetimein the past. In the quantumtheoryof gravity,on the other hand, a thirdpossibility is in space-times, which the timedirection arises.Becauseone is usingEuclidean to for in on the samefootingas directions space,it is possible space-time be finite that formeda boundaryor edge.... in extent and yet to have no singularities at . . . Therewouldbe no singularities which the laws of sciencebrokedown to at andno edgeofspace-time whichone wouldhaveto appeal Godorsomenew law to set the boundaryconditionsfor space-time....The universewould be by and self-contained not aSected anythingoutsideitself.It wouldbe completely It neithercreatednor destroyed. wouldjust BE.(pp. 135-6) Hawking emphasizes that his model is merely a proposal, and so far as he describes it, it makes no unique successful predictions, which would be necessary to transform it from a metaphysical theory to a plausible scientific theory. Still Hawking believes that

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The idea that space and time may form a closed surface without boundary ... has profound implications for the role of Godin the aSairsof the universe.... So long as the universe had a begirlning,we could suppose it had a creator. But if the universe is really completely self-contained, having no boundary or edge, it would have neither beginning Ilor end. What place, then, for a creator? (pp. 140-1)

4.2 Assessment
Unfortunately, Hawking's model is rife with controversial philosophical assumptions, to which he gives no attention. Since Hawking is trying to explain how the universe could exist without the necessity of God'sbringing it into being at a point of time, it is evident that he construes his theory to be, not merely an engaging mathematical model, but a realistic description of the universe. On a non-realist interpretation of science, there wouId be no contradiction between his model and temporal creatio nihilo.Hence, the ex central question that needs to be addressed in assessing his model as an alternative to divine creation is whether it represents a realistic picture of the world. Now to me at least it seems painfully obvious that Hawking faces severe difficulties here. Both Quantum Theory and Relativity Theory inspire acute philosophical questions as to the extent to which they picture reality. To begin with Quantum Theory, most philosophers and reflective physicists would not disagree with the remarks of Hawking's erstwhile collaboratorRoger Penrose:
I should begin by expressing my general attitude to present-day quantum theory, by which I mean standard, non-relativistic quantum mechanics. The theory has, indeed, two powerful bodies of fact in its favour, and only one thing against it. First, in its favour are all the marvelous agreements that the theory has had with every experimental result to date. Second, and to me almost as important, it is a theory of astonishing and profound mathematical beauty. The one thing that can be said against it is that it makes absolutely no sense! (Penrose [1986], p. 129)

Does Hawking believe, for example, that Feynman's sum-over-histories approach describes what really happens, that an elementary particle really does follow all possible space-time paths until its wave function is collapsed by measurement? I think most people would find this fantastic. If he does interpret this approach realistically, then what justification is there for such an interpretation?Why not a Copenhagen Interpretation which eschews realism altogether with regard to the quantum world? Or an alternative version of the Copenhagen Interpretationwhich holds that no quantum reality exists until it is measured? Why not hold that the uncollapsed wave function is, in Bohr's words, 'only an abstract quantum mechanical description' rather than a descriptionof how nature is? A disavowal of realism on the quantum level does not imply a rejection of a critical realism on the macroscopic level. Orwhy not

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interpret quantum mechanics as a statistical theory about ensembles of particles rather than about the behavior of any individual particle? On this interpretation, the wave function describes the collective behavior of particles in identical systems, and we could quit worrying about the measurement problem. Or again, what about a Neo-realist interpretation along the lines of the de Broglie-Bohm pilot wave? A non.local hidden variables theory, in which a particle follows a definite space-time trajectory, is compatible with all the experiment and evidence for quantum theory, is mathematically rigorous and complete, and yet avoids the philosophical difficulties occasioned by the typical wave functional analysis. Obviously, it is not my intention to endorse any one of these views, but merely to point out that a realistic interpretation of Feynman's sum-over-histories approach on Hawking's part would be gratuitous. In general, I think we should do well to reflect on de Broglie's attitude to the mathematical formalism of Quantum Theory. As Georges Lochak notes, 'He does not consider that mathematical models have any ontological value, especially geometrical representations in abstract spaces; he sees them as practical mathematical instruments among others and only uses them as such . . .' (Lochak [1984], p. 20). The principle of the superposition of wave functions is a case in point. Simply because a mathematical model is operationally successful, we are not entitled to construe its representations physically. Feynman himself gave this sharp advice: 'I think it is safe to say that no one understands quantum mechanics. Do not keep saying to yourself, if you possibly can avoid it, "But how can it be like that?" because you will go "down the drain" into a blind alley from which nobody has yet escaped. Nobody can know how it can be like that.'8 One can use the equations without taking them as literal representations of reality. Now it might be said that Hawking's use of Feynman's sum-over-histories approach may be merely instrumental and that no commitment to a physical description is implied. But it is not evident that such a response will work for Hawking. For his model, based on the application of quantum theory to classical geometrodynamics, must posit the existence of a super-space which is ontologically priorto the approximations of classical space-time that are slices of this super-space. This super-space is no ens fictum the primary reality. but The various 3-geometries surrounding the classical space-time slice in superspace are fluctuations of the classical slice. By 'summing the histories' of these 3-geometries one can construct a leaf of history in super-space which carl be mapped onto a space-time manifold. Since, as we have seen, Hawking takes the wave function of a particle to be the analogue of a physical space-time that represents the history of the universe, an instrumentalist interpretation of the sum-over-histories approach leads to an equally instrumentalist, non-realist view of space-time, which betrays Hawking's whole intent.
8

Cited in Herbert [1985], p. xiii.

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In short,Hawking's wave-functional analysisof the universerequiresthe Many Worlds Interpretation quantum physics, and in another place of Hawkingadmitsas much (Hawking[1983], pp. 192-3). Butwhy shouldwe adoptthis interpretation quantumphysicswith its bloatedontology and of miraculoussplittingof the universe?John Barrow ([1988], p. 156) has recently remarkedthat the Many Worlds Interpretation 'essential'to is quantumcosmologybecausewithoutit one is left,on the standard Copenhagen Interpretation, with the question, 'Who or what collapsesthe wave functionof the universe?' someUltimate Observer outsideof spaceandtime? This answer has obvioustheisticimplications.Indeed,although 'the theologianshavenot beenveryeagerto ascribe Godthe roleofUltimate to Observer who bringsthe entirequantumUniverseinto being',stillBarrowadmitsthat 'sucha picture logically is consistent with the mathematics. escapethisstep To cosmologists have beenforcedto invokeEverett's "Many Worlds" interpretation of quantumtheoryin orderto make any sense of quantumcosmology' (Barrow[1988], p. 232). 'It is no coincidence',he says, 'that all the main supporters the ManyWorlds of interpretation quantumrealityareinvolved of in quantum cosmology' (Barrow [1988], p. 156). But if we, like most physicists,find the Many Worldsinterpretation outlandish,then quantum cosmology, fromobviating placeof a Creator, far the mightbe seento createfor Hima dramatic new role.Again,my intentionis not to endorsethis view,but simplyto underscore fact that a realistconstrualof Hawking'saccount the involvesextravagant dubiousmetaphysical and commitmentst such that his modelcan hardlybe said to have eliminated placeof a Creator. the The impression that Hawkings model is thoroughlynon-realistis heightenedby his use of imaginary timein summingthe wavesforparticle histories and,hence, in his finalmodelof space-time. doesanyoneseriously But believe that one has therebydone anything more than performa mathematical operationon paper,that one has therebyalteredthe nature of time itself? Hawkingasserts,'Imaginary may soundlikesciencefiction it is in fact time but a well-defined mathematical concept'(p. 134). But that is not the issue;the question is whether that mathematicalconcept has any counterparti physicalreality.Alreadyin 1920, Eddington suggestedthat his readerswho foundit difficult thinkin termsof the unfamiliar to non-Euclidean geometry of relativistic space-time might evade that difficulty means of the 'dodge'of by usingimaginary numbers the timeco-ordinate, he thoughtit 'notvery for but profitable' speculateon the implicationsof this, for 'it can scarcelybe to regardedas more than an analytical device' (Eddington[1920], p. 48). Imaginarytime was merelyan illustrativetool which 'certainlydo[es] not correspond any physical to reality'(Eddington [1920], p. 181). EvenHawking himselfmaintains,'In any case, as far as everydayquantummechanicsis concerned, mayregard use ofimaginary we our timeandEuclidean space-time as merely a mathematical device (or trick)to calculateanswersabout real

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space-time'(pp. 134-5). But now in his model this imaginarytime and Euclideanspace-timeare suddenlysupposedto be, not merely conceptual devices, but actual representations(however unimaginable)of physical of reality. This 'ontologizing' mathematicaloperationsis not only neither absurd.Forwhat but, is, to my mind,metaphysically explainednor justified, time?Havingthe opposite to possible physicalmeaningcan we gisre imaginary sign of ordinary'real'time,would imaginarytime be a sort of negativetime? But what intelligiblesense can be given, for example,to a physicalobject's enduringfor, say, two negative hours, or an event's having occurredtwo negative years ago or going to occur in two negative years?If we are Aand becomingas objective real,what doesit mean theoristsandtaketemporal to speakof the lapseof negativetime or the becomingof events in negative time? Since imaginarytime is on Hawking'sview merely another spatial dimension,he admits that there is rlo directionto time, even though the (p. is ordinary timewith whichwe are acquainted asymmetric 144). Butis the thermodynamic, Hawking's realitywe know (including whole of the temporal Couldanything arrowsof time)then illusory? and cosmological, psychological fiction?9 be more obviousthan that imaginarytime is a mathematical recognizesthat the history of the universein real (=ordinary) FIawking time.In realtime, than its historyin imaginary timewouldlookverydifferent the universe expands from a singularityand collapsesback again into a singularity.'Onlyif we couldpicturethe universein termsof imaginarytime would there be no singularities.... When one goes back to the real time in (pp. which we live,however,therewill stillappearto be singularities' 138-9). modelis a meremathematical Thismightleadone to concludethat Hawking's Hawking drawsthe astounding import. Instead, constructwithoutontological conclusion,
timeis reallythe realtime,and Thismightsuggestthat the so-calledimaginary In that what we callrealtimeis justa figmentof ourimaginations. realtime,the that forma boundaryto universehas a beginningand an end at singularities time, and space-time at whichthe laws of sciencebreakdown.Butin imaginary time So or thereareno singularities boundaries. maybewhat we call imaginary is reallymorebasic,andwhat we callrealis justan ideathatwe inventto helpus what we thinkthe universeis like. (p. 139) describe

than this. One can think of no more egregiousexampleof self-deception employs mathematical devices (tricks) such as sum-over-historiesand in changingthe sign of the timeco-ordinate orderto constructa modelspacetime, a model which is physicallyunintelligible,and then one invests that that the timein whichwe live is in factunreal. modelwith realityanddeclares theoryis just a defends positionby arguingthat '. . . a scientific his Hawking
I

of 9 As MaryCleughnicelyputsit, 'Whatis the wildestabsurdity dreamsis merelyalteringthe (Cleugh[1937], p. 46). sign to the physicist'

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mathematical modelwe maketo describe observations: existsonlyin our our it minds.Soit is meaningless ask:Whichis real,"real" "imaginary" to or time? It is simplya matterof which is the moreusefuldescription' 139). But this (p. reasoningis fallaciousand relapsesinto an instrumentalist view of science which contradictsHawking'srealist expressionsand intentions.One may adopta sortofnominalist view ofthe ontological statusof theories themselves, but this says absolutelynothing about whetherthose theoriesare meant to describe,in approximate limits, physical reality or are merely pragmatic instruments makingnew discoveries advancingtechnology.I should for and like to know on what theory of meaning Hawkingdismissesthe question concerning physicaltimeas meaningless. seemto see herethe vestigeof a We defunct positivism, whichsurfaces elsewhere Hawking's in book(pp.55, 126). But a verificationist theory of meaning is today widely recognized being as simply indefensible.lt) The question Hawking brushes aside is not only obviouslymeanirlgful, crucialfor the purposesof his book,for only if he but can provethat imaginary timeis ontologically andrealtimefictitious real has he succeeded obviatingthe needfora Creator. in Whichbringsus againto his scientiSc realism: seemsclearthatforHawking ontological it the statusof time is not just a matter of the more useful description. believesthat 'The He eventualgoal of scienceis to provide singletheorythat describes whole a the universe'and that this goal shouldbe pursuedeven though the theory'may not even aSect our lifestyle'(pp. 10, 13; cf. his remarksin [1982], p. 563). Hawkingyearns to understand'the underlyingorderof the world'(p. 13). Knowing mindofGodis forhimnotjllSta matterofpragmatic the utility.Thus, he both needs and believesin scientific realism. To addressas meaningful, then, the questionposedabove,it is evidentthat imaginarytime is not ontologicaltime. This is apparentnot only from its physically unintelligible nature,but also fromthe factthat it transforms time into a spatialdimension, thus confounding distinction the betweenspaceand time.According Hawking, use ofimaginary to the numbers'hasan interesting effect on space-time:the distinctionbetweerl time and space disappears completely . . thereis no diSerence . betweenthe timedirection directions and in space . . . time is imaginaryand is indistinguishable from directionsin space' (pp. 134-5). This decisively disqualifiesHawking's model as a representation reality, since in fact time is not ontologicallya spatial of dimension.Contemporary expositors the SpecialTheoryof Relativity of have
Healeydescribes contemporary the attitudetowardpositivism: 'Positivists attempted imposerestrictions the contentof scientific to on theoriesin orderto ensurethat they wereempirically meaningful. effectof theserestrictions to limitboth An was theclaimsto truthoftheoretical sentences onlydistantly related observation, theclaims to and to existence unobservable of theoretical entities. More recently positivism comeundersuch has sustainedattack that opposition it has becomealmost orthodoxyin the philosophyof to science'(Healey[1981, p. vii]. Fora disinterested devastating and critique positivism, of see Suppe[19771, pp. 62-118.

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beenexercised disassociate to themselves fromthe frequent statements early of proponents the theoryto the effectthat Einstein's of theoryhad madetimethe fourthdimensionof space.1lB-theorists timehave beenespecially of sensitive to the allegation A-theorists they havebeenguiltyof 'spatializing' by that time and have pointedto the oppositesign of the timeco-ordinate evidencethat as the temporaldimerlsion in fact not a mere fourthdimensionof space. By is changingthe sign,Hawking conflatesthe temporal dimension with the spatial ones. Hawkingapparently feelsjustified this movebecausehe, like certain in early interpreters STR, believes that STR itself treats time as a spatial of dimension.He writes, 'In relativity,there is no real distinctionbetweenthe spaceandtimeco-ordinates, as thereis no realdifference just betweenany two spaceco-ordinates, 24). Hejustifies statement pointingout that one (p. this by couldconstructa new timeco-ordinate combining oldtimeco-ordinate by the with one of the spatialco-ordinates. In spatializing time, Hawkingimplicitlyrejectsan A-theoryand identifies himselfas a B-theorist. statementconcerningthe universeas he modelsit His that 'ItwouldjustBE' an expression the tenselesscharacter itsexistence. is of of Unfortunately, provides justification he no whatsoever adopting B-theory for a of time. Perhapshe thinksthat STRentails a B-theory; A-theorists but have arguedrepeatedly the SpecialTheoryis neutralwith regard the issueof that to temporal becoming,and the most sophisticated B-theorists not appealto it do as proofof theirview.12 debatebetweenthe A-theoryand the B-theoryis The controversial. in the absenceof someoverwhelming But proofof the B-theory, I see no reasonto abandonour experience temporal of becomirlg objective. as D. H. Mellor, himselfa B-theorist, agrees,commenting, 'Tenseis so strikingan aspectof realitythat only the most compellingargumerlt justifiesdenyingit: namely, that the tensed view of time is self-contradictory so cannot be and true' (Mellow[1981], p. 5). Melloraccordinglytries to rehabilitate McTaggart'sproofagainstthe objectivity the A-series,but, to my thinking,to no of avail.13 Moreover, seemsto me (althoughspacedoesnot permitme to argue it it here) that rlo B-theorist successfullydefended has that theory against the incoherencethat if externalbecomingis mind-deperldent, the subjective still experience becomingis objective, of that is, thereis an objective successionof contentsof consciousness, that becomingin the mentalrealmis real.If an so A-theory of time is correct, then Hawking's model is clearly a mere mathematical abstraction.
See the interesting citahonsin Meyerson [19253,pp. 354-5. In his comments Meyerson's on book,Einstein repudiated 'extravagances the ofthe popularizers evenmanyscientists' and who construed to teachthattimeis a spatialdimension: STR 'Time spacearefusedintoone and and thesamecontinuum, butthiscontinuumis not isotropic. element spatial The of distance the and elementof duration remaindistinctin nature. . .' (Einstein [1928], p. 367). ForA-theoretic approaches STR, Capek to see [1966], Stein[1968], Denbigh [1978], Whitrow [1980], pp. 283-307, 371, and Dieks[1988]. Grunbaum [1968] makesno appealto STRto defenda B-theory. See refutations Horwich[1987l, pp. 26-7. in

12

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equations Whether the opposite sign of the time co-ordinate in the relativity time and space dimensions suicient to establish a 'real difference'betweerl is not sufficient, that the in Special Theory need not be adjudicated here. If it is of the theory is insufficient goes to show that the mathematical formalism only mathematical tocapture the ontology of time and spacet but is a useful space are ontologically distinct is from reality.l4 That time and abstraction to set up a from the fact that a series of mental events alone is sufficient evident of spatial events.ls Imagine, for series of events even in the absence temporal In that that God led up to creation by counting, '1, 2, 3, . . . fiat lux!' example, of counting, though the physical case,time begins with the first mental event and space are universe does not appear until later. Clearly, then, time ontologicallydistinct. 'Henceforth, But what, then, of the oft-repeated claim of Minkowski that, to fade away into mere shadows, spaceby itself, and time by itself, are doomed reality' and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an independent is based on one of the most widespread (Minkowski[1908], p. 75)? This claim Theory that andpersistent errors concerning the interpretation of the Special distinguish between what we may call measured exists,namely, the failure to Hawking, '. . . the orempirical time and ontological or real time. According to end to the idea of absolute time.... The theory of theory of relativity put an of space and time. relativitydoes force us to change fundamentally our ideas independent of We must accept that time is not completely separate from and (pp. 21, 2 3). space, but is combined with it to form an object called space-time' absolute Nothing could be farther from the truth. Einstein did not eliminate redefined it. In the absence of a detectable aether, simultaneity: he merely that it was Einstein, under the influence of Ernst Mach's positivism,16believed simultaquite literally meaningless to speak of events' occurring absolutely that simultaneously because there was no empirical means of determining signal method neity. By proposing to redefinesimultaneity in terms of the light the notion of to of synchronization, Einstein was able to give meaning
14 5

pp. 60-96. in See helpfuldiscussions Cleugh[1937], pp. 46-69, and Kroes[1985], physicist,this is a of Wenzlcautions, 'Fromthe standpoint the space-time, On Minkowski the understand objection, consistentsolution.But the physicistwill [doubtless] thoroughly Timeis, as Kantputit, matter. a that by raised philosophy, timeis byno meansmerely physical Shouldour experiences of the formnot merelyof our outerbut also of our innersense.... pp. 587-8) and of memorybe mereillusion.. .?'(Wenzl[1949], successiveness ofscience,but by STR of foundations Einstein's arewidelyrecognized historians 16 Thepositivistic of foundations the exploring philosophical by philosophers rarelydiscussed are surprisingly [1970], pp. 167-77, Frank[1949], Reichenbach that theory.For discussion,see Holton the 'Certainly original [1949], Bridgman[1949], Lenzen [1949]. Accordingto Sklar, presuppositions viewpointare rifewith verificationist in favorof the relativistic arguments pointof view, of laterdisavowal the verificationist Einstein's aboutmeaning,etc. Anddespite of an provided adequateaccountof the foundations relativity has no one to my knowledge the no way of rejecting in whichisn'tverificationist essence'(Sklar[1981], p. 141). 'Ican see critique somekind of theories. . . withoutinvokinga verificationist old aether-compensatory p. or other'(ibid., 132).

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simultaneity,only now the simultaneitywas relativedue to the invariant velocityoflight.Inso doing,Einstein established sortofempirical a time,which would be subjectto dilationand in which the occurrenceof identicalevents couldbe variouslymeasured.But it is evidentthat he did rlothingto 'put an end'to absolutetimeor absolutesimultarleity.l7 say that those notionsare To meaningless to revertto the deaddogmasofpositivism the verificationist is and theory of meaning. J. S. Bell asserts that apart from nzattersof style, it is primarilythis philosophicalpositivism which serves to differentiatethe receivedinterpretation from the Lorentz-Larmor interpretation, which distinguishes betweenempirical, localtimeandontological, time.Bellwrives, real
The d;fference philosophy this. Sinceit is experimentally of is impossible say to which of two uniformly moving systemsis really at rest, Einsteindeclaresthe notions 'reallyresting'and 'reallymoving'as meaningless. him, only the For relativemotionof two or moreuniformly movingobjects real.Lorentz, the is on otherhand,preferred view that thereis indeeda stateof real rest,defined the by the 'aether,' even thoughthe laws of physicsconspire preventus identifying to it experimentally. factsof physicsdo not obligeus to acceptone philosophy The ratherthan the other(Bell[1987], p. 77).

Sinceverificationism hopelesslyflawedas a theoryof meanirlg,it is idle to is talk about STRs 'forcing'us to change our fundamental ideas of space and time.Lawrence Sklarconcludes,'Onething is certairl. Acceptance relativity of cannot forceone into the acceptanceor rejectionof any of the traditional metaphysical viewsaboutthe realityof pastandfuture'(Sklar [1981], p. 140). Ofcourse,Hawking mightretortthatontological timeis scientifically useless and may therefore leftto the metaphysician. be Granted, then the pointis but surelythis:Hawkingis doing metaphysics.When he begirlsto speculateabout the natureof spaceandtime andto claimthathe has eliminated needfora the Creator, then he has, as I said,enteredthe realmof the philosopher, here and he must be prepared do battle with philosophical to weapons on a broader conceptualfieldor else retreatwithin the walls of a limitedscientificdomain. Whatis ironicis that even within that restricted domaintheremay now be empiricalevidencefor rejectingthe receivedtnterpretation STR.For the of experimental resultsof the Aspectexperiments the inequalities on predicted by Bell'sTheorem have apparently established widelyseparated that elementary particlesare in some way correlated such that measuremerlts one result on instantlyin the collapseof the wave functionof the other, so that localityis violated.Evena hiddenvariablesinterpretation the fabledEPRexperiment of mustbe a non-localtheory.Noris the violationof localitydependent uponthe validityof quantumtheory;it can be demonstrated the macro-level, that on so
17

Cleughhits the essentialpoint:'It cannot be too oftenemphasized physicsis concerned that withthe measurement time,ratherthan withthe essentially of metaphysical questionas to its nature';'. . . howeveruseful "t" may be for physics,its complete identification with Timeis fallacious' (Cleugh [1937], pp. 51, 30).

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apparently any if even quantumtheoryshouldbe superseded, new theorywill interpretathe received But to have includenon-locality. thesedatacontradict signals,but rather positssuper-luminal of tion STR,not becausenon-locality it because goes to establishempiricallyrelationsof absolutesimultaneity. is that disclaimers STRis not violatedbecauseno signalor information Hence, Ratherthe salientpoint to fromone particle anotherarebesidethe point. sent particlesoccurs the collapseof the wave functionin both correlated that is by of synchronization light wholly apartfromconsiderations simultaneously, as the firstcrucial Karl signals. Popperthus regardsthe Aspectexperiments of interpretation STR,commenting, and betweenLorentz's Einstein's test
velocity The reasonfor this assertionis that the mere existenceof an infinite and therebyof an absolutespace. entails that of an absolute simultaneity is of in velocitycan be attained thetransmission signals or Whether not an infinite this argument:the one inertial system for which Einsteinian irrelevantfor . coincideswith absolutesimultaneity . . would be the system at simultaneity rest rest whetherornot this systemat absolute can be experimentally absolute p. 54). [1984], (Popper identified

couldthus vindicate in of establishment non-localcorrelations space-time The between distinction of Lorentz's domainthe validity evenwithinthe scientific of conflation the two in to timeandrealtimein opposition the positivistic local thereceivedview. What this lengthy excursus goes to show is that it is metaphysically of timeas a dimension space.SinceHawking ontological to misguided identify timewith einpirical andconflates time empirical to a spatialdimension reduces which he existingspace-time time,he windsup with a tenselessly ontological is the errors factthatthe timeinvolved reality.Addto these wishesto passoWas vision of the world of Hawking's absurdity and imaginary, the metaphysical seemsstarklyapparent.
5 CONCLUSION

Hawking's Thereare many other things which one shouldlike to say about but I thinkenough view (forexample,his misuseof the anthropicprinciple), question,'Whatplace, then, for a has been said to answerhis fundamental Godplays for popularimpression, We Creator?' have seen that contraryto Reasonfor the Sufficient of Leibnizian role as a sort Hawkingan important failedto we universe.Withregardto God'sroleas Creator, saw that Hawking creatiocontinuans,so that even if God betweencreatiooriginansand distinguish as a sort of failedto play the formerrole, He may still carry out the latter of critique we have seenthatHawking's groundofbeing.Butfinally Thomistic by FirstCauseas demonstrated the God'sassumingthe officeof temporally and unjustified kalam cosmological argument is rife with unexamined

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to that, when examined,degenerate assumptions assumptions, philosophical to modelappears dependon The absurdity. successofHawking's metaphysical approach to the a realist application of Feynman's sum-over-histories a priorsuper-space, corlstrual froman ontologically of derivation space-time which is implausibleand in any case unjustified.Essentialto Hawking's of schemeis the identification imaginarytime with physicaltime,a construal which is again never justifiedand is in any case physicallyunintelligible. philosophical Hawking'smodeldepends,moreover,on certainquestionable of Theoryas well, forexample,the identification aboutRelativity assumptions dubious,since time time as a dimensionof space,a move which is extremely Theoryto justifythis appealto the Special can existwithoutspace.Hawking's of move rests on an interpretation that theory which fails to distinguish dependent esserltially time fromontologicaltime, an interpretation empirical on a defunct positivistictheory of meaning and now perhapscalled into questionby empiricalfacts as well. Any attemptto interpretthe temporal betraysthe truenatureof existingspatialdimension as dimension a tenselessly time. of the The postulateof metaphysicalsuper-space, metamorphosis real to imaginarytime, the conflationof time and space:all these seem extravagant ex of lengthsto which to go in orderto avoidclassicaltheism'sdoctrine creatio question: a squarely different nihilwhich forcesus andHawkingto confront What price,then, for no Creator? Kraainem Belgium
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