July 2010, Volume 7, No.7 (Serial No.

68)

US-China Law Review, ISSN 1548-6605, USA

Constitutional limitations of the privacy framework advanced in Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade
Nancy Pietroforte
(Rockland Community College, State University of New York, NY 10901, U.S.A.)

Abstract: This paper examines the role of framing in advancing a progressive sexual and reproductive rights agenda. U.S. Supreme Court decisions including Griswold v. Connecticu and Eisenstadt v. Baird helped establish legal precedent invoking a privacy framework for subsequent cases including Roe v. Wade (as well as Doe v. Bolton and, more recently, Lawrence v. Texas). This paper highlights the limitations of the privacy framework while exploring more potentially efficacious frames. Key words: abortion; constitutional issues; Eisenstadt v. Baird; gender; Griswold v. Connecticut; privacy; reproductive rights; Roe v. Wade Sexuality and human reproduction are an inextricable part of human history. Yet both remain contentious topics. According to Foucault and others, societys treatment of sexuality is invariably about power. During the Victorian Era, [s]exuality was carefully confinedthe conjugal family took custody of it and absorbed it into the serious function of reproductionthe legitimate and procreative couple laid down the law.1 In contemporary society legitimate sexuality continues to be principally confined to the heterosexual, procreative couple. As a consequence, forms of sexuality that extend beyond normative parameters tend to be viewed with suspicion. Linda Gordon has similarly asserted that controlling reproduction is not merely a matter of science but an issue of politics. 2 Ultimately, the ability for individuals to freely control their reproduction and sexuality necessarily requires society to accept that sexuality is not exclusively for procreative purposes. It also requires that women are permitted to be sexual agentsnot merely sexual objects. Ideas about sexuality and reproduction vary significantly across both time and culture. These ideas are invariably rooted in cultural understandings of human sexuality. In spite of the fact that birth control and abortion have existed since ancient times, efforts to control sexuality and reproduction continue to be highly charged political issues. The enduring debate over gay marriage and the relatively recent debacle at the Food and Drug Administration concerning Plan B are irrefutable evidence of the ongoing efforts by some members of society to attempt to control the sexuality and reproduction of others.3 In much of his research, sociologist Erving Goffman discussed how society is, essentially, a stage where people perform specific roles.4 Society provides us with significant cues about the roles each of should play in
Nancy Pietroforte, assistant professor of sociology, Rockland Community College, State University of New York; research fields: gender, reproductive rights, Salem witch hysteria, social constructionism. 1 Michel Foucault (1990). The history of sexuality: An introduction (Vol. 1). New York, NY: Random House, 3. 2 Linda Gordon (1990). Womens body, womens right: Birth control in America. New York, NY: Penguin Books. 3 Frank Davidoff (2006). Sex, politics, and morality at the FDA: Reflections on the plan B decision. Hastings Center Report, 36(2), 20-25. 4 Erving Goffman (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. New York, NY: Doubleday. 40

Constitutional limitations of the privacy framework advanced in Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade

society and these societal scripts give members of society clear guidelines regarding what constitutes appropriate behavior. Scripts regarding sexuality are among the strongest society imposes upon its members. A societys language makes it particularly evident: how nice girls behave; who we should and when were supposed to marry; how many and when to have children. These scripts reinforce societal expectations and ensure that members of society dutifully fulfill normative roles. Such restrictive scripts continue to prohibit certain forms of sexual and reproductive behavior in contemporary society. This presents particular problems for those who fall outside of normative scripted rolessuch as those who wish to remain childfree and/or single and those with sexual orientations/proclivities outside of mainstream society. Framing social issues significantly impacts public perception, policy, and societal scripts; the framing perspective draws heavily on the pioneering work of Goffman. Frames help individuals to make sense of the world by enabling members of society to categorize ideas and group related concepts. According to Lakoff, [f]rames are mental structures that shape the way we see the world [i]n politics our frames shape our social policies and the institutions we form to carry out policies. To change our frames is to change all of this. Reframing is social change.5 For those who support reproductive rights, framing a progressive agenda that fully captures the complexities of the pro-choice position is problematic and this may at least partially explain why the reproductive rights movement itself has been losing ground since Roe v. Wade 6was decided (particularly via legislation that sets restrictions on reproductive health services). Indeed, Roe v. Wade exacerbated the intense debate and controversy over reproductive rights. It plainly made the abortion issue more visible and vulnerable to ongoing public scrutiny. (It is significant to note that although capital punishment has existed in the United States for hundreds of years, there was no right-to-life/anti-abortion movement until approximately 1973 when Roe v. Wade was decided.) Many scholars maintain that the anti-abortion contingent has been far more successful in framing their position.7 At this juncture it seems that reframing the pro-choice position is critical to advance an unequivocally progressive reproductive rights agenda. Since the seventies, those in favor of reproductive rights tend to package their message in terms of women, rights, and choice while those opposed to reproductive rights focus on an ideological package of morality, life, and protecting the unborn. While the pro-choice frames of rights and choice may resonate with some segments of the population, the anti-abortion movements frames of life and morality seem to be more effective and persuasive. Solinger, Tannen, and Lakoff, among others, have insisted that the rhetoric of the abortion debate favors the anti-abortion contingent.8 For instance, many scholars maintain that the term choice invokes a frame that is used predominately in a consumer-driven marketplace (not, generally speaking, in healthcare); therefore, it carries a consumer framework with it.9
George Lakoff (2004). Dont think of an elephant: Know your values and frame the debate. White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, xv. 6 Roe v. Wade. 1973. 410 US, 113. 7 Supra note 5. See also Gene Burns (2005). The moral veto: Framing contraception, abortion and cultural pluralism in the United States. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Susan A. Farrell (spring, 2005). Reframing social justice, feminism and abortion: Isnt it time we combated the bishops opposition to reproductive rights on our own terms? Conscience: The Newsjournal of Catholic Opinion. William Saletan (2003). Bearing right: How the conservatives won the abortion war. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 8 Supra note 5. See also Rickie Solinger (2001). Beggars and choosers: How the politics of abortion shapes adoption, abortion, and welfare in the United States. New York, NY: Hill and Wang. Deborah Tannen (1998). The argument culture: Moving from debate to dialogue. New York, NY: Random House, Inc. 9 Tannen, supra note 8 & supra note 5. 41
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Life emerges from a moral framework and carries with it a somber, serious message; understood in these terms, life generally wins out over choiceprovided that anti-abortion advocates are not too militaristic and/or violent.10 (Certainly the gruesome images of late term abortionswhich are statistically quite rare and performed under extraordinary circumstancesexploited by the more strident anti-abortion activists must also be considered here. Those in the reproductive rights movement rarely display images of butchered women who suffered the horrors of illegal abortions. In terms of the efficacy of public relations campaigns, the anti-abortion movement is likely more persuasive in this regard as well.) Roe v. Wade transformed ideas about abortion and made abortion less of a private, medical issue and more of a public, political issue. Burns, among others, has suggested that if abortion was framed strictly as a medical matter and had never been legislated, it is quite possible that the issue would not have turned into a protracted, contentious debate, [i]f we are told that abortion law reform is a medical matter and had never heard anything that would suggest the contrary, that limiting frame may make sense and not lead us to think about larger moral implications for abortion law reform.11 Instead, Roe v. Wade politicized the abortion issue, helped galvanize anti-abortion support, and moved abortion from the medical to the political arena. In other words, if abortion laws had been repealed as opposed to reformed, perhaps this issue would not have evolved into the contentious matter it is today in the United States. Interestingly, around the time the Constitution was ratified there was scant attention paid to the legality of birth control and abortion; it was not a political issue. In fact, abortions performed before quickening (generallywhen a woman becomes aware of the physical presence of the fetus via fluttering) were commonplace and abortion services were routinely advertised in local papers. Most restrictive laws concerning birth control and abortion were not implemented until the mid-nineteenth century. These laws forced women to resort to illegal means of controlling their fertility.12 Early efforts to criminalize birth control and abortion were overwhelmingly controlled by medical doctors in a concerted effort to prevent other practitionersprimarily midwivesfrom providing medical services. 13 Controlling womens reproductive choices through the innovative tactics of state regulation and criminalization of abortion was, the doctors claimed, a necessary precondition of social order itself.14 Draconian Comstock laws intended to legislate morality further ensured that even the mere dissemination of information about birth control and abortion was prohibited. Once World War II ended, the campaign for population control combined with the development of oral contraceptives created more legitimacy for birth control.15 The manner in which birth control (and later, though to a lesser degree, abortion) gained acceptance in the U.S. is a story of unlikely coalitions. Some advocates -particularly those with a feminist orientationwere hoping to improve womens political, economic, and social standing. Other supporters were concerned about overpopulation. Some groups focused on free-love while others were staunch proponents of eugenics. Margaret Sanger (via her birth control organization which ultimately morphed into Planned Parenthood) also made significant inroads in changing public opinion. These developments
10 11

Ibid. Burns, supra note 7, 282. 12 Supra note 2. Bill Baird Interviews on March 18, 2009 in Suffern, NY and July 2, 2009 in Palmer, MA (also multiple phone interviews September, 2008July, 2010). 13 Ninia Baehr (1990). Abortion without apology: A radical history for the 1990s. Boston, MA: South End Press. 14 Ibid, 2. 15 Supra note 12. 42

Constitutional limitations of the privacy framework advanced in Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade

created a political and social climate that eventually liberalized public opinion concerning birth control and abortion in the 1960s and 1970s.16 A significant development concerning reproductive rights occurred on June 7, 1965 when the United States Supreme Court handed down the Griswold v. Connecticut17 decision. Griswold v. Connecticut invalidated a Connecticut law forbidding the use of contraceptives based on the right of marital privacy. The Court struck down a statute forbidding the use of contraceptives by married persons. The case centered on a mini-Comstock law in Connecticut. Comstock was the well-known fundamentalist enthusiast who marshaled the Comstock Act of 1873 through Congress, which banned the importation or transportation in interstate commerce of matter pertaining to abortion or contraception.18 Members of the Courts majority varied in their reasons for deciding Griswold v. Connecticut as they did. Justice Douglas wrote the Courts formal opinion and maintained that the right to privacy was implicit and based on the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments. He believed that marriage constituted a protected zone of privacy. Other Justices (Goldberg, Warren, and Brennan) maintained that the right to privacy was contained within the Ninth Amendment. Justices Harlan and White also concurred and based their findings on the Fourteenth Amendment. Briefs filed on behalf of Griswold v. Connecticut emphasized that the right to privacy was based on protections guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment. Significantly, dissenting Justices Stewart and Black found no right of personal privacy either expressed or implied in the Constitution.19 Interestingly, in 1925, Margaret Sanger similarly supported the idea that married women were entitled to birth control information. However, she and Planned Parenthood did not support the right of single women to have access to this information. Planned Parenthood in the 1960s refused to serve the unmarried, as did many doctors, but young women often obtained contraception by claiming they were about to be married or by borrowing a wedding ring.20 Around that time Sanger stated that married women, have moral obligations, which unmarried women havent.21 Reproductive rights activists such as Bill Baird immediately recognized that while most in the movement considered Griswold to be a positive development, it plainly ignored the rights of single people. Furthermore, Baird maintained that the government should have no authority over the reproductive and sexual lives of its citizens. Baird began his activism in 1963 and was arrested eight times in five states during the 1960s and 1970s. One of Bairds more notable arrests occurred in 1967 when he directly challenged antiquated Massachusetts laws prohibiting crimes against Chastity, Morality, Decency, and Good Order (he exhibited contraceptive devices and distributed contraceptive foam and one condom) before an audience at Boston University (BU) in 1967. The legal wrangling that ensued after the incident at BU ultimately culminated in the 1972 decision Eisenstadt v. Baird 22 which relied on a privacy framework (similar to Griswold v. Connecticut). The Eisenstadt v. Baird decision stated in part:
Whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike. Ibid. Griswold v. Connecticut. 1965. 381 US, 479. 18 Roy Lucas (2003). New historical insights on the curious case of Baird v. Eisenstadt. Roger Williams University Law Review, 9, 14. 19 Elder Witt (1980). Congressional quarterly. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 275. 20 Supra note 2, 298. 21 David Garrow (1994). Liberty and sexuality: The right to privacy and the making of Roe v. Wade. New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 18. 22 Eisenstadt v. Baird. 1972. 405 US, 438.
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Constitutional limitations of the privacy framework advanced in Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is true that in Griswold the right to privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child[f]undamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into ones privacy[b]y providing dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated [Mass laws] violate the Equal Protection Clause.23

The decision also noted, [t]he teachings of Baird and Galileo may be of a different order, but the suppression of either is equally repugnant.24 According to Roy Lucas and other constitutional and reproductive rights scholars, Eisenstadt v. Baird became a very forceful supporting precedent for Roe v. Wade, Doe v. Bolton,25 and a host of privacy/Equal Protection cases (more recently, Lawrence v. Texas26 ) in the decades since.27 The fundamental difference between Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird is its focus on an individuals right to make fundamental decisions connected to sexuality and reproduction. Eisenstadt v. Baird was a critical step since it marked the transformation of the notion of the family unit with privacy rights protecting the male-controlled entity into an association of separate individuals, with separate claims to constitutional protection.28 Justice Brennan had expected that the language of Eisenstadt v. Baird would later establish a constitutional basis, under the right to privacy, for a womans right to abortion. Much of Brennans opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird centered on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, finding that the statutes different treatment of married and unmarried people was unreasonable.29 What, then, was the purpose of Massachusetts ban on distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people while allowing distribution to married people? The state might have been trying to deter premarital sex. But, Justice Brennan said, it would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication.30 The Abortion Cases of 1973 followed, and relied in significant part upon Baird dictum cleverly inserted into the opinion by Justice Brennan.31 Justice Brennans hope that Eisenstadt v. Baird and its privacy framework would establish a constitutional basis for womens right to abortion was realized on January 22nd, 1973 when the Supreme Court handed down Roe v. Wade. That landmark decision was decided exactly ten months after Eisenstadt v. Baird. Indeed, Eisenstadt v. Baird was referenced multiple times in the Roe v. Wade decision. There have been several rulings since Eisenstadt v. Baird that reference its privacy framework. Yet there is no language within the Constitution that clearly, convincingly, and explicitly, guarantees an unqualified right to

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Ibid. Ibid. 25 Doe v. Bolton. 1973. 410 US, 179. 26 Lawrence v. Texas. 2003. 539 US, 558. 27 Supra note 18, 35. 28 Marlene Gerber Fried (Ed.). (1990). From abortion to reproductive freedom: Transforming a movement. Boston, MA: South End Press. 29 Mark Tushnet (1996). Abortion. New York, NY: Facts on File, 56. 30 Ibid, 57 31 Supra note 18, 11. 44

Constitutional limitations of the privacy framework advanced in Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade

privacy. 32 Indeed, when drafting the document, James Madison expressed particular concerns about the Constitution only referring to specific enumerated rights; he feared that this could be interpreted to mean that only enumerated rights existed.33 Under the privacy framework birth control and abortionas well as other sexual rights (including, but certainly not limited to, the right of gays and lesbians to marry)continue to be vulnerable to attack. The limits of the privacy framework are evident in Roe v. Wade. Though commonly considered to be a positive development by most supporters of reproductive rights, many reproductive rights activists maintain that Roe v. Wade was a compromise that permits abortion only under specific circumstances. In other words, this qualified right to abortion never guaranteed women an absolute right to abortionsince Roe v. Wades emphasis on trimesters (which ostensibly considers the changing interest of a womans right to terminate a pregnancy against the evolving state interest in the pregnancy) undermines the right of women to fully control their reproductive destinies and denies them full bodily integrity. These limitations concerned Baird and others who believed that as long as the government maintained a voice in each womans abortion decision, it would use that power to chip away at womens right to abortion.34 Legally, privacy is a largely nebulous concept. Copelon maintains that there are two notions of privacy: a qualified right to be left alone and an unqualified right to self-determination and equality. Privacy has within it the tendency to constrain as well as to expand sexual and reproductive rights.35 Regardless of ones interpretation of privacysince there is no mention of it in the Constitutionthe right is, at best, implicit. In the 1960s most radical feminists, including many women attorneys, insisted that controlling reproduction is an absolute right of women. These activists made analogies between forced pregnancy and slavery and invoked formal servitude violations of the 13th Amendment. They also emphasized the disparate impact of criminal abortion laws on poor women. Ultimately their contention was that both birth control and abortion are central to gender equality and womens capacity to participate fully and equally in society. The right to terminate a pregnancy is also linked to the right of women to be sexual. As one reproductive rights scholar argued, hostility to womens autonomy is the unifying link between opposition to abortion and opposition to other feminist goals. Abortion rights are central to and have come to symbolize womens control. The [religious] Right opposes that control in the broadest sense.36 In spite of earlier gains achieved by those in favor of reproductive and sexual freedom, post Roe v. Wade decisions (including Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,37 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,38 Bowers v. Hardwick39) have demonstrated that the privacy framework may not be most effective for advancing a truly progressive sexual and reproductive rights agenda. Bowers upheld criminalization of gay sexuality and Webster demonstrated the fragility of reproductive freedom.40 Bowers v. Hardwick was a particularly salient realization for progressives. As Tushnet asserted, Bowers expressed discomfort with judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights, although it did not completely disclaim
32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

Ellen Alderman &Caroline Kennedy (1995). The right to privacy. New York, NY: Albert A. Knopf, 55. Supra note 29, 3. Supra note 13, 33. Supra note 28. Ibid, 3. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. 1989. 492 US, 490. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 1992. 505 US, 83. Bowers v. Hardwick. 1986. 478 US, 186. Supra note 28. 45

Constitutional limitations of the privacy framework advanced in Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade

the power to do so. A Court that remains committed to the view of unenumerated rights stated in Bowers is unlikely to develop a general constitutional law of privacy beyond its present contours.41 Realizing the potential ramifications of Bowers v. Hardwick Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent, privacy means more than toleration of offensive conduct and insisted that the Constitution should protect sexual intimacy affirmatively and respect sexual difference because the process of sexual and familial self-definition is central to authenticity and self-realization.42 Bowers v. Hardwick clearly underscores and exposes some highly troublesome limitations of the privacy framework. In another post Roe v. Wade decision, Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,43 Justice Blackmun (writing for the majority of five) asserted, [f]ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a womans decisionwith the guidance of her physician and with the limits specified in Roewhether to end her pregnancy. A womans right to make that choice freely is fundamental. Any other result, in our view, would protect inadequately a central part of liberty that our law guarantees to all.44 This opinion relies on a more positive notion of privacy as well as the recognition of unenumerated rights. It also includes a feminist understanding of the connection between reproductive rights and womens full personhood.45 Although there is clearly qualification demonstrated through assertions such as with the guidance of her physician and with the limits specified in Roe. However, as Copelon asserts, even Griswold v. Connecticut framed privacy within a conservative legal and patriarchal tradition of marriage.46 Indeed, those who do not support sexual and reproductive rights have argued that Griswold v. Connecticut was strictly about marital privacy. George and Tubbs maintain that, Griswold simply allowed married couples to decide whether to use contraceptives. But the Supreme Court soon transformed the right to privacy (the reference to marriage quickly disappeared) into a powerful tool for making public policy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972), the Court changed a right of spousesjustified in Griswold precisely by reference to the importance of marriageinto a right of unmarried adults to buy and use contraceptives. Then, in a move that plunged the United States into a culture war, the Court ruled in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton (1973) that this generalized right to privacy also encompassed a womans virtually unrestricted right to have an abortion.47 George and Tubbs, like others who would like to see decisions such as Roe v. Wade overturned, argue that the privacy framework (particularly the intent of Griswold) has been taken to an extreme. Overall, Copelon maintains that the privacy framework is a weak vehicle for challenging traditional, gendered reproductive and sexual norms.48 In terms of defending and defining future sexual and reproductive rights frameworks, Lucas asserted that the right to health care without discrimination or undue governmental interference is an additional constitutional framework that might have been more solid than privacy.49 For Lakoff and others it seems obvious that the reproductive rights movement lacks the ability to frame the issue as effectively as it could, [i]n cognitive science there is a namehypocognitionthe lack of a relatively

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

Supra note 29, 120. Supra note 28, 36. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists. 1986. 476 US, 747. Supra note 28, 35. Ibid. Ibid, 34. Robert P. George & David L. Tubbs (July 18, 2005). The bad decision that started it all: Griswold at 40. National Review, 57, 39. Supra note 28, 36. Supra note 18, 23.

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simple fixed frame that can be evoked by a word or two.50 Perhaps the notion of hypocognition may, at least partially, explain the dilemma that those in favor of reproductive rights face in effectively contextualizing the issue. The anti-abortion contingent doesnt face this dilemma since their framework, for the most part, has been highly effective at appealing to public sentiment. Certainly the importance of framing issues concerning sexuality and reproduction cannot be overstated and it appears evident that the privacy framework is becoming increasingly obsolete. As Saletan and others have argued, it is up to those who support sexual and reproductive rights to provide a more effective framework for the issueone that likely emphasizes autonomy. 51 A framework that additionally accentuates freedom from governmental influence may also be more useful than one that relies primarily on the notion of choice. (However, as much legislative activity has proven since Roe v. Wade, the freedom from government framework tends to abandon the reproductive and sexual rights of the poor, young, non-white, etc.) Claudia Whitman writes extensively about the death penalty. Like abortion, public opinion with regard to the death penalty is ambiguousand both issues remain highly contentious. Whitman asserts that since we cannot accurately assess the will of the people, polling is a dubious method for determining public policy. Whitman points out that all members of the European Union (EU) have no death penalty (since abandoning capital punishment is required for admission) and the issue is considered closed. Therefore, polling on attitudes regarding the death penalty is essentially irrelevant.52 Perhaps, the EUs treatment of capital punishment could serve as a model for how abortion policy could be handled in the United States. Another approach that encompasses a more progressive agenda is the World Health Organizations (WHO) Department of Reproductive Health and Research human rights based frame.53 The WHO emphasizes that respect, protection, and fulfillment of human rights must be part of all international sexual and reproductive health laws and policies. Their framework emphasizes a holistic approach which includes an agenda that condemns female genital mutilation and overall violence against women; the framework also promotes adequate prenatal care and child care. (It is significant to note that while such a broad based framework sounds appealing, such a framework could potentially alienate those who are committed to the single issue of reproductive rights.) If the underlying positive notion of privacywhich seemed so promising when Eisenstadt v. Baird was decidedcould have evolved into its full progressive potential as Justice Brennan had hoped, it may very well have guaranteed reproductive and sexual rights. However, as the years since Roe v. Wade have clearly demonstrated, unencumbered sexual and reproductive rights will remain elusive unless a resonant, pro-active framework can be invoked. Formulating that framework and securing these rights will certainly require innovative strategizing and vision by activists and scholars to meet the daunting challenges ahead. (Edited by Anderson)

Supra note 5, 24. Saletan, supra note 7. 52 Claudia Whitman (2001). The death penalty as the will of the people. Peace Review, 13(4), 519-523. 53 World Health Organizations Department of Reproductive Health and Research. Retrieved January 22, 2007, from http://www. who.int/reproductive-health/gender/index.html.
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