Response by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Vanity Fair article The Kingdom and the Towers

July 2011
Why Vanity Fair has published The Kingdom and the Towers is confounding, as it only rehashes long-debunked myths and falsehoods regarding Saudi Arabia and its leadership. From the 9/11 Commission Report to statements made by U.S. officials, the accusations in the article are without merit or standing. The following are examples:
1. VANITY FAIR (VF): Was there a foreign government behind the 9/11 attacks? A decade

later, Americans still havent been given the whole story, while a key 28-page section of the Congresss Joint Inquiry report remains censored. RESPONSE: The Saudi government has repeatedly requesteddirectly to the President and publiclythat the U.S. release the 28-pages to cease the perpetuation of conspiracy theory. As early as 2003, Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal stated on ABCs Good Morning, America: CHARLIE GIBSON: Those who have seen the deleted 28 pages of that report on 9/ 11 say it implicates Saudi Arabia in helping finance the attacks. Why would you want something like that released? PRINCE FAISAL: Well, this is the problem. You and I haven't seen it, and it is being used to cast aspersions and insinuations against Saudi Arabia. We want the report published, not only in order to clear the good name of Saudi Arabia, but if there is real information about terrorists, these are people that we arrest and bring down to the dock and bring to trial, and we want to know. GIBSON: You flew halfway around the world to make that case to the president, and he said, no, that he would not release those 28 pages, even before the meeting. Do you feel that your arguments were even considered? You didn't even get a hearing before he said no. AL-FAISAL: No, I got a hearing and we had a good meeting with the president, and he had his case too, remember. He worries about lives that would be compromised, he says, that if he releases the information, because it would give details of ongoing investigations. And we believe him, that he has his reasons for that; so do we.

2. VF: The idea that al-Qaeda had not acted alone was there from the start. The terrorists

do not function in a vacuum, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told reporters the week after 9/11. I know a lot, and what I have said, as clearly as I know how, is that states are supporting these people. Pressed to elaborate, Rumsfeld was silent for a long moment. Then,
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saying it was a sensitive matter, he changed the subject. RESPONSE: On July 22, 2004, the final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, a bipartisan commission mandated by the United States government, confirmed that: ...we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization [of Al-Qaeda].

3. VF: As for Saudi Arabia, Americas purported friend, you would have thought from the

reaction of the Saudi ambassador, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, that the commission had found nothing dubious in his countrys role. The clear statements by this independent, bipartisan commission, he declared, have debunked the myths that have cast fear and doubt over Saudi Arabia. Yet no finding in the report categorically exonerated Saudi Arabia. RESPONSE: False. The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, a bipartisan commission mandated by the United States government, confirmed that: ...we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization [of Al-Qaeda].

4. VF: In sworn statements after 9/11, former Taliban intelligence chief Mohammed Khaksar

said that in 1998 Prince Turki, chief of Saudi Arabias General Intelligence Department (G.I.D.), sealed a deal under which bin Laden agreed not to attack Saudi targets. In return, Saudi Arabia would provide funds and material assistance to the Taliban, not demand bin Ladens extradition, and not bring pressure to close down al-Qaeda training camps. Saudi businesses, meanwhile, would ensure that money also flowed directly to bin Laden.... After 9/11, Prince Turki would deny that any such deal was done with bin Laden. Other Saudi royals, however, may have been involved in payoff arrangements. RESPONSE: The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States confirms that Saudi Arabia made repeated attempts to capture Osama bin Laden prior to September 11, 2001. The Kingdom has also repeatedly tried to foil Al-Qaeda terror attacks inside the Kingdom, as early as 1998. The Saudi government was pursuing bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network before the September 11 attacks, and these terrorists, in turn, were pursuing targets inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia before the attacks on the United States. Osama bin Laden fled Saudi Arabia 10 years before the September 11 attacks. The government of Saudi Arabia revoked his citizenship in 1994. In 1996, he publicly denounced the government of Saudi Arabia. According to the 9-11 Commission: The CIA learned in the spring of 1998 that the Saudi government had quietly disrupted Bin Ladin cells in its country that were planning to attack U.S. forces with shoulder-fired missiles. They had arrested scores of individuals, with no publicity. Furthermore, the former head of Saudi Intelligence Prince Turki Al-Faisal worked to persuade Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders to hand over bin Laden. According to the 911 Commission:
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Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mullah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Ladin, the Taliban leader said no. Both sides shouted at each other, with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government. Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime.

5. VF: It had been far from clear, and for the longest time, that the Saudis were thus

committed [to fighting extremism]. More than seven years before 9/11 the first secretary at the Saudi mission to the United Nations, Mohammed al-Khilewi, had defected to the United States. RESPONSE: A Saudi diplomat could no more defect to the United States than a French diplomat could. France and the Kingdom are key allies of the U.S. and have longstanding diplomatic, military and cultural bonds with the U.S.

6. VF: American and British official sources, speaking later with Simon Henderson, Baker

Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, named the two princes in question. They were, Henderson told the authors, Prince Naif, the interior minister, and Prince Sultan. The money involved in the alleged payments, according to Hendersons sources, had amounted to hundreds of millions of dollars. It had been Saudi official moneynot their own. RESPONSE: False. The final report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, a bipartisan commission mandated by the United States government, confirmed that: ...we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization [of Al-Qaeda].

7. VF: Breaching royal etiquette, he (George Tenant) placed his hand on the princes knee

and said, Your Royal Highness, what do you think it will look like if someday I have to tell the Washington Post that you held out data that might have helped us track down al-Qaeda murderers? On a flight home from Saudi Arabia in the late 1990s, F.B.I. director Louis Freeh told counterterrorism chief John ONeill that he thought the Saudi officials they had met during the trip had been helpful. Youve got to be kidding, retorted ONeill, a New Jersey native who never minced his words. They didnt give us anything. They were just shining sunshine up your ass. RESPONSE: Saudi Arabia has been a reliable ally in counterterrorism efforts Saudi Arabia has been vigilant in confronting terrorists, those who fund them, and those who condone their actions. The Kingdom works closely with various U.S. government entities to accomplish this mutual goal.
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CIA Director George Tenet in The Washington Times in February 2003 stated: The Saudis are providing increasingly important support to our counter-terrorism effortsfrom arrests to sharing debriefing results. On October 9, 2002, Former FBI Director Louis Freeh testified Tuesday before a joint hearing of the House/Senate Select Intelligence Committees on counter-terrorism efforts and the events surrounding the terrorist attacks of September 11. Fortunately, the FBI was able to forge an effective working relationship with the Saudi police and interior ministry. After several trips and meetings with the Saudi leadership, and particularly Prince Nayef, the interior minister, the FBI was granted permission to expand its presence and joint operational capability within the Kingdom. I was particularly fortunate to gain the trust and cooperation of Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to the United States, who was critical in achieving the FBI's investigative objectives in the Khobar case. Due to Prince Bandar's forthcoming support and personal efforts, the FBI was able to establish an FBI office in Riyadh. Our Arabic-speaking special agent, who became the first FBI agent to be assigned to Saudi Arabia, quickly made critical liaison, and relationships of trust were established between the FBI and the Mabahith. Evidence and access to important witnesses were obtained, and excellent investigative support was furnished to various teams of FBI agents who worked with Saudi Arabia to pursue the case. In one instance, Canadian authorities, acting on Saudi information, arrested a Khobar subject who was brought to the United States and thereafter sent by the Attorney-General to Saudi Arabia for prosecution. The cooperation the FBI received as a result of Prince Bandar and Prince Nayef's personal intervention and support was unprecedented and invaluable. From time to time, a road block or legal obstacle would occur, which was expected, given the marked differences between our legal and procedural systems. Despite these challenges, the problems were always solved by the personal intervention of Prince Bandar and his consistent support for the FBI. The case almost faltered on the issue of the FBI's critical request for direct access to six Saudi nationals who were being detained in the Kingdom and who had admitted participation in the Khobar bombing. One of these subjects, who had been returned to Saudi Arabia from another country, had key information which would later implicate senior Iranian government officials as responsible for the planning, funding and execution of this attack. We needed direct access to these subjects, because their admissions and testimony were critical to support our prosecution. Yet no FBI agent had ever been given such unprecedented access to a detained Saudi national, which access could potentially taint their prosecution under Islamic law. For the same reasons, the FBI would have been very reluctant to allow Saudi police officers to come to the United States and interview a subject under like
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conditions. Moreover, by making these witnesses directly available to the FBI, the Saudis understood that they would be helping to provide evidence that senior officials of the government of Iran were responsible for the Khobar attack. Despite these extremely sensitive and complex issues, the Saudis put their own interests aside to aid the FBI in the United States. Supported by Prince Bandar, Prince Nayef, the police and Crown Prince Abdullah, they decided to grant the FBI request to interview the detainees. Ambassador Wyche Fowler closely worked with me in this endeavor, and we finally succeeded. Teams of FBI agents were then able to have access to these critical detainees, and full debriefings were conducted in Saudi Arabia. As a direct result of these and later direct interviews, the Department of Justice was able to return a criminal indictment in June 2001, charging 13 defendants with the murders of our 19 servicemen. The indictment was returned just days before the statute of limitations would have run on some of the criminal charges. The case could not have been made without the critical support and active assistance of Saudi Arabia and the State Department through Ambassador Fowler.

8. VF: An F.B.I. memo written two years after the exodus appears to acknowledge that some

of the departing Saudis may have had information pertinent to the investigation. RESPONSE: Despite such accusations, the post 9-11 flights that repatriated Saudi citizens, including members of the bin Laden family, were investigated by the FBI and no one with known links to terrorism departed on these flights. According to the 9-11 Commission: First, we found no evidence that any flights of Saudi nationals, domestic or international, took place before the reopening of national airspace on the morning of September 13, 2001. To the contrary, every flight we have identified occurred after national airspace reopened. Second, we found no evidence of political interventionNone of the officials we interviewed recalled any intervention or direction on this matter from any political appointee. Third, we believe that the FBI conducted a satisfactory screening of Saudi nationals who left the United States on charter flights. The Saudi government was advised of and agreed to the FBIs requirements that passengers be identified and checked against various databases before the flights departed. The Federal Aviation Administration representative working in the FBI operations center made sure that the FBI was aware of the flights of Saudi nationals and was able to screen the passengers before they were allowed to depart.
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The FBI interviewed all persons of interest on these flights prior to their departures. They concluded that none of the passengers was connected to the 9/11 attacks and have since found no evidence to change that conclusion. Our own independent review of the Saudi nationals involved confirms that no one with known links to terrorism departed on these flights.

9. VF: Several years later, in two long conversations with Jean-Charles Brisard, author of a

study on terrorist financing for a French intelligence agency, (Counter Terrorism chief John) ONeill was still venting his frustration. All the answers, all the clues that could enable us to dismantle Osama bin Ladens organization, he said, are in Saudi Arabia. The answers and the clues, however, remained out of reach, in part, ONeill told Brisard, because U.S. dependence on Saudi oil meant that Saudi Arabia had much more leverage on us than we have on the kingdom. And, he added, because high-ranking personalities and families in the Saudi kingdom had close ties to bin Laden. RESPONSE: Please see above description of Saudi-U.S. intelligence cooperation.

10. VF: The authors spend paragraphs describing how the U.S. government was assisting

Saudis who wanted to leave the U.S. after 9/11, including members of the bin Laden family in which then counterterrorism expert Richard Clark acknowledged the go-ahead for the flights. An F.B.I. memo written two years after the exodus appears to acknowledge that some of the departing Saudis may have had information pertinent to the investigation, the article continued. RESPONSE: Despite such accusations, the post 9-11 flights that repatriated Saudi citizens, including members of the bin Laden family, were investigated by the FBI and no one with known links to terrorism departed on these flights. According to the 9-11 Commission: First, we found no evidence that any flights of Saudi nationals, domestic or international, took place before the reopening of national airspace on the morning of September 13, 2001. To the contrary, every flight we have identified occurred after national airspace reopened. Second, we found no evidence of political interventionNone of the officials we interviewed recalled any intervention or direction on this matter from any political appointee. Third, we believe that the FBI conducted a satisfactory screening of Saudi nationals who left the United States on charter flights. The Saudi government was advised of and agreed to the FBIs requirements that passengers be identified and checked against various databases before the flights departed. The Federal Aviation Administration representative working in the FBI operations center made sure that the FBI was aware of the flights of Saudi nationals and was able to screen the passengers before they were allowed to depart.
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The FBI interviewed all persons of interest on these flights prior to their departures. They concluded that none of the passengers was connected to the 9/11 attacks and have since found no evidence to change that conclusion. Our own independent review of the Saudi nationals involved confirms that no one with known links to terrorism departed on these flights.

11. VF: Congresss Joint Inquiry has found evidence that Saudis were facilitating, assisting,

some hijackers. And my suspicion is that they were providing some assistance to most if not all of the hijackers. Its my opinion that 9/11 could not have occurred but for the existence of an infrastructure of support within the United States. By the Saudis, I mean the Saudi government and individual Saudis who are for some purposes dependent on the governmentwhich includes all of the elite in the country. I think, the former senator said, that they did in fact take actions that were complicit with the hijackers. RESPONSE: These statements are categorically refuted by the 9/11 Commission Report and are the authors opinion and suspicion.

12. VF: At page 396 of the Joint Inquirys report, in the final section of the body of the

report, a yawning gap appears. All 28 pages of Part Four, entitled Finding, Discussion and Narrative Regarding Certain Sensitive National Security Matters, have been redacted. The pages are there, butwith the rare exception of an occasional surviving word or fragmentary, meaningless clausethey are entirely blank. I cant tell you whats in those pages, the Joint Inquirys staff director, Eleanor Hill, said. I can tell you that the chapter deals with information that our committee found in the F.B.I. and C.I.A. files that was very disturbing. It had to do with sources of foreign support for the hijackers. The focus of the material, leaks to the press soon established, had been Saudi Arabia. RESPONSE: RESPONSE: The Saudi government has repeatedly requesteddirectly to the President and publiclythat the U.S. release the 28-pages to cease the perpetuation of conspiracy theory. As early as 2003, Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal stated on ABCs Good Morning, America: CHARLIE GIBSON: Those who have seen the deleted 28 pages of that report on 9/ 11 say it implicates Saudi Arabia in helping finance the attacks. Why would you want something like that released? PRINCE FAISAL: Well, this is the problem. You and I haven't seen it, and it is being used to cast aspersions and insinuations against Saudi Arabia. We want the report published, not only in order to clear the good name of Saudi Arabia, but if there is real information about terrorists, these are people that we arrest and bring down to the dock and bring to trial, and we want to know.
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GIBSON: You flew halfway around the world to make that case to the president, and he said, no, that he would not release those 28 pages, even before the meeting. Do you feel that your arguments were even considered? You didn't even get a hearing before he said no. AL-FAISAL: No, I got a hearing and we had a good meeting with the president, and he had his case too, remember. He worries about lives that would be compromised, he says, that if he releases the information, because it would give details of ongoing investigations. And we believe him, that he has his reasons for that; so do we.

13. VF: It was, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, one of only three nations

that recognized the Taliban. Osama bin Laden had operated there as early as 1979, with the blessing of Saudi intelligence, in the first phase of the struggle to oust the Soviets from neighboring Afghanistan. RESPONSE: The authors fail to state that Saudi Arabia suspended diplomatic relations wihh the Taliban regime, prior to 9/11. According to the 9-11 Commission: Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, who had taken charge from the ailing King Fahd, promised Tenet an all-out secret effort to persuade the Taliban to expel Bin Ladin so that he could be sent to the United States or to another country for trial. The former head of Saudi intelligence Prince Turki Al-Faisal coordinated with CIA Director George Tenet to get Mullah Omar and other Taliban leaders to hand over bin Laden. According to the 9-11 Commission: Yet in September 1998, when the Saudi emissary, Prince Turki, asked Mullah Omar whether he would keep his earlier promise to expel Bin Ladin, the Taliban leader said no. Both sides shouted at each other, with Mullah Omar denouncing the Saudi government. Riyadh then suspended its diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime.