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Village Defence: Understanding the Afghan Local Police (ALP)

July 2011 Comprehensive Information on Complex Crises

Wiebke Lamer Assistant Knowledge Manager

wiebke.lamer@cimicweb.org

Kathleen Hughes Security Knowledge Manager

kathleen.hughes@cimicweb.org

This document discusses the Afghan Local Police (ALP), an initiative which has drawn attention in light of the up-coming security transition. The paper presents the organisation and current status of the ALP as well as the challenges and successes of the initiative. Related information is available at www.cimicweb.org. Hyperlinks to source material are highlighted in blue and underlined in the text.

he handover of security responsibility from NATOs International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan government is scheduled to begin in July 2011, and local policing initiatives have come to the forefront in strategic planning and media coverage. While viewed by some as a critical initiative and a key part of the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, others have expressed concern that the emergent Afghan Local Police (ALP) might empower armed groups and precipitate a new source of insecurity. This report provides a brief overview of the development of local police initiatives, their current status and the successes and challenges associated with them.

Objective and Development

The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is comprised primarily of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP). As of March 2011, the US Department of Defence (DoD) counted 159,363 members of the ANA and 125,589 of the ANP. The goal is to expand the ANSF to 171,600 ANA soldiers and 134,000 ANP policemen by October 2011. According to a recent study by Oxfam and three other nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), these two primary ANSF units have not developed evenly, with the ANA more highly regarded than the ANP in terms of operational capacity and professionalism. An earlier report by the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) lists the many problems facing the ANP, including corruption, police criminality, abuses of power, unaccountability and a lack of oversight and professionalism. The ALP is the newest addition to the ANP structure. Operating at the village level, the objective of the ALP is to provide public protection in communities that lack sufficient ANSF resources. Instituted by President Karzai in August 2010, reportedly following strong encouragement from the US government, the ALP built upon previous local defence initiatives. It is important to note there have been numerous attempts at establishing a community police mechanism throughout Afghanistans recent history, according to a study by Mathieu Lefevre of the Afghan Analysts Network (AAN). The ALP is the latest iteration of this type of program and is designed to embrace, where appropriate, other local police initiatives such as the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP) and the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF). The ANAP was established in 2006 and designed to carry out a community policing function. However, the ANAP was plagued by a variety of problems including weak logistical support, vetting, command and control, and loyalty and as a result, was disbanded in 2008. The APPF was established in 2009 with the goal of filling a security gap left by insufficient numbers of ANP. The APPF were lightly armed, quickly trained gunmen that were associated with local tribes. The plan was for the APPF to be a sort of neighbourhood watch. Like the ANAP, the APPF experienced difficulties with recruitment, vetting and loyalty. In addition to building upon the previous attempts to establish local policing capabilities, the ALP is

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intended to complement local defence measures such as the Village Stability Operations (VSO) initiative that was established in early 2010. The VSO is run by the Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) and aims to enhance local security and development at the village level by connecting the local population to district governance, according to the US DoD. The 2011 Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan describes the VSO as grounded in the tradition of rural Afghan villages providing for their own security, and focuses on Afghan communities with the will but not the means to resist the insurgency through grass-roots initiatives, especially in areas that have limited ANSF and [ISAF] presence. Currently not all VSO sites have an ALP component, but all ALP initiatives are part of VSO. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), the ALP is subject to specific constraints that include restricting their activity to purely local operations. As such, they do not deploy outside their home district or take weapons outside their area of responsibility. Law enforcement tasks do not fall within the responsibilities of the ALP unless specifically requested by the ANP. The ALP reports directly to the district chief of police and falls exclusively under the supervision of the MoI. In December 2010, a conventional US Army infantry battalion was placed under the operational control of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) for a rapid expansion of the ALP programme. These forces provide training and guidance to ALP units for a period of time prior to handing over mentoring responsibility to other elements of the ANSF. Despite this recent build-up of the ALP, Voice of America reports the programme is intended as a temporary effort to supplement formal police and army in their fight against insurgent influence. The Los Angeles Times writes that ALP members will eventually be integrated into the ANP, a task that has proved difficult in past attempts.

Training and Vetting

While US Special Forces units, in cooperation with Afghan authorities, are responsible for most of the training of ALP, ISAF has also been involved in training local police. The British Royal Navy, for example, reports the following: The ALP love the training; they are so enthusiastic and are great students to instruct. The ALP is a part-time force and many of the officers have day jobs to do as well as providing security. They are passionate about providing lasting security for their home towns and villages.Recruits receive three weeks of training and AK-47 rifles as well as access to a range of equipment and hardware, including vehicles, motorbikes and radios, Reuters reports. Instruction includes training in ethics, morals and values as well as in human rights and the rule of law. ISAF also works with local instructors to conduct training on Afghan government policies, military defensive drills, and defensive policing skills. Many Afghans have expressed concerns that local armed groups will grow abusive and corrupt, according to Oxfam. Hence, ALP recruits are vetted carefully, reports the Financial Times. The vetting process includes involvement of community leadership (shuras) and the MoI. The shuras recommend the officers for service and vet them, but the MoI must also grant authorisation. The MoI selection process includes screening by the Afghan intelligence service, collection of biometric data, and final validation before the recruits are allowed to bear arms. However, as discussed later in this report, these vetting procedures may not fully address concerns regarding ALP composition and conduct.

Current Status
The national ALP commander is Brigadier General Ali Shah Ahmadzai. The MoIs weekly update on the ALP for 17 June 2011 reports 41 validated ALP districts with a total of 6,400 community-selected ALP members. However, only 4,518 have completed training; the remainder are in the process of becoming operational members of the ALP. Figure 1 below, provides a country-wide picture on the number of ALP sites as of March 2011.

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Figure 1: Afghan Local Police Sites (as of 31 March 2011)

Source: United States Department of Defence, Report of Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan and United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 2011

Challenges
The ALP is facing several challenges while it rapidly expands. Like local defence measures previously attempted in Afghanistan, the ALP is having difficulty with recruitment and vetting, professionalism, clear understanding of mission and management, and gaining legitimacy in the eyes of segments of the Afghan population. These issues are addressed in turn below. Recruitment and Vetting In spite of formalized vetting processes, observers have voiced their doubts about the effectiveness of the vetting and training procedure. Vetting is often difficult in remote areas. In reality, as reported by Oxfam, a major international NGO, shuras often do not have influence over choosing ALP officers. Instead, local strongmen or former mujahideen commanders in many cases bypass the village elders and select recruits.1 In addition, UNAMA points out that the recruitment procedure does not exclude individuals joining the peace process with records of past human rights violations and those that have been reintegrated through the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP). As such, former anti-government operators can become members of the ALP. Another concern highlighted by UNAMA is that the ALP reinforces ethnic, tribal or political rivalries. Areas with minimal ANSF presence are likely to have strong power brokers that demand loyalty from the local population making support for ANSF problematic. Furthermore, in order to maintain control, these local powerbrokers, or warlords, may exploit the ALP recruitment process to ensure their supporters are part of the force. In this context,
1

Mujahideen is a term used to refer to actors that united inside Afghanistan and across into Pakistan to resist the Soviet invaders and the Soviet-backed Afghan Army in the 1970s. Upon removal of Soviet leadership in Afghanistan, the term mujahideen was seen as an honorific title. The term is still used today to refer to individuals that participated in the ousting of the Soviet regime in Afghanistan and is often synonymous with someone who is a powerbroker, warlord or strongman. Source:http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/7798/Afghanistan/226141/Civil-war-mujahideen-Talibanphase-1992-2001

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the Oxfam report also finds that the ALP programme in many cases is used by former mujahideen commanders as a way to provide their own militias with salaries and a cloak of legitimacy. Professionalism Since ALP recruits are only trained for a short period of time, their level of professionalism and ability to carry out their responsibilities within the boundaries of applicable laws and procedures is questionable. According to the previously mentioned UNAMA report, [w]ithout sufficient knowledge of the law and inadequate training, ALP members may exceed their duties, abuse their official position or act outside their mandate putting civilians at risk. The fact that ALP members receive less pay than ANP might contribute to corrupt practices because they may feel justified in demanding money from local communities for their services. According to the Los Angeles Times, an ALP member is paid roughly USD 120 per month, which works out to a yearly salary of USD 1,440. This is a substantial amount of money in many rural areas, but still 40% less than what a police officer in the ANP earns. As the New York Times reports, measures that had been a staple of Afghan life under the Taliban, like demanding an Islamic tax from villagers, are now carried out by local police recruits. Such instances of misconduct against the local population do nothing to ameliorate fears of the Afghan people towards ALP forces. Other media accounts have reported additional human rights abuses by local police. The UN-affiliated Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) reports that the local police are believed to recruit underage boys and sexually abuse them in an environment of criminal impunity. Additionally, the AAN has highlighted concerns over the criminal and predatory behaviour carried out by some, though certainly not all, local police forces. Mission and Management After several attempts at establishing local defence forces in Afghanistan, it is evident that there is a lack of understanding about the specific tasks of the ALP. In most accounts, the ALP is described as a force instituting public protection with no law enforcement capabilities. According to the Army Times, President Hamid Karzai stated that the ALP will not have arrest authority. In contrast, UNAMA reports that the ALP does perform law enforcement tasks if requested by the district police. ISAF further notes that the ALP training does include a session on understanding Afghan law and police tactics, which one could deduce means the ALP carries out law enforcement tasks. Without uniform implementation of the ALP across villages it is likely village-specific definitions of public protection may emerge. Independent interpretations of the ALP mission may translate into ALP forces protecting the village from other familial, tribal or ethnic groups instead of combating insurgents. There is also a question over what is deemed public, for example, protecting a particular villages access to public resources like water may in some cases prompt the ALP to act. In addition to an uncertain definition of the exact ALP mission, management and oversight issues are a concern, as UNAMA reports. While the requirement of the ALP to report to the district chief of police is seen as a positive step, there are several other problems. For example, no clear guidelines have been established as to how the ALP is to deal with detainees. This is a particularly controversial aspect of the programme, since many of the areas with ALP have very little, if any, ANP or ANA presence. For the same reason, observers are worried about the oversight of out of area operations by ALP and their reputation for lack of discipline and corruption. Local Legitimacy The Peace Training and Research Organization (PTRO), which has been carrying out several studies on militias in Afghanistan, argues the ALP programme in design is the best version so far of such local defence initiatives with government oversight. Nevertheless, the PTRO report suggests that local communities often perceive the
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implementation of the ALP as failing to resemble its intended design. The recent Oxfam study even called for a complete halt to local policing programmes until adequate training of recruits can be secured. Criticism is wideranging, from a lack of uniforms that hinder proper identification of ALP to encouraging the legitimisation of armed groups. The biggest concern for most Afghans and many observers, however, is the development of a new version of tribal militias that have caused problems the country for several decades. Many of the local police initiatives are modelled after the so-called arbakai.2 These semi-official local militias, AlJazeera reports, were historically typical in the south-eastern part of the country, where they were a major part of the tribal security structure. Since a standing police force in these areas was rare, arbakai were made up of members from village families that provided security when it was needed. In the north of Afghanistan and in much of the rest of the country, however, the arbakai are new. According to Al-Jazeera, they are now largely comprised of former mujahedeen in the north, who had been disarmed during the early years of Karzais presidency. But over the last few years they have re-established themselves with new arms under the name of arbakai. They are responsible for extensive misconduct in many parts of the country, most notably in Kunduz and Baghlan. By describing local defence initiatives almost universally as arbakai, local communities conflate two diverging strands of Afghan security culture, PTRO points out. On the one hand, the report argues, there is the traditional view that communities should be able to protect themselves by organizing local forces that are under control of elders. On the other hand, PTRO concludes, recent experience with militias has been very negative, as these have often been regarded as efforts of failing governments to uphold their authority. The result is that many Afghans now distrust any form of militia.

Successes
With the start of US troop withdrawal pending, the ALP could become the cornerstone for a US exit from Afghanistan, according to analysts cited in the Wall Street Journal. General David Petraeus, Commander of US and NATO Forces in Afghanistan, is said to view the ALP as a potential game changer in the war. The advantage of the local police, according to US forces on the ground, is that they know the area, they know who is an outsider, and they also tend to be very aggressive in going after the Taliban. The US DoD also reports on the successes of the ALP in the following passage. Insurgent leadership views ISAF local security programs, such as the ALP and VSO, as significant threats, as they empower the local populace to reject the insurgency and connect them to the government. These local security programs also deny the insurgency access to terrain while providing time and space for the Government of Afghanistan to build capacity. Attacks against the ALP and VSOs have so far been largely ineffective. In some areas, the attacks are even having the opposite effect, strengthening ALP cohesion and spurring locals to join the ALP. Corroborating the statement above, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting notes that the Taliban has recently begun to target local police aggressively, denouncing them as devoted slaves of the Americans. On the one hand, intimidation tactics by insurgents might lead to a decrease in security for civilians and deter locals to join the ALP programme. On the other hand, UNAMA has observed some accounts of local communities responding positively to the establishment of local police.

See the Tribal Liaison Office (TLO) for more information on the Arbakai. http://www.tlo-afghanistan.org/

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Conclusion
The ALP is the latest attempt to establish a local defence force to help foster security throughout Afghanistan. The force is designed with particular recruitment and vetting procedures that are intended to keep local strongmen and former insurgents from infiltrating the ALP. However, the implementation of these procedures in rural village environments throughout Afghanistan has proven and will continue to prove difficult. Deploying this arbakaibased force throughout Afghanistan is a challenge. A long-standing tradition of arbakai exists only in certain parts of the country, and attempting to appeal to local population groups by establishing militias under the guise of a traditional structure is problematic. To date, some, though not all, communities have met local police efforts with distrust and scepticism, potentially exacerbating the pre-existing divide between the state and the citizenry in parts of the country. However, there are signs that this incarnation of a local police force is having some success in combating insurgents ultimately providing improved security for rural communities. Despite these successes, descriptions of misconduct by local defence initiatives are common. Navigating the blurry line between legitimate community safe-keepers and rogue militias will prove a major challenge and priority for the ALP and its overseers in the Afghan MoI and international community.

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