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Sino-Nepalese Relations : Factoring in India

Bhaskar Koirala China Report 2010 46: 231 DOI: 10.1177/000944551104600305 The online version of this article can be found at: http://chr.sagepub.com/content/46/3/231

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Sino-Nepalese Relations: Factoring in India

Bhaskar Koirala

This article argues that the intensity of Sino-Nepal relations over the past decade has witnessed a lack of consistency, attributable to shifting political conditions in Nepal. From 2000 to 2010, Nepal has experienced different political systems such as constitutional monarchy, absolute monarchy and currently a republican framework. However, Nepals espousal of the one China policy, particularly as it concerns Tibet, has been steady and enduring, as has the logic that Sino-Nepal relations are not strictly bilateral in nature but also potentially serve as a channel for Nepal to connect to a wider canvas including Central Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia. It is also argued that to a large extent, Sino-Nepal relations are poised to be signicantly affected by an evolving ChinaNepalIndia triangular relationship on account of Nepals geographic position. Effective consolidation of this triangular relationship is vital to ensure political stability in Nepal and therefore security for both China and India.

A cursory examination of the trajectory of NepalChina relations over the past decade would certainly have to commence by honing in on events of February 2001, when the late King Birendra embarked on a state visit to China at the invitation of former Chinese President Jiang Zemin. On the rst leg of this visit King Birendra addressed the Boao Forums inaugural ceremony afrming Nepals strong support and desire for active participation in an Asian forum akin to the World Economic Forum in Davos.1 Subsequently in Beijing, the key aspect of Birendras visit on the bilateral front was the agreement forged between Nepal and China to expedite construction of the SyaprubeshiRasuwa road which would serve as a second road linking Nepal to the Tibet Autonomous Region of China (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2001). Sino-Nepal relations of this particular period seemed to be marked by a convergence which in theory saw the leveraging of bilateral relations to position Nepal in a broader Asian framework, and which in practice began to expand the physical infrastructure that would facilitate this.
As Guest of Honour and speaking alongside Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamad, former Australian and Japanese prime ministers Robert Hawke and Yasuhiro Nakasone, respectively, King Birendra stressed that establishment of the forum reected the aspirations of Asian countries for common development through enhanced dialogue and cooperation (Peoples Daily 2001).
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The end of the decade witnessed another state visit to China in December 2009 by Nepalese Prime Minister Madhav Kumar Nepal, the atmospherics of which were markedly less grandiose in the overall leveraging of Sino-Nepal relations and appeared to focus more on mundane concerns reected by the signing of just two accords on Bilateral Economic and Technical Cooperation and a Memorandum of Understanding on Youth Exchanges.2 Following the abolition of monarchy in 2007 and with Nepal thus in a period of transition, the Chinese government has naturally tended to proceed with some caution and avoided alignment with any one political force, not knowing which party is clearly preponderant in Nepal. This position has perhaps come into sharper relief after the much anticipated second visit to Beijing by former Premier Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda failed to materialise in May 2009. Though the immediate reason behind the cancellation of the visit had to do with the controversy surrounding the sacking of the Nepal Army Chief of Staff Rookmangad Katwal and Prachandas subsequent resignation, it can also be argued that the agenda of the visit itself was overly ambitious and perhaps premature given the nature of politics of that time.3 It is obvious that the intensity of Sino-Nepal relations has oscillated during the course of the past decade on account of momentous events such as the assassination
2 However, a few months prior to the visit of Premier Madhav Nepal to Beijing, the Chinese government announced in October 2009 at a programme in Kathmandu focused on The Role of China in Nepals Economic Development that it commits to increase its grant assistance to Nepal by 50 per cent (Gorkhapatra 2009; Nepalnews 2009) 3 During Prachandas planned visit to China, a new Comprehensive Treaty to replace the 1960 Peace and Friendship Treaty was expected to be signed and substantial increases in aid to Nepal by China were expected to be pledged. In an interview given to the Times of India after resigning as prime minister, Prachanda stated, Its also true that there are forces that did not want the Beijing visit to take place. And furthermore, asked if he planned to sign a special treaty with Beijing, Prachanda stated: Yes. We want a pact on the lines of the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship. We could have prepared the ground for this. We planned to formalize it only after taking other political parties into condence. This treaty would have had no negative impact on our friendship with India. We just want to strengthen our ties with China according to the changed situation in Nepal. We are now a republic (Times of India 2009). Prachandas desire to move forward with a new treaty with China perhaps highlighted a dilemma for Beijing in that, though it probably was not fully clear about the merits of signing a historic treaty with a new Maoist administration and thereby appearing to tilt towards this particular party, reluctance to do so could mean losing further ground to India which had played a key role in engineering the 12-point agreement in New Delhi between the Maoists and mainstream parties that subsequently led to the Constituent Assembly elections. That there is no denitive/unequivocal ideological or fraternal linkages between the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) and the Peoples Republic of China is evident from the fact that just about three years prior to Prachanda becoming prime minister, China was reported to have provided military assistance to King Gyanendras government to ght the Maoists insurgency after the US, UK and India suspended military aid following the kings takeover (BBC News 2005). Moreover, as early as 2001, Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan had stated in a telephone exchange with Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba that, in reference to anti-government forces as they were referred to by the Chinese governmentin other words the Maoists of NepalChina supports the counterinsurgency measures that His Majesty King Gyanendra and the Nepalese government have taken to uphold national unity, solidarity and stability, adding that China is opposed to all forms of terrorism and the terrorist acts that took place in Nepal (Vela 2009).

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of King Birendra in June 2001 and transition to King Gyanendra, the Peoples Movement of 2006, the abolition of the monarchy and advent of republicanism and the complexities of the Nepalese peace process, landmark events of the past decade which have all drawn sober ofcial reactions from the Chinese government. However, it would appear that the overarching logic for Nepal in advancing relations with China has always rested on the premise that Nepal would not just accelerate interactions with China but would also open up to the broader canvas of Central Asia, Southeast Asia and even East Asia and thereby create new opportunities to promote its national development and prosperity. The extent to which this logic impacts upon global geopolitics is debatable, but to say that such a process is detrimental to Indian interests and security concerns requires re-evaluation in light of tightening Asian integration and also the notion of dynamic equilibrium4 which has been employed to characterise Sino-Indian relations and which obviously have a bearing on regional developments. Similarly, remarks in April 2010 by Indian Foreign Minister S.M. Krishna in Beijing that India and China must always remember that the two countries are each part of the others immediate periphery [and] that both seek a secure and peaceful environment that allows them to focus on domestic growth prospects [and that we must] encourage progress in our neighborhood [so] we will be more secure and stable (Krishna 2010) would seem to point to a slightly reduced degree of Indian concern, for example, in the face of Nepals desire to expand cooperation and connectivity with China and thereby wider regions. It would appear that some sections of the Indian strategic community are also thinking along these lines.5

KEY ASPECTS OF CONTEMPORARY SINO-NEPALESE RELATIONS

The most profound developments in contemporary Sino-Nepal relations are represented by the rapid pace of changes in the western sector of China encompassing the Tibet Autonomous Region and also the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The completion of the QinghaiTibet Railway is a quintessential example of this, as is the nature of infrastructure development in Xinjiang which could in the near future

4 Though the term dynamic equilibrium was not dened precisely by the Indian Foreign Secretary, except in as much as she indicated that it consists of both collaboration and competition, one can surmise that equilibrium refers to the greater trend of stability while the dynamic element is situated at either end of this equilibrium and refers to competition and collaboration (Rao 2010). 5 For example, C. Raja Mohan argues that one option is to develop a strategy of working with China to transform the subcontinentDelhis comfort level with Beijing may have to rise a lot more before the idea of India-China cooperation in South Asia can take off. One way of getting there, however slowly, is for Delhi and Beijing to start talking about the subject at the ofcial level (Mohan 2010).

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have particular relevance for north-west Nepal.6 Such transformations in Chinas western regions have taken place with great intensity in the past decade and present Nepal with numerous opportunities to expand ties with China and beyond, especially in terms of physical connectivity. Indeed, Sino-Nepal relations are moving forward in a rather organic and irreversible manner. Nepal shares a boundary of over 1,400 km with Chinese territory (specically with the Tibet Autonomous Region). Despite the fact that the Tibet issue has continued to crop up especially in Sino-US relations, Nepals consistent espousal of the One China policy has rendered it a non-issue in Nepal. Protests in Kathmandu by Tibetan activists notwithstanding, and in spite of very limited support for these protests by a small section of Nepals civil society, by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and some sections of the diplomatic community based in Kathmandu, no government in Nepal has broken with this policy. Further, Nepalese do not necessarily conate NepalChina relations with the Tibet issue. Rather, what gures prominently in Nepals imagination with respect to China is her expanding clout and achievements which are brought home to Nepal on an almost daily basis via radio, television, internet, vehicular and air trafc, and also the movement of people and students. The likely impact of China on Nepal will be substantially amplied by 2013 when the Tibet Railway is expected to arrive at the border.7 It is true that Chinese soft power is increasingly being felt in Nepal, but one is rather confounded when only suspicions are cast on China and Nepal, for instance, when Confucius Centers are established in Nepal or when China Radio International (CRI) launches a local FM radio station in Kathmandu (Bhattacharya 2009), without conceding that Nepal stands to gain a great deal as well in terms of knowledge and information, in the same way that Nepal benets from local radio broadcasts of the BBC World Service, from the Alliance Franaise, the Goethe Institute or the British Council, and from the availability of TV channels in Nepal in various languages such as Russian, German, English, French, Korean, Japanese, Arabic, Bengali, Hindi and so on. The Nepalese Service of China Radio International, as a matter of fact, has been operating in Nepal since 1975 and now has more than 500 CRI listeners clubs and millions of listeners in the country (Embassy of PRC in Nepal 2004). Comments by a former Chinese ambassador to Nepal are instructive: Nepalese listeners of China Radio International (CRI) played an important role in disseminating information
The allusion here is to the XinjiangTibet Highway, encompassing an extraordinary length of 1,179 km in what is the highest highway network of its kind in the world. Of relevance here is the Tibet segment of the highway that runs parallel to the Himalayas, along the Gung-gyu and almost circling the Lake of Manasarovar and dissecting the area separating that lake with the Rakshas Tal, and nally terminating (currently) in the town of Khorzhak, which is extremely close to the north-western Nepalese zone of Karnali (Koirala 2006). 7 Under current plans the Tibet Railway should arrive close to the Nepal border by 2013, if not reach the border itself, but due to challenging terrain (almost 90 degree mountain slopes at the exact intersection of the two countries), some delays are to be anticipated (Sigdel 2009).
6

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they got from CRI of Chinas latest developments to their relatives and friends so [as to] further understanding of each other (China.org.cn 2006; Sennitt 2005). The diffusion across Nepal of more information about China combined with increasing numbers of Nepalese students in China, as also the steadily increasing movement of peoples8 between the two countries, is creating an organic and natural momentum that is bringing the two countries closer together. Furthermore, increasing air, vehicular and cargo trafc between the two countries is rapidly promoting Sino-Nepal economic relations as well.9 Trade between Nepal and China has registered signicant increases in recent years. Exports from Nepal to China in the scal year 200506 stood at approximately US$ 12.8 million; by scal year 200809, the gure had more than doubled to US$ 26.4 million. However, it must be acknowledged that China is still only the fth largest export market for Nepal behind India, US, Bangladesh and Germany. On the other hand, China is currently the second largest importing country to Nepal behind India and here staggering increases have been seen. For instance, in scal year 200405, imports from China stood at approximately US$ 183.7 million but by 200809 the gure was close to US$ 469 million, translating into a signicant balance of trade decit for Nepal of around US$ 443 million (Trade and Export Promotion Centre 2008/2009). Finally, China is also one of the largest bilateral donors to Nepal, ranking sixth in terms of ofcial development assistance to Nepal, providing about US$ 12 million every year. On the political front, for China at this point in time, perhaps the single greatest concern in terms of Nepal is related to political stability. The reasons according to Han Hua of Beijing University are simply because it is likely to have a spill-over effect on the security environment in Chinas frontier areas. For Beijing, Nepals strategic disposition is of tremendous value to its South Asia Policy and to the stability in its frontier region (Han 2006). In examining Sino-Nepal relations, the bulk of international commentary tends to focus narrowly on the Tibet issue10 without acknowledging that Nepal possesses its own logic in building a strong partnership with China, among other reasons because
8 China is now the second largest tourist market for Nepal after India and some 35,000 Chinese tourists visit Nepal annually. Exact gures for the number of Nepalis visiting China is not available, but the Nepali student population in China is the ninth largest behind students from South Korea, Japan, USA, Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand, Germany and Russia. There are approximately 1,199 Nepali students in China each year (Ministry of Education, PRC 2010; Peoples Daily Online 2010). 9 There are now four different Chinese airlines connecting Kathmandu to various cities in China approximately fourteen times a week (Xinhua 2009). 10 A news analysis in the New York Times zeroed in on the unfavorable implications for the Tibet activist community stemming from agreements between Nepal and China to cooperate on border security that renders a tighter regulation of the border and passes which have been used by Tibetans to pass into Nepal and then move onwards to India. Such movement of people across Nepals northern border has obviously posed difculties for Beijing. This was demonstrated vividly during the 2008 Beijing Olympics when Tibetan activists began agitating in Kathmandu and received extensive global media coverage (Yardley 2010).

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of the varied opportunities that lay in the broader ChinaIndiaNepal triangle which Kathmandu seeks to nurture. At the same time, Sino-Nepal relations have been adversely affected to a certain extent due to protests launched by Nepal-domiciled Tibetan activists, precisely at a time when Nepal requires strong support from its neighbours to consolidate its own fragile peace process. While reports have claimed that an expanding Chinese presence in Nepal would be especially alarming to India, given that India and Nepal share a long and porous border (Yardley 2010), such reports have failed to identify the reverse aspect of this argument, namely that China is also affected unfavourably by the same open border. Thus, the questions that routinely fail to get addressed concern the reciprocal advantages deriving from NepalChina relations as also from NepalChinaIndia relations, and failure to acknowledge these is to ignore truly historic developments currently underway in the very heart of Asia.

CHINANEPALINDIA TRILATERAL COOPERATIONA POTENTIAL RAILWAY AXIS

A great deal has already been written in Nepal about the considerable economic and trade benets that will accrue to both Nepal and China in light of the extension of the Tibet Railway to the Nepalese border by 2013. It is worth considering this statement about the early history of American railroads, The rails carried more than goods; they provided a conduit for ideas, a pathway for discourse The completion of [this] great railroad ... gave birth to a transcontinental culture. And the route further engendered another profound change. Here was manifest destiny wrought in iron Distances shrank, but identication to land and fellow [peoples] grew in inverse proportion. (PBS Online 2003) Admittedly, to quantify the economic benets11 of a truly historic endeavour that seeks to link by rail two countries like Nepal and China separated by the tallest mountains in the world is a much simpler and less speculative exercise than to talk about the broader transformations that this would engender. However, just as the American Trans-continental Railroad or the Trans-Siberian Railway and others wrought profound and epochal transformations whether political, economic, social or culturalthe
11 What are the likely economic benets of a rail link between China and Nepal? Besides the benets on a strictly bilateral basis, the larger issue in terms of Nepal serving as transit point or a transit state between China and India are focused on many different ideas. For example, India could export construction materials to Tibet [via Nepal] which could change the composition of its exports to China in which primary products such as iron ore is very important at the present time (Raj 2005; see also Dahal 2005; Nepal 2006).

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TibetNepal Railway is also set to do the same, though of course the environmental and other drawbacks of this have also to be acknowledged (Ministry of Environmental Protection, PRC 2009). To turn to a larger concern, it should be mentioned that in spite of reported plans in the pipeline for a high-speed rail link that intends to connect China and India, specically Kunming in south-western China to New Delhi (Krishnan 2010), the fact is that a railway line that connects China with India via Nepal is something which could materialise much more rapidly. In fact, once the Tibet Railway arrives at the Nepal border, the total length of the missing link that would connect the three countries would stand at just 220 km (Raxual in Bihar to Kathmandu 80 km, and Kathmandu to Kodari on the Sino-Nepal border, 140 km). As has been pointed out before, this would represent the achievement of an earlier vision of the British Royal Geographical Society dating back to around 1885 to establish a rail link between India and China (Hallett 1885; Koirala 2008). Clearly, in achieving this, several objectives would be met simultaneously, namely, the further cementing of Sino-Nepal relations and of Indo-Nepal relations and perhaps more importantly, the establishment of a cooperative trilateral axis that would cut vertically across the heart of Asia and naturally transform Nepal into an earnest Zone of Peace. For Nepal in particular, if it becomes a transit state between India and China, some have argued that foreign investors could very well see greater prospects in investing in Nepal. The Nepalese Foreign Ministry has noted that multinational companies may [decide to] produce in large quantities to capture the big markets of two gigantic economies. It might increase the possibilities of [amplication] in foreign investment in service sector industries [and] the creation of investment opportunities will [likewise] strengthen the tax base (Nepal 2006).

INDIA FACTOR IN SINO-NEPAL RELATIONS

It is a truism that the India factor is pivotal in Sino-Nepal relations (just as the China factor is pivotal in Indo-Nepal relations). This becomes clear if we simply account for the fact that India is by far the largest trading partner for Nepal both in terms of imports and exports and the countrys largest trade decit is with India, currently worth a staggering US$ 1.73 billion (Trade and Export Promotion Centre, Government of Nepal 2009). For better or worse, India has also been closely involved at nearly every juncture of Nepals modern political history. Nonetheless, what has been amply demonstrated by events of the recent and more distant past is that to achieve true and long-term stability in Nepal (which is vital from a security perspective for both China and India) there must be a high degree of convergence and coordination between these two, the most populous countries of the world that sandwich Nepal with a population of just 27 million. The narrow geographic space Nepal occupies as a sovereign state China Report 46, 3 (2010): 231242

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between India and China can be thought of as being both very consequential and quite inconsequential. It is consequential in the sense that, from a security standpoint, excessive and to that extent, unhealthy, jockeying and competition by China and India in Nepal (and the instability that must follow) would not bode well for either country in the face of this geographic reality. It is, however, inconsequential, in the sense that genuine cooperation between China and India in the Nepalese theatre can be relatively easy to achieve, and there are multiple ways to do so, the ChinaNepalIndia railway being just one example. The main argument here from a Nepalese perspective is that sustained cooperation between its two neighbours on the question of Nepal would almost certainly constitute the key ingredient of the countrys long-term stability and prosperity. It would be appropriate here to highlight two old Chinese proverbs which can be normatively employed to discuss Sino-Nepal relations within the context of what is referred to as the India factor, the US factor and Other External Power factors. The rst proverb says that better good neighbours near, than relations far away, while the second states that distant water wont quench your immediate thirst. Indeed, Nepals relations with both China and India stand unambiguously as the cornerstone of the countrys foreign policy. From the perspective of Kathmandu, however, the problem is that it is not enough for Nepal merely to have good neighbours in the form of Beijing and New Delhi. That is to say, at a certain level, it may be largely irrelevant if China and India are good to Nepal without also being good to each other. To evoke another Chinese proverb, it never rains on your neighbours without you getting your feet wet. To put it differently, if dark clouds hover over Sino-India relations, Nepal will certainly suffer the consequences, no matter how good each neighbour is to Nepal itself. As a matter of fact, the rampant instability we have seen in Nepal over the past decade can be traced somewhat broadly to miscommunication and disjointed efforts by China and India in the Nepalese arena. And this instability has spawned a very unfortunate and undesirable phenomenon which is precisely Nepals sort of compulsion to cultivate relations far away to address her many development challenges. During these years of sharp turmoil, substantial foreign aid and assistance supplied to Nepal by countries, in many cases continents away, has still not delivered stability to Nepal, and stability being the principal thirst of the Nepalese people, it has in fact been borne out that distant water does not actually quench your immediate thirst. The case must be made therefore that in light of the centrality of the India factor in Sino-Nepal relations (and vice versa), ultimately genuine cooperation and partnership between the three countries must be the basis of the process to ensure stability in Nepal and therefore security for both China and India.12
12 Kunda Dixit argues that despite geopolitical suspicions, cooperation rather than antagonization would behoove both China and India [in Nepal]. In turn, a more cooperative relationship between the two Asian giants would promote stability for their smaller neighbors, for the region at large, and for the world (Dixit 2010: 134).

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Finally, with regards to the question of the shifts in the dynamics of Chinas South Asian regional strategy within which Sino-Nepal relations are arguably embedded, one should begin by acknowledging overarching processes of contemporary Chinese foreign policy. Chinas interactions with South Asia in the form of SAARC are quite limited and lacklustre, relative to Chinas diplomatic engagements in its other peripheral regions such as in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and beyond in Africa and the Pacic Island region. China is presently merely an observer in SAARC, just as the US, Japan, the European Union, Australia and Iran are, though Chinas relations with virtually all South Asian states are steadily acquiring much greater depth, situated as it is in geographic proximity to the region unlike the other observers. However, if one examines Chinas relations with Africa, for example, what is evident is that not only have these relations advanced rapidly and embraced a diverse range of issues, they have also been institutionalised and regularised within the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation. The same is true for Chinas relations with Pacic Island countries in what is called the China-Pacic Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum. It is thus somewhat of an anomaly to nd that in spite of the aforementioned geographical reality, institutionally, linkages between SAARC and China are considerably weak at the present time. Therefore, the question must be posed as to whether and how China wishes to institutionalise relations with SAARC in ways more consistent with Chinese diplomacy as evidenced in other parts of the world. This would give a clearer picture as to whether there is any signicant shift in Chinas South Asian regional strategy. The fact that China dispatched senior Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya to lead the Chinese delegation to the sixteenth SAARC summit in Bhutan in April 2010 is signicant in this regard, given Minister Wangs current major role in policy planning at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.13 Minister Wangs comments in Bhutan are also noteworthy and suggest that China is indeed looking at cooperation with SAARC in nothing short of historical terms. At the opening ceremony of the summit on 28 April 2010, in a speech entitled For Friendship, Cooperation and Common Prosperity, Minister Wang said: [T]odays world is undergoing major changes, adjustments and development. Asia, including South Asia, is witnessing a steady rise of its international standing and inuence. Cooperation between China and SAARC thus faces a historical opportunity. China is South Asias biggest neighbor. Our traditional friendship boasts a history of more than a thousand years. Our good-neighborly relations are deep-rooted. With a combined population that accounts for over 40 per cent of the worlds total, we have a major responsibility to promote world peace and
13 Wang has extensive expertise in international organisations and conferences, among others due to his ve-year stint as the Chinese representative at the Permanent Mission at UN headquarters in New York.

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development. We all face the task of growing economy and improving peoples livelihood. There is a lot we can learn from each other. There is even more we can do together. All in all, we have everything it takes to foster greater cooperationthe right time, favorable geographical conditions and most importantly, support from our people. (Wang 2010) Finally, it can be argued that Chinas South Asia regional strategy, as well as various dimensions of its policy in Nepal are really part and parcel of greater macro trends in Chinese diplomacy. It, therefore, comes as somewhat of a surprise when analysts outside Nepal take a simplistic view by interpreting any kind of traction in Sino-Nepal relations as being directed against a third country or as a deliberate attempt to disrupt extant geostrategic balances (Agarwal 2009; Singh 2010). Obviously it cannot be denied that the rise of China and indeed the rise of India are profoundly altering old geostrategic patterns and constellations, but to ascribe ill intentions to the motives of both Kathmandu and Beijing in their desire to expand Sino-Nepal relations is to miss the point. To a large extent current Nepalese political leaders have also been unable to properly consolidate the larger ChinaIndiaNepal triangle, because in practice they have not always been consistent in hewing to the quite forward-looking principle of Nepal serving as a Zone of Peace which was articulated by King Birendra (Sharma 2009). It should be acknowledged that the overall political dynamics of Nepal over the past decade have been very complicated, that political leaders have not risen above their narrow agendas of advancing their own personal and party interests, and that they have appeared unable (maybe even unwilling) to keep China and India on the same page insofar as this concerns Nepal. Normatively speaking, this is a wrong approach and one which is not in the long-term interest of Nepal or of the more crucial IndiaChinaNepal triangle.

REFERENCES
Agarwal, Bipin Chand, Chinas New Front on Indo-Nepal Border, Times of India, 25 October 2009, http://timesondia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5158630.cms#ixzz0wNuc3q3x (accessed on 30 May 2010). BBC News, Chinese Deliver Arms to Nepal, BBC News, 25 November 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/ hi/south_asia/4469508.stm (accessed on 30 May 2010). Bhattacharya, Abanti, Chinas Inroads into Nepal: Indias Concerns, IDSA Comment, Institute of Defense Studies and Analyses, 18 May 2009, http://www.idsa.in/node/756/117 (accessed on 30 May 2010). China.org.cn, Nepal Organizes Chinese Film Festival in Kathmandu, 23 January 2006, http://french1. china.org.cn/english/features/lm/156032.htm (accessed on 30 May 2010). Dahal, Tara, Nepal as a Transit State: Emerging Possibilities, Institute of Foreign Affairs, 13 November 2005, http://www.ifa.org.np/pdf/new4.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2010). Dixit, Kunda, A New Himalayan Game, Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 34, No. 1, Winter 2010, p. 134.

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Authors Address: Doctoral Scholar, School of International Studies, Peking University, China. E-mail: bhaskar.koirala@gmail.com

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