EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS Tanada v.

Tuvera Facts:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing), to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process.

It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987 PROVIDING FOR THE PUBLICATION OF LAWS EITHER IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE OR IN A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS A REQUIREMENT FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;" WHEREAS, the requirement that for laws to be effective only a publication thereof in the Official Gazette will suffice has entailed some problems, a point recognized by the Supreme Court in Taada. et al. vs. Tuvera, et al. (G.R. No. 63915, December 29, 1986) when it observed that "[t]here is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic release and limited readership"; WHEREAS, it was likewise observed that "[u]ndoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly"; and WHEREAS, in view of the foregoing premises Article 2 of the Civil Code should accordingly be amended so the laws to be effective must be published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country; NOW, THEREFORE, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby order: Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its publication in the Official Gazette. Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION Jean Arnault vs Nazareno This case arose from the legislative inquiry into the acquisition by the Philippine Government of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates sometime in 1949. Among the witnesses called to examined by the special committee created by a Senate resolution was Jean L. Arnault, a lawyer who delivered a partial of the purchase price to a representative of the vendor. During the Senate investigation, Arnault refused to reveal the identity of said representative, at the same time invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Senate adopted a resolution committing Arnault to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate . . . the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith. Arnault petitioned for a writ of Habeas Corpus

ISSUE: Can the senate impose penalty against those who refuse to answer its questions in a congressional hearing in aid of legislation. HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the witness right to due process of law.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE Facts: Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5. The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them. Issues: Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

Ruling: The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed. Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute or without limitation.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION Senate vs. Ermita FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional? RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation.

If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION Camilo Sabio vs Gordon On February 20, 2006, Sen MD Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Sen Gordon, wrote Chairman Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[7] At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task. Gordons Subpoenae Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he threatened Sabio to be cited with contempt.

Issue: May Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 be invoked by Chairman Sabio to justify non-appearance on legislative

investigations?
HELD: It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive understanding. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.

LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATION Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations FACTS:

On September 26, 2007, Neri; appeared before the respondent committees and testified for about 11 hours on the matters concerning the National Broadband Project, a project awarded to a Chinese company ZTE. The Petitioner therein disclosed that when he was offered by Abalos a bribe of 200 million pesos to approve the project, he informed PGMA of the attempt and she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However when he was probed further on PGMAs and petitioners discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking exec privilege. The questions that he refused to answer were: 1. whether or not PGMA followed up the NBN Project. 2. whether or not PGMA directed him to prioritize it. 3. whether or not PGMA directed him to approve it.

The petitioner did not appear before the respondent committees upon orders of the President invoking exec privilege. He explained that the questions asked of him are covered by exec privilege. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. ISSUES: 1. Is there a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system? 2. Did the respondent committee commit a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order? - YES, presidential communications privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the constitution. - The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke exec privilege granted by the President to exec officials in sec 2(b) of E.O. 464 does not apply in this case. - In this case, it was the President herself, through exec sec. Ermita, who invoked exec privilege on a specific matter involving an exec agreement between Philippines and China, which was the subject of the 3 questions asked. - If what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same be recognized. - YES, an unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked executive generates its own abuses. - Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the executive to function effectively. - The Legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus prevent roving commissions. - The court although a co-equal branch of government to the legislature, must look into the internal

rules of congress w/ regard to ensuring compliance by congress to it. Since, the issuance of a contempt order must be done by a vote of majority of all its members. The issuance of the order was w/o concurrence of the majority. HELD: RESPONENTS COMMITTEES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DATED 08APRIL2008 IS HEREBY DENIED.

ACT AS BOARD OF CANVASSERS FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION Pimentel vs. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for President and VicePresident in the 10 May 2004 Elections Facts:

By a Petition for Prohibition, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the 10 May 2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die on 11 June 2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.

Issue [1]:

Whether legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress supports Pimentels arguments against to the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress after the sine die adjournment of Congress.

Held [1]: NO. Pimentels claim that his arguments are buttressed by legislative procedure, precedent or practice as borne out by the rules of both Houses of Congress is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution. Moreover, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee. Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on 25 May 1992. On 16 June 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President. Thereafter, on 22 June 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-President, respectively. Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on 25 May 1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on 27 May 1998. The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on 29 May 1998 as the National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President and Vice-President, respectively.

Issue [2]: Whether the existence and proceedings of the Joint Committee of Congress are invalid, illegal and unconstitutional following the adjournment sine die of both Houses of Congress of their regular sessions on 11 June 2004.

Held [2]:

NO. The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on 11 June 2004. Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution (which provides that "The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.") does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time). Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "the term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "the Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be said to have "passed out of legal existence." The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular sessions on 11 June 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes. Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.

THE PRESIDENT: PRIVILEGES AND SALARY Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

On 17 December 1991, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan (Civil Case 0141. "Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, represented by his Estate/Heirs and Imelda R. Marcos") pursuant to RA 13791 in relation to Executive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A; seeking the declaration of the aggregate amount of US$356 million (now estimated to be more than US$658 million inclusive of interest) deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously held by 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss banks: (1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts; (2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-SpinusAvertina Foundation accounts; (3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts; (4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts; and (5) Maler Foundation accounts. In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG. On 18 October 1993, Imelda R. Marcos, Maria Imelda M. Manotoc, Irene M. Araneta and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr. filed their answer. Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental Agreements dated 28 December 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the assets of the Marcos family. Subsequently, the Marcos children filed a motion dated 7 December 1995 for the approval of said agreements and for the enforcement thereof. The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate, cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner "obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990, that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are met x x x." The said decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Zurich District Attorney Peter Consandey, granting the Republic's request for legal assistance. Consandey declared the various deposits in the name of the enumerated foundations to be of illegal provenance and ordered that they be frozen to await the final verdict in favor of the parties entitled to restitution. Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the General/Supplemental Agreements. Ferdinand, Jr. was presented as witness for the purpose of establishing the partial implementation of said agreements. On 18 October 1996, the Republic filed a motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings. Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition thereto which was later adopted by Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. In its resolution dated 20 November 1997, the Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for summary judgment and/or judgment on the pleadings on the ground that the motion to approve the compromise agreement "(took) precedence over the motion for summary judgment." Mrs. Marcos filed a manifestation on 26 May 1998 claiming she was not a party to the motion for approval of the Compromise Agreement and that she owned 90% of the funds with the remaining 10% belonging to the Marcos estate.

Meanwhile, on 10 August 1995, the Republic filed with the District Attorney in Zurich, Switzerland, an additional request for the immediate transfer of the deposits to an escrow account in the PNB. The request was granted. On appeal by the Marcoses, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in a decision dated 10 December 1997, upheld the ruling of the District Attorney of Zurich granting the request for the transfer of the funds. In 1998, the funds were remitted to the Philippines in escrow. Subsequently, the Marcos children moved that the funds be placed in custodia legis because the deposit in escrow in the PNB was allegedly in danger of dissipation by petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, in its resolution dated 8 September 1998, granted the motion. After the pre-trial and the issuance of the pre-trial order and supplemental pre-trial order dated 28 October 1999 and 21 January 2000, respectively, the case was set for trial. After several resettings, the Republic, on 10 March 2000, filed another motion for summary judgment pertaining to the forfeiture of the US$356 million. Mrs. Marcos filed her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, which opposition was later adopted by her Mrs. Manotoc, Mrs. Araneta and Ferdinand, Jr. On 24 March 2000, a hearing on the motion for summary judgment was conducted. In a decision dated 19 September 2000, the Sandiganbayan granted the Republic's motion for summary judgment. Mrs. Marcos filed a motion for reconsideration dated 26 September 2000. Likewise, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. filed their own motion for reconsideration dated 5 October 2000. Mrs. Araneta filed a manifestation dated 4 October 2000 adopting the motion for reconsideration of Mrs. Marcos, Mrs. Manotoc and Ferdinand, Jr. In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the Sandiganbayan reversed its decision, thus denying the Republic's motion for summary judgment, holding that "the evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis." The Sandiganbayan set the case for further proceedings. The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the Swiss funds deposited in escrow at the PNB can be forfeited in favor of the Republic, on the basis, largely, of the Marcoses lawful income. Held: RA 1379 raises the prima facie presumption that a property is unlawfully acquired, hence subject to forfeiture, if its amount or value is manifestly disproportionate to the official salary and other lawful income of the public officer who owns it. The following facts must be established in order that forfeiture or seizure of the Swiss deposits may be effected: (1) ownership by the public officer of money or property acquired during his incumbency, whether it be in his name or otherwise, and (2) the extent to which the amount of that money or property exceeds, i. e., is grossly disproportionate to, the legitimate income of the public officer. Herein, the spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were public officials during the time material to the present case was never in dispute. Paragraph 4 of the Marcoses' answer categorically admitted the allegations in paragraph 4 of the petition for forfeiture as to the personal circumstances of Ferdinand E. Marcos as a public official who served without interruption as Congressman, Senator, Senate President and President of the Republic of the Philippines from 1 December 1965 to 25 February 1986. Likewise, the Marcoses admitted in their answer the contents of paragraph 5 of the petition as to the personal circumstances of Imelda R. Marcos who once served as a member of the Interim Batasang

Pambansa from 1978 to 1984 and as Metro Manila Governor, concurrently Minister of Human Settlements, from June 1976 to February 1986. Mrs. Marcos also admitted in paragraph 10 of her answer the allegations of paragraph 11 of the petition for forfeiture which referred to the accumulated salaries of respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. The combined accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple were reflected in the Certification dated 27 May 1986 issued by then Minister of Budget and Management Alberto Romulo. 80 The Certification showed that, from 1966 to 1985, Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos had accumulated salaries in the amount of P1,570,000 and P718,750, respectively, or a total of P2,288,750: (1) Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President: (a) 1966-1976, at P60,000/year, P660,000; (b) 1977-1984, at P100,000/year, P800,000; (c) 1985, at P110,000/year, P110,000; (2) Imelda R. Marcos, as Minister: June 1976-1985, at P75,000/year, P718,000. In addition to their accumulated salaries from 1966 to 1985 are the Marcos couple's combined salaries from January to February 1986 in the amount of P30,833.33. Hence, their total accumulated salaries amounted to P2,319,583.33. Converted to U.S. dollars on the basis of the corresponding peso-dollar exchange rates prevailing during the applicable period when said salaries were received, the total amount had an equivalent value of $304,372.43. The dollar equivalent was arrived at by using the official annual rates of exchange of the Philippine peso and the US dollar from 1965 to 1985 as well as the official monthly rates of exchange in January and February 1986 issued by the Center for Statistical Information of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of the Marcoses since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities". Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source." In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution (See Article VII, Sec. 4(2), Article VII, Sec. 11. and Article IX, Sec. 7 thereof). Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds. The Republic did not fail to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss deposits. The elements which must concur for the prima facie presumption in Section 2 of RA 1379 to apply are: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee; (2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during his incumbency; and (3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant. The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the second element. The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's salary and his other lawful income. It is the proof of the third element that is crucial in determining whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case. The Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of five different foundations.

The Republic was able to establish the prima facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials. Otherwise stated, the Republic presented enough evidence to convince the Court that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their incumbency as government officials. Considering, therefore, that the total amount of the Swiss deposits was considerably out of proportion to the known lawful income of the Marcoses, the presumption that said dollar deposits were unlawfully acquired was duly established. It was sufficient for the petition for forfeiture to state the approximate amount of money and property acquired by the Marcoses, and their total government salaries. The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are deposited in escrow at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of US$658,175,373.60 as of 31 January 2002, plus interest, were forfeited in favor of the Republic.

THE PRESIDENT: SUCCESSION IN CASE OF TEMPORARY DISABILITY Estrada V. Arroyo FACTS: Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

HELD: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic are DISMISSED. FIRST: The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions.

SECOND: Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President. a. The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. b. The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name. If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear my name, then I will go. The SC held that this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.

c. During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. d. His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. THIRD: The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII provides that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily.

That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

FOURTH: The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

FIFTH: Petitioner was not denied the right to impartial trial. Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.