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Asian Journal of Political Science

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Bureaucratic rationality in an evolving developmental state: Challenges to governance in Singapore

Gillian Koh
a a
Research Fellow in the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore
Available online: 02 Jan 2008
To cite this article: Gillian Koh (1997): Bureaucratic rationality in an evolving developmental state: Challenges to governance in Singapore, Asian Journal of Political Science, 5:2, 114-141 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02185379708434108
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Asian Journal of Political Science Volume 5 Number 2 (December 1997)
Bureaucratic Rationality in an Evolving Developmental State: Challenges to Governance in Singapore

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Gillian Koh*
ingapore has been lauded as a story of successful delayed or late development.1 This has been the result of a strategic political resolve to "catch up" that has been effectively translated into action by a generally competent and incorruptible bureaucracy. State management assumed the "aura" of being a science.2 However, the initial global and local conditions under which the Singapore developmental state was able to engender factor- and investment-driven economic transformation based on borrowed technology, are no longer obtaining. The critical trends impinging on the role of the state and bureaucracy in development are the rise of the "second wave" newly industrializing economies and other Asian emerging economies, the entrenchment of the new informational economy in the global economy and, domestically, a maturing industrial society. Assuming that there are no major changes in political regime, these factors present challenges to further economic and social development and, hence, governance in Singapore. In the early stages of the 1960s and 70s, the bureaucracy had a relatively clear and given problem-definition of the "catching up" exercise and the basic universal good of socio-economic development. The bureaucratic elite is now expected to be engaged in a more proactive process of problem-definition, that is, of creating a vision of the future of Singapore and "building it". This is different from being a bureaucracy geared towards problem-solving, which is focused mainly on policy implementation and system maintenance. 3 It would also need to grapple with the prospects of an increasingly stratified society and its implications for how the state should meet its social responsibilities.4 These issues of distributive justice and a differentiated response to needs question the adequacy of an ideology of bureaucracy that is based mainly on technocratic management. One other challenge confronting the higher bureaucracy in Singapore, that is, the Administrative Service especially, is the attraction and retention of talent in the face of keen competition in remuneration and conditions of employment from the private sector.
* Gillian Koh, Ph.D., is Research Fellow in the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore. 114
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There has been much thinking among the public sector and political leadership on the need to prepare the Singapore Public Service for the demands that lie ahead. This has culminated in a new wave of administrative reform: the establishment of the Civil Service College in April 1993; the devolution of powers to hire, pay and promote staff to ministrybased personnel boards in January 1995; the introduction of a broad-ranging programme code-named "PS21" for "Public Service for the 21st Century" launched in May 1995; and the introduction of "Budgeting for Results" in March 1996 that is not just an accounting system but an important corollary to this impetus to reforming bureaucratic culture. In a nutshell, these reforms are expected to effect a paradigm shift in how public servants think and work. Firstly, public servants should be catalysts of change to make for a government that "works smart", grafting traditional virtues like consistency and continuity with those of flexibility and enterprise.5 The Public Service should play the role of facilitator and nurturer rather than the more passive, reactive traditional role of regulator and controller; hence, public servants should be output-oriented rather than input-driven. Secondly, public servants should strive for service-excellence at "street level" in serving the needs of their "customers", the public. Thirdly, the Service should avail itself of modern management tools and techniques to improve work and also to keep the morale and standard of welfare of public servants high. Flexibility and autonomy for responsiveness, yet with accountability, are to be achieved in personnel and financial management systems of the Public Service. These reforms have been described as adding up to nothing short of a "managerialist revolution" in the Singapore Public Service.6 The Prime Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong, had advocated in 1991 that the Singapore Public Service be run along private sector principles and processes with the caveat that its goals remain different. While a company would be revenue- and profit-oriented, the goal of the Public Service is to provide services that are cost-efficient and affordable, and its accountability is to the Government.7 What are the limits to which "managerialism" can or should be extended to the Singapore bureaucracy or a public bureaucracy? There are, indeed, those who are wary of the utility of this "generic management" perspective in which a public organization is conceptualized as a business organization and run on the basis of private sector professional management practices.8 A countermodel has been proffered by J. Parkin for the context of democratic societies:9 If the duty of a public servant is to implement a political policy in as cost-efficient a manner as possible, then a technocratic ideology of bureaucracy would be adequate. If, however, the view and desire are for a public servant who sees it as his or her duty to be responsive to the needs of the public, viewed as citizens and not merely customers, then technocratic professionalism in the Public Service must be constrained by the even higher mission of being a civic agency driven by substantive social meaning. Agencies would need to weigh their activities by their social effectiveness.10 This means that they will need to operate on the basis of the soft judgement of what is appropriate to constituents rather than merely by the hard measurement and direction of "performance targets" and economic cost-benefit analysis. Together, these merit a re-examination of the concept of bureaucratic rationality, and an exercise in trying to encapsulate the nature of what correct and appropriate administrative action among the bureaucratic elite in Singapore has been, is and will be. [This paper will focus on the members of the Administrative Service as the elite section
116 Asian Journal of Political Science
othe Singapore bureaucracy..) How can $ie demands for a bureaucracy that is forwardthinking and innovative, yet one that "is responsive^ sensitive td'local and particular demands of citizens be reconciled and met? These issues will be examined in the following sections of this paper: "The Evolving Singapore Developmental State", "Bureaucratic Rationality of the Singapore Administrative filite and the 'Managerialist Revolution'", "Public Sector Leadership in 21st Century Singapore", ending with a small section of "Concluding Remarks".
The Evolving Singapore Developmental State

The term "developmental state" has been applied to Japan and post-World War II South Korea and Taiwan where the state played a strategic role in superseding or suppressing domestic and international economic forces to overcome the backwardness or devastation of economy and society. Generally, these states effectively mobilized human and physical resources, and development aid in such a way as to create competitive advantage in selected strategic industries regardless of the apparent comparative advantage or lack of it.11 Based on his analysis of South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, Castells conceptualized the political dimension of the term "the developmental state" by pointing out that these were states which established their principle of legitimacy on the ability to promote and sustain development posing as "avant-garde of the classes and nations that were not yet fully aware of their destiny and interests".12 In other words, in a developmental state, the legitimacy principle is exercised on behalf of the societal project, where economic development is the means to, say, surviving as a sovereign state and society building a national identity.13 The PAP (People's Action Party) Government established its relative autonomy over civil society, direction of the economy and legitimacy in the same way. In the absence of other competing centres of power,14 citizens quickly internalized the logic of the development project as defined by the PAP elite, especially because it was relevant and reflective of their experience of ordinary, everyday life.15 With the declaration of independence, the Government launched into what it referred to as a "survival exercise".16 This was the task of survival against the odds of being an "unnatural" nation-state, a very modest economy based on entrepot trade without the benefit of any natural resources except its people, and the threat of Communism and communalism looming large at home and in Southeast Asia. Under those circumstances, the PAP leaders decided to take an ideologically pragmatic course in political and economic strategy to bring about quick economic and social development.17 In consultation with United Nations advisers, the Government strategically mapped out economic development in Singapore.18 It invested what it had, and what it could commandeer of citizens' savings through the Central Provident Fund (a social security scheme) in physical infrastructural development and, more importantly, in social development like health, education and housing. Firm and credible tripartite management of labour relations made for industrial peace.
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, By 1960s and 70s, Singapore had successfully pitched itself as a choice investment location for multinational corporations. Castells et al. have suggested that the overriding considerations for these companies in choosing Singapore were: (1) there was favourable quality of labour to cost ratio and the predictability of industrial relations and wage determination; (2) there was the provision of adequate industrial, communications and business infrastructure; and (3) the Singapore Government had been active and entrepreneurial in prospecting for foreign investors "... the institutional mediation provided by the Economic Development Board's initiative and efficiency has been an indispensable element in the process of capital formation".19 These factors suggest the centrality of the role of the state and the bureaucracy in engendering industrial development in Singapore. Top bureaucrats also held multiple, interlocking directorships in the governmentlinked companies that were established to jump-start indigenous industrialization as a second engine of growth.20 A common rationale for such enterprises was that they were to provide promotional stimulus to venture into what were considered strategic industries [airline, shipping and defence-related industries).21
Mobilizing the Bureaucracy for Development

The Civil Service was viewed and mobilized from the start as a vital instrument through which the PAP would achieve its objectives of development. This was why the leadership embarked on attitudinal reform as much as it did organizational reform. The aim of this reform was to have civil servants eschew the colonial mindset of being a politically-neutral agency maintaining law and order. In R. Vasil's assessment, the bureaucracy came to share an identity of purpose with the PAP leadership.22 In 1959, the then Prime Minister, Mr Lee Kuan Yew, described the political leadership and bureaucracy as having a vested interest in the viability of Singapore as a democratic state and a shared responsibility to translate PAP plans for development into reality. He added: "If we do not do our best, then we have only ourselves to blame when the people lose faith, not just you in the Public Service and we, the democratic political leadership, but also in the democratic system of which you and I are working parts."23 A former senior bureaucrat intimated that civil servants at the time had indeed been driven by this nationalistic vision defined by the PAP. He testified that civil servants were infused with and mobilized under the "common cause of collective survival", with "euphoria, camaraderie", and that their "missionary zeal" was combined with "top-down planning and co-ordination ... achieved largely through the Head of [the] Civil Service, [in] co-ordination with all [the] Permanent Secretaries".24 The bureaucracy operated as a strict top-down hierarchy or "machine bureauc25 racy", driven by the need for efficiency but, more importantly, held together by a commitment to a clear, but I would argue, uni-dimensional mission focus. With the localization of the bureaucracy, many men of talent were given quick promotions to the top ranks. Others were recruited from among the scholars who received Commonwealth scholarships disbursed by the Singapore Government. The political leadership and these civil servants were among the handful of the educated elite in Singapore who gave credence to their ideological appeal as the technocratic, meritocratic elite, best
118 * Asian Journal of Political Science placed to lead the nation.26 Indeed, the PAP recruited its leaders from among the civil servants too; hence, blurring the dividing line between politicians and civil servants.27 In a 1975 article, Chan Heng Chee described Singapore as an "administrative state" where the meaningful political arena had shifted to the bureaucracy. Her argument was that the Government was presenting state management as a task of the "rational application of scientific techniques to ... administration",28 that the style of governance "looks for the elimination of politics ... trust is placed on the expertise and the judgement of the leadership to plan and implement with complete and irreversible power".29 Her sense was that bureaucrats were, on the other hand, "politicized" and then entrusted with large decision-making powers, especially in their management of government-linked enterprises. Top bureaucrats were expected to possess "political alertness"; along with integrity, they were to be "both 'red' and 'expert'",30 although undoubtedly under the authority and control of the political leadership at the time. The technocratic prong in governance was further promoted in the 1970s with a drive throughout the bureaucracy to be efficient.31 It was reflected in the strategic choice of recruiting technocrats into the higher bureaucracy.32 A contrariant voice was heard in 1981, however, when the former Head of the Civil Service and Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, the late Mr George Bogaars, criticized officers in the Administrative Service for being "extremely efficient" but very "mindless".33 There were two main points in this important interview. First, Bogaars commented that bureaucrats tended to act on the basis of "instant action" "You are told something, you rush out and do it without even sitting down to think about it."34 This resulted in quickly completed tasks but not necessarily meaningful, elegant or holistic solutions to problems. Second, he exhorted senior bureaucrats to move away from the role of being just policy implementors. They should instead view their role as "checking, testing, evaluating ideas which are being thrown up by the politicians". He added that they should be more proactive: "The Civil Service should get hold of an idea first before politicians begin talking about it and then look at the whole thing."35 Bogaars argued that if bureaucrats did not stop just "doing things" and exercise more "thinking", "the gap between the Government and the people widens because people begin to have less trust and confidence in what you say".36 This was because the demands of existing circumstances and values of constituents would have changed, making previous equations and solutions in public policy inappropriate and lose their resonance among the constituents. Two decades of fast-paced growth and relatively successful social development had meant that public policy arena had grown to be increasingly complex. 37 The political leadership expressed its concern that public administration could no longer be viewed in a rational detached manner but that there was going to be a need for bureaucrats to adopt a broad understanding of people and a vision that empathizes and grasps the complexities of human nature. This led to a reorientation in recruitment of the higher bureaucracy in the early 1980s. More bright young scholars, the recruiting grounds for Administrative Officers, were encouraged to read the Humanities. It was hoped that this would equip them with the tools to consider the more abstract, philosophical issues in public policy and do more "thinking".38
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In July 1991, and in his first address to the Administrative Service, Prime Minister Goh issued a call for bureaucrats to be more people-oriented and people-friendly. In addition, he highlighted the need for Administrative Officers to exercise "political sensitivity" in order to impute a sense of how policies affect people in the increasingly complex policy arena into policy recommendations.39 In November 1991, then PAP Chairman Ong Teng Cheong warned of "an over-zealous bureaucracy tuned in more to statistics than people".40 In August 1992, Ong referred to a perception gap between government and people because bureaucrats took a far too clinical view of policy, so that no exceptions could be made to accommodate those adversely affected by policy. He reiterated the need to inculcate political sensitivity in younger civil servants.41 More recently, the issue of "perception gaps" continues to plague the leadership for instance, that about cost of living and income distribution in Singapore. There seems to have been a disjuncture between "facts" and, as Prime Minister Goh put it, the "emotional question about people's perception".42 Has the nationalist, mission- and development-oriented elan of the "Old Guard" bureaucratic elite been lost with succeeding generations of civil servants? If Chan was right in her account of the modus operandi of the bureaucracy in the mid-1970s, then how can we square this with concerns raised by Bogaars (that the higher bureaucracy had been fixated on policy implementation and lacked judgement), and these more recent concerns mentioned by the political leadership that the bureaucracy be more "people-oriented" and "people-friendly"? Perhaps Chan was referring to the sense of "political alertness" of a very select group of senior bureaucrats vis-a-vis their political masters. What is being referred to in these more recent times has to do with the latter's sensitivity to the other side of the equation of state action, that is, to the concerns and demands of the public. It is a recognition that "the meaningful political arena" can no longer be confined within the bureaucracy and the state.43 The question is: How is the bureaucracy responding to these changing circumstances? How can it do so? These developments suggest a need to review the nature of bureaucratic rationality in Singapore and that the models implied in a rules-driven, ideal-typical Weberian bureaucracy or a goals-, performance-driven technocratic bureaucracy may not address all the concerns regarding the role of the bureaucracy in the Singapore of the present and the future.
Bureaucratic Rationality of the Singapore Administrative Elite and the "Managerialist Revolution"
Claus Offe's "three-tiered" concept of bureaucratic rationality is a way to put a handle on this discussion about the role and mindset of the bureaucratic elite of Singapore.44 The first level or possible standard is "organizational rationality", where bureaucratic action is strictly guided by general, politically pre-established formal-legal rules. It is input-driven. It is a calculable "reflex" of legal norms, organizational programmes and codified rules and procedures. However, this hardly guarantees that bureaucratic action is rational in a functional sense.
120 Asian Journal of Political Science The next standard is "systemic rationality", where the criterion for bureaucratic action is the fulfilment of the functional requirements of the societal environment; it is driven by goals. Bureaucrats themselves develop a sensitivity to the policy environment and visualize how to meet its needs. They decide what the requisite resources are, and take appropriate action. This, therefore, suspends the primacy of the input-output orientation of legal norms and weighs the relevance of what they do according to functional effectiveness. This implies, of course, that there may be a blurring of traditional theoretical lines between politics and administration, such that bureaucratic action requires extra-legal legitimation. There may be a need for bureaucrats to negotiate a consensus through compromise with societal actors about the required action.45 Hence, a third and related standard of administrative action is the ability to generate consensus, support and cooperative relations between the administration and its specific clientele. In the case of Offe's argument about advanced welfare states, he considered the presence of three-tiered, contradictory rationalities a problem for public administration because there was "no available overarching criterion of rationality that would permit the respective premises of the three levels to be brought into an hierarchical relationship".46 In Singapore, that singular overarching criterion as discussed earlier had been development for "survival". The state was pragmatic in its choice of development policy, and the bureaucracy, fully socialized in the developmentalist values. The public acquiesced for the sake of this national vision and project. The "survival crisis" is now no longer a plausible legitimation for these. It could be replaced by the "problems of the management of success", which focus on the problems of managing and meeting aspirations, and problems of distributive justice,47 but this is far less powerful a rallying-point for national solidarity or the acquiescence of citizens to state-directed action. Also, it is uncertain whether the members of the bureaucracy will view what is demanded of them as being a national project or as a question of political management and strategy. Do they or would they see this as falling within the parameters of their perceived role? An added consideration is the presence of opposition party members in Parliament now.48 The Evans et al. thesis proposes a theorization of how bureaucratic rationality is linked with the issue of state power and state-society relations in the context of the developmental state and how the bureaucracy might respond. 49 Briefly, given the starting condition of relative state autonomy from civil society, the state legitimates intervention as the guardian of the universal interests of the society. With effective state intervention and economic transformation, the increasingly differentiated, and empowered interest groups of the maturing industrial society will seek to limit the state's potential autonomy over them (or, as the case may be, make greater demands on it). Unless the latter effectively co-opts these groups, accepting an erosion of its own autonomy, the aggrieved parties may raise questions in the larger political arena about particularistic state action; after all, state agencies and actors are unlikely to be equally capable of intervening in all the different areas of the increasingly complex society. This could constitute grounds for questioning the legitimacy of state action and the regime. The dialectic could undermine the state's coherence as a corporate actor, and its autonomy. The implications for a bureaucracy are that as economic transformation progresses, "non-bureaucratic modes of interrelation" among parts of the state apparatus become
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increasingly important if the state elite as a unit wants to continue to provide direction and yet maintain coherence as it interacts with the different groups and their competing interests. "Non-bureaucratic elements of bureaucracy or modes of interrelation" that Evans argued must be strengthened refer to "a bureaucratic corporate identity, to norms, traditions, values, informal networks within the Service that offer members organic solidarity centred on the pursuit of the collective ends of the state. In the case of East Asian bureaucracies, these are generally attributed to common recruitment grounds, which are highly selective and meritocratic, and the long-term career rewards that create commitment and pride in the Service. Paying bureaucrats well, or somewhat in line with private sector wages, also keeps them independent from unproductive rent-seeking. Together, these give states the ability to resist "incursions by the invisible hand of individual maximization" and bind "the behaviour of incumbents to the pursuit of collective ends, [so] that [the] state can act with some independence in relation to particularistic societal pressures".50 This argument also suggests that strict hierarchical structures of the bureaucracy may have to give way to more organic ones in the important policy-making and policyimplementing, sections under these circumstances of an evolving developmental state. Each team or division of bureaucrats is given the discretion to understand and respond effectively to the concerns of policy communities, while keeping in line with the demands of moderating centralized policy. That is, that it exercises "systemic rationality" within the context of the overarching metavalues of the state and citizenry. Ascertaining what the intermediate and overarching metavalues of the state are and socializing bureaucratic elites to them are prime considerations if the state is to continue in its role of effectively directing economic and social transformation while accommodating these shifts in the socio-political structure of civil society. While this may sound like greater discretionary power to the bureaucracy, it is in the context of stronger normative control based on what is perceived or negotiated by the two parties of the political leadership and citizenry in terms of what are the key social and political values that must be upheld.51 (The question of how this can be achieved will be dealt with in the section titled "Public Sector Leadership in 21st Century Singapore".) Before looking at how this theorization anticipates the administrative reform in the Administrative Service in Singapore and offers directions, it would also be appropriate to examine and evaluate some other arguments on the applicability of technocratic rationality and "managerialism" in the public sector. These offer a second set of considerations that could or should shape bureaucratic rationality in public sector leaders in Singapore.
On the "Managerialist Revolution"

Some of the main thrusts of public sector reform the world over in this last decade to strengthen the management capacity of public servants have been summarized as: (1) (2) (3) the recognition that government must become more facilitative and catalytic, and involved in steering rather than rowing; re-examination of its involvement in economic activities; concern about results and results-orientation, the emphasis shirting from inputs to performance;
122 * Asian Journal of Political Science (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) the need to be customer-driven, providing quality service at all times; a decentralization of decision-making so as to improve service delivery; transparency in government decision-making; greater levels of accountability in public management; and concern for value for money by taxpayers.52
Peters and Savoie argued that an underlying assumption in this public sector reform was that management practices in the private sector were far superior to those in government, and should be emulated. Performance measures were introduced for accountability to the top-level managers, to help them record results and plan activities. Service-orientedness would hopefully make bureaucracies open, and responsive and innovative.53 Their critique was that, firstly, these measures had been more successfully implemented in agencies that had simple, discrete goals and were already well managed. They were less successful in departments that had many goals and activities which had medium-to-high policy content. Secondly, the pressure of accountability of civil servants upwards to their political masters and downwards to their clients actually diminished their autonomy, leading to a loss in morale. Thirdly, these reforms took place to the neglect of the policy advice and formulation functions at a time when these functions were more critical than ever: The world of relatively isolated national economies, linearity, discrete variables (and even common sense) inhabited by government officials has given way to a new world. The new order is much more challenging, less deferential. It requires a strong capacity to adapt to change and to deal with a more probing and better informed media, policy communities or interest groups and the public.54 Mintzberg also questioned the assumptions of the applicability of the generic management to governance: specifically, that the view in generic management that particular activities could be isolated did not hold true in public policy. Agencies and policies were often interconnected vertically at the level of policy formulation and objectives, even if some activities could be isolated horizontally in terms of function. After all, effective public policy was crafted in an iterative process, with close connection between politics and administration for it to benefit from "learning" and be effective. Another point which Mintzberg raised was that many government activities did not lend themselves easily to measurement and, in fact, "Many activities are in the public sector precisely because of measurement problems". 55 Finally, professional managers could not be expected to take charge of just any kind of activity because they would be unable to appreciate the constraints, processes and goals that drove specific and specialized areas of public policy. Mintzberg recommended that the current wave of "managerialism" in the public sector should be balanced, if not tamed by what he termed, the "normative-control model". It would promote the ideal of public service a commitment and dedication rooted in values and beliefs. In his terms, the vertical control by the superstructure would be normative rather than technocratic, which is best expressed by the motto
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"select, socialize and judge".56 These would make for "microstructures" that are "more missionary, egalitarian and energized, less machine-like and less hierarchical". This coincides with the argument for the importance of the "non-bureaucratic modes of interrelation" which was referred to earlier. "Judgement" is a process, or form of substantive rationality that is particularly important in the face of ever-changing policy environments before states and their bureaucracies today, as discussed by Peters and Savoie. Mintzberg referred to this as a form of superior thinking where the innovative organization is driven by the process of "strategy formation" which is based on mental synthesis and "rich knowledge" that understands the environment deeply, based on substantial and intimate experience of it. He contrasted this with "strategic planning", which is limited rational analysis, and which disengages thinking by reducing problems till they are accessible to given rules and procedures, to a form of reductio ad absurdumF This is what Mintzberg termed the "cult of rationality" (organizational rationality of a machine bureaucracy). It is also the distinction between Bogaars's "thinking" civil servant and one who is mindlessly efficient. Another way to make this distinction between analysis and synthesis is to talk about "determinant judgement", which is the activity of subsuming particulars under the relevant universal, and "reflective judgement", which is the act of "finding the correct concept with which to apprehend a given instance". Technocratic rationality, however, assumes that the latter is unnecessary because universally accepted substantive goals already exist and the only task at hand is to achieve them. Instead, a bureaucracy where reflective judgement is exercised is where bureaucrats have to concern themselves with weighing the ultimate social ends in policy formulation, implementation and review.58 This "reflective judgement", the basis of Offe's second and third concepts of bureaucratic rationality, is, perhaps, the theoretical articulation of what Prime Minister Goh has referred to as "political sensitivity". An important reason why judgement and intuitive thinking, which makes for innovation, is, unfortunately, not more commonly practised in private or public bureaucracies is the fear and avoidance of bias and politicization, and the difficulty of having to "prove one's case" to those who might not be prepared to think outside the box. A public servant could, however, defend such judgements by demonstrating a "rich knowledge" of common and socially accepted values held by constituents, and, hence, deliver compliance to the decision by the pertinent policy community and public at the end of the day. Where do the public sector leaders in Singapore stand on these issues of mindset, ethos and appropriate administrative action, especially in the light of calls by the political leadership to respond to the changing socio-political circumstances described in the earlier section?
Public Sector Leadership in 21st Century Singapore

A survey was conducted on the Administrative Service and how the Officers view their role. A small section of its findings can offer some hints on the question posed above. The findings are based on responses to a mail questionnaire issued to the population of
Administrative Service Officers between September 1991 and February 1992.59 This study was conducted before any of the managerialist reforms were instituted. However, calls had already been issued for public servants to exercise more creative and sensitive policy-making, and to run their departments and ministries more cheaply, efficiently and flexibly, along the lines of a private sector company. Administrative Officers closest to the processes of policy-making in the Public Service had already had to accommodate to Prime Minister Goh's more consultative, inclusive style of government in dealing, for instance, with new policy initiatives in some politically sensitive areas of public policy, like Land Transportation. 60 There was also increased opposition representation in Parliament. For these reasons, it was a good time to re-explore the question of what guided bureaucratic action: Was it a sense of value commitment to the project of development and nation-building, commitment to the political elite, or a drive towards neutral, technocratic competency and professionalism? It is not that these were necessarily exclusive forces of motivation but the survey sought to capture the prevailing mood among the bureaucratic elites at the time. Administrative Officers were asked in an open-ended question at the end of the survey about their perception of the role of the bureaucracy vis-a-vis the political leadership in the future, in the "next lap" of development in Singapore. Two responses illustrate the forces of change that impinged on the nature of bureaucratic rationality as perceived by the Officers themselves. The first takes into account the larger sociopolitical factors: The Administrative Service should continue to support the Government in public policy-making but the top-down element in the relationship between the two should be complemented by a strong bottom-up component. A more developed society and diversified economy means that policies would not be so clear as before. Multiple objectives have to be achieved through a package of mutually-reinforcing policies. The Administrative Service has the responsibility of providing the Government with alternative policy directions, all viable, all with their pros and cons. The Government's single-mindedness in the past has to be moderated with a new awareness that there are always alternative means, and the civil servants should not just follow orders and implement policy but help identify policy options. The second considers the direction of party politics and the nature of the political system in the future: Some of the civil servants should be less partisan in considering or making policies. This is especially important given that opposition members in Parliament are likely to be a fact of life in the next lap. These responses certainly indicate a concern about the growing complexity of the policy environment and anticipate the need for change as discussed in the earlier sections. We shall examine the aggregate results and specific examples of responses to that question. The responses were coded into four categories [see Table 1): "Greater Involvement", which refers to the desire of Officers to take more initiative and form a closer partnership
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with the political leadership in policy formulation; "Greater Professionalism", which also refers to a desire to be impartial, and of Officers to "speak their minds"; "Greater Sensitivity", which refers to the need to be more politically attuned to the policy environment and constituents of public policy; and finally, an "Others" category which refers to "maintaining status quo", assisting the political leadership and implementing policy. Although these were not necessarily exclusive categories, the goal in coding the responses was to try to record the wording of these responses accurately. The response rate to this question was 66, or 88% of all those who returned their questionnaires. Refer to Table 1 for the specific results. Fifty per cent of the responses fell into the "Others" category. This comprised 21.1% of the respondents who said the bureaucracy's role was to "assist the political leadership"; 10.6%, to "advise on and implement policy"; and another 10.6%, to "maintain status quo". Respondents in this category described the political leadership as being in the driving seat in policy formulation and the role of the Officers as helping the leadership achieve its vision or being implementors of policy decisions. An example of such responses is: There is no doubt that the politicians are the drivers in the country. Civil servants become relegated to being implementors. This will continue as long as the Government in power remains. This group tended to take an instrumental view of the bureaucracy, along the lines of the traditional dichotomy between politics and administration, and suggested that there might not be any change. While it is still challenging work to operationalize and implement policy, it is possible to infer that there would be less demand for the kind of reflective judgement discussed above, or for "systemic rationality". Among the respondents who cared to make a comparison between the "Old Guard" bureaucracy and the present, the impression given was that the former were independent thinkers and considered different from the political leadership but none the less equal, and certainly unequivocally committed to the "national vision". This independence has been replaced by more "organic linkages" between the two groups. Since the 1980s especially, the tendency of the PAP has been to recruit its elite from the bureaucracy. 61 There has been a fairly stable, rather than highly competitive political system, with the PAP being predominant. Hence, being familiar and comfortable with the work of the bureaucracy, it is said that Cabinet Ministers also take a relatively involved, "hands-on" approach to policy formulation and implementation. A respondent noted: The political leadership is taking a very proactive role in administration. The Administrative Service will end up being in the support role. If, however, party politics were to become more competitive in Singapore, the Service could come to play a wider, even more strategic role. If this mindset were to prevail, would this lead bureaucrats to act on the basis of anticipated response? Would they be able to exercise independent judgement, question and challenge enough of the precedents in public policy to offer fresh initiatives in response to a changing policy environment?
Table 1: Officers' Perception of Their Role vis-a-vis the Political Leadership in the NEXT LAP of Singapore's Development Role of Administrative Officers in the NEXT LAP Greater Involvement (Overall) Administrative officers take greater initiative More co-operation, rapport building and equal relationship Develop partnership in work, i.e. the work should belong to both politicians and civil servants Greater Professionalism (Overall) Greater professionalism (General) More professional: having integrity, being able to speak one's opinion fearlessly Greater autonomy to do what the Officers should be doing Less politicized, and providing impartial, apolitical assessment More professional and politically sensitive More specialized Greater Sensitivity (Overall) Greater sensitivity (General) More politically oriented/attuned Get more feedback from grass roots Close to the ground to recommend policies for "common good" Others (Overall) Maintain status quo Advise on and implement policy Assist the political leadership Others No Comment Missing Values Column Total Number of Valid Observations Number of Missing Observations Frequency Percentage Valid Percentage (15.2) 3.0
4.5
(10) 2
2.7 4.0
6.7
7.6 (27.3)
(18)
6 8.0 5.3 4.0 2.7 2.7 1.3
9.1 6.1
4
3 2 2 1
4.5 .
3.0 3.0 1.5
(4)
2 0 1 1 2.7 0 1.3 1.3
(6.1)
3.0 0 1.5 1.5
(33)
7 7 14 5 1 9 9.3 9.3
18.7
6.7
1.3
(50.0) 10.6 10.6 21.1

7.6 1.5
12.0 100.0
Missing 100.0
75
66 out of 75 [88.0%] 9 [12.0%]
Gillian Koh 127
Of the responses, 27.3% were coded under the category of "Greater Professionalism" where there were direct references to a need for a clearer distinction between politics and administration. Respondents highlighted the need for bureaucrats to develop a form of courage and "integrity" to independently arrive at and assess policy options and to be prepared to argue against bad policies. A respondent commented: There should be clearer division of responsibilities between the two. All too often politicians are dealing with administrative matters. Politicians should keep their feet on the ground and their head in the cloud[s], that is, know ground sentiments and conceive policies with visions of "tomorrow". The Civil Service should then translate their policies into administrative schemes. There is a need for clearer definition of political policies and policies of administration. This group of Officers would favour playing a greater role in being idea generators; rather than merely being implementors, they would like a clearer division of work between the two groups, and more opportunities and a climate in which Administrative Officers as a Service can have frank and open exchanges with their political masters. Elsewhere in the survey, Officers were asked about the areas in which their training could be improved as an indicator of what they perceived as their ideal role as Administrative Officers. A majority, 69.1%, indicated that training in the area of "strategic thinking, administrative science and public policy" could be improved, and 11.8% indicated the need for more training in the "technical, specialized skills". Only 9.3% of the respondents to this question suggested improving the "sociology and politics" content in their training and 6.7% cited the need for greater "attitudinal training". This hints at a relatively strong orientation towards the ideal of a technocratic role for the higher bureaucracy. The establishment of the Civil Service College62 is a step towards the greater professionalization of the Service. To put it briefly, the College serves an instrumental function of values transmission, role orientation, and developing thinking and management skills. The introduction of techniques like scenario-based planning through the College is a tool by which, it is hoped, Administrative Officers can be trained to think outside the box. It will also strive to provide opportunities for networking between the higher bureaucracy and the elites of the policy communities in the private sector in a "think tank" environment. It has an expressive function where tradition is preserved and identity is built, and corporate bonding can take place among Officers enhancing those "non-bureaucratic elements of bureaucracy", informal modes of "organic solidarity" among Administrative Officers mentioned by Evans. Finally, it has a visibility function, which builds the outward image of the Service, indicates what the members of the Service do, and will serve to attract people to join the Service at a time when the competition for talent with the private sector is severe. The Civil Service College has also been placed under the ambit of the Prime Minister's Office, which signals the political commitment towards administrative reform of the bureaucracy in Singapore. Two issues related to the greater professionalization of the Service emerge at this point: firstly, the "managerialist revolution" in public service is to be applauded for how it emphasizes the achievement of outcomes away from any obsession with rules for rules' sake. However, outcomes and performance targets tend to be for short-term
impact and are quantifiable. There must be a way to ensure that the more abstract, less easily quantifiable goals like "public interest" are not neglected in policy-making, particularly at a time when they will become increasingly important. The Service should be seen to be driven by the social effectiveness of what it does, and to build up, not lose, the trust the people have towards state agencies. Building up this normative control in a values-driven bureaucracy will give social meaning to what Officers do and can be the basis for a deeper motivation in their work than just pecuniary rewards. Hence, a professionalization of the Singapore Civil Service must proceed in tandem with the promotion of some contextualized version (suited to the political economy of a developmental state, that is), for instance, of James Parkin's list of the civic virtues that apply to his concept of the "citizen-technocrat":63 radical tolerance, civil courage, solidarity, justice, phronesis and rational communication, where bureaucrats create and uphold channels for dialogue within the organization and with the public and policy community. All of these are values very different to those generated by a technocratic rationality. These are metavalues set above the intermediate goals of technocratic public management, imbued ivith the power to focus action in tune with the life-world of common humanity, and in this case, the "life-world" of Singaporeans as citizens. The bureaucracy will have to find a way in which to access this "life-world". The introduction of Humanities scholars into the Service anticipated this need to balance the weight of the technocrats with input from philosopher-bureaucrats who might be more at ease at dealing with the more thorny, values-related questions of public policy. I think that it is for this reason that efforts of the public sector leaders to set out a mission statement under the PS21 reforms are a positive step in this direction for the Public Service as a whole.64 Other ways in which to create a more values-driven bureaucracy will be dealt with below. The second issue is one that is more practical; it is the question of whether the demands on senior Administrative Officers to take on the tasks of personnel management with these new managerialist reforms, would distract them from their policymaking functions? The conditions of the policy environment in almost all spheres of public policy require an enhanced policy-making facility within individual ministries and across them as mentioned by Peters and Savoie. Perhaps it was this sense of mission and appreciation of the need for the civic values of the "citizen-technocrat" that the last group of respondents had in mind: 15.2% referred to a need for bureaucrats to get a better feel of the needs and sentiments of the constituents of the state, to be "politically sensitive", or to play an equal role of partnership" with the political leadership: They should be close to the ground and recommend policies that could contribute to greater social happiness ... and greater prosperity without the ilb of social indiscipline and moral turpitude [found] in many advanced countries. The Administrative Service should be politically sensitive on one hand, but not compromise on independent efficiency and professionalism.
GiUian Koh 129 Administrative Officers should not be required to merely work out implementation plans for policies without being given opportunity to be exposed to socio-economic and political feedback on "true feelings" of people affected. Mere "intellectual excellence" could not be sufficient: Administrative Officers have to be groomed to be "street smart", just like politicians. The political leadership expects that the bureaucracy should increasingly be able to empathize with the concerns of people, anticipate their anxieties and accommodate the exceptions within a general framework of the rules and regulations in what they do. This is not only to be confined to front-line or street-level bureaucracy but the middle and, most crucially, the senior levels of bureaucracy, that is, the Administrative Officers should set the tone.65 When the responses were cross-tabulated with rank as a proxy for generational change in the elite [the results of which are found in Table 2), the proportion of the most senior bureaucrats suggesting that the bureaucracy should continue to "advise and assist the political leadership" and to experience "greater involvement" was larger than the proportions within the other rank groups. "Greater professionalism" featured more frequently within the other rank groups even if only equal or second to "advise and assist the political leadership". "Greater sensitivity" was not, overall, a very important consideration, and none of the most senior Administrative Officers among the respondents mentioned it at all. If courtesy and compassion are to be as valued as competence and efficiency in the bureaucratic ethos, and contribute to enforcement, compliance to policy and its social effectiveness, how then can these "civic virtues" be ascertained, promoted and routinized? Parkin made the following recommendations: (1) (2) The efforts should focus on middle management, not the elite. The civic agency must be sensitive to the methodological and structural issues associated with the concepts of "community" (of interested parties) and the "public" (interests at large). The civic agency needs more positive engagement with the community through action research, surveys, meetings and representative committees. Modes for rational communication need to be created for upward influence and resolution of upward and downward power flows.66
(3) (4)
These need to be adapted for the Singapore context. For instance, with the Singapore system being a relatively small and highly centralized one, the focus of the effort must begin, and has in fact begun, with the most senior level of the bureaucracy rather than at the middle level. There are already initiatives to build up communication with respective policy communities and the public and, hence, engage them; presently, this is done through the activities of the Feedback Unit,67 the Service Improvement Unit,68 through the use of ad hoc consultative committees for policy review and by promoting private sector participation on formal advisory boards linked to activities of ministries and statutory boards. Also, Administrative Officers are now receiving an increasing amount of exposure through secondments to government-linked companies, statutory boards, private-sector business concerns, civic and grass-roots organizations
2 3D Asian Journal of Political Science Table 2: Officers' Perception of Their Role vis-a-vis the Political Leadership in the NEXT LAP of Singapore's Development by Rank Rank of Officer Role of Administrative Officers I
n
1 [10.0%] (5.3%) 8 [44.4%] (42.1%) 2 [50.0%] (10.5%) 8 [24.2%] (42.1%) 0 19 [28.8%]
m
6 [60.0%] (24.0%) 4 [22.2%] (16.0%) 0
Row Total 10 (15.2%) 18 (27.3%) 4 (6.1%)
Greater Involvement Greater Professionalism Greater Sensitivity Others: Maintain status quo; Advise and assist political leadership No Comment Column Total
3 [30.0%] (13.6%) 6 [33.3%] (27.3%) 2 [50.0%] (9.1%) 10 [30.3%] (45.5%) 1 [100.0%] (4.5%) 22 [33.3%]
15 [45.5%] (60.0%) 0 25 [37.9%]
33 (50.0%) 1 (1.5%) 66[100.0%] (100.0%)
Number of Valid Observations Number of Missing Observations
66 out of 75 [88.0%] 9 [12.0%]
Notes (1) Rank of Officer I Administrative Assistant and Senior Administrative Assistant II Assistant Secretary and Principal Assistant Secretary III Deputy, Senior Deputy, Permanent Secretary (2) Percentages in round brackets are valid column percentages; those in square brackets are valid row percentages. too. Public servants will need to exercise judgement in trying to discern the nature of the views that are being made whether they are from a vocal minority of only a specific policy community who have a very narrow range-of interests, and how to respond in a way that would be sensitive to the wider national concern of the public. The communication and engagement with the public can be improved with techniques such as focused interviews, needs assessment surveys, formal random samplings and ethnographic studies.69 In addition to utilizing technocratic policy aids, bureaucrats should be trained in the areas of ethics, political philosophy, sociology, public organizational theory, communication skills, critical thinking and argument construction. As noted, there has
Gillian Koh 131
already been an attempt at recruiting more Officers with the Humanities background but training can also be offered, post-entry. Technocrats are still always welcome.70 The task is to strike the right balance between the two orientations, rather than for one to supersede the other. Another factor is the internal socialization through modes of formal interaction among Administrative Officers the Service is a generalist Service where Officers are rotated among different portfolios so that none get entrenched in one area, and so that
Table 3: Nature of Intra-Ministry Interaction among Administrative Officers Rank of Officer Mode of Interaction II Conference of All Officials from Relevant Departments and Divisions in the Ministry Discussions of Heads of Relevant Departments, or Divisions Meeting of Ad hoc Committee of Officials of Relevant Competence Independent, Decentralized Consultation within Different Departments, or Divisions Others, Not Listed Not Applicable Column Total
m
4 (16.7%)
Row Total
3 (10.7%)
4 (21.1%)
11 [15.5%]
6 (21.4%)
9 (47.4%)
5 (20.8%)
20 [28.2%]
10 (35.7%)
4 (21.0%)
11 (45.8%)
25 [35.2%]
7 (25.0%)
(5.3%)
(8.3%)
10 [14.1%]
1 1
(3.6%) (3.6%)
1 0
(5.3%)
1 1
(4.2%) (4.2%)
3 2
[4.2%] [2.8%]
28(100.0%)
19(100.0%)
24(100.0%)
71 [100.0%] (100.0%)
71 out of 75 [94.7%] 4 [5.3%]
Notes (1) Rank of Officer I Administrative Assistant and Senior Administrative Assistant II Assistant Secretary and Principal Assistant Secretary III Deputy, Senior Deputy, Permanent Secretary (2) Percentages in round brackets are valid column percentages; those in square brackets are valid row percentages.
232 Asian Journal of Political Science Table 4: Nature of Inter-Ministry Interaction among Administrative Officers Rank of Officer Mode of Interaction
n
Conference of All Officials in All Relevant Ministries
in
3 (13.0%)
Row Total
(7.1%)
4 (19.0%)
9 [12.5%]
Meeting of Ad hoc Committee of Officials of Relevant Competence3 Independent, Decentralized Consultation among Officers of Different Ministries Others, Not Listed Not Applicable Column Total
17 (60.7%) 4 (14.3%)
14 (66.7%) 2 (9.5%)
14 (60.9%) 3 (13.0%)
45 [62.5%] 9 [12.5%]
4 (14.3%) 1 (3.6%)
1 0
(4.8%)
2 1
(8.7%) (4.3%)
7 2
[9.7%] [2.8%]
28(100.0%)
21(100.0%)
23(100.0%)
72 [100.0%] (100.0%)
72 out of 75 [96.0%] 3 [4.0%]
Notes (1) Rank of Officer I Administrative Assistant and Senior Administrative Assistant II Assistant Secretary and Principal Assistant Secretary III Deputy, Senior Deputy, Permanent Secretary (2) Percentages in round brackets are valid column percentages; those in square brackets are valid row percentages. (3) This includes contributors from the private sector. eventually, most Administrative Officers are equipped to take on a global view of public policy in Singapore. This serves to facilitate a multi-agency and integrated approach to policy formulation. In some cases of non-programmed policy-making, review teams are drawn not along formal organizational lines but according to the individuals' qualities and areas of competency. It makes for a bureaucracy that is more likely than not, able to exercise "systemic rationality" and at the higher level, more reflective in its operation. This must be encouraged. Tables 3 and 4 indicate that Administrative Officers would frequently organize themselves into highly organic, responsive administrative adhocracies when initiating and evaluating policies rather than being highly centralized and hierarchical. In intra-
Gillian Koh 133
ministry consultation on policy proposals, the most common practice was to organize flexibly according to areas of competence or specialization "regardless of level" listed by 35.2% of the respondents (Table 3). This trend towards a flexible organization around areas of competence was even stronger in inter-ministry level consultation. Of the respondents, 62.5% chose this as their preferred descriptor (Table 4). One other factor that will influence the level of elite and value cohesion among Administrative Officers is related to the practical matter of attracting and retaining enough people to be in the Service. Owing to the competition from the private sector for such personnel, and "crusting" at the highest ranks of the Service, where movement into the highest ranks is restricted because the incumbents are relatively young, a review in 1989 of Service strength indicated that it was haemorrhaging from among its middle ranks. This led to the introduction of pay schemes for Administrative Officers that are pegged to private sector wages,71 the devolution of the powers to promote and reward Officers to the heads of individual ministries, and the broadening of the recruitment pool to civil servants in other streams and sectors in the Public Service (dual career, "Corps of Senior Administrators" scheme, etc.) and to those with some years in the private sector.72 Adjustments have been made to allow for quicker promotions for highfliers in the Service and there has been a widening of possible postings for members of this generalist Service in order to rectify the situation of "crusting". Actively recruiting Officers from the private sector, and at mid-career levels, could erode the elite and value cohesion of the Service, but there has been a lot of stated caution to recruit those who are younger and those found to have the appropriate mindset because, it is recognized that the civil service has a different culture ... we do not work towards the bottom-line. Each decision carries a whole range of implications and is intertwined with many different issues.73 While the adoption of private sector management techniques in the Public Service allows for this kind of movement, the role of socialization of Administrative Officers becomes even more critical if the unique bureaucratic values and ethos are truly to be maintained. This would similarly apply to plans to second bureaucrats to, say, private sector companies, in order for them to understand their policy environment better. These are good measures to widen the knowledge-base and experience of the bureaucracy and to instil an operational frame of mind, but as discussed, an entrepreneurial mindset or culture driven by monetary results rather than welfare results or public service will be incongruous in state bureaucracy. Officers on secondment should be given a clear idea about the lessons they should learn from thenstint outside the Public Service. Hence, the establishment of the Civil Service College, a mission focus that is centred on the civic goals of public service and a political leadership deeply committed to a civil service ethos with its distinctive values are crucial for routinizing the developmentalist spirit in the higher bureaucracy and the Public Service at large.
The key for the future is to temper the need for managerialism with its benefits of creativity and flexibility and accountability with an overarching orientation towards the civic virtues and values of the nation. This develops trust in citizens in state agencies and helps the Singapore State build an even more durable basis for legitimacy that is beyond the personal authority of political leaders and, even if it is enviable, the performance in economic and social development.74
Concluding Remarks
The basis of the successful Singapore developmental state was a simple missionoriented bureaucracy that was organized like an efficient, machine bureaucracy. The top bureaucrats were certainly reputed to be independent thinkers but this was not an autonomous group. It adopted the overarching metavalue as defined by the PAP leadership of "development for survival". Progress itself, a more differentiated and discerning public, changes in patterns of international business and the global economy, and the need to adopt market practices to retain talent in the higher bureaucracy have led to a "managerialist revolution". Since salaries of top bureaucrats are benchmarked to those of top professionals, it is also an important corollary to specify performance targets to which remuneration and advancement could be linked. This way, "private sector pay" would be seen to be linked to private sector-type performance standards and appraisal. Accountability to political leaders and the public is maintained. This would lead to a bureaucracy that is less oriented towards rules and structure, and more towards performance. There are, however, areas of the Public Service where cost accounting and performance measures will be difficult to apply especially because public policy often requires a multi-agency network, and some public sector "goods" and their effects on public welfare are difficult to measure. The Service could suffer a displacement of goals, where managerialism and technocratic rationality may become the goal in itself and dictate the bureaucratic mindset, thereby alienating the public from the agency. To maintain the public's trust, to promote sensitive policy-making through differentiated policy framework and discretionary policy application, the Service will need to be enhance its engagement with respective policy communities and the public, as well as with the political leadership. Maintaining the ideal of a public service is important, so that senior bureaucrats will weigh their actions not just by the productivity, efficiency or profitability of their offices and policies, but by their social effectiveness.75 This necessarily means that they will have to strengthen the concept of social goals for state action, and that they are adequately motivated by these goals, engaged with the constituents, in order to minimize the threat of capture by particularistic interests. A "performance-control" model of governance in the horizontal structures of the Public Service must be adequately balanced or linked with the "normative-control" model of governance in its vertical superstructure. The organizational structure in the case of the Administrative Service is, however, as we have seen, less hierarchical, more
Gillian Koh 135 organic and team-based. A clear mission-focus and the establishment of a set of value systems are even more critical within what should be the most innovative, and responsive, section of the Public Service. Therefore, an institution like the Civil Service College is also a necessary and critical corollary to "managerialism" because it can potentially play a role not only in honing policy-making skills, but also in being the focus of the socialization process for the Administrative Service. The College also holds the promise of institutionalizing linkages between senior bureaucrats and members of important policy networks. Taken together, or seen holistically, this is a possible recipe for a public sector leadership of the 21st Century Singapore that will be characterized by a sense of dedication and service-orientedness, and one that has also mastered the art of thinking and judgement.
Notes
1 The term "late development" refers to the industrialization of continental Europe in the late 19th century, following the industrialization of England. To bridge the development gap, the late developers resorted to formal training programmes, centralized research institutes, infrastructural development, all sponsored and co-ordinated by government. The post-World War II late development of East Asia has required yet heavier doses of government support and direction for the economies to adopt the more complex industrial systems and make available the necessary capital in order to overcome their conditions of underdevelopment in the post-World War II era. See Gordon White (ed.), Developmental States in East Asia (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988), Chapters 1-4; Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 11-23, on South Korea; and Ezra Vogel, The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1991), on the East Asian experience, which includes Singapore. Also pp. 1-12 on the world history of industrialization. Singapore was identified as a newly industrializing country in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) report The Newly Industrializing Countries: Challenge and Opportunity for OECD Industries (Paris, 1988), as one of the "high performing Asian economies in the World Bank's The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). Singapore graduated out of the OECD's classification of "developing country" status into that of "advanced developing economy" in 1996. Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an Administrative State: Where Has the Politics Gone?", in Seah Chee Meow (ed.), Trends in Singapore (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1975), pp. 51-52. This was first systematically articulated at the National Marketing Workshop organized by the Economic Development Board in 1989. The question of social cohesion in the face of the stratifying effects of being a market economy, and managing the social aspirations of an increasingly differentiated society has been an important theme of the Government in recent years, marked by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's National Day Rally Speech in August 1991. See also "Staying Ahead Scenarios and Challenges", Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's address to the Alpha Society on 25 October 1994, reproduced in Ethos (Singapore:. Civil Service College, Third Quarter, 1994), pp. 3-6; "Long Term Issues for
3 4
136 * Asian Journal of Political Science
Singapore", Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong's speech to the Nanyang Technological University, The Straits Times, 14 February 1995; "SM on key to Singapore's success in future. It will depend on entrepreneurs, social cohesion", Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew's speech to the Singapore National Employers' Federation, The Straits Times, 11 July 1996. For arguments on an emerging dual labour market where the wages for low-skilled and high-skilled, professional workers will diverge, see Garry Rodan, "The Growth of Singapore's Middle Class and Its Political Significance", in Garry Rodan (ed.), Singapore Changes Guard (Melbourne: Longman Cheshire Pty Ltd, 1993), esp. p. 63. However, an earlier study on social class in Singapore has suggested that the social class structure in Singapore indexed by employment, status and education, is an open, flexible one, and that there is a relatively even distribution of people along the social class continuum except at the extremes. See Stella Quah, Chiew Seen Kong, Ko Yiu Chung and Sharon Lee, Social Class in Singapore (Singapore: Times Academic Press for Centre for Advanced Studies, National University of Singapore, 1991), Chapters 7 and 9. Finally, there is a public perception that the income gap among Singaporeans will widen as suggested by a TCS (Television Corporation of Singapore) and Gallup Poll, where 49% of the 525 Singaporeans asked felt that way, with 29% saying that it might stay the same. For report, see "S'pore's future bright say 9 in 10 polled", The Straits Times, 5 October 1996. In lieu of a more comprehensive study, it can be argued that the anticipation of the effects of social stratification has been important in shaping government policy, and is a concern among some Singaporeans even if the Quah et al. study (1991) suggests that the social class system in Singapore is still relatively open, flexible and evenly distributed. 5 See Lim Siong Guan, "The Public Service", in Singapore: The Year in Review 1995 (Singapore: Times Academic Press for The Institute of Policy Studies, 1996), pp. 36-37. 6 See "Public sector budgeting: A high bar pushed higher", The Straits Times, 1 March 1996. 7 See "PM wants Civil Service run more like private sector firm", The Straits Times, 6 August 1991. 8 See Henry Mintzberg, "Managing Government. Governing Management", Harvard Business Review (May-June 1996), pp. 75-83; Guy B. Peters and Donald J. Savoie, "Civil Service Reform: Misdiagnosing the Patient", Public Administration Review, Vol. 54, No. 5 (September/October 1994), pp. 418-25. 9 See James Parkin, Public Management: Technocracy, democracy, and organizational reform (Aldershot, UK: Avebury, 1994). 10 That is, when the state and its agencies are judged by constituents as having met their needs, according to what the latter perceive as being in accordance with a legitimate value system and method. See section titled "Bureaucratic Rationality of the Singapore Administrative Elite and the 'Managerialist Revolution'". 11 On Japan, see Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), especially Chapter 9. On South Korea and Taiwan, see note 1. 12 Manuel Castells, "Four Asian Tigers With A Dragon Head", in Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey Henderson (eds.), States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1992), p. 57. 13 It is different from being a revolutionary state however, because it respects the broader parameters of social order while it seeks to effect a fundamental transformation of economic order. Ibid., pp. 56-57. 14 For analysis of how this was achieved, see Raj Vasil, Governing Singapore (second edition) (Singapore: Times Books International, 1988), Chapters 1-3; Garry Rodan, The Political
Gillian Koh 137 Economy of Singapore's Industrialization: National State and International Capital (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1989), Chapter 3; James Minchin, No Man Is an Island (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990), Chapters 1-8. Crystallized by political scientist Chan Heng Chee as the "ideology of survival", Singaporeans were rallied around certain key themes that were nothing short of creating the "new man". These were: Commitment to a multiracial, multilingual and multi-cultural democratic state. Creating a "tightly organized society" a rugged society with the people imbued with social discipline, self-restraint "denying ourselves of short-term and immediate rewards for long-term gains", a dedication to training and skill, and determination. Public spiritedness with the "necessity of extending loyalties beyond the immediate family". Acceptance that change is the essence of life. Both the vision and strategy for development were communicated clearly to the constituents and deemed to depend on their willingness and capability to be socialized into new attitudes, values and perspectives. See Chan Heng Chee, Singapore: The Politics of Survival 1965-1967 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 48-54. The Mirror, Vol. 1, No. 39 (29 November 1965), p. 8. Quoted in ibid., p. 48, footnote 2. See Raj Vasil, op. tit, p. 120. They were not overly concerned with the worth of democratic institutions and processes and norms in themselves. Their paramount obligation was to the survival, well-being and prosperity of their people. They chose to practise only "Socialism that Works" and paid allegiance only to those aspects of democracy and such modes of operation that ensured rapid social and economic change and advancement. The United Nations Industrial Survey Mission headed by Albert Winsemus. For an overview of state policy, see Thirty Years of Economic Development (Singapore: Singapore Economic Development Board, 1991). See Manuel Castells, Goh Lee and Kwok R. Yin-Wang, The Shek Kip Mei Syndrome: Economic Development and Public Housing in Hong Kong and Singapore (London: Pion Ltd, 1990), pp. 170-73. On the role and nature of the Economic Development Board, see Edgar H. Schein, Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore's Economic Development Board (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996). See Werner Vennewald, "Technocrats in the State Enterprise System of Singapore", Working Paper No. 23 (Murdoch: Murdoch University, Asia Research Centre, 1994). See Linda Low, The Political Economy of Privatization in Singapore: Analysis, Interpretation and Evaluation (Singapore: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1991); and Lee Tsao Yuan and Linda Low, Local Entrepreneurship in Singapore: Private and State (Singapore: Times Academic Press for The Institute of Policy Studies, 1990), Chapter 3. See Raj Vasil, op. cit., p. 133. See, also, Seah Chee Meow, "Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Change in an Emerging Nation: A Case Study of Singapore", Ph.D. dissertation, Victoria University of Manchester, United Kingdom (1971); Seah Chee Meow, "The Singapore Bureaucracy and Issues of Transition", in R. Hassan (ed.), Singapore: Society in Transition (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 52-66. Quoted in Raj Vasil, op. cit, pp. 128-29. See "The Role of the Civil Service in Development and Corruption Management", in Can Singapore's Experience Be Relevant to Africa (Singapore: Singapore International Foundation), pp. 66-67. See Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management (New York: The Free Press, 1989), Chapter 8.
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138 Asian Journal of Political Science 26 See Thomas Bellows, "Bridging Tradition and Modernization: The Singapore Bureaucracy", in Tai Hung-chao (ed.), Confucianism and Economic Development: An Oriental Alternative? (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute Press, 1989). See Raj Vasil, op. tit, p. 131. See Chan Heng Chee, "Politics in an Administrative State", p. 52. Ibid., p. 54. Ibid., p. 63. See Lim Siong Guan, "The New Public Administration", op. cit. See K.E. Shaw, Peter S.J. Chen, Lee Sheng-yi and George G. Thomson, Elites and National Development in Singapore (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1977). See "Bogaars: Civil Servants Should Do More Thinking", Management Development (Singapore: Civil Service Institute, 1981), Vol. 33, pp. 1-14. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 2. Refer to note 43 for recent analysis on this. See Seah Chee Meow, "The Civil Service", in Jon S.T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow, Government and Politics of Singapore (revised edition) (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 110. "Core team to take on top Govt jobs", The Straits Times, 6 July 1991 He is reported to have added that politicians would be ill-advised to look at policy issues only through the eyes of bureaucrats or to behave like them; nor should they rely entirely on statistics. They should, instead, look to the needs of the common man and the underclass "This way, our party will then be able to continue to enjoy the support of the majority of Singaporeans." "Help the common man achieve his goal", The Straits Times, 17 November 1991. See "Perception gap dividing people and govt, says Teng Cheong", The Straits Times, 12 August 1992. "Tackle facts of rising costs before people's perception: PM", The Straits Times, 9 July 1996. For arguments on this growing complexity of the policy environment, see Chua Beng Huat, "Domestic Politics", op. tit.; and Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling, "Public Policy and the Singapore Dream", paper presented at the School of Building and Estate Management Conference on "'The Singapore Dream': Private Property and Social Expectations and Public Policy", National University of Singapore, 6 September 1996, for examples on the area of public housing. Garry Rodan, "State-Society Relations and Political Opposition in Singapore", in Garry Rodan (ed.), Political Oppositions in Industrializing Asia (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 95-127. See, also, Yao Souchou, "Consumption and Social Aspirations of the Middle Class in Singapore", Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), pp. 337-54. Offe referred to these as three-tiered contradictory concept of rationality, decisive for administrative action under the conditions of advanced capitalist welfare state. Since the developmental Singapore state has also been a provider of important social goods, it could face somewhat similar problems of the "dilemma of welfare-state policies" that Offe deals with in Claus Offe, Disorganized Capitalism (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1985), pp. 300-16. See Castells et al., op. cit., pp. 187-88. See Gillian Koh, "A Sociological Analysis of the Singapore Administrative Elite: The Bureaucracy in an Evolving Developmentalist State", Ph.D. dissertation, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom (unpublished, 1995), Chapter 4, for examples of policy
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Gillian Koh 139 formulation and processes of negotiation in the areas of land transportation and economic planning between 1989-92 in Singapore. See Claus Offe, op. cit, p. 316. See Yao Souchou, op. cit, p. 350; Chua Beng Huat and Tan Joo Ean, "Singapore: New Configuration of a Socially Stratified Culture", Occasional Paper No. 127 (Singapore: Department of Sociology, National University of Singapore, 1995); Garry Rodan, "Class Transformations and Political Tensions in Singapore's Development", in Richard Robison and David S.G. Goodman (eds.), The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald's and Middle-Class Revolution (London: Routledge, 1996). There are now 2 opposition Members of Parliament since the 1997 General Elections. There were 4 after the 1991 Elections. The PAP command over total number of votes had been on a gradual decline and stood at 61% in 1991 from 63.2% in 1989, but it was able to increase its margin to 65% in the 1997 Elections. After 1991, there were 5 marginal seats that were won by the PAP, that is, the PAP won these seats with a less than 5% lead. See Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, "On the Road Toward a More Adequate Understanding of the State", in Peter Evans and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), Bringing the State Back in (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 4477. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 58-59. See also Chapter 3. An example of a catalogue of such values of governance can be found in Lim Siong Guan, "The New Public Administration", op. cit. How these values can be identified and routinized is dealt with in the section titled "Public Sector Leadership in 21st Century Singapore". See Halim Shafie, Saraswathy Rajagopal and Mohamed Zin Mohamed, "Notes on "The Public Service New Strategic Dimensions for the 21st Century'", National Seminar, September 1995, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in Public Administration and Development, Vol. 16(1996), pp. 186-87. See Guy Peters and Donald Savoie, op. cit., pp. 418-25. Ibid., p. 424. My emphasis in Roman print. See Henry Mintzberg, "Managing Government. Governing Management", p. 79. Selection of people by values and attitudes rather than qualifications, socialize them to ensure that the membership is dedicated to an integrated social system, guidance is by accepted principles rather than imposed plans, vision rather than targets, and where all members have a shared sense of responsibility and, finally, performance is judged by experienced people, including recipients of the service. Ibid., p. 81. See Henry Mintzberg, Mintzberg on Management, op. cit., pp. 342-73. See James Parkin, op. cit., pp. 64-65. There were 183 members in the Service at the time of which 75 members responded to the survey, resulting in a response rate of 40.4%. Full report in Gillian Koh, "A Sociological Analysis of the Singapore Administrative Elite", op. cit. See ibid., Chapter 4, for analyses of policy formulation on Land Transportation and Economic Planning. As a quick indicator, of the 1968 Cabinet, 6 out of 10 Ministers were from the private sector; in 1994, 3 out of 14 Ministers were from the private sector; and of the 1996 Cabinet, the proportion is 4 out of 16. The Civil Service College was established in April 1993 as a "staff college" for Administrative Officers. It brings under its roof basic training of new officers, development programmes for officers on "threshold grades", and other public sector leadership training. It organizes
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public policy discussion groups and, more importantly, comprises the Scenario Planning Office. The former Head of the Civil Service, Dr Andrew Chew, described its function as follows: The College will provide an institutional focal point, a catalyst for new ideas and innovations and the meeting place for discussion on public administration and management. It should also imbue in the senior levels of management an acute sense of corporate purpose. It must nurture the shared values and facilitate its transmission from one generation of civil servants to the next. See Ethos (Singapore: Civil Service College, First Quarter 1994), p. 2. The following is also based on interviews with personnel in the Public Service Division between August 1991 and December 1992. These are: Radical tolerance that is, a public servant should strive to correct any institutional discrimination, say, based on race, religion, etc.; upholding civic liberties. Civic courage that is, that speaking up for an unpopular cause will not be prohibitively costly as long as it is set in a rational dialogue based on widely accepted moral principles. Solidarity that is, empathy for the "hard-done-by" to fight oppression from the ineffectual, because of personality or social situation. Justice civic courage and solidarity can be abused without this; methods must be fair and transparent. Phronesis which is the exercise of good judgement for a plan to be accepted and legitimated, but once agreed upon, the decision should be based on rational judgement, not passion or prejudice. Rational communication where channels for dialogue within the organization and with the community should be used and upheld. See James Parkin, op. cit., pp. 91-92. For a list of the values that are being promoted within the Public Service as part of the PS21 reforms, see Lim Siong Guan, "The Public Service", op. cit., pp. 46-48. The Finance Minister, Dr Richard Hu, in commending "autonomous agencies" (similar to the British model of the "executive agency"), stated that since information technology had taken the routine functions out of the hands of civil servants, this would free them to exercise greater autonomy, and to be responsive to demands of a more discerning and demanding public. What was required, he added, was therefore "confident, mission-driven organizations" rather than "rules-driven organizations". See Chua Mui Hoong, "Dr Hu on changing role of civil servants. Managing expectations; less routine work", The Straits Times, 5 March 1996. See James Parkin, op. cit., p. 123. At the introduction of the current supervisory panel of the Feedback Unit under Chairman Dr John Chen (26 March 1997), it was announced that plans were afoot to widen and systematize the reach of the Unit through the formation of Feedback Clubs focused on specific policy issues, through the formation of Feedback Groups and also through the convening of policy discussion sessions. Contact the Feedback Unit at the Ministry of Community Development for more information. See Jon S.T. Quah, "Sustaining Quality in the Singapore Civil Service", Public Administration and Development, Vol. 15 (1995), pp. 339-41. James Parkin, op. cit., pp. 128-29. The breakdown of graduates in the Administrative Service for 1983 according to discipline was 45% in the specialists subjects (Engineering, Systems Analysis, Law, Psychology, etc.), 21% in the General Sciences and 34% in the Arts and Social Sciences/Humanities subjects.
Gillian Koh 141 See Daniel Tan, "The Singapore Civil Service: A Study of Specialist Administrators in Two Ministries", BA (Hons.) Academic Exercise, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 1984, p. 36. In 1991, it was 30.4% in the specialist subjects, 14.9% in the General Sciences and 50.3% in the Arts and Social Sciences/Humanities subjects (information based on data from Director of Personnel Development, Public Service Division, 13 July 1993). Two benchmarks for the level of salaries of senior bureaucrats in Singapore: For Officers of Staff Grade 1, the highest grade in the Civil Service, the pay is 60% of the average principal earned income of the top four individuals from each of six selected professions: bankers, accountants, engineers, lawyers, senior executives of local manufacturing companies and multinational companies. For Superscale G, the lowest rung on the superscale ladder, the pay would be the average principal earned income of the 15th person aged 32 from the same six professions. With the latest round of revisions, the monthly salary of the benchmark Staff Grade 1 Officer is $36,700 and that of the Superscale G officer is $12,400. Chua Mui Hoong, "Private sector execs sought for govt admin jobs", The Straits Times, 23 March 1996. These people would be likely to be in their early 30s, and join the Service at deputy director or director levels and be put on scales ranging from principal assistant secretary (the fourth rung in the rank ladder of the Administrative Service) to superscale. Ibid. and see, also, Chua Mui Hoong, "Opening door to private sector", The Straits Times, 2 March 1996. See Khong Cho Oon, "Singapore: Political Legitimacy through Managing Conformity", in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 135. See Cherian George, "PAP rides new tiger but will it fall off?", The Sunday Times, 16 June 1996.
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Asian Journal of Political Science

Bureaucratic rationality in an evolving developmental state: Challenges to governance in Singapore

Research Fellow in the Institute of Policy Studies, Singapore

Available online: 02 Jan 2008

Asian Journal of Political Science Volume 5 Number 2 (December 1997)

Bureaucratic Rationality in an Evolving Developmental State: Challenges to Governance in Singapore

Gillian Koh 115

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116 Asian Journal of Political Science

The Evolving Singapore Developmental State

Gillian Koh 117

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Mobilizing the Bureaucracy for Development

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Gillian Koh 119

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Gillian Koh 121

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On the "Managerialist Revolution"

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Gillian Koh 123

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Public Sector Leadership in 21st Century Singapore

124 Asian Journal of Political Science

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Gillian Koh 125

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126 Asian Journal of Political Science

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(50.0) 10.6 10.6 21.1

66 out of 75 [88.0%] 9 [12.0%]

Gillian Koh 127

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128 Asian Journal of Political Science

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Row Total 10 (15.2%) 18 (27.3%) 4 (6.1%)

15 [45.5%] (60.0%) 0 25 [37.9%]

33 (50.0%) 1 (1.5%) 66[100.0%] (100.0%)

Number of Valid Observations Number of Missing Observations

66 out of 75 [88.0%] 9 [12.0%]

Gillian Koh 131

Number of Valid Observations Number of Missing Observations

71 out of 75 [94.7%] 4 [5.3%]

Number of Valid Observations Number of Missing Observations

72 out of 75 [96.0%] 3 [4.0%]

Gillian Koh 133

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134 Asian Journal of Political Science

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136 * Asian Journal of Political Science

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140 Asian Journal of Political Science

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