Final Rep or Ti A Election Reform Project March 2011

ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS National Engagement on Electoral Reform: Building a Better Election System for
First Nations Communities
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ENGAGEMENT ON ELECTORAL REFORM Building a Better Election System for First Nation Communities 1. Background Over the last couple of years, the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs Secretariat (APC), as mandated by the APC Chiefs (Resolutions #2008-12 and 2010001), has been researching and discussing with First Nations leaders, technicians and First Nations peoples in Atlantic and Eastern Canada, the issue of First Nations elections. All the input we have received on this issue was carefully considered in developing recommendations for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada to develop an improved system for holding and managing First Nation elections that are currently held pursuant to the Indian Act. The Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was very receptive to these recommendations and asked the APC to lead a national engagement effort, jointly with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC), to present these recommendations, generate discussion, obtain feedback and gain support among First Nations leaders and organizations across the country. This national engagement effort was officially launched on October 1st, 2010, during Treaty Day celebrations in Halifax, Nova Scotia, by the Minister, AMC Grand Chief Ron Evans, and Executive Co-Chairs of the APC, Chiefs Candice Paul and Morley Googoo. Whenever possible, information materials were developed and approved jointly by the AMC and the APC. This material was disseminated on the websites of both organizations in mass mail-outs to First Nations who hold their elections under the Indian Act, and they were made available for distribution at various engagement forums. APC was responsible, for making contacts, disseminating information and making presentations to First Nations leaders and organizations in Eastern Canada, while AMC carried out these responsibilities in Western Canada. Since this initiative was geared to First Nations who hold their elections under the Indian Act election system, no engagement was planned for the territories where there are no First Nations who hold elections under the Indian Act. This report presents the efforts employed by the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs in the course of the national engagement phase of the electoral reform initiative. 1
ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS National Engagement on Electoral Reform: Building a Better Election System for First Nations Communities
2. Preparation and Update of Engagement Materials The APC worked with INAC and the AMC to review existing and develop new materials specific for the national engagement initiative based on the recommendations for electoral reform that were provided to the Minister in April 2010. All materials were also translated into French as well. These include: Launch Announcement (Appendix A) Discussion Paper (Appendix B) Backgrounder and Frequently Asked Questions (Appendix C) A form on which comments could be inscribed specific to each recommendation(Appendix D) A discussion paper on various recall mechanisms to inform this debate in the First Nations context (Appendix E) APC Website on the Indian Act Election Reform initiative: http://www.apcfnc.ca/en/aboutapc/Elections.asp Facebook Group weblink: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=150789196002 As APC was responsible for engagement efforts in Qubec, all developed materials, including the electoral reform module of the APCs website were available in French. 3. Engagement in Ontario and Qubec Using the materials developed for the national engagement, APC Executive Director delivered a Power Point presentation to the special assembly of the Chiefs of Ontario on November 23, 2010, in Toronto. There were 134 First Nations invited to the special assembly. Copies of the materials were distributed to participants. APC also contacted all political organizations in Ontario via email and telephone to inform them of the electoral reform initiative and to seek opportunities to make presentations to key members of these organizations. During these exchanges, links to the materials on the APCs website were provided, where all interested parties could learn more about the initiative and provide their feedback and comments. 3.1 Mail-out to Ontario and Quebec First Nations Holding Elections Under the
Indian Act
APC worked with AMC to develop a joint information letter that was sent to all Ontario and Quebec First Nations who hold elections under the Indian Act to inform the Chief and Councils of this initiative. This letter, which was signed by the two APC Co-Chairs, included a brief explanation of the electoral reform initiative and was 2
accompanied by the detailed discussion paper on the recommendations, a backgrounder and a feedback form. In the letter, the APC Co-Chairs encouraged the Chief and Councillors to make these documents available to their community members and invited both leaders and community members to provide feedback directly to the APC. A copy of this letter can be found at Appendix H. 4. General Meeting of the Aboriginal Financial Officers Association Representatives from the APC attended the National Aboriginal Finance Officers Association (AFOA) annual general meeting, held in Vancouver on from February 15 thru 18, 2011. Over 1100 delegates attended the conference. APC staff procured a booth from which information, background materials and feedback forms on the election reform initiative were distributed. Limited written feedback ensued. However, several First Nations people and leaders did provide general comments signaling that they supported longer terms of office and other similar reforms that would stabilize First Nations governance and allow for better long term planning. 5. Fall Policy Forum of the Assembly of First Nations The Assembly of First Nations hosted their National Fall Policy Planning and Discussion Forum in Montreal on November 8 and 9, 2010. APC Executive Director, John Paul, and Glen Sanderson from the office of the Grand Chief of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs were part of the discussion panel on alternatives to the Indian Act system. APC and AMC made a presentation on the proposed election reform model and handed out over 100 copies of the discussion paper and feedback form. The question and answer session held after the panel presentation was very interesting and participants were very engaged in the topic of election reform. There were over 50 delegates that attended this particular breakout workshop. The key points or issues raised in the subsequent discussion are detailed in the Feedback Form (Appendix F). 6. Sustaining the Initiative among Atlantic First Nations Throughout the national engagement effort, and recognizing that First Nations leaders sometimes change (due to elections), the APC continued to take steps to maintain interest in, and commitment to, the electoral reform initiative in the Atlantic region. Activities included:
Provision of regular reports to the APC Executive Committee as well as to all APC All Chiefs Forums 3

Presentation to the Confederacy of Mainland Mikmaq Chiefs and Councillors Annual General Meeting Presentation to the NS Native Womens Association (Board of Directors) Presentation to both the NS/NF and NB/PEI Band Managers meetings Presentation to the Atlantic AFOA Workshop Presentation to the Madawaska Maliseet First Nation Indian Act Workshop (planned for March 25th, 2011) Presentation to the Staff of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs (Nova Scotia) Regular monitoring of the initiative within the membership of the APC Publication of two articles in the Mikmaq Maliseet Nations News (November 2010 & March 2011)
7. Research on Recall One of the recommendations that both the APC and the AMC provided to the Minister was that the new election system provide for a recall mechanism that would allow for elected leadership to be removed from office during their term. To inform the discussion and legislative development of a sound recall mechanism, additional research on this subject matter in other jurisdictions was undertaken. A research expert engaged by the APC produced a detailed report on various recall systems and key considerations when developing such a system. This report can be found at Appendix E. 8. Conclusion The Atlantic Policy Congress has employed its best efforts to carry out this national engagement on electoral reform, using written correspondence, information dissemination on its website and in other communication mediums, and in-person presentations delivered by APC representatives. Few negative reactions or comments on the recommendations have been encountered either in written or verbal format. As we have reported previously, our engagement efforts in the Atlantic region has led us to conclude that First Nations people and here are supportive of our recommendations for electoral reform. It is difficult to draw definitive conclusions as to the level of interest and support for legislative election reform among First Nations in Ontario and Qubec. Although APC expended considerable effort to engage in Ontario, and to a lesser degree, in Qubec, these efforts solicited little reaction. Other than the presentation delivered at the general meeting of the Union of Ontario Indians in November 2010, political and tribal organizations in Ontario did not provide the APC with any opportunities to attend forums and make presentations to their membership. In Qubec, where there are only four First Nations under the Indian Act electoral system that are not members of the APC, communications were made directly with individual First 4
Nations. Despite the relative silence of First Nations people in these provinces on this initiative, based on the fact that APCs efforts did not solicit negative reactions, it can be said that there is no opposition in Ontario and Qubec to the development of optional legislation on First Nations elections. We ask that the Minister consider our report and our conclusions to inform the development of a new First Nations Elections Act.
John G. Paul Executive Director
List of Appendices Appendix A: Launch Announcement Appendix B: Detailed discussion paper (both English and French) Appendix C: Backgrounder and Frequently Asked Q & A (both English and French) Appendix D: Feedback form (both English and French) Appendix E: Recall Discussion Paper & Summary Chart (both English and French) Appendix F: List of Engagement Sessions/Comments recd & all written feedback received via APC website, email, fax, Facebook etc. Appendix G: Powerpoint Presentation provided at Engagement Sessions (both English and French) Appendix H: Joint APC/AMC Letter to all Ontario First Nations
News Release
Communiqu
NR # 2-3412 For immediate release
ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATION CHIEFS AND ASSEMBLY OF MANITOBA CHIEFS RECEIVE SUPPORT FROM GOVERNMENT OF CANADA FOR ENGAGEMENT ON FIRST NATION ELECTIONS
HALIFAX, NOVA SCOTIA (October 1, 2010) The Honourable John Duncan, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and Federal Interlocutor for Mtis and Non-Status Indians, announced today that the Government of Canada will support the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nation Chiefs and the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs as they lead an engagement effort across the country to discuss a better electoral system for First Nations. The Atlantic Policy Congress (APC) and the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC) have made several recommendations to address concerns about the election process under the Indian Act. With the support of the Government of Canada, they will now meet with other First Nation leaders across the country to seek advice and consensus on improving the election process for First Nations. The Government of Canada is proud to give its support to the APC and AMC in their efforts to discuss electoral reform with First Nation organizations, said Minister Duncan. This reform will help First Nations create the political stability they need to establish solid business investments, practice long-term planning, and build relationships that will increase economic development for First Nations. Following the engagement process, the Government in partnership with First Nations will develop new, opt-in legislation that will help address concerns and support stable and effective First Nation governments. This First Nation led engagement will guide our Government in drafting new opt-in legislation that will build a stronger electoral system for First Nations, added Peter MacKay, Minister of National Defence. /2
-2The modernization of the Indian Act election system for our First Nation Governments will help all of us to look toward the longer term and build confidence in our governance so we can pursue our goals of economic development, said APC Co-Chair (Nova Scotia) Chief Morley Googoo. Our joint initiative with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs is paving new ground by making the necessary changes to the existing election system which will support the stability of leadership, longterm planning and increased accountability, added Chief Candice Paul, APC Co-Chair (New Brunswick). The Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs is pleased to lead this historic electoral reform process in partnership with the APC, said Grand Chief Ron Evans, Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs. The ultimate goal of all First Nations is to be self-sustaining and self-governing. Creating an electoral system that is driven by First Nations will create the stability that will strengthen First Nation governance in Canada. Many First Nations have been critical of the election process under the Indian Act, which they believe sets out an electoral regime that is antiquated and paternalistic. Terms of office that are much shorter than municipal, provincial and federal counterparts, a loose nominations process and an absence of penalties for offences related to the electoral process are some of the key concerns that are up for discussion. There are currently 247 First Nations in Canada holding elections under the Indian Act election system. This initiative will not affect the 338 First Nations who follow custom code elections. - 30 Backgrounder Frequently Asked Questions For more information, please contact: Minister's Office Press Secretary Michele-Jamali Paquette Indian and Northern Affairs Canada Office of the Honourable John Duncan (819) 997-0002 Media Relations Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (819) 953-1160
Appendix B
IMPROVING THE SYSTEM FOR FIRST NATIONS ELECTIONS Discussion Paper
October 1, 2010
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ............................................................11 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN IMPROVED ELECTION SYSTEM AND MORE STABLE FIRST NATIONS GOVERNMENTS .....................................................12 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. New Opt-in Legislation for Band Council Elections ............................13 Band Council Size and Membership .....................................................13 Term of Office for Band Council Members ............................................14 Same or Common Day for Elections .....................................................15 Electoral Officers ..................................................................................15 Nominations and Elections ...................................................................16 Mail-In Ballots and Advance Voting ......................................................17 Appeals of Band Council Elections .......................................................18 Election Offences and Penalties ...........................................................20 Recall of Elected Band Council Members .............................................20 Removal of Elected Band Council Members from Office ......................21
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................22 OFFENCES AND PENALTIES IN THE CANADA ELECTIONS ACT .................22
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

At the current time, 247 First Nations (approximately 40%) hold Band Council elections under the election provisions of the Indian Act. The vast majority of First Nations agree that these election provisions are out-dated and problematic. Specific issues centre around the following: The term of office for elected Band Councils under the Indian Act is two years. This short length of term places First Nations communities in an almost continual state of electioneering, and it undermines the Band Councils stability as well as their efforts to develop long-term projects. A weak process for the nomination of candidates that can result in the nomination of many candidates (sometimes over 100) for one election. A mail-in ballot system that can lead to abuse. An appeal process to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development that is paternalistic, complicated and often takes too long to produce findings and a final ruling. The absence of defined election offences and associated penalties under the Indian Act allows alleged cheating and other related activities such as the selling and buying of votes to go unpunished.
The Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs (APC) and the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC) have taken a keen interest in looking at ways to stabilize and improve upon First Nations governance through a stronger and more modern election system. Over the last two years, with the support of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, the AMC and the APC have been researching the issue of Band Council elections. After having heard from First Nation leaders, governance technicians and community members in their respective regions, both organizations produced recommendations which called for an improved system for Band Council elections. This discussion paper was written for the purposes of outlining these recommendations, to further the discussion and to invite feedback on developing a stronger election system for First Nations.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AN IMPROVED ELECTION SYSTEM AND MORE STABLE FIRST NATIONS GOVERNMENTS
At the onset, and before outlining the recommendations, it is important to point out that replacing the existing Indian Act election system is not what is being proposed. The Indian Act election system will remain unchanged for those First Nations who feel that it suits their needs. The AMC and the APC have recommended the development of a brand new opt-in law and system for Band Council elections. First Nations who hold elections under their own community-election codes approved by their membership will not be affected by the proposed reforms. For the purposes of this discussion only, the proposed election law will be referred to as a First Nations Elections Act. It would contain some of the same rules as the Indian Act election system along with some important differences as outlined below: the term (length) of office for Band Council members should be 4 years instead of the 2-year term that exists under the Indian Act system; the mail-in ballot system should be improved; the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and his Department who currently receive, investigate and decided upon election appeals - should be removed from any involvement; and the Act should define and set out election offences and attach penalties to discourage cheating and other dishonest activities from taking place in elections.
While the above are the major recommendations for improving the election system as put forward by the APC and the AMC, there were other recommendations that dealt with matters such as a common (or same) day for elections in Manitoba, and the ability for First Nations voters to recall elected officials and have them removed during their term of office. The key elements of a proposed First Nations Elections Act are described in the following pages.
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1.
New Opt-in Legislation for Band Council Elections
The APC and AMC have recommended that the Government of Canada introduce new legislation as an alternative to the Indian Act system for Band Council elections. With this new legislation, individual First Nations could choose to opt in and have it applied to their elections. In keeping with this, a First Nation Council would pass a resolution, indicating that it wishes to opt-in to the new legislation, and then send that resolution to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for action. If the new legislation for Band Council elections were to be introduced, individual First Nations currently operating under the Indian Act system would have three basic options:

opt-in to the new legislation so that the provisions of that legislation would then govern the elections for the opting in First Nations; continue to hold Band Council elections under the Indian Act election system; or develop and ratify a community-designed (custom) election code.
1. It is proposed that the Government of Canada introduce a new First Nations Elections Act with key provisions as proposed below in sections 2 to 11 of this discussion paper and provide individual First Nations with the choice of opting in or, at a later date opting out if they so wish, in favour of a community-designed or custom election system.
2.
Band Council Size and Membership
Under the Indian Act, a Band Council consists of one Chief and one Councillor for every 100 members of the Band, but the number of Councillors is not less than 2 and no more than 12. Also, under the Indian Act, no Band shall have more than one Chief. It is proposed that these provisions of the Indian Act for Band Council size and membership be the same in a new First Nations Elections Act. Until recently, all candidates for Councillor positions had to live on-reserve. However, in August 2007, the Federal Court struck down this residency requirement in what is called the Gull Bay decision. As a result of this court decision, it is now possible for some First Nations Councils to be made up entirely of Band members not living on the reserve. Many First Nations are troubled by this prospect as they believe that a Band Council made up largely or entirely of off-reserve members would have less knowledge of on-reserve issues. They believe that this would result in the concerns of 13
on-reserve members not being properly heard and their priorities being ignored. This prospect highlights the need for the new First Nations Elections Act to provide a structure that establishes a balance between, (i) the rights of off-reserve members to hold Band Council positions and, (ii) the need to address the specific interests of onreserve members, such as in respect of the direction, management and delivery of onreserve services. 2. It is proposed that, under a new opt-in First Nations Elections Act, that: (a) a Band Council consist of one Chief and one Councillor for every 100 members of the Band, but the number of Councillors not be less than 2 nor more than 12; and (b) up to one-half of the Councillor positions on a Band Council may be designated to be held by only Band members who live on the reserve if, during a vote held on this question, 50% or more of the votes cast support it.
3.
Term of Office for Band Council Members
First Nations Band Council members, who are elected under the Indian Act election system, hold office for a 2-year term. The APC and the AMC have recommended that the new elections legislation provide that, for First Nations opting into the legislation, the Band Council members be elected for a 4-year term. The Indian Act, in requiring elections every two years, has created conditions of instability and has fostered divisions in First Nations communities. Most often the twoyear term of office is too short to provide political stability for First Nations governments to plan for and implement long-term initiatives, and to build a proper foundation for community development before they face re-election. The 2-year term is especially difficult and challenging for those elected to a Band Council for a first time. New Councillors need time to learn their responsibilities and the various projects that require their attention. Projects are often put at risk by the 2-year election cycle and by the related high turnover of elected officials. For these reasons, the APC and the AMC recommend a 4-year term for Band Councils. Federal, provincial and most municipal governments across the country have 4-year terms, so this recommendation would make terms of office of Band Councils comparable with most other governments in Canada.
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3. It is proposed that, under the new opt-in First Nations Elections Act, the term of elected office for Chiefs and Band Councillors be 4 years.
4.
Same or Common Day for Elections
Under the Indian Act provisions, elections of Band Councils must be held every two years. However, the Indian Act provisions do not require that elections be held on a common or same day. Consequently, under the Indian Act elections system, if there are 20 First Nations in a province, there could be 20 different election dates spread over a 2year period on which the individual elections would be held. Manitoba First Nations have voiced their disagreement with regards to this formula and want Band Council elections in their province to be held on the same day, or within the same period. With this approach, First Nations Band Councils in Manitoba that choose to opt in would all hold office starting and ending on the same day. The AMC believes that this would foster stability, consistency and better coordination of joint and cooperative projects among First Nations in Manitoba, and possibly bring enormous benefit to economic development for First Nations across the province. The AMC noted that, under the Indian Act elections system, joint or cooperative projects requiring the participation and support of several Band Councils in Manitoba often cannot get started because, in any given month, leadership in one or more of the Band Councils changes due to an election. As new Band Councils are elected, members often have their own personal perspectives and interests. Beyond Manitoba, if all or most of the First Nations in the same region or province so wished, a common or same day for elections within that region or province could be selected. However, this part of the legislation would not be mandatory and each region would decide whether they want to adopt a common election day or not.
4.
It is proposed that the new First Nations Elections Act and regulations provide First Nations with the possibility of adopting a common day for all Band Council elections in that region or province.
5.
Electoral Officers
Before an election is to be held under the Indian Act election system, an electoral officer is appointed by the Band Council and approved by the Minister. The electoral officer is responsible for preparing the voters list, sending and receiving mail-in ballots, conducting the nomination meeting, overseeing the voting, verifying the mail-in ballots 15
and counting the votes. It is believed that these provisions for Electoral Officers have worked well and should be incorporated in a new First Nations Elections Act. However, it has been recommended that under the new legislation, and in accordance with the proposal to remove the involvement of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in Band Council elections, that the appointment of an electoral officer by a Band Council would not need to be approved by the Minister. 5. It is proposed that the new First Nations Elections Act and its regulations provide for the appointment of electoral officers by Band Councils without requiring the Ministers approval.
6.
Nominations and Elections
Under the Indian Act election system, any one who is registered on the Band list and is 18 years of age or older can vote. To be a candidate, to nominate or to second a nomination of a candidate for a Councillor position, a person must be a qualified elector (voter). These features of the Indian Act election system have proven to be effective. Under the Indian Act election system, a nomination meeting is held at least 42 days before the election. The purpose of this meeting is to nominate candidates for the positions of Chief and Councillors for the upcoming election. Notice of this meeting, along with the voters list, must be posted by the Electoral Officer at least 30 days in advance. The Electoral Officer will, at the same time, mail out to each eligible offreserve voter for whom there is an address, the notice of the nomination meeting along with a voter declaration form. Voters can nominate candidates for the position of Chief and Councillors through the mail-in process. If the number of nominees does not exceed the number of positions to be filled, the nominees will be declared elected. While these provisions of the Indian Act for nominations and voting do not require changes, there are others that have created problems. For example, under the Indian Act provisions, one person can be nominated for both the Chief and a Councillor position. Furthermore, there is no limit on the number of candidates that one person can nominate. Frivolous candidates - individuals without the serious intent of running - can also be a problem. Nobody is discouraged from letting their names stand for election once they are nominated. In addition, people who have no interest in running for election are often nominated by others. Once people are nominated, their name will automatically appear on the ballot unless they withdraw in writing, so names may appear on the ballots without the person even knowing they were nominated. If the ballots are already printed, a name stays on the ballot even if the candidate has withdrawn.
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In other election systems, including many First Nations community-designed (or custom) systems, there are many ways to control the nomination process so that it is not abused. For example, a candidacy fee must be paid which can ensure that candidates letting their names stand for election are serious. At the very least, persons who are nominated must sign a declaration accepting the nomination for their name to appear on the ballot. 6. It is proposed that, in the new First Nations Elections Act and its regulations, the process to nominate candidates generally mirror or copy the process under the Indian Act system with the following improvements: (a) only First Nations Band members (aged 18 or older) may nominate and be nominated for a Chief or Councillor position; no person may be nominated for more than one position; and no person can nominate more candidates than there are positions available for election; (b) persons who are nominated will be required to accept their nomination in writing or their name will not appear on the ballot. (c) individual First Nations be provided with the option of charging a candidate fee of up to $250.
7.
Mail-In Ballots and Advance Voting
Under the Indian Act election system, voters both on and off reserve may vote by mail-in ballot. The Electoral Officer receives a list of addresses from a Band administrator and, using this list, mails the ballots and voting instructions to off-reserve voters. On-reserve voters can contact the Electoral Officer directly to obtain a mail-in ballot. These voters then fill out the ballot, sign a voter declaration form in the presence of a witness and mail the completed ballot package to the Electoral Officer so that it can be received before the polls close on voting day. As the APC and the AMC have noted, there have been abuses with the mail-in ballot system. Since no one sees the voter cast his or her vote on the mail-in ballot, it is often difficult to ensure that the person filling and mailing the ballot is indeed the proper voter. A number of off-reserve voters, who have little interest in their First Nations election process but have received a mail-in ballot because their name and address are kept by the First Nation, are alleged to have sometimes sold their ballots to others. In various parts of the country, the alleged buying and selling of mail-in ballots has been quite widespread. Given that the First Nation provides the Electoral Officer with a list of addresses for mail-in ballots that may or may not be accurate or up-to-date, this activity can easily take place. Voters who receive these mail-in ballots may or may not have an interest in casting a legitimate vote. This type of abuse could be reduced if the new 17
legislation allowed for greater control of the distribution and return of mail-in ballots. The rules could also place the responsibility on the interested voters to contact the Electoral Officer to have a mail-in ballot sent to them. This would ensure that ballots are only sent to interested voters.
7. (a) It is proposed that the new First Nations Elections Act or its regulations provide that mail-in ballots be sent to voters only upon their written request and that those written requests must be accompanied by photocopies of reliable identification of the voters. (b) It is also proposed that the regulations permit the holding of advance polls to reduce the number of electors who would need to vote by mail-in ballot.
8.
Appeals of Band Council Elections
The Indian Act sets out provisions for First Nations voters to launch an appeal of an election with the Minister and the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. To do so, a First Nations voter must submit an affidavit setting out the grounds for the appeal within 45 days of an election. When the Department receives an appeal, a copy of it is sent by registered mail to all the candidates in the election and the electoral officer, who may provide a response and comments within 14 days. After receipt of the responses and any other information, the Department may conduct an investigation. If there is enough evidence to show that the election was invalid, the Minister can ask the Governor in Council to overturn the election of one or more candidates. The experience to date has been that about 30% of all Band Council elections under the Indian Act have been appealed; which amounts to 40 elections per year. Many of the election appeals are rejected outright by the Department because the reasons put forward for the appeal are not acceptable, do not demonstrate violations of the election rules or are considered to be so minor as to have had no impact on the election. Each year, usually no more than 5 election appeals result in the overturn of an election. Identified problems with the Indian Act appeals process are: It lacks rigor, transparency and procedural fairness. It is easy to launch an appeal based on frivolous allegations, which throws a dark cloud of uncertainty over the Band Council for often a very long period of time. 18
An appeal can take anywhere from 6 to 18 months to be resolved, which is a significant part of a Band Councils mandate. The role of the Minister in investigating and deciding upon election appeals is paternalistic and an inappropriate intervention in the internal affairs of a First Nation.
The AMC noted that approximately 50% of all Indian Act elections in Manitoba are appealed and in some cases, appeals can take over a year to get resolved. The AMC said that this creates uncertainty and instability both in the community and among other First Nation leaders and business stakeholders and that the challenge is to design a legitimate, independent and impartial appeal mechanism. The APC and the AMC recommended that, under a new First Nations Elections Act, the role of the Minister and his Department in election appeals be eliminated in favour of the establishment of new independent tribunals that would have powers set out in the legislation to investigate and decide upon appeals. The APC also recommended that timeframes for conducting investigations and issuing decisions on appeals be established and that persons wishing to launch an appeal be required to pay a fee up to a maximum of $250. There are also some other options to consider to change the appeals process by improving the current role of the Minister in election appeals as outlined in Option #1, or relying on the courts to hear and decide election appeals as per Option #3. Option #1: Improve the current election appeal process in the new legislation. The current role of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in the appeals of Band Council elections could be maintained but significantly improved in the new legislation. Considering that many First Nations elections appeals under the Indian Act system are superficial and not justified, the new legislation could set out measures to reduce these types of appeals, such as providing guidelines, requiring fees, and setting strict timelines for investigation and resolution. While such added provisions could improve and speed up the Departments elections appeal process, this option would not satisfy the recommendation of many First Nations that the Minister and the Department not play a role in election appeals. Option #2: Set up a new independent and impartial elections appeals tribunal. This approach calls for the establishment of an elections appeals tribunal to take over the related roles and responsibilities of the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. This option satisfies the recommendations for the Minister and the Department to withdraw completely from election appeals. Option #3: Rely on the courts to handle the appeals of Band Council elections. For federal, provincial/territorial and municipal elections, the power to impose penalties on corrupt practices and to overturn elections resides only with the courts. 19
In this regard, the Superior Courts have demonstrated that they can act impartially and judiciously. Through a new First Nations Elections Act, the Superior Courts could be asked to take on this appeals function for opting in First Nations. That arrangement would draw on the demonstrated capacity of the Superior Courts and put the opting in First Nations on a comparable basis with other governments across Canada in terms of ruling upon the validity of elections. 8. It is proposed that options for improving the appeals process for Band Council elections be given further consideration and that one option be chosen and recommended for inclusion in the new First Nations Elections Act, based on feasibility and the best use of limited financial resources.
9.
Election Offences and Penalties
As noted by the APC, the Indian Act election system does not set out election offences or attach any related penalties. This is a major weakness because people who engage in dishonest and corrupt election practices are not called to account. The APC recommended that the new election legislation define offences such as buying and selling mail-in ballots and offering gifts or favours for individual votes and attach penalties to the defined offences. This arrangement exists in federal, provincial and municipal elections laws and even allows prosecutions to be launched outside of the election appeal process. In the new First Nation election legislation, the introduction of defined elections offences and penalties would allow the investigation, prosecution and imposition of penalties relating to corrupt or dishonest practices by the Crown prosecutors, courts and 9. It is proposed that the new First Nations Elections Act and its regulations provide for offence and penalty provisions similar to those found in the Canada Elections Act for vote buying, intimidation and interference (see Annex A to this discussion paper). A person who has been convicted of a serious election related offence could also be declared ineligible to be a candidate at a First Nation election for up to 6 years.
police, which is consistent with federal, provincial and municipal elections in Canada.
10.
Recall of Elected Band Council Members
Under the Indian Act and its regulations, there is no provision for First Nations voters who have lost confidence in their leaders to take action to recall elected Band Council members and have them removed from office. However, in British Columbia 20
and in many community (or custom) election systems, voters are able to recall their elected officials. The APC and the AMC recommended that the new First Nations Elections Act allow for the majority of a First Nations voters to recall one or more elected Band Council members during the 4-year term of office for reasons such as: excessive absences from Band Council meetings, poor performance, conflict of interest or disreputable behaviour. Under a new system of recall, it is further proposed that petitions for the recall and removal of an elected official from office be allowed only at the 2-year point of the 4year mandate and only within 30 days of that 2-year point. This will ensure that the stability that a four year term would achieve is not ruined by the leaders constantly being recalled. If an elected official is recalled and removed from office, there would need to be a by-election to fill the vacancy on the Band Council. Although this kind of recall mechanism does not exist in most municipal, provincial or federal election systems, it was thought to be a good way to address the concerns of some individuals who feel that four years is a long term for a leadership that 10. It is proposed that the new First Nations Elections Act provide for the recall and removal from office of one or more elected officials when there is a related petition having the support of at least 60% of the voters of that First Nation. The petition for a recall would only be allowed to take place at the 2-year point of a 4-year mandate and only within 30 days of the 2-year point. is not doing a good job.
11.
Removal of Elected Band Council Members from Office
The Indian Act provides that the office of a Chief or Band Councillor becomes vacant when the person who holds that office is convicted of a crime, dies or resigns his office. It is suggested that these conditions for removal from office, along with the recall provision (as discussed and proposed above), be incorporated in the new First Nations Elections Act. The Indian Act also gives powers to the Minister to remove an elected person from a Band Council if he or she had been absent from three consecutive Band Council 11. It is proposed that the new First Nations Elections Act and its regulations provide that a Chief or Band Councillor would cease to hold office if he or she: (i) is convicted of an indictable offence and sentenced to imprisonment for more than 30 consecutive days; (ii) dies or resigns from office; (iii) is convicted of offences under the new Act; or (iv) is removed from the elected position pursuant to the legislations recall provision. 21
meetings without authorization. It is proposed that no such powers be given to the Minister under a new First Nations Elections Act.
CONCLUSION
This discussion paper is based on the analysis and recommendations put forward by both the APC and AMC who engaged their First Nations members on the issue of First Nations elections. Both the APC and the AMC have called for the design and implementation of a new opt-in First Nations Election Act and resulting regulations that would provide an effective and modern system for governing Band Council elections for the opting-in First Nations. As evidenced by the recommendations, First Nations are interested in having free and fair Band Council elections that support stable, effective and accountable First Nations governments as well as supporting the individual rights of their members. Annex A
OFFENCES AND PENALTIES IN THE CANADA ELECTIONS ACT

480. (1) Every person is guilty of an offence who, with the intention of delaying or obstructing the electoral process, contravenes this Act, otherwise than by committing an offence under subsection (2) or section 481 or 482 or contravening a provision referred to in any of sections 483 to 499. Public meetings (2) Every person is guilty of an offence who, at any time between the issue of a writ and the day after polling day at the election, acts, incites others to act or conspires to act in a disorderly manner with the intention of preventing the transaction of the business of a public meeting called for the purposes of the election. Offering bribe 481. (1) Every person is guilty of an offence who, during an election period, directly or indirectly offers a bribe to influence an elector to vote or refrain from voting or to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate. Accepting bribe (2) Every elector is guilty of an offence who, during an election period, accepts or agrees to accept a bribe that is offered in the circumstances described in subsection (1). 22
Intimidation, etc. 482. Every person is guilty of an offence who (a) by intimidation or duress, compels a person to vote or refrain from voting or to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate at an election; or (b) by any pretence or contrivance, including by representing that the ballot or the manner of voting at an election is not secret, induces a person to vote or refrain from voting or to vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate at an election. Offences under Part 1 (Electoral Rights) Offences requiring intent dual procedure 483. Every person is guilty of an offence who contravenes (a) paragraph 5(a) (voting when not qualified or entitled) or 5(b) (inducing a person not qualified or entitled to vote, to vote); or (b) section 7 (voting more than once). Punishment 500. (5) Every person who is guilty of an offence under any of subsections 480(1) and (2), sections 481 to 483, subsections 484(3), 485(2), 486(3), 487(2), 488(2) and 489(3), section 490, subsections 491(3) and 492(2), section 494, subsections 495(5), 496(2) and 497(3), section 498 and subsection 499(2) is liable: (a) on summary conviction, to a fine of not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both; or (b) on conviction on indictment, to a fine of not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years, or to both.
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AMLIORER LE SYSTME APPLICABLE AUX LECTIONS DES PREMIRES NATIONS Document de discussion
le 1er octobre 2010
24
TABLE DES MATIRES
INTRODUCTION ET HISTORIQUE 26 RECOMMANDATIONS POUR DE MEILLEURES LECTIONS ET DES GOUVERNEMENTS DES PREMIRES NATIONS PLUS STABLES
27
1. Nouvelle loi sur les lections aux conseils de bande, laquelle ladhsion serait facultative......................................................................................................... 27 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. Taille et composition des conseils de bande................................................... 28 Dure du mandat des membres dun conseil de bande .................................. 29 Tenue des lections le mme jour .................................................................. 30 Prsidents dlection ....................................................................................... 31 Mises en candidature ...................................................................................... 31 Bulletins de vote postaux et le vote par anticipation ....................................... 33 Appels relatifs aux rsultats dune lection ..................................................... 33 Infractions lectorales et peines ..................................................................... 36 Destitution des membres lus dun conseil de bande ..................................... 37 Rvocation des membres lus dun conseil de bande .................................... 38
CONCLUSION 38 INFRACTIONS ET PEINES PRVUES PAR LA LOI LECTORALE DU CANADA 39
25
INTRODUCTION ET HISTORIQUE
lheure actuelle, dans 247 Premires nations (ou environ 40 % ce celles-ci), les lections au conseil de bande se font conformment aux dispositions de la Loi sur les Indiens. Une majorit des Premire nations sont daccord que ces dispositions lectorales sont dsutes et problmatiques. Certains des problmes observs sont les suivants : La dure du mandat impose par la Loi sur les Indiens aux conseils de bande lus est de deux ans. Ce court mandat place les collectivits des Premires nations en mode lectoral continuel et nuit galement la stabilit des conseils de bande ainsi qu leurs efforts quant au dveloppement et la mise en uvre des projets long terme; Un processus de mise en candidature aux postes de chef et de conseiller qui se traduit souvent par un trop grand nombre de candidats une lection (parfois plus de cent); Un systme de vote par bulletins de vote postal qui donne lieu de labus; Un processus dappel des rsultats dune lection au ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien jug paternaliste ,compliqu et qui prend souvent trop de temps produire des rsultats et rendre une dcision finale; Comme la Loi sur les Indiens ne dfinit pas prcisment dinfraction lectorale ni de peine en cas dinfraction, on observe des cas allgus de tricherie et dautres irrgularits, comme la vente et lachat de votes, lesquels se font en toute impunit.
Le Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nation Chiefs (APC) et le Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC) ont signal un intrt dexplorer des pistes alternatives pour stabiliser et amliorer la gouvernance dans les Premires nations par le biais dun systme lectoral plus robuste et moderne. Au cours des deux dernires annes, avec le soutien des Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada, lAMC et lAPC ont effectu des recherches dans le domaine des lections au sein des conseils de bande. Aprs avoir pris contact avec des dirigeants, des techniciens en gouvernance et des membres des collectivits des Premires nations dans leur rgion respective, chaque organisation a labor des recommandations dans lesquelles ils demandent la cration dun meilleur systme pour la tenue des lections au sein des conseils de bandes. Le prsent document de discussion a pour objet dexaminer ces recommandations, de poursuivre les discussions et dinviter la rtroaction sur la question du dveloppement dun systme lectoral nouveau et amlior pour les Premires nations.
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RECOMMANDATIONS POUR UN MEILLEUR SYSTME LECTORAL ET DES GOUVERNEMENTS DES PREMIRES NATIONS PLUS STABLES
Avant de poursuivre la discussion, il est important de noter que lAPC et lAMC ne recommandent pas que le systme actuel de la Loi sur les Indiens soit remplac. Ce systme demeurera le mme pour les Premires nations qui en sont satisfaites. On propose plutt dlaborer une nouvelle loi et un nouveau systme facultatifs pour les lections aux conseils de bande. Les Premires nations qui tiennent leurs lections en vertu de leur propre code lectoral communautaire approuv par les membres ne seront pas touches par les changements proposs. Pour les propos de la prsente discussion, le projet de loi propos portera le nom loi sur les lections des Premires nations . Elle partagerait certaines rgles avec le systme de la Loi sur les Indiens, mais elle compterait aussi des diffrences trs importantes, telles : le mandat des membres dun conseil de bande devrait tre de quatre ans plutt que de deux ans, dure fixe par la Loi sur les Indiens; le systme de vote par bulletin postal devrait tre amlior; le ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien et le Ministre qui reoivent actuellement les demandes dappel relatives aux lections, font enqute et rendent des dcisions devraient tre exclus de toute intervention; et la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations devrait dfinir et tablir des infractions lectorales et des peines connexes afin de dcourager la tricherie et dautres pratiques malhonntes pendant les lections.
Ces recommandations constituent les mesures principales que lAPC et lAMC prconisent relativement la rforme lectorale. Dautres recommandations ont aussi t prsentes; elles concernent notamment la tenue des lections le mme jour dans toutes les Premires nations du Manitoba et la capacit des lecteurs des Premires nations de destituer un lu avant la fin de son mandat. Les lments principaux de la loi propose sur les lections des Premires nations sont expliqus dans les pages suivantes.
1.
Nouvelle loi sur les lections aux conseils de bande, laquelle ladhsion serait facultative
LAPC et lAMC recommandent que le gouvernement du Canada adopte une nouvelle loi qui servirait de solution de rechange au systme que prvoit la Loi sur les 27
Indiens pour les lections aux conseils de bande. Les Premires nations pourraient alors dcider individuellement dadhrer ou non la loi pour la tenue de leurs lections. Le cas chant, le conseil dune Premire nation adopterait une rsolution indiquant quil souhaite adhrer la nouvelle loi, rsolution quil ferait parvenir au ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien. Si la nouvelle loi sur les lections aux conseils de bande tait adopte, toute Premire nation qui est aujourdhui assujettie au systme de la Loi sur les Indiens pourrait choisir entre trois options :

adhrer la nouvelle loi, laquelle rgirait dornavant les lections dans la Premire nation; continuer dlire le conseil de bande conformment au systme prvu par la Loi sur les Indiens; ou laborer et ratifier un code lectoral communautaire (coutumier).
1. Il est propos que le gouvernement du Canada adopte une nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations y compris les dispositions cls proposes dans les sections 2 11 du prsent document et quil laisse chaque Premire nation le choix dy adhrer et de sen affranchir ultrieurement dans le cas o elle souhaite adopter un systme communautaire ou coutumier.
2.
Taille et composition des conseils de bande
En vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens, le conseil de bande se compose dun chef et dun conseiller par tranche de 100 membres de la bande, et le nombre de conseillers doit tre de deux au minimum et de douze au maximum. La Loi sur les Indiens interdit par ailleurs aux bandes davoir plus dun chef. On propose que les dispositions de la Loi sur les Indiens concernant la taille et la composition des conseils de bande soient maintenues dans la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations. Jusqu tout rcemment, tous les candidats un poste de conseiller devaient vivre sur la rserve. Cependant, en aot 2007, la Cour fdrale a annul cette exigence dans ce qui est appel la dcision Gull Bay . la suite de ce jugement, il est maintenant possible quun conseil de bande soit compos entirement de membres vivant hors rserve. Bon nombre de Premires nations sinquitent de ce phnomne; elles estiment quun conseil de bande form totalement ou en grande partie de membres vivant hors rserve risque de mal connatre les questions qui touchent la rserve. Un tel conseil pourrait ne pas donner toute lattention ncessaire aux points de vue et aux priorits des membres vivant sur la rserve. Ce risque met en lumire un 28
besoin pour la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations de prvoir une structure qui concilie, dune part, (i) le droit des membres hors rserve doccuper un poste au conseil de bande et, dautre part, (ii) le besoin de respecter les intrts particuliers des membres vivant sur la rserve, notamment en ce qui concerne la direction, la gestion et la prestation des services sur la rserve. 3. Il est propos que, en vertu de la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations, laquelle ladhsion sera facultative : (a) un conseil de bande se compose dun chef et dun conseiller par tranche de 100 membres de la bande, et que le nombre de conseillers soit de deux au minimum et de douze au maximum; (b) dans un conseil de bande, jusqu la moiti des postes de conseiller puissent tre occups uniquement par des membres de la bande vivant sur la rserve dans le cas o au moins 50 % des lecteurs appuient cette proposition lors dun vote sur la question.
3.
Dure du mandat des membres dun conseil de bande
Les membres du conseil de bande dune Premire nation qui suit le systme prvu par la Loi sur les Indiens sont lus pour des mandats de deux ans. LAPC et lAMC recommandent que la nouvelle loi sur les lections, laquelle les Premires nations pourront choisir dadhrer, prvoit des mandats de quatre ans. La Loi sur les Indiens, qui imposant des lections aux deux ans, a engendr linstabilit et provoqu des divisions au sein des communauts de Premires nations. Souvent, les mandats de deux ans sont trop courts pour favoriser la stabilit politique, pour permettre aux gouvernements des Premires nations denvisager et de mettre en uvre des initiatives long terme et pour btir les fondations ncessaires lessor des communauts avant quils aient faire face de nouvelles lections. Le mandat de deux ans savre particulirement problmatique pour les personnes qui font partie dun conseil de bande pour la premire fois. Aprs avoir t lues, ces personnes doivent prendre le temps de se familiariser avec leurs responsabilits ainsi que les enjeux et les projets qui exigent leur attention. Le mandat de deux ans et le roulement lev des lus, phnomne qui en dcoule, mettent donc en pril ces projets. Pour les raisons expose ci-dessus, lAPC et lAMC recommandent que les membres des conseils de bande soient lus pour des mandats de quatre ans. Aux niveaux fdral et provincial et dans la plupart des administrations municipales du pays, le mandat est de quatre ans. Ainsi, cette recommandation ferait en sorte que la dure des mandats des conseils de bande soit comparable celle des autres lus au Canada. 29
3. Il est propos que, en vertu de la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations, laquelle ladhsion sera facultative, le mandat des chefs et des conseillers lus soit de quatre ans.
4.
Tenue des lections le mme jour
La Loi sur les Indiens exige que les lections aux conseils de bande se tiennent aux deux ans, mais elle ne prcise pas que ces lections doivent avoir lieu au mme jour dans toutes les Premires nations. Pour cette raison, selon le systme prvu par la Loi sur les Indiens, sil y a vingt Premires nations dans une province, il peut y avoir 20 jours dlections diffrents rpartis sur une priode de deux ans. Les Premires nations du Manitoba ont soulign quelles ne sont pas en accord avec cette formule. Elles veulent plutt que les lections se tiennent le mme jour dans toutes les Premires nations de la province ou durant une mme priode de temps. Selon cette approche, les conseils de bande des Premires nations au Manitoba qui choisissent dadhrer la nouvelle loi auraient un mandat commenant et se terminant le mme jour. LAMC a indiqu que cette faon de faire favoriserait la coordination, la stabilit et le bon droulement des projets conjoints et coopratifs des Premires nations du Manitoba, et pourrait stimuler grandement le dveloppement conomique des Premires nations dans lensemble de la province. LAMC a aussi dit que, dans le cadre du systme lectoral de la Loi sur les Indiens, il arrive souvent quil soit impossible de lancer ou de conclure des projets conjoints ou coopratifs qui exigent la participation et le soutien de plusieurs conseils de bande de la province parce que, nimporte quel moment de lanne, les dirigeants dau moins un conseil de bande risquent de changer la suite dlections. Or, les nouveaux lus ont souvent des points de vue et des intrts personnels diffrents de leurs prdcesseurs. En dehors du Manitoba, si la totalit ou la plupart des Premires nations dune mme rgion ou province appuie lide dlections tenues le mme jour ou durant la mme priode dans leur rgion ou province, cela pourrai galement se faire. Cette partie de la loi ne serait toutefois pas excutoire, et il reviendrait chaque rgion de dcider si elle veut fixer un seul jour dlections.
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4.
ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS
On propose que la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations et National Engagement on Electoral Reform: les rglements affrents donnent aux Premires nationsNations Communities Building a Better Election System for First la possibilit de tenir les lections aux conseils de bande le mme jour dans la rgion ou la province concerne.
5.
Prsidents dlection
Avant que des lections aient lieu dans le cadre du systme prvu par la Loi sur les Indiens, le conseil de bande doit nommer un prsident dlection et le ministre doit approuver la nomination. Cette personne a la responsabilit de dresser la liste des lecteurs, denvoyer et de recevoir les bulletins de vote postaux, de diriger lassemble de mise en candidature, de superviser le vote, de vrifier les bulletins postaux et de dpouiller le scrutin. On estime que, jusqu prsent, cette faon de faire fonctionne bien et quelle devrait tre intgre la loi sur les lections des Premires nations. Il est toutefois recommand que, en vertu de la nouvelle loi et conformment lide dliminer lintervention du ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien dans les lections aux conseils de bande, la nomination dun prsident dlection par le conseil de bande nexige pas 5. Il est propos que la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations et les rglements affrents prvoient la nomination du prsident dlection par les conseils de bande, sans que le ministre ait donner son approbation.
lapprobation du ministre.
6.
Mises en candidature
Conformment au systme lectoral prvu par la Loi sur les Indiens, toute personne inscrite la liste dune bande et ge dau moins 18 ans peut voter. En outre, seuls les lecteurs admissibles peuvent tre candidats, proposer un candidat ou appuyer une candidature un poste de conseiller. Ces exigences de la Loi sur les Indiens se sont rvles judicieuses et efficaces. Selon la Loi sur les Indiens, une assemble de mise en candidature doit se tenir au moins 42 jours avant llection. Cette runion sert dsigner les candidats aux postes de chef et de conseillers. Le prsident dlection doit afficher lavis annonant lassemble et la liste des lecteurs au moins 30 jours lavance. En mme temps, il doit envoyer chaque lecteur admissible vivant lextrieur de la rserve et pour qui il a une adresse, lavis de lassemble ainsi quune formule de dclaration de llecteur. Les lecteurs peuvent proposer par voie postale des candidats aux postes de chef et de conseillers. Si le nombre de candidatures ne dpasse pas le nombre de postes combler, les candidats seront dclars lus.
31
Mme si les dispositions de la Loi sur les Indiens concernant les mises en candidature et le scrutin peuvent rester telles quelles, dautres dispositions ont entran divers problmes. Par exemple, une personne peut tre candidate la fois au poste de chef et au poste de conseiller, et il ny a pas de limite au nombre de candidats quune personne peut proposer. Mentionnons aussi les mises en candidature frivoles, cest--dire, les personnes qui nont aucune chance raisonnable de gagner. Il nexiste aucune mesure pour inciter ces personnes retirer leur candidature. Il arrive aussi souvent que des personnes qui nont aucun intrt se faire lire soient dsignes candidats. Le nom de tout candidat propos apparat automatiquement sur le bulletin de vote moins que le candidat ne se dsiste par crit. Ainsi, il y a des candidats proposs dont le nom figure sur le bulletin de vote sans mme que ces derniers aient connaissance quils ont t sujet dune mise en candidature. Si les bulletins sont dj imprims, le nom demeure inscrit mme si la personne sest retire de la course. Dautres systmes lectoraux, dont un grand nombre de systmes communautaires (coutumiers) des Premires nations, prvoient diffrentes faons dassurer la bonne marche du processus de mise en candidature. Par exemple, on peut exiger des droits de candidature pour veiller ce que seules les personnes srieuses demeurent inscrites au bulletin de vote. Au minimum, les candidats doivent signer une dclaration par laquelle ils acceptent que leur nom figure au bulletin de vote.
7. On propose que le processus de mise en candidature prvu par la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations et les rglements affrents reflte gnralement ou reproduise le processus dcrit dans la Loi sur les Indiens, et que les amliorations suivantes soient apportes : (d) seuls les membres de la Premire nation (gs dau moins 18 ans) peuvent tre candidats ou proposer des candidats aux postes de chef ou de conseiller; personne ne peut tre candidat plus dun poste; et personne ne peut proposer un nombre de candidats suprieur au nombre de postes disponibles; (e) les candidats doivent accepter leur mise en candidature par crit, dfaut de quoi leur nom ne pourra figurer au bulletin de vote; (f) les Premires nations ont loption dexiger jusqu' 250 $ en droit de candidature lors dune lection.
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7.
Bulletins de vote postaux et le vote par anticipation
En vertu du systme lectoral prvu par la Loi sur les Indiens, les lecteurs vivant la fois sur et hors rserve peuvent voter par bulletin de vote postal. laide dune liste dadresses reue dun administrateur de la bande, le prsident dlection envoie les bulletins de vote et les instructions relatives au vote aux lecteurs vivant hors rserve. Les lecteurs vivant sur la rserve peuvent communiquer avec le prsident dlection afin dobtenir un bulletin de vote postal. Ces derniers remplissent alors le bulletin, signent une formule de dclaration de llecteur en prsence dun tmoin et retournent le tout par la poste au prsident dlection. Les bulletins postaux doivent tre reus avant la fermeture des bureaux de scrutin, le jour du vote. Comme lAPC et lAMC lont fait remarquer, le systme des bulletins de vote postaux a dj fait lobjet dabus. Puisque personne ne voit llecteur faire son choix sur le bulletin de vote, il est souvent difficile de sassurer que la personne qui a rempli et post le bulletin est bien celle qui le bulletin tait adress. Il est arriv que des lecteurs vivant hors rserve, qui sintressaient peu aux lections dans leur Premire nation, mais qui avaient reu un bulletin de vote postal parce que la Premire nation avait conserv leur nom et leur adresse, aient vendu leur bulletin. Dans diverses rgions du pays, lachat et la vente de ces bulletins sont assez communs. Il est difficile dempcher cette pratique, car le prsident dlection doit envoyer les bulletins de vote en se fiant uniquement la liste dadresses que lui fournit la Premire nation. Or, cette liste nest pas ncessairement juste et jour. Les lecteurs qui reoivent ces bulletins ne tiennent pas tous voter de faon lgitime. La nouvelle loi pourrait limiter ce type dabus si les rgles permettaient un meilleur contrle de la distribution et du renvoi des bulletins, et si elles amenaient les lecteurs intresss contacter le prsident dlection pour quun bulletin leur soit envoy par la poste. Ainsi, seules les personnes qui veulent vraiment voter obtiendraient un bulletin.
8. (a) Il est propos que, en vertu de la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations ou des rglements affrents, les bulletins de vote postaux ne soient envoys aux lecteurs que si ceux-ci en font la demande crite, laquelle doit tre accompagne de la photocopie dune pice didentit fiable. (b) Il est propos galement que les rglements permettent la tenu de bureaux de vote par anticipation afin de rduire le nombre dlecteurs qui doivent voter par bulletin de vote postal.
8.
Appels relatifs aux rsultats dune lection
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La Loi sur les Indiens renferme des dispositions qui permettent aux lecteurs des Premires nations de faire appel au ministre et au ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien concernant les rsultats dune lection. Pour ce faire, un lecteur doit soumettre un affidavit qui expose les motifs de lappel dans les 45 jours suivant llection. Lorsque le Ministre reoit un appel, une copie est envoye par poste recommande tous les candidats llection ainsi quau prsident dlection, qui peuvent commenter les allgations ou rpondre dans les 14 jours qui suivent. Aprs avoir reu les rponses, le Ministre peut effectuer une enqute. Si les preuves suffisent tablir que les rsultats de llection ne sont pas valides, le ministre peut demander au Gouverneur en Conseil dannuler llection du ou des candidats en cause. ce jour, environ 30 % des lections aux conseils de bande tenues en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens ont fait lobjet dun appel, ce qui quivaut une quarantaine par anne. Le Ministre rejette demble bon nombre des appels lorsquils sappuient sur des motifs inacceptables, quils ne prouvent pas que les rgles lectorales ont t enfreintes ou quils reposent sur des motifs si anodins quils nont aucun effet sur les rsultats de llection. En gnral, on ne compte chaque anne pas plus de cinq appels ayant pour rsultat lannulation dune llection. Les problmes relis au processus dappel en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens sont : un manque de rigueur, de transparence et dquit procdurale. il savre trop facile dinterjeter un appel bas sur des allgations frivoles, qui place une incertitude prolonge sur le conseil de bande. le lapse de temps pour en arriver une rsolution peux tre de 6 18 mois, ce qui nest pas raisonnable, le mandat tant de deux ans. le rle du ministre dans lenqute et la prise de dcision en matire dappels dlections est la fois un geste paternaliste et une intervention inapproprie dans les affaires des Premires nations.
LAMC a soulign quenviron la moiti des lections tenues au Manitoba conformment la Loi sur les Indiens font lobjet dun appel et que dans certains cas, la rsolution dun appel peut prendre plus dun an. LAMC a indiqu que ce systme cre de lincertitude et de linstabilit dans la collectivit, chez dautres chefs de Premires nations et dans le milieu des affaires. Selon elle, le dfi consiste en la conception dun mcanisme dappel lgitime, indpendant et impartial. LAPC et lAMC ont recommand que, en vertu de la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations, le rle du ministre et du Ministre dans le cadre des appels relatifs aux lections soit limin au profit de nouveaux tribunaux indpendants qui la loi confrerait de pouvoirs en matire denqute et de dcision. LAPC a aussi 34
recommand ltablissement de dlais pour la tenue denqutes et la production des dcisions, ainsi que limposition de frais maximaux de 250 $ pour interjeter appel. Il y a aussi dautres options considerer afin de changer le processus dappel, en amliorant le rle actuel du minister lgard des appels dlections telle loption no 1, ou en en demandant la cours de traiter et de dcider des appels telle loption n o 3. Option no 1 : amliorer, dans la nouvelle loi, le processus actuel dappel relatif aux lections. Les rles actuels du ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord canadien lgard des appels ports contre llection dun conseil de bande pourraient tre maintenus mais grandement amliors dans la nouvelle loi. Dans le cadre du systme tabli par la Loi sur les Indiens, beaucoup des appels interjets relativement aux lections sont frivoles et injustifiables. La nouvelle loi pourrait prciser des mesures servant rduire le nombre dappels de ce type, par exemple : la mise en place de directives, limposition de frais ou ltablissement de dlais stricts pour les enqutes et les rglements. Ces mesures pourraient amliorer et acclrer le processus dappel ministriel, mais elles ne rpondent pas la recommandation de nombreuses Premires nations selon qui le ministre et le Ministre ne devraient pas intervenir dans le processus dappel. Option no 2 : tablissement dun tribunal dappel indpendant et impartial. Cette approche prconise la cration dun tribunal dappel pour remplacer le rle et les responsabilits du ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord. Cette option rpond la recommandation qui le Ministre et son ministre se retire des appels lgard des lections. Option no 3 : demander la cour de traiter les appels relatifs aux lections. Aux niveaux fdral, provincial/territorial et municipal, le pouvoir dimposer des peines en cas de manuvre frauduleuse et dannuler des lections est rserv la cour. cet gard, les cours suprieures ont dmontr quelles pouvaient agir de faon impartiale et judicieuse. En vertu dune loi sur les lections des Premires nations, les cours suprieures pourraient tre amenes examiner les appels provenant des Premires nations qui ont choisi dadhrer la nouvelle loi. Cette option mettrait profit la capacit prouve des cours suprieures et placerait les Premires nations concernes dans une situation comparable celles dautres gouvernements du pays en ce qui a trait la reconnaissance de la validit des lections.
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9. Il est propos de poursuivre lexamen des options visant amliorer le processus dappel concernant les lections aux conseils de bande et, en sappuyant sur la faisabilit et la meilleure utilisation possible de ressources financires limites, de recommander la mise en uvre de lune de ces options dans la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations.
9.
Infractions lectorales et peines
Comme lAPC la fait remarquer, le systme lectoral tabli par la Loi sur les Indiens ne prvoit pas dinfractions lectorales ni de peines sy rattachant. Il sagit dune lacune importante, car ceux et celles qui participent des manuvres frauduleuses ou malhonntes en rapport une lection ne sont pas appels en tre imputables. LAPC a recommand que la nouvelle loi dfinisse des infractions comme lachat et la vente de bulletins de vote postaux et loffre de pot-de-vin ou de services en change de votes individuels et des peines connexes. Les lois sur les lections fdrales, provinciales et municipales contiennent dj de telles dispositions et elle permet mme dintenter des poursuites en dehors du processus dappel tabli. Si la nouvelle loi dfinissait des infractions lectorales et des peines, on permettrait aux procureurs de la Couronne, aux tribunaux et aux services de police de faire enqute, dintenter des poursuites et dimposer des peines en cas de manuvres frauduleuses ou malhonntes ce qui se fait dj dans le cadre des lections fdrales, provinciales et municipales au Canada.
9.
Il est propos que la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations et les rglements affrents prvoient des infractions et des peines semblables celles qui sont dfinies dans la Loi lectorale du Canada concernant lachat de votes, lintimidation et lingrence (voir lAnnexe A du prsent document). Une personne reconnue coupable dune infraction lectorale grave pourrait galement tre inhabile se prsenter aux lections dune Premire nation pour une priode maximale de six ans.
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10.
Destitution des membres lus dun conseil de bande
La Loi sur les Indiens et les rglements affrents ne comportent aucune disposition tablissant que les lecteurs dune Premire nation qui ont perdu confiance en leurs dirigeants peuvent prendre des mesures pour destituer des membres lus du conseil de bande et les carter du pouvoir. Dans le systme provincial de la Colombie-Britannique et bon nombre de systmes lectoraux communautaires (coutumiers) toutefois, les lecteurs peuvent destituer des lus. LAPC et lAMC ont recommand que la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations permette aux lecteurs dune Premire nation de destituer un ou plus dun membre lu du conseil de bande au cours du mandat de quatre ans, si cest le souhait de la majorit. Les raisons invoques pourraient tre, par exemple : des absences excessives aux runions du conseil de bande, un mauvais rendement, des conflits dintrts ou un comportement rprhensible. Par ailleurs, dans le cadre de la nouvelle procdure de destitution, les ptitions visant la destitution ou la rvocation dun lu seraient autorises uniquement aprs les deux premires annes du mandat de quatre ans et dans les 30 jours suivant la marque des deux ans. De cette faon, la stabilit dun mandat de quatre ans ne sera pas mine par la destitution perptuelle des dirigeants. En cas de destitution, une lection partielle devrait se tenir pour quon puisse combler le sige laiss vacant au conseil de bande. Mme si la plupart des systmes lectoraux fdraux, provinciaux et municipaux nont pas de mcanisme de destitution du genre, on croit quil sagit dun bon moyen de rpondre aux proccupations de certains selon qui un mandat de quatre ans est trop long dans le cas dun conseil de bande qui ne fait pas du bon travail.
10. Il est propos que la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations prvoit la destitution et la rvocation dun ou plus dun lu lorsquune ptition appuye par au moins 60 % des lecteurs de la Premire nation concerne en fait la demande. La ptition visant une destitution doit tre prsente aprs les deux premires annes du mandat de quatre ans et dans les 30 jours suivant la marque des deux ans.
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11.
Rvocation des membres lus dun conseil de bande
Selon la Loi sur les Indiens, le poste dun chef ou dun conseiller devient vacant lorsque le titulaire est reconnu coupable dun crime, quil meurt ou quil dmissionne. Il est propos que ces conditions rattaches la rvocation, de mme que la disposition sur la destitution (telle que propose et discute ci-dessus), soient incorpores la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations et aux rglements affrents. La Loi sur les Indiens expose galement des pouvoirs que le ministre peut utiliser pour rvoquer un membre lu dun conseil de bande, dans le cas o celui-ci a t absent trois runions conscutives du conseil de bande sans autorisation. Il est propos que la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations ne confre aucun pouvoir du genre au ministre. 12. Il est propos que, selon la nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations et les rglements affrents, un chef ou un conseiller cesse doccuper sa fonction : (i) sil est dclar coupable dun acte criminel et condamn une peine demprisonnement de plus de 30 jours conscutifs; (ii) sil meurt ou dmissionne; (iii) sil est reconnu coupable dune infraction la nouvelle loi; ou (iv) sil est rvoqu conformment la disposition sur la destitution .
CONCLUSION
Le prsent document de discussion sappuie sur lanalyse et les recommandations de lAPC et de lAMC, qui ont consult leurs membres concernant les lections chez les Premires nations. LAPC et lAMC prconisent llaboration et la mise en uvre dune nouvelle loi sur les lections des Premires nations et de rglements affrents, auxquels ladhsion serait facultative. La loi procurerait aux Premires nations participantes un systme lectoral moderne et efficace. Comme latteste les recommandations de l APC et de lAMC, les Premires nations veulent que leurs lections des conseils de bande soient libres et justes pour quelles puissent soutenir la fois des gouvernements des Premires nations stable, efficace et responsable, et les droits individuels de leurs membres.
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Annexe A
INFRACTIONS ET PEINES PRVUES PAR LA LOI LECTORALE DU CANADA

480. (1) Commet une infraction quiconque, avec lintention dentraver ou de retarder les oprations lectorales, contrevient la prsente loi autrement quen commettant une infraction vise au paragraphe (2) ou aux articles 481 ou 482 ou quen contrevenant une disposition mentionne aux articles 483 499. Assembles publiques (2) Commet une infraction quiconque, entre la dlivrance du bref et le lendemain du jour du scrutin, agit, incite dautres personnes agir ou conspire pour agir dune manire dsordonne dans lintention dempcher la conduite dune assemble publique convoque pour une lection. Offre de pot-de-vin 481. (1) Commet une infraction quiconque, pendant la priode lectorale, offre un pot-de-vin, directement ou indirectement, en vue dinciter un lecteur voter ou sabstenir de voter ou voter ou sabstenir de voter pour un candidat donn. Acceptation de pot-de-vin (2) Commet une infraction llecteur qui, pendant la priode lectorale, accepte tel pot-de-vin. Intimidation 482. Commet une infraction quiconque : (a) par intimidation ou par la contrainte, force ou incite une autre personne voter ou sabstenir de voter ou voter ou sabstenir de voter pour un candidat donn; (b) incite une autre personne voter ou sabstenir de voter ou voter ou sabstenir de voter pour un candidat donn par quelque prtexte ou ruse, notamment en tentant de lui faire croire que le scrutin une lection nest pas secret. Infractions la partie 1 (droits lectoraux) Infraction exigeant une intention double procdure 483. Commet une infraction quiconque contrevient lune ou lautre des dispositions suivantes : 39
(a) les alinas 5a) (voter sans tre habile le faire) ou 5b) (inciter voter une personne qui nest pas habile le faire); (b) larticle 7 (voter plus dune fois). Peines 500. (5) Quiconque commet une infraction vise lune ou lautre des dispositions suivantes : les paragraphes 480(1) et (2), les articles 481 483, les paragraphes 484(3), 485(2), 486(3), 487(2), 488(2) et 489(3), larticle 490, les paragraphes 491(3) et 492(2), larticle 494, les paragraphes 495(5), 496(2) et 497(3), larticle 498 et le paragraphe 499(2) est passible, sur dclaration de culpabilit : (a) par procdure sommaire, dune amende maximale de 2 000 $ et dun emprisonnement maximal dun an, ou de lune de ces peines; (b) par mise en accusation, dune amende maximale de 5 000 $ et dun emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans, ou de lune de ces peines.
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Appendix C ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS SECRETARIAT www.apcfnc.ca
Introduction Over the last year, the APC has been researching and discussing with leaders, technicians and First Nations people in the Atlantic Region the issue of band elections. All the input we have received on this issue was carefully considered in developing recommendations for the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada to develop an improved system for holding and managing Band Council elections. In the Atlantic Region, which includes three Mikmaq communities in Quebec, there are 27 First Nations who hold their elections under the Indian Act election system. This system has weaknesses and problems that destabilize First Nation governments and prevent them from moving forward on important projects. With the two year term of office, our community research has shown that newly elected Chief and Council have little time to learn their responsibilities before its time for another election. Often, these important plans and projects cannot move forward because of the disruption. If a new Chief and Council are elected, the cycle starts all over again. This political instability does not make First Nations very attractive to long term investment and economic development. If a better electoral system could be developed, First Nations who choose this system will have stronger, more stable and capable governments. All community members would benefit. Other problems with the Indian Act election system are: As a result of the Gull Bay decision, off-reserve members can run for councillor positions. Since there is no limit on how many positions they can hold, it is possible for all the council positions to be held by off-reserve members. A loose nomination process that allows the nomination of candidates who are not serious or dedicated, often resulting in excess of 100 candidates vying for between three and twelve positions in a given election. No way to prevent one person from running and being elected to both a Chief and Councillor position. If the same person is elected to both positions and wishes to only hold one, the vacancy has to be filled through another lengthy and costly byelection. 41
A mail-in ballot system that is open to abuse. The Indian Act election system has no defined offences and penalties making it impossible to prosecute corrupt practices that, if they were to take place in the context of a federal, provincial or municipal election, would be illegal and subject to criminal prosecution. Involvement of the Minister in reviewing, investigating and deciding upon election appeals, which takes too long.
Our key recommendation is for the design and introduction of a new and modern First Nations Elections Act (and regulations) as an alternative to the Indian Act system for the election of Band Councils. First Nations would then be able to choose whether they want to opt-in to the new election system. We have also recommended the following: the new First Nations Elections Act should respond to the specific needs of First Nations and be largely designed by them; the term (length) of office for Band Council members should be 4 years instead of the 2-year term that exists under the Indian Act system; the mail-in ballot system should be improved the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and his Department who currently receive, investigate and decide upon election appeals - should be removed from any involvement; and the new First Nations Elections Act should define and set out election offences and attach penalties to discourage cheating and other dishonest activities from taking place in elections.
A National Engagement Effort on Electoral Reform With the support of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, the APC has partnered with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, who has also been working in their province on election reform, to lead a national engagement effort. This will ensure that other regions of the country have an opportunity to provide their thoughts on the recommendations and this initiative as a whole. Over the next few months, both our organizations will be informing and talking to First Nations leaders and provincial First Nations organizations about our recommendations for election reform. We hope that they will be interested in supporting our efforts for a better election system.
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We also want to hear from First Nations people everywhere about this issue. For further information on our recommendations, you may wish to read the detailed discussion paper that is enclosed. We invite you to provide your comments and thoughts. You can do so by writing directly to the APC either by e-mail or through the mail at the addresses below. We have also developed a feedback form that targets each recommendation individually that you may wish to complete and send to us either by mail or fax. This form is also enclosed. Send your feedback to:
Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs

c/o Krista Brookes 153 Willowdale Drive Dartmouth, NS B2V 0A5 General Inquiry/Fax Phone (Toll Free): 1-877-667-4007/(Local): 902-435-8021 Fax: 902-435-8027 E-mail: electionreform@apcfnc.ca Facebook site: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=150789196002 Finally, you can also consult the websites of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs at www.manitobachiefs.com, and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada at www.aincinac.gc.ca The information gathered during this national engagement effort will inform the development of the new legislation.
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Frequently Asked Questions
Q1: A1:
Is this a proposal to change the Indian Act? We are not recommending that the Indian Act election system be changed. It will remain the same for those First Nations who believe it best suits their needs. We are proposing a new stand-alone and optional piece of legislation. What role does the APC and the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs play in this initiative? We are leading this initiative in partnership with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs. They have basically made the same recommendations to the Minister, with the notable exception of a common election day for Manitoba First Nations. The APC does not want a common election day and has made this point clear to the Minister. Together, we have agreed to present and collect feedback on our recommendations across the country. Will this affect First Nations who hold their elections under their own community election system? We have not recommended that a new First Nation Elections Act be in any way designed to affect First Nations that hold their elections under their own community codes.
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Q4: A4:
Will this new legislation be optional or mandatory We have recommended that this new legislation be optional. Each First Nation can determine if the proposed new framework for elections is workable in their community. What can be expected to happen over the next couple of months? We will be talking with leaders in other parts of the country seeking support and feedback on the recommendations we have made for new election legislation. All the comments and suggestions will be gathered and reported back to the Minister. This will inform the development of a new piece of legislation.
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ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS SECRETARIAT www.apcfnc.ca
Introduction Au cours de la dernire anne, le APC a men des discussions avec les dirigeants, les techniciens et les membres des Premires nations de la rgion de lAtlantique sur la question des lections des conseils bandes, ainsi queffectu des recherches sur le sujet. Tous les commentaires que nous avons reus ont t rigoureusement pris en compte pour laborer des recommandations lintention du ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada, afin quun meilleur systme soit mis en place pour la tenue et ladministration des lections des conseils de bandes. La rgion de lAtlantique, qui comprend trois communauts micmacs au Qubec, compte 27 Premires nations qui tiennent leurs lections conformment au systme tabli par la Loi sur les Indiens. Ce systme comporte toutefois des lacunes qui dstabilisent les gouvernements des Premires nations et qui les empchent de raliser certains projets importants. En ce qui concerne le mandat de deux ans, les recherches que nous avons menes ont montr que les chefs et les conseils qui se font lire disposent de peu de temps pour se familiariser avec leurs responsabilits avant les lections suivantes. Il arrive souvent que les projets entrepris ne puissent pas tre mens bien en raison du calendrier des lections. Ds llection dun nouveau chef et dun nouveau conseil, le mme cycle recommence. Linstabilit que ce systme engendre ne rend pas les Premires nations attrayantes pour les investissements long terme et ne favorise pas non plus le dveloppement conomique. En mettant en place un meilleur systme lectoral, les Premires nations seraient en mesure dlire des gouvernements plus forts, plus stables et plus comptents, ce qui profiterait tous les membres des communauts concernes. Le systme lectoral tabli par la Loi sur les Indiens comporte dautres problmes : En consquence du jugement Gull Bay, les autochtones vivant hors-rserve peuvent se prsenter pour tre lus au poste de conseiller. Puisque le nombre de postes de conseillers pouvant tre dtenus par les personnes en question nest pas limit, il est possible que tous ces postes soient combls par des membres hors-rserve. Le systme de mise en candidature peu structur qui permet des candidats qui ne sont pas srieux ou dvous de se prsenter. Il arrive donc souvent que plus 45
de 100 personnes rivalisent les unes avec les autres pour un nombre de postes qui se situe entre trois et douze. Il nest pas possible dempcher une personne de se prsenter pour tre lue la fois au poste de chef et celui de conseiller. Si une mme personne est lue pour occuper ces deux fonctions, et si celle-ci souhaite en occuper une seule, il faut alors organiser une lection partielle longue et coteuse pour pourvoir le poste vacant Un systme de vote par bulletin postal qui donne lieu de labus. Puisque le systme lectoral tabli dans la Loi sur les Indiens ne prvoit aucune infraction ou pnalit, il est impossible de poursuivre en justice les personnes responsables de manuvres frauduleuses. Si ces manuvres se produisaient pendant une lection fdrale, provinciale ou municipale, elles seraient dclares illgales et entraneraient des poursuites criminelles. Le travail fait par le ministre pour examiner et enquter les appels ainsi que prendre une dcision sur ces derniers prend trop de temps.
Notre principale recommandation est donc la suivante : mettre en place une nouvelle loi sur les lections au sein des Premires nations (ainsi que des nouveaux rglements) pour remplacer le systme lectoral de la Loi sur les Indiens. Les Premires nations pourraient alors choisir de prendre part au nouveau systme. Nous recommandons en outre ce qui suit : La nouvelle loi sur les lections au sein des Premires nations devrait rpondre aux besoins qui sont propres celles-ci; elle devrait de plus, dans une large mesure, tre cre par celles-ci. Le mandat des membres du conseil de bande devrait tre de 4 ans, et non pas de 2 ans comme le prvoit actuellement la loi. Le systme de vote postal devrait tre amlior. Le ministre et le ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada qui sont actuellement chargs de lexamen, des enqutes et des dcisions lis aux appels ne devraient plus prendre part ce processus. La nouvelle loi sur les lections au sein des Premires nations devrait prvoir certaines infractions et pnalits afin de dissuader toute manuvre frauduleuse.
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Rforme lectorale : un effort national Grce au soutien du ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada, le APC sest associ lAssemble des chefs du Manitoba, laquelle participe galement une rforme lectorale dans sa propre province, afin de mener un effort national sur la question. Cela permettra de faire en sorte que dautres rgions du pays aient la possibilit de sexprimer sur les recommandations et linitiative. Au cours des prochains mois, nous ferons un travail dinformation auprs des leaders des Premires nations ainsi que des organisations provinciales des Premires nations, au sujet de nos recommandations sur la rforme lectorale. Nous esprons que ces leaders et ces organisations nous soutiendront dans notre effort. Nous voulons galement que les membres des Premires nations sexpriment sur la question. Pour en savoir plus sur nos recommandations, vous pouvez consulter le document de travail dtaill sous pli. Nous vous invitons nous faire parvenir vos commentaires et vos rflexions. Vous pouvez crire directement au APC, soit par courrier lectronique, soit par courrier postal (voir les adresses ci-dessous). Nous avons galement cr une feuille de commentaires, que vous trouverez sous pli qui cible chaque recommandation. Vous pouvez nous lenvoyer soit par courriel, soit par tlcopieur. Veuillez faire parvenir vos commentaires ladresse suivante :
Congrs des chefs des Premires nations de l'Atlantique

a/s Krista Brookes 153, rue Willowdale Dartmouth, N.-. B2V 0A5 Demandes de renseignements/Tlcopieur Tlphone (sans frais) : 1-877-667-4007/(Local): 902-435-8021 Tlcopieur : 902-435-8027 Courriel : electionreform@apcfnc.ca Facebook site: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=150789196002 Vous pouvez galement consulter le site Web de lAssemble des chefs du Manitoba (www.manitobachiefs.com), ainsi que le site du ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada (www.ainc-inac.gc.ca). Les informations obtenues pendant le processus seront prises en compte pour crer la nouvelle loi.
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Foire aux questions Sagit-il dune proposition visant changer la Loi sur les Indiens? Nous ne recommandons pas un changement du systme lectoral prvu par la Loi sur les Indiens. Les Premires nations qui jugent que ce systme rpond leurs besoins pourront le conserver. Nous proposons la cration dune nouvelle loi dont lapplication ne serait pas obligatoire. Quel rle jouent le APC et lAssemble des chefs du Manitoba dans cette initiative? Nous menons cette initiative en partenariat avec lAssemble des chefs du Manitoba. Les membres de cette assemble ont pratiquement fait les mmes recommandations au ministre, lexception dune journe dlection commune pour les Premires nations du Manitoba. Le CCA, qui ne souhaite pas fixer une journe dlection commune, a clairement fait valoir cet aspect auprs du ministre. Nous avons donc, ensemble, dcid de demander aux Premires nations du pays ce quelles pensent de nos recommandations. Est-ce que les changements proposs auront des consquences pour les Premires nations qui possdent leur propre systme lectoral? Nous navons pas recommand que la nouvelle loi que nous proposons entrane des changements pour les Premires nations qui possdent leur propre systme lectoral. Lapplication de la nouvelle loi serait-elle obligatoire? Nous avons recommand que lapplication de cette loi soit facultative. Chaque Premire nation pourra donc dterminer si le nouveau systme lectoral lui convient. Quest-ce qui est prvu pour les deux prochains mois? Nous irons rencontrer les leaders dautres rgions du pays afin dobtenir leur avis, ainsi que leur soutien, sur la nouvelle loi que nous proposons. Les avis et suggestions en question feront lobjet dun rapport qui sera remis au ministre; ils seront galement pris en compte pour crer la nouvelle loi.
Q1: R1:
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Appendix D ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS SECRETARIAT www.apcfnc.ca
Indian Act Election Reform Initiative - Feedback/Comment Form The AMC and the APC have provided a number of recommendations to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development for a new First Nations Election Act. We invite you to provide your comments either in a summary fashion or specific to each recommendation. Name: E-mail: ___________________________________ ___________________________________
Before providing your comments on this form, we suggest that you read the discussion paper on the proposed reforms. This will help you to better understand the rationale for the recommendations that we have made. RECOMMENDATION 1 New opt-in election legislation that First Nations may choose to come under as an alternative to the Indian Act election system when a First Nation passes a Band Council Resolution (BCR) and demonstrates that community consultation and engagement took place on this question. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________ RECOMMENDATION 2 As a result of the Gull Bay decision, off-reserve members can hold Councillor positions, and there is no limit to the number of positions they can hold. It is recommended that 49
the new legislation provide that up to one-half of Councillor positions on a Band Council may be designated to be held by on-reserve Band members only if, during a vote held on this question, 50% or more of the votes cast support it. (you can consult the Gull Bay decision on the Internet at: http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/en/2007/2007fc878/2007fc878.html ) ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________ RECOMMENDATION 3 The term of office for Chiefs and Councillors be 4 years. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION 4 (For Manitoba First Nations only) First Nations in a given region or province have the possibility of adopting a common election day. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
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RECOMMENDATION 5 Band Councils be able to appoint an electoral officer without requiring the Ministers approval. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION 6 A better nomination process where nominees have to sign a written acceptance of their nomination and pay a small fee, if the First Nation decides to make the fee a requirement. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION 7 As result of the 1999 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Corbiere, all band members at least 18 years of age are eligible to vote regardless of where they live. This decision also required that a mail-in ballot system be put in place to allow off-reserve members to vote without having to travel to the reserve. Under a proposed new system, mail-in ballots must still remain available. It is recommended however that: (a) Mail-in ballots be sent to voters only upon their written request and that those written requests must be accompanied by photocopies of reliable identification of the voters; and (b) Advance polls be held where deemed necessary. (you can consult the Corbiere decision on the Internet at: http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1999/1999scr2-203/1999scr2-203.html ) 51
______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION 8 Removal of the role of the Minister in receiving, investigating and deciding on election appeals, and consider alternative decision making bodies. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION 9 Offences and penalties surrounding vote and ballot buying and interference in the electoral process be well defined (just as they are in the Canada Elections Act). ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ RECOMMDENTION 10 That there be a recall mechanism that would allow for the removal from office of one or more elected officials where there is a related petition having the support of at least 60% of the voters of a First Nation. The petition for a recall would only be allowed to take place at the 2-year point of the 4-year mandate, and only within 30 days of the two year point.
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______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMENDATION 11 A Chief or Councillor would cease to hold office is he or she is convicted of an indictable offence and sentenced to imprisonment for more than 30 consecutive days; dies or resigns from office; is convicted of offences under the Act (related to elections); or is removed from the elected position by recall. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
GENERAL COMMENTS ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________________ ____________________________________
Send your feedback to: Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs Secretariat
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c/o Krista Brookes 153 Willowdale Drive Dartmouth, NS B2V 0A5 General Inquiry/Fax Phone (Toll Free): 1-877-667-4007/(Local): 902-435-8021 Fax: 902-435-8027 Email: electionreform@apcfnc.ca Facebook site: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=150789196002 You can also consult the websites of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs at www.manitobachiefs.com, and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada at www.ainc-inac.gc.ca. The information gathered during this national engagement effort will inform the development of the new legislation.
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ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS SECRETARIAT www.apcfnc.ca
Feuille de commentaires sur la proposition de rforme lectorale LAPC et lAssembly of Manitoba Chiefs ont fait un certain nombre de recommandations au ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada pour la cration dune nouvelle loi sur les lections au sein des Premires nations. Nous vous invitons donc nous faire part de vos commentaires, soit de faon gnrale, soit pour chacune des recommandations en question. Nom : Courriel : _______________________________ _______________________________
Avant de procder, nous vous suggrons de lire le document de discussion qui porte sur les rformes proposes. Ce document vous permettra de mieux comprendre les raisons pour lesquelles chaque recommandation a t formule. RECOMMANDATION 1 Mise en place dune nouvelle loi sur les lections, non obligatoire, que les Premires nations pourraient choisir dappliquer, au lieu du systme lectoral prvu par Loi sur les Indiens, sur adoption dune rsolution de conseil de bande et sur preuve que des consultations communautaires ont t menes sur la question.
________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________
RECOMMANDATION 2 En consquence du jugement Gull Bay, les membres des Premires nations vivant hors-rserve peuvent se prsenter pour tre lus au poste de conseiller, et le nombre de postes de conseillers pouvant tre dtenus par les personnes en question nest pas 55
limit. Nous recommandons par consquent que la nouvelle loi stipule que jusqu cinquante pour cent des postes de conseillers dun conseil de bande puissent tres rservs des membres vivant sur les rserves, si au moins 50 % du vote portant sur cet aspect approuve cette recommandation. (Vous pouvez lire le jugement Gull Bay ladresse suivante : http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.ca/fr/2007/2007cf878/2007cf878.html )
RECOMMANDATION 3 Nous recommandons que le mandat des chefs et des conseillers soit de 4 ans.
RECOMMANDATION 4 (pour les Premires nations du Manitoba seulement) Nous recommandons que les Premires nations dune rgion ou dune province donne aient la possibilit de fixer une journe dlection commune. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
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RECOMMANDATION 5 Nous recommandons que les conseils de bande puissent nommer un prsident dlection sans avoir lobligation dobtenir lapprobation du ministre. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMANDATION 6 Nous recommandons que soit mis en place un meilleur processus de mise en candidature, en vertu duquel les personnes proposes devraient signer une acceptation crite pour leur nomination et payer une lgre redevance (facultative). ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________
RECOMMANDATION 7 En consquence de la dcision prise par la Cour suprme du Canada en 1999 dans laffaire Corbiere, tous les membres dune bande ayant au moins 18 ans ont le droit de voter, quel que soit leur lieu de rsidence. En vertu de cette dcision, un systme de vote postal a d galement tre mis en place pour permettre aux membres hors-rserve de voter sans avoir se rendre sur les rserves. Nous recommandons que ce systme reste en place, mais que : (a) les bulletins de vote postal soient seulement envoys aux personnes qui en font la demande par crit, et que chaque demande soit accompagne de photocopies de pices didentit valables; (b) des bureaux de vote par anticipation soient mis en place sils sont jugs ncessaires. (Vous pouvez lire le jugement Corbiere ladresse suivante : http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/fr/1999/1999rcs2-203/1999rcs2-203.html ) 57
______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________ RECOMMANDATION 8 Nous recommandons que soit supprim le rle que joue le ministre quant lexamen, le travail denqute et les dcisions lis aux appels en matire dlections, et que soit considre la mise en place dun autre corps dcisionnel. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMANDATION 9 Nous recommandons que soient clairement dfinies des infractions et des peines pour les manuvres frauduleuses (p. ex. achat de bulletins de vote) ainsi que toute ingrence dans le processus lectoral (comme ce que prvoit la Loi lectorale du Canada). ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMANDATION 10 Nous recommandons que soit mis en place un mcanisme permettant de dmettre de leurs fonctions des lus, sur prsentation dune ptition signe par au moins 60 % des lecteurs dune Premire nation. Cette ptition pourrait tre seulement organise 2 ans 58
aprs une lection (au cours dun mandat de 4 ans), et seulement dans les 30 jours suivant ce seuil de 2 ans.
______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
RECOMMANDATION 11 Nous recommandons quun chef ou conseiller quitte ses fonctions sil est reconnu coupable dun acte criminel et condamn tre emprisonn pendant plus de 30 jours conscutifs; dcde ou dmissionne; est reconnu coupable dinfractions en vertu de la Loi (lies aux lections); ou soit dmis de ses fonctions par destitution. ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________ COMMENTAIRES ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________________________ ______________________________________________
Veuillez faire parvenir vos commentaires l'adresse suivante : Congrs des chefs des Premires nations de l'Atlantique
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a/s Krista Brookes 153, rue Willowdale Dartmouth, N.-. B2V 0A5 Demandes de renseignements/Tlcopieur Tlphone (sans frais) : 1-877-667-4007/(Local): 902-435-8021 Tlcopieur : 902-435-8027 Courriel : electionreform@apcfnc.ca Facebook site: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=150789196002 Vous pouvez galement consulter le site Web de l'Assemble des chefs du Manitoba (www.manitobachiefs.com), ainsi que le site du ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada (www.ainc-inac.gc.ca). Les informations obtenues pendant le processus seront prises en compte pour crer la nouvelle loi.
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Appendix E
REPORT ON LEADERSHIP ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS IN FIRST NATION GOVERNMENTS
Prepared for:
The Indian Act Electoral Reform Working Group
November 15, 2010
Naiomi S. Metallic Associate Lawyer Burchells LLP 1801 Hollis Street, Suite 1800 Halifax, Nova Scotia, B3J 3N4 t. 902-428-8344 f. 902-420-9326 nmetalic@burchells.ca
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Table of Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................... 3 Research & Methodology .................................................................................. 4 The Three Main Variable of Leadership Accountability Models ........................ 5 1) How the accountability process is initiated (How Initiated) ............. 5 2) The grounds on which removal / recall / termination decisions are based (Grounds) ....................................................................................... 6 Chart of Specified Grounds found in Election Laws .............. 8 3) How decisions on a leaders removal / recall / termination are reached (How Reached) ......................................................................................... 10 Chart of Different Leadership Accountability Models .................................. 11 Comparison of the Six Different Leadership Accountability Models .................. 12 1. Automatic removal based on definite, specified grounds .................. 12 2. Complaint-driven based on specified grounds decided by a designated decision-maker.................................................................................. 14 3. Petition on specified grounds put to a designated decision-maker ... 18 4. Complaint-driven on specified grounds decided by public vote......... 21 5. Petition on specified grounds put to a public vote ............................. 24 6. Petition on open grounds put to a public vote (pure recall) ............. 27 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 33 Appendix A Additional Examples of Leadership Accountability Models ......... 35
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Introduction The Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs (APCFNC), the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs (AMC), and the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) are working together (the Working Group) on coming up with a proposal for legislative reform to the election provisions in the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. In particular, the Working Group is interested in examining the proposal to extend the length of term of office of Chief and Council members from two (2) to four (4) years. In this context, the Working Group is also interested in investigating the options available for community members to have increased means of holding their leadership accountable in light of extending Chief and Councils term of office. In hearings before Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal People considering electoral reform of the Indian Act, First Nation witnesses would often refer to this as the need for a recall process. The purpose of having a recall process was plainly and clearly stated Ron Evans, Grand Chief of the AMC before the Standing Senate Committee: The recall process is put in place simply because there are communities that will have a concern as to whether they have chosen a good leader. If they have chosen a good leader, of course, that is not a problem, but if they feel that they have chosen bad leadership and they want to change it, that is when the recall process comes into play.1 Based on indications that many First Nations communities would be interested in having a recall process along with any extension of their leaderships terms of office, the Working Group commissioned further research of what constitutes a recall process and key considerations it can raise. This Report aims to summarize the results of such research. Research & Methodology The author examined British Columbias recall legislation, the Recall and Initiative Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 398 (the only legislation of its kind in Canada), the recall laws of several U.S. states, and the recall / removal / termination provisions in the elections codes and laws of First Nations in both Canada and U.S., in addition to reports and news articles on the subject. It has occurred to the author that what many of the witnesses before the Senate Standing Committee hearings meant by a recall process may not necessarily be the same things as a true recall process. A true recall is the specific political process whereby a specified percentage of voters can petition to remove a particular elected official and, if the vote is in favour of removal, then the seat is held to be vacant and a
1
Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, Monday, May 25, 2009, at p. 7:17.
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by-election is held to fill the vacancy.2 Rather, it seems those before the Senate Standing Committee more generally meant any process where there is a means for community members to hold their leaders accountable for their actions by removing, recalling or terminating leaders from their positions. There are many different ways to achieve this end, only one of which involves a true recall. For this reason, the author prefers using the terminology of leadership accountability models over recall process to describe the different types of models of holding elected officials accountable for their actions. Discussion of leadership accountability models can get very technical and detailed once one starts focusing on a particular model. Realizing that at this stage, the Working Group primarily wants to appreciate the different models that exist and the main considerations surrounding them, the author wishes to keep the discussion at the conceptual level (i.e., understanding the differences between models) rather than getting into too much detail. Once the Working Group chooses one or two models that it would like to focus on, this would be the time to get into the fine details. The author would be pleased to assist with this at a later date. Consequently, this report is structured to review six (6) different types of leadership accountability models. The differences between these models are explained by reference to three (3) key variables: 1) how the removal process is initiated; 2) whether or not there are specified grounds for removal; and 3) who decides whether a leader should be removed. Understanding the different variables and how they can interact with each other explains how the six (6) different accountability models are arrived at. Once the variables are explained, we turn to examining each of the accountability models and key considerations to keep in mind with each. The Three Main Variables of Leadership Accountability Models The three main variables of the leadership accountability models discussed in this report are: 1) How the accountability process is initiated (How Initiated) How it can vary a) It can be automatic (Automatic) This means that a leader can automatically lose his seat upon the occurrence of a certain event. For example, a leader would automatically lose his seat upon being convicted of an indictable offence.
First Report of the Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct, Standing Orders and Private Bills, Legislative Assembly of British Columbia, Second Session, Thirty-fifth Parliament, November 23, 1993 (First Report of BC Parliamentary Reform Committee), p. 1 of 7.
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b) It can be complaints-driven (Complaints-Driven) This means that the process would be initiated by a person, such as a community member or a Band Council member, lodging a complaint with some designated body, such as the Band Council or a Complaints Officer or Elders Council, for example. The designated body, depending on the other variables at play, oversees the processing of the complaint, and may even decide the outcome of the complaint (i.e., whether to remove the leader).
c) It can be by petition (Petition) An election law can set out that a petition be signed by a certain percentage of electors to initiate the removal process. The higher the percentage of voters that is needed, the more difficult it will be to get the process started. The petition will have to be submitted to some specified body, such as the Band Council or a Complaints Officer or Elders Council, for example, who, depending on the other variables at play, will ensure that petition is valid (i.e., has requisite amount of signatures, no duplicates or fraudulent signatures, meets the specified grounds for removal (if any)), and may even decide the outcome of the complaint, (i.e., whether to remove the leader). The petition process requires the person initiating the recall, and their supporters, going door to door canvassing for the signatures of voters. In the First Nations context, and in light of cases like Corbire and Gull Bay, there is the issue of how off-reserve voters would be canvassed. Would off-reserve voters have to be canvassed? What if the majority of petitioners were offreserve voters? Could they be canvassed by mail? With a leadership accountability model initiated by petition, law makers may want to have detailed rules in place about how the canvassing of signatures is to be undertaken. There is a possibility, especially in a small community where many people know each other, that there could be potential disagreement, conflict, or potentially people feeling pressured to sign. Could a person revoke their signature later?
2) The grounds on which removal / recall / termination decisions are based (Grounds) How it can vary 65
a) Leaders can be removed for any grounds (Open Grounds) This means that a complaint against a leader can be for any reason. This not only includes things like incompetence, negligence in their duties, missing band meetings, or fraud, but also complaints based the leaders political decision-making (i.e., I dont like that the leader supported this project, or signed that agreement, or The leader focuses too much on elders, not enough on youth, etc.). One concern with having open grounds for removal is that it can be used to use to hide personal or vindictive reasons for wanting to remove the leader (i.e., I dont like the leader, or The leader got more votes than me in the last election, etc.). (It is also possible to use some specified grounds for such hidden purposes, of course, but it is harder since some proof is needed to substantiate the specified ground alleged.)
b) Leaders can be removed on specified grounds (Specified Grounds) These are grounds that are specifically described in the law. They serve to limit the grounds upon which a leader can be removed. Usually, they are limited to bad behaviour: acts of wrongdoing, incompetence, negligence, etc. Specified grounds can be definite, meaning no judgment call is needed to decide if the ground is met. For example, the ground of being convicted of an indictable offence is definite you dont need someone to interpret whether the leader has been convicted or not either they have or they havent. Other grounds are indefinite meaning open to interpretation. An example of this would be a ground of removal for neglect of duty a decision-maker would have to decide whether a certain fact scenario could be interpreted as the leader neglecting their official duties.
The chart on the following page sets out examples of grounds found in the election codes and laws examined by the author. The source of each ground is indicated in the notes below the chart. Some grounds are similar to each other, but are included to give the Working Group a taste for variations that can exist.
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Chart of Specified Grounds found in Election Laws

Is negligent in failing to ensure the safety and protection of the communitys members and property [1] Gross neglect of duty or gross misconduct, which can include failing to reveal a conflict of interest, or violating Tribal Councils Code of Ethics, if it has one [2] Incompetence [5] Malfeasance or misconduct while in office [8] Failure to perform duties prescribed by law [11] They engaged in drunk, disorderly, and irresponsible conduct at a council meeting, community meeting, or in another public forum or function which interferes with the conduct of business or brings the reputation of the Council or the First Nation into disrepute [14] Willful misuse, conversion, or misappropriation, without authority, of public property or funds entrusted or associated with the elective office [3]
Corruption [4] Physical or mental lack of fitness [7] Misconduct in office [10] Is convicted of an offence that may affect their ability to give effective leadership or bring disrepute to their person or the office including, but not limited to, fraud, violent crimes including murder, manslaughter and assault of any kind, any sexual offence, any offences tending to corrupt morals, disorderly conduct, and offences involving drugs and alcohol [13] Failure to attend three consecutive band meetings without reasonable excuse [16] / without authorization of Council [17]
Neglect of duties [6] Serious malfeasance or nonfeasance in performance of duties of the office [9] Violation of oath of office [12] Is convicted of a listed indictable offence set out in Appendix D (includes weapons offences, sexual offences, all manner of assault and murder offences, common nuisance, robbery, extortion, theft, arson, fraud, drug offences, etc.) [15]
Fails to maintain a standard of conduct expected of a council member [20] Conviction of a serious crime during the term of office [23] Is in arrears on payment of a debt to the First Nation [26] Acts in a manner which is detrimental to the office of Chief or Councillor or which is detrimental to the First Nation, where Council has established policies for the conduct of the Chief and Councillors [29] Found to be mentally incompetent [32] / incapacitated [33] by a duly licensed medical practitioner Unable to perform the functions of office for more than 6 months of leave [36]
3
Failure to attend three (3) regular or special meetings consecutively absent good cause, such as sickness, vacation, death in the immediate family, failure to receive adequate notice of the meeting [18] Accepts or offers a bribe, forges a council document or otherwise acts dishonestly in his role [21] Has been convicted of an indictable offence [24] No longer ordinarily resident of 3 the community [27] Is convicted of an offence prosecuted by way of indictment that carries the possibility of imprisonment for 2 years or more [30]
Council member was absent from 5 consecutive council meetings without valid reason [19]
Declares bankruptcy or is declared bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act (Canada) [34] Has misused any Band funds or resources or has breached his fiduciary responsibilities [37]
Abuses his office such that the conduct negatively affects the dignity and integrity of the community or of the council [22] Charged with or convicted of an indictable offence under the Criminal Code of Canada [25] Contravenes First Nations conflict of interest rules [28] Be convicted of an indictable offence, except those of a political nature relating to the exercise or defense of aboriginal rights or title, or be convicted of any sexual or assault offence while in office [31] Contravenes band policies on acceptance of gifts, use of influence, or use of confidential information [35] Has engaged in Corrupt Election practices, the evidence of which were discovered and proven after
This may raise issues with respect to s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms along the lines of cases like Corbire and Gull Bay.
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the Appeal period [38]
Sources of grounds indicated in Chart

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code. Constitution of the Yavapai-Apache Nation, Arizona. Georgia, Ga. Code 21-4-3(7), 21-4-4(c). Alaska, AS 15. 45. 510. Alaska, AS 15. 45. 510, Kansas, KS Stat. 25-4301, Montana, Mont. Code 2-16-603. Alaska, AS 15. 45. 510. Montana, Mont. Code 2-16-603. Georgia, Ga. Code 21-4-3(7), 21-4-4(c). Minnesota, Const. Art. VIII 6. Kansas, KS Stat. 25-4301. Georgia, Ga. Code 21-4-3(7), 21-4-4(c), Kansas, KS Stat. 25-4301. Georgia, Ga. Code 21-4-3(7), 21-4-4(c), Montana, Mont. Code 2-16-603, Washington, Const. Art. I 33; Gitxaala Nation Custom Election Code, December 15, 2009. Sturgeon Lake First Nation Election Act, 2009. Interestingly, the Act provides that a person charged with such crimes is immediately suspended without pay until the issue is determined by the courts. If not found guilty, he or she is reinstated with retroactive pay. If guilty, position is automatically vacant. Smiths Landing First Nation, Alberta, Election Code, May, 2004; Salt River First Nation 195 Election Code. Squiala First Nation Governance Manual, April 2008. INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code, Cold Lake First Nation Election Law, May 27, 1986; Namgis First Nation Election Regulations, April 2008. NQuatqua First Nation Community Election Code; Gitxaala Nation Custom Election Code, December 15, 2009; Long Plain First Nations Election Act, 2009. Constitution of the Yavapai-Apache Nation, Arizona. Smiths Landing First Nation, Alberta, Election Code, May, 2004. INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code. INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code. INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code. Minnesota, Const. Art. VIII 6. INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code, Lennox Island Band, June 25, 2001, amended Custom Election Rules; NQuatqua First Nation Community Election Code; Salt River First Nation 195 Election Code. Smiths Landing First Nation, Alberta, Election Code, May, 2004. Tsawwasen First Nation 2009 Election Act. Smiths Landing First Nation, Alberta, Election Code, May, 2004; NQuatqua First Nation Community Election Code. Squiala First Nation Governance Manual, April 2008; Smiths Landing First Nation, Alberta, Election Code, May, 2004. Dene Tha First Nation (Alberta) Election Regulations. Tsawwasen First Nation 2009 Election Act. Lower Nicola Indian Band, Custom Election Rules. Squiala First Nation Governance Manual, April 2008. Tsawwasen First Nation 2009 Election Act. Tsawwasen First Nation 2009 Election Act. Squiala First Nation Governance Manual, April 2008. Westbank First Nation Constitution, July 19, 2007. Lower Nicola Indian Band, Custom Election Rules. Salt River First Nation 195 Election Code.
14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.
25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38.
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3) How decisions on a leaders removal / recall / termination (How Decided) How it can vary
are reached
a) Decisions for removal are reached by a designated decision-maker (Designated Decision-Maker) This means that a designated decision-maker, such as the Band Council or a Complaints Officer or Elders Council, for example, makes the final decision on whether or not to remove the leader. This is done through holding a hearing, where both the person complaining against the leader and the leader are given sufficient notice of, and allowed to make representations at, the hearing. The designated decision-maker then reaches a decision, preferable setting it out in writing, explaining how they reached their decision. Election laws can provide that this decision can be appealed to a higher body, or that the decision of the decision-maker on the removal is final and binding. This does not, however, prevent a party from trying to challenge the decision in court.
b) Decision for removal are put to a public vote (Public Vote) This means that the election laws set out that a public vote will occur, where some percentage of the electors must vote in favour of removal of the leader (i.e., 50% + 1, 40%, 70%, etc.). If the removal vote is successful, it is normally followed by a by-election to replace the removed leader. While this type of removal decision is quite different from the type of removal involving a decision-maker holding a hearing, the courts have stated that there must be procedural protections carefully built into the removal vote, such as making sure notice of the upcoming vote is published widely and that the leader has a sufficient opportunity to present his response to the allegations for removal before the vote occurs. With both the removal vote and the by-election, in light of cases like Corbire and Gull Bay, there may be a requirement for there to be some process to include the off-reserve members in the votes.
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CHART OF DIFFERENT LEADERSHIP ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS By examining the permutations of each of the variables and how they connect to each other, we get a picture of the main options of leadership accountability models available for considerations. HOW INITIATED:
Automatic
Complaint-Driven
Petition
GROUNDS:
#1
Specified Grounds Definite Indefinite
Open Grounds
HOW DECIDED:
#2 #3 #4
#5
#6
Designated Decision-Maker
Public Vote
This Charts shows six different leadership accountability models. #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 Automatic removal based on definite, specified grounds Complaint-driven based on specified grounds decided by a designated decision-maker Petition on specified grounds put to a designated decision-maker Complaint-driven on specified grounds decided by public vote Petition on specified grounds put to a public vote Petition on open grounds put to a public vote (a pure recall)
Note: Other variations on the variables are possible (e.g., complaint-driven based on open grounds put to a public vote, etc.), however, these are more remote and would unlikely be chosen by the Working Group as a model to give further focus to. Therefore, they are not examined in this Report.
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COMPARISION MODELS
OF
THE
SIX
DIFFERENT
LEADERSHIP
ACCOUNTABILITY
Note: It is possible to combine two or more of the models within one election law. Many election laws contain provisions for automatic removal for definite specified grounds paired with some other form of leadership accountability model. One interesting hybrid is the Sturgeon Lake First Nation Election Act, 2009, which combines both models #1, #2 and #4, and is summarized further below (under model #4). Other examples of interesting hybrids can be found in Appendix A, and they include INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code (combining models #2 and #3), and the Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing Custom Code (combining #1, #4 and #6).
1. Automatic removal based on definite, specified grounds Five (5) out of the twenty-six (26) codes surveyed, or 19%, followed this model. Example: Lennox Island Band, June 25, 2001, Amended Custom Election Rules Section 29.7 provides that the office of Chief or Councillor becomes vacant when the person who holds office: 1) is convicted of an indictable offence under the Criminal Code of Canada; 2) dies or resigns; or 3) becomes ineligible office by virtue of any provision of these Custom Election Rules (ineligibility rules are related to residency requirements). Other codes following a similar model are summarized in Appendix A. They include the Tsawwasen First Nation 2009 Election Act, the Namgis First Nation Election Regulations, April 2008, NQuatqua First Nation Community Election Code, and the Draft Election Code of the Kwakiult Band, 4th draft May 2006. Key considerations pertaining to this model: There is no requirement for interpretation of whether the grounds for removal alleged have been met as there would be for a ground like neglect of duties, for example. All that needs to be proved is that the ground occurred (i.e., the person was convicted of an indictable offence). Since there is no interpretive requirement, there is no big role for a designated decision-maker to play and no requirement for a hearing or due process, etc. All that would be required is for a designated-body, such a the whole Council, passing a resolution that they have proof that one of the grounds for automatic removal has been triggered and the official is thereby removed. 71
The fact that the grounds are definite, and capable of clear proof, greatly reduces the chances that the official will seek judicial review of their removal. If the grounds are definite, and the proof is clear, there is very little basis for a court to interfere. There are obvious cost-savings with this model; you dont have to set up an independent body to make the decision (aside from the existing Council making a motion, having a discussion at a Council meeting, and then passing a resolution). This model provides the lowest level of accountability of the models examined in this Report. This is because there are only a limited number of definite grounds of removal: convicted of an indictable offence under the Criminal Code of Canada; dies or resigns; is no longer resident in the community; is in arrears on payment of a debt to the First Nation; declares bankruptcy or is declared bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act; is found to be mentally incompetent. Other grounds that community members might want to remove their leaders for, such as neglect of their duties, incompetence, or misconduct in office, for example, require some interpretation, and consequently a body to interpret them.
2. Complaint-driven based on specified grounds decided by a designated decision-maker Eight (8) out of the twenty-six (26) codes surveyed, or 30% followed this model. Examples: Dene Tha First Nation Election Regulations Section 9 TERMINATION PROVISION 1. PROVISIONS FOR RECALL - A Chief or Councillor may be disqualified from holding office, if while in office: (A) As a result of an appeal or other investigation, he/she is shown to be guilty of a corrupt election practice; (B) He/she acts in a manner which is detrimental to the office of Chief or Councillor or which is detrimental to the Dene Tha' First Nation, where Council has established policies for the conduct of the Chief and Councillors. 72
2. DEALING WITH VIOLATION - If a violation of Section 9 Clause 1 occurs, a motion must be presented at a duly convened Council Meeting, calling for the termination of the person in violation. Thereafter, a First Nation Council Resolution outlining the infraction and calling for the disqualification, must be signed by a quorum of the Council. In any case the Chief or Councillor will be disqualified until after the next general election. 3. CODES OF CONDUCT - Other items establishing specific codes of conduct for elected representatives of the Dene Tha' First Nation may be established from time to time by the First Nation Council by official resolution or by-law. Of the eight (8) codes that follow this model, five (5) provide that Chief and Council is the designated decision-maker who makes the final call on removal. Other codes that designate Chief and Council as the decision-maker are set out in Appendix A and include the Gitxaala Nation Custom Election Code (BC), December 15, 2009, the Lower Nicola Indian Band, Custom Election, and the Salt River First Nation 195 Election Code. Three (3) codes provide that some other body, such as an Appeal Committee or Council of Elders, is the designated decision maker who makes the final call on removal. For example: Long Plain First Nations Election Act, 2009 The Election Appeal Committee is the body given authority to remove members of Council on specified grounds. Per section 8.1, the Election Appeal Committee is made up of three non-Tribal members. Per article 18, vacancy occurs on the following grounds: o Dies while he/she is in office. o Resigns during his/her term of office. o Has been absent from any three (3) duly convened meetings of the Tribal Government without the consent of the quorum of the Ogema and Oginjiganag. o Has been found guilty of corrupt practice in connection with the election pursuant to a decision of the Election Appeal Committee. A corrupt practice shall include, but not be limited to, tampering with the election process, bribery, or coercion related to the election, campaigning while the polls are open, and anything else the Election Appeal Committee deems to be a corrupt practice. o Is convicted of an indictable conviction offence under the Criminal Code of Canada or under the United States felony offences. o Has been found guilty of conflict of interest as defined herein pursuant to a decision of the Election Appeal Committee. o Has been found guilty of contravening the Declaration of Office for Elected Officials pursuant to a decision of the Election Appeal Committee. o Is or becomes ineligible to hold office by virtue of this Election Act. 73
The Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation Custom Election Code also appoints an Appeal Committee to make the final decision on removal. The Peepeekisis First Nation Election Code designates a Council of Elders to make final decisions on removal. These codes are summarized in Appendix A. The Squiala First Nation Governance Manual, April 2008, summarized at Appendix A, specifies that it is both council members and community members who can make complaints to the Council to start the removal process (the other codes do no specify). Key considerations pertaining to this model: Allows for removal on more grounds than model # 1. But since the grounds are specified and targeted at bad behaviour, you avoid situations where people are removed for political reasons as can occur in a pure recall like model #6 (i.e., I dont like that the leader supported this project, or signed that agreement, or The leader focuses too much on elders, not enough on youth, etc.). If Council is the designated decision-maker, there are cost-savings for not having to create another body to make the final decision on removal. However, Council controlling the process can give rise to perceptions of bias by: 1) the person subject to the removal process (i.e., the rest of the council is against me and trying to get rid of me); or 2) members of the community (i.e., even though we complain about X being corrupt, the Council wont get rid of X, because they are all corrupt). However, the second concern can be alleviated if you have a system like in the Squiala First Nation Governance Manual, April 2008 that specifically allows community members to put their complaints before a Council meeting. If some independent body, such as an Elders Council or an Appeal Committee, is the designated decision-maker, this helps the process appear more independent (though it is more costly to set up such a body than leaving decision-making to Council). With an independent body, there can sometimes be issues of fit, meaning perceptions by the community of the independent bodys members knowledge or appreciation of community issues. Some communities may want decision-makers to be familiar with the dynamics in the community to make the final recall decision; others may want a decision-maker not to be from the community. A complaints driven model may still not be viewed as allowing sufficient community participation as a model initiated by petition would. 74
A person subject to removal might think that a complaints-driven model allows just one persons complaint to be the basis of their removal, whereas a petition system ensures there is a certain number of people who feel similarly to the complainant. However, the more public participation you incorporate through petitions and voting, which both require bodies being designated to oversee these processes, the more costly it can get. A complaint-driven model also avoids the question of how off-reserve members are to participate in petition process, discussed earlier. Unlike with model # 1, there is more likelihood that the removed leader might challenge the decision through the courts. Challenges will tend to be based on whether 1) the reason for removal fell within the grounds listed in the Code; and 2) if the removed leader was afforded procedural fairness (notice and a hearing). Detailed process requirement set out clearly in the law, and meticulous followed, help to avoid this.4
Case Examples: In Dene Tha' First Nation v. Didzena, 2005 FC 1292 (CanLII), the Band Council maintained that it had removed the chief at a special meeting where a BCR was signed terminating the chief. The Federal Court held that the procedures followed were not in keeping with that set out in the Election Regulations, which required that there first be a motion presented calling for the termination of the Chief. This was not a technical requirement, but a condition precedent that had to fulfilled. The motion was considered important to the process because it let the community members attending the public meeting be informed of what was happening. In Martselos v. Salt River Nation 195, 2008 FCA 221, the Chief was elected by a majority of 11 votes at a by-election. Within a week of her election, four of the five elected members of the Council adopted a BCR removing her from office, alleging that she did a number of things in her first week as chief, including refusing to meet with the Council, firing or demoting some band office staff, changing the locks of the band office, etc., that showed she was conducting herself in an autocratic manner without regard for the lawful authority of the Council. The Chief brought judicial review proceedings challenging her removal. The trial judge had held that because she had only been there a week, it could not be said that she failed to ensure a stable, competent and efficient administration of the First Nation. The Court of Appeal avoided deciding whether the communitys Election Code gave the First Nation grounds to remove the Chief, but instead held that the BCR did not
4
Cardinal v. Sucker Creek Indian Band No. 150A, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1057; Prince v. Sucker Creek First Nation No. 150A, 2008 FC 1268; Basil v. Lower Nicola Indian Band, 2009 FC 741
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sufficiently set out how the Council members arrived at their decision, what facts as opposed to allegations they relied on, and therefore it was not a reasonable exercise of their discretion. As noted by the Court: [48] I simply reiterate that the Council must exercise its authority respecting the rule of law, keeping in mind the primacy of the Bands interests. With respect, a more elaborate election code construed and applied in a fair and transparent manner would go a long way in achieving this noble goal and in avoiding, one would hope, situations like the present, which are counter-productive and extremely disturbing for all concerned. 3. Petition on specified grounds put to a designated decision-maker Four (4) out of the twenty-six (26) codes surveyed, or 15% followed this model. Example: Westbank First Nation Constitution, July 19, 2007 There are grounds that automatically render seat vacant (section 43): o Dies o Resigns o Convicted of an indictable offence in Canada or a felony in the US since their election and all appeals are completed, provided that the conviction does not relate to the assertion or exercise of Aboriginal rights or title o Unable to perform the functions of office for more than 6 months o Has missed three consecutive council or membership meetings within a 12 month period without just cause (just cause to be determined by the rest of council, voting a majority) o A criminal record check reveals that the person was convicted of an indictable offence in Canada or a felony in the US in the last 10 years prior to their nomination. And there is a way for community members to petition for the removal of a candidate on the grounds that (Section 42): o He or she has violated the Constitution; or o Breached their oath of office The decision of whether this has in fact occurred is made by an independent Arbitrator, appointed to consider such matters. The process is as follows (Section 44): o A petition signed by 20% or more of the Electors is filed with the Arbitrator. o The petition identifies the Council member to be removed, sets out the facts substantiating the grounds for removal, and is accompanied with a non-refundable filing fee of $75. o The petitioner is also required to provide the $2,000 as security for costs, held in trust until the determination of the matter. 76
o Arbitrator, after receiving valid petition, fixes date, time and place of hearing, and how evidence will be taken. o After the hearing, the Arbitrator must give a written decision either confirming the Council member in their office or removing the member from the office and declaring the office vacant. The decision is published in Westbank newsletter and posted in public area in community. o The Arbitrator an make an order for costs. o Decision of Arbitrator is final and not subject to appeal. o If person is removed, a by-election has to be held within 90 days. Other codes following a similar model are summarized in Appendix A. They include the Sucker Creek First Nation Customary Election Regulation, the Muskeg Lake First Nation Election Acts, and INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code. (INACs sample Code is actually a hybrid of models #2 and #3, decided by an independent designated decision maker, the Complaints.) Key considerations pertaining to this model: Allowing for the removal process to be initiated by petition allows more community participation / control over the process than models #1 and #2. Unlike model #2, this model avoids situations where complaints can stems from only one individual or a small minority. By requiring that a designated number of people sign the petition, you ensure that there is some community consensus on the desire to have the leader removed. The threshold to set the percentage at is up to the law maker. The higher percentage, the more difficult it will be to get the requisite number of signatures.
There is a large variance in those codes that allow the removal process to be initiated by petition: the Constitution of the Yavapai-Apache Nation, Arizona 35% of voters; the Constitution of the Native Tribe of Huslia, Alaska 60% of voters; INAC Sample Leadership Selection Code 25% of voters; Smiths Landing First Nation, May 2004 50% of voters; Sucker Creek First Nation Customary Election Regulation 50% + 1 of voters; Westbank First Nation Constitution, July 19, 2007 20% of voters; Grand Rapid First Nations Election Code 51% of voters; and British Columbias Recall and Initiative Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 398 40% of voters.
However, as discussed earlier, the petition process raises issues for off-reserve voters. By having specified grounds targeted at bad behaviour, you avoid situation where people are removed for political reasons as you can get in a pure recall (model # 6). There is still less community participation with this model than you would have with models #4 #5 and #6, which are put to a public vote. The final decision is made by a designated-decision maker. However, having a designated decision-maker is potentially more economical than having a community vote. There might be some 77
cost associated with the petition (photocopies and paying to provide oversight functions verify signification, ensure no duplication or fraud), but not much. This model is also potentially less disruptive than one that ends up in a public vote. A vote can be potentially divisive in a small community. As much as some community members may want to be the ones who make the final call, others may be just as relieved if theres an appointed decision-maker making the call. It cuts both ways. As discussed with model #2, there are conflict / impartiality issues present with having Council being the final decision-maker. Having an independent body make the decision may be preferable to Council. However, it would take some financial resources to establish and independent body (and there are community-fit issues), but may costs less than having to organize and hold a public vote (as with models #4, #5, and #6).
Case Examples: In Cardinal v. Sucker Creek Indian Band No. 150A, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1057, the Chief, Alvin Cardinal, who had been elected one year earlier, was the subject of a removal petition signed by 119 members of the First Nation. Following this, the Band Council held a series of meetings to consider the petition, however, never invited Cardinal to come and make submissions on it. He was removed from office and then brought judicial review proceedings. The Federal Court held that the removal process did not conform to the provisions of the Custom Election Regulations on the following grounds: 1) The petition did not contain at least 50% plus 1 signatures of the electors. 2) The petition was initiated by someone who was not an elector under the definition in the Regulations. 3) The reasons for removal were not based on a listed ground for removal (i.e., drunken or disorderly conduct), but rather for decisions that some people were not happy about walking out a band meeting, hiring someone who was not a band member to be equipment foreman. 4) There was no evidence of any conduct by Cardinal falling within the allowable grounds. 5) Cardinal had not received proper notice of the meetings considering his removal, and was not given an opportunity to respond to allegations at the meeting. In Prince v. Sucker Creek First Nation No. 150A, 2008 FC 1268, four members of the council passed a resolution to remove two other councilors on the basis of a conflict of interest they had with a contract of the Band. The Councillors did not follow the provisions for removal set out in the Election Regulations, and for this reason, the removal was held not be valid. At para. 49, the Court held: In this case, the Election Regulations require that there be a petition of 50% plus one of the electorate before the applications can be removed by Council. The electorate elected the applicants and the Election Regulations give the electorate 78
the power to initiate their removal. The Elections Regulations are crystal clear, and reflect logical and democratic principles. Otherwise, Councilors who fight amongst themselves could bring resolutions to remove each other by forming alliances of four councilors. That would undermine the will of the electors and makes no sense. 4. Complaint-driven on specified grounds decided by public vote Three (3) out of the twenty-six (26) codes surveyed, or 12% followed this model. Example(s): Sturgeon Lake First Nation Election Act, 2009 Section 15 provides that the office of Chief and Councillor shall immediately become vacant when the person holding that office: a) Is convicted of an offence that may affect their ability to give effective leadership or bring disrepute to their person or the office including, but not limited to, fraud, violent crimes including murder, manslaughter and assault of any kind, any sexual offence, any offences tending to corrupt morals, disorderly conduct, and offences involving drugs and alcohol; Many of these grounds are b) Dies or resigns; definite (model c) Is found guilty by the Appeal Tribunal, in connection with an election, or a #1), but others corrupt practice, giving or accepting a bribe, dishonesty or malfeasance; require d) Has been absent from meetings of the Council for 3 consecutive meetings interpretation, without being authorized to do so; such as c, and g. e) Declares personal bankruptcy; f) Is determined to be incompetent by a duly licensed medical practitioner for This ground the Province of Saskatchewan; introduces a g) Fails to uphold the Oath of Office, Band By-Laws or other duly enacted complaint-driven Band legislation including this Act or the Executive Act; system on h) Is removed form office following a vote of no confidence pursuant to the specified grounds Sturgeon Lake First Nation Executive Act, 2009, or to be decided by public vote (model i) Is determined ineligible to hold office by virtue of this Act or any #4) amendments thereto. Vote of non-confidence under the Sturgeon Lake First Nation Executive Act, 2009 can be summarized as follows: o Made on the ground of a serious breach of the duties and responsibilities set out in the Executive Act. o A person makes a formal written complaint supported by an Affidavit setting out the grounds to the Elder Executive Advisory Council. (Person is called the Petitioner but process doesnt actually require a petition supported by a certain percentage of voters.) o Petitioner gives security in the amount of $100 to make the complaint. 79
o Elder Executive Advisory Council gives notice to the official who is the subject of the complaint and call a meeting of the Appeal Tribunal, the official and the petitioner for the purpose of having a hearing. o After hearing, if majority of Elder Executive Advisory Council and Appeal Tribunal find the grounds in the petition are substantiated, a Band meeting is called to vote on whether the official should be removed. o The officials seat becomes vacant when fifty percent plus one (50% + 1) of the persons present at the Band Meeting vote in favour of the motion of No Confidence. Other codes following a similar model are summarized in Appendix A. They include the Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing Election Code and the Cold Lake First Nation Election Law. Key considerations pertaining to this model: Similar concerns as model # 2 about complaint-driven nature that removal process gets triggered just by one person having a beef with you. However, because the removal is ultimately decided by public vote, this ensures that there is some consensus by the public on your removal. Following Corbire, likely have to include off-reserve members in the vote. Because this model is based on specified grounds, even though it is going to public vote, there will have to be some body, either Chief and Council, Electoral Officer, lawyer, Ombudsman, etc., who decides that the complaints fall within the grounds set out in the election law. As will be the case with models #5 and #6 as well, having the final removal decision be by public vote is probably more expensive than having the final decision be made by a designated decision-maker. Although there is no petition process to be overseen, some body will have to be designated to oversee the vote, for example, an electoral officer. As well, in most communities, the public vote is just for the purposes of removing the leader. If the leader is successfully removed, then there would be a by-election held to fill the vacancy (some communities provide that if it is six months before the next election, no by-election will be held unless it is impossible for there to be quorum on Council). With this model you face the prospect of having two elections. In British Columbia, the recall process is designed so that the petition signed by 40% of voters in the riding is sufficient to unseat the leader, and the only vote that takes place is a by-election, where the leader is free to run again. (This model has been criticized 80
and this will be discussed further under models #5 and #6.) In model #4, this could not occur since the process was not initiated by petition, but by complaint. Even though removal is done not by hearing, but instead by vote, it doesnt mean there isnt some procedural fairness requirements. There has to be sufficient notice period and time for person subject to removal vote to make their case.
Case Example: In Catholique v. Lutsel KE First Nation Band Council, 2005 FC 1430, concerns about Chief Catholiques governance arose in 2004. At a meeting on January 28, 2005, a meeting of band members, at a special assembly adopted a resolution to remove him from office. Notice of meeting had only been given earlier that day, though Catholique was presented and participated actively in a lively discussion about the concerns with his leadership. At the end, 37 members voted in favour of his removal; 5 abstained. Following this, due to concerns about what the applicable law was, Band Council held a meeting to confirm the resolution of the special assembly. Catholique was not present at the meeting. Due to further concern about the appropriate procedure, another community meeting was held on February 7, 2005. Notice was given for this special assembly through posters put up in the community and announcements on territorial radio. At this assembly, following a lengthy debate in which the Chief challenged the allegations against him, the membership present voted 67 to 23 to remove him, with 2 spoiled ballots. Catholique brought judicial review proceedings. The Court held that Catholique was entitled to procedural fairness in terms of receiving sufficient notice and being given an adequate opportunity to be heard. The Court concluded that the first two meetings did not accord him procedural fairness, however, the third did give him sufficient notice and time to make his case. Therefore, the resolution at the February 7, 2005, would stand.
5. Petition on specified grounds put to a public vote Two (2) out of the twenty-six (26) codes surveyed, or 8% followed this model. Example: Smiths Landing First Nation, May 2004 Section 19 - Council must convene a special meeting of the community where: 1) It has received a petition signed by 50% of electors (who were eligible to vote in the last election), on one of the following grounds: a. Council member was absent from 5 consecutive council meetings without valid reason; 81
b. They engaged in drunk, disorderly, and irresponsible conduct at a council meeting, community meeting, or in another public forum or function which interferes with the conduct of business or brings the reputation of the Council or the First Nation into disrepute; c. Charged with or convicted of an indictable offence under the Criminal Code of Canada; d. Breached the First Nations conflict of interest guidelines e. Engaged in corrupt election practices that were only discovered after the election appeal period; f. Fails to reside in Fort Smith; g. Misused or misappropriated First Nation funds or converted First Nation property to their own use; h. Suspended 3 times by Council during their terms of office; or (Council can suspend a member for failure to perform their duties or obligations under these regulations or for engaging the conduct listed above, for up to 30 days without pay Section 18) i. Failed to resume their duties after 60 days of allowable leave of absence. 2) Council, after receiving petition, gets a legal opinion from its lawyer that grounds raised in petition properly falls within those listed in these regulations. If the petition is good, and legal opinion says within the grounds, then Council has 21 days to convene a special community meeting to consider the removal. At the meeting, the vote of 70% of the voters present is needed in order to remove the Council member. This must be done by resolution of those voters present, and the written resolution must state the grounds. Without a public meeting, Council is allowed to pass a resolution removing a Council member where that person has been suspended 3 times, or was convicted of an indictable offence. Within 1 month of the removal (unless it is 3 months before the next general election), there is to be a by-election.
The Grand Rapids First Nation Election Policy follows a similar model and is summarized in Appendix A. Key considerations pertaining to this model: Initiated by petition from this you get more community participation / control over the process, avoid potential concerns arising from complaint-driven models (#2 and #4) discussed earlier. Petition raises issues for off-reserve voters, discussed earlier. Because this model is based on specified grounds, even though it is going to public vote, there will have to be some body, either Chief and Council, Electoral Officer, 82
lawyer, Ombudsman, etc., who decides whether the complaints set out in the petition fall within the grounds set out in the law. You will also need somebody to oversee the vote, for example, such as an electoral officer. Per Corbire, would have to include off-reserve members in the vote. The fact that the removal is still based on specified grounds is the real distinguishing features between this model (#5) the pure recall (model #6). Having specified grounds for removal minimizes the opportunities for abuse that many people have concerns with when it comes to pure recalls. This is discussed more in the next section on model #6. As noted under model #4, having the final removal decision be by public vote is probably more expensive than having the final decision be made by a designated decision-maker. In model #4 it was mentioned that there would have to be 2 votes: one to decide recall, then followed by a by-election. It was mentioned that where there is first a petition process (as here), it is possible, like in British Columbia, for the petition to operate, if successful, to unseat the official (without a public vote), and then in a byelection, the leader can run again. There are some problems: o Where you are removing a leader for specific reasons related to badconduct, you want the removal vote to actually remove them not to give them the opportunity to run again. In British Columbia, where leaders can be recalled for purely political reasons, this may be less of a concern.5 o Taking a leaders seat away, just on the basis of a petition, before a vote, raises potential procedural fairness issues. For example, in the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the Recall Process in British Columbia, November 2003, it was concluded that using a recall petition as a complete electoral process to remove a Member of the Legislative Assembly is clearly inappropriate. Recall is a mechanism for voters to un-elect a duly elected leaders. But any petition process lacks the formality, rigor and safeguards necessary for such a consequence. The outcome of a recall petition should be a recall vote, by way of a special election or recall referendum vote.6
Many codes that remove candidate provide that cant re-run for a specified period of time. See, for example, Squiala First Nation Governance Manual cant run in next election; Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation cant run for 8 years; Long Plain First Nations Election Act cant run for 10 years; Grand Rapid First Nations cant run for 4 years. 6 Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the Recall Process in British Columbia, November 2003, at p. 2.
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However, the disadvantages of a separate vote are increased administration costs and a potentially lower voter turnout.7 Even though removal is not by hearing, but instead by vote; it doesnt mean there isnt some procedural fairness requirements. Has to be sufficient notice period and time for person subject to removal vote to make their case.
Case Example: In Ballantyne v. Nasikapow, [2000] F.C.J. No. 1896, where a chief was removed the Grand Rapid First Nations Election Policy (under model #5), which involved a petition for specified grounds followed by a public vote, it was held that the petition was defective, having duplicate and forged signatures, and the electoral officer had a duty to oversee the process better. Also, the Election Policy did not put a time limit on the petition period, which ended up taken seven months. Once the petition was submitted, the electoral officer called a referendum to vote on the Chiefs removal within one week. The Federal Court held that the campaign period of one week did not give the Chief enough time to meet the case against him. 6. Petition on open grounds put to a public vote (a pure recall) Four (4) out of the twenty-six (26) codes surveyed, or 15% followed this model, two of which are from American Indian Tribes. Example: Constitution of the Yavapai-Apache Nation, Arizona The Constitution of the Yavapai-Apache Nation, Arizona, includes both a complaintdrive model on specified grounds decided by a designated decision-maker (the Tribal Council), as well as a petition model on open grounds decided by public vote. The different approaches are summarized below: a) Complaint-driven based on specified grounds decided by a designated decision-maker (based on model #2) o The Tribal Council may suspend or remove a council member for the following reasons: Failure to attend three (3) regular or special meetings consecutively absent good cause, such as sickness, vacation, death in the immediate family, failure to receive adequate notice of the meeting. Final conviction by any Tribal, Federal or State Court of any of the following offences:
7
Ibid., at page 27.
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A felony Any sex related crime Drunk and disorderly conduct or its equivalent, Three (3) misdemeanors while serving on the Tribal Council, Contempt of Court Gross neglect of duty or gross misconduct, which can include failing to reveal a conflict of interest, or violating Tribal Councils Code of Ethics, if it has one.
b) Petition on open grounds put to a public vote (based on model #6) o Any member of tribe can initiate a recall process by filing with the Election Board a written statement of 100 words or less specific reasons why the Tribal Council member should be recalled. o Election Board oversees the entire process; Tribal Council has no jurisdiction over recall proceedings. o After receiving recall process properly engaged, Election Board issues petition forms to the petitioner. o Petitioner has 60 days to collect signatures from 35% of eligible voters. o At the end of 60 days, Election Board verifies the signatures within 10 days of receiving recall petition. o If there is a sufficient amount of valid signatures, a recall vote is called. o When notice of recall vote is sent to members of Tribe, the person subject to the recall may file a written response to the charges alleged in the petition and this will be mailed with the notice. o Recall vote is only to decide whether person should be recalled or not, not to replace. If the person is recalled, there has to be a by-election to fill the vacancy, unless 6 months or less remain in the term for the vacant position, in which case it remains vacant until the next election. o Results of recall election are final. o A Tribal Council member who is successfully recalled must wait one year before being eligible to run for office against. Other codes following a similar model are summarized in Appendix A, including the Constitution of the Native Tribe of Huslia, the Six Nations of the Grand River Elections Code, and Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing Custom Election Code. Key considerations pertaining to this model: Provides the highest level of community control over leadership accountability of all the other models, but because the grounds for removal / recall are open, it is also the model open to the greatest amount of abuse. Open grounds allow recalls to be initiated by citizens for any reason. This means that leaders can not only be removed for bad behaviour but also for unpopular political decisions. 85
This is the sort of recall procedures that has existed in British Columbia since 1995. No other province has since followed suit. According to the Elections BC website, the Chief Electoral Officer has approved 20 recall applications since 1995. Of the 20 petitions issued, four were returned to Elections BC, two proceeded to verification, and one continued through the full verification process. Nineteen of the 20 petitions failed as they did not collect enough valid signatures. The other petition was halted during the verification process because the MLA in question resigned.8 British Columbias Recall and Initiative Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 398, doesnt specify grounds for recall; it simply provides that members of the electoral district the leader represents (who voted in last election) must set out in a statement, not exceeding 200 words, why, in the opinion of the applicant, the recall of the Member is warranted (section 19(1)(c)). Some of the statements submitted in previous recall efforts in British Columbia are provided as examples below:9 o Delta South MLA Val Roddick has failed to represent the wishes of her constituents and should be recalled. o I believe Gillian Trumper, MLA, should be recalled because she actively supports the policies and programmes of the Liberal government of British Columbia. Without a mandate and after winning an unrepresentative and distorted majority in the Legislature, the Liberal government has embarked on a programme designed to dismantle the social benefits built by generations of British Columbia Citizens. o Victoria-Beacon Hill MLA Jeff Bray should be recalled because he misled voters during the last election campaign. Since the election he has failed to represent the wishes of his constituents. o Vancouver-Point Grey MLA Gordon Campbell has failed to represent the wishes of his constituents. He has displayed a deficiency in good judgment and has continually avoided accountability. For these reasons he should be recalled. o Lorne Mayencourt has repeatedly failed to represent the interests of his constituents and therefore is being recalled.
In a Report of the British Columbia Parliamentary Committee considering the provinces move to a recall in 1993, a number of concerns were raised with the recall process:
http://www.elections.bc.ca/index.php/referenda-recall-initiative/recall/ (last accessed 10/4/2010). It appears that this information is current to 2003 based on a chart that goes with this information. 9 See Report of the Chief Electoral Officer on the Recall Process in British Columbia, Appendix A.
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Duplicates or usurps the role of general elections. It is at election time when elected representatives are called to account for their actions during the previous term. If politicians are unwanted or perceived to have committed wrongs or merely to have been poor representatives, then they may be voted out of office. Representatives ought generally to be given the chance to government until the next election.10 Keeps leaders constantly in election mode. Recall encourages short-term over long-term thinking on the part of the elected official. Recall could encourage politicians to act only in accordance with what seems acceptable to the public at a particular time, and to lose sight of the "big picture". The emphasis in a system which adopts recall may well be upon the elected official representing the majority view, even if it is only shortterm or is fundamentally selfish. With recall, many fear that a elected official will become more concerned with keeping their own seats, with the threat that recall may induce elected officials to refrain from necessary action in order to avoid conflict or controversy.11 Potentially divisive, disruptive and subject to a number of abuses. Examples include: o Sore loser takes up the cause of recall in order to get him or herself elected. Not satisfied with the results of the last election, the loser could collect support from his or her own supporters and others, in order to force another election fight.12 o Potential for misuse. Some group may use some marginal issue as a pretext for getting a representative removed from office, when the groups real complaint is about an altogether different issue.13 Elected officials would be likely to be attacked for political reasons, and not necessarily because they were not responding to voters.14 o This was a concern raised by some Senators at the hearings of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal People reconsidering electoral reform of the Indian Act. Senator Lang said he saw recall as being very divisive in the communityif a group of dissenters at any given day can call for a recall, given the low population numbers.15
10 11
First Report of BC Parliamentary Reform Committee, supra, p. 1. First Report of BC Parliamentary Reform Committee, supra, p. 1-2. 12 First Report of BC Parliamentary Reform Committee, supra, p. 3. 13 First Report of BC Parliamentary Reform Committee, supra, p. 2. 14 First Report of BC Parliamentary Reform Committee, supra, p. 3. 15 Senate of Canada, Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, Monday, May 25, 2009, at p. 7:95.
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Serious debate on the merit of the charges of misconduct may not take place. Recall denies a person the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty; it results in an individual representative being put on trial by public debate without few, if any, of the safeguards of a trial.16
In a pure recall model, there are procedural safeguards that can be built into the system to attempt to cut back on some forms of abuse. For example: a) Impose a fee for filing the recall petition, and also require the petition to post security for costs;17 b) Impose a time limitation period to bring the recall, such as not earlier than one year (or more) since the last general election, and also no recall petition within the last year before the next election. The problem with this is that if the purpose of recalling the leader is because they engaged in some bad behaviour, the time period during which they committed the act in should not matter. For example, if a leader misappropriate band property for his own use, the public should have the ability to remove him, whether this occurs 6 months after he gets elected, or 6 months before the next election. c) Impose limits on the amount of petition or recall votes that can be brought against the same leader. In British Columbia, there can be multiple petitions circulating against the same leader at the same time, but if any are successful in triggering a vote, there can only be one vote per term.18 d) Impose a high enough threshold percentage of voter signatures for a successful petition to justify the public expense of mounting a recall election. This also ensures sufficient public support for the removal.19 e) Impose a time-limit in which the petitioner must get all the necessary signatures within. In British Columbia, the petitioner must get the valid amount of signatures (40% of the electors in the riding) within 60 days. This requires the petitioner to be fairly serious and organized about initiating a removal process.20
16 17
First Report of BC Parliamentary Reform Committee, supra, p. 2. This procedural could be built into any of the models involving a public vote (models #4, #5 and #6). 18 This procedural could be built into any of the models involving a public vote (models #4, #5 and #6). 19 This procedural could be built into any of the models requiring that the process be started by petition (models #3, #5 and #6). 20 This procedural could be built into any of the models requiring that the process be started by petition (models #3, #5 and #6).
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f) To avoid situations of abuse, such as recall instituted by a sore loser, there could be some sort of requirement of natural justice for the elected official subject to a recall petition. One suggestion is that once the petition requirement is met, the elected official subject to recall should be given the chance to answer the charges against him or her, for example, either at a hearing possibly before an independent committee, or else through some kind of judicial review in the courts.21 A model presenting less opportunity for abuse, but close the same level of votercontrol is model #5, discussed previously. The requirement of having to allege a specified ground based on bad behaviour, and provide some proof of such, lessens the chances for abuse. Eighteen U.S. states currently permit recall of state officials, seven of which require specified grounds to recall an official, such as misconduct, incompetence, conviction of a crime, or violation of the oath of office.22 With recall, there is the possibility of having to hold two votes: one for recall / removal; the other for the by-election if the leader. The are obviously costs consequences associated with that. There is the option of having just one vote like in British Columbia, but there are problems associated with that as well (discussed previously under model #5). Even though recall / removal is not by hearing, but instead by vote, it doesnt mean there isnt some procedural fairness requirements. With First Nations election laws, the Courts have held that there has to be a sufficient notice period before the vote and time for person subject to removal vote to make their case.
Case Example: The case of Seymour v. Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing, 2009 FC 133, involved Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing First Nations Election Code that contains a pure recall provision. It was used to remove a Councillor, and the Councillor brought judicial review proceedings. The Federal Court found that since the Councillors reputation and continuing right to hold office were at stake in the recall, there could be no question that these were important interests sufficient to attract a duty of fairness. There, the Court found that the notice of the recall vote, put in a few local newspapers, was insufficient, especially when the community had a large off-reserve membership. More had to be done to give notice to the off-reserve community.
21 22
First Report of BC Parliamentary Reform Committee, supra, p. 3. For more information, see http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0082.htm
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Despite this, however, the Court exercised its discretion not to reinstate the Councilor, because an overwhelming majority of those who voted in the recall election supported his removal, and reinstating him would cause political instability. Conclusion As can be gleaned from the various key considerations raised in this report, that there are several issues for the Working Group to consider as it contemplates recommending some form of leadership accountability model to accompany the recommendation to extend the term of office to Chief and Council falling under the Indian Act from two (2) to four (4) years. It seems that the Working Group, with the different leadership accountability models set forth in this report, are faced with a situation akin to that faced by Goldie-Locks in her visit to the Three Bears home. It has to decide which of the model, or hybrid of the models, is just right. In the authors humble opinion (which the Working Group is free to ignore), the models on the two extremes of the spectrum, models #1 and #6, are not desirable for the following reasons: Model #1 ensures only the lowest level of accountability for definite specified grounds. While economical and unlikely to attract much litigation, it would probably not satisfy what many community members are looking for in terms of a recall mechanism because it lacks the grounds and mechanisms for truly holding leadership accountability for bad behaviour. Model #6 on the other hand, while model #6 gives the electorate the greatest amount of power to recall / remove a leader, it is so broad in terms of its application that it presents the danger of being abused. Such a system would allow a sore loser in the previous election seek the recall of a Council member on a ground as vague as not serving the community needs without being required to provide proof. This model can also be costly, requiring someone to oversee the petition process and verify the petition forms, and to oversee the recall vote, as well as the by-election vote, in case the recall vote is successful. All these elections could cause instability in the community. It is the authors view that if such a system were allowed to be used at the two-year mark in a four year election period under the Indian Act, it would effectively be allowing those who want to, to continue to have a two year election through the recall process. In is not inconceivable that a faction might seek to remove most if not all of Chief and Council on an open grounds recall model. In the authors opinion, a more appropriate model is one of the models in-between models #2 through #5 or some sort of hybrid model. The author recommends that in 90
deliberating over which model or hybrid is best, the Working Group might take into account the following considerations: Community needs for accountability Community desire for participation in holding their leadership accountable Community needs for stability in leadership and potential for disruption Length of potential disruption (if there is to be one) Costs The needs of both on-reserve and off-reserve voters Potential for litigation Need for flexibility what one community needs or wants may not be what another community needs or wants Procedural fairness Simplicity vs. complexity of a given model Capacity issues Funding issues
This list is not exhaustive. It simply highlights that there are many perspectives to view the leadership accountability issue from and many considerations for the Working Group to weigh. I hope that this report has been useful and informative for the Working Group. If there are any further questions the Working Group has, or if there is further research or reporting the Working Group would like assistance with, I would be happy to help. Good luck! Naiomi Metallic
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APPENDIX A ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF LEADERSHIP ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS
1. Automatic removal based on definite, specified grounds Tsawwasen First Nation 2009 Election Act Part 6, Division 2, sets out grounds where a Chief or Legislator becomes disqualified, such as being convicted of offence prosecuted by way of indictable offence, owes a debt to the First Nation over a prescribed amount, declares bankruptcy, become incompetent, misses a certain number of prescribed band meetings. Namgis First Nation Election Regulations, April 2008 Vacancy of Chief or Councils offices arise where official dies or resigns, is absent from 3 consecutive band meetings without reasonable excuse, or otherwise become ineligible under the Act (is band employee, etc). NQuatqua First Nation Community Election Code There are specified grounds for a Chief or Councillors position becoming vacant, per s. 12: 1) missing 3 consecutive meetings without authorization; 2) convicted of an indictable offence; 3) no longer ordinarily resident in the community; 4) resigns; or 5) dies. Draft Election Code of the Kwakiult Band, 4th draft May 2006 C&C removed automatically on certain grounds: 1) conviction of an offence under Criminal Code; 2) dies or resigns; 3) is ineligible to hold office by virtue of Election Code, or 4) becomes ordinarily resident outside of the north island.
2. Complaint-driven based on specified grounds decided by a designated decision-maker Squiala First Nation Governance Manual, April 2008 Section 3 sets out an extensive code of conduct, set out in plain language. Section 3.10, provides that Council has the authority to make and enforce its own rules and penalties for Councillors who are found negligent in carrying out (or failing to carry out) their duties or are otherwise in contravention with these policies. Section 4.11, Disqualification and Removal sets out that, notwithstanding policy 3.10, Councillor is automatically removed if: o Is absent from 3 consecutive Council meetings without proper authorization o Contravenes conflict of interest rules o Accepts gifts in contravention of policy 3.4 o Uses his/her influence in contravention of policy 3.5 92
o Uses confidential information for his/her or others benefit in contravention of policy 3.6 o Is convicted of a listed indictable offence set out in Appendix D (includes weapons offences, sexual offences, all manner of assault and murder offences, common nuisance, robbery, extortion, theft, arson, fraud, drug offences, etc.) o Dies or resigns o Is found to be mentally incompetent o Is disqualified under s. 78 of the Indian Act o Can also become disqualified if you learn another council is in breach of the above, and dont tell the rest of council within a reasonable time period. A councillor who is disqualified is ineligible to run in the next election. If a member of the community thinks a Councillor should be removed because one of the above grounds is met, they can file a complaint under policy 11.0: o The complaint is made to the Administrator, who will respond within 15 days o If not satisfied with Administrators response, can direct complaint to Chief and Council, who must respond within 15 days; o If not satisfied with Chief and Council response, can direct complaint to Traditional Advisory Council, who will respond with its decision in 20 days.
Gitxaala Nation Custom Election Code, December 15, 2009 There are specified grounds for vacancy per article 4.14, which includes: 1) resigns; 2) misses 3 consecutive regular Governing Council meetings without written authorization from the Governing Council; 3) is convicted of an offence under the Criminal Code; 4) is in violation of the Oath of Chief Councillor, Deputy Chief Councillor and Councillors (which sets a number of commitments, such as not to allow any private interest to influence their conduct of public matters, be eligible to be a candidate for election, uphold Gitxaala law, not employed any bribery or corruption to gain election); and 5) does not take Oath within 14 days of getting elected; or 6) dies. The process for removal requires that if any of the above is believed to occur, a motion must be presented as soon as practical at a duly convened regular meeting of the Governing Council for a resolution outlining the situation and declaring the position to be vacant.
Lower Nicola Indian Band Custom Election Rules 34. Should a Member of Council (a) be convicted of an indictable offence, except those of a political nature relating to the exercise or defense of aboriginal rights or title, or be convicted of any sexual or assault offence while in office, or 93
(b) should a legal proceeding recognized by the Council find that a member of Council has misused any Band funds or resources or has breached his fiduciary responsibilities, or (c) fail to fulfill his responsibilities as a member of Council for a period of more than 30 days after having received written notice to that effect from Council, then that member of Council may be immediately removed from office by the passing of a Band Council Resolution to that effect and a by-election shall be called immediately thereafter pursuant to Section 24 above. 35. For the purposes of Section 34(b) above, the responsibilities of a member of Council shall include but not be limited to: (a) the swearing of an oath of office and the signing of an agreement that he will work for the best interests of the Band as a whole and will enforce and protect the aboriginal rights and title of all Band members and (b) conducting or attending Council Meetings and special or General Band Meetings and (c) maintaining a presence on reserves of the Band and making himself available to address Band members needs and interests. Nisichawayasihk Cree Nation Contains several grounds where the officials seat becomes vacant, set out in s. 3(5). For breaches of oath of allegiance, oath of office or oath of confidentiality, can be determined by Appeal Committee or court of competent jurisdiction, to be disqualified from office. Person who is convicted of an indictable offence or a corrupt practice under this Code, not eligible to run as a member of the council for 8 years.
Salt River First Nation 195 Election Code 19.

19.1
REMOVAL FROM OFFICE

Grounds for Removal
The removal of a Chief or Councillor from office may be determined by the Council on the following grounds: 19.1.1 The are absent for three (3) consecutive meetings of the First Nation or the Council for which they have been given verbal and/or written notice and for which no valid reason for their absence is provided in writing to the Council; or
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19.1.2 The engage in drunk, drug related, disorderly, violent or other irresponsible conduct at Council meetings, community meetings, or in other public forums or functions which interferes with the conduct of business or brings the reputation of the Council or the First Nation into disrepute; or 19.1.3 They fail to perform duties and obligations as set out in Schedule B or breach the Conflict of Interest Guidelines for Chief and Council as set out in Schedules C; or 19.1.4 They have been charged with or convicted of an indictable offence under the Criminal Code; or 19.1.5 They had engaged in Corrupt Election practices, the evidence of which were discovered and proven after the Appeal Period; or 19.1.6 19.1.7 or They failed to reside in the vicinity of Fort Smith during their term of office; or They have been suspended three (3) times pursuant to s. 18 during his term of office;
19.1.8 They have failed to resign or resume their duties after a sixty (60) day leave of absence as required, pursuant to s.16.3. 19.2 Upon satisfactory confirmation of the grounds for removal, the Council by Resolution which states the grounds for removal may remove the Chief or Councillor from their Office.
Peepeekisis First Nation Custom Election Act Under the Act, only the Council of Elders has authority under the Election Act to remove a Chief or Headperson from office. Article 7C provides that the office of Chief shall become vacant when the person who holds that office is found by the Council of Elders to be guilty of corrupt election practice, accepting a bribe, dishonesty or malfeasance in office. Article 7D further provides that the Council of Elders may declare a person who ceases to hold office by virtue of the Election Act to be ineligible to hold office for a period up to 10 years. Caldwell First Nation Custom Election Code* A hybrid of models #1 and #2 some automatic grounds for removal, and then complaint-driven on specified grounds, decided by Chief and Council:
Section 12 Vacancy of Office

12.1 The Office of Chief or Councillor automatically becomes vacant if the Chief or Councillor: (a) (b) (c) (d) Dies; Submits a written resignation to Council; Is convicted of an indictable offence during his/her tenure; or Is declared mentally incompetent in accordance with the laws of Ontario; 95
12.2 The Council may determine that the office(s) of Chief and /or Council is vacant if: (a) The Chief or Councillor fails to perform their fiduciary duties owed to the members (eg. malfeasance); or (b) Is absent from 4 (four) consecutive meetings of the Council without authorization of the Council, and such authorization may not be unreasonably withheld. *Note: This Code was submitted to author after a draft was provided to the working group. This Code is noted here, but is discussed or taken into account in the body of the report. 3. Petition on specified grounds put to a designated decision-maker INACs Sample Leadership Selection Code Member of council can be removed from office on certain grounds by a decision of the Complaints and Appeal Board initiated either by 1) a majority of council (by passing a BCR), or 2) an elector submitting a petition with at least signatures of support by 25% of the band and a fee. Grounds that can lead to removal: o Violation of the Code, oath of office, or Code of Ethics; o Failure to attend three consecutive band meetings without reasonable excuse; o Fails to maintain a standard of conduct expected of a council member; o Has been convicted of an indictable offence since his election; o Accepts or offers a bribe, forges a council document or otherwise acts dishonestly in his role; o Is negligent in failing to ensure the safety and protection of the communitys members and property; o Abuses his office such that the conduct negatively affects the dignity and integrity of the community or of council; o Encourages others to commit any of the above acts or omissions; or o Engages in such other conduct as may be determined by council to be of such a serious nature that the removal is necessary and appropriate. Complaint and Appeal Board (CAB) verifies that application meets all requirements and decides whether it is frivolous (in which case it dismisses), or whether it should go to a hearing. CAB must make this decision within 20 days. o CAB is composed of 3 members: an elder, a non-member with no vested interested in the result; and a member who is familiar with the traditions, values and language of the band. Selected by the Band Council at least 100 days before an election and hold office until another CAB is chosen. Band also keeps a list of 10 additional potential members of the CAB. Cannot sit if there is potential for apprehension of bias. CAB hears election appeal and removal petitions. 96
If there is hearing, notices must be sent to parties setting out time, place, date of hearing and that petitioner, any member of council, or member subject to the removal application, may make a presentation to the CAB, which can include submitting documents and the testimony of witnesses. After the hearing, CAB has five days to make a determination of whether to remove the Council member or not. They can also decide that in addition to removal, the person should be banned from running for Council for up to six years. Decision of CAB is final and binding Effect of removal is that seat is vacant and there must be a by-election within 90 days. There should not be a by-election if only 3 months left in the term, unless it is needed in order for there to be a quorum on Council. INAC document provides an alternative, where the petition of the members of the community first goes to the Council to decide whether to remove the member, and then it can be appealed to CAB.
Muskeg Lake First Nation Election Act REMOVAL FROM OFFICE 4. Once duly elected by members of the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, the Chief and Headmen are politically and financially accountable to all members of the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation and as such they may be removed from office if they: i. Consistently ignore or abuse the OATH OF OFFICE;
ii. Are absent from three (3) consecutive Muskeg Lake Cree nation assemblies or duly convened council meetings without justified cause; iii. Are convicted under the Criminal Code of Canada for an indictable offence or a dual offence on which the Crown has elected to proceed by way of indictment, unless such a conviction relates to the exercise of an aboriginal or treaty right which is a matter of legal dispute. The Discipline Procedures are triggered by submitting a complaint which must be accompanied by a petition signed by 35 electors of MLCN. The complaint shall be received by the Chief Executive Officer of the MLCN who will then submit it to a Discipline Committee or a Family Representatives Committee. Subsequently, the committee will appoint a three person Discipline Tribunal. The Discipline Tribunal shall then hold a hearing into the complaint in which the complainants and all Council members who are the subject of the complaint will be provided with written notice of the hearing and given an opportunity to present evidence and argument in support of their position. The individual(s) against whom the complaint is made shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to know and respond to the allegations made against 97
him or them as the case may be. The Discipline Tribunal will determine if the complaint has been proven on a balance of probabilities and if it has, may decide to dismiss the individual from office or allow the individual to continue in office with or without conditions attached. Sucker Creek First Nation Customary Election Regulation Sets out a list of grounds for removal and provides that it is the electors who can initiate removal on these grounds, but providing Council with a petition signed by at least 50% + 1 of the Electors, setting forth the grounds of removal. After this, Chief and Council is to convene a special meeting of the Council to consider the removal of the member of Council from office. The member subject to the petition is allowed to present written or oral evidence. After hearing all the relevant evidence, the council may then pass a resolution at the Special Meeting to remove a Chief or Councillor form office. The Resolution must state the grounds of removal.
4. Complaint-driven on specified grounds decided by public vote Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing Election Code the removal provisions in this code are both complaint-driven, as opposed to being initiated by petition. But the decision to remove is by public vote, and theres two ways to do it: 1) on specified grounds, or 2) on open grounds. It is strange to see both options in one code. The strangeness of this was commented on in the case of Seymour v. Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing, 2009 FC 133.
6. Vacancies, Resignation, Recall and Removal
a. The office of the Chief or a Councillor will become vacant when the person holding such office: i. dies, resigns or is otherwise unwilling to continue to hold their office;
ii. is determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to be a mentally incompetent person; iii. is an undischarged bankrupt person;
iv. is voted by the Electorate to be removed from their office by a vote of fiftyone (51%) percent of the persons voting in favour of the removal where at least twenty five (25%) percent of the Electorate are present for the vote; or v. forfeits the office in accordance with paragraphs 6.b. or 6.c.
b. The Chief or a Councillor who during the term of their office is convicted of an indictable offence, except in the pursuit or defense of, or in the exercise of aboriginal and/or treaty rights shall automatically forfeit their office.
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c. The Chief or a Councillor who during the term of their office is found guilty in any court of a misdemeanour involving misconduct reflecting on the dignity and integrity of Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing, Malfeasance in office, or gross neglect of duty, may be removed from office by a majority vote of the Electorate at a meeting called for that purpose with at least twenty five (25%) percent of the Electorate present at the meeting. Before any vote is referred to the Electorate by Council as provided by this subparagraph, such Councillor shall be given a written statement of the charges and shall be given an opportunity to answer to the Electorate at the meeting called by the Council for that specific purpose. The decision of the Electorate shall be final. d. Any Councillor or the Chief may resign from office by tendering a written resignation to the Council, and upon receipt thereof by the Council it will become effective. 7. By-Elections
a. In the event of a vacancy in the Office of Chief or a Councillor, and provided that no less than six (6) months remains in the term of the vacated office the remaining Council members will instruct the Electoral Officer to call a By-Election to fill and complete the remaining term of the vacant office within thirty (30) days after the vacancy has taken effect. []
Cold Lake First Nation Election Law, May 27, 1986 Section 17 provides that a Council members position becomes vacant automatically upon: o Dies or resigns o Is convicted of a criminal code offence o Moves from the Cold Lake First Nations territory o Fails to attend 3 consecutive Council meetings without reasonable excuse Finally, there are the following provisions that allows 75% of electors to vote by secret ballot to remove a candidate at a public meeting: E. Any person during the term of office who is found guilty of any neglect of duty or misconduct reflecting on the dignity and conduct of the Council must resign or have the place declared vacant and a by-election held. F. An elector can request a public meeting of the electors to have a Councillor or Chief removed from office if there is misconduct of the member which relates to their position on Council. G. All requests for a public meeting must be approved by the Chief and Council. H. In the event the item comes to a public meeting there must be a vote of least seventy-five (75) percent of the electors calling for the resignation of the Councillor and/or Chief. I. All voting shall be done in secret ballots. J. Counting of the ballots shall be done in public
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5. Petition on specified grounds put to a public vote Grand Rapids First Nation Election Policy
900. VACANCY IN OFFICE 910. [1] The office of Chief or Councillor shall become vacant immediately upon the electoral officer certifying in writing that a vote pursuant to this clause 910 has been taken, declaring that the person who holds the said office is; ... d) was [sic] substantially involved in corrupt election practices, bribery, accepting a bribe, or substantial dishonest or disorderly conduct. 920 Votes under clause 910 shall take place when the electoral officer receives a petition signed by 51% (fifty-one percent) of the Electors setting out the grounds for the request of the vote under 910 and the electoral officer shall conduct the vote in the same way as a vote for a position on Council and a decision in said vote shall be by a majority of the Electors voting.
940 Any person who ceased to hold office by virtue of clause 910 shall be ineligible to be a candidate for the office of Chief or councillor for three (3) years. (Election Policy).
6. Petition on open grounds put to a public vote (a pure recall) Constitution of the Native Tribe of Huslia, Alaska Creates Tribal Council, elected by majority, made up of seven members. They hold office for a term of 3 years, but their terms are staggered. Removal: o Tribal Council can remove a member in 4 vote in favour of removal, and it is on the grounds of: 1) neglect of duty; 2) gross misconduct in office; or 3) an offence involving dishonest. o Council member should be given 10 days notice in writing of the charges against him, and the opportunity to answer such charges before the Tribal Council. o All questions of removal shall be resolved by the Tribal Council and may not be reviewed by the Tribal Court. Recall: o Tribal Council member can be removed if petition request such recall signed by at least 60% of the voters is presented to the Tribal Council. o Tribal Council then has 60 days to decide whether to hold a recall election o If a majority of the voters vote in favour of the recall, the official shall be removed 100
o Official cant be subject to recall proceedings more than once during their term. o If Tribal Council fails to call a recall, the tribal membership can hold a meeting to conduct such business. Forfeiture: o Any Council member who submits resignation, dies, is convicted of a felony, or is absent from 3 regular monthly meetings without excuse, are deemed to have automatically forfeited their office. Vacancies: o Any vacancies are filled by appointment by the Tribal Council.
Six Nations of the Grand River Elections Code Article XII of the Code provides that a member of an elected council shall be removed from Council when: o Councilor ceases to live in the district there were voted into, or Chief ceases to live on the reserve (unless move was for reasons beyond their control, i.e., house burnt down) o Recall a valid petition is brought forth to be Council at a duly convened General Council meeting signed by the majority of the eligible voters that voted in that District at the General Election when the Councilor was voted into office. o Charged with an indictable offence or felony in US and cannot have it cleared within 90 days. o Convicted of an indictable offence or felony o Misses 3 consecutive council meetings without reasonable excuse o Becomes employee of the Six Nations Council. Anishinaabeg of Naongashiing Election Code summarized under model #4, above, contains pure recall provision on open grounds.
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RAPPORT SUR LES MODLES D'IMPUTABILIT DANS LES GOUVERNEMENTS DES PREMIRES NATIONS
Rdig pour :
Le Groupe de travail sur la rforme des dispositions relatives aux lections de la Loi sur les Indiens
15 novembre 2010
Naiomi S. Metallic Avocate adjointe Burchells LLP 1801, rue Hollis, bureau 1800 Halifax, Nouvelle-cosse B3J 3N4 t. 902-428-8344 f. 902-420-9326 nmetalic@burchells.ca
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Table des matires Introduction ....................................................................................................... 3 Mthode de recherche ...................................................................................... 4 Les trois grandes variables des modles d'imputabilit .................................... 5 4) Comment le processus d'imputabilit est initi ................................. 5 5) Motifs sur lesquels sont fondes les dcisions lies une rvocation/destitution ........................................................................ 6 Schma des motifs dcrits dans les lois lectorales ............. 8 6) Comment les dcisions lies la rvocation/destitution d'un dirigeant sont prises ................................................................................................ 10 TABLEAU DES DIFFRENTS MODLES D'IMPUTABILIT ......................... 11 COMPARAISON DES SIX MODLES D'IMPUTABILIT ................................. 12 7. Rvocation automatique fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi et dfinitifs .......................................................................................................... 12 8. Rvocation dont la dcision est prise par un dcideur dsign, partir d'une plainte fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi .................................. 14 9. Ptition fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi, soumise un dcideur dsign ............................................................................................. 18 10. Rvocation fonde sur une plainte pour des motifs dcrits dans la loi, soumise un vote public ................................................................................. 21 11. Ptition fonde sur des motifs dcrits dans la loi, soumise un vote public .......................................................................................................... 24 12. Ptition fonde sur un motif quelconque, soumise un vote public ( rvocation pure ) ............................................................................. 27 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 33 Annexe A - Autres exemples de modles d'imputabilit ................................... 35
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Introduction Le Congrs des chefs des Premires nations de l'Atlantique ( CCPNA ), l'Assemble des chefs du Manitoba ( ACM ) et le ministre des Affaires indiennes et du Nord Canada ( MAINC ) travaillent ensemble ( le Groupe de travail ) l'laboration d'une proposition pour la rforme des dispositions lectorales de la Loi sur les Indiens, L.R.C. 1985, c. I-5. Ce groupe s'intresse en particulier la proposition d'tendre la dure du mandat du chef et des membres du Conseil de deux (2) quatre (4) ans. Le Groupe de travail souhaite galement examiner les options dont disposent les membres de la communaut pour mettre en place davantage de moyens de tenir leurs chefs responsables, compte tenu de la prolongation du mandat de ces derniers et du Conseil. Lors des audiences devant le Comit snatorial permanent des peuples autochtones, les membres des Premires nations qui taient prsents ont, en ce qui concerne la question d'une rforme lectorale de la Loi sur les Indiens, souvent fait rfrence cette rforme en tant que besoin de mettre en place un processus de rvocation/destitution . Le but li la mise en place d'un tel processus a t clairement et simplement prsent par Ron Evans, grand chef de l'ACM : Le processus de rvocation est ncessaire tout simplement parce qu' un moment donn, des communauts se demanderont si elles ont choisi un bon chef. Si cest le cas, bien sr, le problme ne se pose pas; mais si elles pensent avoir choisi un mauvais chef et souhaitent le remplacer, entre alors en jeu le processus de rvocation.23 Compte tenu de ce que nombreuses communauts des Premires Nations ont exprim par rapport la mise en place d'un processus de rvocation ainsi que la prolongation de la dure du mandat de leurs chefs, le Groupe de travail a demand que la question du processus en question soit davantage tudie. Le prsent rapport vise rsumer les rsultats de cette tude.
23
Snat du Canada, dlibrations du Comit snatorial permanent des peuples autochtones; lundi 25 mai 2009, la p. 7:17.
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Mthodes de recherche L'auteur a examin la loi sur la rvocation de la Colombie-Britannique, Recall and Initiative Act, RSBC 1996, c. 398 (la seule loi du genre au Canada), les lois sur la rvocation dans plusieurs tats amricains et les dispositions en matire de rvocation/destitution des codes et lois relatifs aux lections des Premires nations, la fois au Canada et aux tats-Unis, ainsi que des rapports et des articles d'information sur le sujet. Selon l'auteur, pour beaucoup de personnes qui se sont exprimes devant le Comit snatorial permanent, les termes processus de rvocation ne signifient pas forcment la mme chose que la ralit laquelle ils renvoient. Une vraie rvocation est un processus politique selon lequel un certain pourcentage des lecteurs peuvent dposer une demande en vue de se dbarrasser d'un reprsentant lu et, si le vote est en faveur de la rvocation, le sige est alors considr vacant et une lection partielle est organise pour le combler.24 Il semblerait plutt, pour ceux qui se sont exprims devant le Comit snatorial, que ce processus permette de tenir leurs chefs responsables de leurs actions en mettant fin leur poste. Il existe de nombreuses faons de parvenir cette fin, et un seul de ces moyens constitue une vritable rvocation. Cest pour cette raison que l'auteur prfre utiliser les termes modles d'imputabilit , plutt que processus de rvocation pour dcrire les diffrents processus qui permettent de tenir des lus responsables de leurs actes. Les discussions sur les modles d'imputabilit peuvent tre trs techniques et trs dtailles ds que l'on commence se concentrer sur un modle particulier. Conscient qu' ce stade-ci le Groupe de travail souhaite avant tout comprendre les diffrents modles qui existent ainsi que les principales considrations qui s'y rapportent, l'auteur tient maintenir la discussion au niveau conceptuel (p. ex. comprendre les diffrences entre les modles) plutt quentrer dans les dtails. Aprs que le Groupe de travail choisit un ou deux modles particuliers, nous pourrons examiner ces derniers de faon plus dtaille. L'auteur serait heureux de pouvoir participer ce type de discussions une date ultrieure. Le prsent rapport s'articule donc autour de six (6) diffrents types de modles d'imputabilit. Les diffrences entre ces modles sont prsentes en fonction de trois (3) grandes variables : 1) comment le processus de rvocation est initi; 2) existence ou non de motifs prcis lis une rvocation; 3) personnes responsables de la rvocation d'un chef. La comprhension des diffrentes variables ainsi que des liens entre chacune d'elles permet de saisir comment les six (6) modles d'imputabilit ont t labors.
24
Premier rapport du Select Standing Committee on Parliamentary Reform, Ethical Conduct,Standing Orders and Private Bills, Assemble lgislative de la ColombieBritannique, deuxime session, trente-cinquime lgislature, 23 novembre 1993 ( premier rapport du BC Parliamentary Reform Committee"), p. 1 de 7.
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Une fois les variables expliques, nous examinerons les modles d'imputabilit ainsi que les principales considrations correspondant chacun d'eux. Les trois grandes variables des modles d'imputabilit Les trois grandes variables lies aux modles d'imputabilit sont les suivantes : 4) Comment le processus d'imputabilit est-il initi? Comment il varie a) Il peut tre automatique Cela signifie qu'un chef peut automatiquement perdre son sige en raison d'un vnement particulier, par exemple aprs avoir t reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel.
b) Il peut tre fond sur les plaintes Cela signifie que le processus est engag par une personne, comme un membre d'une communaut ou un membre de Conseil de bande, qui dpose une plainte auprs d'un organisme dsign, comme le Conseil de bande ou un prpos aux plaintes, ou encore le Conseil des anciens. Le groupe dsign supervise le traitement de la plainte, selon les autres variables en jeu, et peut mme dcider de l'issue de cette dernire (c.--d. la rvocation ou non du chef concern).
c) Il peut se faire par voie de ptition Une loi lectorale peut stipuler qu'une ptition doive tre signe par un certain pourcentage dlecteurs afin de pouvoir initier le processus de rvocation. Plus le pourcentage des lecteurs devant voter est lev, plus il est difficile d'engager le processus. La ptition doit tre soumise un organe particulier, comme le Conseil de bande, un prpos aux plaintes ou un Conseil des anciens qui, selon les autres variables en jeu, fait en sorte que la ptition soit recevable (c.--d nombre requis de signatures, aucune signature double ou frauduleuse, correspond aux motifs se rapportant la rvocation (le cas chant)), et peut mme dcider de l'issue de la plainte, ( savoir la rvocation ou non de la personne cible). Dans le cadre d'une ptition, la personne qui engage le processus de rvocation doit, ainsi que les individus qui la soutiennent, faire du porte-106
porte pour obtenir les signatures d'lecteurs. Dans le contexte des Premires nations, et la lumire des affaires comme Corbire et Gull Bay, la question lie l'obtention des signatures des lecteurs hors rserve se pose. Faut-il demander la signature des lecteurs hors rserve? Que se passe-t-il si la majorit des ptitionnaires sont des lecteurs hors rserve? Peut-on les solliciter par courrier postal? En ce qui concerne le modle d'imputabilit engag par voie de ptition, les lgislateurs devraient mettre en place des rgles dtailles sur la manire de solliciter les lecteurs. Il est possible, surtout dans une petite communaut o beaucoup de gens se connaissent, qu'il y ait des dsaccords ou des conflits ou que certaines personnes se sentent obliges de signer sous la pression. Une personne pourrait-elle donc rvoquer sa signature?
5) Les motifs sur lesquels sont fondes les dcisions lies une rvocation Comment ils varient a) Une rvocation peut avoir lieu pour n'importe quel motif Cela signifie qu'une plainte peut tre dpose contre un chef pour une raison quelconque. Cela comprend non seulement des choses comme l'incomptence, un manquement ses devoirs, ne pas assister des runions de bande ou la fraude, mais aussi les plaintes se rapportant des prises de dcisions (p. ex., je napprcie pas que le chef ait soutenu tel projet, ou sign tel accord, , ou encore le chef se proccupe trop des ans et pas suffisamment des jeunes, etc.). L'un des problmes associs ce type de motif est la possibilit de dissimuler des raisons personnelles ou vindicatives pour vouloir se dbarrasser d'un chef (p. ex. je n'aime pas le chef , ou le chef a obtenu plus de voix que moi lors de la dernire lection , etc.). (Il est galement possible, bien sr, d'invoquer des motifs dcrits dans la loi des fins caches, mais cela est plus difficile puisque des preuves doivent tre fournies.)
b) La rvocation d'un chef peut tre invoque pour un motif dcrit dans la loi Il s'agit de motifs dcrits dans la loi qui permettent de limiter les raisons lies la rvocation d'un chef. En gnral, ces motifs se limitent aux mauvais comportements : actes fautifs, incomptence, ngligence, etc. Les motifs prvus par la loi peuvent tre dfinitifs, signifiant qu'aucun jugement n'est ncessaire pour dterminer si ceux-ci sont justifis. Par exemple, tre dclar coupable d'un acte criminel est dfinitif, car personne 107
ne doit interprter si le chef a t dclar coupable ou non : il est coupable ou il ne l'est pas. Les autres motifs sont indfinis, c'est--dire sujets interprtation. Par exemple, dans le cas d'un motif de rvocation pour manquement au devoir , il faut dcider si tel ou tel fait peut tre interprt comme un manquement des fonctions officielles.
Le tableau de la page suivante prsente des exemples de motifs contenus dans le codes et lois lectoraux examins par l'auteur. La source de chaque motif est indique dans les notes situes sous le tableau. Certains motifs sont semblables mais sont prsents pour montrer au Groupe de travail des exemples de variations possibles.
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Motifs dcrits dans les lois lectorales

Fait preuve de ngligence en omettant d'assurer la scurit et la protection des membres de la communaut et des biens [1] Manquement grave au devoir ou faute grave, par exemple dfaut de rvler un conflit d'intrts ou infraction au code de dontologie du Conseil tribal (si un tel code existe) [2] Incomptence [5] Mfait ou inconduite pendant un mandat [8] Mauvaise utilisation dlibre, conversion ou appropriation illicite, sans autorisation, de biens ou de fonds publics confis ou associs la charge lective [3]
Corruption [4] Incapacit physique ou mentale [7]
Faute professionnelle [10] Est dclar coupable d'une infraction pouvant influer sur sa capacit faire preuve de leadership efficace ou jeter le discrdit sur sa personne ou le bureau, y compris, mais sans s'y limiter, la fraude, les crimes violents, y compris un homicide, un homicide involontaire et des agressions, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, une infraction caractre sexuel, des infractions tendant corrompre les murs, une conduite dsordonne, des infractions relatives aux drogues et l'alcool [13] Dfaut d'assister trois assembles de bande conscutives sans excuse raisonnable [16] / sans l'autorisation du Conseil [17]
Manquement aux fonctions prescrites par la loi [11] tat d'brit, inconduite et conduite irresponsable pendant une runion de conseil, une runion communautaire ou un forum ou vnement public, qui entrave la conduite des affaires ou discrdite la rputation du Conseil ou de la Premire nation [14]
Manquement au devoir [6] Accomplissement dun acte interdit ou faute par abstention, jugs graves, lis aux fonctions de sa charge [9] Violation du serment [12] Est dclar coupable d'une infraction criminelle mentionne l'Annexe D (infraction commise avec une arme, infractions caractre sexuel, toutes sortes d'agressions et meurtres, nuisance publique, vol qualifi, extorsion, vol, incendie criminel, fraude, infractions relatives aux drogues, etc.). [15]
Ne se conduit pas de la faon dont un membre du Conseil devrait le faire [20]
Reconnu coupable d'un crime grave au cours de la dure du mandat [23] A des paiements en souffrance lis une dette contracte auprs de la Premire nation [26] Agit d'une manire qui porte prjudice sa fonction de chef ou de conseiller, ou qui est prjudiciable la Premire nation, si le Conseil a mis en place des politiques relatives la conduite du chef et des conseillers [29]
25
Dfaut d'assister trois (3) runions conscutives ordinaires ou spciales sans raison valable, p. ex. maladie, vacances, dcs d'un membre de sa famille immdiate, absence de pravis suffisant [18] Accepte ou offre un pot-de-vin, contrefait un document du Conseil ou agit de faon malhonnte pendant l'exercice de sa charge [21] A t reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel [24] La communaut n'est plus son 25 domicile habituel [27] Est dclar coupable d'une infraction par voie de mise en accusation, avec possibilit d'emprisonnement de 2 ans ou plus [30]
Le membre du Conseil n'a pas assist 5 runions de Conseil conscutives sans raison valable [19]
Abuse de ses fonctions de telle sorte que sa conduite nuit la dignit et l'intgrit de la communaut ou du Conseil [22] Accus ou reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel en vertu du Code criminel [25] Contrevient aux rglements des Premires nations en matire de conflits d'intrts [28] tre dclar coupable d'un acte criminel, sauf ceux de nature politique relatifs l'exercice ou la dfense de droits ou titres ancestraux; ou tre dclar coupable d'une infraction ou d'une agression caractre sexuel
Cette situation peut entraner des problmes relativement l'article 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et liberts, comme dans les affaires Corbire et Gull Bay.
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pendant son mandat [31] Contrevient aux politiques de la bande relatives aux aspects suivants : accepter un cadeau, user de son influence, utiliser des informations confidentielles [35] A pris part des pratiques lectorales frauduleuses, lesquelles ont t dcouvertes et prouves aprs le dlai d'appel [38]
Reconnu d'incapacit mentale [32] ou inapte [33] par un mdecin autoris
Dclare faillite ou est dclar en faillite en vertu de la Loi sur la faillite (Canada) [34]
Impossibilit de remplir les fonctions de sa charge pendant plus de 6 mois [36]
A abus des fonds ou ressources de la bande ou manqu ses responsabilits de fiduciaire [37]
Sources des motifs indiqus dans le tableau

39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. Modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC Constitution de la nation Yavapai-Apache, Arizona. Gorgie, Code 21-4-3 (7), 21-4-4 (c). Alaska, AS 15. 45. 510. Alaska, AS 15. 45. 510, Kansas, KS 25-4301, Montana, Mont. Code 2-16-603. Alaska, AS 15. 45. 510. Montana, Mont. Code 2-16-603. Gorgie, Ga. Code 21-4-3 (7), 21-4-4 (c). Minnesota, Const. Art. VIII, 6. Kansas, KS 25-4301. Gorgie, Ga. Code 21-4-3 (7), 21-4-4 (c), Kansas, KS Stat. 25-4301. Gorgie, Ga. Code 21-4-3 (7), 21-4-4 (c), Montana, Mont. Code 2-16-603, Washington, Const. Art. I, 33; code lectoral coutumier de la nation Gitxaala, 15 dcembre 2009. Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Sturgeon Lake, 2009. Chose intressante, cette loi prvoit qu'une personne accuse de tels crimes soit immdiatement suspendue sans traitement jusqu' ce que la question soit tranche par les tribunaux. Si la personne n'est pas trouve coupable, elles est rintgre avec salaire rtroactif. Si elle est reconnue coupable, le poste devient automatiquement vacant. Premire nation de Smith Landing, Alberta, code lectoral, mai 2004; Premire nation de Salt River, code lectoral 195. Premire nation Squiala, manuel de gouvernance, avril 2008. Modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC, loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Cold Lake, 27 mai 1986; rglements lectoraux de la Premire nation de Namgis, avril 2008. Code des lections communautaires de la Premire nation N'Quatqua; code lectoral coutumier de la nation Gitxaala, 15 dcembre 2009; loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Long Plain, 2009. Constitution de la nation Yavapai-Apache, Arizona. Premire nation de Smith Landing, Alberta, code lectoral, mai 2004. Modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC Modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC Modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC Minnesota, Const. Art. VIII, 6. AINC, modle de code de slection des dirigeants, bande de Lennox Island, 25 juin 2001, rglements lectoraux coutumiers modifis; code lectoral communautaire de la Premire nation N'Quatqua; code lectoral 195 de la Premire nation Salt River. Premire nation de Smith Landing, Alberta, code lectoral, mai 2004. Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Tsawwasen, 2009. Premire nation de Smith Landing, Alberta, code lectoral, mai 2004; code lectoral communautaire de la Premire nation de N'Quatqua. Manuel de gouvernance de la Premire nation Squiala, avril 2008; code lectoral de la Premire nation de Smith's Landing, mai 2004. Rglements lectoraux de la Premire nation Dene Tha' (Alberta).
52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.
63. 64. 65. 66. 67.
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ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS National Engagement on Electoral Reform: Building a Better Election System for First Nations Communities 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Tsawwasen, 2009. Bande indienne de Lower Nicola, rglements lectoraux coutumiers. Premire nation Squiala, manuel de gouvernance, avril 2008. Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Tsawwasen, 2009. Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Tsawwasen, 2009. Premire nation Squiala, manuel gouvernance, avril 2008. Constitution de la Premire nation de Westbank, 19 juillet 2007. Bande indienne de Lower Nicola, rglements lectoraux coutumiers. Premire nation de Salt River, code lectoral 195.
6) Comment les dcisions lies au retrait / rvocation d'un dirigeant sont-elles prises? Comment elles varient a) Ces dcisions sont prises par un dcideur dsign ( dcideur dsign ). Cela signifie qu'un dcideur dsign, comme le Conseil de bande, un agent des plaintes ou le Conseil des ans, prend la dcision finale, savoir la rvocation ou non du dirigeant. Cela se fait lors d'une audience laquelle assistent la fois l'auteur de la plainte et le dirigeant cibl pour tre entendus. La dcideur dsign prend alors une dcision qui, de prfrence est consigne pour expliquer comment ladite dcision a t prise. Les lois lectorales peuvent prvoir que la dcision puisse donner lieu un appel devant une instance suprieure, ou que la dcision est dfinitive et obligatoire. Cela n'empche cependant pas l'une des parties de tenter de contester la dcision devant un tribunal.
b) La dcision lie la rvocation est soumise un vote du public Cela signifie que les lois lectorales prvoient un vote public et qu'un certain pourcentage des lecteurs doit voter en faveur de la rvocation (c.--d. 50 % + 1, 40 %, 70 %, etc.). Si le vote en faveur de la rvocation est majoritaire, celui-ci est normalement suivi d'une lection partielle pour remplacer le dirigeant qui a t dmis de ses fonctions. Bien que ce type de dcision soit tout fait diffrent du type de rvocation impliquant un dcideur avec une audience, les tribunaux ont indiqu que des protections procdurales devaient tre prvues, comme la publication d'un avis sur le vote, et que le dirigeant concern devait avoir suffisamment de temps pour prsenter sa rponse aux allgations avant que le vote n'ait lieu. 111
En ce qui concerne le vote li une rvocation et l'lection partielle, il pourrait tre obligatoire, la lumire des affaires comme Corbire et Gull Bay, de demander aux membres hors rserve de voter.
112
TABLEAU DES DIFFRENTS MODLES D'IMPUTABILIT En examinant les transpositions de chacune des variables et de la faon dont elles sont lies les unes aux autres, l'on obtient un schma des principales options de modles d'imputabilit possibles. ENGAGEMENT DU PROCESSUS :
Automatique Ptition
Fond sur Des plaintes
MOTIFS :
N O 1
Motifs dcrits par la loi Dfinis Indfinis
N'importe quel motif
PRISE DE DCISION :
N O 2 N O 3 N O 4
N O 5
N O 6
Dcideur dsign
Vote public
Ce schma dcrit six diffrents modles d'imputabilit. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Rvocation automatique fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi et dfinitifs Rvocation dont la dcision est prise par un dcideur dsign, partir d'une plainte fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi Ptition fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi, soumise un dcideur dsign Rvocation fonde sur une plainte, pour des motifs dcrits par la loi, soumise un vote public Ptition pour des motifs dcrits par la loi, rvocation soumise un vote public Ptition pour n'importe quel motif, rvocation soumise un vote public (rvocation pure) 113
Remarque : Il existe d'autres variations possibles pour ces variables (p. ex., rvocation fonde sur une plainte, partir d'un motif quelconque, et soumise un vote public, etc.); cependant, ces variations sont plus loignes et ne seraient probablement pas retenues par le Groupe de travail pour qu'il en fasse l'examen. Le prsent rapport n'examine donc pas ces variations.
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COMPARAISON DES SIX MODLES D'IMPUTABILIT Remarque : Il est possible de combiner au moins deux modles dans une loi lectorale. Beaucoup de lois lectorales contiennent des dispositions lies une rvocation automatique fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi, jumeles avec une autre forme de modle d'imputabilit. La loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Sturgeon, 2009 constitue un hybride intressant qui combine la fois les modles 1, 2 et 4; celuici est rsum ci-dessous (sous le modle 4). D'autres exemples d'hybrides intressants sont prsents dans l'Annexe A, comme le Modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC (combinaison des modles 2 et 3), ainsi que le code coutumier des Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing (combinaison des modles 1, 4 et 6).
3. Rvocation automatique fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi et dfinitifs Parmi les vingt-six (26) codes examins, cinq (5), soit 19 %, correspondent ce modle. Exemple : Bande de Lennox Island, 25 juin 2001, rgles lectorales coutumires modifies L'article 29.7 prvoit que le bureau du chef ou du conseiller devienne vacant lorsque la personne qui l'occupe : 1) est dclare coupable d'un acte criminel en vertu du Code criminel; 2) dcde ou dmissionne; ou 3) devient inligible en vertu d'une disposition des rglements lectoraux coutumiers en question (les rglements en matire d'inligibilit sont lis aux exigences en matire de rsidence). Les autres codes qui suivent un modle similaire sont rsums l'Annexe A. Ceux-ci comprennent la loi lectorale 2009 de la Premire nation Tsawwasen, les rglements lectoraux de la Premire nation Namgis, avril 2008, le code lectoral communautaire de la Premire nation N'Quatqua, et le projet de code lectoral de la bande Kwakiult, 4 mai 2006. Principales considrations relatives ce modle : Il n'est pas ncessaire d'interprter si les motifs de rvocation qui sont avancs sont valables, comme dans le cas par exemple dun manquement ses devoirs. Tout ce qui doit tre prouv, c'est que le motif est rel (p. ex., la personne a t reconnue coupable d'un acte criminel). tant donn qu'il n'y a aucune exigence d'interprtation, la prsence d'un dcideur dsign n'est pas vraiment importante, et tenir une audience ou mettre en place une procdure quitable n'est pas ncessaire, etc.
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Dans ce modle, il suffit que l'entit dsigne, par exemple le Conseil, adopte une rsolution stipulant que l'un des motifs de rvocation automatique est valable, entranant ainsi la rvocation du dirigeant cibl. Le fait que les motifs sont dfinis et peuvent tre accompagns de preuves claires rend peu probable la demande d'une rvision judiciaire de la part de la personnes cible. Si les motifs sont dfinis, et si la preuve est claire, l'intervention d'un tribunal n'est pas justifie. Ce modle permet de faire des conomies videntes : il n'est pas ncessaire de demander une entit indpendante de prendre une dcision (en dehors de la prsentation d'une motion par le Conseil, d'une discussion lors d'une runion de Conseil et de l'adoption d'une rsolution). Ce modle comporte le niveau de responsabilit le plus faible de toux ceux qui sont examins dans le prsent rapport. Cette situation dcoule du nombre limit de motifs dfinis : Reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel en vertu du Code criminel; Dcde ou dmissionne; La communaut n'est plus son domicile habituel; A des paiements en souffrance lis une dette contracte auprs de la Premire nation; Dclare faillite ou est dclar en faillite en vertu de la Loi sur la faillite; Est dclar mentalement inapte. Il existe d'autres motifs pour lesquels les membres de la communaut peuvent rvoquer un dirigeant, comme le manquement ses devoirs, l'incomptence ou une inconduite; ces motifs ncessitent toutefois une certaine interprtation et donc le recours une entit prcise.
4. Rvocation dont la dcision est prise par un dcideur dsign, partir d'une plainte fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi Parmi les vingt-six (26) codes examins, huit (8), soit 30 %, correspondent ce modle. Exemples : Rglements lectoraux de la Premire nation Dene Tha' Article 9 CESSATION DES FONCTIONS
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1. DISPOSITIONS RELATIVES UNE RVOCATION - Un chef ou un conseiller peut tre dmis de ses fonctions si, en cours de mandat : (A) la suite d'un appel ou d'une enqute, il s'avre tre coupable d'une manoeuvre lectorale malhonnte; (B) il agit d'une manire qui porte prjudice sa fonction de chef ou de conseiller, ou qui est prjudiciable la Premire nation Dene Tha', si le Conseil a mis en place des politiques relatives la conduite du chef et des conseillers. 2. TRAITEMENT DES INFRACTIONS - Si une infraction en vertu de la disposition 1 de l'article 9 se produit, une motion doit tre prsente lors d'une runion du Conseil convoque en bonne et due forme, appelant la cessation des fonctions de la personne en infraction. Par la suite, le quorum du conseil doit signer une rsolution du conseil de bande de la Premire nation dcrivant l'infraction et exigeant la destitution de la personne concerne. En tout tat de cause, le chef ou le conseiller sera dmis de ses fonctions jusqu'aprs la prochaine lection gnrale. 3. CODES DE CONDUITE- Le conseil de la Premire nation peut, par rsolution officielle ou rglement, tablir d'autres rgles prcises concernant la conduite des reprsentants lus de la Premire nation Dene Tha'. Sur les huit (8) codes qui suivent ce modle, cinq (5) prvoient que le chef et le conseil soient les dcideurs dsigns qui prennent la dcision finale. Les autres codes qui dsignent le chef et le conseil en tant que dcideurs sont indiqus l'Annexe A; ceux-ci comprennent le code lectoral coutumier de la nation Gitxaala (C.-B.), 15 dcembre 2009, le code lectoral coutumier de la bande indienne de Lower Nicola, et le code lectoral 195 de la Premire nation de Salt River. Trois (3) codes prvoient que certaines entits, comme un comit d'appel ou un conseil d'anciens, prennent la dcision finale quant la rvocation du dirigeant cibl. Par exemple : Loi lectorale des Premires nations de Long Plain, 2009. Le comit d'appel en matire d'lections est l'organe qui a le pouvoir de rvoquer des membres du conseil pour des motifs dcrits dans la loi. Selon l'article 8.1, le comit d'appel en matire d'lections est compos de trois membres non tribaux. Selon l'article 18, le poste est dclar vacant pour les motifs suivants : o La personne dcde pendant l'exercice de ses fonctions. o La personne dmissionne au cours de son mandat. o La personne n'a pas assist trois (3) runions conscutives du gouvernement tribal, convoques en bonne et due forme, sans le consentement du quorum du Ogema et des Oginjiganag. o La personne a t juge coupable de pratiques de corruption en lien avec les lections, selon une dcision du comit d'appel en matire d'lections. Les 117
o o o o
actes de corruption sont entre autres l'entrave au processus lectoral, la corruption ou la contrainte lie l'lection, faire campagne pendant que les bureaux de vote sont ouverts, et tout autre motif que le comit d'appel en matire d'lections considre comme une pratique corrompue. La personne est reconnue coupable d'un acte criminel en vertu du Code criminel du Canada, ou d'un dlit grave en vertu des lois des tats-Unis. La personne a t reconnue coupable de conflit d'intrts en vertu d'une dcision du comit d'appel en matire d'lections. La personne a t juge coupable de contravention la dclaration des lus, conformment une dcision du comit d'appel en matire d'lections. La personne est ou devient inligible en vertu de loi lectorale en question.
Le code lectoral coutumier de la nation Nisichawayasihk Cree prvoit galement la mise en place d'un comit d'appel pour prendre la dcision finale en matire de rvocation. Le code lectoral de la Premire nation Peepeekisis stipule que la dcision finale est prise par un conseil des anciens. Ces codes sont rsums l'Annexe A. Le manuel de gouvernance de la Premire nation Squiala, avril 2008, rsum l'Annexe A, prcise que les membres du conseil et les membres de la communaut peuvent dposer une plainte auprs du Conseil afin d'engager le processus de rvocation (les autres codes ne donnent aucune prcision ce sujet).
Principales considrations relatives ce modle : Permet la rvocation pour davantage de motifs que le modle no 1. En revanche, puisque les motifs sont qualifis de mauvais comportements , cela permet d'viter les situations o des personnes sont rvoques pour des raisons politiques, comme cela peut se produire dans le modle no 6 (p. ex., je ne suis pas d'accord avec la dcision du chef d'appuyer tel ou tel projet, ou de signer tel ou tel accord, , ou le chef est trop ax sur les anciens et pas assez sur les jeunes, etc. ). Si le Conseil est le dcideur dsign, ne pas avoir mettre en place une autre entit pour prendre la dcision permet de faire des conomies. Toutefois, le contrle du processus par le Conseil peut donner lieu une impression de partialit par : 1) la personne soumise la procdure de rvocation (p. ex., le reste du conseil est contre moi et essaie de se dbarrasser de moi); ou 2) les membres de la communaut (p. ex., mme si nous avons port plainte contre X pour corruption, le Conseil ne voudra pas rvoquer cette personne parce qu'ils sont tous corrompus ). 118
Le deuxime problme peut toutefois tre attnu dans le cas d'un systme comme celui que prvoit le manuel de gouvernance de la Premire nation Squiala, avril 2008, qui permet expressment aux membres de la communaut de dposer une plainte pendant une runion du Conseil. Si une entit indpendante, comme le Conseil des anciens ou un comit d'appel, est le dcideur, cela permet de rendre le processus plus indpendant (il est toutefois plus coteux de mettre en place une telle entit plutt que de laisser la prise de dcision au Conseil). Avec une entit indpendante, la communaut peut parfois avoir l'impression que les membres qui composent une telle entit ne possdent pas suffisamment de connaissances sur certains problmes qui les concernent ou ne sont pas en mesure de vritablement les apprcier. Il se peut que certaines communauts veuillent des dcideurs qui connaissent bien la dynamique de la communaut afin de pouvoir prendre une dcision finale sur la rvocation d'un de ses dirigeants; pour d'autres personnes en revanche, le dcideur ne devrait pas tre un membre de la communaut. Un modle ax sur les plaintes peut ne pas tre considr comme un modle permettant une participation communautaire suffisante, comme c'est le cas par exemple avec le processus engag par voie de ptition. Une personne faisant l'objet d'une rvocation peut penser qu'un modle ax sur les plaintes permet la plainte d'une seule personne d'tre la base de sa rvocation, tandis qu'un systme de ptition permet d'assurer qu'un certain nombre de personnes pensent la mme chose au sujet de la personne cible. Plus la participation du public est importante en revanche (ptitions et vote), ce qui exige que des entits prcises soient dsignes pour superviser le processus, plus cela est coteux. Un modle ax sur les plaintes permet galement d'viter la question du mode de participation des membres hors rserve au processus de ptition (que nous avons abord plus haut). Contrairement au modle n 1, il est plus probable que le dirigeant qui a t rvoqu conteste la dcision devant les tribunaux. Les problmes viendront plutt de la ncessit de savoir si 1) le motif de la rvocation correspond aux motifs indiqus dans le Code, et 2) s'il y a eu quit procdurale l'gard du dirigeant qui a t rvoqu (avis et audience). Pour viter ce genre de situation, la loi doit clairement
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stipuler les exigences relatives au processus, et ces exigences doivent tre rigoureusement respectes.26 Exemples : Dans Premire nation Dene Tha' c. Didzena, 2005 CF 1292 (CanLII), le conseil de bande a indiqu avoir rvoqu le dirigeant lors d'une runion spciale, avec la signature d'une RCB. La Cour fdrale a statu que les procdures en question n'taient pas conformes celles figurant dans les rglements lectoraux, lesquels stipulent qu'une motion demandant la rvocation du dirigeant doit d'abord tre prsente. Il ne s'agissait pas d'une exigence de nature technique, mais d'une condition pralable qui devait tre remplie. La motion tait juge importante dans le processus, car elle permettait aux membres de la communaut d'assister une runion publique pour tre informs de la situation. Dans Martselos c. la nation de Salt River 195, 2008 CAF 221, le chef a t lu par une majorit de 11 voix lors d'une lection partielle. Dans la semaine suivant l'lection, quatre des cinq membres lus du Conseil ont adopt une RCB pour dmettre la personne cible de ses fonctions, allguant qu'elle avait fait un certain nombre d'erreurs au cours de sa premire semaine en tant que chef, dont refuser de rencontrer le Conseil, congdier ou rtrograder certains membres du personnel du bureau de bande, changer les serrures du bureau de bande, etc., montrant ainsi qu'elle se conduisait de manire autocratique sans tenir compte de l'autorit lgitime du Conseil .... La personne concerne a alors contest la dcision de sa rvocation en demandant que celle-ci soit soumise une rvision judiciaire. Le juge a dclar que parce que la chef n'exerait ses fonctions que depuis une semaine, il n'tait pas possible de dire qu'elle n'assurait pas une administration stable, comptente et efficace de la Premire nation. La Cour d'appel a vit de dcider si le code lectoral de la communaut permettait de rvoquer la personne en question et a dclar que la RCB n'expliquait pas suffisamment comment les membres du Conseil taient arrivs leur dcision ainsi que les faits qu'ils invoquaient, plutt que des allgations, et qu'il ne s'agissait donc pas d'un exercice raisonnable de leur pouvoir discrtionnaire. Comme le juge l'a indiqu : [48] Je redis simplement que le Conseil doit exercer son autorit en respectant la primaut du droit, gardant l'esprit la primaut des intrts de la bande. Un code lectoral plus labor, interprt et appliqu de manire juste et transparente, contribuerait largement raliser ce noble objectif et viter, il faut esprer, des situations comme celle-ci, qui sont contre-productives et extrmement inquitantes pour toutes les personnes concernes. 3. Ptition fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi, soumise un dcideur dsign
26
Cardinal c. Bande de Sucker Creek no 150A, [1999] A.C.F. n 1057; Prince c. Premire nation de Sucker Creek n 150A, 2008 CF 1268; Basil c. Bande indienne de Lower Nicola, 2009 CF 741
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Parmi les vingt-six (26) codes examins, quatre (4), soit 15 %, correspondent ce modle. Exemple : Constitution de la Premire nation de Westbank, 19 juillet 2007 Il existe des motifs qui rendent automatiquement un sige vacant (article 43) : o Dcs o Dmission o Reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel au Canada ou d'un crime aux tatsUnis depuis son lection; tous les appels sont termins; la dclaration de culpabilit ne doit pas se rapporter la revendication ou l'exercice de droits ou titres ancestraux o Impossibilit de remplir les fonctions de sa charge pendant plus de 6 mois o N'a pas assist trois runions conscutives du conseil ou des membres dans un dlai de 12 mois, sans raison valable (ces raisons devant tre dtermines par le reste du conseil, avec un vote la majorit) o Une vrification du casier judiciaire rvle que la personne a t reconnue coupable d'un acte criminel au Canada ou d'un crime aux tats-Unis au cours des 10 annes prcdant sa nomination. Les membres de la communaut peuvent signer une ptition pour le retrait d'un candidat au motif (article 42) : o que ledit candidat a enfreint la Constitution; o quil a enfreint son serment. La dcision de savoir si cela a effectivement eu lieu est prise par un arbitre indpendant, charg d'examiner ces questions. Le processus est le suivant (article 44) : o Une ptition signe par 20 % ou plus des lecteurs est dpose auprs de l'arbitre. o La ptition identifie le membre du Conseil qui doit tre rvoqu, expose les faits qui justifient les motifs de rvocation; elle est de plus accompagne des frais de dpt non remboursables de 75 $. o Le ptitionnaire est galement tenu de fournir 2 000 $ en cautionnement pour les dpens, dtenus en fiducie jusqu' dtermination de la question. o Aprs avoir reu la ptition juge valable, l'arbitre fixe la date, l'heure et le lieu de l'audience et dtermine la faon dont les preuves seront recueillies. o Aprs l'audience, l'arbitre doit rendre une dcision crite indiquant que le membre du Conseil doit maintenir ses fonctions ou quil est rvoqu et que le poste est dclar vacant. La dcision est publie dans le bulletin de Westbank et affiche dans les endroits publics de la communaut. o L'arbitre rend une ordonnance de dpens. o La dcision de l'arbitre est dfinitive et n'est pas susceptible d'appel. o Si la personne cible est rvoque, une lection partielle doit alors avoir lieu dans un dlai de 90 jours. 121
Les autres codes qui suivent un modle similaire, rsums l'Annexe A, comprennent les rglements lectoraux coutumiers de la Premire nation de Sucker Creek, les lois lectorales de la Premire nation de Muskeg Lake et le Modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC. (Le modle de code l'AINC est en fait un hybride des modles no 2 et no 3; et la dcision est prise par un dcideur indpendant dsign.) Principales considrations relatives ce modle : Par rapport aux modles no 1 et no 2, avoir un processus de rvocation initi par voie de ptition permet une plus grande participation de la communaut ainsi qu'un plus grand contrle du processus en question. Contrairement au modle n 2, ce modle permet dviter les situations o les plaintes peuvent venir d'un seul individu ou d'une petite minorit. En exigeant qu'un certain nombre de personnes signent la ptition, on s'assure alors qu'un certain consensus existe au sein de la communaut quant au souhait de voir le dirigeant cibl tre rvoqu. Le pourcentage de personnes devant signer la ptition est fix par le lgislateur. Plus ce pourcentage est lev, plus il est difficile d'obtenir ce nombre.
Les codes qui permettent au processus de rvocation d'tre initi par voie de ptition varient beaucoup : constitution de la nation Yavapai-Apache, Arizona 35 % des lecteurs; constitution de la tribu autochtone Huslia, Alaska 60 % des lecteurs; modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC - 25 % des lecteurs; Premire nation de Smith's Landing, mai 2004 - 50% des lecteurs; rglement lectoral coutumier de la Premire nation de Sucker Creek 50 % des lecteurs + 1; constitution de la Premire nation de Westbank, 19 juillet 2007 20 % des lecteurs; code lectoral des Premires nations de Grand Rapid 51 % des lecteurs; Recall and Initiative Act de la Colombie-Britannique, RSBC 1996, c. 398 40 % des lecteurs.
Toutefois, comme nous l'avons indiqu plus haut, le processus ptitionnel soulve un certain nombre de questions en ce qui concerne les lecteurs hors rserve. En associant certains motifs des mauvais comportements , on vite les situations dans lesquelles des personnes sont rvoques pour des raisons purement politiques, comme dans le modle no 6 (rvocation directe). Ce modle en revanche est associ une participation communautaire moins importante que dans les modles 4, 5 et 6, qui sont soumis un vote public. La dcision finale est prise par un dcideur dsign. Avoir un dcideur dsign peut tre cependant moins coteux que de tenir un vote communautaire. Une ptition peut tre associe certains cots (photocopies, surveillance - veiller ce qu'il n'y ait ni ddoublement, ni fraude), ceux-ci n'tant pas trs levs.
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Par rapport un processus qui se termine par un vote public, ce modle peut entraner moins de perturbations. Dans une petite communaut, un vote peut tre source de discorde. Il se peut que certains membres de la communaut souhaitent participer la prise de dcisions finale, mais que d'autres en revanche soient soulags qu'un individu ait t dsign pour s'occuper de l'affaire. Comme nous l'avons indiqu pour le modle 2, il existe des problmes de conflit et d'impartialit quand le Conseil prend la dcision finale. Il peut tre prfrable de demander une entit indpendante, plutt qu'au Conseil, de prendre cette dcision. Mme s'il faut cependant des ressources financires pour mettre en place une telle entit (ajoutons cela le niveau de connaissance que doivent possder les membres de cette entit sur les affaires de la communaut), ce processus peut coter moins cher que d'avoir organiser un vote public (comme c'est le cas pour les modles 4, 5 et 6).
Exemples : Dans Cardinal c. Sucker Creek Indian Band n 150A, [1999] ACF n 1057, le chef, Alvin Cardinal, qui avait t lu un an plus tt, a fait l'objet d'une ptition signe par 119 membres de la Premire nation pour sa rvocation. Le conseil de bande a ensuite tenu une srie de runions pour examiner la ptition, sans toutefois jamais inviter Cardinal venir prsenter ses observations. Celui-ci a t dmis de ses fonctions, suite quoi il a demand une rvision judiciaire de l'affaire. La Cour fdrale a statu que le processus de rvocation n'tait pas conforme aux dispositions des rglements lectoraux coutumiers pour les motifs suivants: 1) la ptition n'avait pas t signe par au moins 50 % des lecteurs + 1; 2) la ptition avait t initie par un non-lecteur selon la dfinition donne de ce terme dans les rglements; 3) les raisons de la rvocation n'taient pas fondes sur un motif dcrit dans les rglements (p. ex. ivresse ou inconduite), mais plutt sur le mcontentement de certaines personnes (sortir en plein milieu d'une runion de bande, embaucher une personne qui n'tait pas un membre de la bande pour tre responsable de l'quipement); 4) il n'y avait aucune preuve, quant la conduite de Cardinal, relevant des motifs admissibles; 5) Cardinal n'avait pas reu un pravis suffisant pour les runions concernant sa rvocation et n'avait pas eu la possibilit de rpondre aux allgations lors de la runion. Dans Prince c. Sucker Creek First Nation no 150A, 2008 CF 1268, quatre membres du Conseil ont adopt une rsolution pour rvoquer deux conseillers en raison d'un conflit d'intrts li un contrat de la bande. Puisque les conseillers n'avaient pas respect les dispositions relatives aux rvocations, indiques dans les rglements lectoraux, la rvocation en question a t dclare non valable. Au paragraphe 49, la Cour a dclar :
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Dans ce cas-ci, les rglements lectoraux exigent qu'une ptition soit signe par 50 % des lecteurs + 1 avant que le Conseil puisse procder une rvocation. Les lecteurs ont lu les candidats, et les rglements lectoraux donnent ces lecteurs le pouvoir d'initier un processus de rvocation. Lesdits rglements sont tout fait clairs et refltent des principes logiques et dmocratiques. Sinon, en cas de conflit entre conseillers, certains pourraient adopter des rsolutions aux fins de rvocation en formant des alliances, ce qui nuirait la volont des lecteurs et n'a donc pas de sens. 4. Rvocation fonde sur une plainte, pour des motifs dcrits par la loi, soumise un vote public Parmi les vingt-six (26) codes examins, trois (3), soit 12 %, correspondent ce modle. Exemple(s) : Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Sturgeon Lake, 2009 L'article 15 prvoit que le poste de chef ou de conseiller soit immdiatement dclar vacant lorsque la personne qui l'occupe : j) est dclare coupable d'une infraction pouvant influer sur sa capacit faire preuve dun leadership efficace ou jeter le discrdit sur sa personne ou le bureau, y compris, mais sans s'y limiter, la fraude, les crimes violents, y compris un homicide, un homicide involontaire et des agressions, de quelque nature qu'elles soient, une infraction caractre Parmi ces motifs, sexuel, des infractions tendant corrompre les murs, une conduite beaucoup sont dsordonne, des infractions relatives aux drogues et l'alcool; dfinitifs k) dcde ou dmissionne; (modle 1), l) est reconnue coupable par le Tribunal d'appel, dans le cadre d'une alors que lection, d'une manoeuvre malhonnte, d'un don ou de l'acceptation d'un d'autres ncessitent une pot-de-vin, de malhonntet ou d'actes de malveillance; interprtation, m) n'tait pas prsente 3 runions conscutives du Conseil, sans y tre tels que c et g. autorise; n) dclare une faillite personnelle; o) est dclare inapte exercer par un mdecin autoris de la province de la Ce motif est li au Saskatchewan; processus ax sur p) ne respecte pas son serment, les rglements de bande ou toute loi une plainte pour dment adopte par la bande, y compris la prsente loi ou la loi sur des motifs dcrits lexcutif (Executive Act); dans la loi, la q) est dmise de ses fonctions suite un vote de non confiance en vertu de question devant tre tranche par la loi sur lexcutif de la Sturgeon Lake First Nation, 2009; un vote public. r) est dclare inligible en vertu de la prsente loi ou toute modification s'y (modle n 4) rapportant.
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Le vote de non-confiance en vertu de la loi sur lexcutif (Executive Act) de la Premire nation de Sturgeon Lake, 2009 peut tre rsum comme suit : o Vot au motif d'un manquement grave aux devoirs et responsabilits noncs dans la Executive Act. o Une personne dpose une plainte officielle, par crit, appuye par un affidavit exposant les motifs au Conseil consultatif des anciens. (La personne est appele le ptitionnaire - mais le processus ne ncessite pas en ralit de ptition signe par un certain pourcentage d'lecteurs.) o Le ptitionnaire donne une garantie d'un montant de 100 $ pour prsenter la plainte. o Le Conseil consultatif des anciens avise la personne contre laquelle la plainte est dirige et convoque une runion du Tribunal d'appel, laquelle ladite personne et le requrant assistent pour avoir une audience. o Une fois l'audience termine, si la majorit des membres du Conseil consultatif des anciens et du Tribunal d'appel pensent que les motifs de la ptition sont justifis, une runion de bande est convoque pour dcider, par vote, si la personne cible doit tre rvoque. o Le poste en question devient vacant si 50 % + 1 des personnes prsentes lors de la runion de bande votent en faveur de la motion de non-confiance.
Les autres codes qui suivent un modle similaire, rsums l'Annexe A, comprennent le code lectoral des Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing et la loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Cold Lake. Principales considrations relatives ce modle : Problmes similaires au modle 2, sur la nature des plaintes ainsi que sur la possibilit, par une seule personne mcontente, d'initier le processus de rvocation. tant donn toutefois que la prise de dcision finale se fait par un vote public, ce processus permet de faire en sorte qu'il y ait un certain consensus. Comme dans l'affaire Corbire, il faudrait probablement permettre aux membres hors rserve de voter. tant donn que ce modle est fond sur des motifs dcrits dans la loi, et mme s'il y a un vote public, une personne ou une entit, comme le chef et le Conseil, le directeur des lections, un avocat, un mdiateur, etc., devrait dcider si les plaintes entrent dans le cadre des motifs noncs dans la loi lectorale.
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Comme ce serait galement le cas avec les modles 5 et 6, avoir recours un vote public pour la dcision finale est probablement plus coteux que d'avoir recours un dcideur dsign. Bien qu'il n'y ait pas de processus ptitionnel superviser, une personne devrait tre dsigne pour superviser le vote, comme un agent lectoral. En outre, dans la plupart des communauts, le vote public sert seulement rvoquer un dirigeant. Une fois la rvocation obtenue, une lection partielle doit tre organise pour combler le poste vacant (dans certaines communauts, si une telle rvocation se produit six mois avant la prochaine lection, aucune lection partielle n'est organise, sauf s'il est impossible d'obtenir un quorum au sein du Conseil). En ce qui concerne ce modle, il y a le risque d'avoir deux lections. En Colombie-Britannique, le processus de rvocation est conu de sorte qu'une ptition signe par 40 % des lecteurs est suffisante pour dmettre un dirigeant de ses fonctions, et le seul vote qui a lieu est une lection partielle pendant laquelle le dirigeant en question est libre de se reprsenter. (Ce modle a t critiqu et il en sera question plus loin dans les parties sur les modles 5 et 6.) Dans le modle 4, cela ne peut pas se produire puisque le processus n'est pas initi par une ptition mais par une plainte. Mme si la rvocation se fait pas le biais d'un vote et non d'une audience, cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu'il n'existe aucune exigence en matire d'quit procdurale. La personne cible par la rvocation doit en effet avoir suffisamment de temps pour prsenter ses arguments.
Exemple : Dans Catholique c. Lutsel KE First Nation Band Council, 2005 CF 1430, plusieurs proccupations ont t exprimes au sujet de la gouvernance du chef Catholique en 2004. Lors d'une runion des membres de la bande qui s'est tenue le 28 janvier 2005, une rsolution a t adopte pour dmettre le chef en question de ses fonctions. Le chef Catholique ayant t prvenu de la situation plus tt cette mme journe, celui-ci avait tout de mme eu la possibilit de participer une discussion, plutt anime, sur les proccupations exprimes au sujet de son leadership. Une fois la runion termine, 37 des membres prsents ont vot en faveur de sa rvocation; 5 se sont abstenus. Par la suite, en raison de proccupations au sujet de la loi applicable dans un cas comme celui-ci, le conseil de bande a tenu une runion pour confirmer la rsolution de l'assemble spciale. Catholique n'tait pas prsent lors de la runion. Suite de nouvelles proccupations exprimes sur la procdure approprie, une autre runion publique a eu lieu le 7 fvrier 2005. La communaut a t informe de cette runion grce des affiches et des annonces faites la radio. Lors de cette assemble, aprs un long dbat pendant lequel le chef cibl a contest les allgations faites contre lui, 67 des membres prsents ont vot en faveur de la rvocation, 23 contre et 2 bulletins nuls. Le chef Catholique a alors engag une procdure de contrle judiciaire. 126
Le juge a dclar que Catholique avait droit une quit procdurale quant l'obtention d'un avis suffisant et la possibilit d'tre entendu. Le juge a conclu qu'il n'y avait pas eu quit procdurale pour les deux premires runions, mais que pour la troisime runion en revanche, Catholique avait reu un avis suffisant et suffisamment de temps pour se faire entendre. La rsolution adopte le 7 fvrier 2005 serait par consquent maintenue. 5. Ptition pour des motifs dcrits par la loi, rvocation soumise un vote public Parmi les vingt-six (26) codes examins, deux (2), soit 8 %, correspondent ce modle. Exemple : Premire nation de Smith Landing, mai 2004. Article 19 - Le Conseil doit convoquer une runion spciale de la communaut si : 3) ledit Conseil a reu une ptition signe par 50 % des lecteurs (qui taient admissibles voter lors des dernires lections), sur l'un des motifs suivants : a. Le membre du Conseil n'a pas assist 5 runions de Conseil conscutives sans raison valable; b. Ledit membre est coupable d'ivresse, d'inconduite et de conduite irresponsable au cours d'une runion du Conseil et dans une runion communautaire ou vnement public, ce qui entrave la conduite des affaires ou discrdite la rputation du Conseil ou de la Premire nation; c. Le membre est accus ou reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel en vertu du Code criminel; d. Infraction aux lignes directrices de la Premire nation en matire de conflits d'intrt; e. A pris part des pratiques lectorales frauduleuses, lesquelles ont t seulement dcouvertes aprs le dlai d'appel; f. Ne rside pas Fort Smith; g. Dtournement de fonds de la Premire nation ou appropriation de biens de la Premire nation ses propres fins; h. Suspendu 3 fois par le Conseil au cours de son mandat; (Le Conseil peut suspendre un membre pour manquement ses devoirs ou obligations en vertu des prsents rglements, ou pour les conduites indiques ci-dessus, pendant un maximum de 30 jours et sans solde - Article 18) i. N'a pas repris ses fonctions aprs 60 jours suivant l'absence autorise. 4) Aprs avoir reu la ptition, l'avocat du Conseil informe celui-ci que les motifs invoqus dans la ptition correspondent ceux qui sont indiqus dans les prsents rglements.
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Si la ptition est juge valable et si l'avocat du Conseil dclare que son contenu est conforme aux rglements en vigueur, le Conseil dispose alors de 21 jours pour convoquer une runion communautaire spciale pour envisager une rvocation. Pour que la rvocation du membre cibl puisse avoir lieu, 70 % des lecteurs prsents doivent voter en sa faveur, par voie de rsolution, laquelle doit indiquer les motifs. Sans runion publique, le Conseil est autoris adopter une rsolution pour rvoquer un membre du Conseil si ce membre a t suspendu 3 fois ou dclar coupable d'un acte criminel. Dans un dlai d'un mois suivant la rvocation ( moins que cette rvocation n'ait eu lieu 3 mois avant la prochaine lection gnrale), des lections partielles doivent tre tenues.
La politique de la Premire nation de Grand Rapids, qui suit un modle semblable, est rsume l'Annexe A. Principales considrations relatives ce modle : Processus initi par voie de ptition - Ce processus permet d'obtenir une participation communautaire plus importante, un plus grand contrle sur le processus ainsi que d'viter des problmes potentiels lis aux modles axs sur les plaintes (modles 2 et 4). Toutefois, comme nous l'avons indiqu plus haut, le processus ptitionnel soulve un certain nombre de questions en ce qui concerne les lecteurs hors rserve. tant donn que ce modle est fond sur des motifs dcrits dans la loi, et mme s'il y a un vote public, une personne ou une entit, comme le chef et le Conseil, un agent lectoral, un avocat, un mdiateur, etc., doit dcider si les plaintes invoques dans la ptition entrent dans le cadre des motifs noncs dans la loi lectorale. Il faut galement quelqu'un pour superviser le vote, p. ex. un agent lectoral. Comme dans l'affaire Corbire, il faut permettre aux membres hors rserve de voter. Le fait que la rvocation reste fonde sur des motifs noncs dans la loi constitue la distinction relle entre le modle 5 et le modle 6 (rvocation pure). Invoquer des motifs dcrits dans la loi pour rvoquer une personne permet de minimiser les possibilits d'abus dont beaucoup de gens se proccupent quand il s'agit d'une pure rvocation. Cette question est examine de faon plus dtaille dans la partie suivante, qui porte sur le modle 6. Comme nous l'avons indiqu pour le modle 4, avoir recours un vote public pour la dcision finale est probablement plus coteux que d'avoir recours un dcideur dsign. 128
Nous avons indiqu, pour le modle 4, que 2 votes doivent avoir lieu : le premier pour la rvocation, le second l'occasion d'lections partielles. Nous avons galement indiqu que dans les cas o il y a d'abord un processus ptitionnel (comme dans ce cas-ci), il est possible, comme en Colombie-Britannique, qu'une ptition permette de rvoquer un dirigeant (sans vote public), et que celui-ci se reprsente lors d'lections partielles. Ce modle comporte cependant certains problmes : o Si l'on rvoque un dirigeant pour des raisons lies une mauvaise conduite, le vote doit entraner une rvocation de cette personne sans pour autant lui permettre de se prsenter nouveau. En Colombie-Britannique, o les dirigeants peuvent tre rvoqus pour des raisons purement politiques, cet aspect est peut-tre moins proccupant.27 o Dmettre un dirigeant de ses fonctions, seulement partir d'une ptition, avant un vote, comporte d'ventuels problmes d'quit procdurale. Par exemple, le rapport du directeur gnral des lections sur le processus de rvocation en Colombie-Britannique, datant de novembre 2003, conclu qu'avoir recours une ptition aux fins de rvocation en tant que processus lectoral pour rvoquer un membre de l'Assemble lgislative est clairement inappropri. Le processus de rvocation est un mcanisme qui permet aux lecteurs de dmettre de leurs fonctions des dirigeants dment lus. Le processus ptitionnel toutefois n'a ni le caractre officiel, ni la rigueur, ni les garanties ncessaires un tel rsultat. Le rsultat d'une ptition aux fins de rvocation devrait tre un vote de rvocation, par le biais d'une lection spciale ou d'un rfrendum rvocatoire.28
Les inconvnients d'un vote spar cependant sont l'augmentation des cots d'administration et un taux de participation potentiellement plus faible.29 Mme si la rvocation se fait par vote, plutt que par une audience, cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu'il n'existe aucune exigence en matire d'quit procdurale. La personne cible par la rvocation doit en effet avoir suffisamment de temps pour prsenter ses arguments.
Exemple :
27
En vertu de nombreux codes qui permettent de rvoquer des candidats, ces derniers n'ont pas le droit de se reprsenter pendant un priode de temps dtermine. Voir par exemple le manuel de gouvernance de la Premire nation Squiala (ne peut pas se prsenter aux prochaines lections); nation crie Nisichawayasihk (ne peut pas se prsenter pendant 8 ans); loi lectorale des Premires nations de Long Plain (ne peut pas se prsenter pendant 10 ans; Premires nations de Grand Rapid (ne peut pas se prsenter pendant 4 ans). 28 Rapport du directeur gnral des lections sur le processus de rvocation en Colombie-Britannique, novembre 2003, p. 2. 29 Ibid., p. 27.
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Dans Ballantyne c. Nasikapow, [2000] ACF n 1896, o un chef a t rvoqu en vertu de la politique des Premires nations de Grand Rapid (modle 5), avec une ptition pour des motifs dcrits par ladite politique, suivie d'un vote public, la ptition en question a t juge non conforme puisqu'elle comportait des ddoublements et des fausses signatures; l'agent lectoral avait de plus le devoir de mieux superviser le processus. En outre, la politique lectorale en question ne prcisait aucun dlai quant au processus ptitionnel, lequel a en fin de compte dur sept mois. Une fois la ptition prsente, l'agent lectoral a convoqu un rfrendum dans la semaine suivante pour voter au sujet de la rvocation. La Cour fdrale a statu qu'une seule semaine ne donnait pas suffisamment de temps au chef en question pour rpondre aux accusations portes contre lui.
6. Ptition pour un motif quelconque, rvocation soumise un vote public (rvocation pure) Parmi les vingt-six (26) codes examins, quatre (4), soit 15 %, suivent ce modle, dont deux dans des tribus indiennes amricaines. Exemple : Constitution de la nation Yavapai-Apache, Arizona La constitution de la nation Yavapai-Apache (Arizona) comprend la fois un modle ax sur les plaintes, pour des motifs dcrits par la loi, avec un dcideur dsign (conseil tribal), ainsi qu'une ptition, fonde sur n'importe quel motif, avec dcision sur vote public. Les diffrents modles sont rsums ci-dessous : a) Rvocation dont la dcision est prise par un dcideur dsign, partir d'une plainte fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi (modle 2) o Le conseil tribal peut suspendre ou rvoquer un membre du conseil pour les raisons suivantes : Dfaut d'assister trois (3) runions ordinaires ou spciales conscutives sans raison valable, p. ex. maladie, vacances, dcs d'un membre de la famille immdiate, absence de pravis suffisant. Condamnation par un tribal, une Cour fdrale ou d'tat pour l'un des dlits suivants : Acte dlictueux grave Tout crime caractre sexuel Ivresse et inconduite, ou comportement quivalent Trois (3) mfaits alors qu'il sigeait au conseil tribal Outrage au tribunal 130
Manquement grave au devoir ou faute grave, par exemple dfaut de rvler un conflit d'intrts ou infraction au code de dontologie du Conseil tribal (si un tel code existe)
b) Ptition pour n'importe quel motif, rvocation soumise un vote public (modle 6) o Tout membre de la tribu peut amorcer un processus de rvocation en dposant, auprs du comit d'lection, une dclaration crite de 100 mots ou moins indiquant les raisons pour lesquelles le membre du Conseil tribal en question devrait tre rvoqu. o Le comit d'lection supervise l'ensemble du processus; le Conseil tribal n'a pas comptence sur les procdures de rvocation. o Une fois le processus de rvocation engag en bonne et due forme, le comit d'lection remet des formulaires de ptition au ptitionnaire. o Le ptitionnaire a 60 jours pour recueillir les signatures de 35 % des lecteurs admissibles. o Une fois le dlai de 60 jours expir, le comit lectoral vrifie les signatures dans les 10 jours suivant la rception de la ptition. o Si le nombre de signatures admissibles est suffisant, un vote est tenu. o Lorsque l'avis d'lection est envoy aux membres de la tribu, la personne vise par la rvocation peut dposer une rponse crite aux accusations invoques dans la ptition, laquelle est envoye avec l'avis d'lection. o Le vote a pour seul but de dcider si la personne doit tre rvoque ou non, et non pas de la remplacer. Si la personne est rvoque, des lections partielles doivent tre tenues pour combler le poste vacant, sauf s'il reste 6 mois ou moins au mandat, auquel cas le poste en question reste vacant jusqu' la prochaine lection. o Le rsultat de l'lection est dfinitif. o Un membre du conseil tribal qui est rvoqu doit attendre un an avant de pouvoir se porter nouveau candidat. Les autres codes qui suivent un modle similaire, rsums l'Annexe A, comprennent la Constitution de la tribu indigne des Huslia, le code lectoral des six nations de Grand River, et le code lectoral coutumier des Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing. Principales considrations relatives ce modle : Parmi tous les modles examins, ce modle offre le meilleur niveau de contrle communautaire sur l'imputabilit des dirigeants; mais tant donn que n'importe quel motif peut tre invoqu pour une rvocation, il s'agit galement du modle le plus susceptible d'entraner des abus. Ce modle permet en effet aux citoyens d'initier un processus de rvocation pour n'importe quel motif. Cela signifie que les dirigeants peuvent non seulement tre rvoqus pour mauvaise conduite , mais galement pour des dcisions politiques impopulaires. 131
Il s'agit du genre de procdure de rvocation qui existe en Colombie-Britannique depuis 1995. Aucune autre province n'a depuis embot le pas. Selon le site Web de Elections BC, le directeur gnral des lections a approuv 20 demandes de rvocation depuis 1995. Sur les 20 ptitions mises, quatre ont t retournes Elections BC, deux ont fait l'objet d'une vrification et une a t soumise au processus de vrification complet. Sur ces 20 ptitions, 19 ont chou par manque de signatures admissibles. L'autre ptition a t interrompue pendant le processus de vrification parce que le dput en question avait dmissionn.30 Dans la loi de la Colombie-Britannique intitule Recall and Initiative Act, RSBC 1996, l'article 398 ne prcise pas les motifs de rvocation mais prvoit simplement que les membres de la circonscription lectorale que le chef reprsente (qui ont vot lors des dernires lections) doivent indiquer dans une dclaration ne dpassant pas 200 mots, pourquoi, de l'avis du requrant, la rvocation du membre en question est justifie (article 19(1)(c)). Certaines des dclarations prsentes lors de tentatives de rvocation en Colombie-Britannique sont fournies ci-dessous titre d'exemples :31 o Val Roddick, dput de Delta South, n'a pas su tenir compte des souhaits de ses lecteurs et devrait donc tre rvoqu. o Je crois que Gillian Trumper, dput, devrait tre rvoque parce qu'elle soutient activement les politiques et programmes du gouvernement libral de la Colombie-Britannique. Sans mandat et aprs avoir remport une majorit non reprsentative l'Assemble lgislative, le gouvernement libral a lanc un programme visant dtruire les avantages sociaux mis en place par des gnrations de citoyens de la Colombie-Britannique. o Jeff Bray, dput de Victoria-Beacon Hill, devrait tre rvoqu car il a induit en erreur les lecteurs au cours de la dernire campagne lectorale. Depuis les lections, il n'a pas su tenir compte des souhaits de ses lecteurs. o Gordon Campbell, dput de Vancouver-Point Grey, n'a pas su tenir compte des souhaits de ses lecteurs. Il a fait preuve de mauvais jugement et a toujours vit de rendre des comptes. Il convient donc, pour ces raisons, de le rvoquer. o Lorne Mayencourt est dmis de ses fonctions pour n'avoir pas su, de nombreuses reprises, reprsenter les intrts de ses lecteurs.
30
http://www.elections.bc.ca/index.php/referenda-recall-initiative/recall/ (dernier accs le 04/10/2010) Il semble que selon le tableau qui accompagne cette information, celle-ci soit jour (2003). 31 Voir le rapport du directeur gnral des lections sur le processus de rvocation en Colombie-Britannique, Annexe A.
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Dans un rapport de la commission parlementaire de la Colombie-Britannique qui examine l'adoption du processus de rvocation par la province en 1993, un certain nombre de proccupations ont t exprimes ce sujet : Ddouble ou usurpe le rle des lections gnrales. C'est pendant des lections que les lus sont appels rendre compte des actions prises pendant la priode prcdente. Si on ne veut plus d'un politicien ou si celui-ci est peru comme ayant commis des fautes ou d'avoir simplement de mauvais reprsentants, il peut tre alors dmis de ses fonctions. Les reprsentants devraient gnralement avoir la chance de faire partie du gouvernement jusqu' la prochaine lection.32 Tient les dirigeants en mode lectoral constant. Le processus de rvocation favorise, chez l'lu, le court terme plutt que le long terme. Le processus de rvocation pourrait encourager les politiciens seulement agir par rapport ce qui semble acceptable pour le public un moment donn, et perdre de vue la situation dans son ensemble. Dans un systme qui adopte le processus de rvocation, il se peut que l'lu ait tendance reprsenter la majorit, mme si c'est seulement court terme ou fondamentalement goste. Avec le processus de rvocation, beaucoup craignent qu'un lu soit plus soucieux de garder sa place, puisqu'un tel processus peut induire s'abstenir de toute action ncessaire afin d'viter un conflit ou une controverse.33 Source potentielle de discorde, processus perturbateur et soumis un certain nombre d'abus. Exemples : o Les mauvais perdants font appel afin de se faire lire de nouveau. N'tant pas satisfait des rsultats de la dernire lection, le perdant peut recueillir l'appui de ses partisans et d'autres personnes afin de provoquer une autre lutte lectorale.34 o Possibilits d'abus. Certains groupes peuvent utiliser une question secondaire comme un prtexte pour obtenir la rvocation d'un reprsentant de ses fonctions, alors que la plainte relle du groupe en question porte sur une question tout fait diffrente.35 Les lus sont susceptibles d'tre attaqus pour des raisons politiques, et pas forcment parce qu'ils ne rpondent pas aux besoins des lecteurs.36
32 33
Premier rapport du comit sur la rforme parlementaire en Colombie-Britannique, supra, p. 1. Premier rapport du comit sur la rforme parlementaire en Colombie-Britannique, supra, p. 1-2. 34 Premier rapport du comit sur la rforme parlementaire en Colombie-Britannique, supra, p. 3. 35 Premier rapport du comit sur la rforme parlementaire en Colombie-Britannique, supra, p. 2. 36 Premier rapport du comit sur la rforme parlementaire en Colombie-Britannique, supra, p. 3.
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o Cette proccupation a t souleve par certains snateurs lors des audiences du Comit snatorial permanent des peuples autochtones, portant sur l'examen de la rforme lectorale de la Loi sur les Indiens. Le snateur Lang a indiqu que pour lui, le processus de rvocation est source de divisions au sein de la communaut si un groupe de contestataires peut, tout moment, initier un tel processus , en raison de la faible population .37 Il se peut qu'un dbat srieux sur le bien-fond des accusations n'ait pas lieu. Le processus de rvocation nie une personne le droit d'tre prsume innocente jusqu' preuve du contraire ; celui-ci rsulte en la mise en accusation, par dbat public, d'un reprsentant, sans aucune des protections d'un procs.38
Dans un modle de rvocation pure, des protections procdurales peuvent tre intgres dans le systme pour tenter d'attnuer certaines formes d'abus. Par exemple : g) Facturer des frais pour le dpt de la ptition de rvocation et imposer que la ptition comporte un cautionnement pour les dpens.39 h) Imposer un dlai de prescription avant de pouvoir initier un processus de rvocation, par exemple au moins un an (ou plus) aprs la dernire lection gnrale, et pas de ptition au cours de l'anne prcdant des lections. Cette situation comporte le problme suivant : si le but de dmettre un dirigeant de ses fonctions vient du fait que celui-ci s'est mal comport, la priode pendant laquelle les comportements en question se sont produits ne devrait pas tre importante. Par exemple, si un dirigeant s'est appropri, ses propres fins, des biens appartenant la bande, les citoyens devraient avoir la possibilit de le dmettre de ses fonctions, que l'incident se soit produit 6 mois aprs son lection ou 6 mois avant les lections suivantes. i) Imposer des limites sur le nombre de ptitions et de votes de rvocation l'endroit d'un mme dirigeant. En Colombie-Britannique, plusieurs ptitions peuvent circuler en mme temps contre un mme dirigeant; cependant, si une de ces ptitions russit dclencher un vote, il ne peut y avoir qu'un seul vote par mandat.40
37
Snat du Canada, dlibrations du Comit snatorial permanent des peuples autochtones, le lundi 25 mai 2009, la p. 7:95. 38 Premier rapport du comit sur la rforme parlementaire en Colombie-Britannique, supra, p. 2. 39 Cette procdure peut tre intgre dans tous les modles qui supposent un vote public (modles 4, 5 et 6). 40 Cette procdure peut tre intgre dans tous les modles qui supposent un vote public (modles 4, 5 et 6).
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j) Imposer un seuil lev de signatures pour qu'une ptition justifie les dpenses ncessaires la tenue d'une lection des fins de rvocation. Cela permet galement d'obtenir un soutien public suffisant pour la rvocation.41 k) Imposer un dlai pendant lequel le ptitionnaire doit obtenir toutes les signatures ncessaires. En Colombie-Britannique, le ptitionnaire doit obtenir le montant requis de signatures (40 % des lecteurs d'une circonscription) dans un dlai de 60 jours. Ce dlai exige du ptitionnaire qu'il soit suffisamment srieux et organis.42 l) Pour viter les situations d'abus, comme une rvocation intente par un mauvais perdant, il pourrait y avoir une exigence relative la justice naturelle . Nous suggrons ce qui suit : une fois la ptition valable, l'lu cibl par le processus de rvocation devrait avoir la possibilit de rpondre aux accusations portes contre lui; par exemple, soit lors d'une audience devant un comit indpendant, soit par le biais d'une rvision judiciaire devant les tribunaux.43 Le modle 5, que nous avons abord plus haut, offre moins de possibilits d'abus tout en procurant un niveau proche de contrle des lecteurs. Le fait de devoir invoquer un motif dcrit dans la loi, li un mauvais comportement , et fournir des preuves, diminue les risques d'abus. Aux .-U., dix-huit tats autorisent actuellement la rvocation d'lus, dont sept exigent l'invocation de motifs dcrits dans la loi, comme l'inconduite, l'incomptence, la condamnation pour crime ou la violation du serment.44 En ce qui concerne le processus de rvocation, la possibilit de devoir tenir deux votes existe : le premier pour la rvocation, le second pour l'lection partielle. Ces votes comportent un certain nombre de cots. Il y a la possibilit d'avoir un seul vote, comme en Colombie-Britannique, mais certains problmes sont associs ce systme (que nous avons dj abords avec le modle n 5). Mme si la rvocation se fait par vote, plutt que par une audience, cela ne signifie pas pour autant qu'il n'existe aucune exigence en matire d'quit procdurale. En ce qui a trait aux lois lectorales des Premires nations, les tribunaux ont dclar qu'un pravis suffisant doit tre accord avant le vote, et
41
Cette procdure peut tre intgre dans tous les modles exigeant que le processus soit initi par voie de ptition (modles 3, 5 et 6). 42 Cette procdure peut tre intgre dans tous les modles exigeant que le processus soit initi par voie de ptition (modles 3, 5 et 6). 43 Premier rapport du comit sur la rforme parlementaire en Colombie-Britannique, supra, p. 3. 44 Pour plus d'informations, consulter le site http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/rpt/2004-R-0082.htm
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que la personne cible par la rvocation ait suffisamment de temps pour avoir la possibilit de prsenter ses arguments. Exemple : Seymour c. Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing, 2009 CF 133, concernant le code lectoral de la Premire nation des Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing, lequel contient une disposition de rvocation pure. Cette disposition a t utilise pour rvoquer un conseiller, et celui-ci a eu recours une rvision judiciaire. La Cour fdrale a conclu que, puisque la rputation du conseiller ainsi que le maintien du droit d'occuper sa charge taient en jeu, ces intrts taient sans nul doute suffisamment importants pour faire l'objet d'une quit. La Cour a dclar que l'avis li au vote de rvocation, publi dans plusieurs journaux locaux, tait insuffisant, en particulier parce de nombreux membres de la communaut vivaient hors rserve. Un avis plus important devait donc tre donn ces membres. Malgr cela cependant, la Cour a exerc son pouvoir discrtionnaire de ne pas rintgrer le conseiller, car une majorit crasante des personnes ayant vot tait en faveur de sa rvocation; de plus, le rintgrer aurait entran une instabilit politique.
Conclusion Comme ce rapport l'explique, le groupe de travail doit examiner un certain nombre d'aspects avant de proposer un modle d'imputabilit particulier pour accompagner la recommandation de proroger le mandat de chef et du conseil (Loi sur les Indiens) de deux (2) quatre (4) ans. Il semble que le groupe de travail, en ce qui concerne les diffrents modles examins dans le prsent rapport, soit confront une situation semblable celle de Goldie-Locks pendant sa visite de la maison des trois ours. Celui-ci doit en effet dcider lequel des modles en question est le meilleur . Selon l'humble avis de l'auteure (que le groupe de travail est libre d'ignorer), les modles les plus extrmes, c'est--dire les modles 1 et 6, ne sont pas souhaitables pour les raisons suivantes : Le modle 1 procure le niveau d'imputabilit le plus faible pour des motifs dfinis et dcrits dans la loi. Bien que peu coteux et peu susceptible d'entraner des litiges, ce modle ne permettrait probablement pas de satisfaire ce que de nombreux membres de la communaut recherchent dans un processus de rvocation , parce qu'il ne permet pas de vritablement tenir un dirigeant responsable d'actions qualifies de mauvaise conduite . 136
Modle 6 - Alors que ce modle offre aux lecteurs le plus de pouvoir pour la rvocation d'un dirigeant, sa mise en oeuvre est si large qu'il comporte des risques d'abus. Un tel systme permettrait en effet un mauvais perdant de rechercher la rvocation d'un membre du Conseil pour des motifs flous (p. ex. ne sert pas les besoins de la communaut ), sans avoir en fournir la preuve. Ce modle peut galement tre coteux, puisqu'il ncessite qu'une personne supervise le processus ptitionnel, vrifie la formulation des ptitions, supervise le vote de rvocation ainsi que le vote de l'lection partielle si les lecteurs votent en faveur de la rvocation. Toutes ces lections peuvent engendrer de l'instabilit au sein de la communaut. Selon l'auteure, si en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens un tel systme tait autoris aprs les deux premires annes d'un mandat lectoral de quatre ans, il permettrait ceux qui le souhaiteraient de continuer d'avoir, grce au processus de rvocation, des lections aprs une priode de deux ans. Il n'est pas inconcevable, avec un modle de rvocation pour des motifs quelconques, qu'une faction chercherait se dbarrasser de la plupart sinon de la totalit des chefs et des conseillers. Selon l'auteure, les modles qui se situent entre les deux extrmes sont plus appropris (modles 2 5), ou une sorte de modle hybride. L'auteure recommande donc, pour choisir le meilleur modle, de prendre en compte les considrations suivantes : Besoin de la communaut en matire d'imputabilit Souhait de la communaut de prendre part au processus permettant de tenir ses dirigeants responsables Besoins de la communaut lis la stabilit du leadership (potentiel de perturbation) Dure de la perturbation possible (si une telle chose est prvue) Cots Besoins lis aux lecteurs vivant dans les rserves et hors rserve Risques de litiges Besoin de souplesse : les souhaits et les besoins d'une communaut peuvent varier par rapport une autre quit procdurale Simplicit et complexit d'un modle donn Problmes de capacit Problmes de financement
Cette liste n'est pas exhaustive mais souligne simplement le fait que la question d'imputabilit peut tre examine en fonction de nombreux aspects, lesquels doivent tre examins par le groupe de travail. J'espre que le groupe de travail a trouv ce rapport utile et instructif. Pour toute question ou recherche supplmentaire en lien avec le sujet trait, je serais heureuse de pouvoir vous aider. 137
Bonne chance! Naiomi Metallic
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ANNEXE A AUTRES EXEMPLES DE MODLES D'IMPUTABILIT
6. Rvocation automatique fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi et dfinitifs Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Tsawwasen, 2009. Loi lectorale de la Premire nation Tsawwasen, 2009 Partie 6, division 2 : nonce les motifs qui disqualifient un chef ou un lgislateur, p. ex. coupable d'une infraction poursuivie par voie de mise en accusation, dette contracte auprs de la Premire nation, dclaration de faillite, devient inapte, absence d'un certain nombre de runions de bande obligatoires. Rglements lectoraux de la Premire nation Namgis, avril 2008 Le poste de chef ou de conseiller devient vacant quand un dirigeant dcde ou dmissionne, est absent de 3 runions de bande conscutives sans motif raisonnable, ou devient inligible en vertu de la loi (p. ex. est employ de la bande, etc.). Code lectoral communautaire de la Premire nation N'Quatqua Selon l'article 12, le poste de chef ou de conseiller peut devenir vacant pour plusieurs motifs : 1) absent de 3 runions conscutives, sans autorisation, 2) reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel; 3) ne rside plus dans la communaut; 4) dmissionne; 5) dcde. Avant-projet de code lectoral de la bande Kwakiult, 4e avant-projet, mai 2006 Chefs et conseillers automatiquement rvoqus pour certains motifs : 1) dclar coupable d'une infraction en vertu du Code criminel; 2) dcde ou dmissionne; 3) n'est pas admissible exercer ses fonctions en vertu de code lectoral; 4) lieu de rsidence en dehors de l'le nord.
7. Rvocation dont la dcision est prise par un dcideur dsign, partir d'une plainte fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi Premire nation Squiala, manuel gouvernance, avril 2008 L'article 3 contient un code de conduite, rdig en langage simple. L'article 3.10 prvoit que le Conseil a le pouvoir de crer et d'appliquer ses propres rgles et sanctions en ce qui concerne les conseillers coupables de manquement leurs devoirs ou qui enfreignent lesdites politiques. Selon l'article 4.11 (Disqualification et rvocation), nonobstant la politique 3.10, un conseiller est automatiquement rvoqu dans les cas suivants : o Est absent de 3 runions conscutives sans autorisation. o Enfreint aux rglements en matire de conflits d'intrts. 139
o Accepte des cadeaux, ce qui est contraire la politique 3.4. o Use de son influence, contrevenant ainsi la politique 3.5. o Utilise des informations confidentielles son profit, contrevenant ainsi la politique 3.6. o Est dclar coupable d'une infraction criminelle mentionne l'Annexe D (infraction commise avec une arme, infractions caractre sexuel, toutes sortes d'agressions, meurtres, nuisance publique, vol qualifi, extorsion, vol simple, incendie criminel, fraude, infractions relatives aux drogues, etc.). o Dcde ou dmissionne. o Est dclar mentalement inapte. o Est disqualifi en vertu de l'article 78 de la Loi sur les Indiens o Peut galement tre disqualifi s'il dcouvre qu'un autre conseiller contrevient ce qui prcde et ne le signale pas aux autres membres du conseil dans un dlai raisonnable. Un conseiller qui est disqualifi n'a pas le droit de se prsenter la prochaine lection. Si un membre de la communaut pense qu'un conseiller devrait tre rvoqu, compte tenu que ce dernier est coupable de l'un des motifs susmentionns, il peut dposer une plainte en vertu de la politique 11.0 : o la plainte est adresse l'administrateur, qui y donnera suite dans un dlai de 15 jours; o si la personne n'est pas satisfaite de la rponse de l'administrateur, celle-ci peut adresser sa plainte au chef et au Conseil, qui doivent rpondre dans un dlai de 15 jours; o si la personne n'est pas satisfaite de la rponse du chef et du conseil, celle-ci peut directement adresser sa plainte au conseil consultatif traditionnel, qui rpondra dans un dlai de 20 jours.
Code lectoral coutumier de la nation Gitxaala, 15 dcembre 2009 Selon l'article 4.14, un poste devient vacant pour les motifs suivants : 1) dmissionne; 2) est absent de 3 runions ordinaires conscutives du Conseil sans autorisation crite dudit conseil; 3) est coupable d'une infraction en vertu du Code criminel; 4) viole le serment du conseiller en chef, du sous-conseiller en chef et des conseillers (lequel serment fixe un certain nombre d'engagements, p. ex. ne pas laisser les intrts privs influencer les affaires publiques, tre admissible se prsenter une lection, faire respecter le droit Gitxaala, ne pas avoir recours aux pots-de-vin ou la corruption pour gagner des lections); 5) ne prte pas serment dans les 14 jours suivant l'lection; 6) dcde. Selon le processus de rvocation, si l'on estime que l'une des situations susmentionnes s'est produite, une motion doit tre prsente, ds que possible, lors d'une runion ordinaire dment convoque du Conseil, pour l'adoption d'une rsolution prsentant la situation et dclarant le poste vacant. 140
Rglements lectoraux coutumiers de la bande indienne de Lower Nicola 34. Si un membre du Conseil : (A) est dclar coupable d'un acte criminel, sauf ceux de nature politique relatifs l'exercice ou la dfense de droits ou titres ancestraux; ou est dclar coupable d'une infraction ou d'agression caractre sexuel pendant son mandat; (B) si une procdure judiciaire reconnue par le Conseil conclut qu'un membre du Conseil a abus des fonds ou des ressources de la bande ou a manqu ses responsabilits de fiduciaire; (C) ne s'acquitte pas de ses responsabilits en tant que membre du Conseil, pendant une priode de plus de 30 jours aprs rception d'un avis crit cet effet par le Conseil; ledit membre du Conseil peut tre alors immdiatement dmis de ses fonctions par le vote d'une rsolution du Conseil de bande cet effet, suite quoi une lection partielle doit tre immdiatement dclenche, en vertu de l'article 24. 35. Pour l'application de l'article 34 (b), les responsabilits d'un membre du Conseil comprennent entre autres : (a) la prestation d'un serment d'office et la signature d'un accord selon lequel il travaillera dans l'intrt suprieur de la bande dans son ensemble et fera respecter et protgera les droits et titres ancestraux de tous les membres de la bande; (b) la direction ou la participation des runions du Conseil et des runions de tous les membres de la bande; (C) maintenir une prsence dans les rserves de la bande et se rendre disponible pour rpondre aux besoins et aux intrts des membres de la bande. Nation Crie Nisichawayasihk Selon l'article 3(5), un poste de dirigeant devient vacant pour un certain nombre de motifs, p. ex. violations de serment d'allgeance, du serment professionnel ou du serment de confidentialit, lesquelles peuvent tre dtermines par un comit d'appel ou un tribunal comptent, avec pour consquence une rvocation. Quiconque est dclar coupable d'un acte criminel ou d'une manuvre frauduleuse en vertu du prsent code ne peut pas tre candidat au Conseil pendant 8 ans.
Code lectoral 195 de la Premire nation de Salt River 19. RVOCATION 141
19.1 Motifs de rvocation La rvocation d'un chef ou d'un conseiller peut tre dcide par le Conseil pour les motifs suivants : 19.1.1 Absent de trois (3) runions conscutives de la Premire nation ou du Conseil pour lesquelles la personne a reu un avis crit ou verbal et pour lesquelles aucune raison valable n'est fournie, par crit, audit Conseil; 19.1.2 Ledit membre se prsente aux runions du conseil, aux assembles communautaires ou aux autres vnements publics dans un tat d'brit ou d'intoxication par la drogue, ou en affichant un comportement dsordonn, violent ou autrement irresponsable, entravant ainsi la conduite des affaires ou jetant le discrdit sur le conseil de la Premire nation; 19.1.3 Il nglige d'accomplir ses obligations selon ce que prvoit l'Annexe B ou contrevient aux lignes directrices relatives aux conflits d'intrts en ce qui concerne le chef et le Conseil, qui sont reproduites l'Annexe C; 19.1.4 Il a t accus ou reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel en application du Code criminel; 19.1.5 Il s'est livr des pratiques lectorales malhonntes, dont la preuve fut dcouverte et tablie aprs le dlai d'appel; 19.1.6 Il ne rsidait pas dans le voisinage de Fort Smith durant son mandat; 19.1.7 Il a t suspendu trois (3) fois conformment l'article 18, durant son mandat; 19.1.8 Il n'a pas dmissionn ou n'a pas repris ses fonctions aprs une absence de soixante (60) jours, contrairement ce que requiert l'article 16.3. 19.2 Aprs confirmation satisfaisante des motifs de destitution, le conseil peut, par rsolution exposant les motifs, destituer de ses fonctions le chef ou le conseiller.
Loi lectorale coutumire de la Premire Nation Peepeekisis En vertu de cette loi lectorale, seul le Conseil des anciens a le pouvoir de dmettre un chef de ses fonctions. Selon l'article 7, le bureau du chef devient vacant lorsque la personne qui occupe le poste ... est dclare, par le conseil des anciens, coupable de pratiques lectorales malhonntes, de corruption, de malversations ou de mfaits dans l'exercice de sa charge. Selon l'article 7D, le Conseil des anciens peut dclarer qu'une personne qui cesse d'exercer ses fonctions en vertu de la loi lectorale non admissible ce poste pendant une priode allant jusqu' 10 ans. Code lectoral coutumier de la Premire nation de Caldwell* Hybride des modles 1 et 2 : Certains motifs entranent une rvocation automatique; rvocation fonde sur une plainte dpose en vertu de motifs dcrits par la loi, avec dcision prise par le chef et le conseil. 142
Article 12 - Poste vacant

12.1 Le poste de chef ou de conseiller devient automatiquement vacant si ledit chef ou conseiller : (e) (f) (g) (h) dcde; envoie une lettre de dmission au Conseil; est dclar coupable d'un acte criminel au cours de son mandat; est dclar mentalement inapte conformment aux lois de l'Ontario.
12.2 Le Conseil peut dcider que le(s) poste(s) du chef ou du Conseil est/sont vacant(s) si : (c) ledit chef ou conseiller ne parvient pas s'acquitter de ses obligations fiduciaires envers les membres (p. ex. mfait); (d) est absent de quatre (4) runions conscutives du Conseil sans l'autorisation de ce dernier, et cette autorisation ne peut tre refuse sans motif raisonnable. * Remarque : Ce code a t soumis l'auteure aprs que l'bauche a t remise au groupe de travail. Ce code est mentionn dans la prsente annexe, mais il est discut et pris en compte dans le texte du rapport. 8. Ptition fonde sur des motifs dcrits par la loi, soumise un dcideur dsign Modle de code de slection des dirigeants de l'AINC Un membre du conseil peut tre retir de ses fonctions pour certains motifs, par dcision du comit des plaintes et des appels, initi soit par 1) une majorit du conseil (en adoptant une RCB); soit 2) un lecteur qui prsente une ptition signe par au moins 25 % des membres de la bande et qui paie les frais correspondants. Motifs pouvant conduire une rvocation : o Violation du code, du serment ou du code de dontologie; o Dfaut d'assister trois assembles de bande conscutives sans excuse raisonnable; o Ne se conduit pas de la faon dont un membre du Conseil devrait le faire; o A t reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel depuis son lection; o Accepte ou offre des pots-de-vin, contrefait un document du Conseil ou agit de faon malhonnte pendant l'exercice de sa charge; o Fait preuve de ngligence en omettant d'assurer la scurit et la protection des membres et des biens de la communaut; o Abuse de ses fonctions de telle sorte que sa conduite nuit la dignit et l'intgrit de la communaut ou du Conseil; o Encourage les autres commettre les actes ou omissions susmentionns; o Se conduit d'une faon dont la gravit est juge suffisamment grave par le conseil pour rendre sa rvocation ncessaire et approprie. 143
Le comit des plaintes et des appels ( CPA ) vrifie que la demande respecte toutes les exigences et dcide si elle est futile (auquel cas elle est rejete), ou si elle doit tre examine lors d'une audience. Le CPA doit prendre une dcision dans un dlai de 20 jours. o Le CPA est compos de 3 membres : un ancien, une personne qui n'est pas membre et qui ne possde aucun intrt direct dans le rsultat, et un membre qui connat les traditions, les valeurs et la langue de la bande; choisis par le Conseil de bande au moins 100 jours avant des lections, et exerant leurs fonctions jusqu' ce qu'un nouveau CPA soit mis en place. La bande conserve galement une liste de 10 autres membres pouvant faire partie du CPA. Une personne ne peut pas faire partie de ce comit s'il existe une crainte de partialit. Le CPA entend les appels des rsultats des lections et examine les ptitions de rvocation. En cas d'audience, des avis prcisant les informations suivantes doivent tre envoys : heure, lieu et date de l'audience; le requrant, tout membre du conseil, ou le membre cibl par la demande de rvocation, peut tmoigner devant le CPA, ce qui peut inclure la prsentation de documents et le tmoignage de tmoins. Aprs l'audience, le CPA dispose de cinq jours pour prendre une dcision, c'est-dire rvoquer ou non le membre cibl. Outre la rvocation, le comit peut galement dcider que la personne en question ne devrait pas avoir le droit d'tre candidat au conseil pendant une priode pouvant aller jusqu' six ans. Les dcisions du CPA sont finales et excutoires. Effet de la radiation : le sige est vacant et il doit y avoir une lection dans les 90 jours. Il ne doit pas y avoir d'lections partielles s'il reste seulement 3 mois au mandat, sauf si celles-ci sont ncessaires pour qu'il y ait quorum au sein du Conseil. Le document de l'AINC offre un processus de rechange, selon lequel la ptition des membres de la communaut est d'abord soumise au Conseil pour dcider si le membre doit tre rvoqu, laquelle dcision peut faire l'objet d'un appel auprs du CPA.
Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Muskeg RVOCATION 4. Une fois dment lus par les membres de la nation crie de Muskeg Lake, le chef et les conseillers sont politiquement et financirement responsables devant tous les membres de cette nation et, en tant que tels, peuvent tre dmis de leurs fonctions s'ils : i. ignorent ou abusent de faon rpte le SERMENT ; ii. sont absents de trois (3) assembles conscutives de la nation crie Muskeg Lake ou runions du conseil dment convoques, sans motif valable;
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iii. sont reconnus coupables, en vertu du Code criminel, d'un acte criminel ou d'une infraction mixte pour laquelle la Couronne a choisi de procder par voie de mise en accusation, moins qu'une telle condamnation est lie l'application d'un droit ou trait autochtones faisant l'objet d'un conflit. Les procdures disciplinaires sont engages par le dpt d'une plainte devant tre accompagne par une ptition signe par 35 lecteurs de la nation crie de Muskeg Lake. La plainte doit tre reue par le premier dirigeant de la nation crie de Muskeg Lake qui doit la soumettre ensuite un comit disciplinaire ou un comit de reprsentants des familles . Le comit dsigne ensuite un tribunal disciplinaire compos de trois personnes. Le tribunal disciplinaire doit alors tenir une audience pendant laquelle les plaignants et tous les membres du Conseil qui font l'objet de la plainte ont la possibilit de prsenter des preuves et des arguments l'appui de leur position. Le ou les individu(s) contre lequel/lesquels la plainte est faite doit/doivent se voir accorder la possibilit, de faon raisonnable, de connatre et de rpondre aux allgations portes contre lui/eux. Le tribunal disciplinaire doit dterminer si la plainte a t prouve selon la prpondrance des probabilits, et si elle l'a t, peut dcider de dmettre la personne cible de ses fonctions ou lui permettre de continuer exercer ses fonctions avec ou sans conditions.
Rglement lectoral coutumier de la Premire nation de Sucker Creek Ce rglement tablit une liste des motifs de rvocation et prvoit que ce sont les lecteurs qui peuvent initier une rvocation selon ces motifs, en remettant toutefois au Conseil une ptition exposant les motifs du retrait, signe par au moins 50 % + 1 des lecteurs. Le chef et le conseil doivent convoquer une runion extraordinaire du Conseil pour examiner la destitution du membre du Conseil. Le membre faisant l'objet de la ptition est autoris prsenter des preuves de faon crite ou verbale. Aprs avoir entendu toutes les preuves, le conseil peut alors adopter une rsolution lors d'une runion extraordinaire pour destituer le chef ou le conseiller de ses fonctions. La rsolution doit indiquer les motifs de la destitution.
9. Rvocation fonde sur une plainte, pour des motifs dcrits par la loi, soumise un vote public Code lectoral des Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing - Les dispositions de ce code relatives la destitution d'un dirigeant ou d'un conseiller sont fondes sur une plainte plutt qu'une ptition. La dcision finale en revanche est prise par un vote public; il existe deux faons de procder : 1) motifs dcrits dans la loi, 2) motif quelconque. Il est intressant de voir ces deux options dans un mme code. Cette particularit a t commente dans l'affaire Seymour c. Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing, 2009 CF 133. 145
6. Postes vacants, dmission, rvocation et destitution a. Le poste de chef ou de conseiller devient vacant lorsque la personne qui l'occupe : i. dcde, dmissionne ou ne veut pas continuer exercer ses fonctions; ii. est dclare mentalement inapte par un tribunal comptent; iii. est un failli non libr; iv. est dmise de ses fonctions par un vote de 51 % des lecteurs en faveur de la destitution, si au moins 25 % pour cent des lecteurs en question sont prsents au vote; c. perd son poste conformment aux paragraphes 6.b. ou 6.c. b. Le chef ou un conseiller qui, pendant la dure de son mandat, est dclar coupable d'un acte criminel, sauf en ce qui concerne la dfense ou l'exercice de droits ancestraux ou issus de traits, doit automatiquement renoncer son poste. c. Le chef ou un conseiller qui, pendant la dure de son mandat, est dclar coupable par un tribunal d'un dlit prjudiciable la dignit et l'intgrit des Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing, de malversations ou de grave manquement son devoir, peut tre dmis de ses fonctions par un vote majoritaire de l'lectorat lors d'une runion convoque cette fin, avec au moins 25 % pour cent des lecteurs prsents lors de la runion. Avant qu'un vote soit soumis aux lecteurs par le Conseil, tel que prvu par cet alina, le conseiller qui est cibl doit se voir remettre un expos des accusations et doit tre autoris prsenter ses arguments l'lectorat lors d'une runion convoque par le Conseil cette fin prcise. La dcision de l'lectorat est finale. d. Le chef ou le conseiller en question peut remettre sa dmission crite au Conseil; ds rception par le Conseil, ladite dmission prend effet. 7. lections partielles a. Si le poste de chef ou de conseiller est vacant, et s'il reste au moins six (6) mois au mandat de ce poste, les autres membres du Conseil demanderont au directeur gnral des lections de dclencher une lection partielle, dans les trente (30) jours aprs que le poste est rendu vacant, afin de combler ledit poste et de terminer le mandat. []
Loi lectorale de la Premire nation de Cold Lake, 27 mai 1986 L'article 17 prvoit que le poste d'un des membres du Conseil devient automatiquement vacant si ledit membre : o dcde ou dmissionne; o est reconnu coupable d'une infraction au Code criminel; o quitte le territoire de la Premire nation de Cold Lake pour s'installer ailleurs; 146
o est absent de trois runions conscutives du Conseil sans excuse raisonnable. Les dispositions suivantes permettent 75 % des lecteurs de voter par scrutin secret pour destituer un candidat lors d'une runion publique : E. Toute personne qui, pendant la dure de son mandat, est dclare coupable d'un manquement son devoir ou d'inconduite prjudiciable la dignit du Conseil, doit dmissionner; le poste doit tre dclar vacant et une lection partielle doit tre tenue. F. Un lecteur peut demander une runion publique des lecteurs pour qu'un chef ou conseiller soit dmis de ses fonctions si ledit chef ou conseiller est coupable d'inconduite lie ses fonctions. G. Toutes les demandes lies aux runions publiques doivent tre approuves par le chef et le conseil. H. Si un problme fait l'objet d'une runion publique, la dmission du conseiller ou du chef doit tre vote par au moins soixante-quinze (75) pour cent des lecteurs. I. Tout vote doit se faire bulletin secret. J. Le dpouillement des bulletins de vote doit tre fait en public.
10. Ptition pour des motifs dcrits par la loi, rvocation soumise un vote public Politique lectorale de la Premire nation de Grand Rapids
900. POSTE VACANT 910. [1] Le poste de chef ou de conseiller devient vacant ds que l'agent lectoral certifie par crit qu'un vote s'est tenu en application de l'article 910, dclarant que la personne qui occupe ledit poste; ... d) a [sic] particip de faon importante des pratiques lectorales malhonntes, est coupable de subornation, d'avoir accept des pots-de-vin, de malhonntet ou d'inconduite grave. 920 - Les votes prvus en vertu du paragraphe 910 doivent avoir lieu lorsque l'agent lectoral reoit une ptition signe par 51 % des lecteurs, exposant les motifs de la demande de vote en vertu du paragraphe 910. L'agent lectoral doit procder au vote de la mme manire que pour un vote li un poste au Conseil, et la dcision doit tre prise par la majorit des lecteurs.
940 - Toute personne qui a cess d'exercer ses fonctions en vertu de l'article 910 n'est pas admissible se prsenter candidat au poste de chef ou de conseiller pendant trois (3) ans. (Politique lectorale).
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6. Ptition pour n'importe quel motif, rvocation soumise un vote public (rvocation pure) Constitution de la tribu autochtone des Huslia, Alaska Cre un conseil tribal, lu la majorit, compos de sept membres. Ces membres sont lus pour un mandat de 3 ans, mais ces mandats sont dcals. Destitution : o Le conseil tribal peut rvoquer un membre avec 4 votes en faveur de ladite destitution, pour les motifs suivants : 1) manquement au devoir; 2) inconduite flagrante; 3) infraction impliquant de la malhonntet. o Le membre concern doit recevoir un pravis de 10 jours prcisant les accusations qui sont portes contre lui, et celui-ci doit avoir la possibilit de rpondre ces accusations devant le conseil tribal. o Toutes les questions lies sa destitution doivent tre rgles par le conseil tribal et ne peuvent pas tre examines par la cour tribale. Destitution : o Le membre du conseil tribal peut tre destitu si la ptition demandant une telle destitution, signe par au moins 60 % des lecteurs, est prsente au conseil tribal. o Le conseil tribal dispose alors de 60 jours pour dcider de la tenue d'une lection au sujet de la destitution. o Si la majorit des lecteurs vote en faveur de la destitution, le dirigeant est alors dmis de ses fonctions. o Un dirigeant ne peut pas faire l'objet d'une procdure de destitution plus d'une fois pendant son mandat. o Si le conseil tribal n'organise pas le vote de destitution, les membres de la tribu peuvent alors tenir une runion cette fin. Renonciation : o Tout membre du conseil qui prsente sa dmission, dcde, est dclar coupable d'un crime, ou est absent de 3 runions ordinaires mensuelles, sans excuse, est dclar avoir automatiquement renonc son mandat. Postes vacants : o Tous les postes vacants sont pourvus sur nomination du conseil tribal.
Code lectoral des Six Nations de la rivire Grand L'article XII de ce code prvoit qu'un membre d'un conseil lu doit tre destitu lorsque : o ledit conseiller cesse de vivre dans le district o il a t lu, ou le chef cesse de vivre dans la rserve (sauf si son dpart rsulte de raisons indpendantes de sa volont, p. ex. sa maison a brl). o Destitution - Une ptition recevable, signe par la majorit des lecteurs admissibles qui ont vot dans cette circonscription lors de l'lection 148
o o o o
gnrale, pendant laquelle le conseiller a t lu, est dpose auprs du conseil lors d'une runion gnrale du conseil dment convoque. Accus d'un acte criminel ou d'un crime aux tats-Unis et ne peut pas rgler la question dans un dlai de 90 jours. A t reconnu coupable d'un acte criminel ou d'un acte dlictueux grave. Est absent de 3 runions conscutives du conseil sans excuse raisonnable. Devient employ du conseil des Six Nations.
Code lectoral des Anishinaabeg de Naongashiing - rsum dans la partie sur le modle 4 : contient une disposition relative une rvocation pure pour motifs quelconques.
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Recall
Recall is defined as the democratic process that allows citizens of a jurisdiction to remove elected officials from office prior to the end of the term of office for which they had been elected. The chart below presents a high level view of existing models of recall.
Initiated
Criteria Chief The non-subjective conditions are set as the criteria.
Managed by*
Decision made
Automatic:
of Councillor automatically removed from Council upon the occurrence of a nonsubjective eventmost often conviction of an offence
There is little process No requirement for a to manage since the decision making criteria is nonbody. subjective and the removal is automatic
Complaints Driven: Recall is

initiated by the lodging of a complaint by one or more individuals against the Chief or a Councillor.
The complaint against the elected official is tied to one or more grounds that are set out in the recall rules. These are most often related to wrongdoing, negligence, incompetence or extended absences.
A body needs to be identified to receive a complaint, evaluate it and decide whether the complaint is founded and meets the identified grounds. The Chief or Councillors subject to the complaint must be afforded an opportunity to hear the complaint and respond.
The ultimate decision to remove from office could be made by the body or could be put to a community vote** once the decision is made that the complaint is valid and meets the established criteria.
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Initiated
Criteria Option 1: No criteriathe recall rules contain no specific criteria and therefore, the reason for the petition need not meet any conditions. Option 2: The reason set out in the recall petition must meet specific criteria set out in the recall rules.
Managed by* Option 1: A body needs to be identified to receive the petition and verify that it is duly executed, there are sufficient signatures and that they are all from eligible electors. Option 2: A body needs to be identified to, not only certify the petition, but to evaluate whether the reasons being put forward respect the criteria. The Chief or Councillors subject to the recall petition must be afforded an opportunity to hear the reasons and make their own submission as to whether the criteria are met.
Decision made The ultimate decision to remove from office could be made by the body in certifying the petition and the criteria being presented (if criteria are necessary). Alternatively, the petition could be the trigger for the question to be put to a community vote.**
Petition:
Recall is initiated upon the presentation of a petition that sets out the reason for the recall and contains the signature of electors, representing an established percentage of the total electorate (at least 60%, but could be higher).
*In all cases, the management of a recall process should not fall the sitting band council. Members of the council will quickly find themselves in a situation of conflict if they were forced to evaluate a complaint against one of their colleagues. It could further lead to situations of ganging-up. **Any question put to a community vote will have to include a mechanism for electors not residing on the reserve to cast a vote without having the travel to the reserve, in keeping with the Corbiere decision and principle.
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Destitution
La destitution constitue le processus dmocratique qui permet aux citoyens dun territoire de dmettre de leurs fonctions des reprsentants lus avant la fin du mandat pour lequel ils avaient t lus. Le tableau ci-dessous prsente un aperu de haut niveau des modles de destitution existants qui ont cours.
Lancement
Critres Les conditions non subjectives constituent les critres.
Gestion du processus* La gestion du processus est minime puisque les critres sont non subjectifs et que la destitution est automatique.
Prise de dcision Un organisme dcisionnaire nest pas requis.
Automatique : Le
chef ou un conseiller est automatiquement retir du conseil ds la survenance dun vnement non subjectif, la plupart du temps lors de la dclaration de culpabilit relative une infraction.
En raction une plainte : Le

processus de destitution est lanc par le dpt dune plainte par une ou plusieurs personnes contre le chef ou un conseiller.
La plainte contre un lu est lie un ou plusieurs motifs qui sont exposs dans les rgles de destitution. Ces motifs concernent la plupart du temps la faute, la ngligence, lincomptence ou labsence prolonge.
Un corps dcisionnel doit tre dsign pour recevoir les plaintes, les examiner et dcider si elles sont motives et si elles correspondent aux motifs reconnus. Le chef ou les conseillers qui font lobjet dune plainte doivent avoir l'occasion de prendre connaissance de la plainte et de se dfendre.
La dcision finale de destitution peut tre prise par lorganisme ou peut tre soumise un vote communautaire** lorsquil est dcid que la plainte est pertinente et quelle correspond aux critres tablis.
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Lancement
Critres Option 1 : Aucun critre. Les rgles de destitution ne comprennent aucun critre particulier; par consquent, la raison de la ptition na pas besoin de rpondre des conditions. Option 2 : La raison expose dans la ptition de destitution doit correspondre des critres particuliers exposs dans les rgles de destitution.
Gestion du processus* Option 1 : Un corps dcisionnel doit tre dsign pour recevoir la ptition et confirmer quelle est en bonne et due forme, quelle compte un nombre suffisant de signatures et que les signatures sont toutes celles dlecteurs admissibles. Option 2 : Un organisme doit tre dsign non seulement pour certifier la ptition, mais aussi pour valuer si les raisons prsentes respectent les critres. Le chef ou les conseillers faisant lobjet de la ptition de destitution doivent avoir l'occasion de prendre connaissance des raisons et de prsenter leurs propres arguments en ce qui concerne la satisfaction des critres.
Prise de dcision La dcision finale de destitution peut tre prise par lorganisme en certifiant la ptition et les raisons prsentes (si des critres sont requis). Autrement, la ptition peut tre llment dclencheur pour soumettre la question un vote communautaire.**
Ptition : Le
processus de destitution est lanc lors de la prsentation dune ptition qui expose la raison de la destitution et contient la signature des lecteurs, lesquels reprsentent un pourcentage tabli de llectorat total (au moins 60 %).
*Dans tous les cas, la gestion dun processus de destitution ne doit pas tre assume par le conseil de bande au pouvoir. Les membres du conseil se retrouveraient rapidement dans une situation de conflit sils taient forcs dexaminer une plainte contre un de leurs collgues. Cela pourrait par la suite conduire des situations dans le cadre desquelles les membres font bloc contre un autre membre.
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**Toute question soumise un vote communautaire devra inclure un mcanisme pour que les lecteurs qui ne rsident pas dans la rserve puissent voter sans avoir se rendre la rserve, conformment au principe et la dcision Corbire.
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Appendix F List of APC Information/Engagement Sessions held on Indian Act Election Reform Initiative since October 1, 2010 Date October 13, 2010 Meeting/Location AFOA Atlantic Workshop, Moncton, NB # in Attendance 40 Questions/Issues Would be beneficial to the community to have elections in March and elected officials to take office on April 1st (beginning of new fiscal year); Needs to be a clear separation or division between the Band Council and the Administration is this initiative going to address this and if not, it should; Six Nation Custom Code is a three year term and there is a requirement that those running for Chief/Council cannot work for the Government as well; Six Nations does not take mail in ballots and there are no appeals; appeal process in custom code in Saskatchewan lesson learned is that the appeal process needs to be outside of the First Nation; Elders Council could be used for appeals but would be advisory or make recommendations only; First Nations need to have their own court or judicial system if developing their own election laws; we should be moving more away from the Indian Act in this area; Should exercise selfgovernment rights via section 35 of Constitution Act not via creation of optional federal legislation; should be moving away from municipal style/model of election system should move to more traditional systems (whereby it is part of the norm to look after 155
November 9th, 2010
AFN National Policy Forum Workshop on Nation Building, Montreal, PQ
50
family and friends); traditional systems are based on clan or family systems, problem with IA system is based on having one Chief only which is not consistent with traditional systems in which there are several large families or clans (Carcross First Nation implemented a traditional family or clan system for their election system); APC clarified why required to have 78 day election timeframe and mail in ballots (Corbiere regulations); current election and membership codes may need to be reviewed to ensure in compliance with current case law (Corbiere, Gull Bay, Repeal of s. 67 of CHRA) as some are not consistent; APC emphasized that this can be interim measure only as transition to custom codes or selfgovernment; one First Nation (Peepeekinis) that has a custom election code has been in federal court three times dealing with appeal issues (can be costly and extremely disruptive as well); First Nations can also create a combination of traditional and IA system as well (blended); concern expressed with lack of electoral officers that would be trained and available to run a common election day in BC First Nations (over 200 FNs in BC)- would also mean common appeal dates too which could also have challenges; cost of an appeal or defending an appeal can be as high as $40K in federal court do not recommend this route to deal with election appeals plus it also interferes with governance process by having to 156
November 10th, 2010
NS Band Managers Meeting, Millbrook First Nation, NS
10
November 16th, 2010
NS Department of Aboriginal Affairs Staff Meeting, Halifax, NS
November 18th, 2010
Email Comment/Feedback from First Nation member
N/A
go to federal court to resolve (not timely); recall initiative issues in BC (need to learn from these before adopting in optional legislation); Need to clarify with DIAND whether same person can hold both position of Chief & Councillor now can the First Nation leave vacant or required to hold byelection; Glooscap used to have all off-reserve Council members and worked out fine because the Council all lived just outside the community; Should not be optional legislation in light of the challenges and proposed changes (should be mandatory legislation); APC confirmed interim only optional option for First Nations moving towards Self-Government arrangements (ie., Made in NS Process); some First Nations may wish to opt in via referendum as well; problems with the existing BC Recall legislation/process (need to learn from their lessons learned); other models for recall internationally that are successful (Venezuela); nomination fees will not fly in certain First Nations; This process is questionable at best. Concerns: (1) Who would decide if individual Bands wish to opt in or out of this system? (2) Will this decision be made by the Chiefs or will it be put to a vote so the Band Members can take part? (3) Who would decide if a nomination is a loose nomination? This is one of the most debatable parts of this process not only is it undemocratic I don't know who would think they can judge who is 157
November 20th, 2010
NS Native Womens Association - Board of Directors Meeting, Millbrook, NS
20
November 23rd, 2010 December 8th, 2010 January 25, 2011
Chiefs of Ontario Meeting, Toronto, ON NB & PEI Band Managers Meeting, Moncton, NB Band and Finance Managers Southern Ontario Meeting in
134 First Nation delegates invited 25
or isn't worthy to run for an elected office. (3) Is electoral reform a priority for Band Members in general or is this only a major concern for elected Band officials? (4) There already exists provisions for custom elections which is enshrined in the Constitution. This is more suited to the First Nations concept than the proposed one size fits all approach. I believe some of the frustration surrounding elections have more to do with how money is distributed by the elected officials who treat Band funding as their own and of course the blatant nepotism displayed by those in office. Need to clarify with DIAND whether same person can hold both position of Chief & Councillor now can the FN leave vacant or required to hold by-election; elected official should not be able to hold position of Chief/Council and band employee; qualifications for Chief should not be limited to band member b/c could include non-native persons should be Mikmaq or First Nation band member only; need to make the mail in ballot & affidavit process a simpler process, where possible; No comments or feedback received.
No comments or feedback received. A video-taped message from the AMC Grand Chief was played. An INAC representative elaborated on the recommendations for 158
42
Brandford, Ontario
January 27, 2011
Band and Finance Managers North/Central Ontario Meeting in Sudbury, Ontario
46
February 1517th, 2011
AFOA National Conference & Annual General Meeting in Vancouver, BC
Over 1100 conference delegates/75 attended the booth
electoral reform making it clear their optional nature, that any new system is viewed as an alternative to the Indian Act and that this initiative does not seek to affect in any way First Nations who hold their elections under their own community system. Few questions and comments participants indicated they would share the information with their leadership and others in their First Nations. A video-taped message from the AMC Grand Chief was played. An INAC representative elaborated on the recommendations for electoral reform making it clear their optional nature, that any new system is viewed as an alternative to the Indian Act and that this initiative does not seek to affect in any way First Nations who hold their elections under their own community system. Few questions and comments participants indicated they would share the information with their leadership and others in their First Nations. APC set up an information booth at the conference and distributed approximate 75 discussion papers and feedback forms. People that attended the booth were very receptive to changing the term of office from 2-4 years because they felts if gives the leadership a longer time to develop and implement a vision for their community and ensured less disruption to the community. Some had questions about custom codes and whether this initiative could include those with 159
February 17 , 2011
th
Letter emailed from First Nation member (Norman Johnson, former Councilor)
N/A
custom codes as well. In agreement generally with key recommendations set out in Backgrounder; additional suggested changes: Chief/Council should be required to provide educational qualifications and criminal background checks prior to election; Newly elected C/C should be provided financial business training and should demonstrate the ability to manage a budget and how to read financial statements; all band meeting agendas should include a review of a balance sheet statement; band should be run like a business; # of councillors should be based on how many members live on the reserve (in his case, too many elected councillors); need to figure out how to accommodate off-reserve members; C/C should not be limited to a two year term of office; DIAND should provide a recommendation for C/C compensation and this framework should be consistent nation-wide; when bands are put in third party management, there should be a complete investigation and criminal charges laid, if necessary. Often DIAND ignores the problem, and the entire C/C should be held accountable; should have a mechanism in place for band members to formally direct the replacement of elected councillors, should the need arise; above all the compensation of elected councillors and their activities, particularly the financial aspects 160
March 1, 2011
Faxed Completed Feedback form from Donna Big Cove
N/A
of band business should be very transparent. Agreed with optional legislation provided that consultation with members has been done in advance; agreed that the majority of Council should be living onreserve in order to hold Councillor positions (if not, members would feel they did not understand the needs of the members); agreed that 3-4 year term of office for Council would be adequate as she sits as member of Council and finds that projects they are working on cannot be completed in two years without the membership fully involved; needs to be strict guidelines appointing an electoral officer and should meet the Ministers approval; agrees that a small fee should be charged as some members do not take being on Council seriously when they are nominated and therefore do not care whether they are elected or not this way not anyone can just come and nominate someone or more without consulting the candidate; agrees with recommendation that band members be sent to voters only upon their written request and that those written requests must be accompanied by photocopies of reliable identification of the voters; band members also need to be responsible to update their addresses with their First Nation; do not agree with advance polls; do not agree that the Minister should be removed from receiving, investigating and deciding on election appeals; 161
completely agree that there should be offences and penalties surrounding vote and ballot buying and interference in the electoral process; agrees with recall mechanism but it needs to be clearly defined and have more support with it besides a written petition; agrees with recommendation #11 that a Chief/Councillor would cease to hold office if she/he is convicted of an indictable offence and sentenced to imprisonment for more than 30 consecutive days; dies or resigns from office; is convicted of offences under the Act (related to elections); or is removed from the elected position by recall. GENERAL COMMENTS: this initiative is something all First Nations need to consider. Applauds the AMC for taking this on and allowing other First Nations to comment. Hopes this continues on and becomes a source for First Nations to opt in to.
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Appendix G
Supported by the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nation Chiefs and the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs
Building a Better Election System for First Nations Holding Elections under the Indian Act
February 2011
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Background
New research and discussion on the development of an alternative to the Indian Act election system has been underway
In January 2010, the APC provided recommendations to the Minister of Indian Affairs for the development of a new optional Elections Act. The AMC undertook consultation sessions in Indian Act First Nations in Manitoba and, following these, also submitted recommendations to the Minister. The recommendations both groups submitted are almost identical.
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Whats Wrong with Indian Act Elections?

Two-year terms create severe challenges to achieving significant accomplishments. With the Gull Bay decision, potentially all Council members can live off the reserve. Nomination process that allows non-serious candidates to run, often resulting in excess of 100 candidates in one election. A mail-in ballot system open to abuse. No defined election offences or penalties under the Indian Act.
Minister currently reviews, investigates and decides election appeals and often takes 12-18 months to resolve
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Legislative Reform Recommendations are

Four year term of office for Chiefs & Councils/common election period for Manitoba First Nations Ability to designate off-reserve councillor positions (optional)
Requirement for candidates for Chief to be band members at least 18 years of age, just as is required of councillor candidates (no requirements for Chief under Indian Act)
Candidates must accept their nomination in writing; pay a fee (optional by First Nation); can only run for one Council position; limit the number of nominations any one person can make Improve the mail-in ballot system by requiring written requests with ID, add advance polls and offences and penalties No role for the Minister in election appeals creation of independent appeal tribunal and establish timeframes Recall mechanism: two-year mark of mandate that would allow4 First Nations members to remove their leaders based on criteria
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How will four year terms strengthen governance?

Two year term has resulted in chronic instability in First Nation governments compare with fed/prov/municipal term of office Instability for newly elected leaders: no sooner do they become acquainted, they find themselves back in election mode. Especially those communities where leadership change is frequent, lack of continuity has hampered the First Nations ability to improve the lives of members.
Four year terms will provide the stability and certainty that First Nation governments need to plan and implement change.
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Recall
Why? To ensure that longer terms do not create conditions where communities could be worse off.
What? Recall is when elected leaders can be removed (or recalled) from office by the electorate prior to the end of their term. Example: British Columbia, California and some First Nations under custom systems. How? A petition, where supporters required is a significant portion of the voting population (at least 50%, but sometimes as high as 75%) When? Time frame to obtain the required number of signatures be small (max. 60 days) Recall petitions should only be considered for a 60 day time frame two years into the mandate.
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Next Steps
The AMC and APC have partnered together to undertake a national engagement effort on electoral reform. Over the next few months, both organizations will be speaking with regional and Treaty organizations in other provinces to hear their views on our recommendations, and to gain their support for a new optional First Nations Elections Act. The Minister has indicated that our recommendations, along with the results of the national engagement sessions will inform the drafting of the new legislation.
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Additional Information
We invite you to consult the websites of each organization for additional information and updates, and to learn how you can provide your comments and thoughts. You will also find a discussion paper which provides the details surrounding our recommendations. You may also contact each organization directly. Atlantic Policy Congress www.apcfnc.ca John G. Paul 1 877 677-4007
8
Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs www.manitobachiefs.com Debbie Burka 1 888 324-5483
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Soutenu par le Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nation Chiefs et lAssembly of Manitoba Chiefs
laboration dun nouveau systme lectoral pour les Premires nations qui tiennent des lections en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens
Novembre 2010
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Historique
Des recherches et des discussions sont en cours sur llaboration dun systme lectoral de rechange la Loi sur les Indiens.
En janvier 2010, lAPC a recommand au Ministre des Affaires indiennes llaboration dune nouvelle loi lectorale qui serait facultative. LAMC a men des sessions de consultations dans les Premires nations au Manitoba qui tiennent leurs lections en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens, et suivant celles-ci, ont aussi fait des recommandations au Ministre. Les recommandations soumises par les deux groupes sont presque identiques.
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172
Quest-ce qui ne va pas avec les lections tenues en vertu de la Loi sur les Indiens ?
Mandats de deux ans prsentent des normes dfis raliser des projets importants. Suite la dcision Gull Bay , il existe le potentiel que tous les membres dun conseil ne rsident pas sur la rserve. Le systme de mise en candidature peu structur qui permet des candidats qui ne sont pas srieux ou dvous de se prsenter. Il arrive donc souvent quil y a plus de 100 candidats une mme lection. Une systme de vote par bulletin de vote postal qui donne lieu de labus. La Loi sur les Indiens ne dfinit pas prcisment dinfractions lectorales ni de peines en cas dinfraction. En matire dappel, le Ministre mne enqute et rend une dcision finale, ce qui prend souvent 12 18 mois.
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Les recommandations pour une rforme lgislative sont
Des mandats de quatre ans et une priode commune pour la tenu des lections pour le Premires nations du Manitoba. La capacit de limiter un nombre de postes sur un conseil de bande pour des membres hors rserve (facultatif).
Obligation quun candidat au poste de chef soit ag dau moins 18 ans et membre de la bande comme il est requis pour les candidats au postes de conseillers (cette obligation nexiste pas prsentement sur la Loi sur les Indiens).
Les candidats doivent accepter par crit leur mise en candidature, doivent payer un droit de candidature (facultatif par Premire nation), et ne peuvent se prsenter que pour un poste au conseil de bande. De plus, des limites seraient imposes sur le nombre de mise en candidature quune seule personne peut faire. Amliorer le systme de vote par bulletin postal en exigeant que les demandes soient par crit et accompagnes dune pice didentit de llecteur; en ajoutant la possibilit de tenir un vote par anticipation et en dfinissant des infractions et des peines. liminer le rle du Ministre quant aux appels dlections et crer un tribunal dappel indpendant.
Un mcanisme de rappel : qui permettrait aux membres dune Premire nation de destituer leurs lus pour des raisons tablies aprs deux ans du mandat.
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174
Comment les mandats de quatre ans renforceront-ils la gouvernance ?

Des mandats de deux ans contribuent rendre les gouvernements de Premires nations instable. Les mandats des gouvernements municipaux, provinciaux, et celui du gouvernement fdral, sont plus long. Aussitt que les lus prennent connaissance de leurs rles et responsabilits, ils se retrouvent en mode lectorale. Dans les communauts o les dirigeants changent frquemment, le manque de continuit nuit au efforts pour lamlioration du bien tre des membres.
Des mandats de quatre ans donneront aux gouvernements de Premires nations la stabilit et la certitude quils ont besoin pour une planification comprhensive et pour mettre en uvre des changements importants.
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Processus de rappel
Pourquoi ? Assure que des mandats plus long ne crent pas des conditions qui nuisent davantage aux communauts. Quoi ? Un processus de rappel est un mcanisme par lequel les lecteurs peuvent destituer des lus de leurs postes avant que leur mandat soit chu. Ce mcanisme existe en Colombie-Britannique, en Californie et dans quelques Premires nations qui tiennent leurs lections en vertu de leur propre code coutumier. Comment ? Par le biais dune ptition qui dmontre lappui dune majorit significative des lecteurs (au moins 50 pour 100 mais parfois aussi lev que 75 pour 100). Quand ? Le temps permis pour obtenir le nombre requis de signataires la ptition soit restreint (un maximum de 60 jours). Des ptitions de rappel ne devrait tre considres que pour une priode de 60 jours uniquement aprs les deux premires annes du mandat.
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176
Prochaines tapes
LAMC et lAMC se sont associs afin de mener une discussion national sur la question de la rforme lectorale. Dans les mois qui suivent, les deux organismes mneront des discussions avec les organisations rgionales et de traits dans les autres province afin dobtenir leurs rflexions quant aux recommandations, dans le but dobtenir leur soutien pour une nouvelle loi facultative sur les lections des Premires nations. Le Ministre nous a signal que nos recommandations, ainsi que les rsultats des sessions dengagement guideront la rdaction dune nouvelle loi.
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Informations supplmentaires
Nous vous invitons consulter les sites Web de chacune de nos organisations pour obtenir des informations supplmentaires, pour des mises jour et pour savoir comment vous pouvez nous soumettre vos commentaires et vos rflexions. Vous trouverez galement sur nos sites Web un document de discussion qui expose les dtails de nos recommandations Vous pouvez aussi communiquer avec nous directement. Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs www.manitobachiefs.com Debbie Burka 1 888 324-5483 Atlantic Policy Congress www.apcfnc.ca John G. Paul 1 877 677-4007
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Appendix H
Building a Better Election System For First Nation Communities

January 14, 2011 Dear Chief and Council: On Friday, October 1, 2010, in Halifax, Nova Scotia, the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, jointly with ourselves, the Grand Chief of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs and the Co-chairs of the Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nation Chiefs, announced a national engagement initiative on election reform. We are writing to you today in the context of this announcement. In speaking with First Nations leaders, technicians and community members in our respective regions over the last year, we have heard a great deal about the weaknesses of the Indian Act election system. The discussions within our regions have allowed us to formulate recommendations for change to the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. We believe that our recommendations for four year terms of office and other improvements will create the political stability all First Nations need to establish solid business investments, practice long-term planning, and build relationships that will increase economic development. The Minister is very interested in moving forward on this. As your First Nation holds elections under the Indian Act election system, you must undoubtedly face many of the same challenges as First Nations governments in our regions, particularly the limited ability to move important projects forward and maintain momentum within the short two year term of office. Beyond this limiting aspect, the Indian Act election system has many other weaknesses that undermine the election process as a whole and consequently the leaders who are elected under it.
The Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs and the Assembly of Manitoba, with the support of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, have partnered to lead a
179
national engagement on our recommendations for a modern legislated election system that will enable First Nations to shed the poor and limiting election process under the current Indian Act legislation. Our purpose is to inform First Nations people across the country about our recommendations, seeking their input and support. Thus far, our organizations have held discussions with First Nations leaders in Saskatchewan and Alberta where this initiative has received positive feedback and expressions of support. Since we will be reporting to the Minister on this engagement in the latter part of February, between now and then, our efforts will be focussed on holding discussions in British Columbia and Ontario. Enclosed please find a brief backgrounder and a detailed discussion paper that outlines our recommendations to the Minister and the rationale for making them. We ask that you make copies of these documents available to your members at the band office. These documents are also available on our websites. We encourage you, as leaders in your community, to discuss this initiative with your members, inviting them to consult our websites to obtain additional information and to learn how to provide their feedback and comments. We also invite you to provide us with your thoughts on this initiative. Contact information appears on the following page. Our organizations are also available to hold a discussion forum with other First Nations within your Tribal Council or your Political or Treaty Organization. If you are interested in such a forum, you may wish to ask these organizations to coordinate with the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs or the Atlantic Policy of First Nations Chiefs. We look forward to hearing from you and your members on this important step in improving the well-being of First Nations people everywhere. Sincerely,
Chief Candice Paul Co-Chair Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs
Chief Morley Googoo Co-Chair Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs
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Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs

c/o Ed Buller 200-275 Portage Avenue Winnipeg, MB R3B 2B3 Fax: (204) 956-2109 E-mail: commonelectionday@manitobachiefs.com Web: www.manitobachiefs.ca
Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs

c/o Krista Brookes 153 Willowdale Drive Dartmouth, NS B2V OA5 Fax: (902) 435-8027 E-mail: electionreform@apcfnc.ca Web: www.apcfnc.ca Facebook site: http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=150789196002
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Final Rep or Ti A Election Reform Project March 2011

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Final Rep or Ti A Election Reform Project March 2011

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ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS National Engagement on Electoral Reform: Building a Better Election System for

First Nations Communities

John G. Paul Executive Director

IMPROVING THE SYSTEM FOR FIRST NATIONS ELECTIONS Discussion Paper

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

New Opt-in Legislation for Band Council Elections

Band Council Size and Membership

Term of Office for Band Council Members

Same or Common Day for Elections

Nominations and Elections

Mail-In Ballots and Advance Voting

Appeals of Band Council Elections

Election Offences and Penalties

Recall of Elected Band Council Members

Removal of Elected Band Council Members from Office

OFFENCES AND PENALTIES IN THE CANADA ELECTIONS ACT

le 1er octobre 2010

TABLE DES MATIRES

CONCLUSION 38 INFRACTIONS ET PEINES PRVUES PAR LA LOI LECTORALE DU CANADA 39

Taille et composition des conseils de bande

Dure du mandat des membres dun conseil de bande

Tenue des lections le mme jour

ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS

Bulletins de vote postaux et le vote par anticipation

Appels relatifs aux rsultats dune lection

Infractions lectorales et peines

Destitution des membres lus dun conseil de bande

Rvocation des membres lus dun conseil de bande

INFRACTIONS ET PEINES PRVUES PAR LA LOI LECTORALE DU CANADA

Appendix C ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS SECRETARIAT www.apcfnc.ca

Atlantic Policy Congress of First Nations Chiefs

Frequently Asked Questions

ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS SECRETARIAT www.apcfnc.ca

Congrs des chefs des Premires nations de l'Atlantique

Appendix D ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS SECRETARIAT www.apcfnc.ca

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ATLANTIC POLICY CONGRESS OF FIRST NATIONS CHIEFS SECRETARIAT www.apcfnc.ca

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REPORT ON LEADERSHIP ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS IN FIRST NATION GOVERNMENTS

The Indian Act Electoral Reform Working Group

November 15, 2010

Chart of Specified Grounds found in Election Laws

Sources of grounds indicated in Chart

Specified Grounds Definite Indefinite

Ibid., at page 27.

APPENDIX A ADDITIONAL EXAMPLES OF LEADERSHIP ACCOUNTABILITY MODELS

Salt River First Nation 195 Election Code 19.

REMOVAL FROM OFFICE

Section 12 Vacancy of Office

Motifs dcrits dans les lois lectorales

Corruption [4] Incapacit physique ou mentale [7]

Ne se conduit pas de la faon dont un membre du Conseil devrait le faire [20]

Reconnu d'incapacit mentale [32] ou inapte [33] par un mdecin autoris

Impossibilit de remplir les fonctions de sa charge pendant plus de 6 mois [36]

Sources des motifs indiqus dans le tableau

63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

Fond sur Des plaintes

Motifs dcrits par la loi Dfinis Indfinis

N'importe quel motif

Bonne chance! Naiomi Metallic

ANNEXE A AUTRES EXEMPLES DE MODLES D'IMPUTABILIT

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