THE ORIGINS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR I. WORLD WAR I IN PERSPECTIVE A. Why care about WWI? 1. 2. B.

Cause versus free choice Weird event or signal for future?

Single event which determines course of history for Europe in the 20th century. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Beginning of drop of Europe as center of power, signals emergence of US as a great power. Beginning of the end of colonialism Rise of Soviets as a power (leads to fall of Romanovs) End of the 19th century, Victorian age, belief in Man s perfection. Loss of faith in industrial revolution as improvement of mankind which leads to a loss of faith in man himself.

C.

In 1890 Europe was a nice, quiet place. Things were cool. Question: how could such a great war emerge from such an untroubled world? WWI unleashed an avalanche of violence that pervaded the 20th century. Ask three questions of these events (and other wars): 1. 2. 3. What caused the war? i.e. what conditions, events, or actions made the war inevitable? Who caused the war? What states, or political groups or persons within states? Why did these actors choose the war? What expectations and intentions animated their actions? Were they trying to cause war? Expecting to cause war?

D. E.

F. G.

FOUR COMMON EXPLANATIONS FOR WWI "Germany caused the war." Three main variants are offered: 1. The minimalist Germany-blaming view: Germany risked a great war in July 1914 in order to make gains for the German/Austrian alliance. Germany preferred the prewar status quo to a general war, but did knowingly risk a general war. The intermediate Germany-blaming view: Germany preferred a continental war to the prewar status quo, but preferred the prewar status quo to a world war (a war against Britain, France, and Russia). (This is the view of "Fischer School" moderates, exemplified by Imanuel Geiss.) The maximalist Germany-blaming view: Germany preferred even a world war to the prewar status quo. (The extreme "Fischer School" view,)

2.

3. H.

"Russia, or Serbia, or Britain, or France, or Austria caused the war." 1. During 1919-1945 many Germans alleged that Britain organized the encirclement of Germany and conspired to cause the war. Germany, they said, was wholly innocent. Sidney Fay and other scholars have put prime responsibility on Austria and Russia; some also focus on Serbia; some blame France and Britain for not restraining Russia more firmly; some suspect that France egged Russia on.

2.

I.

"Crisis bungling caused the war." 1. 2. In this view no European power willfully risked war. European leaders simply mismanaged the July crisis. "Russia began pre-mobilization without realizing that mobilization meant war, or that partial mobilization against Austria was impossible." "Austria failed to give Russia its evidence showing that Serbia was responsible for the death of the Archduke. Had Russia known Serbia's role it would have sympathized more with Austria's position." "British leaders (Grey) did not realize that mobilization meant war; hence they unwisely failed to restrain Russian mobilization." "German leaders (Jagow) falsely assured Russia that Germany would tolerate Russian partial mobilization against Austria."

3.

4. 5. J.

"The explosive military situation caused the war."

1.

In this view the widespread belief in the power of the offense and the general embrace of offensive plans primed the world for war. This explosive military backdrop magnified the dangers posed by a minor crisis and the usual crisis blunders it produced.

II.

BACKGROUND TO WAR: EUROPE 1890-1914 A. The Powers' Relative Strength: 1. B. They ranked as follows: (1) Germany; (2) Britain; (3) Russia; (4) France; (5) Austria-Hungary; (6) Serbia.

Social Structure and Domestic Politics in Europe, 1890-1914 1. Oligarchy and fears of upheaval in Europe. Russia and Austria on a collision course in Balkans. a) Russia (1) has revolution in 1905. Regime was weak, agrarian based economy in an emerging industrial age. High proletariat unrest. Intellectuals alienated from society and politics. Compare to how Bismarck had been willing to make liberal concession during 1870 s. Slavophile opinion holding state together. Leads to need to back Serbs. 1909 Bosnia crisis Russia is spanked and loses face. Leaders decide better to have war abroad than revolution at home. 2nd sick man of Europe (Turkey is 1st) Multiethnic state, many nationalities. Serbs, poles, Czechs, Rumanians, Hungarians, etc. Austrian wealth based on industrial development, Hungary on agrarian. s Fears that liberal reforms will tear country apart. Sees existence of independent and pan-Slavic Serbia as a threat to existence of A-H. Domestic politics here may have been guiding force behind policy of conquest in Balkans.

(2)

(3) (4)

b)

Austria-Hungary (1) (2)

(3) (4) (5)

c)

Serbia (1) Balkans wars of 1912-13 heightened Serbian nationalism (tossed out Turks then gained concession from Bulgarians). Semi-modern national revolutionary state w/ democratic self-government. Rise of the Black-Hand (secret revolutionary society) responsible for the assassination of Austrian Arch-Duke. Wanted to ultimately create a greater south-Slav state (would have been at the expense of A-H empire). This would have been a big political threat to the ossified and conservative government in A-H Fischer thesis: Internal pressure (need for land) necessitated a belief that a war of continental expansion was necessary. The self-encirclement of Germany, and the German myth that others had conspired to bring it about. In article written by Schlieffen: (a) (b) Britain envious of German economic and industrial prowess France thirsting for revenge from war in 1871 (regain Alcase and Loraine) C: war is never over. Russia filled with Slav resentment at Tueton. Italy with fortresses aimed at Austria. Fears that the British navy would attack out of the blue to destroy the nascent German Navy.

(2) (3)

(4)

d)

Germany (1)

(2)

(c) (d) (e)

(3) (4) (5)

Self-proclaimed bulwark against revolution and democracy Public opinion driving need for expanded influence in outside world Excess steel making capacity leads Krupp to lobby for more warships and naval expansion.
4

(6)

Constant dealing and tension between agrarian (Junker) and steel (industrialists). (a) (b) (c) Junkers: political power Industrialists: economic power via taxes. Workers: no room in political debate for workers. Social democrats large party, but little real power. (i) (ii) (iii) 1st try oppression industrial reforms and colonial expansion. emigration to US

(7) e) f)

Lack of viable defensive (natural barriers) borders Relatively calm at this point. Threat of civil war in Ireland Debate over home rule which they thought would satisfy Irish simply succeeds in splitting them, Protestants in Ulster very unhappy. Army has disproportionate % of Irish and Scottish. The decline of British power and the AngloGerman Detente of 1912-1914. Britain #1 seas power very threatened by German Naval expansion.

France: (1) (1) (2) Britain

(3) (4) (5)

2.

Systemic Militarism a) The military's influence was large, especially in Germany (1) (2) Civilians weren aware of war plans, or didn t t understand implications. German military leaders viewed mobilization as first step of war, in other states leaders viewed it as a deterrent step to enhance their credibility.

b)

The military's ideas/myths were dangerous. These included: (1) (2) Offense is easy Windows of vulnerability are common, large, open and close quickly (and everyone knows this). (a) Russia defeated by JPN and recovering from 1904-5 revolution would be growing more powerful each year. Anglo-Russia naval cooperation on the rise. French army reorganization underway but not complete (increase in mandatory conscription from 2 to 3 years).

(b) (c)

(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 3.

Surprise is essential. Waving big sticks makes others nice. Others are hostile. Empires are valuable. War is short, glorious, even fun.

Self-glorifying nationalist myths in the schools--history as fiction a) Lack of independent scholarship. Professors were propagandists for the state who repeated fatuous ideas instead of evaluating them, especially in Germany Example, Ratzel (German geographer) teaches that growing populations need growing territories.

b)

c)

Historians taught that a growing power (Germany) would have to either be satisfied with being a 2nd rate or be willing to promote self to status of world power. Spoke and wrote about the inevitability of war and in particular, the next one.

d)

C.

The Changing Nature of War 1. The rise of mass armies and the mobilization system: a) b) Preliminary mobilization v. full mobilization. Why mobilization meant war. (Because Germany's Schlieffen plan mandated a surprise attack on Belgium as soon as mobilization began.) Was secret mobilization possible? (No, but some thought so.)

c) 2.

The rise of the power of the defensive on the battlefield: a) b) Machine guns, barbed wire, railroad, and mass armies. This becomes a serious command problem. In most states rural based elite's (Junkers) are into Cavalry and also control much political power. Cavalry is an offensive force, but out of place in a defensive, attrition based environment.

3.

The growth of the "Cult of the Offensive a) b) Schlieffen plan: wide swing through Belgium due to fears of simultaneous war with France and Russia. France Plan XVII: Based on Eln and Red trousers and a massive, but not well planned, offensive into Germany: two dogs chasing each otherstails. Austria: Plan to sweep through Balkans. Russia south and west, based on long and massive mobilization.

c) d) 4.

Questions: a) b) What war plans would have made the most sense for each power? Once at war, what was the best way for each side to fight? (Depends on goals, thinks Clausewitz.) In assessing war blame, post-war analyses looked at how Germany fight and inferred their intentions from the plans.

D.

Perceptions in Europe: AKA Public Opinion 1. The rise of international Social Darwinism a) b) Leads to belief that imperialism is good. Motive power and justification for imperial expansionist policies. (1) c) leads to need for militaries to accomplish this and prevent being the one selected out.

Goes hand in hand with late 1800 notions of economic s laissez-faire; i.e. that the best firms will win out through competition. Germanys population increases 800-900k each year. Need greater sources of materials. Need a world empire of colonies. Pan-Germanism Pan-Slavism; expansionism in Germany, Russia, Serbia (!), and France. People (masses) believed that war would improve their lot in life and that in any event it wouldn be so bad, 6 t weeks tops. Not willing to run risks (loss of face) for peace because down side not too bad. Leaders underestimated own options and overestimated their opponent s. Lack of empathy with rest of world (surprising since most leaders related). Couldn put themselves in shoes of others t Lack of understanding of causality, that a chain of events might all be linked. Events tended to be seen in isolation rather than the context in which they were made.

2.

Malthuesean economics. a)

3.

The need for empire a) b)

4.

"War is good for you"--a remarkable idea. a)

b) 5.

Psychological environment of inevitability: a) b) c) d)

E.

The appearance of a tight (offensive) network of alliances in Europe versus loose (defensive ones.) 1. 2. Dual Alliance: Germany, Austria and Italy (who was seeking distance from Germany) Entante Cordial: France, Britain, Russia. a) Germany believes this to be an offensive alliance, but in fact, Recent Russian conflict over Persia make the alliance very tense. France and Russia DO have an offensive pact though.

3. 4.

Alliances designed to deter potential aggressors but had effect of making opponent feel weaker and threatened. Alliances tighten relative to past because of increases tightness (need to supply cash, not just a verbal and written commitment).

F. G.

The naval and land arms races (causes of trouble, or mere symptoms of other causes?) The rise of economic interdependence. 1. Trade levels in 1914 between major powers at levels not reached again until 1960 Up to 25% of each states GDP s. coming from Int trade. Modern argument is that l interdependence helps, did it then? Germany and Britain each others best trading partners, may have led Germans to think Britain would NOT come into war.

2. H. I.

The (alleged) appearance of dumb national leaders in Russia, Germany, Britain, and Austria-Hungary. The rise of (incompetent?) peace movements: "let's arbitrate disputes!"; "lets have arms control!"

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III.

THE "JULY CRISIS": JUNE 28-AUGUST 4, 1914 A. The Sarajevo Assassination of Austria's Archduke Ferdinand (heir the throne), June 28. 1. 2. 7 members of the Black Hand conspire to assassinate the ArchDuke of Austria. They were teenagers at the time. Was the Serbian government responsible? a) Evidence of ties between the Black Hand and the Serbian defense forces, that the Serbs, via the Black hand, deliberately tried to provoke the Austrians knowing that Russia would come to their aid.

B.

The German "Blank Check" to Austria, July 5-6. 1. 2. Germans agree to cover Austria back. s Germany pushes Austria toward war: it does far more than approve an Austrian war against Serbia, it actively pushes them to it. German expectations: what were they? a) Did the German government think that such a war would provoke Russia to intervene? (1) Most evidence (see Geiss) suggests that most Germans thought Russia would sit quietly, from monarchic solidarity, and for window reasons: Germany's good window was the RussianFrench bad window. However, some straws in the wind suggest that some Germans foresaw where the crisis would lead.

3.

b)

Was British intervention in such a war expected? Again, this is debated, but most evidence suggests that most Germans thought not.

4.

German desires: what were they? a) Did Germany want a war? The elite was split. (1) The Army actively wanted a continental war, the Kaiser and Bethmann didn't. In my view the preferred center-of-gravity outcome of the elite was a crisis victory; the next preferred outcome was a continental war; the next was status quo ante; and the least-desired result was world war.

11

(2)

Bethmann and the Kaiser preferred the status quo ante to continental war, but the Army didn't, and prevailed--ultimately in an unrecorded confrontation on July 30.

C.

The Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia, July 23. 1. Has three main parts: a) b) c) Serbian government to forbid anti-Austria activities in Serbia Ban main Serbian nationalist organization: Naroda Odbrana Allow Austrians to participate in assassination investigation. (1) This last one is really tough for Serbs to swallow, because, while assassination had taken place in Bosnia, the Black hand had been funded and trained by Serbian defense forces.

2.

This had a 2-day deadline (it took the Austrians 14 days to write and 4 days to deliver), and was designed to be impossible to accept. Austria's plan was then to smash the Serbian army and "vassalize" Serbia, but not to annex it, because AustriaHungary's Hungarian politicians wouldn't accept more Slavs in the empire. The Serbs considered accepting all Austria's demands but in the end rejected Austria's demand to allow Austrian officials to participate in the Serbian enquiry into the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Serbs then ask Russians for help. Also signal Austrians that they are willing to talk about the terms and to agree to many of them, although they can accept them uncritically in 24 hours. t On receiving this reply the Austrian government promptly ordered mobilization of its army against Serbia. This order reached the army command at 9:23 p.m. July 25; it posited July 27 as "alarm day" (whatever that means), and July 28 as the first day of mobilization. With orders issued at 4:00 p.m.--even before the Serbian time limit expired at 6:00. Russian leaders also decide in principle to mobilize later against Austria (but not Germany.)

D.

Serbian reply, 6:00 p.m., July 25. 1.

2.

3.

E.

Russian Preliminary Mobilization, July 25 1.

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2.

The French also began pre-mobilization on July 25, although this had less effect on the crisis, perhaps because these measures were still substantially undetected by July 28. Why did the Russians begin to mobilize? With what expectation? Answer: we don't know. This grave decision, a key to the crisis, has never been fully explained. These points are pertinent: a) Sazonov, the Russian Foreign Minister, said on July 24 "C'est la guerre Europenne!" when he heard the terms of the Austrian ultimatum. In short, the Russians already expected war at this point: they felt the Austro-German move showed that Austria and Germany planned to smash Serbia, and that Russia would have to allow this or fight; and since Russia wouldn't allow this, it would have to fight. If so, it seems likely that the Russians pre-mobilized to gain the first strike (really first-mobilization) advantage in the war that Germany and Austria seemed to be forcing upon them. Since war seemed inevitable, and the Russians thought that whoever mobilized first would have the upper hand, quick mobilization made sense. Cannot allow German-Austrian expansion into Balkans and Baltic Russia had only of late managed s. to begin to reconstruct their image as a great power following defeats in 1905 and later. Couldn allow t Germans and their lap dogs the Austrians to force them to yet again lose face. Note: this crisis occurred against the backdrop of manifest signs of war fever in Germany (e.g., the Jubilees of 1913) that Russia had detected. Russian civilians (Sazonov and the Czar) were apparently unaware that mobilization meant war until later in the crisis. We can surmise that their soldiers talked them into these preliminary measures before they realized that mobilization meant war. Russian civilians (Sazonov and the Czar) were apparently unaware that Russia had an "all or nothing" mobilization plan; Russia had to mobilize against Germany if it mobilized against Austria. The Russian chief of staff failed to explain this to the civilians at the key meetings on July 24-25. This

3.

b)

c)

d)

e)

f)

13

misconception eased the Russian decision in principle to mobilize against Austria. F. Germany hangs tough, July 25-30. 1. The British proposed mediation of the crisis under British auspices. Lord Grey is ineffectual, and also confuses other powers as to British intentions. The Germans kept pushing Austria forward, seeking to get the fait accompli finished. The German problem: Austria wouldn't be ready to attack Serbia until August 12. Hence, to foreclose diplomacy, the Germans urged Austria to declare war on Serbia, which Austria did on July 28. This in turn helped spur Russia to declare partial mobilization on July 29, and then full mobilization on July 30. What went on? Some details: Kaiser makes a peace bid with cousin Nicky: See Telegrams Bethmann sabotages the Kaiser's peace effort. a) The Kaiser wasn't told of the Serbian reply for several days. He becomes despondent when he realizes a diplomatic solution might have been possible. He then asked Bethmann to ask Austria to offer the "Halt in Belgrade" to Russia. But Bethmann didn't do it! He waited half a day, and then late on July 28 he told the Austrian's something much milder! He never told them how strongly the Kaiser wanted the crisis ended! Then late on July 29 Bethmann reversed course and tried to pull the Austrians back from the brink, in messages sent overnight, asking Austria to accept the Halt in Belgrade. These messages were sent at 2:55 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. July 30. Too much can be made of this change. Even on July 30 Bethmann never made a clear threat to Austria, or clearly stated that the crisis should be called off. Still, it was a change. What caused it? Some say it was the latest warning from Britain, received at 9:12 p.m. July 29. Some say it was Russian partial mobilization, which convinced him that Russia wouldn't cave. I also wonder if it wasn't Belgian

2.

3. 4.

b)

5.

Bethmann then changes his mind: a peace effort. a)

b)

c)

14

mobilization too; Germany learned of significant Belgian mobilization measures on July 29 at 4:00 p.m. 6. Moltke sabotaged Bethmann's effort at 2:00 p.m. July 30 a) With a telegram to Austria urging immediate Austrian mobilization, and promising that Germany would follow suit. It's possible that Moltke also made more direct efforts to persuade Bethmann to halt his peace effort. (1) Bethmann was inactive during the morning of July 30. If B really meant to avoid war, he should have been telling Russia that he was now willing to pressure Austria, and asking it not to mobilize in the meantime; and he should have been telling Britain the same thing, and asking it to restrain Russia. He didn't. Could coercion or persuasion by Moltke be the reason?

b)

c)

However, why did M really tried to restrain B? Two very different interpretations are possible. (1) Moltke had hoped to preserve peace, but was finally persuaded that Germany had to mobilize in order to keep pace with the Russian, French, and Belgian mobilizations. He explained this necessity to Bethmann with sadness in his heart. Moltke, having desired an opportunity for preventive war against Russia for months, and seeing in the July crisis a fine opportunity for such a war, was delighted that Russia, France and Belgium gave Germany a pretext to mobilize; was enraged that Bethmann might take this pretext as an opportunity to make peace; and either persuaded or coerced Bethmann to cease his efforts. (a) Interpretation 1) suggests World War I was an accidental war caused by military factors that made the July crisis exceptionally dangerous; Interpretation 2) suggests that World War I was a deliberate war of aggression by Germany, which plotted

(2)

(b)

15

to provoke, and then exploited, the excuse that Russian mobilization presented in order to wage a war of continental conquest. (c) Note: the Germans learned of the Russian pre-mobilization measures on July 27, two days after they began. If Germany really sought to prevent a continental war, shouldn't this news have shocked Germany into backtracking--i.e. forcing the "Halt in Belgrade" compromise on Austria? But Bethmann kept going until late on July 29. This supports the inference that the Germans viewed a continental war with equanimity, and feared only a world war.

G.

British dithering. 1. The British never warned Germany in a crystal-clear manner that they would intervene if Germany launched a continental war, chiefly because the British themselves did not decide what they would do until August 3. British waffling leads Germans to believe that they might be able to move through Belgium without British intervention. Partial mobilization, July 29. Russia did this partly to deter Austria from invading Serbia, partly to offset Austrian mobilization against Serbia, partly to forestall Austrian mobilization in Galicia, and perhaps partly because on July 27 German Secretary of State Jagow lullingly assured the Allies that Germany would accept a partial Russian mobilization that was aimed only at Austria-Hungary. Full mobilization, 5:00, July 30. Reasons: the conviction that war was inevitable, spurred by: a) Reports that the Germans were upset by Russian preliminary mobilization, and that the Austrians still resisted any compromise; and Russian military warnings that mobilization was an all-or-nothing matter--a partial, South-only mobilization would make more difficult a full mobilization later if that became necessary. False reports that German mobilization had begun.

2. H.

Russian mobilization 1.

2.

b) I.

German mobilization: late on July 30

16

1.

Before learning of Russian full mobilization, the German government made a commitment to decide at noon July 31 whether to mobilize. This was, in essence, a provisional decision to mobilize the next day unless something favorable (e.g. a Russian/French cave-in) happened in the interim to defuse the crisis. Germany was probably responding to continuing Russian pre-mobilization, to Belgian premobilization, to the Russian partial mobilization of July 29, and/or to the Kaiser's misinterpretation of Czar's remark that Russian mobilization had begun 5 days earlier, which emerged from the Willy-Nicky correspondence. This decision meant that the war would have broken out absent Russian full mobilization, with German mobilization on July 31. (Thus the outbreak of the war was "overdetermined.") An interpretation of the crisis to consider. Note that German military leaders rightly knew that Germany could not mobilize in secret for any length of time; but Russian and French military leaders thought Germany could mobilize secretly, with the French believing secret mobilization was possible for a week (See Joffre's memoirs). Why was this? a) Perhaps German officers, hoping to bait Russia or France into early mobilizations that would then justify German mobilization and the preventive war that many German officers sought, primed French and Russian intelligence with false information that would scare them into a premature mobilization. Joffre does indicate that his 7-days-of-secret mobilization estimate came from secret intelligence on Germany. Had I been a German general, and had I desired a preventive war, this is exactly what I would have wanted the French to believe, and I would have polluted French intelligence with exactly this sort of information. (This is a speculative interpretation, but I know no evidence against it.)

2.

b)

J.

Belgian intransigence 1. Germany presented Belgium an ultimatum: allow us to move peacefully through your territory to get to France, and we will honor Belgian sovereignty after the war and recompense any damages; oppose such movement, and face destruction. Even with this relatively attractive offer in hand and facing the prospect of destruction on the battlefield, the Belgians still fought

2.

17

3.

Belgians didn believe that Germany would release lands after t war. The felt that they would be occupied either war; to yield would be to lose honor too. If we are to be crushed, let us be crushed gloriously. To which the undersecretary f state replies, Well Sir, Are we ready? and the Premier and war minister replies Yes, we are ready, yes, except for one thing we have not yet got our heavy artillery. The guns had been ordered from Krupp. The invasion of Belgium provides the legal basis for British intervention. It is of particular importance because France and Britain had coordinated their military plans (assuming politicians would allow the British to come into a potential war immediately). Without the British holding up there end, the French would have been really in a bad way.

4.

5.

18

IV.

MILITARY-RELATED CAUSES OF WWI? A. B. C. D. E. F. G. Deliberate war provoked by Germany Preemption desires Windows of vulnerability Militarism: civilians out of the loop Inflexible mobilization and tactical plans Development of defensive technology Cult of the Offensive (Schlieffen, Plan XVII) Spiral or deterrence failure? Miscalculation Non-evaluation Nationalist mythmaking Non-strategy War as glorious Cheap War (What if all sides had possessed nuclear second-strike capabilities in 1914?)

V.

MISPERCEPTIONS AS CAUSES OF WORLD WAR I? A. B. C. D. E. F. G.

VI.

The War

19