Electric Power Substations Engineering CH 7

CRC Electric Power Engineering Handbook
Chapter 11: Power System Dynamics and Stability
Section 8: Direct Analysis of Wide Area Dynamics
J. F. Hauer W. A. Mittelstadt R. Adapa

M. K. Donnelly W. H. Litzenberger
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Bonneville Power Administration Electric Power Research Institute
(PNNL) (BPA) (EPRI)
Richland, Washington Portland, Oregon Palo Alto, California
The material to follow deals with the direct analysis of power system dynamic performance. By “direct” we mean
that the analysis is performed on the physical system, and that any use of system models is secondary. Many of
the tools and procedures are as applicable to simulated response as to measured response, however. Comparison
of the results thus obtained is strongly recommended as a means to test model validity.
The resources needed for direct analysis of a large power system represent significant investments in measurement
systems, mathematical tools, and staff expertise. New market forces in the electricity industry require that the
“value engineering” of such investments be considered very carefully. Many guidelines for this can be found in
collective utility experience of the Western Systems Coordinating Council (WSCC), in western North America.
1. Dynamic Information Needs: The WSCC Breakup of August 10, 1996

Large power systems are very rich in information that can be developed from direct measurements of dynamic
behavior. Progressive electrical utilities are developing comprehensive data acquisition facilities. The emerging
critical path challenge is to extract essential information from this data, and to distribute the pertinent information
where and when it is needed. Otherwise system control centers will be progressively inundated by potentially
valuable data that they are not yet able to fully utilize.
New factors are rapidly compounding this problem. Utility restructuring promises to sharply increase the need for
measurement based information while shrinking the time frame in which it must be produced and distributed. In
addition, financial pressures dictate that cost recovery for the requisite technology investments be prompt and low
risk.
Malin-Round Mountain #1 MW
Dittmer Control Center,
Vancouver WA 15:48:51
1500 sample rate = 20 per sec. Out-of-Step separation
15:42:03
15:47:36
Keeler-Allston line trips
Ross-Lexington line trips/
McNary generation drops off
1400
1300
0.276 Hz
0.264 Hz, 0.252 Hz
3.46% damping
1200
(see detail)
Reference time = 15:35:30 PDT

1100
300 400 500 600 700 800
Time in Seconds
Fig. 1. Oscillation buildup for the WSCC breakup of August 10, 1996.
These issues were brought into sharp and specific focus by the massive breakup experienced by the Western North
American Power System on August 10, 1996. The mechanism of failure (though perhaps not the cause) was a
transient oscillation, under conditions of high power transfer on long paths that had been progressively weakened
through a series of seemingly routine transmission line outages. Later analysis of monitor records, as in Fig. 1,
provides many indications of potential oscillation problems. Verbal accounts also suggest that less direct
indications of a weakened system were observed by system operators for some hours, but that there had been no
means for interpreting them. It is very likely that, buried within the measurements already at hand, lay the
information that system behavior was abnormal and that the system itself was vulnerable.
Utility restructuring, through several mechanisms, is making it impossible to predict system vulnerabilities as
accurately or as promptly as the increasingly volatile market demands. It is quite possible that standard planning
models could not have predicted the August 10 breakup, even if the conditions leading up to it had been known in
full detail. This situation has deep roots and many ramifications [1,2,3,4,5,6]. Correcting the situation will require
many years of concerted effort, on many fronts.
An interim solution is to reinforce capabilities for predicting system vulnerability with the capability to detect and
recognize its symptoms as evidenced in dynamic measurements. This can also be viewed as a form of
measurement based dynamic security assessment (DSA). In the Western Power System, the technology and
infrastructure that this requires are being developed as extensions of the DOE/EPRI Wide Area Measurement
System (WAMS) Project and related efforts [7,8,9].
2. Background
Comprehensive monitoring of a large power system is a long step beyond the monitoring of local devices or even
regional performance. Developing a suitable investment plan calls for close attention to emerging information
needs and information technologies. Even more important–perhaps decisively so–are the inter-utility practices and
infrastructure through which dynamic information resources are collectively reinforced and operated.
Timeliness of the information is becoming an increasingly important consideration. The pace of utility
restructuring strongly encourages more aggressive use of power delivery assets, which translates into progressive
encroachment upon customary operating margins. This can greatly increase the need for direct evidence
concerning the proximity and nature of safe operating limits.
CRC Monitor Section – 2

The Western North America power system provides a useful example of the agencies at work. Driven by stability
considerations, and in an earlier regulatory environment, the member utilities of the Western North America power
system have made significant progress in the development of monitor facilities for examining system behavior.
This development, coordinated through the WSCC, is a collective response to their shared needs for measurement
based information about system characteristics, model fidelity, and operational performance [1,2,4].
Utility restructuring is now carrying these and all utilities toward the future in large abrupt steps. Infrastructure
development for acquiring wide area dynamic information started in response to technical needs in a cost based
environment. Its value in the new price based environment is likely to be much higher, through direct services such
as
• Real time determination of transmission capacities, assuming necessary progress with mathematical
tools.
• Early detection of system problems. This enables cost reductions through performance based
maintenance, and provides a safety check on network loading.
• Refinement of planning, operation, and control processes essential to best use of transmission assets.
Such an infrastructure can also provide indirect benefits as an enterprise network [10,11], or "people net." It is a
proven means through which a wide range of technical skills can be accessed and shared among the utilities as a
virtual technology staff. This may be very important to the future power system, especially in situations where
difficult stability problems constrain the use of transmission assists.
3. An Overview of WSCC WAMS

Collectively, in response to the needs that utilities share in operating their facilities, these efforts are leading toward
an integrated dynamic information network that spans the entire WSCC system. WSCC WAMS is evolving as a
hierarchical network of dynamic monitors, plus the information tools and general infrastructure necessary for
effective use of the acquired data. Data sources are of many kinds, and they may be located anywhere in the
power system. This is also true for those who need the data, or those who need various kinds of information
extracted from the data.
It would not be practical or sufficient to just collect all WAMS data at one location and then permit users to
retrieve it as needed. Data volume, and information demands, call for distributed storage and management.
Central to this is a WAMS Information Manager having enough "intelligence" to route data and manage archives
on the basis of the information contained. This issue is pursued in a later section.
4. Direct Sources of Dynamic Information

There are a variety of means by which dynamic information can be extracted from a large power system. These
include
• Disturbance analysis
• Ambient noise measurements
- spectral signatures
- open-loop/closed-loop spectral comparisons
- correlation analysis
• Direct tests with

- low level noise inputs
- mid-level inputs with special waveforms
- high level pulse inputs
- network switching
Each has its own merits, disadvantages, and technical implications [8,12,13,14,15,16]. For comprehensive results, at
best cost, a sustained program of direct power system analysis will draw upon all of these in combinations that are
tailored to the circumstances at hand.
Some of these operations–such as network switching tests–are outside the usual scope of power system
monitoring. All of them represent required functionalities for the WAMS infrastructure, however, and for the
monitor facilities within it. Monitoring is a subset of measurement operations. Even so, it is the monitor
facilities that provide the backbone for the dynamic information infrastructure.
From a functional standpoint, wide area monitoring for a large power system involves the following general
functions:
• Disturbance monitoring: characterized by large signals, short event records, moderate bandwidth, and
straightforward processing. Highest frequency of interest is usually in the range of 2 Hz to perhaps 5 Hz.
Operational priority tends to be very high.
• Interaction monitoring: characterized by small signals, long records, higher bandwidth, and fairly complex
processing (such as correlation analysis). Highest frequency of interest ranges to 20–25 Hz for rms
quantities but may be substantially higher for direct monitoring of phase voltages and currents. Operational
priority is variable with the application and usually less than for disturbance monitoring.
• System condition monitoring: characterized by large signals, very long records, very low bandwidth.
Usually performed with data from SCADA or other EMS facilities. Highest frequency of interest is usually
in the range of 0.1 Hz to perhaps 2 Hz. Core processing functions are simple, but associated functions such
as state estimation and dynamic or voltage security analysis can be very complex. Operational priority tends
to be very high.
These functions are all quite different in their objectives, priorities, technical requirements, and information
consumers. At many utilities they are supported by separate staff structures and by separate data networks.
5. What is a Monitor?
The power system contains many devices that can serve as monitors for some processes and purposes. This
document narrows the field somewhat, through the following definition:
"A monitor is any device that automatically records power system data, either selectively or continuously,
according to some mechanism that permits the data to be retrieved later for analysis and display."
With exceptions as noted, present attention is further restricted to monitors that record one or more of the
following:
• dynamic "swing" interactions among generators and loads through an interconnecting electrical
transmission system.
• the performance of specific facilities involved in swing interactions. This includes generators, loads, and
control systems.
This focus excludes most digital fault recorders and SCADA systems, since their typical record lengths and data
rates are (respectively) not adequate for capturing swing dynamics. Network condition monitors might be
included, depending upon the specifics of the device.

Overall monitor facilities often contain a wide range of recording devices that are not swing monitors. The
ubiquitous (and under utilized) digital fault recorder, or DFR, is a particulary good example of this. The facilities
may also include devices that have little or no direct recording capability, but that do provide essential
"intelligence" to overall facility performance. It is becoming established practice to classify all of the
aforementioned devices as intelligent electronic devices, or IED's [17,18]. Drawing upon this terminology, just
about any modern measurement system reduces to an IED network.
6. Monitor System Functionalities

The primary rule in power system measurements is this:
"Record good data, and keep them safe!"
These are two distinct functions and both call for close attention. If monitor facilities are used to support direct
tests then an even more important rule enters the picture:
"Do no harm to the power system!"
In both cases it is the measurement of low-level interactions that define the most rigorous functionality
requirements to the overall measurement system. This is due, in part, to long recording periods plus the need to
resolve very small changes in large signals [12].
There is a more demanding need, however: the evaluation of system dynamic performance in nearly real time
(NRT). This is particularly critical during staged tests, when a close balance must be maintained between system
security and the quality of test results. It is also important during routine monitor operations, as a means for
identifying important data and for generation of operator alerts.
test signal u(t) Signal
Conditioning Interactive
response y(t) System Recording
Time Domain Storage
Display
Freq Domain
Storage
Display
Archival
Recording
Fig. 2. Information functions in measurement of low level interactions
Fig. 2, with the test signal deleted for the case of passive monitoring, represents core information functions that are
needed in both situations. The functions are
• Signal conditioning, to assure the measurement quality and prompt observability of important signal
features.
• Archival recording, to assure safekeeping of important results. This should be as comprehensive as
possible, and include all phases of testing that involve switching operations or application of test signals.
• Interactive recording, to permit prompt examination of data that cannot be fully assessed in real time.
This also provides backup recording of high priority signals.
• Time domain display, to permit frequent review of signal waveforms for evidence of data quality and
emerging trouble on the power system.

• Frequency domain display, to permit frequent review of signal spectra for evidence of data quality and
possible trouble on the power system.
The NRT displays permit appropriate actions to be take by the test team or monitor operations staff. In some
cases the analysis tools underlying these displays are also used in event detection logic (EDL) to trigger automatic
functions such as accessory data capture, information routing, or operator alerts.
Fig. 2 represents a paradigm that is fundamental to low level measurements of power system dynamics. Not all
monitors are interaction monitors, and many interaction monitors lack some of the functions shown. The required
functionality resides in the overall measurement system. Fig. 2 will reappear in many expanded forms
throughout the Sections to follow.
7. Event Detection Logic

Data recording in an individual monitor is either selective or continuous. In selective recording, data "snapshots"
are collected upon command of "trigger logic." This requires that dynamic event signatures be detected in real
time–otherwise useful data is lost. Continuous recording requires very similar logic, but uses it to sort records
already captured according to their information content.
Triggers for initiating data capture can be classified in several ways. A "manual vs. automatic" classification
provides
• manual
– local
– remote
• automatic
– pre-scheduled
– internal event detection
– cross-trigger (from another monitor or IED)
Another classification is
• external
– local manual
– remote manual
– pre-scheduled (clock initiated)
– cross-trigger (from another monitor or IED)
• internal event detection
This highlights the fact that EDL is fundamentally different from some other triggers. EDL is also a core issue in
monitor design and operation, whether recording be selective or continuous.
There are four basic factors involved in detecting the onset of a dynamic event. They are
• magnitude
• persistence
• frequency content
• context

A simple disturbance trigger might examine just magnitude and persistence, in tests of form "Do the latest M
samples each exceed threshold T(M)?" [19]. It is useful to think of the context factor as adjusting such thresholds
to system conditions, such as network stress or the operational status of key system resources.
A partial list of signatures through which events can be detected, and perhaps recognized, includes the following:
• Steps or swings in tieline power.
• Large change, or rate of change, in bus voltage or frequency.
• Sustained or poorly damped oscillations, perhaps in conjunction with some other event.
• Large increase in system noise level.
• Increase of system activity in some critical frequency band.
• Unusual correlation or phasing between fluctuations in two given signals.
The tools needed to extract useful signature information from measured data range from straightforward heuristics
to very advanced methods of signal analysis. Recognition of the underlying events calls for pattern recognition
logic to match extracted signatures against known event templates.
8. Monitor Architectures
The vast majority of dynamic monitors only capture data for disturbances that are strongly observable in the
monitor inputs. The "trigger to archive" or "snapshot" monitor in Fig. 3 is typical. A circulating prehistory buffer
retains the most recently acquired data, assuring that a certain amount of information will be provided about
system conditions before the disturbance is detected. Trigger logic causes the disturbance to be recorded as one or
more data snapshots in the motor archives. The device shown also has the following accessory features:
• External trigger inputs for initiating data capture.
• Flags and alarms sent out to indicate the triggering condition.
• External control of monitor settings via a modem port.
• Retrieval of archive data via a modem port.
The triggered monitor uses a rather conservative architecture that is necessary and appropriate when substantial
amounts of data must be captured at high rates (as in digital fault recording). The reliance upon triggered
recording–together with a general tendency toward short records and even shorter prehistories–are serious
handicaps in wide area measurements, however.

Circular
buffer
Signal
Converter
Analog Signals Merging
Gate
A/D
Monitor
and Archives
Routing
External triggers
Archive access
Interface
Digital
Trigger
Logic
Flags and alarms
Trigger selections
Signal selections
Modem Port
dial-up access
Fig. 3. A simple "snapshot" disturbance monitor

WSCC experience suggests that triggered data capture does not provide an adequate basis for wide area
measurements. Even rather large events may not be sensed by trigger logic that is remote from the site of the
disturbance. Records for a cascading failure that develops slowly, from some fairly small initiating event, are very
unlikely to present a comprehensive view of the mechanism by which the small failure propagated into a very large
one.
MALINR MOUNTAIN 1+2 DATE 3/ 6/87
50 MS TIME 23:10:39
2000
1800
1600
M
W
1400
1200
1000
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
BPA
SECONDS SYS OPS
Fig. 4. Western system oscillations of March 6, 1987 (sum for two parallel circuits)
Fig. 4 illustrates the point. The record there, collected on BPA’s earlier Power System Disturbance Monitor,
indicates peak-to-peak 0.7 Hz swings of roughly 900 MW on the Pacific AC Intertie (PACI). However, as is
usual with triggered monitors, it failed to capture the all-important interval during which the oscillations started.
Without this, whatever indications there may have been to warn system operators of pending trouble remain
unknown.
Some triggered monitors can support interaction measurements under manual control, provided that their storage
capabilities and analog to digital (A/D) resolution are sufficient. Their functionality in this mode of operation is
similar to that of a high quality tape recorder. The more "intelligent" functions expected of a monitor are lost, and
sorting through the data can become a very laborious manual exercise. Monitors that are explicitly designed to
operate in a continuous recording mode are a far better option.

Internal Analysis
Signal and
Merging
Analog Signals Display
and
A
C D /
on
v
Routing
er
te
r
Manual
External trigger trigger
Controls
Trigger
D
t ta
Inigi
ref l
a
ce
Flags and alarms Logic
File Tags
Monitor Shared
Archives Data
&
Data sharing
O
b
on
u
n
n
rv
io
io
se
c
tr
at
(
l f
ct
s)
ol
al
Archive access
Ethernet Port Modem Port
high capacity ethernet
Fig. 5. Basic architecture for a continuously recording monitor
Fig. 5 shows a basic "stream to archive" monitor that, typically, will maintain a continuous data record for periods
ranging to several weeks. While triggers are used, their role is rather different than for a triggered monitor. Data
capture in a continuous monitor does not depend upon trigger logic. Instead, trigger logic is used to
• tag the acquired data in ways indicating its likely value. Factors in this are
– the magnitude, duration, and frequency content of dynamic activity.
– the context in which the data were acquired–e.g., event specific external triggers and system stress levels
(from condition monitoring).
• generate external flags or alarms when data values reach critical levels.
The value tags will also determine such matters as the priority, routing, archiving level, compression, and retention
time for the associated data. In a fully developed monitor system the value tags will be amended by an Archive
Scanner that automatically reviews and restructures collective monitor archives.
This continuous monitor also has some accessory features beyond those in Fig. 3. These are
• Real time analysis and display, with an option for manual triggering.
• NRT data sharing through the computer network.
The next architecture takes the functionality progression several steps further.

external triggers operator alerts
Trigger
cross triggers
Coordination
manual trigger
internal
triggers
Short
Short Long
Long
EDL**
EDL EDL**
EDL
Raw
Display
Filters & Time Domain
Decimation Displays
Converter/
Interface
Signals Signal FFT Freq. Domain
Selection Tools Displays
Signal Processing
Buffer (SPB) Other O th e r
Analysis D is p la y s
Continuous Event
Gate
Archives Archives
storage control & status flags
*event detection logic
Fig. 6. A continuous monitor combining short and long EDL
Fig. 6 shows a configuration that is representative for a mature interactions monitor that is operating in a manned
substation or in a system control center. Absence of an indicated perimeter for the monitor reflects the fact that
this might well be a locally networked facility, containing several computers or other IED's plus linkages to the
energy management system (EMS).
The indicated triggers are both external and internal, manual and automatic. The internal automatic triggers are
classified as short or long (fast or slow), depending upon length of the data segment needed by the associated event
detection logic. Short EDL can work with a short block of recent data, and is usually sufficient for disturbance
monitoring.
A distinguishing feature in this architecture is the signal processing buffer (SPB) used for advanced triggers (in the
long EDL) and in special displays. SPB functionality is essential for extracting interaction signatures, and for
presenting those signatures to operations staff for their interpretation and review. At hardware level, however, this
functionality can be distributed among one or more buffers internal to the monitor itself plus external buffers for
shared access to the record stream at file level.
A next step in monitor refinement is to enhance the EDL and trigger coordination functions of Fig. 6 through
artificial intelligence. Fig. 7 represents a Diagnostic Event Scanner (DES) suitable for this purpose, and for the
Archive Scanner mentioned earlier.

Feature Extraction Logic
Fast Edge Analysis:
Edge Features
Signature
(short data blocks) • Levels
• Steps
• Ramps
Recognition Operator Alerts
Logic
Ringdown Analysis: Ringdown Features Cross Triggers
• Prony analysis
• FFT spectra Functions:
• FFT correlations analysis controls • Detection Display Controls
• Classification
start • Recoginition
Dataa Edge Timing Data Retention
Signal Step/Ramp
Stream Selection Detector Tools: Requests
pause
• Interactive review
• Heuristic rulesets RecordValue Tags
Signal Processing
Buffer (SPB) • Expert systems
Ambient Analysis: • ANN's
• "Mode Meter" Ambient Features data routing &
• FFT spectra • Others
• FFT correlations analysis controls processing controls
• Filter banks*
Other data & information
*NOTE: Filter banks can include wavelets and BPA oscillation triggers
Fig. 7. Diagnostic Event Scanner (DES) within a continuous monitor
9. Monitor Network Topologies

With respect to their architecture, monitor facilities consist of
• Central monitors that continually scan signals from transducers, and similar instruments, that are
communicated from remote sites.
• Distributed monitor networks, which are found in a variety of general forms
• Local monitors, for which remote access is usually weak and manually initiated.
BPA operates a centralized monitor system, based at the Dittmer control center, that is interlaced with an
expanding network of remote monitors and secondary recording devices. Many of the remote monitors provide
local or regional surveillance over some important parts of the control system. The general strategy is to collect
essential signals (including alarms) from such sites on the central monitors, at modest data rates, and to perform
comprehensive high-speed monitoring locally. In most cases the high speed data is immediately available to site
operators, but is selectively forwarded to the control center or to system analysts.
BPA has three central monitors at or near the Dittmer Control Center. The newest of these, based upon BPA's
rapidly evolving Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC), is discussed a bit later. The other two, the Power System
Analysis Monitor (PSAM) and the Dittmer PPSM, are indicated in Fig. 9
The PSAM and PPSM have access, in parallel, to several hundred analog signals. Most of these signals represent
power flowing within the BPA service area and contain useful information at frequencies up to perhaps 2 Hz.
Signals associated with control projects are an increasingly common exception to this. They ordinarily use 20 Hz
channels and the corresponding transducers, if any, tend to be conventional electronic units modified for either a 2
Hz or 20 Hz bandwidth.

CUSTER
BOUNDARY
SEATTLE
AREA
MONTANA
GRAND
DITTMER COULEE
PORTLAND
AREA
CELILO
IDAHO
MALIN
to Los Angeles (dc)
to San Francisco (ac)
Dittmer control
center
communications link to
Dittmer control center
MALIN interchange metering
point
HVDC Terminal
Fig. 8. BPA central monitor coverage
In this arrangement, the 2 Hz signals present a comprehensive view of interarea "swing" dynamics visible in BPA
interchanges, plus information about voltages, reactive flow, important loads, and automatic generation control
(AGC). The 20 Hz signals convey a necessary minimum of essential information about controller behavior. They
also facilitate alignment and cross analysis of central monitor records with more comprehensive local recordings.
The total communications burden for this mixture of central plus distributed monitoring is much less than for a
fully centralized monitor system. Furthermore, much of the data can be moved with adequate speed and reliability
using general purpose computer networking technology.

GPS Synchronization & Timing
RMS
Xducers
RMS
Xducers
Data Distribution
System
(analog) Controller
Signals
A/D A/D RMS

Portable Power Power System Xducers
SystemMonitor Analysis Monitor
(PPSM) (PSAM)
Security
"Firewall"
Security
Zone
Fig. 9. Topology of BPA central monitor system for analog signals
PMU PMU
Phasor Data Phasor Data

PMU PMU
Concentrator Concentrator
(BPA) (WAPA)
PMU
PMU
PMU
Phasor Data
Concentrator
PMU
(Southwest)
PMU
Fig. 10. Partial topology of the emerging WSCC phasor measurements network
This deployment of remote monitors on a general network represents an evolutionary step in the gradual transition
from analog technology to digital. Direct replacement of BPA's present point-to-point analog communications by
digital channels of comparable bandwidth and resolution (about 14 bits, after filtering) would be needlessly
expensive at this time. Best use of digital technology will call for new architectures, which should readily
accommodate the rapid product enhancements so characteristic of the "information age."

The third monitor system at the Dittmer Control Center is entirely digital. The system consists of multiple Phasor
Measurement Units (PMUs) that are linked together by one or more PDC units. The PMUs are synchronized
digital transducers that stream their data, in real time, to the Dittmer PDC(s). The general functions and topology
for this network resemble those for the Dittmer PSAM and PPSM. Data quality for the phasor technology appears
to be very high, however, and secondary processing of the acquired phasors can provide a broader range of signal
types.
Phasor networks provide their best value in applications that are mission-critical, and that involve truly wide area
measurements. Both factors encourage real time data links among regional phasor networks. This can be
accomplished at both the PMU and the PDC levels. Connecting a PMU to multiple PDC units is straightforward
and has already been done. Selective forwarding of PDC signals to other PDC units seems feasible and is under
very active development. A copy of the BPA PDC became operational at Southern California Edison (SCE)
facilities in mid 1998, and another copy became operational at WAPA in November 1998. The resulting network is
evolving toward a topology of the sort indicated in Fig. 10.
Central monitor systems, though very effective, are not a complete answer:
• They do not serve information needs at local or regional level.
• The dedicated communications can be very expensive.
• Communication failures may cause important data to be lost.
• Data rates and data volumes for some dynamic processes are so high that continuous transmission to central
facilities is not practical. This is especially likely for high performance control systems.
• Under normal circumstances, a lot of data are too mundane to merit the costs of continuous transmission.
Transmission should be selective, and based upon information value.
In many situations better performance and better "value engineering" can be obtained through distributed monitor
networks, in which local storage and selective messaging minimize reliance upon dedicated communications.
Distributed monitor networks can take many forms, ranging from dial-up access among sites to NRT
communication of data and information on full time computer networks. A general computer network permits a
much wider range of functions and technologies than those of the central monitors represented in Fig. 9 and Fig.
10. It is particularly valuable for broadening the staff support base for monitor operations.

.
Field Site A Field Site B Field Site C

*
Analysis
Workstation
(Matlab)
PPSM Core
PPSM PPSM PPSM
MODEM
MODEM
local ethernet
Analysis
Workstation *PDADS
(Matlab) Monitor
Central
PPSM
general ethernet
Analysis Analysis Analysis

Workstation Workstation Workstation
(Matlab) (LabVIEW) (FORTRAN)
Central Facilities
(Operations Center & Technical Support)
Fig. 11. A distributed network for dynamic information
Fig. 11 shows a dynamic information network that represents the topology and functionalities associated with
distributed regional monitoring. The nomenclature there is based upon BPA/PNNL elements of the WAMS
technology package. A "monitor" in this context generally means a measurements workstation, consisting of
• a "core monitor" or data capture unit (DCU).
• one or more analysis toolsets . Most of this functionality is applied to data already captured but, as
indicated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 5, some may be used in near real time.
The analysis toolsets , when operated separately from the DCU, provide an analysis workstation.
The following comments apply to the network of Fig. 11:
• All monitor units and most workstations can communicate with one another.
• PPSM data capture (in the DCU) follows the logic shown in Fig. 5. Continuous recording is customary but
optional.
• PPSM units normally include LabVIEW® analysis station capabilities suitable for initial analysis of
captured data. For in-depth analysis and design this is augmented or replaced by a more advanced package
based upon Matlab® (plus imbedded FORTRAN®).
• The diagram for Field Site B shows a PPSM variant in which LabVIEW analysis tool have been replaced by
a more extensive Matlab toolset for combined analysis and design. The result is a Portable Dynamic
Analysis and Design System (PDADS).
• Analysis in the FORTRAN environment is often performed on larger computers that do not communicate
readily with the PPSM or other workstations. Then the communications may be limited to data transfers
only.
In point of fact there are two monitor types shown in Fig. 11. The standard PPSM is entirely a LabVIEW based
virtual instrument [20,21]. It finds its best uses in field analysis or in pre-defined environments where "pushbutton"
analysis is appropriate. The other monitor is an extended PPSM that uses the standard LabVIEW DCU, while
turning to Matlab to support its more advanced functions [7,22].

This network topology is suitable when security requirements are modest. Dial-in modems can be particularly
inviting points for external attack, however, and they may not be suitable for applications that need a high level of
data security [23].
10. Networks of Networks

A well evolved monitor system will necessarily involve a mixture of technologies, data sources, functions,
operators, and data consumers. In broad terms,
• Required functionalities are determined by who must see what, when, and in what form.
• System configuration is strongly influenced by geography, ownership, selected technology, and the
technology already in service (legacy systems).
• Investment value is strongly enhanced through

– selective use of IED's to supervise, integrate, or replace legacy systems.
– organization of IED's (including monitors) into local, regional, and wide area networks appropriate to
their functions and technologies.
The choices that a particular utility will make are strongly colored by its operating and business requirements and,
more generally, by the value it places upon information.
Overall, the forces at work strongly favor wide area measurement systems that evolve as "networks of networks."
There are a lot of advantages to this. Interleaving networks that have different topologies and different base
technologies can make the overall network much more reliable, while broadening the alternatives for value
engineering. It also permits networks to be operated on the basis of ownership. The ability of a utility to retain
data until it is no longer sensitive (delayed release) will almost certainly prove necessary for information sharing in
the new power system.
PMU Microwave System
PMU PMU
Regional dialup
PMC extended link
PPSM
PPSM PPSM
Regional Regional ethernet
PMC
Monitor PPSM
Analysis
Workstation
(Matlab) DSM
Analysis
Workstation DSM dialup
(Matlab) Terminal link
Site A Site B Site C
Regional Dynamic
Information Center
Nomenclature:
PMU Phasor Measurement Unit
PMC Phasor Measurement Concentrator
To Central PMC PPSM Portable Power System Monitor
DSM Dynamic System Monitor
Fig. 12. Interleaved networks of PMU, PPSM, and DSM units (plus analysis workstations)

Fig. 12 shows interleaved networks of PMU, PPSM, and DSM units (plus analysis workstations). These devices
are proprietary to Macrodyne, BPA/PNNL, and Power Technologies Inc. In this case
• The PMU network has dedicated microwave communications in addition to dial-up links.
• The DSM "network" consists of individual units, accessed from a DSM base unit via dial-up links.
• The PPSM network serves in several roles. In addition to advanced monitor functions, it also provides the
PMU and DSM units with
– alternate communication paths, via the computer network.
– local, high volume archiving.
– analysis and display functions available both on site and through remote teleoperation.
.
Typical network details are shown in Fig. 13 and Fig. 14. Note that Fig. 13 indicates yet another layer of
networking, for a digital transducer network). This could range from a basic PMU/PMT configuration to the
highly versatile Integrated Object Network produced by Power Measurement Ltd. [18].
RealTime Data
Potential Digital
Continuous
Xformers
Transducer Link(s)
Current Network
Xformers (DTN) DTN control
DialUp and data retrieval
Link(s)
Precise Clock Time
CrossTriggering
Data Snapshots
Archive Files
Commands
Interface
Portable Power Local
Electronics
System Monitor Archives
Enhanced (PPSM)
Local Area
Xducers Analysis, Other
Alarms, and Network Instruments
Display
Other signals
Wide Area Data Files and
Network PPSM Control
Fig. 13. PPSM interconnections to local transducers
Potential
Xformers Enhanced Central
Microwave
Analog Monitor
Transmitter
Current Xducers Facilities
Xformers
Processing
Phasor
PTI Electronic
Instruments
Dynamic System BEN–5000
Monitor Digital
Direct
Fault Recorder
Input
TCSC
(DSM) (DFR)
Controller
LAN
communications
Dynamics
System
Portable Power
Scientific Atlanta
System Monitor
(PPSM) SD 390 Dynamic
Interface local analysis Signal Analyzer

SSR
Electronics and display (DSA)
PPSM control and data transfer
[wide area network links]
Fig. 14. Monitor organization local to the Slatt TCSC

Fig. 14 represents a local measurement network developing for the 500 kV Thyristor Controlled Series Capacitor
(TCSC) that was installed at BPA's Slatt substation under an EPRI FACTS project [24,25,26]. The functionalities
there are highly desirable for any large control project. Guidelines for network organization are that
• Any monitor (DFR, DSM, PPSM), through the local area network (LAN), trigger data collection on the
others according to its own rules.
• The PPSM can supervise and control all other monitors or major instruments. All measurements are
available to the PPSM for local display and analysis, for archiving, or for routing to other locations on the
wide area network (WAN).
• The WAN permits remote observation and control of all devices in the measurement LAN through the
PPSM.
The PPSM can extract real time data from any other PPSM on the WAN and incorporate that data into its own
processing.
• Every monitor, and the majority of major instruments, can be accessed through a telephone connection as a
(lower performance) backup to WAN failure.
In addition to its usual functions, the DFR is used for waveform recording in controller performance tests. The
DSA, by itself, is not quite a monitor. It does have good recording capabilities and it is readily networked. It is
quite clearly a rather advanced IED and a valuable addition to overall monitor facilities.
Fig. 15 provides an expanded view of the Slatt measurement network, and of the regional network containing it.
Information facilities of this kind are particularly valuable for certification and operation of major control systems
such as the TCSC. For example, control engineers can perform wide area performance tests without the cost and
delay of special purpose communication links. Staged tests can be supported remotely, with a minimum of travel,
and technical staff can time-share that support across several projects while remaining in their normal work areas.
Workteam functionality is a major requirements source in the proper design of dynamic information
networks.
TCSC PTI Microwave

Monitor Receivers
Controller
(DSM)
Isolation
Amplifiers
Relay
Dittmer
ch
Dynamic TCSC ohms
Signal δω
3
House
PPSM
(synthesized)
7
Analyzer #1 damping signal Control
operator order
8
PPSM
2
internal order
1 House
Signal
modulation test signal
0
Generation cos (ωt) PPSM

Boardman
6
Buckley MW
Dynamic Enhanced
4
Slatt V
PPSM
5
Signal Transducers
Analyzer #2
Chart
optical link BPA Hq
Recorder Highpass Optical
Optical (Portland)
Filters Receiver Transmitter
PGE Hq
(Portland)
PDADS DFR DFR
optical link
Extension Main Unit BPA Labs
Workstation
(BEN5000) (BEN5000) (Vancouver)
ethernet Pacific NW Labs
(Richland)
TCSC CONTROL HOUSE RELAY HOUSE
Fig. 15. Slatt measurement network for TCSC modulation tests of June 6-7, 1994

The final network to consider in this "network of networks," then, is the "people net." As indicated in Fig. 15, the
TCSC Project draws upon remote technical support from three institutions (BPA, PNNL, and Portland General
Electric) at four different locations. Some of this support was provided interactively during commissioning tests
[8], and all of it is available as needed.
Developing the proper interfaces between the "people net" and the monitor network(s) is critical to value
engineering of the dynamic information system. The information users determine who must know what, when,
and in what form. The information providers must deal with who must do what, when, and with what tools.
Various aspects of these questions are treated in the Sections immediately below. The very important issue of
placing a value on the information itself is reserved for separate discussion.
11. WSCC Experience in Monitor Operations

A competent monitor network is the "backbone" of the dynamic information infrastructure and it is a fundamental
requirement for wide area control [27,28,29]. We should expect (or hope) that most of measurement functions will be
mundane ones, performed unobtrusively under routine operating conditions. However, the network must stand
ready to provide mission-critical services with little or no warning. Some examples of high value support are
• Early warnings of trouble arising on the system, or in specific equipment.
• Integrated recording and information sharing for major system disturbances.
• Real-time recording and analysis during tests of controller performance, or of wide area system dynamics.
• Recording of anomalous system behavior that is to intermittent for scheduled examination.
The reader is advised that these are performance objectives, and that they might not be fully mature operational
realities.
The WSCC utilities, individually and collectively, have been comparatively aggressive in their development of
monitor facilities [8,30,31,32,33,34]. Operation of those facilities has revealed a number of general problems:
• Of the triggered monitors installed on the system, expect no more than 50% to provide good records for a
major disturbance. Leading problems are
– failure to detect the event (i.e., to trigger data capture)
– failure to trigger soon enough, or to "retrigger" often enough during protracted disturbances.
– inadequate data storage.
– overwriting of stored data before they have been downloaded to secure archives.
– monitor out of service.
– monitor failure from loss of supply power.
• Of the continuous monitors installed on the system, expect about 90% to provide good records for a major
disturbance. Leading problems are
– monitor out of service.
– monitor failure from loss of supply power.
• The value of a particular event record may be higher for some other utility than for its owner. This
situation may not be recognized for several days after the event, in which case the record may well have been
deleted from the data system.
• Determination of pre-disturbance conditions, though fundamental to subsequent model studies, is

seriously hampered by sparse monitor coverage plus failure to retain relevant EMS data.

• Operations staff are very cautious about high-level staged tests, and becoming more so (see also [2] and
comments by Scottish Power in [27]). Better use must be made of chance disturbances, plus low level
("non-intrusive") tests and measurements.
• Very few triggered monitors are designed for low level tests and measurements. These are the defining
tasks for a continuous interactions monitor such as BPA’s PPSM and PDC.
• Necessary tools and skills for conducting staged tests, and extracting dynamic information from measured
data, are not evenly distributed among the utilities. Some mechanism is needed for sharing these resources
(and their costs) to meet shared utility needs.
• An emergency response plan is needed to assure safe retention and prompt integration of measured data
following major disturbances. It is not realistic to task primary operations staff with this function, and it is
one that should be automated anyway.
The WAMS effort and the WAMS technologies are directly rooted in this experience.
12. Database Management in Wide Area Monitoring

Deployment of new monitors–and the proliferation of IED's in general–are overcoming many of the problems in
acquiring raw data. It is clear that this emerging abundance is producing a new generation of challenges in
monitor operations. Chief among them are
• Timely extraction and routing of information resident in the data.
• Avoiding premature deletion of valuable data, but without inundating data facilities.
EPRI and BPA have initiated exploratory research into a generic WAMS Information Manager to deal with such
matters. A key element in this is a WAMS Database Manager (DBM). Conceptually, its functions include the
following:
• Automatic Routing:
– Operator alerts
– Cross triggers to local & remote monitors
– Event-driven control of local displays
– Data retention requests to local & remote monitors
• Servicing of Staff Requests:
– Data transfers
– Special data operations & displays
– External triggering of local or remote monitors
– Special log entries
• Background Directory Operations:
– Exchanges among DBM units
– Integration, annotation, & indexing
– Posting on EMS, OASIS, WWW
• Background Data Operations:
– Launching & supervision of the Archive Scanner

– Content based compression & archiving
– Logging of events & summary features
• Utility Functions:
– File merging & compression
– Hardcopy generation
The monitors involved in this include SCADA, DFR, and other IED units in addition to the usual swing monitors.
13. Placing a Value on Information

It is apparent that the utilities face a massive investment in information technology. Planning these investments
encounters a very basic question: just how do you place a value on information? A partial answer is this:
The value of information is precisely that of the decisions derived from it.
Fig. 16, another paradigm, is useful for expanding upon this statement.
Disturbances
System planning
Unobserved response
System operation Power
Automatic control
System Observed response
Measurement
Decision Information Based
Processes Information
System
Fig. 16. The cycle of measurement, information, and decisions
TABLE I. Decision time scales

• Automatic Control:
– Protection: milliseconds
– Stability: milliseconds to seconds
– AGC: seconds to minutes
• System Operation:
– minutes to weeks
• System Planning:
– Operations: hours to weeks
– Expansion: weeks to years
Decision processes in a power system range from the very rapid ones pre-programmed into protective control
equipment to the very slow ones associated with expansion planning. In all cases the decisions are derived, with

varying degrees of immediacy, from measurement based information. In some cases the information is
encapsulated in a model, or perhaps in operating policies. In others the data is processed immediately–e.g., a
controller input or as a signal to system operators.
Accumulated over time, information provides a knowledge base that permeates utility practices and, often enough,
those of the industry. Such long term effects, together with the many paths by which information enters utility
decision processes, will defeat any direct attempt to place a value upon it. More constructive results follow from
considerations of affordability and risk management.
Some suggestions in the matter are these:
• Consider information an insurance policy against operational uncertainty:

– How much insurance is enough?
– How much risk is too much?
• Distinguish between value, cost, and affordability.
• Consider all cost elements, especially lead time and staff demands.
Another factor, one that may pre-empt many of these considerations, is regulatory mandates issued at various
levels of government. It is very likely that an infrastructure for developing and exchanging dynamic information
will be found necessary for assuring power system reliability and, thereby, the public interest.
14. Monitor Placement

There can be no simple rule for determining what to monitor, or how to configure particular monitor systems.
WSCC recommendations in [1] are still a reasonable guide with respect to functionalities. They state that the
overall monitor facilities should support the following applications:
• analysis of system disturbances and oscillation incidents

• performance evaluation for major control systems
• early detection of poor damping or other unusual system behavior
• validation of computer models
These same guidelines also state that the overall facilities should provide a comprehensive report of line flows, bus
conditions, and control actions for
• major and/or critical interchanges and load areas

• major control systems, especially those for HVDC line flow
• major and/or critical generation projects
Regarding technical performance, the guidelines emphasize long-term recording capabilities with an overall signal
resolution equivalent to 14-16 binary digits and sample rates at or above 20 samples per second. Some general
guidelines on technology choices are provided in [8,15] and in Appendix A of this Chapter. The underlying
perspective there is that the rationale for power system performance monitors should parallel that for flight
recorders on commercial aircraft.

SUNDANCE
MI CA
KEMANO
GRAND
COULEE
COLSTRIP
SHASTA
HOOVER
FOUR
MEAD CORNERS
PALO jf h
VERDE
ME X IC O
Major interaction path
"Index" generator
Fig. 17. Major interaction paths for the western North America power system
Surveillance of major interactions is fundamental to the objectives of wide area monitoring, and to the broader
objectives of a dynamic information infrastructure. Fig. 17 indicates the more important interaction paths in the
WSCC system, plus "index" generators where the associated dynamic modes are particularly observable and/or
controllable.
Monitoring may well call for different technologies in different regions. The western power system has an
underlying loop structure, with important radial extensions into British Columbia, Alberta, and eastern Montana.
Remote imports into the Los Angeles area often approach 10% of system capacity. Power flow along the western
side of the loop is concentrated on a few major interties. Along the east side of the loop power flow is diffused
across a web of more numerous and weaker lines, eventually concentrating along a major transmission corridor
that approaches Los Angeles from the east.
Monitor needs on the west side of the system has the following characteristics:
• the dominant problem is interarea "swing" dynamics and related control systems.
• measurements of dynamic state are the key indicator for system performance.
• fairly good signals for the needed quantities are available from enhanced conventional transducers for power,
frequency, and voltage magnitude.

• critical information is concentrated at a fairly small number of sites.
• substantial monitor facilities are already in place.
However, on the eastern side
• the dominant problem is overloading of weak links through power surges or through inadvertent "loop" flows.
• measurements of static state (powerflow variables) are the key indicator for system performance.
• competent measurement of complex voltage and current requires precise time synchronization technology that
has just now reaching maturity [13,16,8].
• critical information is broadly dispersed across the network, and the appropriate measurement points are not
obvious..
• monitor facilities are in the early stages of development.
The natural "state variables" for the west side are, for the most part, those associated with generator and control
system dynamics. The natural state variables on the east side are those associated with powerflow on the network.
15. Access to Monitor Data

In-depth analysis of monitor data is often done at locations well removed from the original point of data collection,
and some other computing environment. Overall monitor facilities must accommodate many different users for the
data collected. Some users may need regular access to records from a number of monitors and monitor types. It is
highly desirable that
• overall data access be provided within a consistent, well integrated framework.

• the users process the data with the same tools that they use in other work of the same general nature.
Fig. 18 indicates three of the more common analysis environments for monitor data. The LabVIEW environment
is typical of normal field operations, the FORTRAN/C environment is typical for system planning, and the Matlab
environment is typical for advanced analysis and for control system design. Fig. 19 shows the various means of
access to PDC data at BPA. Special Matlab toolsets indicated there include the BPA/PNNL Power System
Identification (PSI) Toolbox, of which the Power System Monitor (PSM) Tools are a subset. Toolsets coded in
Visual Basic are also in use, but not indicated in this figure.

Data generation FORTRAN or C MATLAB environment
environments environment (Portable Dyanmic Analysis and Design
System, used for Slatt TCSC tests)
Power System modeled response

Modeling
Codes MATLAB
Generic
Toolsets
Power System measured response
Monitors
(PSMs)
PSI
Toolbox Translators
Translators
Local
An alysis
& Display
EMTP Tools
Ringdown PSM
GUI T ools
Power System
Inden tification
(PSI) Toolbox
Controller
Design Tools
Fig. 18. Typical analysis environments for power system response records
PM U PM U
PDC
ether net Local Custom
Display Menus
Message Integrator
Internal Archive M a t la b
Tr an sla t o r Matlab Tools Displays
(binary files)
• Data repair & restructuring
Automatic
• RMS ca lculations Documentation
L abV IEW
External • Signal extraction & linking
Vie w er/T ra nsla to Ha rdcopy
Archiver r
• Filtering & s moothing O utputs
Translated • Fourier & Prony analysis Result
Files
Files
Remote Hardcopy
Viewing Tools Outputs
Add-On
Toolsets
Fig. 19. Surrounding network for the Phasor Data Concentrator at BPA’s Dittmer Control Center
16. Monitor Application Examples

This Section presents a cross section of PPSM data collected on the WSCC system. The examples are organized
according to the conditions under which they were obtained–that is, during ambient conditions, system
disturbances, and staged tests.
A. Examples for Ambient Conditions

Major modes for the WSCC system are conspicuous in ambient noise activity under just about all conditions. The
activity shown in Fig. 20, on BPA interchanges into Canada and California, is typical. Power flows there are
represented as north to south; slow trends have been removed by a highpass filter set at 0.1 Hz, and lowpass
filtering at 1.0 Hz was used to reduce local-mode activity plus extraneous noise. Fig. 21 and Fig. 22 show that
ambient swings are strong, highly coherent, and sharply focused near 0.29 Hz. (See [35,36,37,38] for analysis
principles.) Those on the Canada interchanges (Ingledow and Boundary) are in phase, and slightly offset from
those with California (at Malin). Such results are a constant reminder that the "AC Intertie" mode associated with
the Pacific AC Intertie (PACI) is very much alive.

40
20 (recorded 02/09/92)
-20
-40
Malin #1 MW
40
20
-20
-40
BCH Ingledow MW (reversed)
40
20
-20
BCH Boundary MW (reversed)
-40
0 10 20 30 40 50
Time in Seconds
Fig. 20. Signals for ambient noise on major BPA interchanges, 02/09/92
.
40
nfft = 1024, overlap = 0.950 pu
(Dittmer Control Center, 02/09/92)
30
BCH Ingledow
Autospectra in dB
Malin #1
20
10
0 BCH Boundary
-10
0 1 2
Frequency in Hertz
.
Fig. 21. Spectra for ambient noise on major BPA interchanges, 02/09/92
1.0
(Dittmer Control Center, 02/09/92)
0.8
BCH Boundary MW vs BCH Ingledow MW
Squared Coherency
0.6
Malin #1 MW vs BCH Ingledow MW
0.4
0.2
0
0 1 2
Frequency in Hertz
Fig. 22. Coherencies for ambient noise on major BPA interchanges, 02/09/92

A next issue is whether warning signs such as those conspicuous in Fig. 1 can be extracted from prior ambient
activity. Comparison of Fig. 20 and Fig. 23 indicates that such warnings, if present, are not obvious in the time
domain records.
Fig. 24 and Fig. 25 show Fourier analysis results for thirty minutes prior to tripping of the Keeler-Allston line on
August 10, 1996. (See also Fig. 1). At first inspection, the highly structured spectrum in Fig. 25 is very similar to
what is usually observed. Closer inspection, with more subtle tools, may show otherwise. The abundance of data
collected for this very important disturbance may contain a number of hidden clues concerning proximity to the
limits of safe operation.
40
20 reference time = 08/10/96 15H35m30s
-20
-40
Malin #1 MW
40
20
-20
-40
BCH Ingledow MW (reversed)
40
20
-20
BCH Bound ary MW (reversed)
-40
0 10 20 30 40 50
Time in Seconds
Fig. 23. Sample of Ambient Noise on Major BPA Interchanges, starting 400 sec. before Keeler-Allston line
trip on August 10 1996
1800
1600 Spectral analysis interval
1400
1200
1000
800 Keeler-Allston line trip
600
400
200
0
Reference time = 15H12m10s PDT
jfh
-200
0 500 1000 1500 2000
Time in Seconds
Fig. 24. Record for prehistory analysis of conditions preceding Keeler-Allston line trip.

PACI
0
Alberta
-10
0.7 Hz mode
cluster
-20
jfh
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

Frequency in Hertz
Fig. 25. Prehistory analysis for conditions preceding Keeler-Allston line trip.
Fig. 26 and Fig. 27 show an example of wide are correlation involving two widely spaced continuous monitors.
The signals represent bus frequency at Kyrene substation in Phoenix, AZ, and bus frequency at Tacoma
substation (near Seattle WA but recorded on the central PPSM at the Dittmer Control Center). The substations
are about 1000 miles apart.
The signals were obtained under ambient conditions, from ordinary frequency transducers and without direct
synchronization. Even so the activity peaks (Fig. 27) and the correlations between them (Fig. 28) provide dynamic
signature information up to roughly 0.8 Hz. .
The records used in this analysis are 25 minutes long, at 20 samples per second. In other applications, such as the
commissioning of major feedback controllers, the recording periods would span many hours and much of the
correlation analysis would be done at the test control site in real time.
(signals offset for clarity)

Frequency Deviation in Hz
0.02
Tacoma
Tacoma (x 0.75)
-0.02
Kyrene jfh
-0.04
0 5000 10000 15000
Time in Seconds
Fig. 26. Ambient fluctuations in bus frequency, Tacoma and Kyrene substations (Tacoma WA and Phoenix
AZ) April 15, 1996.

-20
Kyrene System Frequency vs 005 Tacoma 230 kV - Bus Frequency
Pxx (db) and Pyy (db)

-30
samples = [ 02641 : 33000]

-40
Autospectrum in dB
May 15, 1996
jfh
-50
Tacoma
-60
-70 Kyrene
-80
-90
0 1.0 2.0
Frequency in Hertz
Fig. 27. Autospectra for ambient fluctuations in bus frequency, Tacoma and Kyrene substations (Tacoma
WA and Phoenix AZ) April 15, 1996.
1.0
Kyrene System Frequency vs 005 Tacoma 230 kV - Bus Freque ncy
coherency
0.8 nfft = 1024, overlap = 0.900 pu
samples = [ 02641 : 33000]

Coherency
0.6
May 15, 1996
jfh
0.4
0.2
0
0 1.0 2.0
Frequency in Hertz
Fig. 28. Coherency of ambient fluctuations in bus frequency, Tacoma and Kyrene substations (Tacoma WA
and Phoenix AZ) April 15, 1996.
B. Examples from Major Disturbances

"Ringdown" signals from major disturbances are a good source of information concerning the behavior of
oscillatory dynamics (and of the control systems that affect them). Generator trips units at the Palo Verde plant
(near Phoenix AZ) are particularly useful for determining current frequency and damping of the PACI mode.
Fig. 29 shows limiting cases among 5 trips during the winter of 1992–1993. Implicit in this figure we find the
following information:
• Frequency and damping of the PACI mode vary considerably, during normal conditions.
• Damping of the PACI mode can reach values low enough to be considered potentially dangerous.

• Frequency content of the ringdown signal is dominated by the PACI mode. This "mode shape" information
– provides an excellent modeling benchmark for time domain simulations and for eigenanalyis.
– indicates that Palo Verde is a good location for metering the effectiveness of PACI damping controls.
– suggests that Palo Verde itself may be a good point for damping the PACI mode.
Fig. 30 is just one among many examples gathered through collective efforts of the WSCC system oscillation work
groups and, more recently, through the WAMS Project.
Dittmer Control Center, Vancouver WA

400
S W IN G S
0 .2 8 H z @ 7 .5 % d a m p in g
300
M A L IN - R O U N D M T N M W
200
1 2 /0 8 /9 2
100 0 .3 3 H z @ 4 .5 % d a m p in g 0 3 /1 4 /9 3
(C ir c u it # 1 o n ly )
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
T IM E IN S E C O N D S
Fig. 29. AC Intertie Response to Palo Verde Unit Trips, 12/08/92 vs. 03/14/93.
The events of August 10, 1996 provided ample opportunity (and incentive) to examine the PACI mode under more
extreme conditions. Development of these conditions and the subsequent separation are shown in Fig. 30 and Fig.
31. Tripping of McNary generation seems to have been a major factor [4,6] in the breakup. Whether this major
loss of system support actually caused the oscillations, or merely made bad conditions worse, cannot be determined
without very exacting studies based upon fully realistic models. This work is still in progress.
Fig. 30. McNary plant generation during WSCC breakup of August 10, 1996.

Malin M W model f itting wind ow
1500
model respo nse

1400
Line Power in MW
1300
1200 measured resp onse
jfh
1100
790 792 794 796 798 800
Time in Second s
Mode Frequency in Hz Damping Ratio
PACI 0.216 -0.0628
trend? 0.0596 -0.0216

Alberta 0.448 -0.0234
Kemano 0.615 -0.0234
Fig. 31. Oscillation modes just prior to final separation on August 10, 1996
Summary Plot for Bus Angles

400
WSCC PDC Units, 12/08/98
reference time = 08:14:00
300 sample rate = 30 sps
200
100
-100
-200
-300
60.1 2
Summary Plot for Bus Frequencies
60.1 0
60.0 8
60.0 6
60.0 4
60.0 2
60
59.9 8
59.9 6
80 85 90 95 100 105 110 1 15 120
Time in Seconds
Fig. 32. Bus angle and frequency swings for San Francisco trip on December 8, 1998)
(Combined data for WSCC phasor measurement system)
On December 8, 1998, a major portion of the electrical services to San Francisco were lost through a chain of
unintended breaker actions. All three PDC units collected good data (as did the Dittmer PPSM). Table II describes
the data obtained, and Fig. 32 is a sample of the bus angles and frequencies. The primary rms signals indicated
there are those conventionally produced in the PSI Toolbox, which was used to align and process the PDC records.
TABLE II. Data Collected by the WSCC Phasor Measurements Network for the San Francisco Load Trip
of December 8, 1998
Organization PDC Units PMUs Phasors Primary RMS
Signals
BPA 1 7 45 153
SCE 1 4 24 86
WAPA 1 3 15 32
WSCC Total 3 14 84 271
Major disturbances triggers a number of actions among the operating utilities. A high priority is to determine what
happened, why it happened, and how to avoid it in future operations. Key steps in this include the following:
• Integration of operating records

– initiating and trans-disturbance events
– pre-disturbance activity & conditions
– system performance and consequences
• Search for warning signs
– dynamic signatures in prior swing activity
– information from model-based stability tools
(DSA, voltage stability)
• Support for countermeasures
– engineering review
– model development and analysis
– operator alerts & guidelines
A general process and toolsets for this are indicated in Fig. 33 (see appendices of [39] plus [40,41,42,43,44,45]). Table
III, which tracks behavior of the PACI mode before and during the August 10 breakup, provides good eigenvalue
benchmarks for development of the necessary models.

Model-Based Analysis
Eigenshape
jω
Eigenvalue x
o
Analysis x σ
o
Model x
Data
Time-domain
Simulation
Time/Frequency
Measurements Analysis
Data
DISTURBANCE System Tests Criteria & Models

and for
Measurements System Engineering
Measurement-Based Analysis
Fig. 33. Integrated Use of Measurement and Modeling Tools
TABLE III. Observed behavior of the PACI mode
PACI mode before August 10, 1996

Date/Event Frequency Damping
12/08/92 (Palo Verde trip) 0.28 Hz 7.5 %
03/14/93 (Palo Verde trip) 0.33 Hz 4.5 %
07/11/95 (brake insertion) 0.28 Hz 10.6 %
07/02/96 (system breakup) 0.22 Hz 1.2 %
PACI mode on August 10, 1996

Time/Event Frequency Damping
10:52:19 (brake insertion) 0.285 Hz 8.4%
14:52:37 (John Day-Marion) 0.264 Hz 3.7%
15:18 (ringing) 0.276 Hz
15:42:03 (Keeler-Allston) 0.264 Hz 3.5%
15:45 (ringing) 0.252 Hz
15:47:40 (oscillation start) 0.238 Hz -3.1%
15:48:50 (oscillation finish) 0.216 Hz -6.3%
C. Examples From Staged Tests

Fig. 34 and Fig. 35 summarize results from 1991 test insertions of BPA's 1400 MW Chief Joseph dynamic brake.
They demonstrate that the 500 kV connection to Alberta strongly influences overall system dynamics, and that its
operational status may be a factor in tuning of future stability controls such as modulation of HVDC, TCSC, or
SVC equipment.

.
Fig. 36 was produced during staged tests of the Slatt TCSC. For subsynchronous resonance (SSR) tests a TCSC
modulation signal was produced at the nearby Boardman generator and transmitted to Slatt. PPSM acquisition
rates at these sites were set to 400 sps and 900 sps respectively.
The basic procedure was to sinusoidally modulate the TCSC at a selected shaft torsional frequency, remove the
stimulus while switching the TCSC to the desired operating condition, and then record the ringdown in shaft speed.
Fig. 37 is typical. Prony analysis produced values that agree closely with those produced by the General Electric
test team with other instruments [24,25,26]. Fig. 36 shows composite autospectra for sequential testing of the four
shaft modes.
Dittmer Control Center, Vancouver WA

AC INTERTIE RESPONSE (MW)
800
Pulse #1 *
600
Pulse #2
400 Pulse #3
200
*Alberta separated
[11/19/91]
0
0 5 10 15 20 25
TIME IN SECONDS
Fig. 34. PACI response to energization of the 1400 MW Chief Joseph dynamic brake.
10
05/08/85
11/19/91, Pulse #1 *
0
11/19/91, Pulse #2
11/19/91, Pulse #3
10 *Alberta separated
GAIN IN DB
20
30
40
50
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
FREQUENCY IN HERTZ
Fig. 35. Effect of Alberta 500 kV connection upon PACI response

20 60
Gain
Phase 40
15
20
Phase
G ain
10 0
-20
5
-40
open loop, Ross line open
1944-1947 h, June 7 1994
0 -60
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Frequency in Hz
Fig. 36. Frequency response of Slatt-Buckley line MW to TCSC modulation signal
-2
L N O F P O S IT IV E S P E E D D E V IA T IO N
T est E ven t 74:

1743 h on A u gu st 6, 19 94
-3 5 m o d u le s in v e r n ie r ,
1 m o d u le in E -fir e
-4
-5
-6
-7
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
T IM E IN S E C O N D S
Fig. 37. Boardman generator shaft speed ringdown, TCSC decoupled from shaft
0
T e s t E v e n ts 7 1 -7 4 :
1 7 3 2 -4 3 h o n A u g u st 6 , 1 9 9 4
5 m o d u le s in v e r n ie r ,
1 m o d u le in E -fir e
A U T O S P E C T R U M IN D B
-2 0
-4 0
-6 0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
F R E Q U E N C Y IN H Z
Fig. 38. Composite autospectrum for Boardman generator shaft speed deviations (rear sensor)
In April 1999 BPA resumed the testing of WSCC dynamics by modulation of the Pacific HVDC Intertie. These had
been suspended for more than a decade, due to lack of immediate need and to lack of a suitable measurement

system. The breakup of August 1996 and progressive integration of the WSCC phasor measurement system
significantly altered these factors.
For this new test program the objective is to safely examine the frequency and damping of a single mode, with a
direct testing procedure that is minimally intrusive and that can be automated. The adopted procedure is similar to
the shaft ringdown tests illustrated in Fig. 37.
Fig. 39 shows typical response for a two different applications of a two-cycle HVDC probing signal, with a base
frequency of 0.33 Hz and a level of ±125 MW. If the level of probing were much lower then some kind of time
averaging would be needed during modal analysis. In the present case, spatial averaging across multiple signals
should be done when Prony analysis is applied to the ringdown. Another option is to perform “extended” Prony
analysis, using input/output tools that extract information from the forced response as well as the ringdown
response [44,46,47]. These tools require an accurate record of the input signal. Though rarely available in the
general case, such records are available for well instrumented tests.
The results shown in Table IV were produced with a tool of this class, one that is contained in the Matlab System
Identification Toolbox®. It was selected on the basis of immediate convenience rather than full comparisons against
similar products or algorithms of the same kind, and its use here is exploratory. To this point the results produced
with this tool have been internally consistent, and consistent with those produced with Fourier and Prony methods
(see [29], chapter 7). Sharper tradeoffs among the test procedure, the analysis methods, and the design of the
probing signal will evolve with as this BPA project continues.
Malin bus voltage (kV)

552
550
548
546
544
2 800 Pacific HVDC Intertie power (MW)
2 700
2 600
2 500
2 400
0 5 10 15 20 25
Time in Seconds
Fig. 39. Power system response to two applications of two cycle probing signal

Table IV Modal parameters identified at various stages of the probing signal test on April 27, 1999.
Test Mode 1 Mode 2
Frequency Damping Damping Frequency Damping Damping
Hz Ratio % neper/sec Hz Ratio % neper/sec
B6 –probe 0.303 10.15 % 0.193 0.416 9% 0.235
B7 – brake 0.295 9.3 % 0.172 0.417 7.9% 0.207
B8 –probe 0.296 10.02 % 0.186 0.416 8% 0.209
17. Conclusions
The material here advances two key points, that
• Timely access to dynamic information is essential to successful grid operation in the emerging power system.
• Lack of such information is a particularly acute threat to system reliability during the transition to a
deregulated industry.
The presentation examines these needs and the technology options for meeting them, drawing upon WSCC
experience as a guide to the challenges that many other utilities and systems will encounter.
It is reasoned that the dynamic information infrastructure will draw upon a hierarchical monitor network that
provides integrated and fairly comprehensive measurements of wide area dynamics. In a large power system this
is a long step beyond the monitoring of local devices or even regional performance. Reliable data capture, for
example, implies sub-networks of continuously recording monitors plus "intelligent" information tools that can
cope with the very high data volumes. Even more important–perhaps decisively so–are the inter-utility practices
and infrastructure through which dynamic information resources are collectively reinforced and operated.

APPENDIX A.
A One Page Perspective on Wide Area Monitoring
1) Purpose: the role of monitor facilities is to avoid system disturbances, not just to record them. Measured
information is a major input to the many decision processes that planning and operation involve.
2) Value: information has the same value as the decisions based upon it.
3) Level of investment: consider measured information as insurance against operational uncertainty. How much
insurance is enough? How much information is too much?
4) Monitor applications: in addition to event recording, monitor facilities should support
a) direct tests and analysis of the power system.
b) real time system operations (operator alerts, cross triggers, etc.)
5) Monitor recording options:
a) evaluate data in real time, using event detection logic (EDL) to trigger "snapshot" recordings of special
activity or conditions.
b) record all data continuously, then apply EDL to archived records.
6) EDL considerations:
a) EDL tuneup is ongoing: automatic detection of significant abnormal system behavior requires
comprehensive examination and knowledge of normal behavior.
b) Real time EDL rarely detects the onset of distant events. “Snapshot” monitors often miss the conditions
contributing to major disturbances (e.g., cascading outages).
c) EDL for scanning continuously recorded archives can be simplified and/or desensitized for
– use in real time, as a refinement to the "triggers" now in use.
– scanning and characterization of snapshot archives.
7) Value engineering:
a) Functionality is the key issue: Who needs to see what, where, when, in what form? Why – what decisions
hinge upon the information?
b) Staff costs (engineering, operations, maintenance) are dominant in power system monitoring. Compared to
these, hardware is free – configure the hardware to minimize staff costs.
c) Continuous recording, in combination with a competent archive scanner, provides the best value
engineering for wide area measurements of power system dynamics.
d) The archive scanner required for continuous recording can and should be designed for the overall monitor
facility. Better integration and more timely access increases information value while lowering staff costs.
e) Ease of use hastens workflow and reduces direct staff costs, but generally requires that data be translated
into multiple work environments.
f) User participation is essential to development and operation of high performance monitor facilities. It is
highly desirable that custom data interfaces and EDL be directly accessible for modification by the user,
and that this require a minimum of special skills. Refinement of measurement tools is part of the system
engineering process.

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CRC Electric Power Engineering Handbook

Chapter 11: Power System Dynamics and Stability

Section 8: Direct Analysis of Wide Area Dynamics

J. F. Hauer W. A. Mittelstadt R. Adapa

1. Dynamic Information Needs: The WSCC Breakup of August 10, 1996

Reference time = 15:35:30 PDT

CRC Monitor Section – 2

3. An Overview of WSCC WAMS

4. Direct Sources of Dynamic Information

CRC Monitor Section – 3

CRC Monitor Section – 4

6. Monitor System Functionalities

"Record good data, and keep them safe!"

"Do no harm to the power system!"

Fig. 2. Information functions in measurement of low level interactions

CRC Monitor Section – 5

7. Event Detection Logic

CRC Monitor Section – 6

• Steps or swings in tieline power.

• Large change, or rate of change, in bus voltage or frequency.

• Large increase in system noise level.

• Increase of system activity in some critical frequency band.

• Unusual correlation or phasing between fluctuations in two given signals.

• External trigger inputs for initiating data capture.

• Flags and alarms sent out to indicate the triggering condition.

• External control of monitor settings via a modem port.

• Retrieval of archive data via a modem port.

CRC Monitor Section – 7

Fig. 3. A simple "snapshot" disturbance monitor

CRC Monitor Section – 8

Fig. 5. Basic architecture for a continuously recording monitor

• NRT data sharing through the computer network.

CRC Monitor Section – 9

storage control & status flags

*event detection logic

Fig. 6. A continuous monitor combining short and long EDL

CRC Monitor Section – 10

Fig. 7. Diagnostic Event Scanner (DES) within a continuous monitor

9. Monitor Network Topologies

• Distributed monitor networks, which are found in a variety of general forms

CRC Monitor Section – 11

Fig. 8. BPA central monitor coverage

CRC Monitor Section – 12

A/D A/D RMS

Fig. 9. Topology of BPA central monitor system for analog signals

Phasor Data Phasor Data

CRC Monitor Section – 13

• They do not serve information needs at local or regional level.

• The dedicated communications can be very expensive.

• Communication failures may cause important data to be lost.

CRC Monitor Section – 14

Field Site A Field Site B Field Site C

Analysis Analysis Analysis

Fig. 11. A distributed network for dynamic information

• a "core monitor" or data capture unit (DCU).

The following comments apply to the network of Fig. 11:

CRC Monitor Section – 15

10. Networks of Networks

• Investment value is strongly enhanced through

CRC Monitor Section – 16

Fig. 13. PPSM interconnections to local transducers

Interface local analysis Signal Analyzer

Electronics and display (DSA)