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Rule Paragraph

9/16/11

A court would likely find that Stanley Student is guilty of burgling Rogers parents home. One is guilty of burglary whenever one enters any building with the intent to commit a petit grand larceny or felony [California Penal Code 459]. Courts seem to be willing to find one guilty of burglary regardless of consent. In People v. Salleme (1992) 2 Cal. App. 4th 775 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 398], the court has found that when one enters a building withe the intent to commit a felony, the consent of the occupier or inhabiter of the building is invalidated, (id. at p. 3). In Salemme, defendant was invited into the residence of the intended victim and entered with the intent to sell fraudulent securities to her. The court found that Salleme was guilty of burglary regardless of other partys consent, since it was made invalid by his wrongful intent, (id. at p. 3). In People v. Gauze (1975) 15 Cal. 3s. 709 [125 Cal.Rptr. 773, 542 P.2d 13650], the court appears to have established an narrowly defined exception in cases where application of the statute would lead to potentially absurd results in light of legislative intent, [id. at p. 4]. The court stated that the purpose of Penal Code 459 in short, is aimed at the danger caused by unauthorized entry. Since 1975, California courts have only recognized one case exemplifying such a potentially absurd result, [id. at p. 4; see also People v. Salleme, where court rejected this argument proffered by the defense]. In Guaze, defendant was convicted at the trial court level of burglary when defendant entered a residence that he shared with the victim with the intent to commit a felony (specifically assault with a deadly weapon). On appeal, the Third Circuit California Court of Appeals, found that convicting people of burglary for entering a residence, which one occupies or inhabits, was not an intended result of the legislature, and was absurd in light of the codes purpose. From this, the Court has found consistently that an unconditional possessory right to a building (which appears to be a right of ownership, occupation or habitation) precludes one from being convicted of burgling, [id. at p. 3]. California courts have further defined unconditional possessory right by distinguishing it from a conditional [id. at p. 4, citing People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180 [84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847].). In Sears, the court found that Sears, even though he was married to the occupier of the residence, and had only recently moved out of the residence, was guilty of burglary, because his possessory rights were conditional, and thus such a party could be refused at the threshold, or ejected from the premises after the entry was accomplished, [id. at p. 4 referencing People v. Barry (1892) 94 Cal. 481 (29 P. 1026)]. In the case of Sears, the court found that, despite Sears co-owning the residence with his wife, Sears separation from his wife, and the following three weeks during which he lived in a hotel, alone, constituted the establishment of conditional possessory rights over the dwelling.