CRIM FINALS

1. Narvaez v. People (Self Defense) Facts: Attack that prompted Narvaez was mere aggression towards property. The principle that for legitimates self-defense to be invoked in connection with an attack upon ones property has to be coupled with an attack against the person. Question: Would you consider Narvaez entitled to? Answer: incomplete justification because although there was an attack against his property, which gave him the right to prevent or repel it, he nevertheless need not use reasonable force to prevent or repel the aggression.

We will be 2. US v. Apego (Self Defense, Mistake of Facts) foc usi ng on the Facts: A woman left alone in the house, retired to sleep early. She was living in a house, with her sister and brother in law, who on that night spent the night until the wee hours of the morning to attend a celebration, on the occasion of festivities. So when they came back home, the house was in total darkness, they had to grope their way into the house in order to find a

gasera. The husband went ahead into the house and stated doing this Unfortunately, instead cas of groping for a gasera, he groped an arm. The woman, who was sleeping with a knife e underneath her pillow thought that she was the subject of an attack against her honor or of chastity. And so she pulled out the knife and struck a fatal blow on her brother-in-law. Nar Question: Could she be exempt from the crime? vae Answer: Incomplete self-defense because of the absence of the absence of the second z requisite: REASONABLE NECESSITY OF THE MEANS EMPLOYED TO PREVENT AND vs. REPEL IT. Pe -That in the commission of the crime there was present the circumstance of incomplete opl exemption from responsibility, as all the three requisites specified in subarticle 4 of article of the e. Penal Code are not applicable; wherefore the criminal act is not altogether excusable, on So account of the lack of the second of the said requisites, although a majority of them were this present, that is, the first and the third requisites; and, therefore, in accordance with the is a qu esti

provisions of article 86 of the code, a penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by article 404 of the code, in the discretion of the court, must be imposed upon the defendant. (absence of 2nd requisite: reasonable necessity)

3. Probation Law page. 65 of San Beda Question: No specified question. Read sec. 14 and Art 29 to learn how to convert fines into number of days in terms of subsidiary imprisonment. Answer: a. period of one year or less; b. period of six years or less; c. period consisting of the subsidiary imprisonment as translated; d. period twice the subsidiary imprisonment.

Explanation: Section 4. Grant of Probation. - after convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best. Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal frm the judgment of conviction. Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal. Section 8. Criteria for Placing an Offender on Probation.. Probation shall be denied if the court finds that: (a) need of correctional treatment (b) undue risk that during the period of probation the offender will commit another crime; or(c) probation will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed.

Section 9. Disqualified Offenders. The benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those: (a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; (b) convicted of subversion or any offense against the national security or the public order; (c) who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos; (d) who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and (e) who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to Section 33 hereof. (As amended by PD 1990.) Section 14. Period of Probation. Sentenced to: -Imprisonment not more than 1 yr - all other Imprisonment Period of Probation: -Shall not exceed two years - shall not exceed 6 yrs

- pay fines and offender is made to serve - not less than nor more than twice the total subsidiary imprisonment in case of number of days of subsidiary imprisonment as insolvency computed at the rate established in 39 of RPC (one day for each 8 pesos)

Art 39 limitations:

If prision correccional or arresto and fine. - confinement until his fine is satisfied, but imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner. only a fine -subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six months, - if grave or less grave felony, and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a light felony. penalty imposed is higher than prision no correccional subsidiary imprisonment shall be

imposed

not to be executed by confinement in a continue to suffer the same deprivation as penal institution, but such penalty is of those of which the principal penalty consists. fixed duration, in case his financial circumstances subsidiary personal liability which the convict should improve. may have suffered by reason of his insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine

4. US vs. Catamay, in re: People vs. Ramirez, and US vs. Knight (Requisites of Accidents) Exempting Circumstance Catangay -Facts: 3 men went hunting. When they saw a deer, the deceased went ahead and took a squatting position to aim at it. After quite some time, he still hadnt fired, so the accused,
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Catangay, followed suit to where the deceased was. As he was hastily approaching, he had his shotgun pointed up, with the safety still on but he was in the process of releasing it, and was looking at the dear. He tripped on an embankment, or a mound of earth, and his shotgun fired and hit the deceased in the back of his head, killing him. Ruling and Ratio: Catangay was absolved of all charges. Not guilty of charge of homicide through reckless negligence. Death was due to unforeseen and unfortunate accident. SC said that under the circumstances, he exercised proper diligence. All the acts that he did, from walking with eyes forward, to unlocking the safety of his shotgun, aiming the gun up while approaching, were all reasonable actions for the intended legal action he was about to do -shoot the dear. No voluntary firing. Ramirez -Facts: 4 men went hunting. 1 was left in a hut (disregard this guy). 3 went on. The accused told the other 2 to stay put and watch over their first kill, while he was going inside the forest to hunt another one. Soon after, shotgun of accused fired and hit and killed 1 of the 2 guys who stayed put (although the witness said they did not stay put -- doesnt matter). Ruling and Ratio: Guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence.The defendant, who was carrying a firearm to hunt at nighttime with the aid of a lantern, knowing that he had two companions, should have exercised all the necessary diligence to avoid every undesirable accident. Knight -Facts: About 3.30 in the afternoon of the 13th of September, 1912, the defendant, a chauffeur, was driving a heavy truck. Road was completely unoccupied, except a road roller in front of him, heading same direction. Just as the truck was passing the slow-moving road roller, a boy about 10 or 12 years of age jumped from the step or sideboard of the road roller directly in front of the truck, was knocked down, run over, and instantly killed. The truck was moving at a speed of 8 MPH. Before he overtook, he sounded his horn twice. The road was wide, no other obstructions. He followed all legal driving rules. Question: Whether or not, the accused is entitled to an acquittal because on account of an
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accident, or if the accused is guilty of a crime by means of negligence? If there is negligence not accident. Answer from Norby: Ruling and Ratio: (From case) The accused in the case at bar cannot be said to have been negligent in the management of his machine, merely because he did not anticipate that the boy, 10 or 12 years of age, who was riding on the slow-moving road roller, would jump down directly in front of him at the moment when he turned his machine out into the open street in an effort to pass by. And it appearing that in all other respects he operated his machine carefully, prudently, and skillfully at the time when the accident occurred, having regard to all the surrounding circumstances, he must be acquitted of all criminal liability arising out of the unfortunate accident which resulted in the death of the boy. Art. 12, Par. 4 - Any person who, whole performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. Elements: A person is performing a lawful act; With due care; He causes an injury to another by mere accident; Without fault or intention of causing it. Choices in the items would have to deal with the requisites for an accident. Your conclusion would be to determine whether or not the accused is entitled to an acquittal because on account of an accident, or convicted because of crime due to negligence.

5. People vs. dela Rosa Facts: Exploding Rally Qualified Treachery: No warning. No Mitigating Murder

Multiple Homicide Aggravating Circumstance Explosions

6. Leano vs. CA, Padilla vs. CA, Cadua vs. CA, People vs. Simon. (Indeterminate Sentence Law) Facts: By the terms of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum would be that which, taking into account the attending circumstances, would be properly imposable under the RPC. The minimum would be the penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed by law. If the crime is punishable under Special Penal Law, the minumum of an Indeterminate Sentence is the maximum prescribed by that Special Penal Law; whereas the minimum is that minimum prescribed by that Special Law. So the mystery has to do with the offense involved. Question: Under which is it punishable? Is it punishable under the RPC, or under a special penal law? sentence? Page 772 a. that which taking into account the circumstances would be properly plausible under the provisions of the relevant law. That is not necessarily literal to a Determinate Sentence Law. But of course the word relevant law already accommodate the possibility of the law being the Revised Penal Code. But it also as youve seen, an uncertainty because that relevant law may be a special law. b. The penalty prescribed by the relevant law. The maximum would be the penalty prescribed by the relevant law. c. The penalty should be the maximum of the penalty prescribed by the relevant law. d. the penalty should be the maximum should be the minimum of the penalty prescribed by the relevant law. Answer: Reclusion Perpetua- NO. Divisible Is a special penal law that carries the nomenclature of penalty to the RPC, to be treated under the 2nd or under the 1st rule? what should be the maximum of the indeterminate

Exemptions no ISL- p. 23 of Beda ISL- lowers penalty Process- This is RPC: 1. Know maximum term of punishment (penalty assigned or imposed) 2. Put circumstances 3. liabilities of persons 4. stages of execution 5. = to know maximum penalty 6. minimum will always be 1 degree below the maximum applied Answer 2: 7. Bayan vs. Sandiganbayan (measures of prevention or safety) Facts: X is charged before the Sandigan Bayan for 100 counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Each violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act authorizes upon the filing of the information in court the suspension of the person charged with that strength. Question: Is this suspension a penalty? If charged with 100 offenses, and there will be 100 justifications for suspending him, could he be suspended successively 100 times without him being able to complain that he is being subjected to a penalty? So choice would be: a. The suspensions, though successively applied do not constitute penalties but are mere measures of prevention or safety under Art. 24 of the Revised Penal Code. ONLY PREVENTIVE MEASURE The could be suspended once only and such suspension would not be regarded as a penalty.

Answer:

Paragraph 3 of Article 24 of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension

from employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be considered as a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; that in fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. Article 24(3) of the Revised Penal Code states the following:
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Premise: - - - - - An information can only contain one charge of crime against a person. 100 counts of violations were charged in 100 separate information. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. Sec. 13 RA 3019 Even if he is acquitted with one crime, there are other crimes that are still pending, hence the suspension shall still have to apply. Purpose of preventive suspension: Measure of prevention and safety. It is allowed to prevent the accused from hampering the normal course of investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses. 7. Answer 2: Measures of prevention If they were considered penalties , it would violate the constitutional provision on presumption of innocence. Moreover, they are not imposed after trial on the merits but are mere preventive measures, hence cannot be considered as penalties. Preventive suspension is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during the suspension. (Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, April 2001) Relevant Article: Art. 24. Measures of prevention of safety which are not considered penalties The following shall not be considered as penalties: 3. Suspension from employment or public office during the trial in order to institute the proceedings.

8. Pardon (Codal) Question: differentiate between the affected party and pardon by the Chief Executive

Answer:

Page 51 to 52 of beda Reyes p. 622

CE- principal, not accessory penalty unless said says so. Private party- pardon only for civil liability EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: Express pardon by the offended party will bar criminal prosecution in the ff. crimes: 1. Concubinage 2. Adultery 3. Seduction 4. Abduction 5. Rape 6. Acts of Lasciviousness Art 89: Pardon is an act of grace proceeding from the power entrusted with the President which exempts the offender from punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has committed. Absolute Pardon grants oblivion to all the effects of conviction. it shall restore all civil rights. Under Art 36, pardon by the chief executive shall not work the restoration of the right to hold public office or the right of suffrage unless such rights are expressly restored by the terms of pardon. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO: 1. Pardon by the offended party applies only to crimes against chastity under the RPC and Rape while the pardon by the chief exec. Party appies to any crime 2. Pardon by the offended party in seduction abduction acts of lasciviousness benefits the co-principals, accomplices and accessories. IN adultery and concubinage, the pardon must include both offenders. Pardon by the chief exec can be granted to any orr all of the accused. 3. Pardon by the offended party cant be made subject to a condition while pardon by the chief exec may be absolute or conditional.

9. Preventive suspension Facts: Question: If a person refuses to abide by the rules prescribed by the institution in which he is
10

preventively suspended, would he be entitled to a deduction for times spent in detention once convicted? a. his refusal to abide by the regulations denies him the benefit of a deduction for time spent in preventive detention. b. he is entitled to a full credit for time spent in preventive detention because there is no reason to differentiate between the benefits extended to those willing to abide by the rules of the institution, and those who are not. c. he is entitled to forfeit credit of time spent in preventive detention. d. he must show he is neither a recidivist or a difficult delinquent before he would be entitled to a credit for time spent in preventive detention. Answer: Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the court

must issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. This is because a preventive suspension is not penalty. It is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension. In view of this latter provisions, the accused elective public officer does not stand to be prejudiced by the immediate enforcement of the suspension order in the event that the information is subsequently declared null and void on appeal and the case dismissed as against him. Taking into consideration the public policy involved in preventively suspending a public officer charged under a valid information, the protection of public interest will definitely have to prevail over the private interest of the accused. Answer: Choice 1. The suspensions, though successively applied do not constitute penalties but are mere measures of prevention or safety under Art. 24 of the Revised Penal Code.

- Item # 9 is about preventive imprisonment. If a person refuses to abide by the rules prescribed by the institution in which he is preventively imprisoned, would he be entitled to a deduction for times spent in detention once convicted? Choice # 1 his refusal to abide by the regulations denies him the benefit of a deduction for time
11

spent in preventive detention. Choice # 2 he is entitled to a full credit for time spent in preventive detention because there is no reason to differentiate between the benefits extended to those willing to abide by the rules of the institution, and those who are not. Choice # 3 he is entitled to forfeit credit of time spent in preventive detention. Choice # 4 he must show he is neither a recidivist or a difficult delinquent before he would be entitled to a credit for time spent in preventive detention. Nagkamali ata ung choice 3 eh. Forfeit should be four-fifth. I think theres no such thing as being entitled to forfeit the credit. One can be entitled to the credit. Of course, as part of his choice, he can choose to forfeit the credit or not. There is no need for entitlement. But who in in their right mind would not want a deduction in their sentence? As much as possible, anyone who has spent time under preventive imprisonment would want to deduct such period from their sentence. Answer: Choice #3 He is entitled to four fifths of credit of time spent in preventive suspension.

Answer 2:

10. Art. 70 Question: differentiate between Service of Sentence and Imposition of Penalties. take a look at the effect of the 3-fault rule and the 40 year maximum limit. Answer: -when the culprit has to serve 2 or more penalties he shall serve them simultaneously if
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the nature of the penalties so permit. -if the sum total of all the penalties does not exceed the most severe of all the penalties multiplied by 3, the threefold rule does not apply. Threefold rule: 1. The max duration o the convict's sentence shall not be more than 3 times the length o time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. 2. But in no cars to exceed 40 years 3. The rule shall apply only when the convict is to serve 4 or more sentences successively 4. Subsidiary penalty forms part of the penalty. Answer 2: Art 70. Successive service of sentence accused simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will permit followed Penalties that can be simultaneously served: 1. Perpetual disqualification 2. 5. public censure 6. and temporary absolute perpetual and temporary special disqualification 3. suspension 4. destierro fines and bond to keep the peace 7. civil interdiction 8. confiscation shall serve his sentences otherwise, order of severity will be

and payment of costs Three-fold Rule the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him exceed 40 years successively subsidiary penalty forms part of the penalty Subsidiary penalty - no sufficient property with which to meet the fines, will be subject to subsidiary penalty, ie, fine can't be paid, will be subsidiarily imprisoned for not more than 6 months Different systems of penalty relative to the execution of 2 or more penalties on one accused Real or material plurality Continued crime There is a series of acts There is a series of acts Each act constitutes a separate crime generated by a criminal impulse Different acts constitute only one crime because all of the acts performed arise from one criminal resolution 1. 2. 3.
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the max duration of the convict's sentence shall not be more than 3 times but in no case should

rule will only apply when the convict is to serve 4 or more sentences

Material accumulation system system

all penalties for all violations will be imposed. No limits even if application of three-fold rule absorption

exceeds human life Juridical accumulation system

lesser penalties are absorbed by grave penalties

11 People vs. Tanales. Art. 74 Facts: Penalty 2 degrees higher than recluccion temporal, penalty prescribed for simple theft on account of the existence of a qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence under Art.210.

Question: What is the penalty 2 degrees higher than reclusion temporal? Huh, death? Answer: Not death. Recluccion perpetua for 40 years with the accessories of the death

penalty if not imposed Answer 2:

12. Co-principal, Conspiracy or Accessory Hypothetical Facts: Question: What is the criminal liability of the wife of an AFP Comptroller, who with the proceeds of crime purchases a condominium unit abroad? This is a hypothetical case where we will ask to establish the criminal liability of such a person. a. she is liable as a principal by inducement because her lavish lifestyle induced her husband to commit a crime. b. she is liable as a co-principal on account of co-conspiracy c. she is liable as an accessory, although she will not be exempt under Art. 19, she is nonetheless liable exempted by Art. 20 because she falls under the 2nd paragraph of Art. 19.

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Answer: Answer 2:

13. Accessory Hypothetical Facts: X is the son of K. K committed a crime. Out of the proceeds of the crime, K bought X a car. X did not know that the amount used to purchase the car were proceeds of the crime. Question: What is the liability of X? a X is an accessory under Art, 19 because he benefitted from the proceeds of the crime. b X cannot be an accessory unless he knew of the commission of a crime by K. c - even if X knew that K committed a crime, although he is an accessory, he is exempt under Art. 20 d knowledge on the part of X on whether K committed a crime, out of the proceeds of which he bought the car, X is nevertheless liable because he is a gratuitious participant in the commission of a crime. Answer from sir: he does not that he is partaking of the proceeds of a crime, he will nevertheless be liable civilly. Answer from Gaston: Choice # 1 X is an accessory under Art, 19 because he benefitted from the proceeds of the crime. ART 19 Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.

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2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. Under Article 19, it is a requisite (1) that the accessory should have knowledge of the crime, (2) that he did not take part in its commission as principal or accomplice and (3) that he took part subsequent to its commission in any of the 3 ways enumerated in Art 19 (Aquino Book, page 550) Since X had no knowledge of the crime, he cannot be an accessory.

Choice # 2 X cannot be an accessory unless he knew of the commission of a crime by K. My choice here if the question is just about criminal liability. See the above notes for the reasoning behind the choice. If choice 4 contemplates civil liability, then said choice would be the answer

Choice # 3 - even if X knew that K committed a crime, although he is an accessory, he is exempt under Art. 20 Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. Article 20 does provide exemptions for family members with respect to accessory liability, however, this exemption does not extend to Paragraph 1 of Art 19, which is the situation that item 13 contemplates. Brothers and sisters (and the rest of the enumerated persons in ART 20) xxx cannot be regarded as accessories unless they profited from the effects of the crime. (Aquino Book, page 556) Choice # 4 knowledge on the part of X on whether K committed a crime, out of the proceeds of which he bought the car, X is nevertheless liable because he is a gratuitious participant in the
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commission of a crime. Art. 111. Obligation to make restitution in certain cases. Any person who has participated gratuitously in the proceeds of a felony shall be bound to make restitution in an amount equivalent to the extent of such participation. This article has reference to a case of an innocent person who has participated in the proceeds of a felony through the liberality of the offender. In other words, he should not have paid for the stolen property which he received from the offender (in this case, he did not pay for it). (Reyes Book) It is necessary that his fortune has been augmented by his participation of the crime. X in this case is not criminally liable, but he would be subsidiarily liable in the sum of the amount used to buy the car, given that K is insolvent. If the choice is phrased in a way that asserts that X is civilly liable for restitution, then this would be the answer here. Answer from Jed: My answer is B X cannot be an accessory unless he knew of the commission of a crime by K. Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. It is a prerequisite for a person to have knowledge of the crime for him to be considered an accessory. HOWEVER sirs comment Total provision yun. Gratuitous participant in the commission of a crime is __???___ liable if he does not know of theif he does not that he is partaking of the proceeds of a crime. He will nevertheless be liable civilly. Makes me want to pick D that is if it
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means civil liability.

14. People v. Abiong and Abiong Facts: Both blows were sufficient to cause the death of the victims. But it cant be said which blow actually caused the death of the victim. To keep it simple, there were 3 brothers (Vincent, Marcelino, Luis Abiog - V, M, L) and 1 guy (Anacleto Cudiamat - C). I suppose they were farmers. Anyway, they got into a fight over words, which led to V going back home to get a revolver. M tried to stop V, but was killed in the process (probably by accident, not important in the case). V then shot C in the stomach. The wife of C tried to help him, but L stopped her and further wounded C with a bolo. The doctor said that both wounds were by themselves mortal. When asked what caused the death, he said the wounds.No charges of conspiracy were charged in information. None were proved. No joint acts of preparation or execution. Each apparently acted on his own behalf and upon his own motive without regard to the motive of the other

Question: a. both be acquitted because it cannot be established which injury caused the death of the victim. b. one must determine which blow was 1st inflicted. Because if the 1st blow inflicted was mortar, then there was no need for the 2nd blow. Only the person who inflicted the 1st blow will be held liable. c. they are liable as co-principals. d. they are both liable separately.

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Answer from Sir:

They were both liable separately. They were each principals of their

respective crimes. Each of them were acting independently of the other. They were being held both liable of the crime, not collectively, but rather individually. Both of their acts were sufficient to cause the death of the victim. Answer from Norby: The defendants and appellants are each sentenced to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal... General rule is, when 2 or more wounds are dealt by 2 or more people, without conspiracy, and it cannot be determined which wound caused the death, they are entitled to be acquitted. This does not fall under that rule. It would be an absurdity to state that a man can killed twice. For example, if the pistol wound of V killed C, the bolo wound of L could not kill a man already dead. Or if the bolo wound killed C, V may not be culpable. In other words, one may not be punished for the act of another. Participation in both the homicidal design and act is essential. Under such circumstances, it is established that the onus is on each defendant to show that the wound inflicted by him did not cause death. The string of Jurisprudence basically says that when a wound necessarily contributes to hasten the death, the person who inflicted it would be charged with homicide. Its as when the bolo struck, C was not merely languishing from the mortal wound. He was actually dying and after the bolo strike he continued to languish from both wounds. Drop by drop the life current went out from both wounds, and at the very instant of death the gunshot wounds was contributing to the event. Answer 2:

15. Timex v. Valdez (Subsidiary/Liability of Employers)

Facts:

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Question: Answer: Answer 2:

16. (Liability Stemming From Mere Presence) US v. Balisacan Facts: Appellants Ambrosio Agnis, Eulogio Malvar, and Zoilo Malvar and it is claimed that there is no evidence to show that they took any actual part in the killing of Antolin Alejandro. We can not agree with this view. They were present from the time the deceased was taken from his house until the time he was killed, and must be considered, under the evidence in the case, as principals. A majority of the court is also of the opinion that the defendants Santos Manuel and Mariano Ganutisi must also be considered as principals. They did not accompany the rest of the party to the place where Antolin was killed, but were detailed to guard the witness Mateo Reyes at a point some distance from the place where the killing of Antolin took place US v. Silvestre & Atienza Facts: Mere passive presence at the scene of anothers crime and mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of conspiracy do not constitute complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively or with regard to which one has kept silent. Question: In others words we are talking here of the liability of a person merely present in the commission of a crime. *No choices given Answer by : Gaston
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Ratio: Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals: 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. A principal is one who took direct part in the commission of the crime, or directly forced or induced others to commit it or cooperate in its commission by some indispensable act. xxx A person, who is present when a crime is committed but has no knowledge of the intention to commit the crime takes no part therein, cannot be convicted as a co-principal or accomplice. Without proof of conspiracy, mere passive presence at the scene of anothers crime does not constitute complicity. (Aquino)

-The accused was convicted with qualified theft. Under Article 310 under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two (2) degrees than that specified in Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. In the circumstances involved where the amount stolen was tantamount to more than P2.5 M, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal pursuant to Article 309. -What is the penalty two degrees for reclusion temporal (or for qualified theft)? penalty Reclusion Perpetua for Forty Years with the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. In fine, Caales is not entitled to pardon before the lapse of the forty-year period -Art 40: the death penalty when it is not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of perpetual absolute disqualification and that of civil interdiction during thirty tears following the dates of sentence, unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Answer 2: 16. people v balisakan, people v drillon, people v Silvestre, atienza merely present in a crime

Article 16. Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies:
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1. Who are criminally liable. - The following are criminally liable for grave and less grave felonies: 1. Principals. 2. Accomplices. 3. Accessories. The following are criminally liable for light felonies: 1. Principals 2. Accomplices. Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals: 1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; 3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Article 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are those persons who, not being included in article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. Article 19. Accessories. - Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners: 1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime. 2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery. 3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. TABULATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER 4

Penalty the crime

Penalty upon frustrated crime,

to Penalty the upon an

to Penalty the upon

to Penalty the upon

to the

Prescribe for be imposed be imposed be imposed be imposed principal in a principal and attempted in accessory in accessory in a frustrated an crime, and attempted
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accomplice in d crime

crime,

the the in an

crime

a accessory in accomplices consummate attempted d crime and crime the accomplices in frustrated crime. a

consummate the

First Case

Death

Reclusion Perpetua

Reclusion Temporal Prision Mayor

Prision Mayor Prision

Prision Correccional Arresto

Second Case

Reclusion Perpetua to Death

Reclusion Temporal

Correccional Mayor

Third Case

Reclusion Temporal in period death

Prision

Prision in maximum period to prision medium period

Arresto its maximum period to prision its

Fine Mayorin minimum and medium its

Mayor in its correccional Mayorin it s andArresto

its maximum maximum to period toreclusion temporal in its period

correccional periods medium period Fine Mayorin minimum and medium its its Fine.

medium mayor in its in

Fourth Case Prision Mayorin maximum period toreclusion temporal its

Prision in maximum period in to prision

Arresto its maximum period to prision

its correccional mayor in its andArresto

correccional periods

medium mayor in its in

23

period.

medium period.

medium period.

Balisakan That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his death.

Drilon Facts: Drilon, Jr. alone fired at the victim's car with a carbine and killed him. This is attested to by the testimonies of the state witnesses. As well as the findings of Domingo del Rosario, the ballistic expert of the National Bureau of Investigation, who conducted a ballistic examination of all the twenty-two (22) carbines in the armory of the Log Support Company in Cebu City. He declared that the seven (7) empty shells found at the scene of the crime were fired from only one carbine. Despite the finding of the trial court that it was Drilon alone who fired all the shots during the incident in question, it pronounced Lobaton (the companion) guilty as charged on the theory that he and Drilon conspired and acted in common accord as to render him liable for the acts of the latter. Issue: Does Lobatons mere presence while the crime is being commited make him an accomplice to the crime through conspiracy? Held: We do not share this view. We have thoroughly and painstakingly scrutinized the records
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and found the same bereft of any fact or circumstance to establish the existence of a conspiracy. While it is true that direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy, for it may be established by facts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the crime charged, nevertheless, the same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of a criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.'

The mere presence of appellant at the scene when the crime was perpetrated is not by itself indicative of the existence of conspiracy between them. The accused must be shown to have had guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer, and this presupposes knowledge on his part of such criminal design. It is not enough that there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as co-principal or accomplice, it is, furthermore, necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the former's criminal intent, should cooperate with moral or material aid in the consummation of the crime. " There is not a shred of evidence to justify the inference that they had any pre-conceived plan to shoot anyone that night. It was held that where the conspiracy was to commit robbery, but during the course thereof, due to the sudden movement and attempt of the taxi driver to escape, one of appellant's companions shot the victim, said appellant cannot be held guilty of murder which was the charge filed against him. Certain facts may be cited to show the lack of a common design to kill. As found by the lower court, immediately after Drilon had fired the first shot, Iraque ran to him, pleading, "don't do it". The records likewise reflect the uncontroverted testimony of appellant Lobaton to the effect that when he returned to the barracks after the incident, he asked Drilon why he had to shoot at the car, and the latter responded by saying, "because he started the car." These spontaneous reactions to Drilon's felonious act strongly indicate not only the absence of a common plan or purpose to do away with the deceased, but
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also that assailant's act in firing his gun was so sudden and unexpected, it caught his companions unaware. It being patent that no conspiracy to kill existed between the actual assailant and the appellant, the latter cannot be held liable for the criminal act of the former. People v. Sylvestre and Atienza Article 14 of the Penal Code, considered in connection with article 13, defines an accomplice to be one who does not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions. Facts: Sylvestre and Atienza were cohabitating despite Atienza still being married to one Domingo Joaquin (her second marriage). Joaquin charged both with adultery. But after the couples sworn promise to leave the town, and cohabit elsewhere, Joaquin relented and withdrew his suit. Later on, Sylvestre and Atienza returned to the town and lived with Sylvestres child from a previous marriage (the first) and his wife. Atienza sent the couple away with a pistol and a promise to commit arson. Turning back they saw their home in flames, and ran back to it. The fire destroyed about forty-eight houses. Witnesses saw Martin Atienza going away from the house where the fire started, and Romana Silvestre leaving it. Issue: is Silvestre guilty of being an accomplice of the crime? Held: By virtue wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified as follows: It is affirmed with reference to the accused-appellant Martin Atienza, and reversed with reference to the accusedappellant Romana Silvestre, who is hereby acquitted with one-half of the costs de oficio. So ordered.

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Now then, which previous or simultaneous acts complicate Romana Silvestre in the crime of arson committed by her codefendant Martin Atienza: Is it her silence when he told the spouses, Nicolas de la Cruz and Antonia de la Cruz, to take away their furniture because he was going to set fire to their house as the only means of revenging himself on the barrio residents? Her passive presence when Martin Atienza set fire to the house, where there is no evidence of conspiracy or cooperation? Or her failure to give the alarm when the house was already on fire?

The complicity which is penalized requires a certain degree of cooperation, whether moral, through advice, encouragement, or agreement, or material, through external acts. In the case of the accused-appellant Romana Silvestre, there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation, and none of an agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does not make her liable as an accomplice. For all the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold, that: Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by article 14 of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to which one has kept silent; and 1. US v Indangan (principal by inducement) son fighting with X and father cheered him on. When is the father liable? ANSWER: when such remark of the father was the motivation behind the fatal blow Article 17. Principals. - The following are considered principals: 2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it; Principals by induction:

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Requisites: 1. That the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime 2. That such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime by the material executor One cannot be held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime without first being shown that the crime was actually committed or attempted by another There can be NO principal inducement unless there is a principal by direct participation. There can be however, a principal by direct participation without a principal by inducement. The inducement must be the determining cause of the commission of the crime. Without the inducement, the crime would not have been committed. The inducement must precede the act and must be so influential; hence if there is a price or reward involved without prior promise, there can be no inducement. If the crime committed is not contemplated in the order given, inducement is not material and not the determining cause thereof. 2 ways of becoming principal by induction: 1. By directly forcing another to commit a crime by: a. Using irresistible force. i. Such physical force as would produce an effect upon the individual that in spite of all resistance, it reduces him to a mere instrument b. Causing uncontrollable fear i. Compulsion by means of intimidation or threat that promises an evil of suck gravity and eminence that the ordinary man would succumb to it ii. In these cases, there is no conspiracy, not even a unity of criminal purpose and intention. Only the one using the force or causing the fear is criminally liable. The material executor is not criminally liable because of Art. 12 par 5 (exempting circumstances) 2. By directly inducing another to commit a crime by: a. Giving of price, or offering of reward or promise i. The one giving the price or offering the reward or promise is a principal by inducement while the one committing the crime in consideration of is a principal by direct participation. Therefore, there is criminal liablilty. b. Using words of command i. The person who used the words of command is a principal by inducement while the person who committed the crime because of the words of command is principal by direct participation. Liability present. The inducement must precede the act and must be so influential that without it, the act would not be performed. If the person who actually committed the crime had reason of his own to commit the crime, it cannot be said that the inducement was influential in producing the criminal act.

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US v Indangan it was held that a father who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being held in mind that the inducement to the commission of the crime by means of which a person may be considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes the act itself can only be founded in commands, sometimes in advice, in considerations, or by inducement so powerful that it alone produces the criminal act. None of these characteristics pertain to the words of Miguel Perez, inasmuch as the circumstances which surrounded the event at the time do not appear in sufficient detail to show with clearness the effects which the words produced, or the relative situation of the deceased and of the one who killed him, or the point to which the fight had progressed at the time the words were spoken. Moreover, the decision of the court below does not show sufficient facts upon which to affirm that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced him to use said weapon."

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17. Case cited in Indanan Facts: A father told his son, who was at the time engaged in combat with another, Hit him. Question: Is the father liable for the injuries committed after the advice was given? Answer form Zep: Act cannot be considered direct inducement because is is necessary that the advice or the words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that they be a direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. To be convicted of inducement by words, the inducement must 1. be made with the intent of procuring the commission of the crime 2. be the command must be the moving cause of the crime.

Answer 2:

18. US v. Asahan Facts:

Question: When is a co-conspirator act criminally liable with the other co-conspirators, even though the crime conspired upon was actually executed? a. If he did not participate in the actual execution of a crime. b. If our law allows a person to voluntarily and spontaneously desist from the commission of a crime without incurring criminal liability at the attempted stage, c. so much more if a crime is still in the conspiratorial stage. So a person who participates in a meeting where the commission of the crime is decided upon, but does not participate in its actual

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execution, or cannot be proven to have participated in its actual execution, then he is not criminally liable.

Answer: Art. 29 of RPC Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the FULL time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, IF the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners except: Recidivists Upon being summoned for execution of their sentence, they have failed to surrender voluntarily. If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths (4/5) of the time he has undergone preventive imprisonment. XXX Answer 2: Facts: For some time prior to July 1929, trouble has been brewing between the Moro Angkaya and the Moro Japal Alli. Angkaya took council with a number of his relatives (Asaad, his son and right hand man, as well as another 4 people) and concocted a plan to call on two other moros -- Sampang and Suhali -- to murder Japal Alli. They were more than willing to oblige (Angkaya and his son were going to pay them P200 to do it). They also agreed to kill Japal Alli's wife, Nurkisa. And so one night, Sampang and Suhali visited the house of Japal Alli and killed him and his wife. Ruling and Ratio: Sampang and Sahuli were convicted for direct participation of the murders. Angkaya was not charge because he did before conviction. Asaad, Angkaya's son, charged for direct inducement for paying the 200 and suggesting that the wife, too, should be killed. The only doubtful factor of the case has had to do with the guilt or innocence of the remaining four accused, Mawaji, Salim, Saladi, and Nahula. These four accused attended the conferences and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme. After the commission of the murders, they joined with the other accused in celebrating with a fiesta. Aside from this, these four did not cooperate in the commission of the crimes. Nor is it certain that, as relatives or retainers of Angkaya, the four had any influence over Sampang and Suhaili, and that any of the four said or did anything that determined the commission of the crimes. May they be considered as authors by inducement within the meaning of article 13 of the Penal Code? May they be considered as
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accomplices within the meaning of article 14 of the Penal Code? Our deliberate judgment on these question is that the four accused may neither be considered as authors by inducement nor as accomplices. Merely assenting out of respect and fear, and merely attending a feast by way of custom does not constitute an effective inducement. What the four did amounted to joining in a conspiracy. But the Penal Code, in article 4, does not punish a conspiracy as such. As to the accused being accomplices, it has not been shown that, aside from attending the meetings of the conspirators and joining in a feast, they cooperated in the execution of the crimes by previous or simultaneous acts. it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time the act was committed. Such advice and such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. We conclude that the defendants and appellants Sampang, Suhaili, and Asaad have been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of double murder. We further conclude that the defendants and appellants Mawagi, Salim, Saladi, and Nahula have not been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes charged, or of any lesser crimes included in the charge, and that as a consequence they are entitled to acquittal.

19. People v. Butler Facts: US soldier (6 foot, 155 pounds) had sex with Filipina girl (dirty girl, 411 and slim, in purple fishnet attire) in Olongapo City. After having sex, they fought in room when the girl started hitting him. In the middle of the fight he found a Jesus figurine and smashed it on her head which made her fall face down on the bed. He then used a pillow and suffocated her to death. Afterwards, he defiled her corpse by having anal sex with it.

Question:

No specific Question Given but relevant topic is Aggravating Circumstances

(Outraging at the corpse and Abuse of Superior Strength) Possible Questions:

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1) Was the aggravating circumstance of Treachery established? NO 2) Was the aggravating circumstance of Scoffing at the corpse of the victim established? YES 3) Was the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength established? - YES

Court Ruling: Murder and qualified by abuse of superior strength (not treachery) and aggravated by scoffing at corpse

Answer from Zep:

The aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the

victim is present as the act of anal intercourse after the murder is an outrage at victims corpse. This circumstance is only applicable in crimes of murder and when the victim is already dead. There is also abuse of superior strength due to the disadvantage of the 411 girl vs Butler who was 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs and the strength which he wielded in striking her with a figurine on the head and shoving her head into a pillow and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which, due to the strong pressure, caused her to suffocate to death. Due to the fact that all of this happened without risk to himself and she was not able to defend or retaliate, the court held that the crime he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure caused her death was murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Answer from Dondon: Difference between treachery and abuse of superior strength: Treachery means, methods or forms of attack are employed by offender to make it impossible or hard for the offended party to put up any sort of resistance Abuse of superior strength the offender does not employ means, methods or forms of attack; he only takes advantage of superior strength (to win)

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Treachery NO treachery - Commits crime against person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make - - Offended party was not given opportunity to make a defense Cannot be presumed especially if there is no witness as to how it happened o Cannot be appreciated where there is nothing in the record to show that the accused had pondered upon the mode or method to ensure the killing of the deceased without risk to himself - - Where attack was frontal The mode of attack must be consciously adopted accused must have made time to prepare for the crime in such a manner to ensure its execution without risk to himself

Rules regarding treachery: 1) Applicable only to crimes against persons 2) Means, methods, and forms need not ensure accomplishment of crime (only to ensure execution) 3) The mode of attack must be consciously adopted

People v. Dauz: The mode of attack must be thought of by the offender, and must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. The mode of attack could not have been thought of when the decision to shoot was sudden, in view of the latters flight, and the relative positions of the victim and the killer were entirely accidental

Case: where the meeting of the accused and the victim is causal and the attack done impulsively done, there is no treachery even if attack was sudden and unexpected

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Requisites of treachery: 1) That at the time of the attack, the victim was NOT IN A POSITION TO DEFEND HIMSELF o Cannot be appreciated since Butler and woman were in the middle of a physical struggle, she hit him numerous times before that and was the aggressor she was not defenseless 2) That the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him o The attack was in the middle of an unexpected struggle and therefore was not premeditated or planned. In the testimony, in the middle of the struggle he chanced upon the figurine which he chose to employ

Advantage be taken of superior strength or means be employed to weaken the defense

Advantage use purposely excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked Evidence of relative physical strength necessary obvious in this case Depends on: age, size, strength of parties

No advantage of superior strength: - - One who attacks with passion and obfuscation Does not apply when a quarrel arose unexpectedly and the fatal blow was struck at a time when the aggressor and his victim were engaged against each other as man to man

Abuse of superior strength when a man attacks a woman with a weapon (especially US marine) People v. Brana (1969): accused attacked an unarmed 411 girl with a knife

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It is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.

Scoffing at the Corpse of the Victim While We reject the presence of treachery, We, however, find and sustain the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, Exhibit "B1 ", clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.

1. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means employed to weaken the defense 2. That the act be committed with treachery

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take

RELEVANT LAST PART OF THE CASE: The third issue is whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and corpse at the corpse of the victim. The prosecution maintains that there is abuse of superior strength as can be deduced from the
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fact that the victim was slender, only 4'11" in height while the accused is about 6 feet tall and 155 lbs that the accused took advantage of this unequal physical condition when he struck the victim with the figurine which made the victim unconscious, after which he shoved and pressed the victim's mouth and nose against the bed mattress. 14 On the other hand, it is the defense counsel's contention that the court a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength because like treachery, nocturnity and evident premeditation, this circumstance has to be deliberately and purposely utilized to assure the accomplishment of the criminal purpose without risk to the offender which might arise from the defense that the victim might offer. The defense counsel further maintains that there is no evidence to support that advantage was taken by the accused of his superior strength as contrary to what the court a quo said in its decision, there was no evidence nor testimony on the part of the medico-legal officer to the effect that when the victim was hit by a figurine, she went into a coma then her head was pushed by a pillow, causing her nose and mouth to be pressured against the bed mattress. In addition to this, the defense counsel further maintains that the instrument used by the accused, which was a brittle porcelain statue of Jesus Christ, could not produce physical injury nor render the victim unconscious as testified to at cross-examination by the medico-legal officer. In People vs. Bustos, 15 this Court held that to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that the accused is physically stronger than the victim or the relative strength of the parties must be proved. In People vs. Casillar, 16this Court said that the essence of this circumstance is that advantage is taken by the offender of this physical strength which is relatively superior to that of the offended party. The fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove its existence. 17 Still, in People vs. Cabiling, a guideline to determine whether or not there is abuse of superior strength has been laid down. In that case this Court ruled: To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attached. This circumstance should always be considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. To properly appreciate it, not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to analyze the incidents and

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episodes constituting the total development of the event. 18 In the light of the above legal precepts and considering the evidence adduced, this Court holds that there was an abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is not only the notorious advantage of height that the accused had over his hapless victim, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft 11 inches tall, but also fits strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been very strong and powerful to suffocate her to death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that she may have taken to defend herself or retaliate since she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced us to find and rule that the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery attended the commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the killing. The extra-judicial confession of the accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face." Although the figurine was found broken beside her head, the medical report, however, do not show any injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of intracranial hemorrhage. While We reject the presence of treachery, We, however, find and sustain the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, Exhibit "B1 ", clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse. It is true as maintained by the defense that the aggravating circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the victim is not alleged in the information and that the lower court found it had been proved but its contention that the said aggravating circumstance should not have been

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appreciated against the accused is without merit. And this is so because the rule is that a generic aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be proven during the trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the, penalty (People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil. 597). Aggravating circumstances not alleged in the information but proven during the trial serve only to aid the court in fixing the limits of the penalty but do not change the character of the offense. (People vs. Collado 60 Phil. 610, 614; People vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368; People vs. Vega, 31 Phil. 450; People vs. Domondon, 64 Phil. 729). On the claim of the defense that the accused is entitled to the benefits of Section 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment by P.D. 1179 on August 15, 1977, the records disclose that at the time of the commission of the crime on August 8, 1975, said accused was seventeen (1 7) years, eleven (11) months and four (4) days old, he having been born on September 4, 1957 in Orlando, Florida, U.S.A. The records further disclose that during the consideration of the defense's motion to suppress the extra-judicial confession (Exhibit "H") the accused declared that he was eighteen (18) years old as evidenced by the certification issued by Vice Consul Leovigildo Anolin of the Consul General of the Philippines in New York City dated November 14, 1975 (Exhibit "1"-Motion). According to the trial court, notwithstanding the presentation of Exhibit "1"-Motion, the accused did not make any serious effort to invoke Article 192 of Presidential Decree 603 and further, since the accused was found guilty of a capital offense, the suspension of sentence and the commitment of the accused to the custody of any institution or person recommended by the Department of Social Welfare cannot be carried out. On December 17, 1976, an Urgent Motion for New Trial was filed by the defense on the ground that a serious error of law was committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial right of the accused and newly discovered evidence which would probably change the judgment of the court. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and Second Motion for Reconsideration. Thereupon, the records of the case were ordered immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to law. At the time of the commission of the offense, trial and rendition of judgment, the applicable law was P.D. 603 otherwise known as Child and Youth Welfare Code. The relevant provisions of the said law to the instant case are Articles 189 and 192 which provide the following: Art. 189. Youthful Offender. Defined A youthful offender is one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.

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A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed to the care of Ws or her father or mother, or nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its supervision. The same shall be done for a child over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance ,with Article 192. The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the provisions of tills Chapter. Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing and the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court,upon application of the youthful offender, if it finds that the best interest of the public as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend an further proceedings. The trial court refused to consider and appreciate the minority of the accused because the proof submitted by the defense was not duly authenticated as required by the Rules of Court under Section 25 of Rule 132, said proof being merely a certification issued by Consul Leovigildo Anolin of the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York City, U.S.A. that the attached document is a xerox copy of the original birth certificate of Michael Jerome Butler issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitation Service, State of Florida, U.S.A. shown by Mr. Butler's mother, Mrs. Ethel Butler. (Exhibit "l ", "1-A") After the lower court had ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review on January 25, 1977, as stated earlier accused-appellant filed on August 25, 1978 a petition for mandamus in G.R. No. L-48786 entitled "Michael J. Butler, minor, assisted by Lt. Commander Charles T. Riedel, U.S. Navy (guardian ad litem) vs. Hon. Regino T. Veridiano, et al." praying that respondent judge be ordered and commanded to set aside the judgment of conviction, to declare the proceedings suspended and order the commitment of the accused pursuant to Article 193, P.D. 603. The petition was denied by Us for lack of merit in Our Resolution of December 13, 1978. Subsequently, however, the required proof was submitted as annexes to the defense'
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Manifestation and Motion to Admit (Certified Copy of Certificate of Live Birth) filed May 26, 1981 in the instant proceedings (See Records, pp. 137-141). In Our Resolution of June 4, 1981, We admitted the certified copy of the Certificate of Live Birth of accused-appellant to form part of the evidence. We do not agree with the reasoning of the trial court that the accused had not invoked the privilege granted under Article 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment because the records manifestly show the vigorous plea of the accused for it's application not only in the Motion for New Trial but also in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused (See pp. 237 248, 261271, Records of Criminal Case No. 2465, People vs. Michael J. Butler, CFI of Zambales, Branch 1, Olongapo City). We hold and rule that the lower court erred in not applying the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603 suspending all further proceedings after the court had found that the accused had committed the acts charged against him, determined the imposable penalty including any civil liability chargeable against him. The trial court should not have pronounced judgment convicting the accused, imposing upon the penalty of death. We likewise hold that the penalty of death was not justified. Since murder was committed by the accused, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The accused is a minor and he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which reduces the penalty one degree lower and that is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. (Article 68, Revised Penal Code) With one aggravating circumstance, that of outraging at the corpse of the victim, the penalty imposable is the maximum period which is reclusion temporal medium or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Imposing the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty is eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. We find in the records the Order of the Honorable Regino T. Veridiano II, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch I at Olongapo City, committing the accused in the custody of the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines dated December 3, 1976, "(p)ending the finality of judgment rendered in the above-entitled case, pursuant to the provisions of Para. 5, Article 13 of the Revised Base Military Agreement. " (p. 190, original

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records). After the appeal had been submitted for decision pursuant to Our Resolution of November 20, 1980, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss Case Under P.D. 603 praying that an order be issued "l) Dismissing the case against accused-appellant; (2) Ordering the immediate discharge of accused-appellant; (3) Granting accused-appellant such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises, " alleging: IV 8) During his entire period of continued imprisonment in the BRIG from August 11, 1975 to the present, accused-appellant has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community. Documentary proofs of these are as follows: (a) Official Report of the BRIG Commander, USN Subic Naval Base, attached hereto as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof-, (b) Progress Report filed with this Honorable Court on November 6, 1980, by the Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch, found on pp. 113-114, of the Rollo, and attached hereto as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof Thus: Based on the informations we gathered thru interviews and observations, we would like to recommend to the Hon. Supreme Court, that Michael Butler be given a chance to enjoy his life fully outside the jail, thus promoting his best interest and welfare.' (c) Progress Report with annexes, dated February 18, 1981, filed on March 4,1981, by the Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch, found on pp. 128-131 of the Rollo, a xerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C " and made an integral part hereof Thus: In view of the fact that Mr. Michael Butler is now fully rehabilitated, it is our recommendation that he be given an opportunity to have happily and prove himself outside the Brig.' (d) Diploma awarded by the University of La Verne California, U.S.A., to accused-appellant as evidence of his having completed a course in Behavioral Science, on January 24, 1981, while he was a prisoner in the BRIG. A xerox copy of said Diploma and that of the accompanying group photograph showing a picture of accused-appellant taken on the occasion of the commencement exercises, are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "D-1 ", respectively, and made integral parts
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hereof. The originals are found on p. 133 of the Rollo. (The original of his transcript of record is also hereto attached as Annex "E "). v (9) Under the foregoing facts and circumstances, and while it is now a legal and physical impossibility to place accused-appellant under the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development which was what should have been done in the beginning under P.D. 603, it is submitted that accused-appellant's unfortunate situation could still be remedied and salvaged . . . as justice now demands . . . and that is, by treating accused-appellant's imprisonment in the BRIG as equivalent to what should have been his full period of commitment under the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development. After all, and as said Ministry has reported, it has been regularly visiting accused- appellant at his cell in the BRIG and, is therefore, in a position to attest to the exceptional behavior of accused-appellant. Counsel for the People opposes the Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: 1 That the dismiss for lack of merit by this Court of the petition for mandamus earlier filed and docketed as G.R.L-48788 barred the accused from raising or litigating anew the issue of his minority; 2-That an offender is not entitled to the benefit of suspension of sentence if at the time of trial he could no longer qualify as a minor offender for purposes of the rule on suspension of sentence because of his age, citing the cases of People vs. Capistrano, 92 Phil. 127 and People vs. Estefa, 86 Phil. 104; and 3-That under Section 192, P.D. 603, as amended, accused-appellant is not entitled to the benefit of suspension because he was convicted of an offense punishable by death, considering that the retroactive application to him of Articles 189 and 192, P.D. 603 as amended by P.D. 1179 may not be assailed because said articles are procedural in nature and there is no vested right in rules of procedure. We find no merit' to the opposition of the People. Our dismissal of the mandamus petition in G.R. L-48788 which was for lack of merit due to the insufficient proof of minority of the accused is no bar to raising the same issue in the instant automatic review of the case after We had admitted the proper authentication of the accused's birth certificate "to form part of the evidence." (See Resolution of June 4, 1981, rollo). The second ground is likewise without merit for the accused was below 21 years at the time of his trial and even at the time judgment was promulgated to him on December 3, 1976 (he was then 19 years, 3 months and 3 days old). Neither does the third ground hold water because P.D. 603 was amended on May 15, 1977, which was after the

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trial and conviction already of the accused. The amendment passed during the pendency of the appeal and it cannot adversely affect the right, privilege or benefit accorded to the minor for suspension of the sentence under the original provision of Article 192 of P.D. 603, which reads as follows: Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed. The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe. P.D. 1179, Section 2 and made effective August 15, 1977 amended Articles 192 and 193 of P.D. 603 by adding as its penultimate paragraph the following: The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. (emphasis supplied) The lower court having erred in not suspending the sentence of conviction against the accusedappellant who is entitled thereto under the original provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603, We agree with the defense plea that the "accused-appellant's imprisonment in the BRIG (be treated) as equivalent to what should have been his full period of commitment under the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development. After all, and as said Ministry has reported, it has been regularly visiting accused-appellant at his cell in the BRIG and is, therefore, in a position to attest to the exceptional behavior of accused-appellant." We have examined carefully the documentary proofs attached to the appellant's Motion to

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Dismiss showing that from August 11, 1975 to the present, accused-appellant has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community, and these are (a) Official Report of the BRIG Commander, USN Subic Naval Base; (b) Progress Report filed with this Court on November 6, 1980 by the Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch; and (c) Progress Report with annexes dated February 18, 1981 filed on March 4, 1981 by the Ministry of Social Services and Development; and (d) Diploma awarded by the University of La Verne California, U.S.A. showing completion of a course in Behavioral Science, on January 24, 1981, while he was a prisoner in the BRIG. The Final Report prepared and submitted by the Supervising Social Worker of the Ministry of Social Services and Development Dated September 14, 1981 was subsequently filed with Us and it states as follows: FINAL REPORT In compliance with the request of the Legal Office, U.S. Naval Base, the Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch Office respectfully submits this final report on the progress of the behavior of the above-mentioned youth. Michael Jerome Butler has been detained at the Naval Station Brig of the U.S. Naval Base for a period of six years now. Since his detention, he has been visited and was given counselling by the Social Worker. While in confinement, he was assigned to the Brig's Library, Coffee Mess and at present at the Administrative Office. At the Administrative Office, he is responsible in keeping the records on file, typing various forms and correspondence and forms reproduction. The present Brig Officer said that Prisoner Butler works well requiring limited supervision as he sets and pursues goals in an organized manner. He can be relief upon to complete an assigned task in a timely manner. He also performs all janitorial work required for the above-mentioned spaces. He gets along very well with the Brig's Staff and other confines and he goes out of his way to help other confines adjust to confinement and to rehabilitate themselves. He made use of his time in the Brig constructively and on January 29, 1981, he graduated at the LA Verne Co with the degree m Behavioral Science. This was made possible thru his selfdetermination, diligence, courage and interest. He also takes an active part in promoting health and physical fitness to all cofinees as well as staff. Confines Butler is not only involved in assisting and helping his co- confines but also gives
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financial support to a disabled person in the person of Benjamin dela Cruz and to his (Butler) mother who is in United States. Mr. Butler has been incharge of the complete operation of the Brig's Library and he kept it well stocked and completely clean and neat. He also taken the duties of a Coffee Mess and had accomplished the job expertly. He was given a task within the compound that only trusted confinee would be given and had carried them with zest. His personal appearance and uniforms are always in accord with the Navy standard. With the above findings and Mr. Butler's desire to start life anew, this Final Report is submitted. / Prepared and Submitted by: (SGD.) Supervising 14 Sept. 1981 Noted by: (SGD.) City Social Welfare Officer From these reports, We are fully satisfied that the accused. appellant has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community. It is of no moment that the accused had not been specifically committed by the court to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare then, now the Ministry of Social Services and Development, or to any training institution operated by the government or duly-licensed agencies as directed under Article 192 of P.D. 603. At any rate, the Commander of the U.S. Naval Base in Subic Bay to whom the accused was committed in the Order of December 3, 1976 pending the finality of judgment rendered in the case pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 5, Article 13 of the Revised Base Military Agreement, may be considered a responsible person to whom the accused may be committed for custody or care under the said Article 192 of P.D. 603. What is important is the result of such custody and care showing his conduct as well as the intellectual, physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by the accused as shown in the favorable recommendation of the Supervising Social Worker of the Ministry of Social Services and Development who had visited him regularly and given counselling. We hereby approve the
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ELOISA Social

A.

GARCIA Worker

JUANITA

B.

LAFORTEZA

recommendation of the Ministry that "Michael Butler be given a chance to enjoy his life fully outside the jail, thus promoting Ms best interest and welfare" (Progress Report dated October 27, 1980); "that Mr. Michael Butler is now fully rehabilitated, it is our recommendation that he be given an opportunity to live happily and prove himself outside the Brig" (Progress Reported dated February 18, 1981); "with the above findings and Mr. Butler's desire to start life anew, this Final Report is submitted." (Final Report dated September 14, 1981). The dismissal of the case against the accussed Michael Butler is, therefore, meritorious and justifiable. We hereby order his final discharge therefrom. His final release, however, shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages in the amount of P24.000.00 to the heirs of the victim which We hereby affirm. Such release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil damages. (Article 198, P.D. 603). WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the case against the accused-appellant Michael J. Butler is hereby DISMISSED and We hereby order his final discharge from commitment and custody. The civil liability imposed upon him by the lower court shall remain.

19. People v. Butler Facts: US soldier (6 foot, 155 pounds) had sex with Filipina girl (dirty girl, 411 and slim, in purple fishnet attire) in Olongapo City. After having sex, they fought in room when the girl started hitting him. In the middle of the fight he found a Jesus figurine and smashed it on her head which made her fall face down on the bed. He then used a pillow and suffocated her to death. Afterwards, he defiled her corpse by having anal sex with it. Question: No specific Question Given but relevant topic is Aggravating Circumstances

(Outraging at the corpse and Abuse of Superior Strength) Possible Questions: 4) Was the aggravating circumstance of Treachery established? NO 5) Was the aggravating circumstance of Scoffing at the corpse of the victim established? 47

YES 6) Was the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength established? - YES

Court Ruling: Murder and qualified by abuse of superior strength (not treachery) and aggravated by scoffing at corpse Answer from Zep: The aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the

victim is present as the act of anal intercourse after the murder is an outrage at victims corpse. This circumstance is only applicable in crimes of murder and when the victim is already dead. There is also abuse of superior strength due to the disadvantage of the 411 girl vs Butler who was 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs and the strength which he wielded in striking her with a figurine on the head and shoving her head into a pillow and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which, due to the strong pressure, caused her to suffocate to death. Due to the fact that all of this happened without risk to himself and she was not able to defend or retaliate, the court held that the crime he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure caused her death was murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength.

Answer from Dondon: Difference between treachery and abuse of superior strength: Treachery means, methods or forms of attack are employed by offender to make it impossible or hard for the offended party to put up any sort of resistance Abuse of superior strength the offender does not employ means, methods or forms of attack; he only takes advantage of superior strength (to win) Treachery NO treachery - Commits crime against person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make - - Offended party was not given opportunity to make a defense Cannot be presumed especially if there is no witness as to how it happened
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o Cannot be appreciated where there is nothing in the record to show that the accused had pondered upon the mode or method to ensure the killing of the deceased without risk to himself - - Where attack was frontal The mode of attack must be consciously adopted accused must have made time to prepare for the crime in such a manner to ensure its execution without risk to himself Rules regarding treachery: 4) Applicable only to crimes against persons 5) Means, methods, and forms need not ensure accomplishment of crime (only to ensure execution) 6) The mode of attack must be consciously adopted People v. Dauz: The mode of attack must be thought of by the offender, and must not spring from the unexpected turn of events. The mode of attack could not have been thought of when the decision to shoot was sudden, in view of the latters flight, and the relative positions of the victim and the killer were entirely accidental Case: where the meeting of the accused and the victim is causal and the attack done impulsively done, there is no treachery even if attack was sudden and unexpected Requisites of treachery: 3) That at the time of the attack, the victim was NOT IN A POSITION TO DEFEND HIMSELF o Cannot be appreciated since Butler and woman were in the middle of a physical struggle, she hit him numerous times before that and was the aggressor she was not defenseless 4) That the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him o The attack was in the middle of an unexpected struggle and therefore was not premeditated or planned. In the testimony, in the middle of the struggle he chanced upon the figurine which he chose to employ

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Advantage be taken of superior strength or means be employed to weaken the defense Advantage use purposely excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked Evidence of relative physical strength necessary obvious in this case Depends on: age, size, strength of parties No advantage of superior strength: - - One who attacks with passion and obfuscation Does not apply when a quarrel arose unexpectedly and the fatal blow was struck at a time when the aggressor and his victim were engaged against each other as man to man Abuse of superior strength when a man attacks a woman with a weapon (especially US marine) People v. Brana (1969): accused attacked an unarmed 411 girl with a knife It is considered whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. Scoffing at the Corpse of the Victim While We reject the presence of treachery, We, however, find and sustain the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after she was already dead. The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, Exhibit "B1 ", clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse.

3. That advantage be taken of superior strength, or means employed to weaken the defense 4. That the act be committed with treachery
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There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take RELEVANT LAST PART OF THE CASE: The third issue is whether or not the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, with aggravating circumstances of treachery and corpse at the corpse of the victim. The prosecution maintains that there is abuse of superior strength as can be deduced from the fact that the victim was slender, only 4'11" in height while the accused is about 6 feet tall and 155 lbs that the accused took advantage of this unequal physical condition when he struck the victim with the figurine which made the victim unconscious, after which he shoved and pressed the victim's mouth and nose against the bed mattress. 14 On the other hand, it is the defense counsel's contention that the court a quo erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength because like treachery, nocturnity and evident premeditation, this circumstance has to be deliberately and purposely utilized to assure the accomplishment of the criminal purpose without risk to the offender which might arise from the defense that the victim might offer. The defense counsel further maintains that there is no evidence to support that advantage was taken by the accused of his superior strength as contrary to what the court a quo said in its decision, there was no evidence nor testimony on the part of the medico-legal officer to the effect that when the victim was hit by a figurine, she went into a coma then her head was pushed by a pillow, causing her nose and mouth to be pressured against the bed mattress. In addition to this, the defense counsel further maintains that the instrument used by the accused, which was a brittle porcelain statue of Jesus Christ, could not produce physical injury nor render the victim unconscious as testified to at cross-examination by the medico-legal officer. In People vs. Bustos, 15 this Court held that to be properly appreciated, it must be shown that the accused is physically stronger than the victim or the relative strength of the parties must be proved. In People vs. Casillar, 16this Court said that the essence of this circumstance is that advantage is taken by the offender of this physical strength which is relatively superior to that of the offended party. The fact that the offender is strong does not of itself prove its existence. 17
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Still, in People vs. Cabiling, a guideline to determine whether or not there is abuse of superior strength has been laid down. In that case this Court ruled: To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attached. This circumstance should always be considered whenever there is notorious inequality of forces between aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. To properly appreciate it, not only is it necessary to evaluate the physical conditions of the protagonists or opposing forces and the arms or objects employed by both sides, but it is also necessary to analyze the incidents and episodes constituting the total development of the event. 18 In the light of the above legal precepts and considering the evidence adduced, this Court holds that there was an abuse of superior strength attending the commission of the crime. It is not only the notorious advantage of height that the accused had over his hapless victim, he being 6 feet tall and weighing 155 lbs. while the girl was only 4 ft 11 inches tall, but also fits strength which he wielded in striking her with the figurine on the head and in shoving her head and pressing her mouth and nose against the bed mattress, which pressure must have been very strong and powerful to suffocate her to death and without risk to himself in any manner or mode whatsoever that she may have taken to defend herself or retaliate since she was already struck and helpless on the bed, that convinced us to find and rule that the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The evidence on record, however, is not sufficient to show clearly and prove distinctly that treachery attended the commission of the crime since there was no eyewitness account of the killing. The extra-judicial confession of the accused merely stated, thus: "I thought she was going to do something dangerous to me so I grabbed her, and we started wrestling on the bed. She grabbed me by the throat and I picked up a statue of Jesus Christ that was sitting on the bedside stand and I hit her in the head. She fell flat on her face." Although the figurine was found broken beside her head, the medical report, however, do not show any injury or fracture of the skull and no sign of intracranial hemorrhage. While We reject the presence of treachery, We, however, find and sustain the finding of the lower court that the aggravating circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the corpse of the deceased applies against the accused since it is established that he mocked or outraged at the person or corpse of his victim by having an anal intercourse with her after she was already dead.
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The fact that the muscles of the anus did not close and also the presence of spermatozoa in the anal region as testified to by Dr. Angeles Roxas, the medico-legal officer, and confirmed to be positive in the Laboratory Report, Exhibit "B1 ", clearly established the coitus after death. This act of the accused in having anal intercourse with the woman after killing her is, undoubtedly, an outrage at her corpse. It is true as maintained by the defense that the aggravating circumstance of outraging at the corpse of the victim is not alleged in the information and that the lower court found it had been proved but its contention that the said aggravating circumstance should not have been appreciated against the accused is without merit. And this is so because the rule is that a generic aggravating circumstance not alleged in the information may be proven during the trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the, penalty (People vs. Martinez Godinez, 106 Phil. 597). Aggravating circumstances not alleged in the information but proven during the trial serve only to aid the court in fixing the limits of the penalty but do not change the character of the offense. (People vs. Collado 60 Phil. 610, 614; People vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368; People vs. Vega, 31 Phil. 450; People vs. Domondon, 64 Phil. 729). On the claim of the defense that the accused is entitled to the benefits of Section 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment by P.D. 1179 on August 15, 1977, the records disclose that at the time of the commission of the crime on August 8, 1975, said accused was seventeen (1 7) years, eleven (11) months and four (4) days old, he having been born on September 4, 1957 in Orlando, Florida, U.S.A. The records further disclose that during the consideration of the defense's motion to suppress the extra-judicial confession (Exhibit "H") the accused declared that he was eighteen (18) years old as evidenced by the certification issued by Vice Consul Leovigildo Anolin of the Consul General of the Philippines in New York City dated November 14, 1975 (Exhibit "1"-Motion). According to the trial court, notwithstanding the presentation of Exhibit "1"-Motion, the accused did not make any serious effort to invoke Article 192 of Presidential Decree 603 and further, since the accused was found guilty of a capital offense, the suspension of sentence and the commitment of the accused to the custody of any institution or person recommended by the Department of Social Welfare cannot be carried out. On December 17, 1976, an Urgent Motion for New Trial was filed by the defense on the ground that a serious error of law was committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial right of the accused and newly discovered evidence which would probably change the judgment of the court. The trial court denied the motion for lack of merit as well as the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration and Second Motion for Reconsideration. Thereupon, the records of the case
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were ordered immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to law. At the time of the commission of the offense, trial and rendition of judgment, the applicable law was P.D. 603 otherwise known as Child and Youth Welfare Code. The relevant provisions of the said law to the instant case are Articles 189 and 192 which provide the following: Art. 189. Youthful Offender. Defined A youthful offender is one who is over nine years but under twenty-one years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. A child nine years of age or under at the time of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability and shall be committed to the care of Ws or her father or mother, or nearest relative or family friend in the discretion of the court and subject to its supervision. The same shall be done for a child over nine years and under fifteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, unless he acted with discernment, in which case he shall be proceeded against in accordance -,with Article 192. The provisions of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code shall be deemed modified by the provisions of tills Chapter. Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing and the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court,upon application of the youthful offender, if it finds that the best interest of the public as well as that of the offender will be served thereby, may suspend an further proceedings. The trial court refused to consider and appreciate the minority of the accused because the proof submitted by the defense was not duly authenticated as required by the Rules of Court under Section 25 of Rule 132, said proof being merely a certification issued by Consul Leovigildo Anolin of the Consulate General of the Philippines in New York City, U.S.A. that the attached document is a xerox copy of the original birth certificate of Michael Jerome Butler issued by the Department of Health and Rehabilitation Service, State of Florida, U.S.A. shown by Mr. Butler's mother, Mrs. Ethel Butler. (Exhibit "l ", "1-A") After the lower court had ordered the records of the case forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review on January 25, 1977, as stated earlier accused-appellant filed on August 25,
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1978 a petition for mandamus in G.R. No. L-48786 entitled "Michael J. Butler, minor, assisted by Lt. Commander Charles T. Riedel, U.S. Navy (guardian ad litem) vs. Hon. Regino T. Veridiano, et al." praying that respondent judge be ordered and commanded to set aside the judgment of conviction, to declare the proceedings suspended and order the commitment of the accused pursuant to Article 193, P.D. 603. The petition was denied by Us for lack of merit in Our Resolution of December 13, 1978. Subsequently, however, the required proof was submitted as annexes to the defense' Manifestation and Motion to Admit (Certified Copy of Certificate of Live Birth) filed May 26, 1981 in the instant proceedings (See Records, pp. 137-141). In Our Resolution of June 4, 1981, We admitted the certified copy of the Certificate of Live Birth of accused-appellant to form part of the evidence. We do not agree with the reasoning of the trial court that the accused had not invoked the privilege granted under Article 192 of P.D. 603 before its amendment because the records manifestly show the vigorous plea of the accused for it's application not only in the Motion for New Trial but also in the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused (See pp. 237 248, 261271, Records of Criminal Case No. 2465, People vs. Michael J. Butler, CFI of Zambales, Branch 1, Olongapo City). We hold and rule that the lower court erred in not applying the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603 suspending all further proceedings after the court had found that the accused had committed the acts charged against him, determined the imposable penalty including any civil liability chargeable against him. The trial court should not have pronounced judgment convicting the accused, imposing upon the penalty of death. We likewise hold that the penalty of death was not justified. Since murder was committed by the accused, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The accused is a minor and he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which reduces the penalty one degree lower and that is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. (Article 68, Revised Penal Code) With one aggravating circumstance, that of outraging at the corpse of the victim, the penalty imposable is the maximum period which is reclusion temporal medium or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Imposing the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty is eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
55

We find in the records the Order of the Honorable Regino T. Veridiano II, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, Branch I at Olongapo City, committing the accused in the custody of the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay, Philippines dated December 3, 1976, "(p)ending the finality of judgment rendered in the above-entitled case, pursuant to the provisions of Para. 5, Article 13 of the Revised Base Military Agreement. " (p. 190, original records). After the appeal had been submitted for decision pursuant to Our Resolution of November 20, 1980, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Verified Motion to Dismiss Case Under P.D. 603 praying that an order be issued "l) Dismissing the case against accused-appellant; (2) Ordering the immediate discharge of accused-appellant; (3) Granting accused-appellant such other relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises, " alleging: IV 8) During his entire period of continued imprisonment in the BRIG from August 11, 1975 to the present, accused-appellant has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community. Documentary proofs of these are as follows: (a) Official Report of the BRIG Commander, USN Subic Naval Base, attached hereto as Annex "A" and made an integral part hereof-, (b) Progress Report filed with this Honorable Court on November 6, 1980, by the Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch, found on pp. 113-114, of the Rollo, and attached hereto as Annex "B" and made an integral part hereof Thus: Based on the informations we gathered thru interviews and observations, we would like to recommend to the Hon. Supreme Court, that Michael Butler be given a chance to enjoy his life fully outside the jail, thus promoting his best interest and welfare.' (c) Progress Report with annexes, dated February 18, 1981, filed on March 4,1981, by the Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch, found on pp. 128-131 of the Rollo, a xerox copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "C " and made an integral part hereof Thus: In view of the fact that Mr. Michael Butler is now fully rehabilitated, it is our recommendation that he be given an opportunity to have happily and prove himself outside the Brig.'
56

(d) Diploma awarded by the University of La Verne California, U.S.A., to accusedappellant as evidence of his having completed a course in Behavioral Science, on January 24, 1981, while he was a prisoner in the BRIG. A xerox copy of said Diploma and that of the accompanying group photograph showing a picture of accused-appellant taken on the occasion of the commencement exercises, are hereto attached as Annexes "D" and "D-1 ", respectively, and made integral parts hereof. The originals are found on p. 133 of the Rollo. (The original of his transcript of record is also hereto attached as Annex "E "). v (9) Under the foregoing facts and circumstances, and while it is now a legal and physical impossibility to place accused-appellant under the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development which was what should have been done in the beginning under P.D. 603, it is submitted that accused-appellant's unfortunate situation could still be remedied and salvaged . . . as justice now demands . . . and that is, by treating accused-appellant's imprisonment in the BRIG as equivalent to what should have been his full period of commitment under the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development. After all, and as said Ministry has reported, it has been regularly visiting accused- appellant at his cell in the BRIG and, is therefore, in a position to attest to the exceptional behavior of accused-appellant. Counsel for the People opposes the Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: 1 That the dismiss for lack of merit by this Court of the petition for mandamus earlier filed and docketed as G.R.L-48788 barred the accused from raising or litigating anew the issue of his minority; 2-That an offender is not entitled to the benefit of suspension of sentence if at the time of trial he could no longer qualify as a minor offender for purposes of the rule on suspension of sentence because of his age, citing the cases of People vs. Capistrano, 92 Phil. 127 and People vs. Estefa, 86 Phil. 104; and 3-That under Section 192, P.D. 603, as amended, accused-appellant is not entitled to the benefit of suspension because he was convicted of an offense punishable by death, considering that the retroactive application to him of Articles 189 and 192, P.D. 603 as amended by P.D. 1179 may not be assailed because said articles are procedural in nature and there is no vested right in rules of procedure. We find no merit' to the opposition of the People. Our dismissal of the mandamus petition in G.R. L-48788 which was for lack of merit due to the insufficient proof of minority of the accused is no
57

bar to raising the same issue in the instant automatic review of the case after We had admitted the proper authentication of the accused's birth certificate "to form part of the evidence." (See Resolution of June 4, 1981, rollo). The second ground is likewise without merit for the accused was below 21 years at the time of his trial and even at the time judgment was promulgated to him on December 3, 1976 (he was then 19 years, 3 months and 3 days old). Neither does the third ground hold water because P.D. 603 was amended on May 15, 1977, which was after the trial and conviction already of the accused. The amendment passed during the pendency of the appeal and it cannot adversely affect the right, privilege or benefit accorded to the minor for suspension of the sentence under the original provision of Article 192 of P.D. 603, which reads as follows: Art. 192. Suspension of Sentence and Commitment of Youthful Offender. If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, the court should find that the youthful offender has committed the acts charged against him the court shall determine the imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare, or to any training institution operated by the government, or duly licensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he shall have reached twenty-one years of age or, for a shorter period as the court may deem proper, after considering the reports and recommendations of the Department of Social Welfare or the agency or responsible individual under whose care he has been committed. The youthful offender shall be subject to visitation and supervision by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare or any duly licensed agency or such other officer as the Court may designate subject to such conditions as it may prescribe. P.D. 1179, Section 2 and made effective August 15, 1977 amended Articles 192 and 193 of P.D. 603 by adding as its penultimate paragraph the following: The benefits of this article shall not apply to a youthful offender who has once enjoyed suspension of sentence under its provisions or to one who is convicted of an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment. (emphasis supplied) The lower court having erred in not suspending the sentence of conviction against the accusedappellant who is esntitled thereto under the original provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603, We
58

agree with the defense plea that the "accused-appellant's imprisonment in the BRIG (be treated) as equivalent to what should have been his full period of commitment under the care and custody of the Ministry of Social Services and Development. After all, and as said Ministry has reported, it has been regularly visiting accused-appellant at his cell in the BRIG and is, therefore, in a position to attest to the exceptional behavior of accused-appellant." We have examined carefully the documentary proofs attached to the appellant's Motion to Dismiss showing that from August 11, 1975 to the present, accused-appellant has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community, and these are (a) Official Report of the BRIG Commander, USN Subic Naval Base; (b) Progress Report filed with this Court on November 6, 1980 by the Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch; and (c) Progress Report with annexes dated February 18, 1981 filed on March 4, 1981 by the Ministry of Social Services and Development; and (d) Diploma awarded by the University of La Verne California, U.S.A. showing completion of a course in Behavioral Science, on January 24, 1981, while he was a prisoner in the BRIG. The Final Report prepared and submitted by the Supervising Social Worker of the Ministry of Social Services and Development Dated September 14, 1981 was subsequently filed with Us and it states as follows: FINAL REPORT In compliance with the request of the Legal Office, U.S. Naval Base, the Ministry of Social Services and Development, Olongapo City Branch Office respectfully submits this final report on the progress of the behavior of the above-mentioned youth. Michael Jerome Butler has been detained at the Naval Station Brig of the U.S. Naval Base for a period of six years now. Since his detention, he has been visited and was given counselling by the Social Worker. While in confinement, he was assigned to the Brig's Library, Coffee Mess and at present at the Administrative Office. At the Administrative Office, he is responsible in keeping the records on file, typing various forms and correspondence and forms reproduction. The present Brig Officer said that Prisoner Butler works well requiring limited supervision as he sets and pursues goals in an organized manner. He can be relief upon to complete an assigned task in a timely manner. He also performs all janitorial work required for the above-mentioned spaces. He gets along very well with the Brig's Staff and other confines and he goes out of his way to help other confines adjust to confinement and to rehabilitate themselves.
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He made use of his time in the Brig constructively and on January 29, 1981, he graduated at the LA Verne Co with the degree m Behavioral Science. This was made possible thru his self-determination, diligence, courage and interest. He also takes an active part in promoting health and physical fitness to all cofinees as well as staff. Confines Butler is not only involved in assisting and helping his co- confines but also gives financial support to a disabled person in the person of Benjamin dela Cruz and to his (Butler) mother who is in United States. Mr. Butler has been incharge of the complete operation of the Brig's Library and he kept it well stocked and completely clean and neat. He also taken the duties of a Coffee Mess and had accomplished the job expertly. He was given a task within the compound that only trusted confinee would be given and had carried them with zest. His personal appearance and uniforms are always in accord with the Navy standard. With the above findings and Mr. Butler's desire to start life anew, this Final Report is submitted. / Prepared and Submitted by: (SGD.) Supervising 14 Sept. 1981 Noted by: (SGD.) JUANITA B. LAFORTEZA City Social Welfare Officer From these reports, We are fully satisfied that the accused. appellant has behaved properly and has shown his capability to be a useful member of the community. It is of no moment that the accused had not been specifically committed by the court to the custody or care of the Department of Social Welfare then, now the Ministry of Social Services and Development, or to any training institution operated by the government or duly-licensed agencies as directed under Article 192 of P.D. 603. At any rate, the Commander of the U.S. Naval Base in Subic Bay to whom the accused was committed in the Order of December 3, 1976 pending the finality of judgment rendered in the case pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 5, Article 13 of the Revised Base Military Agreement, may be considered a responsible person to whom the accused may be committed for custody or care under the said Article 192 of P.D. 603. What is important is the result of such custody and care showing his conduct as well as the intellectual,
60

ELOISA Social

A.

GARCIA Worker

physical, moral, social and emotional progress made by the accused as shown in the favorable recommendation of the Supervising Social Worker of the Ministry of Social Services and Development who had visited him regularly and given counselling. We hereby approve the recommendation of the Ministry that "Michael Butler be given a chance to enjoy his life fully outside the jail, thus promoting Ms best interest and welfare" (Progress Report dated October 27, 1980); "that Mr. Michael Butler is now fully rehabilitated, it is our recommendation that he be given an opportunity to live happily and prove himself outside the Brig" (Progress Reported dated February 18, 1981); "with the above findings and Mr. Butler's desire to start life anew, this Final Report is submitted." (Final Report dated September 14, 1981). The dismissal of the case against the accussed Michael Butler is, therefore, meritorious and justifiable. We hereby order his final discharge therefrom. His final release, however, shall not obliterate his civil liability for damages in the amount of P24.000.00 to the heirs of the victim which We hereby affirm. Such release shall be without prejudice to the right for a writ of execution for the recovery of civil damages. (Article 198, P.D. 603). WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the case against the accused-appellant Michael J. Butler is hereby DISMISSED and We hereby order his final discharge from commitment and custody. The civil liability imposed upon him by the lower court shall remain.

20. People v. Bayotas (Civil Liability Arising from Crime, Transmissibility to heirs of victim) Facts: Bayotas was convicted for murder. During his appeal, he died. SC dismissed the criminal case but the Solicitor General said that the death of the accused does not extinguish the civil liability. Question: Does death of Bayotas, which happened during a pending appeal of his conviction extinguish the civil liability? Answer: The death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, rape. Ratio: As a general rule, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability and civil liability solely based on the criminal act. However, if the civil liability is predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict, the civil liability survives the death of

61

the accused, and therefor transmissible to the heirs of the accused. (Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates the other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) Quasi-delicts.) Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by f filing a separate civil action and subject to Sec.1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation. Answer 2:

21. Complex Crimes Art 48 - When a single act constitutes 2 or more a. grave or less grave felonies; OR b. offense is necessary means for committing the other Facts: Bayotas was convicted for murder. During his appeal, he died. SC dismissed the The penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Complex Crimes Art 48 - When a single act constitutes 2 or more criminal case but the Solicitor General said that the death of the accused does not extinguish the Complex Crimesmore crimes aresingle act constitutes 2 or more eyes of the law and in the Although 2 or Art 48 - When a being committed here, in the a. grave or less grave felonies; OR b. offense is necessary means for committing the other civil liability. a. grave offender, it is only a single act since is necessary means for committing the other conscience ofor less grave felonies; OR b. offense it has one intent. Thus, only one penalty. The penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Question: Does death of Bayotas, which happened during a pending appeal of his conviction The penalty for the most Two kinds of complex crime: serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Although 2 or more crimes are being committed here, in the eyes of the law and in the extinguish the civil liability? Although 2 or more crimes are being committed here, in the eyes of the law and in the 1. conscience of offender, it is only a single act since it has one intent. Thus, only one penalty. Answer: The death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability conscience of offender, it is a single act since it has b) Compound Crime Requisites: a) onlya single act is performed one intent. Thus, only one penalty. more single act produces: 2 or Two kinds of complex crime: based solely on the act complained of, rape. Two kinds of complex crime: grave felonies; 1 or more grave or less grave felonies; 2 or more 1. Ratio: As a general rule, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes 1. less grave felonies * two or more grave or less grave = either both grave or less grave or one of Compound Crime Requisites: a) a single act is performed b) single act produces: 2 or his criminal liability and civil liability solely based on the criminal act. However, if the civil liability Compound Crime Requisites: a) a single act is performed b) single act produces: 2 or them a grave and the other less grave* more grave felonies; 1 or more grave or less grave felonies; 2 or more is predicated on a source of obligation other than the delict, the civil liability survives the death of more Examples: grave felonies; 1act of throwing a hand grenade = murder and multiple attempted murders The single or more grave or less grave felonies; 2 or more less grave felonies * two or more grave or less grave = either both grave or less grave or one the accused, and therefor transmissible to the heirs of the accused. (Article 1157 of the Civil less gravetime bomb two plane = multipleor less grave = either both grave or less Single or one grave act of Placing a felonies * in a or more grave murder and destruction of property of them a grave and the other less grave* Code enumerates the other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a firingof shot, causing and death of 2less grave* the same bullet Act of raping a girl causing her a them a grave the the other persons with Examples: The single act of throwing a hand grenade = murder and multiple attempted result of the same act or omission: a) Law b) Contracts c) Quasi-contracts d) Quasi-delicts.) Examples: The single of of throwing a hand physical physical injuries = complex crimeact rape with less seriousgrenade = murder and multiple attempted murders Placing a time bomb in a plane = multiple murder and destruction of property Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued but only by f murders Placing a time bomb in a plane = multiple murder and sentence of property injuries Accused stabbed judge at the back right after the latter read thedestructionof conviction = Single act of firing a shot, causing the death of 2 persons with the same bullet Act of filing a separate civil action and subject to Sec.1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Single act of firing a shot, causing the death of 2 persons with the same bullet Act of complex raping a girl causing her physical injuries = complex crime of rape with less serious physical procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the raping a girl causing her physical injuries = complex crime rape with less crime of direct assault with serious physical injuries When in of obedience toserious physical men an order, injuries Accused stabbed judge at the back right after the latter read the sentence of executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation. injuries shot several people, without the back right after the latter read the sentence of simultaneously Accused stabbed judge at evidence how many conviction = complex eachconviction = complex one single offense; one criminal impulse (People v Lawas) applicable to of them killed = only crime of direct assault with serious physical injuries When in obedience to an order, men Answer 2: crime negligence crimes thruof direct assault with serious physical injuries When in obedience to an order, men simultaneously shot several people, without evidence how many simultaneously shot several people, without evidence how many each of them killed = only one single offense; one criminal impulse (People v Lawas)62 each of them killed = only one single offense; one criminal impulse (People v Lawas) applicable to crimes thru negligence applicable to crimes thru negligence EXCEPTION:

EXCEPTION: Rape with homicide is a special complex crime (penalized under Art 266-B by death) Arson with homicide (Art 320 provides penalty for this) Theft of firearm and illegal possession of same = they are 2 distinct crimes. There must not only intention to own but also intent to use. NO single act when when acts are wholly different, being directed against two persons. Like firing shots in succession killing one person and wounding another; two persons killed one after the other by different acts. Several light felonies resulting from one single act is not complex. 2. a) Should be treated separately or be absorbed by grave felonies. Complex crime proper Requisites: At least 2 offenses b) 1 or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other

(necessary NOT EQUAL to indispensable; if it were, the other offense will be an ingredient rather than being another offense) c) Examples: both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute falsification of public documents to commit malversation when the offender had to

falsify documents to get the funds to misappropriate, the falsification was necessary to commit malversation. simple seduction by means or usurpation of official functions. (US v Hernandez. Hernandez wanted to seduce a girl into marrying him so had a plan with Bautista wherein Bautista will pretend to be a protestant minister to solemnize their marriage) rapeEXEMPTIONS: separate acts of rape. People v Bohos, girl abducted by 4 men, each raping her in the truck and again when brought to a house. The reason is that when the first act of rape was committed in the truck, the crime of forcible abduction was already consummated so that each of succeeding rapes committed in the house cannot legally be considered as still connected with abduction) When trespass to dwelling is a direct means to commit a grave offense like rape, homicide, or trespass will be considered as an aggravating circumstance When offense is committed to Accused set fire to the house after homicide. Neither arson nor homicide were necessary to murder. conceal the other commit the other
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abduction

is

necessary

for

committing

Subsequent acts of intercourse after forcible abduction with rape are

When the offender already had the funds he misappropriated, falsification is a separate offense. NO COMPLEX CRIME WHERE ONE OF THE OFFENSE IS PENALIZED BY A SPECIAL LAW. Illegal possession of firearm is not a necessary means to commit homicide No complex crime

of rebellion with murder, arson, robbery or other common crimes (ingredients of the crime of rebellion) RULES: 1. Art 48 is intended to favor the culprit 2. The penalty for the most serious crime is applied in its maximum period. 3. imprisonment and fine, only imprisonment should be imposed. 4. Only applies to cases where the Code does not provide a definite specific penalty for a complex crime. (An act cannot come under Art 48 by reason that it is already covered by another article) 5. One information should be filed when a complex crime is committed. Special Complex Crimes those which are treated as single indivisible offenses although comprising more than one specific crime and with specific penalty. Examples: Rape with homicide, kidnapping with homicide, kidnapping with rape, robbery with homicide, robbery with rape, robbery with arson, arson with homicide Plurality of crimes consists in the successive execution by the same individual of different criminal acts upon any of which no conviction has yet been declared. Two kinds: 1. 2. person committing multiple crimes is punished with 1 penalty in the following crimes when offender commits any of the complex crimes when the law specifically fixes a single penalty for 2 or more offenses committed. Robbert with homicide kidnapping with serious physical injuries When offender commits continued crimes Formal or ideal only one criminal liability Formal or ideal divided into 3 groups: When 2 felonies constituting a complex crime are punishable by

Real or materiality there are different crimes in law as well as in the conscience of the offender, the offender shall be punished for each and every offense that he committed. Example: A stabbed B then stabbed C. There are two crimes committed. Plurality of crimes as distinguished from recidivism in recidivism, there must be conviction by final judgement of the first or prior offense. In plurality of crimes, no need for conviction
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Continued Crime resolution single impulse

single crime consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal

continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a NOT A COMPLEX CRIME offender in

that may be perpetrated during a long period of time. not necessary for committing the other.

continued crime does not perform a single act but a series of acts and one offense is

Question 21: (Last day lecture)

First Part of Last Day Lecture: Art 48 Complex Crimes <can verify stuff from detailed book notes and lecture notes below, 2 pages lang naman but quite comprehensive) J Possible Questions: 1) Compound crime how to treat light felonies Light felonies produced should be treated and punished as separate offenses or may be absorbed by the grave felony (i.e. if crime committed by force or violence, slight physical injuries is absorbed) 2) Exceptions to Complex crimes (those which the law provides special penalties for, he might give an example from a case or something then ask us if it is treated and penalized as a complex crime under Art 48) - Enumerated below under exceptions

3) If Complex Crimes applies to crimes committed by culpa YES, yes it does. By definition of felony (either by dolo or culpa) 4) Difference of Complex Crime from Continuous Crimes Primary reason: complex crime is a single act while continuous crimes are a series of acts (multiple) Book notes:

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RPC Art 48: Complex crimes Penalty for complex crimes: When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other , the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Art 48 is actually intended to favour the culprit Penalty: penalty for the most serious crime, to be applied in its maximum period - When punishable by imprisonment and fine (2 different crimes), only the penalty of imprisonment should be imposed Although 2 or more crimes are committed, in the eyes of the law there is only ONE crime and therefore ONE penalty - - - - - - It is the same criminal intent that permeates Applies to crimes through negligence (can be by means of dolo or culpa) Must have a single purpose Only one information to be filed When complex crime is charged and one offense is not proven, the accused can be convicted of the other Does not apply when law provides one single penalty for special complex crime (i.e. kidnapping with murder or homicide) 2 Types of Complex Crimes: 1) Compound Crime - When a single act constitutes 2 or more grave or less grave felonies o Only ONE act is done (i.e. throwing grenade leading to multiple murders) o Not single act when acts are wholly different (i.e. aiming gun two different times to kill 2 different people separate crimes and will be liable for each separately) o Light felonies produced should be treated and punished as separate offenses or may be absorbed by the grave felony (i.e. if crime committed by force or violence, slight physical injuries is absorbed)

66

o 2 or more grave or less grave felonies resulting from a single act which excludes crimes punishable by special laws (i.e. illegal possession of firearms) NO COMPLEX CRIME when one of the offenses is penalized by a special law Exceptions: (crimes will be treated separate) Rape (whether attempted or consummated) with homicide special complex crime NOT covered by Art 48 (Art 266 B) shall apply 2 crimes will be considered and punished separately No complex crime of arson with homicide (he burned house and it crumbled killing the victim) Theft of firearm and illegal possession of same firearm (must be coupled with intent to use)

When in obedience to an order, several accused simultaneously shot many persons (without evidence how many each killed) is only a single offense - If acts resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense o If no evidence that 2 people were killed by more than the same bullet, treated as complex crime of double murder 2) Complex Crime Proper - When an offense is a necessary means for committing the other o This type of complex crime does not exist when the 2 crimes are punished under different statutes Requisites: - - - At least 2 offenses are committed One or some of the offenses must be necessary to commit the other (necessary does not mean indispensable) Both or all the offenses must be punished under the same statute

Exceptions: (no complex crime) When trespass to dwelling is a direct means to commit a grave offense it will be considered an aggravating circumstance of unlawful entry or breaking part of dwelling Offense is committed to conceal the other (separate) When offender had in his possession the funds which he misappropriated, the falsification of public document involving said funds is a separate offense
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Illegal possession of firearm is not a necessary means to commit homicide (also, special law) and sometimes just appreciated as an aggravating circumstance or absorbed in rebellion When 2 or more acts are committed but not by a single act or one is not necessary means for committing the other Rebellion absorbs. Murder, arson, and robbery are mere ingredients of rebellion.

When 2 crimes produces by a single act are respectively within the exclusive jurisdiction of 2 courts of different jurisdiction, the court of higher jurisdiction shall try the complex crime

Plurality of crimes successive execution by the same individual of different criminal acts upon any of which no conviction has yet been declared 1) Formal/ideal plurality o When offender commits any of the complex crimes in Art 48 o When law specifically provides a single penalty for 2 or more offenses committed o When the offender commits continued crimes In continued crime, different acts constitute only one crime because all are performed from one criminal impulse 2) Real/material plurality o There are different crimes in law as well as in the conscience of the offender and thus offender shall be punished for each and every offense he committed o Each act is generated by a criminal impulse Continued Crime single crime, consisting of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution (by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. - - - Although there is a series of acts, only one crime is committed therefore only one penalty May be perpetuated during a long period of time Different from a transitory crime

Exception: When two acts are deemed distinct from one another although proceeding from the same criminal impulse - Not Continuous crime
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i.e. using defamatory words then subsequently beating him up cannot be continuous because acts are distinct from each other

A continued crime is NOT a complex crime - - Because does not perform a single act, but a series of acts No law specifically penalizing a continuous crime Penalty is thus not to be imposed in the maximum period.

Lecture Notes: - - Assigns specific penalty for a crime when committed in complex form Calling for imposition of max period for most severe penalty of component crimes and apply it in max period (i.e. homicide + murder = death penalty) 2 Species/Form of complex crimes: 1) Compound crime single act results to 2 or more grave or less grave felonies (light felonies not included, but subject to separate prosecutions and penalties does not disappear) Exception to rule that light felony is a component of a complex crime if law itself provides penalties (then it continues to be a legal entity subject to prosecution) Art 365 Special complex crime and law dictates components Complex compound crime 2) One offense becomes a necessary means to commit another crime (law requires necessity, NOT indispensability) - - Complex crime proper in strict sense of term One will not be complete without the other (i.e. abduction with rape)

No complex crime when offense was found not to be necessary means to commit the crime
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When crime committed to conceal another, no complex crime Sometimes instead of component crime, it is absorbed

A single act leading to multiple crimes

1+1=2 1 + 1 = 1 (max) 1+1=1 1+1=1

Normal: separate criminal liability for separate crimes Complex crime single act, provided that 1 is to the max (Art 48 compound) Continuing/Continuous Single criminal impulse Because law says so (i.e. robbery w/ homicide)

Rebellion any crime will be absorbed if you prove that you were politically motivated Rebellion is not equal to sedition (does not have power to absorb other crimes) Art 70: Expected service of sentence

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