ADMIN LOW reviewer I. Intro a. Concept and Scope b. Distinctions and Classifications II.

Nature and Organization of Administrative Agencies a. Status and Characteristics i. Crisostomo vs CA (258 SCRA 134) PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the PCC into what is now PUP. What took place was a change in the academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence, the change in its name, the expansion of its curriculum offerings and changes in its structure and organization. As a general rule, when the purpose of the lawmaking authority is to abolish the office and create a new one, he says so. In the instant case, PD 1314 merely states that PCC is converted into the PUP. In addition, the law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being transferred to the PUP but only that they stand transferred to it. Stand transferred simply means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution. ***Q: Who has the power to reorganize? A: It depends. In order to determine who has the power to reorganize, it is essential to characterize whether the body to be reorganized is a department or an instrumentality of government. Under EO 292, the President is given the power of control over all departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch. Since the power of control includes the power to reorganize, then the power to reorganize a department, a bureau or an office can be said to be lodged in the President. On the other hand, an instrumentality is, as a general rule, created by statute or made pursuant to a law. So unless the law creating such instrumentality delegates the authority to reorganize to a separate body, the power to reorganize such is with Congress. ***Q: When is reorganization of administrative agencies valid? A: First, determine whether the agency is a department or an instrumentality in order to determine who has the authority to reorganize. Then, determine whether the reorganization is done in good faith, not in good faith, or in bad faith. Reorganization is in good faith if done for the purpose of economy and efficiency. ***Q: May a public officer validly claim violation of security of tenure as a result of abolition of office? A: It depends on the validity of the abolition. Was the abolition done by someone who has authority? To determine who has authority to abolish, bear in mind the three modes of creating an office: (1) Constitution; (2) Statute; and (3) authority by law. An office created by the Constitution may only be abolished by Constitutional amendment or revision, unless the Constitution itself provides for another mode of abolition. Likewise, an office created by Statute, may, as a general rule, be only abolished by Congress, unless this power is delegated. And the President may abolish an office if such office is under his power of control and Congress has not provided for a different mode of abolition. So if the abolition is made by someone with authority, then was it done in good faith? Abolition is in good faith if the purpose is for economy and efficiency, or if it not done in bad faith, bearing in mind the circumstances evidencing bad faith. If done in good faith, then the abolition is valid. When there is valid abolition, there can be no separation or removal from office and the affected public officer cannot

claim violation of security of tenure for there can be no tenure to a non-existent office. ***Q: May an official of an abolished office claim vested right to that office? A: There is no such thing as a vested right to an office. The only exceptions are those offices established by the Constitution, such as the Constitutional Commissions, etc. ***Q: In case of abolition and a new office is thereby created, may the incumbent of the abolished office claim preference to that new office? A: The concept of preference is illustrated in the next-in-rank rule. Under that rule, anyone who is employed on a permanent basis in a position that has been previously determined to be next-in-rank to the vacated office and who is qualified is given preference to said office. This presupposes that there is an old office which is vacated. Thus, the rule does not apply to a newly created office, which necessarily entails new positions. Besides, preference only means that the old employee should be considered first but it does not automatically follow that they should then be automatically reappointed. ii. Larin vs. Executive Secretary 280 SCRA 713 SC held that removal as a result of reorganization was done in bad faith. Does the President have the power to dismiss him? Larin is a presidential appointee. As such, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President for the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint. However, Larin is a career service officer, therefore, he enjoys security of tenure. Under the Civil Service Decree, career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process. Was the removal for a legal cause under a valid proceeding? SC held that the removal complied with the requirements for procedural due process but that the dismissal was not for a valid cause. The basis used in Larins removal is the criminal conviction against him, but this conviction was later set aside by the Supreme Court upon appeal. Where the very basis of the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and clear findings that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in sch a case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit. Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR? Yes, under sec. 48 and 62 of RA 7645, sec. 20, Bk. III of EO 292 (Residual Powers), and PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. But while the Presidents power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. When is there reorganization made in good faith? The general rule is that a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no

dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. What are the marks of bad faith in removal as a result of reorganization? Sec. 2, RA 6656 enumerates the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a result of reorganization: (1) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (2) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (3) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (4) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; (5) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in sec. 3 hereof. iii. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force vs CA 171 SCRA 318 FACTS: The PASTF was created by virtue of PD 1936 to serve as the President''s arm called upon to combat the vice of dollar salting or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange. ISSUE: W/N the PASTF is "such other officer as may be authorized by law" to issue warrants under the 1973 Constitition. RULING: NO. The Court, in reviewing the powers of the PASTF under its enabling law, sees nothing that will reveal a legislative intendement to confer upon the body, quasi-judicial responsiibilities relative to offenses punishable by PD 1883. Its undertaking is simply to determine w/n probable cause exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action of appropriate authorities. The Court agrees that PASTF exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached judge to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see to it that justice if done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the accused," he stands invariably, as the accused''s adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue warrrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. This makes to our mind and to that extent, PD 1636 as amended by PD 2002, unconstitutional. The "responsible officer" referred to under the Cosntitution is one not only possessing the necessary skills and competence but more significantly, the neutrality and independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. iv. Eugenio vs. CSC, et al 243 SCRA 197 FACTS: Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she got the rank, the CSC passed Resolution No. 93-459, reorganizing itself and changing the CES Board (CESB) to Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission (OCES). ISSUE: W/N CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing the CESB

and transferring its budget to OCES HELD: CESB was created by PD 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the power to reorganize under Sec. 17, Chap. 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V. of the Administrative Code of 1987, this must be read with sec. 16, which enumerates the offices under the control of the CSC. CESB is not one of such offices. CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to CSC. This essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain policy and program coordination. b. Administrative Organization III. Powers and Functions of Administrative Agencies a. In General i. RCPI vs NTC 215 SCRA 455 FACTS: Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegramsthrough petitioner RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the morning of 17 March 1989 to hissister and brother-inlaw in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, with thefollowing identical texts: MANONG POLING DIED INTERMENT TUESDAY. Both telegrams did not reachtheir destinations on the expected dates. Thus, private respondent filed a letter-complaint against theRCPI with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service, with a request for theimposition of the appropriate punitive sanction against the company.NTC rendered a decision in favor of private respondent. It found RCPI administratively liable for deficienta n d i n a d e q u a t e s e r v i c e d e f i n e d u n d e r S e c t i o n 1 9 ( a ) o f C . A . 1 4 6 a n d i m p o s e d t h e p e n a l t y o f F I N E payable within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof in the aggregate amount of PHP 1,000.00. RCPI thenfiled a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: whether or not the National Telecommunications Communications has jurisdiction toa d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y i m p o s e f i n e s o n a t e l e g r a p h c o m p a n y w h i c h f a i l s t o r e n d e r a d e q u a t e s e r v i c e t o a consumer. HELD: Petitioner RCPI invoked, C.A. 146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public ServiceCommission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing of rates. RCPI submits that its position is supported bytwo decided cases. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, claimed that that the citedcases are no longer applicable. It averred that the power and authority of the NTC to impose fines isincidental to its power to regulate public service utilities and to supervise telecommunications facilities,which are now clearly defined in Section 15, Executive Order No. 546. NTC also takes the view that itspower of supervision was broadened by E. O. No. 546, and that this development superseded the rulingin RCPI vs. Francisco Santiago and companion cases.The Court held however that E. O.546 is couched in general terms. The NTC stepped "into the shoes" of the Board of Communications which exercised powers pursuant to the Public Service Act. The power toimpose fines should therefore be read in the light of the Francisco Santiagocase because subsequentlegislation did not grant additional powers to the Board of Communications. The Board in other words, didnot possess the power to impose administrative fines on public services rendering

deficient service tocustomers,ergoits successor cannot arrogate unto itself such power, in the absence of legislation.No substantial change has been brought about by Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power toimpose administrative fines on public service utilities, including telegraphic agencies, which have failed torender adequate service to consumers. Neither has it expanded the coverage of the supervisory andregulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine inadministrative law that: Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule thatjurisdiction and powers of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission, are limited to thoseexpressly granted or necessarily implied from those granted in the legislation creating such body; and anyorder without or beyond such jurisdiction is void and ineffective . . .WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. ii. Solid Homes Inc. vs Payawal 177 SCRA 72 FACTS: Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is suing Solid Homes for failure to deliver the certificate of title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes contended that jurisdiction is with the National Housing Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD 1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA. ISSUE: W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the competence to award damages HELD: SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction. In case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this case is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special law. On the competence of the Board to award damages, we find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice. This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably called the fourth department of the government. Statues conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. iii. Buenaseda vs. Flavier 226 SCRA 645 Whether or not the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees. Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 Preventive Suspension The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charges against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the

charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him. RATIO DECIDENDI The court held that Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 grants the Ombudsman power to preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, and that the status in question is procedural. In contrast to penal statutes, which are strictly construed, procedural statutes are liberally construed. As to the preventive suspension, it is imposed as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges. Under the Constitution, the ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. And in order to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct an investigation where the need to suspend the respondents may arise to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient manner. The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers, as he may need to perform efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. As such, said statute, particularly its provisions, should be given such interpretation that will effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided. A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created. Further, as it can be inferred from the Ombudsman Law, the Congress intended to empower the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his office, irrespective of the whether they are employed in his office or in other offices of the government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent is deemed to be in his authority and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension. iv. Philippines Today Inc. vs NLRC 267 SCRA 202 May a "Memorandum for File" which did not mention the words "resign" and/or "resignation" nonetheless juridically constitute voluntary resignation? In answering this question, the Court took into account not merely the literal meaning of the words and phrases used but, more importantly, the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing as well as antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent actions, which were inconsistent with the desire for continued employment of the writer, an intelligent executive occupying a position of trust in the Philippine Star and gifted with an unusual writing ability. RATIO DECIDENDI After a thorough scrutiny of the Memorandum for File of Respondent Alegre and a careful deliberation on the peculiar circumstances attendant to its writing and the antecedent, contemporaneous and subsequent actions of private respondent, we hold that said memorandum juridically constituted a letter of resignation. We see merit in the findings and conclusions drawn by the labor arbiter. They are more in accord with prudence, common sense and sound judgment. The labor arbiter correctly deduced from Alegre's memorandum and attendant actuations that he resigned. In contrast, the NLRC was too strict in its interpretation of what constitutes "resignation." It adhered literally to the dictionary meaning of the word without relating it to the peculiarity of the factual circumstances surrounding the case. Courts and quasi-judicial bodies, in the exercise of their functions and in

making decisions, must not be too dogmatic as to restrict themselves to literal interpretations of words, phrases and sentences. A complete and wholistic view must be taken in order to render a just and equitable judgment. b. Investigatory Powers i. Pantranco South Express Inc. vs. Board of Transportation 191 SCRA 581 ii. Evangelista vs. Jarencio 68 SCRA 99 c. Rule-Making Powers i. Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia Jr. 239 SCRA 386 FACTS: Then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar M. Orbos, issuedMemorandum Circular No. 90-395 to then LTFRBChairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowingprovincial bus operators to charge passengersrates within a range of 15% above and 15% belowthe LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.- Finding the implementation of the fare rangescheme "not legally feasible," Remedios A.S.Fernando submitted memorandum to Oscar M.Orbos suggesting that the implementation of theproposed fare range scheme be further studiedand evaluated. - Respondent Provincial Bus Operators Associationof the Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an applicationfor fare rate increase. An across-the-boardincrease of P0.085 per kilometer for all types ofprovincial buses with a minimum-maximum farerange of 15% over and below the proposed basicper kilometer fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary,first class and premium class buses and P0.50minimum per kilometer fare for aircon buses, wassought. - PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to anacross-the-board increase of 0.065 centavos perkilometer for ordinary buses. The decrease wasdue to the drop in the expected price of diesel. - The application was opposed by the PhilippineConsumers Foundation, Inc. and Perla C. Bautistaalleging that the proposed rates were exorbitantand unreasonable and that the applicationcontained no allegation on the rate of return of theproposed increase in rates. - LTFRB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase - Then Secretary of DOTC issued DepartmentOrder No. 92-587 defining the policy framework onthe regulation of transport services. - Respondent Secretary of the DOTC Jesus B.Garcia, Jr. issued a memorandum to the ActingChairman of the LTFRB suggesting swift action onthe adoption of rules and procedures to implementabove-quoted Department Order No. 92-587 thatlaid down deregulation and other liberalizationpolicies for the transport sector. - LTFRB issued Memorandum Circular No. 92-009promulgating guidelines for implementation ofDOTC Department Order No. 92-587. - PBOAP, availing itself of the deregulation policyof the DOTC allowing provincial bus operators tocollect plus 20% and minus 25% of the prescribedfare without first having filed a petition for thepurpose and without the benefit of a publichearing, announced a fare increase of twenty(20%) percent of the existing fares. - KMU filed a petition with LTFRB opposing theupward adjustment of bus fares. LTFRB issued oneof the assailed orders dismissing the petition forlack of merit. ISSUE WON KMU has the standing to sue. HELD YES. The requirement of locus standi inheres from the definition of judicial power.

- Lamb v. Phipps: judicial power is the power tohear and decide causes pending between partieswho have the right to sue in the courts of law andequity. Corollary to this provision is the principle oflocus standi of a party litigant. One who is directlyaffected by and whose interest is immediate andsubstantial in the controversy has the standing tosue. The rule therefore requires that a party mustshow a personal stake in the outcome of the caseor an injury to himself that can be redressed by afavorable decision so as to warrant an invocationof the court's jurisdiction and to justify theexercise of the court's remedial powers in hisbehalf. -Petition er, whose members had suffered andcontinue to suffer grave and irreparable injury anddamage from the implementation of thequestioned memoranda, circulars and/or orders, has shown that it has a clear legal right that was violated and continues to be violated with theenforcement of the challenged memoranda, circulars and/or orders. - KMU members, who avail of the use of buses,trains and jeepneys everyday, are directly affected by the burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in passenger fares. They are part of the millions ofcommuters who comprise the riding public.Certainly, their rights must be protected, notneglected nor ignored. - Assuming arguendo that petitioner is notpossessed of the standing to sue, this court isready to brush aside this barren proceduralinfirmity and recognize the legal standing of thepetitioner in view of thetranscendentalimportance of the issues raised . And this act ofliberality is not without judicial precedent. As early as the Emergency Powers Cases, this Court had exercised itsdiscretion and waived the requirement of properparty.- Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr.: A party's standingbefore this Court is a procedural technicality whichit may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside inview of the importance of the issues raised. In thelandmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Courtbrushed aside this technicality because 'thetranscendental importance to the public of thesecases demands that they be settled promptly anddefinitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalitiesof procedure. Insofar as taxpayers' suits areconcerned, this Court had declared that it is notdevoid of discretion as to whether or not it shouldbe entertained, or that it 'enjoys an opendiscretion to entertain the same or not. - In line with the liberal policy of this Court on locusstandi, ordinary taxpayers, members of Congress,and even association of planters, and non-profitcivic organizations were allowed to initiate andprosecute actions before this court to question theconstitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions,rulings, or orders of various government agenciesor instrumentalities. Disposition Petition was GRANTED. ii. Bocobo vs. Commission on Elections 191 SCRA 576 Finally, what spells finis to any further pretensions of Batul that the COMELEC denied him due process is his mistaken notion that evidence aliunde is necessary to prove substituted or fake ballots. We have repeatedly ruled that the ballots are the best evidence of the objections raised and an inspection of these ballots is sufficient. Moreover, there is no better authority than the COMELEC itself to determine the authenticity of the ballots, having itself ordered and supervised the printing of all the official ballots. iii. Nestle Philippines Inc. vs. CA 203 SCRA 504 iv. Darville Maritime Co. Inc. vs. Commission on Audit 175 SCRA 701 v. CIR vs. CA 261 SCRA 236

vi. Smart Communications vs. NTC 408 SCRA 678 vii. Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita 488 SCRA 1 viii. Bayan, Karapatan, KMP vs. Ermita 488 SCRA 226 ix. Sec. of the DENR vs. Yap 568 SCRA 164 d. Adjudicatory Powers i. Antipolo Realty Corp vs. NHA 153 SCRA 399 ii. Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board 199 SCRA 454 IV. Separation of Administrative and Other Powers a. Doctrine of Separation of Powers i. DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees 409 SCRA 359 ii. David vs. Macapagal Arroyo 489 SCRA 160 d. Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Powers i. Eastern Shippines Lines Inc vs POEA 166 SCRA 533 ii. Echegaray vs. Sec. of Justice 297 SCRA 754 iii. United BF HOA vs. BF Homes, Inc. 310 SCRA 304 iv. Ynot vs. Intermediate Appelate Court 148 SCRA 659