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SECURITY, DRUGS, AND VIOLENCE IN MEXICO: A SURVEY PREPARED FOR THE SIXTH NORTH AMERICAN FORUM 2010 Eduardo

Guerrero-Gutirrez
(With the collaboration of Eunises Rosillo, Roberto Arnaud and Ricardo Tllez)

Security, Drugs, and Violence in Mexico: A Survey


Preface Acronyms I. Diagnosis 1. The Security Sector a. Main Areas i. Federal Level ii. State and Local Level b. Budget i. Federal Level ii. State Level c. Military and Police Forces i. Military Forces ii. Police Forces (a) Federal Police (b) State and Local Police d. Regulatory Framework e. Security Policy (2007-2010) 2. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime a. Cooperation between Cartels and Gangs b. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion, Vehicle Thefts and Weapons Traffic

II. Organized Crime Violence 1. The Evolution of Violence a. National Level b. State and Local Levels 2. Causes of Violence III. Governments Strategy and Actions against Organized Crime 1. Strategy 2. Actions a. Arrests b. Seizures i. Drugs ii. Weapons and Vehicles c. Dismantled Laboratories and Crop Eradication

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IV. Drug Market 1. Production 2. Prices 3. Data Analysis of Drug State Prices 4. Market Value and Estimated Income 5. Transportation and Distribution a. Points of Entry, Routes of Transportation and Point of Exit b. Violence and Geography of Business 6. Consumption a. International Comparisons b. Consumption at the State Level V. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs VI. A Final Assessment Appendix

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Acronyms AFI ATF CIDAC CISEN CONADIC CSN FASP ICESI INEGI INM
INSYDE

Agencia Federal de Investigacin [Federal Investigation Agency] U. S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Centro de Investigacin para el Desarrollo [Research for Development Center] Centro de Investigacin y Seguridad Nacional [Investigation and National Security Center] Consejo Nacional de Adicciones [National Addictions Council] Consejo de Seguridad Nacional [National Security Council] Fondo de Aportaciones a la Seguridad Pblica [Public Security Contributions Fund] Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad [Citizens Institute for Security Studies] Instituto Nacional de Estadstica y Geografa [National Institute of Statistics and Geography] Instituto Nacional de Migracin [National Migration Institute]
Instituto para la Seguridad y la Democracia

[Institute for Security and Democracy]

NAFTA NDIC PF PFP PGR PJE

North America Free Trade Agreement U. S. National Drug Intelligence Center Polica Federal [Federal Police] Polica Federal Preventiva [Federal Preventive Police] Procuradura General de la Repblica [General Attorney Office] Procuradura de Justicia del Estado [State Attorney Office]

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SAT SEDENA SEGOB SEMAR SHCP SIEDO

Servicio de Administracin Tributaria [Tax Service Administratio] Secretara de la Defensa Nacional [Secretary of National Defense] Secretara de Gobernacin [Secretary of the Interior] Secretara de Marina [Secretary of the Navy] Secretara de Hacienda y Crdito Pblico [Secretary of Finance] Subprocuradura de Investigacin Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada [Specialized Deputy Attorney on Organized Crime Investigation] Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pblica [Public Security National Systema] Secretara de Relaciones Exteriores [Secretary of Foreign Affairs] Secretara de Salud [Secretary of Health] Secretara de Seguridad Pblica [Secretary of Public Security] United States Agency for International Development

SNSP SRE SS SSP USAID

Preface This survey was written under the auspices of the North American Forum Co-Chair Pedro Aspe-Armella, former Mexican Minister of Finance, to serve as a reference document at the Sixth North American Forum (NAF). NAF is an annual meeting of American, Canadian and Mexican government and business representatives to discuss a broad regional policy agenda that includes security, energy, and economic issues. The Sixth NAF will be held at the city of San Miguel de Allende, Mexico (September 30 - October 2, 2010). Pedro Aspe-Armella requested Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez the elaboration of the survey. The survey provides an overview of the security sector in Mexico, the logic of Mexican organized crime, the dynamics of organized crime violence, the governments strategy and actions against organized crime, the main features of the Mexican drug market, and the recent public opinion trends in Mexico regarding the war on drugs. Surveys Data Sources The survey exhibits extensive public data from Mexican government agencies, and from American and international agencies such as the U.S. Department of Justice and United Nations. Some tables and figures derive from three databases constructed by the author, through the systematic recollection of information in newspapers, weekly magazines, and press releases from official agencies. The first database shows the number of organized crime executions. For its construction more than 25,000 news articles related to organized crime homicides were collected. These articles were taken from the following 19 national and regional newspapers: Crnica, El Economista, El Financiero, El Grfico, El Norte, El Sol de Mxico, El Universal, Exclsior, Imagen, Impacto, La Jornada, La Prensa, La Razn, La Segunda de Ovaciones, Metro, Milenio, Ovaciones, Reforma, and UnoMsUno. The second and third databases show the number of arrests, seizures, and dismantled laboratories. The second database was constructed by analyzing 1,500 PGR press bulletins, and the third one was constructed by collecting and analyzing around 20,000 press articles from the newspapers mentioned above. About the Author Eduardo Guerrero-Gutierrez is a University of Chicago trained political scientist who, as a policy and political analyst, has received the following awards: Joseph Cropsey Prize (University of Chicago), Carlos Pereyra Award (Nexos Foundation, Mxico), National Essay Award (Federal Electoral Institute, Mexico), and the Accountability Award (Chamber of Federal Deputies, Mexico). Eduardo Guerrero has held executive posts at the Ministry of Social Development, the Federal Institute of Access to Information, and the Federal Electoral Institute. Eduardo Guerrero has also held advisory posts at the Office of the President, the Center for Investigation and National Security, and the Chamber of Deputies. At present, Eduardo Guerrero is partner of Lantia Consultores (www.lantiaconsultores.com), a consultant firm in public affairs.

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I.

Diagnosis 1. Security Sector a. Main Areas i. Federal Level

Despite the efforts made over the last decade to improve the coherence, coordination and cooperation of the Mexican security sector, the problems of shifting and duplicated responsibilities in a number of agencies, and of general instability, persist. These problems have resulted in uncoordinated efforts (and often animosity) across federal, state, and local security and law enforcement agencies (particularly among police agencies). National security responsibilities are carried out by the president and seven cabinet ministries: the Secretary of the Interior (SEGOB), the Secretary of Public Security (SSP), the General Attorneys Office (PGR), the Secretary of Finance (SHCP), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (SRE), the Secretary of National Defense (SEDENA), and the Secretary of the Navy (SEMAR). Two important security agencies are subordinated to a couple of these ministries: the main agency of civil intelligence (CISEN) is a branch of the SEGOB, and the Federal Police (PF) is a decentralized body of the SSP. Security responsibilities are often duplicated across agencies because jurisdictional roles are not clearly defined in the legislation, which in turn leads to overlapping jurisdictions. For instance, drug interdiction activity is implemented by SEMAR, SEDENA, SSP and PGR. While overlapping roles may provide checks and balances across agencies, the main issue is that there seems to be confusion regarding hierarchy and responsibilities, which ultimately has led to bureaucratic turf battles across agencies. The most recent case was a confrontation between SSP and PGR regarding the scope and limits of PF investigative powers vis--vis the investigative power of the Ministerial Police. Such confrontation ended with the resignation of the General Attorney in September 2009 and the approval in Congress of a new PF law (June 2009) that created a branch of federal police with investigative powers (see Appendix I Section d). Five security agencies have experienced a high turnover rate at the executive level, which has produced extreme instability. In the previous 45-month period, the following five agencies have switched their top officials: the Ministry of Interior (four times), PGR (three times, the National Public Security System (four times), the National Security Council (four times), and the PF (five times). (See Appendix I Table 1) Each of the two chambers of Congress has a Commission on Public Security, and there is also a Bicameral Commission on National Security. Formally, according to the Work Plan 2009-2010 of the Public Security Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, its powers include the following: strengthening coordination between institutions; promoting experience exchange and technical support among the three levels of government; drafting studies about current criminal trends and rates; and creating and managing the crime and violence database.

Formally, according to the Committee on Public Security of the Senates Work Plan 2006-20121, its lines of work are the following: to learn about the national and international mechanisms of police functioning and organization; to analyze, discuss, diagnose and determine the bills referred to this Committee; to disseminate and establish a communication link with citizens and public agencies at the three levels of government; to promote the allocation of adequate budgetary resources for public security and justice; and to properly distribute the Federal Funds for Public Security to states and municipalities. Formally, the policies and actions related to national security are subject to monitoring and evaluation from the Congress through the Bicameral Commission for National Security. Formally, this commission has the following powers: 1) to request specific reports to different public security sector institutions when discussing a law or a case study concerning this subject; 2) to know the annual project of the National Risks Agenda and issue an opinion about it; 3) to know the activity reports sent to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (CSN) in order to make appropriate recommendations; 4) to know the compliance reports given by the Executive Secretary of the CSN; and 5) to ask the appropriate authorities the results of the reviews, audits and procedures to which they have been subjected.2 When the powers of the Bicameral Commission are reviewed, it is immediately perceived that legislative monitoring and the evaluation of decisions and actions on national security matters are a mere aspiration. Indeed, the powers of the Bicameral Commission are only directed at knowing the content of reports or projects or, at best, to request information. Therefore, the Commission lacks the necessary de facto powers to fully comply with its obligations to monitor and evaluate policies and actions related to national security. So far, the only genuine, but limited, instrument of legislative oversight of national security agencies is the Chamber of Deputies Audit Agency3, which reviews public accounts through financial audits related to performance. Finally, a crucial factor that has exacerbated the insecurity problem in Mexico has to do with the performance of the judicial system. For example, about 75 percent of those arrested for alleged drugrelated crimes are acquitted. This is mainly due to two reasons: corruption in the courts and the ineffectiveness of the investigative police and the public prosecutor (ministerio pblico, which is subordinated to the Executive branch) to provide evidence. ii. State and Local Level

The public security sector at the state level is composed by the state public security secretary, the state attorney, the police corps (preventive and investigative) and the penitentiary system. The role of the municipal police is to maintain order and peace in the community. To fulfill these functions, the municipal police force and its subsidiary bodies should ideally perform the following activities: conduct surveillance and take preventive measures over criminal activities, detention of felons and assistance provision to the Public Attorney in prosecuting offenders, organize municipal criminal information and keep
Mexico, Cmara de Senadores. Retrieved from the Internet on September 6, 2010, http://www.senado.gob.mx/comisiones/LX/seguridadpublica/content/informe_plan/docs/plan_trabajo.pdf, Pp. 10-11. 2 Mexico, Centro de Investigacin y Seguridad Nacional. Retrieved from the Internet on September 6, 2010, http://www.cisen.gob.mx/espanol/mecanismos_poder_leg_comision.htm 3 Auditora Superior de la Federacin.
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databases, keep custody of municipal detention centers, communicate and coordinate efforts with state police agencies, conduct surveillance of vehicles and pedestrians within the municipality and organize municipal police archives.4 The situation of the penitentiary centers is an acute security problem in all the states. Overcrowding and linkages between inmate groups and organized crime in these centers have compromised the control of the authorities to such an extent that sometimes inmates carry out crimes outside the prison with the help of the authorities. Recently, in July 2010, a group of inmates were allowed to leave the prison house to execute 17 people in Durango. The prison authorities did not only let the inmates abandon the prison; they also lent them their weapons and vehicles to commit the crime. The levels of penitentiary overcrowding in Mexico can be illustrated with data. Average national prison overcrowding was approximately 22% in 2009 and it is about 21% in 2010. The ten states with the most severe problem of prison overcrowding are Distrito Federal, Nayarit, Sonora, Estado de Mxico, Jalisco, Morelos, Puebla, Chiapas, Guerrero and Tabasco. In these states, prison overcrowding in 2010 ranges between 40 and 110 percent. The states with the largest penitentiary sub-population are Zacatecas, Tlaxcala and Michoacn, where the population is 35 percent below its total accommodation capacity. b. Budget i. Federal Level

SEDENA receives the largest share of the security budget (around 39 percent), while SSP has experienced the largest budget increase in the last four years (from 22.2 percent of total security budget to 28.9 percent). It is worth mentioning that CISEN barely represents 1.9 percent of the total security budget. SEDENA and SSP received most of the total expenditure budget allocated to the security sector (almost 70 percent). It is also striking to see the low amount of resources allocated to the national intelligence agency (CISEN) in comparison to the other security agencies over the 2007-2010 period. This is consistent with the federal strategic goal of developing a more professional and skilled federal police force. Finally, it is important to consider that total security expenditures ranged between 5.6 and 4.6 percent of federal budget from 2007 to 2010.

Mexico, Secretara de Gobernacin. Retrieved from Internet on September 6, 2010, http://www.inafed.gob.mx/wb/ELOCAL/ELOC_La_seguridad_publica_municipal


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Table 1. Budget Expenditure by Security Agency (in Millions of Pesos)


Agency SEGOB SEDENA SEMAR PGR SSP SEGOB* (CISEN) Total Total as percentage of total federal government 5.6% 4.0% 4.7% 4.6% expenditures *Allocated budget. Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacin and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pblica Federal, 2007, 2008, 2009. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each year, was used to calculate the budget amount at constant prices (2010 chained pesos). Note: In 2007 the total exercised budget was 1,634,181.6 million pesos, in 2008 it was 2,371,510.7 million pesos, and in 2009 it was 2,703,128.5 million pesos. The total Federal Budget Expenditure in 2010 was 2,425,552.7 million pesos. 2007 6,827.3 39,623.0 14,113.2 10,949.9 20,447.4 1,292.7 91,960.8 % 7.4 43.1 15.3 11.9 22.2 1.4 100 2008 7,712.0 39,493.1 16,123.0 9,521.8 22,490.3 1,351.6 95,340.2 % 8.1 41.4 16.9 10.0 23.6 1.4 100 2009 9,695.9 49,407.1 17,938.0 11,906.0 36,879.6 2,615.2 125,826.5 % 7.7 39.3 14.3 9.5 29.3 2.1 100 2010* 8,370.6 43,632.4 15,991.9 11,781.5 32,437.8 2,140.6 112,214.2 % 7.5 38.9 14.3 10.5 28.9 1.9 100

All security agencies experienced a budget increase between 2008 and 2009 (in the cases of SSP and CISEN the increase was 64 and 93.5 percent, respectively). However, during 2010 all agencies experience a budget decrease between 1.0 and 18.1 percent mainly due to the global economic crisis. The two agencies that were least affected by these budget cuts were SEMAR and PGR, which suggests that these two agencies are top priorities for the current administration. Table 2. Annual Budget Variation by Security Agency
Agency SEGOB SEDENA SEMAR PGR SSP SEGOB* (CISEN) Total *Assigned budget 2008 13.0 -0.3 14.2 -13.0 10.0 4.6 3.7 2009 25.7 25.1 11.3 25.0 64.0 93.5 32.0 2010* -13.7 -11.7 -10.8 -1.0 -12.0 -18.1 -10.8

Tables 3, 4 and 5 in Appendix I show the differences between assigned resources and spent resources by each agency of the security sector in 2007, 2008 and 2009. In sum, in 2007 occurred an over-expenditure of the budget with an average of 11.5 percent. It can be noted that SSP spent 29 percent more than its assigned budget for 2007. In 2008, SEMAR is the agency that spent more (13.2 percent more in relation to the assigned budget), while PGR spent 3.8 less of its assigned resources. Finally, for 2009, in average, there is no under-expenditure in public security. Nevertheless, SEGOB and PGR have spent less, with an 8 and 12 percent respectively.

ii.

State Level

As shown on Table 2 of Appendix I, the state5 with the largest expenditure on security and law enforcement in the country is D.F. Its expenditure on security and law enforcement takes up the largest share of its total budget (12.9 percent). The second state that spends most on security (as a percentage of its total budget) is Baja California, with 7.9. A remarkable fact is that D.F. spends 27 percent of the total security budget allocated to all states. As shown on Figure 1, state level security spending is not statistically significant nor exist a strong correlation associated with state levels of crime and violence. Note that there is no correlation between a high incidence of crime and violence (as displayed in Chihuahua, Baja California, Estado de Mxico, Sinaloa, and Guerrero) and the proportion of the budget that each state allocates to security expenditure. D. F. is by far the state with the largest per capita security and law enforcement budget and it is not the state with the highest incidence of violence and crime. This may be a result of both the population density and that it is the country capital and seat of the federal government, and as such it needs to invest more in security and law enforcement due to the highest risks it faces. Figure 1. Per Capita Budget on Security and Law Enforcement vis--vis the Criminal Incidence and Violence Index (2009-2010)
2,000

DF 1,800
1,600

1,400 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 COL BCS CAM AGS ZAC
YUC

Per capita budget

TAB
JAL GTO

QROO MICH NAY


NL MOR

SON

SIN
OAX TAM DGO

BC
CHIH

COA TLA PUE GRO CHIA HGO VER SLP

GRO MEX

Violence index

Source: Presupuestos de Egresos Estatales, 2010. ndice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2009, CIDAC. http://www.cidac.org/es/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1000087

The Fondo de Aportaciones para la Seguridad Pblica (FASP) is a federal fund to transfer resources to each state's public security budgets. These resources are intended for recruitment, training, evaluation of
As stated in Article 44 of the Mexican Constitution, the Federal District is the seat of the Powers of the Union and capital of Mexico.
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public security human resources, police equipment, establishment of the national telecommunications network, and the national emergency line. These resources are allocated using the following criteria: number of inhabitants (35%), crime rates (10%), prison occupancy rate (20%), progress in implementing the National Program of Public Security (10%), agreed national projects in progress (20%), application of FOSEG6 resources in programs and/or preventive actions (4%), and resources spent by municipalities on public security programs and/or actions (1%). During 2009 (January to September) a total of 6337.3 million pesos were allocated to states through FASP, an average of 198 million dollars per state. The three entities that received the greatest proportion of resources were Estado de Mxico (495.1 million pesos), Distrito Federal (390.5 million) and Veracruz (299.5 million). The states that received the fewest resources were Colima (94.8 million), Aguascalientes (97 million) and Campeche (97 million). However, these funds registered high under-expenditure levels. In 2009, for example, only 38.7% of the FASP was spent. Between January and September 2009, the states with the highest levels of money spent were Baja California (78.7%), Colima (76.2%) and San Luis Potosi (75.5%). The states with the lowest expenditure levels were Jalisco (8.6%), Quintana Roo (10.6%) and Guanajuato (11.3%). According to information contained in the quarterly reports submitted to the SHCP7, the main reasons why the funds are not exercised in full are the following: (a) delays on both the presentation and the approval of the Technical Annexes of the agreements of coordination by the Executive Secretary of the National Public Security System; (b) delays in issuing guidelines for spending the resources; (c) the lack of timely administration of budgeted resources by SHCP; (d) a prolonged bidding process for procurement contracts, leases and services; and (e) a long and complicated process to analyze and determine the programs and goals that will be carried out. SUBSEMUN (Subsidio para la Seguridad Pblica Municipal) is a group of federal resources transferred to the states, which in turn must be transferred to previously chosen municipalities. The aim of these transfers is to advance in the New Police Model by means of professionalization, equipment and infrastructure. The criteria for their allocation are the following: a) that during the previous year the municipality was incorporated in SUBSEMUN; b) to have a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants; c) to be geographically located in the state border; d) to be part of a conurbation (two or more localities from different municipalities with a population of at least 50,000 inhabitants). The states with the largest amount of resources transferred by concept of SUBSEMUN are D.F. (338.6 million pesos), Estado de Mxico (338.6 million pesos) and Baja California (275 million pesos). The states with the fewest received resources are Baja California Sur, Campeche, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas, which received 30 million pesos each.

Fondos de Seguridad Pblica, in which are summed together FASP resources and others from state contributions. Formato nico annexes to each of the quarterly reports published online by SHCP. http://www.shcp.gob.mx/FINANZASPUBLICAS/Paginas/InformeTrimestral_2.aspx
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c. Military and Police Forces i. Military Forces

As can be seen in Figure 2, SEDENA personnel registered a gradual increase since 1991, from circa 150,000 soldiers to 200,000 soldiers in 2009. The increase in the number of soldiers means that, over a period of 20 years, the number of SEDENA available soldiers grew by 35 percent. In contrast with the ascending trend in SEDENA personnel, over the last 20 years the number of SEMAR personnel remained relatively stable. According with the Third Government Report of President Caldern, SEDENA elements have get better job benefits than previous years. For example, in 2009 their benefits were 55.9 percent higher than in 2006; they received 7,234 house loans; working hours were more flexible; and finally, the elements received specialized training equivalent to more than 15 days. All these have decreased desertion by 39.98 percent compared to 2008. On the other hand, SEMAR has only promoted members and increased technical training by $1,000 pesos a month to class and marine rankings. Figure 2. Number of Military Personnel
250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0

SEDENA

Average

SEMAR

Average

Source: Data from Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.

ii. Police Forces In total, there are 2,122 independent police agencies in Mexico, with jurisdiction at the federal, state and municipal levels (see Table 3). Most policing services are provided at the state and local levels. Currently, Mexico has approximately 407,7088 federal, state and municipal police officers, but approximately 90 percent (361,133) are under the control of state and local authorities. The remaining 43,000 officers are under federal control. Of the universe of 2,440 municipalities in the country, 2,021 had a municipal police force (83 percent). This raises excessively the number of police agencies. At the time this survey was written, legislators were
This figure results from adding up the elements of federal police (46,575), state police (195,646) and local police (165,487).
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discussing a reform proposal that aims to fuse municipal police corps into a single state police force. Some analysts also defend the idea of a single national force that absorbs state and local agencies. Table 3. Number of Police Agencies by Government Level
Government Level Federal Preventive, PGR (Judiciary), Migration Preventive Judiciary Transit Bank, Commercial, Auxiliary Touristic, Rural, Others Number of Police Agencies 3

32 32 State 11 13 10 Municipal 2,021 Total 2,122 Source: Secretara de Seguridad Pblica, 2009. Information Request No. 2210300015709.

(a) Federal Police The Federal Police structure includes personnel from three agencies: the SSP, PGR, and the National Migration Institute (INM)9. In the case of SSP, there was a significant personnel increase of its preventive police during the 2007-2009 period, when it doubled. INM personnel also increased, while the PGR personnel was reduced. There has also been a significant increase in the number of federal police personnel over the 2009-2010 period (more than 10 percent in the case of preventive police officers). The number of migration police officers has shown a notable increase too (24 percent). In contrast, ministerial police officers shrank by 20 percent. This reduction could be due to the fact that the new Ley de la Polica Federal gives investigative power to the preventive police.

The INM is a decentralized agency of SEGOB.

Table 4. Federal Police Personnel Variation (2007 and 2009)


Federal Police Agencies Preventive Police Jail Guards Total 2007 2009 SSP Percentage Variation 2010 Percentage Variation

108.7 35,712 10.6 28.4 2,055 23.1 102.5 37,767 11.3 PGR 5,900 4,347 -26.3 3,472 -20.1 Ministerial Police 5,900 4,347 -26.3 3,472 -20.1 Total INM 2,832 4,298 51.8 5,336 24.2 Preventive Police 2,832 4,298 51.8 5,336 24.2 Total Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

15,464 32,276 1,301 1,670 16,765 33,946

(b) State and Local Police Article 21 of the Federal Constitution mandates that public security is a shared responsibility among the federal, state and municipal authorities. Nevertheless, due to low wages, lack of professionalization, and inadequate recruiting processes, corruption is a widespread phenomenon especially among local police officers. The laws and programs related to public security implemented by Presidents Zedillo and Fox underlined the importance of cooperation and collaboration among the three levels of government. Under President Caldern, the issue of interagency coordination was again included, but it has not been achieved. When he started its campaign against organized crime, President Calderns government found local police deeply infiltrated by organized crime. Figure 3 shows that there seems to be no strong correlation between the number of municipal and state police officers, and criminal and violence incidence.

Figure 3. State and Municipal Police Officers per 10,000 Inhabitants and Criminal Incidence and Violence (2009)
100

90

DF

State and Municipal Police Officers per 10,000 Inhabitants

80

70 60 50 TAB 40 YUC 30 HGO 20 10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90


TLA OAX JAL MOR SLP COL PUE VER CHIA NL TAM CAM MICH SON AGS GTO NAY DGO COA ZAC GRO BCS MEX

QROO

GRO

SIN

BC CHIH

Violence index

Lack of cooperation and coordination among the three levels of government is the major weakness of the current Mexican struggle against drug trafficking organizations. States and municipalities do not collaborate with the Federal Government. The reasons behind this situation might be the following: 1) current legislation indicates that organized crime related felonies are under federal competence; thus state and municipal governments shy away from getting involved in these type of incidents; 2) state and municipal authorities (especially municipal police corps) are highly infiltrated by organized crime; and 3) the federal authorities frequently deploy operatives against organized crime in different states without previous consultation with local authorities, bringing about frictions among levels of government. Sometimes these interventions by the federal government trigger waves of violence. The lack of involvement in the federal strategy against organized crime on the side of state and local police agencies is in part a byproduct of assigned legal jurisdictions, which depend on the type of the crime. This typology distinguishes crimes on common or federal jurisdictions. Common jurisdiction felonies (delitos del fuero comn) are those whose effect falls on the affected person because of the behavior of the criminal (for example, threats, property damage, sexual offenses, frauds, homicides, house robbery, vehicle theft). These crimes are prosecuted by the Common Jurisdiction Public Attorney, investigated by justice attorneys and judged by the Judiciary branch of each state. Federal jurisdiction felonies (delitos del fuero federal) are those that affect the health, economy and security of the country or the interests of the federation (for example, attacks to transport or communication routes, smuggling, fiscal fraud, ecological crimes, drug trafficking, illegal possession of weapons, copyright violations, money laundering, human trafficking, electoral crimes, etc). These crimes are prosecuted by the

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Federal Public Attorney, investigated by the General Attorney and judged by the Federal Judiciary branch.10 The lack of state and local police collaboration and involvement in the strategy against organized crime is patent when we observe the evolution of the number of police officers in each state over the last few years. For example, as shown in Table 5, Chihuahua (the most violent state in the country) did not increase its number of police officers between 2007 and 2010. In fact, during this period the number of police officers in this state decreased 3.3 percent. Something similar happened in Guerrero, Michoacn, Nuevo Len, Baja California, Durango and Tamaulipas between 2007 and 2009. In all these states, where there is a high presence of organized crime, the efforts to strengthen police forces seem to be below the required level. Finally, it is important to point out the increase in the number of police forces between 2009 and 2010 in states such as Baja California Sur, Quintana Roo, Baja California, Guerrero, Nayarit, Zacatecas and Durango.

Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre Inseguridad, Retrieved from the Internet on Septmeber 6, 2010, http://www.icesi.org.mx/publicaciones/gacetas/federalismo_e_inseguridad.asp
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Table 5. State Police Officers Variation


State Police State Percentage Percentage 2007 2009 2010 Variation Variation Aguascalientes 469 491 4.7 524 6.7 Baja California 403 447 10.9 980 119.2 Baja California Sur 18 15 -16.7 258 1,620.0 Campeche 627 939 49.8 917 -2.3 Coahuila 606 732 20.8 712 -2.7 Colima 658 631 -4.1 705 11.7 Chiapas 4,501 4,501 0.0 4,438 -1.4 Chihuahua 1,217 1,217 0.0 1,177 -3.3 Distrito Federal 77,132 80,803 4.8 83,973 3.9 Durango 126 172 36.5 255 48.3 Guanajuato 870 1,187 36.4 1,333 12.3 Guerrero 2,395 2,395 0.0 5,140 114.6 Hidalgo 2,586 2,707 4.7 2,707 0.0 Jalisco 4,213 5,361 27.2 5,800 8.2 Mxico 30,694 35,367 15.2 36,675 3.7 Michoacn 3,091 3,091 0.0 3,117 0.8 Morelos 1,597 1,623 1.6 1,738 7.1 Nayarit 185 185 0.0 346 87.0 Nuevo Len 2,062 2,072 0.5 2,176 5.0 Oaxaca 5,750 6,009 4.5 6,009 0.0 Puebla 6,892 6,710 -2.6 6,712 0.0 Quertaro 775 720 -7.1 720 0.0 Quintana Roo 945 299 -68.4 1,060 254.5 San Luis Potos 3,759 3,882 3.3 3,882 0.0 Sinaloa 396 1,303 229.0 1,303 0.0 Sonora 261 719 175.5 417 -42.0 Tabasco 2,975 5,008 68.3 3,862 -22.9 Tamaulipas 1,192 1,464 22.8 1,428 -2.5 Tlaxcala 2,067 1,711 -17.2 1,954 14.2 Veracruz 10,437 11,826 13.3 11,651 -1.5 Yucatn 2,525 3,075 21.8 3,075 0.0 Zacatecas 295 400 35.6 602 50.5 Total 171,719 187,062 8.9 195,646 4.6 Average 5,366 5,846 8.9 6,114 4.6 Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

In contrast with the increase of 4.6 percent in the state police corps between 2009 and 2010, municipal police forces increased, on average, 3.8 percent. The only state that notably increased its number of municipal police officers was Chihuahua (the most violent state in the country) with a 61.9 percent increase. According to the Federal Public Security Secretary, organized crime spends 1,270 million pesos each year in municipal police bribery, equivalent to a monthly payment of 7,967 pesos to each municipal police officer.11 This represents a 155 percent increase in relation to the monthly average salary of a municipal police officer in 2009.

Reforma, Completa Narco Sueldo de Policas, Seccin Justicia, Retrieved from the Internet on August 6, 2010, http://www.reforma.com/nacional/articulo/569/1136782/
11

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Table 6. Municipal Police Officers Variation


State 2007 2009 Municipal Police Percentage 2010 Variation Percentage Variation

2,111 2,141 1.4 2,244 4.8 Aguascalientes 6,697 6,528 -2.5 6,371 -2.4 Baja California 1,837 2,005 9.1 2,387 19.1 Baja California Sur 957 920 -3.9 869 -5.5 Campeche 3,528 3,973 12.6 3,664 -7.8 Coahuila 1,186 1,126 -5.1 1,330 18.1 Colima 5,956 7,187 20.7 7,187 0.0 Chiapas 4,603 4,482 -2.6 7,258 61.9 Chihuahua * * Distrito Federal 2,336 2,678 14.6 2,693 0.6 Durango 8,061 8,848 9.8 9,198 4.0 Guanajuato 6,885 6,885 0.0 7,838 13.8 Guerrero 3,448 3,499 1.5 3,499 0.0 Hidalgo 12,278 13,505 10.0 13,622 0.9 Jalisco 18,875 22,650 20.0 23,156 2.2 Mxico 5,203 5,203 0.0 6,113 17.5 Michoacn 3,546 3,578 0.9 3,651 2.0 Morelos 1,691 1,691 0.0 1,865 10.3 Nayarit 6,395 8,055 26.0 7,897 -2.0 Nuevo Len 4,299 4,688 9.0 4,688 0.0 Oaxaca 6,208 6,460 4.1 6,460 0.0 Puebla 1,922 2,357 22.6 2,357 0.0 Quertaro 3,146 3,528 12.1 3,528 0.0 Quintana Roo 3,037 3,240 6.7 3,230 -0.3 San Luis Potos 6,008 6,144 2.3 6,144 0.0 Sinaloa 4,637 4,777 3.0 4,912 2.8 Sonora 3,819 4,172 9.2 4,265 2.2 Tabasco 5,384 5,777 7.3 5,617 -2.8 Tamaulipas 1,540 1,700 10.4 1,829 7.6 Tlaxcala 7,748 5,913 -23.7 5,913 0.0 Veracruz 1,329 3,465 160.7 3,465 0.0 Yucatn 2,115 2,237 5.8 2,237 0.0 Zacatecas 146,785 159,412 8.6 165,487 3.8 Total 4,735 5,142 8.6 5,338 3.8 Average Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

The next figure shows that the states which have a number of police officers (per 1,000 inhabitants) above the UN recommended average are D.F. (with an excessive figure of 9.5 police officers per 1,000 inhabitants), Baja California Sur, Guerrero, Estado de Mxico, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, Yucatn, Colima, Tlaxcala, Morelos, Oaxaca, San Luis Potos and Sinaloa (that is 13 out of 32). States with a high organized crime presence such as Coahuila, Durango, Tamaulipas, Nuevo Len, Baja California, Michoacn and Chihuahua are below the UN recommended average.

13

Despite the fact D.F. has almost the double of population than Nuevo Len (96.5 percent more), the number of police officers per 1,000 inhabitants in D.F is far superior because it employs 83,973 officers, compared to 2,176 officers employed in Nuevo Len. Figure 4. Number of Police Officers in the Mexican States and the Minimum Number of Police Officers Recommended by the United Nations Per 1,000 Persons (2010)
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Distrito Federal Baja California Sur Guerrero Mxico Tabasco Quintana Roo Yucatn Colima Tlaxcala Morelos Oaxaca San Luis Potos Sinaloa Jalisco Chiapas Hidalgo Chihuahua Veracruz Aguascalientes Michoacn Puebla Nayarit Baja California Nuevo Len Campeche Tamaulipas Sonora Guanajuato Zacatecas Durango Quertaro Coahuila 2010 ONU

Source: Own elaboration with information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010. Population: CONAPO 2005-2050 projection.

d. Regulatory Framework Out of the most relevant eleven federal legislative pieces that relate to security and organized crime, four have been approved during the current presidential term (see the topics of Appendix I Section d). These laws regulate the intergovernmental public security system, the federal police law, the domain extinction law, and the new PGR organic law. The laws are the following: 1. Ley Orgnica de la Procuradura General de la Repblica (General Attorney Organic Law): This law aims to organize the General Attorneys Office. 2. Ley de la Polica Federal 2009 (Federal Police Law): This law regulates the organization and operation of the Federal Police in its respective area of competence. 3. Ley Federal de Extincin de Dominio 2009 (Federal Law on Domain Extinction): This law regulates forfeiture of property by the State. 4. Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pblica 2009 (General Law of the National Public Security System): This law regulates the integration, organization and operation of the National Public Security System. To a certain extent, at the state level, public security efforts have been expressed through public security laws, public programs, and other kinds of regulations. In this regard, all states have their own Public

14

Security Law; fourteen states (out of 32) have a Public Security Program, and only six states have regulations on police professionalization. States with a high criminal incidence like Baja California, Chihuahua, Durango, Guerrero, Michoacn, Nuevo Len and Sinaloa, do not have a public security program or regulations over police professionalization. Also, during the current administration have been reformed two constitutional articles in relation to public and security (see Appendix I Section d). These articles are the following: 1. Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution (2008): Before the reform, this article gave the sole responsibility over criminal investigations to the public prosecutor, it did not state any principles over which police actions shall be carried out, or provided a description of public security and the principles that govern the actions of the respective agencies. The reform of the Article 21 covered three dimensions: judiciary procedures, police professionalization and public security. 2. Article 29 of the Mexican Constitution (2007): Article 29 states the procedure to suspend civil guarantees in the whole country or in a determined place. This article was reformed in 2007. Before the reform, the article said that in case of invasion or a grave disruption of public peace that puts the society in danger or conflict (Art. 29, paragraph 1), the President, in accordance with the state ministers, administrative departments, PGR and with the approval of Congress, can suspend guarantees in the whole country or in certain parts. e. Security Policy (2007-2010) Security policy objectives 1. Disruption of criminal organizations (short term) 2. Recovery of public spaces (short term) 3. Institutional strengthening (long term) 4. Decrease drug consumption (long term) Policy achievements 1. In relation with the first objective, the government has implemented an active strategy. However, high-level organized crime arrests have provoked, in some cases, divisions within the cartels and with this the emergence of new organizations. These divisions and the retaliatory actions of organized crime against the government have caused an abrupt increase of violence. 2. Regarding the second objective, the fragmentation of criminal organizations has led to their geographic dispersion throughout the national territory, which has impeded the recovery of public spaces. Now, criminal organizations maintain a stable presence in more municipalities than they used to have back in 2006. 3. Regarding institutional strengthening, the federal government has moved ahead with the following actions: Creation of a new federal police with rigorous professional standards and investigative powers. Strengthening of the Attorney Generals Office. Two kinds of actions have been intensified: professionalization of public attorneys and the detention of networks of public officials linked to organized crime groups.

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Consolidation of the criminal database Plataforma Mexico in order to implement the Sistema nico de Informacin Criminal (Single System of Criminal Information), which centralizes information shared by federal, state and municipal governments. Strengthening of the Armed Forces. Considerable increase in the armed forces budget, which has had two main effects: important improvements in personnel wages (especially in low ranking officers) and improvement in equipment and operative capacity. Reform of the criminal justice system. The penal justice system has adopted oral trials, become more simplified and transparent, as well as a regime of victims rights protection. In terms of public opinion, the government has recently made some changes that should improve its communications efforts and capacity to manage information. Caldern recently appointed Alejandro Poir as Technical Secretary of the National Security Council and spokesperson. Till now there was no federal government spokesperson for public security issues, so Poirs appointment could solve the issues in communicating the federal strategy to the public The government has recently made significant strides in setting up the means for going after the financial side of cartel activities, including efforts to limit and monitor cash deposits, money exchanges, and cash purchases, as well as legislation to help the government tackle money laundering. 4. Finally, regarding drug consumption levels, the most recent national addictions surveys from 2002 and 2008 reveal an important increase in cocaine consumption patterns (which grew by 100 percent during this period). In the case of marijuana, the increase in the level of consumption was 20 percent. This shows that despite the preventive efforts of the government, drug consumption is on an ascending trend. However, the number of Mexican citizens that consume drugs is still very small in comparative terms. High-Profile Arrests 1. Compared with previous administrations, the current government has been especially efficient in arresting or killing criminal bosses. 2. During the first four years of the current administration the number of bosses arrested (18) has dramatically increased in relation to previous administrations. They are the following: four from the Sinaloa Cartel (Sandra vila Beltrn, Jess Zambada Garca, Vicente Zambada Niebla and Ignacio Coronel); six from the Beltrn Leyva Cartel (Alfredo Beltrn Leyva, Ever Villafae Martnez, Carlos Beltrn Leyva, Gerardo lvarez Vzquez ,dgar Valdez Villareal and Enrique Villareal Barragn); three from the Tijuana Cartel (Eduardo Arellano Flix, Teodoro Garca Simental and Manuel Garca Simental); one from the Zetas Cartel (Jaime Gonzlez Durn); three from La Familia Michoacana Cartel (Alberto Espinoza Barrn, Rafael Cedeo Hernndez and Arnoldo Rueda Medina); and one from the Jurez Cartel (Vicente Carrillo Leyva). 3. Current governmental actions against organized crime have also resulted in the death of some important cartel bosses. This has been the case with the deaths of Arturo Beltrn Leyva in December 16, 2009, boss of the Beltrn Leyva cartel, and Ignacio Coronel Villareal in July 29, 2010, boss of the Sinaloa cartel. 2. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime According to new institutional economic literature, criminal organizations are companies that provide illicit goods and services for which there is a high demand. Two essential features allow these companies to operate successfully: the exercise of violence and the exercise of bribery. The first allows them to maintain 16

internal discipline, resolve disputes, prevent the entry of competitors, monitor their territory, and respond to military or police harassment. The ability to corrupt, in turn, decreases or neutralizes the government's action against the organization, which reduces the incentives of its members to defect and strengthens internal cohesion.12 Once the criminal organization has a monopoly of violence in a given territory (a few blocks or a neighborhood), its aspiration is to exercise quasi-governmental functions such as charging taxes (extortion) and selling protection. So far, in several Mexican municipalities no organization has successfully imposed itself over the others, hence the ongoing violence between drug cartels. Number of Cartels, Internal Structure, and Modus Operandi. Within the Mexican illegal drug market two types of organizations coexist: i) the large cartels that have the capacity to coordinate at the national and international levels and which are involved mainly in illegal drugs exports to the United States; and ii) the smaller organizations that compete locally for drug distribution and selling. The largest criminal organizations have achieved a high level of vertical integration, which gives them a high degree of coordination.13 In general, the larger criminal organizations strive to achieve some of the next features: a centralized and hierarchical structure that maintains internal cohesion and reduces infiltration risks; controlling monopoly prices to save resources by avoiding competition; increasing their corrupting capacity; and, finally, obtaining access to the international financial markets.14 Typically, cartels have a hierarchical structure of five levels: the first is the bosses level; in the second level are the specialized operators such as lawyers and accountants; in the next level are the lieutenants and military leaders, known as logistics operators; the gunmen are located in the fourth level; and the lowest level is the operative base, composed by drug dealers, drivers and drug smugglers. Kinship and cronyism are important foundations for authority and legitimacy within the organization. Based on these criteria, the cartels are able to maintain high, though vulnerable, levels of cohesion and internal solidarity. Geographical Location. Zetas, Sinaloa, and Golfo are the three cartels with the most extended presence, in 19, 16 and 9 states, respectively. In six states there is only one established drug cartel: Campeche (Golfo), Distrito Federal (La Barbie), Hidalgo (Zetas), Tabasco (Zetas) and Zacatecas (Zetas). The presence of just one cartel is relevant because territorial struggles between two or more cartels leads to higher levels of violence. In the absence of competition, the average number of executions per state is 37 per year; on the contrary, in a contested territory the number of executions increases to 378 per year.15 Tlaxcala is the only state without record of stable drug cartel presence.

Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, Introduction, in The Economics of Organized Crime, New York: Cambridge University Press. 13 Vertically integrated companies are united through a hierarchy and share a common leader. The members of this hierarchy combine different tasks to accomplish a common goal: to generate economies of scale in each company, and synergies within the corporation to increase profits. Oil companies, for example, have a high level of vertical integration as they have under their control such diverse tasks such as exploration, drilling, production, transportation, refining, marketing and sales. 14 Fiorentini and Peltzman, Op. Cit., pp. 5-6. 15 This figure resulted from a MCO regression with a dummy variable. The figure is not significant at a 10 per cent level, which may be due to the size of the sample (it only considers data from 2009), however it still shows an existing correlation.
12

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Table 7. Cartel Presence per State (As of August 2010)16


State Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Campeche Coahuila Colima Chiapas Chihuahua Distrito Federal Durango Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Mxico Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo San Luis Potos Sinaloa Sonora Tabasco Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatn Zacatecas Total X 19 16 11 9 5 5 4 4 3 1 1 X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X ZET X SIN X X X X X X X X X OTH X X GOL LB LF MIL PS JUA DZP TIJ

Cartel Key: ZET: Zetas, SIN: Sinaloa, OTH: Others, GOL: Golfo, LB: La Barbie, LF: La Familia, MIL: Milenio, PS: Pacfico Sur, JUA: Jurez, DZP: Daz Parada, and TIJ: Tijuana.
16

18

Over the last four years there has been an increase in the number of Mexican cartels. In 2007 there were seven large cartels: Sinaloa, Golfo-Zetas, Tijuana, Jurez, La Familia Michoacana, Milenio and Daz Parada. By 2010, three new organizations appeared. First appeared the Zetas, originally Golfo hitmen. This group is present in 19 states, and is considered to be the most aggressive and dangerous. Secondly, we have La Barbie Cartel and, thirdly, the Pacfico Sur Cartel. These last two appeared as a result of a split within the Beltrn Leyva cartel after the death of its leader, Arturo Beltrn Leyva. However, La Barbie was arrested on August 30, 2010, so its small organization is at risk of disappearing. Between 2007 and 2010, the number of intercartel conflicts has grown from four to eight. Yet, as the number of conflicts between cartels has increased so has the number of alliances among them. Each cartel is continually looking for ways to geographically expand its presence and control new points of entry/exit and transport routes. This leads to local alliances among cartels as a way to ensure safe passage through certain areas or to counterbalance rival cartels. In 2007 there were three cartel alliances (Sinaloa and Jurez; Golfo and Zetas; and Sinaloa and Milenio); in 2010 there are six (Sinaloa and a faction of Tijuana; Zetas and a Beltrn Leyva faction; Jurez and Zetas; Sinaloa, Milenio and La Familia; Golfo, Sinaloa and La Familia; and Zetas and Jurez). The Sinaloa and Zetas cartels are the most active alliance-seeking cartels. From April 2008 to December 2009 the geographical location of criminal organizations radically changed. This was, in part, a consequence of the Beltrn Leyva cartel split from the Sinaloa cartel. The Beltrn Leyva organization (which rapidly became a cartel itself), made alliances in nine states with the Tijuana, Jurez, and Zetas cartels to remove the Sinaloa cartel from strategic places for drug trafficking. The ensuing confrontation between the Beltrn Leyva Cartel (and its allies) against the Sinaloa Cartel drastically increased the levels of violence in the municipalities where the confrontations took place. The death of the Beltrn Leyva cartel leader (Arturo Beltrn Leyva) in December 2009 divided the organization. Interestingly, the drastic increase of violence between April 2008 and December 2008, and between December 2009 and May 2010 have their immediate causes on federal government action aimed at arresting Alfredo Beltrn Leyva in March 2008, and Arturo Beltrn Leyva (who died in the confrontation) in December 2009. The Beltrn Leyva Cartel allied itself with three cartels (Tijuana, Zetas and Jurez) to extend its presence in nine states. The Beltrn Leyva cartel saw the alliance alternative as a practical way to gain entrance to new markets and counterbalance rival organizations with a strong presence in those states. Cartel Presence in Central America and the Southern Border More than 200 gangs, with some 3,000 members, operate in the Mexican southern border states and Central America. They control illegal traffic of people, drugs and weapons from Central America to Mexico and the United States.17 Some of these gangs have established close connections with drug cartels, assisting them in drugs and weapons traffic along the border. For example, Zetas are settling in Guatemala, establishing training camps and recruiting former Kaibiles (Guatemalan elite soldiers).18

USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment, April 2006, p. 6. El Universal, Presumen que Zetas y Kaibiles Entrenan Juntos, March 30, 2008, retrieved from the Internet in July 12, 2010: http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/494002.html
17 18

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Table 8. Cartels in the Southern Border States


State Chiapas Cartel Zetas Golfo Sinaloa Milenio Zetas Sinaloa Golfo Golfo Zetas

Quintana Roo Campeche Tabasco

In January 2009 the Chief of the Colombian National Police informed that the gravity center of the Latin American drug trafficking industry was in Mexico and that Colombian cartels only performed a subordinated role in it.19 Now Colombian drug cartels are partners to their Mexican counterparts; they are mainly drug producers and do not control transport routes and distribution networks in the U.S., at least not to the same extent as Mexican drug cartels.20 Proof of this relationship was the detention in Mexico in July 2008 of Ever Villafae Martnez, considered one of the seven most important Colombian cartels bosses. Villafae, boss of the Colombian Norte del Valle Cartel, was Arturo Beltrn Leyvas partner in a cocaine production and distribution network that started in Colombia, passed through Mexico and concluded in the U.S. In this relationship the Colombians were just drug providers; the Mexicans bestowed transportation routes and distribution networks into every major American city. The 2009 Latinobarmetro21 notes that the citizens of Central America have not rejected the idea of a military government, and many feel a coup dtat would be acceptable in circumstances of state corruption or where crime has been allowed to get out of control. The perception that crime is out of control often leads to the perception that the police are incompetent, undermining public confidence in the government as a whole. Even worse, in many areas of this region, the police are viewed as actively contributing to the crime problem. a. Cooperation Between Cartels and Gangs Mexican cartels are dynamic organizations with a high adaptation capacity to new conditions. The logic of the war waged by the government against drug cartels and other criminal organizations, together with the business logic of expanding markets and rising profits, have pushed the cartels to take decisive steps towards their professionalization. One of these steps is the practice of outsourcing specialized services provided by the gangs, with which the cartels have established a relationship of mutual convenience. Gangs offer various services to the cartels in the areas of drug enforcement, freight transport, distribution and sale. Together with the cartels, gangs are also actively forayed into kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, money laundering, vehicle theft, and weapons traffic, which are typical organized crime activities.
El Universal, Mxico, Centro de Gravedad del Narco: Colombia, January 25, 2009, retrieved from the Intenet on August 31, 2010: http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/571796.html 20 National Drug Intelligence Center, 2010. National Drug Threat Assessment, Washington: U.S Department of Justice, p. 9. 21 Latinobarmetro 2009, Retrieved form Internet on September 10, 2010 http://www.latinobarometro.org/
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There are at least five factors for which cartels hire gangs and the services they can provide:
1.

The first factor is risk reduction and protection for the cartels. When they operate with semiautonomous cells, the leaders of the cartels reduce the probability of infiltration by government agents or other criminal groups. Also, when gang members are arrested by the authorities or recruited by rival cartels, they cannot provide information about the modus operandi of the cartel because they simply do not have it: they have worked for the cartel but outside of it. A second factor is related with the logistical, informational and operational advantages. The gangs are located in various parts of the country and each one knows in detail the space they inhabit. Cartel-gang collaboration allows them to carry out their activities swiftly, and it also increases information flows between the leaders and its various cells across the country. In addition, outsourcing increases versatility and specialization within the cartel. A third factor is the effective exercise of violence. The gangs ability to display gang violence throughout the country (especially in border areas in the north and south), is increasingly being employed by the cartels. The ability to inflict high degrees of violence, together with the capacity to bribe and corrupt, are essential assets for any organized crime organization. The fourth factor is of economics nature: with gangs, cartels save resources. Outsourcing a gang to perform certain tasks is cheaper than maintaining a bloated bureaucracy of gunmen. Finally, the fifth factor is gang members are often drug consumers, resulting in considerable sales and profits for the cartels.

2.

3.

4.

5.

Cooperation between gangs and cartels is maintained and assured in terms of mutual convenience. There are at least five reasons why the gangs would collaborate with the cartels.
1.

The first reason is financial gain. The cartels have resources to pay for the gangs services, to reward efficiency and loyalty, and to encourage future cooperation. In addition, they often give "concessions" to the gang to collect rents from retail drug dealers. Second, by allying themselves with cartels, gangs ensure regular supplies of drugs (with discounts). Third, the link between gangs and cartels protects the gangs from police interference, and also makes them immune to arrests or convictions. Fourth, gang affiliation to a cartel creates a sense of solidarity between them and ensures their continuity. Finally, with this alliance gangs receive recognition from a drug cartel, which in turn strengthen its group identity.

2.

3.

4.

5.

In Ciudad Jurez there are between 300 and 500 gangs, of which 30 have between 500 and 1,500 members. The largest gangs, like Barrio Azteca and Mexicles, exceed two thousand active members. These two gangs cooperate, respectively, with the Juarez and Sinaloa cartels. However, these are not the only two cartels that have developed networks with gangs in Jurez. Other large and aggressive gangs 21

have links with the cartels of Tijuana, Golfo and Zetas. According to reports from the U.S. Department of Justice, Barrio Azteca is a "transnational" gang that operates in both Mexican and American territory with a degree of sophistication rarely seen in groups of that nature. According to the U.S. authorities, Barrio Aztecas capacities are largely due to the financial and logistical support it received from the Jurez cartel. The degree of organization of Barrio Azteca is such that to avoid interception of their messages they have developed secret codes based on Nhuatl numerology and phrases. Another place where there has been an abrupt increase in the number of street gangs in Nuevo Len, where 1,500 gangs exist, of which 700 are located in the Monterrey metropolitan area. Information from the local police indicates that 20 of these gangs are linked with the Zetas cartel. These gangs are smaller than the Jurez gangs and are low drug consumers. Given hostile police actions towards them, gang leaders induce their members to collaborate with drug cartels as a way to protect themselves from police harassment. Local police officers frequently extort gang members, and cartels punish the police officers who assault gang members. In summary, youth gangs are becoming an important asset for Mexican cartels. With them, drug dealers criminal activities have multiplied and become more efficient. Furthermore, gangs that operate with cartels have become more effective in avoiding and confronting law enforcement agencies. The overwhelming presence of gangs in several parts of the country provides almost unlimited human resources for the cartels. Hence, in order to disarticulate the gang-drug cartel link the Mexican government will have to deploy, alongside the military and police offensive, a comprehensive policy that combines social and security issues. b. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion, Vehicle Thefts and Weapons Traffic In absolute figures the states with the highest incidence of kidnappings are Chihuahua, Estado de Mxico, Baja California, Michoacn and D.F. Regarding extortion, the states with the highest incidence are D.F. Estado de Mxico, Jalisco, Guanajuato, Veracruz and Chiapas. Finally, the states with the highest incidence of vehicle theft are Estado de Mxico, Baja California, D.F., Chihuahua and Nuevo Len. These three are typical organized crime felonies. There is a strong and positive correlation between executions and kidnappings (0.75), vehicle thefts and kidnappings (0.77) and vehicle thefts and extortions (0.78). Interestingly, the correlation between execution and extortion is very low: 0.05. This shows that extortion is closely linked to intimidation activities against civilians that are threatened in several ways but who are not killed to obtain potential financial gains. As shown in organized crime theory, in the areas where extortion is prevalent the objective is not to generate violence, but to perform criminal activities. Finally, the correlation between kidnapping and extortion is 0.43. Weapons Traffic. Weapons smuggled through the Northwest border region have contributed to escalated violence in Mexico. According to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), Mexican cartel members or associates acquire thousands of weapons each year in Arizona, California and Texas and smuggle them across the border to Mexico.

22

One of the main reasons behind the increasing traffic of weapons has been the neglect of the U.S. authorities to contain the problem. In 2004, neither Congress nor the Executive ratified the Assault Weapons Ban, or any laws prohibiting the sale of high-powered weapons and other lethal weapons. Since then, weapons are sold almost without restriction in the United States. In the American Southern border states there are more than 7,000 gun shops. To illustrate the extent of this problem, note that during the last three and a half years more than 76,000 weapons have been seized, of which more than half are assault rifles. Over 90 percent of these seized weapons were produced and sold in the U.S. In addition, the government has seized more than 5,400 grenades and more than 8 million cartridges. Most of the weapons seized by the Mexican government were bought in the border states of Texas, California and Arizona. Well-armed traffickers increasingly outgun Mexican authorities, and nearly all of the illegal guns seized in Mexico have been smuggled in from the United States. The weapons trade in many ways mirrors the dynamics of the drug market. Drugs flow north from Mexico to the United States, and guns flow south from the United States to Mexico. In 2004, it was estimated that there were 16.5 million illegal weapons in Mexico. ATF data show that 90-95 percent of the guns used in drug violence in Mexico enter illegally from the United States. Official numbers reveal that, between December 2000 and December 2005, Mexican customs officials were able to confiscate a mere 1,791 weapons: not even one per day. In 2007, the number of guns confiscated jumped to 9,000. In addition, in 2007, the ATF started Project Gunrunner, an effort to stop the smuggling of guns into Mexico. In 2005, ATF reported that more than 6,400 guns had been sent illegally into Mexico from the United States. By the end of September 2007, after Project Gunrunner had been implemented, that estimate had dropped to about 3,200.22

Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Benjamin Bahney and Kevin Jack Riley, 2009, Security in Mexico. Implications for U.S. Policy Options, Santa Monica: RAND, p. 37.
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II.

Organized Crime Violence 1. The Evolution of Violence a. National Level

What are the main patterns of Mexican violence? In general, it is a selective type of violence led by rival organizations and police and military authorities, driven by the chronic instability of criminal networks (to which the government has contributed significantly), and their goal to win and retain routes and territories for drug trafficking. Figure 5 shows a dramatic increase in the number of executions in Mexico over the last 44 months. In February 2007 there were approximately 100 executions per month; in August 2010 there were about 1,100. From January 2007 to June 2008 the number of executions oscillated between a 100 and 400 margin. However, in July 2008 the number of executions began to grow systematically until it reached its current figure. There are two violence cycles triggered by a cartel boss detention in January 2008, which caused the split of the Beltrn Leyva faction from the Sinaloa Cartel, and the death of Arturo Beltrn Leyva in December 2009. Cartels boss detentions have increased the national levels of violence. Figure 5. Number of Executions per Month at the National Level (Jan. 2007-Aug. 2010)

Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from Reforma (2007-2009). Data for 2010 was collected from execution information from 19 national and regional newspapers. For 2007: Rolando Herrera, Cimbra al pas narcoviolencia, Reforma, January 7, 2008, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010: http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa_libre.aspx?ValoresForma=9446881066,ejecutadospormes2007&md5libre=5ea8feb75f2d7d3041e9188d3ba5ab0d For 2008: Ejecutmetro, Reforma, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010: http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/ For 2009: Benito Jimnez, Superan ejecuciones la cifra de todo 2009, Reforma, August 8, 2010, retrieved from Internet on August 11, 2010: http://busquedas.gruporeforma.com/reforma/Documentos/DocumentoImpresa_libre.aspx?ValoresForma=12044951066,ejecuciones2009&md5libre=3683c5148a45ffe5766715585a0f4237

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Recently, the Mexican government has revealed some figures related to Mexican violence. According to the National Security Council Technical Secretary, from December 2006 to July 2010 there have been 28,353 organized crime related homicides. According to this version, 80 percent of the organized crime related violence was caused by seven conflicts among cartels. These conflicts are the following: 1. Crtel de Sinaloa versus Crtel de Jurez (Chihuahua, Durango and Sinaloa) 2. Crtel de Sinaloa versus Crtel de los Beltrn Leyva (Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Nayarit, Jalisco and Guerrero) 3. Crtel de Sinaloa versus Crtel del Golfo (Durango, Coahuila, Sinaloa, Guerrero, Tabasco, Quintana Roo and Chiapas) 4. Crtel de Sinaloa versus Crtel de Tijuana (Baja California) 5. Crtel de La Familia Michoacana versus Crtel de los Zetas (Michoacn, Estado de Mxico, Guerrero and Guanajuato) 6. Crtel del Golfo versus Crtel de los Zetas (Tamaulipas and Nuevo Len) 7. Crtel de La Familia Michoacana versus Crtel de los Beltrn Leyva (Guerreo and Morelos) Furthermore, according to the federal government, this 80 percent of the executions have taken place in 162 municipalities around the country. If the killings continue to increase at the current rate the total number of executions will rise to about 75,000 by the time the government's term in office ends in December 2012.

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b. State and Local Level Violence increased in 21 of Mexico's 32 states during the first half of 2010. In 12 states (which include the six northern border states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo Len and Tamaulipas) the growth of violence has been associated with increased collaboration between gangs and cartels. Table 9. Violence Trends by Mexican State (Based on January-June 2010 Executions)
State Trend State Trend Morelos Aguascalientes Nayarit Baja California Nuevo Len BCS Oaxaca Campeche Puebla Coahuila Quertaro Colima Quintana Roo Chiapas SLP Chihuahua Sinaloa Distrito Federal Sonora Durango Tabasco Guanajuato Tamaulipas Guerrero Tlaxcala Hidalgo Veracruz Jalisco Yucatn Mxico Zacatecas Michoacn Note: Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on the known information.

In Ciudad Jurez, for example, located in Chihuahua, the largest and most violent gangs (such as Barrio Azteca or Mexicles, each with about 3,000 members) are employed by drug cartels to smuggle, import weapons, murder, extort and kidnap. Frequent police action against gangs is often the decisive factor that pushes them to co-operate with the cartels, which offer them protection, among other benefits. But in Mexico there are other types of violence that are not associated with gangs, which have distinct dynamics. For example, in states such as Sinaloa, Michoacn and Durango violence is not linked to gangs, but to clashes between disciplined bureaucracies of gunmen engaged in transporting and guarding drug routes and territories. Table 10 shows that the five most violent states in terms of executions between January 2007 and June 2010 were Chihuahua (5,708), Sinaloa (2,935), Guerrero (1,766), Michoacn (1,605), Durango (1,492) and Baja California (1,463). In nine states the number of executions decreased from 2008 to 2009, these states are: Aguascalientes (38-34), Baja California (617-320), Campeche (3-2), Estado de Mxico (360-354), Hidalgo (37-36), Oaxaca (49-6), San Luis Potos (40-7), Tamaulipas (110-49) and Yucatn (17-0). The national total grew from 5,207 in 2008 to 6,587 in 2009.

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Table 10. Number of Executions by State


State Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Campeche Coahuila Colima Chiapas Chihuahua D.F. Durango Estado de Mxico Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo San Luis Potos Sinaloa Sonora Tabasco Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatn Zacatecas 2006 2 163 1 3 17 2 14 130 137 64 31 25 186 16 45 543 10 1 50 17 4 0 9 1 350 61 19 181 0 25 0 12 2007 27 154 1 2 29 0 12 147 145 124 111 40 253 37 92 238 17 2 107 33 2 4 34 13 346 125 24 88 1 48 1 13 2008 38 617 0 3 53 5 30 138 272 360 61 294 37 148 233 28 5 79 49 15 7 18 40 686 137 20 110 1 30 17 24 2009 34 320 1 2 151 12 30 173 637 354 146 638 36 212 371 77 22 99 6 26 14 27 7 767 152 54 49 3 55 0 30 2010* 11 209 6 6 188 20 34 72 395 251 56 395 8 160 220 84 109 217 59 19 6 26 26 786 218 22 379 0 45 1 7 Total 112 1,463 9 16 438 39 120 5,708 665 1,492 1,107 328 1,766 134 657 1,605 216 139 552 164 66 31 114 87 2,935 693 139 807 5 203 19 86

1,652 2,082 1,697

Total 2,119 2,270 5,207 6,587 5,732 21,915 Source: Own elaboration with data from Reforma for 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, and 2010 from a database with data from 19 national and state newspapers. http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_ 2009/ Note: Data for 2010 is from January to June 2010

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During the first semester of 2010 the most violent municipalities have been Juarez (17.5 percent of the executions), Chihuahua (4.7), Culiacn (4.5), Tijuana (3.3), Torren (2.7), Gmez Palacio (2.3) and Mazatln (2.3). At the local level, violence is concentrated in six clusters or high-violence zones. The following table enlists the municipalities that integrate each of these clusters and map 2 shows the clusters locations Table 11. Six Clusters of Violent Municipalities (2007-2010)
Zone 1 (Baja California) Ensenada Tijuana Tecate Zone 2 (Chihuahua) Casas Grandes Ascensin Jurez Guadalupe Ahumada Zone 3 (Chihuahua) Chihuahua Cuauhtmoc Delicias Camargo Hidalgo del Parral Zone 4 (Sinaloa) Ahome San Ignacio Guasave Sinaloa Salvador Alvarado Mocorito Navolato Culiacn Badiraguato Zone 5 (Michoacn) Morelia Uruapan Apatzingn La Huacana Lzaro Crdenas Zone 6 (Guerrero) Zihuatanejo Petatln Tcpan Acapulco Chilpancingo Iguala Arcelia Pungarabato Coyuca

Source: Own ellaboration.

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Map 1. Six Violent Municipalities Clusters (2007-2010)

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At the local level, during 2010 the phenomenon of executed majors has intensified. As September 2010 nine mayors have been executed by organized crime (two from Chihuahua, two from Oaxaca, and one from Guerrero, Durango, Nuevo Len, Tamaulipas and San Luis Potos). (See Appendix III Table 18) Ciudad Jurez: Causes and Mechanisms of Violence Given the exceptional violence levels reached in Ciudad Jurez, maybe here it is possible to see more clearly the internal mechanisms that generate, amplify, escalate and spill over violence. Ciudad Jurez is, by far, the most violent municipality in the country. During the January 2007-June 2010 period around 4,500 executions have been registered in this municipality. In mid-2008 the number of executions in Ciudad Jurez increased till it accumulated 20 percent of national total of executions. This trend has sustained along 2009 and 2010. Probably, Ciudad Jurez will close the year with 2,861 executions; this is about 21 percent of the national projected total.23 How did violence arrive to Ciudad Jurez? Why it has increased exponentially? Along the process of violence in Ciudad Jurez can be distinguished the following groups of events: 1. Alfredo Beltrn Leyva arrest Detachment of the Beltrn Leyva faction from the Sinaloa Cartel Frame of a coalition of organizations (Beltrn Leyva-Zeta-Jurez) to displace the Sinaloa Cartel from the border passage in Ciudad Jurez-El Paso. This sequence of events had the effect of activating or "igniting" the conflict in Ciudad Juarez, so this is called the "igniting effect." 2. The conflicting cartels hired teams of hitmen to undertake and sustain the war There was a massive recruitment of gang members by cartels There was an alignment of gangs with the warring sides in Ciudad Jurez The cartels provided weapons to the gangs. This sequence of events has the effect of "amplifying" the conflict, to swell the manpower and weaponry of each side; this is why it is named the "amplification effect." 3. Neither side have sufficient capacity to defeat the other The authorities are not involved in direct confrontation to the sides in dispute Security and law enforcement agencies are not able to investigate the vast majority of violent events and to enforce the law. There were a few random arrests. These events have the effect to "escalate" the conflict and the levels of violence, so it is categorized as the "escalation effect." 4. The exacerbation of violence encouraged the involvement of more criminal organizations and gangs in the dispute to strengthen the ranks of each party The decapitation of such organizations and gangs often encouraged fragmentation Territorial disputes provoked that some criminal organization and gangs move to other places. These events have the effect of "spreading" violence to other areas, thus increasing violence in new, towns or municipalities that is why it is referred to as "spillover effect".

Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on the known information from a database retrieved from 19 national and local newspapers.
23

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2. Causes of Violence Even though a systematic study about the causes of the increasing violence in Mexico has not been made, there are two promising hypotheses. According to the U.N. 2010 World Drug Report, one reason behind the violence in Mexico is that drug traffickers are fighting over a shrinking cocaine market. Indeed, cocaine consumption has fallen significantly in the United States over the past few years. The retail value of the U.S. cocaine market has declined by about two-thirds in the 1990s, and by about one quarter in the past decade. However, the U.N. 2010 World Drug Report does not elaborate on this idea and does not mention the specific mechanisms that have triggered Mexican violence. The second hypothesis has to do with the effects of arrests and seizures on executions. A detailed analysis of the data available reveals the following patterns of impact for detentions: 1. The impact of arrests on violence spreads to several months after they were performed. 2. The arrests of drug cartel bosses increase levels of violence, regardless of the cartel to which they belong. 3. The arrests of cartel members operating for the Jurez, Tijuana and Beltrn Leyva cartels have decreased violence (probably several of them were hitmen leaders). The same thing happened in 2009 with the arrests of members of the Golfo Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel members (although in the latter case, the violence took a month to drop). 4. However, in the case of arrests of members from La Familia Michoacana and Zetas detentions have increased levels of violence. In the case of seizures: 1. The impact of seizures on violence can extend several months after the seizures event, and their effect is also mixed: there are seizures that increase violence and others that decrease it. 2. Seizures of heroin, cocaine and marijuana have steadily increased the levels of violence in the past three years. 3. The seizure of weapons and money systematically decreased violence. This type of analysis could be useful in designing a new strategy that, in addition to weaken organized crime, avoids triggering uncontrollable waves of violence. But for such strategy to be viable two conditions are required: that the security agencies have the ability to implement a targeted strategy of arrests and seizures; and that the decrease, or at least the containment, of violence becomes the new additional objective of the government strategy. A focused strategy of arrests and seizures means favoring police actions that reduce violence, such as the arrest of hitmen leaders and multi-homicides and the seizures of weapons and money. It must also be designed a specific strategy to confront the most violent cartels such as Zetas or La Familia Michoacana. This is because these cartels organization, and their operation and deployment tactics, make them a singular threat.24

Eduardo Guerrero, Organized Crime and Violence in Mexico (2007-2009): Empirical Explorations. Mexico, D.F.: Lantia Consultores, April 2010, 36 pp.
24

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III.

Government Strategy and Actions against Organized Crime 1. Strategy

The main objective of the Mexican government with its war on drugs seems to be the generation of hundreds of small criminal organizations that do not represent (for their size) a threat to the state and its monopoly on the use of force (as in Colombia). This implies the replacement of current large cartels in extended parts of the country with a variety of small drug enterprises. Without denying that this goal could be achieved at some point, the fact is that given the size, number, resources, capacities (of violence, among others), and the social base that the Mexican cartels currently have, the transition could be long and costly in terms of social welfare and human lives. Moreover, in this hypothetical scenario the drug market would not be affected; quite on the contrary, there would be a more competitive market composed of businesses that, because of their small size and high mobility, would be more elusive to the authorities. President Caldern has deployed an estimated 40,000 troops since December 2006, launching his first military antidrug operation (Operacin Michoacn) on December 11 of that year. Michoacn was particularly hard hit by violence in 2006: there were more than 560 murders and 17 beheadings, and six police officers were assassinated. This mixed operation involved 7,000 personnel, 5,300 of whom came from various forces, and included armored cars, aircraft and surface vessels. Also, in 2006, Mexico launched the Northern Border Initiative, a federal-state effort to fight violence that included the deployment of 800 federal police officers to Nuevo Laredo, who joined the 300 federal officers already deployed there under Operacin Mxico Seguro. According to President Calderon Third Government Report (2009), SEDENA has deployed a monthly average of 48,750 soldiers (24.1 percent of the total) that have participated in anti-drug operatives between September 1, 2008 and June 2009. Hence, from January 2008 to June 2008 and 2009 periods, SEMAR has deployed a monthly average of 7,324 navy elements (14.1 percent of the total for both years) in antidrug traffic operatives. In sum, the total number of military elements deployed by both agencies is 56,074, which represents 22 percent of the total in 2008 and 2009. 2. Actions a. Arrests The number of detainees in 2004 rose well above the national average registered between 1994 and 2003. During the first half of the current government, however, the number of detainees was similar to those from the last two years of the previous government. Thus it can be said that the number of detainees per year has been stable since 2004.

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Figure 6. Detainees Related to Drug Trafficking Activities (1994-2009)


25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Detainees Average

Source: Data from Informes de Gobierno from 1994 to 2008 (Government Reports). 2009 figures are lineally projected based on the same years monthly average.

When we classify the number of detainees by hierarchical level, the distribution is quite uneven: 96 percent of detainees belong to the lowest two ranks of organized crime organizations, 0.2 percent of detainees are top members, and 3.8 percent are specialized or logistics operators. Figure 7. Percentage of Detainees by Hierarchy Level
0.2% 2.0% 1.8%

Boss Specialized Operator Logistics Operator

55.2% 40.8%

Hitmen/Guardian Operative Base

Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins

The following table shows that the current government has made great efforts to increase the number of detainees belonging to the three highest levels within criminal organizations. That is, although the total number of detainees linked to organized crime remains more or less the same since 2004, top-level arrests have increased year by year from 2007 to 2010 (as shown in Table 12 below). For example, Sinaloa, Golfo, Zetas, La Familia Michoacana and Beltrn Leyva suffered the highest number of boss detentions during 2009 in comparison with those suffered in the first two years of this government. It is quite likely that the increase in bosses arrests is linked with the increase in conflicts and confrontations among criminal organizations and between criminal organizations and the government.

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Table 12. Detainees by Cartel and Hierarchy Level


Hierarchical Level 2007 2008 2009 Total Bosses 1 1 2 Specialized Operator Sinaloa/Pacfico 2 1 9 8 12 9 23 18 Logistics Operator 1 2 3 Bosses 1 1 Specialized Operator 10 Golfo 2 9 3 19 10 38 15 Logistics Operator 8 6 8 22 Bosses 3 3 Specialized Operator Zetas 3 10 16 6 29 6 Logistics Operator 3 10 7 20 Bosses 1 1 Specialized Operator Beltrn Leyva 0 2 8 4 10 4 Logistics Operator 2 3 5 Bosses 3 3 Specialized Operator La Familia Michoacana 0 1 12 3 13 3 Logistics Operator 1 6 7 Bosses 1 1 Tijuana / Arellano Flix 4 0 0 4 Specialized Operator 3 3 Bosses 1 1 Jurez / Carrillo Fuentes Specialized Operator 1 11 1 1 13 1 Logistics Operator 1 10 11 Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins. This table does not include data for Milenio, Daz Parada and Colima cartels. Cartel

Six cartel bosses have been extradited to the U.S during the current administration. One of them was a Colombian cartel boss and partner of the Beltrn Leyva cartel. PGR information reveals that until February 2010, 316 criminals have been extradited, of which 299 have been extradited to the U.S. Table 13. Cartel Bosses Extradited to U.S. During the Current Administration (December 2006 to August 2010)
Name Hctor Palma Salazar Osiel Crdenas Guilln Miguel Caro Quintero Ever Villafae Martnez Vicente Zambada Niebla scar Arriola Mrquez Organization Sinaloa Golfo Sonora Beltrn Leyva and Norte del Valle (Colombia) Sinaloa Los Arriola Extradition Date January 19, 2007 January 20, 2007 February 25, 2009 April 17, 2009 February 18, 2010 March 4, 2010

b. Seizures i. Drugs

From December 2006 to February 2010, 90.4 percent of the national marijuana seizures took place in only 10 states, and 26.4 percent of the total occurred in Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua alone, the region known as the Golden Triangle. In the case of cocaine seizures, the vast majority of seizures occurred in Oaxaca, with 26.5 percent. Also, the number of cocaine seizures was highly concentrated in 10 states. In the case of heroin seizures, 59.5 percent occurred in three states: Sonora, Sinaloa and Chihuahua. Finally, 34

99.6 percent of methamphetamine seizures happened in just six states, in which Baja California represented 25.7 percent of the seizures. In an aggregated sense, Michoacn, Estado de Mxico and Jalisco consistently appeared on the top four seizures list. Table 14. States with the Largest Proportions of Drug Seizures (December 2006 - February 2010)
Place Marijuana Seizures Cocaine Seizures Heroin Seizures State % State % State % 1 Sonora 21.3 Oaxaca 26.5 Sinaloa 26.3 2 Tamaulipas 13.5 D.F. 13.8 Sonora 21.1 3 Sinaloa 12.4 Sonora 10.4 Chihuahua 12.1 4 Baja California 11.8 Chiapas 5.9 Nayarit 10.5 5 Durango 7.3 Mxico 5.8 D.F. 10.0 6 Chihuahua 6.7 Tamaulipas 5.6 Baja California 4.7 7 Nuevo Len 6.2 Guerrero 4.6 Jalisco 4.2 8 Michoacn 4.5 Quintana Roo 4.5 Michoacn 3.7 9 Coahuila 3.4 Campeche 3.5 Zacatecas 3.2 10 Jalisco 3.3 1.3 Total 90.4 81.7 95.8 88.1 Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national newspapers, and ten regional or state newspapers. Methamphetamine Seizures State % Baja California 25.7 Michoacn 10.5 Mxico 10.1 Jalisco 9.9 Sinaloa 8.1 Sonora 7.9 Colima 7.7 Chiapas 4.2 D.F. 4.0

As shown in the following figures (Figures 8, 9,10 and 11), the amount of marijuana seized during the current administration is similar to the amount seized during President Foxs administration, and both are well above the amounts seized during President Zedillos term. Regarding cocaine seizures, 2007 was well above average. In the case of opium gum seizures, the average has decreased in comparison with 2001 and 2004 levels. Heroin seizures have been constant between 2000 and 2009. According to U.S. authorities, the Mexican governments increased pressure on cartels coincided with cocaine shortages in 37 U.S. cities and a 24 percent increase in the retail price of cocaine, from $95.89 to $118.70 per gram, from January to September 2007.25 According to the National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 (NDTA), the decrease registered since 2007 in the amount of seized marijuana is because the army is focused on the campaign against organized crime instead of crop eradication. Besides its regular duties in case of an emergency caused by natural disaster, the army also participates in public security responsibilities and surveillance over strategic sites.

25

Executive Office of the President, U.S. National Drug Control Policy Report (October 2007).

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Figure 8. Marijuana Seizures (Tons)


2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Marijuana Average

Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.

Figure 9. Cocaine Seizures (Tons)


60 50 40 30 20 10 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Cocaine Average

Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.

Figure 10. Opium Gum Seizures (Kilograms)


600 400 200 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Opium Gum Average

Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.

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Figure 11. Heroin Seizures (Kilograms)


600 400 200 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Heroine 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average

Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.

ii.

Weapons and Vehicles

There has been an important increase in the number of weapons and vehicles seizures. These two are fundamental resources for organized crime business. In the case of weapons seizures it is possible that this increase might be related to a higher availability of weapons in the country. Figure 12. Weapons Seizures (Units, Includes Long and Short Weapons)
40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Weapons Average

Source: Own elaboration with data from Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.

In the case of vehicles, organized crime frequently uses them for drugs and weapons transportation. It is remarkable that the amount of confiscated vehicles over the last three years is superior to the amount seized during the previous 13 years.

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Figure 13. Seized Vehicles (Units)


15,000 10,000 5,000 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Vehicles Average

Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.

c. Dismantled Laboratories and Crop Eradication In terms of dismantled laboratories and crop eradication, these actions have been concentrated in nine states. Between these two actions there is also a high degree of concentration of dismantled laboratories in Michoacn, with 22.9 percent; and crop eradication in Sinaloa, with 28.4 percent (see Appendix IV Table 27). Regarding marijuana and poppy crop eradication, it is possible to note that during President Calderons administration, the amount of eradicated crops is below the registered average since 1994. Above average eradication occurred between 1999 to 2006 in the case of marijuana, and 2000 to 2006 in the case of poppy. The next figure shows a dramatic increase in the number of dismantled illegal drug laboratories. In the first two years of President Calderns term, the levels were kept within the average from previous years. Figure 14. Dismantled Laboratories (2000-2009)
250 200 150 100 50 0 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 Average 2008 2009 Laboratories Dismantled

Source: Vicente Fox, Quinto Informe de Gobierno (Fifth Government Report); Felipe Caldern, First, Second and Third Government Reports; Fifth Attorney General Management Report (2005). Note: There is no available data for 2006.

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Figure 15. Marijuana Eradication (Hectares)


40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Marijuana Average

Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.

Figure 16. Poppy Eradication (Hectares)


25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Poppy Average

Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). Figures for 2009 are lineally projected based on monthly averages.

In terms of the number of drug seizures, Baja California occupies the first place in amphetamine stimulant seizures, Sinaloa is the first one in eradicated crops and heroin seizures, Sonora holds the first place in marijuana seizures and marijuana eradication, and Oaxaca is first place regarding cocaine. (See Appendix IV Table 22) Table 15 shows that eradication of marijuana decreased in 2009 with relation to 2007 and poppy eradication increased in the same period. The number of seizures of marijuana and cocaine dropped in 2009 with relation to 2007. On the contrary, opium, heroin, vehicles and weapons seizures increased during this period. In relation to detentions, they only decreased in the case of foreigners detained.

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Table 15. Variation in Seizures, Crop Eradication and Detentions (2007 and 2009)
Concept Crop Eradication (Hectares) 2007 2009* Variation Marijuana 23,316 15,994 -31.40 Poppy 11,411 19,133 67.68 Marijuana (ton.) 2,213 1,349 -39.06 Cocaine (ton.) 48 24 -50.00 Opium (kg.) 307 312 1.37 Seizures Heroin (kg.) 317 407 28.37 Vehicles (iu.) 5,400 11,764 117.85 Weapons (iu.) 9,527 60,064 530.46 Mexicans 22,184 22,594 1.85 Foreigners 100 90 -10.00 Detentions Publicly Released* 1,028 2,820 174.3 Affiliated to Cartels 338 1,811 435.80 *These detentions appeared in PGR press bulletins from 2007 to 2009.

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IV.

The Drug Market 1. Production

According to the National Drug Threat Assessment 2010 the production of heroin in Mexico increased from 17 pure metric tons in 2007 to 38 pure metric tons in 2008. The same source shows that marijuana production in Mexico also increased from 15,800 metric tons in 2007 to 21,500 metric tons in 2008. NDTA also indicates that methamphetamine production has increased sharply in Mexico because of traffickers ability to circumvent restrictions on chemical precursors and employ alternative production methods, despite strong restrictions on ephedrine and pseudoephedrine imports on the side of the Mexican Government. Finally, NDTA points out that it is very likely that the amount of cocaine being transported from Colombia through the U.S-Mexico border decreased in 2009. Marijuana, poppy, heroin and amphetamines are produced in states such as Chihuahua and Sinaloa. In the cases of Durango and Guerrero, marijuana, poppy and heroin are produced. There are states where just one kind of drug is produced like Puebla (poppy) or Tamaulipas (heroin). The states with the highest illegal drug production incidence are Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Sonora, Durango, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacn, Nayarit, Baja California, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Oaxaca and Zacatecas. (See Appendix V Table 28) 2. Prices

The next figure shows the wholesale prices of different drugs in the U.S, Canada and Mexico. In all cases, the lowest wholesale prices are found in Mexico. Drug prices increase according to how far they are from its place of origin. Thus, a drug produced in Mexico tends to be more expensive in Canada than in the U.S. This is because usually the protractor or distributor has to pay to local personnel in order to move its illegal drug shipment. Figure 17. Wholesale Price in USD per Kilogram (2008)
140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0
119,431

57,500 35,000 38,761 26,500 12,500 5,935 6,690 16,687 80 36,660 7,846

Heroin

Cocaine Canada USA

Cannabis Herb Mexico

Methamphetamine

Source: Own elaboration with data from U.N. 2010 World Drug Report. Data for amphetamines in Mexico taken from Encuesta Nacional de Adicciones 2008, Secretara de Salud.

Prices at the state level. The Mexican National Addictions Survey has been conducted twice: in 2002 and 2008. The price per dose for twelve different drugs is publicly available in the 2008 survey. The available data and information regarding prices in the survey has several limitations, so a caveat exists to the analysis resulting from it. This is, however, the only public and systematic available information on the

41

matter in Mexico. Limitations include that the price of a drug is based on a "dose" measurement, and thus it is not clearly specified. Also, the price of an illicit substance greatly depends on its level of purity, and this factor is not considered in survey answers. Finally, figures are shown for just one year and not all illicit substances have enough observations to estimate a state-level representative price for the illicit drug. Tables 29 and 30 in the Appendix show that drug prices differ across the country. There are states, such as Chiapas and Estado de Mxico, where the maximum drug price for one heroin dose is 3,000 and 2,000 pesos respectively, while in states like Durango and Aguascalientes the highest price for the same drug dose is 100 and 50 pesos, respectively. Regarding marijuana, the minimum dose price is 50 pesos (Yucatn) and the maximum is 1,500 pesos (Tlaxcala). In the case of cocaine, the highest price is 1,000 pesos (Baja California and Tabasco) and the lowest is 200 pesos (Coahuila, Colima, Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Sinaloa and San Luis Potos). Finally, the price for an amphetamines dose varies from 15 pesos (Oaxaca) to 1,200 pesos (Estado de Mxico). Using a geometric mean26, the states where are found the cheapest illicit drug doses are Chihuahua (where none of the drug prices is above average, except hallucinogens), Hidalgo and Michoacn (where only one drug price is above average). The states with the most expensive drugs are Campeche (where 12 drug prices are above average), Estado de Mxico, Quintana Roo and Tabasco (where nine drug prices are above average). The most expensive drug dose in the country is a tranquilizer dose in Morelos (547.7 pesos) and the cheapest drug dose is a sedative/barbiturates dose in Colima (2.0 pesos). At the national level, the highest drug price for a dose is for heroin (186 pesos) and the lowest average drug price is for inhalable drugs (27.1 pesos). The drugs with the widest price variation per dose are tranquilizers (29.2-547.7 pesos), ecstasy (38.7-353.6 pesos), heroin (50-350 pesos), others (20-300 pesos) and hallucinogens (26.6-300 pesos). On the contrary, the drugs with narrowest price variations per dose are marijuana (21.8-88.7 pesos), inhalable drugs (11.1-100), cocaine (82.5-184.6 pesos), crack (46.8-173.2 pesos) and sedatives and barbiturates (2202.1 pesos). Based on price ranges, the cheapest drugs are opium and inhalable drugs, and the most expensive drugs are heroin, sedatives/barbiturates, cocaine and ecstasy. It is important to note that the one peso dose is sometimes used as a means to hook potential consumers, that is, as an introductory price for consumers with the purpose to promote addiction and, consequently, increase the price of the same drug in future transactions. 3. Data Analysis of Drug State Prices

An exploratory analysis of state price data for 2008 leads to interesting findings regarding the factors that influence price variations of the major drugs in Mexico (marijuana, heroin, cocaine and amphetamine). The factors which influence state-level prices are the following: consumption, state ranking for each drug seizure, level of detentions, number of elements in the state police and number of elements in the municipal police.

A geometric mean allows considering all the prices, nevertheless it gives less weight to extreme values, eliminating bias provoked by outliers.
26

42

The next figure illustrates a statistically significant relationship between the price of marijuana and the national ranking of the seizures of marijuana. This relationship implies that as states are positioned among the first places in marijuana seizures, they have lower prices compared to those states that are positioned below in the ranking. This allows us to infer that in the marijuana market, seizures do not reduce the quantity offered and consequently the price of this drug is not affected when scarcity increases. Under this premise the states with the highest seizure events and lowest prices are those that can be considered major marijuana producers in Mexico. Such is the case in the states of Sonora, Sinaloa, Durango, Tamaulipas, Chiapas and Baja California. Figure 18. Correlation between State Ranking in Number of Marijuana Seizures and Prices
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 0 Marijuana Mean Average Prices
GTO CHIS TAB MOR MX CAMP HGO TLAX

MICH TAM SIN SON BC NL COAH CHI DUR ZAC JAL BCS NAY GRO COL SLP OAX

QROO QRO PUE AGS VER DF

YUC

10

15 20 State Ranking on Marijuana Seizures

25

30

35

On the other hand, data analysis shows that, in the case of Mexico, the price of one dose of heroin increases 6.8 pesos (equivalent to an increase of 4.6 percent) for every position increase in the national ranking of heroin seizures. This also applies to marijuana, where a higher position in the marijuana seizures ranking increases the price of a dose by 2.6 percent. It is interesting to note that the increase in state and municipal police officers has a positive impact, although very marginal, in the increase in prices of doses of marijuana and heroin.

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4.

Market Value and Estimated Income

Recently the Federal Secretary of Public Security produced an estimate of the potential consumption and wholesale market in Mexico. According to these figures, it is a market of around $560 million USD. Table 16. Mexican Drug Wholesale Market
Drug Potential Consumption (Tons) Wholesale Market (million dollars)

Marijuana 514.9 41.2 Cocaine 27.7 345.7 Heroin 3.9 138.2 Amphetamine 4.3 33.7 Total 550.7 558.8 Average 137.7 139.7 Source: Informe del Estado de la Seguridad Pblica en Mxico. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atencin Ciudadana de la Polica Federal (Secretara de Seguridad Pblica) http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_ publica.pptx.

The size of the Mexican market contrasts with the American market, which according to SSP data has an estimated retail value of $61,384.2 million USD. Table 17. U.S. Drug Market Value
Drug Potential Wholesale Wholesale Consumption/Potential Value per Ton Market (USD Export (tons) (USD millions) millions) Retail Value per Ton (USD millions) Retail Market (USD millions) Estimate Gross Profit

Marijuana 4,067.3 2.0 8,134.6 10.4 42,299.9 34,165.3 Cocaine 88.0 28.5 2,508.3 97.4 8,572.2 6,063.9 Heroin 43.3 71.2 3,081.5 131.6 5,696.7 2,615.2 Amphetamine 37.7 65.8 2,479.5 127.7 4,815.4 2,335.9 Total 4,236.3 16,203.9 61,384.2 45,180.3 Source: Informe del estado de la Seguridad Pblica en Mxico. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atencin Ciudadana de la Polica Federal (Secretara de Seguridad Pblica) http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx.

The drug that generates the largest income to Mexican drug traffickers is cocaine, followed by marijuana. Given the lack of reliable data about the drug market, the estimated income ranges are wide. Other studies have estimated the income of the illegal drug trade to be between $2,660 and $7,980 million USD.

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Table 18. Estimated Income for the Illegal Drugs Trade


Value per tons (USD Estimated Income (USD millions) millions) Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Lower Limit Upper Limit Cocaine 165 320 10 15 1,650 4,800 Marijuana 1,000 2,000 1 1 550 2,000 Heroin 6 10 50 70 300 700 Methamphetamine 16 32 10 15 160 480 Total 1,187 2,362 2,660 7,980 Source: U.N. 2010 World Drug Report and Informe del Estado de la Seguridad Pblica en Mxico. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atencin Ciudadana de la Polica Federal (Secretara de Seguridad Pblica) http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx. Drug Export Volume (tons)

In relation to drug traffic income, various American agencies give different estimates: the National Drug Intelligence Center estimates between $13,600 and $48,400 million USD (for Mexico and Colombia); U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement estimates between $19,000 and $29,000 million USD (Mexico only); and the drug Enforcement Agency estimates between $8,300 and $24,900 million USD (only Mexico). The U.N. 2010 World Drug Report states that total income for cocaine, heroin and marijuana would be $5,300 million USD. Clearly there is no agreement regarding this information. 5. Transportation and Distribution a. Points of Entry, Routes of Transportation and Points of Exit The next tables and map show that there is a close relationship between organized crime violence and the geography of the drug business. Table 19 shows municipalities considered strategic points of entry or exit for drug traffic in Mexico. Coincidentally, most of these municipalities register high levels of violence. It is important to note that all the points of entry are located along the Pacific Ocean, and all the points of exit are located along the U.S.-Mexico border. Table 19. Violent Municipalities in Drug Entry and Exit Zones
Entry or Exit Zone Number Entry Zone 1 Entry Zone 2 Entry Zone 3 Exit Zone 1 Exit Zone 2 Exit Zone 3 Exit Zone 4 Municipalities Acapulco, Tecpan de Galeana, Ixtapa-Zihuatanejo and Coyuca (Guerrero), Lzaro Crdenas (Michoacn) Mazatln, Navolato, San Ignacio and Ahome (Sinaloa) Ensenada and Punta Baja (Baja California) Reynosa (Tamaulipas) Ciudad Jurez and Guadalupe de Bravo (Chihuahua) Nogales (Sonora) Mexicali, Tecate and Tijuana (Baja California)

Table 20 shows violent municipalities located between points of entry and exit within Mexico forming drug transport routes. However, not all of them show the same degree of violence. Low levels of violence may be a delineating result of the following circumstances: 1) there is a predominant cartel in the municipality and it exerts control over the route; 2) the municipal police is corrupted and controlled by the predominant cartel; and, 3) there are no internal disputes within the predominant cartel. For example, the cases of Salina

45

Cruz, Oaxaca, and Manzanillo, Colima are two points of entry along the Pacific Ocean with low violence rates. Table 20. Violent Municipalities in Drug Transport Routes
Violent Municipalities Chilpancingo, Iguala, Cuernavaca and Distrito Federal Entry Zone 1 to Exit Zone 1 Ciudad Altamirano, Morelia and Monterrey Apatzingn, Uruapan, Morelia and Monterrey Ciudad Altamirano, Uruapan, Aguascalientes, Torren-Gmez Route 1 Palacio, Camargo, Delicias and Chihuahua Ciudad Altamirano, Uruapan, Guadalajara, Durango, Hidalgo Entry Zone 1 to Exit Zone 2 Route 2 del Parral and Chihuahua Apatzingn, Uruapan, Guadalajara, Durango, Hidalgo del Route 3 Parral and Chihuahua Pueblo Nuevo, Durango, Torren-Gmez Palacio and Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 1 Route 1 Monterrey Route 1 Pueblo Nuevo, Durango, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua Culiacn, Badiraguato, Guadalupe Calvo, Hidalgo del Parral Route 2 Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 2 and Chihuahua Guasave, Guamuchil, Mocorito, Badiraguato, Guadalupe Route 3 Calvo, Hidalgo del Parral and Chihuahua Culiacn, Guamuchil, Guasave, Ciudad Obregn and Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 3 Route 1 Hermosillo Culiacn, Guamuchil, Guasave, Ciudad Obregn, Hermosillo Entry Zone 2 to Exit Zone 4 Route 1 and Caborca Note: There are no violent municipalities in the route between Entry Zone 3 and Exit Zone 4. Entry and Exit Zones Transport Routes Route 1 Route 2 Route 3

b. Violence and the Geography of Business The next map shows the points of entry in the southern region of the country, and the exit points along the Mexico-U.S. border. The red spots show violent municipalities that are also drug points of entry and exit. The green lines are drug transport routes to Mexico; the orange lines indicate land transport routes within Mexico; the blue lines show sea transport routes within Mexico; and the grey lines show routes into the U.S.

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Map 2. Drug Trafficking Routes and Violent Municipalities

47

6.

Consumption a. International Comparisons

Levels of consumption have grown in the United States and Mexico in all cases. However, in contrast with the United States the problem is not yet a social security problem in Mexico. In the United States almost half of the population has tried a drug at least once in a lifetime, while in Mexico this figure is 5.2 percent. Table 21. U.S.* and Mxico** Illicit Drug Consumption Comparison
2008 U.S. Mexico Millions At least once in lifetime 108.3 2.89 117.3 3.9 Last year 35.1 0.57 35.5 1.1 Last month 19.5 0.34 20.1 0.7 Percentage of population At least once in lifetime 46.0 4.2 47.0 5.2 Last year 14.9 0.8 14.2 1.4 Last month 8.3 0.5 8.0 0.9 * Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau ** Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretara de Salud, Mexico Period U.S. 2002 Mexico

The most commonly used drug, in both the United States and Mexico, is marijuana by far, followed by cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin. The United States registered a slight decrease in the consumption of methamphetamines. This phenomenon had no equivalence in Mexico, where the levels of consumption for this drug increased during the same period. Table 22. U.S.* and Mexico** Illicit Drugs Consumption Comparison: At least one dose in lifetime
2008 U.S. Mexico Millions Marijuana 94.9 2.43 102.4 3.1 Cocaine 33.9 0.86 36.8 1.8 Heroin 3.7 0.06 3.8 0.1 Methamphetamines 15.4 0.06 12.6 0.2 Percentage of population Marijuana 40.4 3.5 41.0 4.2 Cocaine 14.4 1.2 14.7 2.4 Heroin 1.6 0.1 1.5 0.1 Methamphetamines 6.5 0.1 5.0 0.3 *Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau ** Source: National Addictions Survey 2002 and 2008, CONADIC, Secretara de Salud, Mexico Drug U.S. 2002 Mexico

48

The age distribution among drug users has a similar pattern in both countries. Both countries have their largest share of consumers between the ages of 35 to 65. In Mexico, cocaine use doubled from 1.2 percent to 2.4 percent between 2002 and 2008. b. Consumption at the State Level At the state level, 13 states are above the national average on marijuana use. The five states with the highest incidence are Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Baja California, Hidalgo and Distrito Federal. Figure 19. Cumulative Incidence for Marijuana Use by State Total Population (12 to 65 Years Old)
10 8 6 4 2 0
Quintana Roo Tamaulipas Baja California Hidalgo Distrito Federal Chihuahua Quertaro Baja California Sur Durango Tabasco Zacatecas Nayarit Campeche Jalisco Estado de Mxico Sinaloa Yucatn Sonora Morelos Guerrero Aguascalientes Michoacn Nuevo Len Guanajuato Puebla Oaxaca San Luis Potos Veracruz Coahuila Colima Tlaxcala Chiapas % Marijuana Average

Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretara de Salud, Mexico. Note: The adjective Cumulative refers to the consumption history of the individual who answers the survey.

In the case of cocaine use incidence, 13 states are above the national average. The five states with the highest incidence are Quintana Roo, Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango and Hidalgo. Figure 20. Cumulative Incidence for Cocaine use by State Total Population (12 to 65 Years Old)
7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Quintana Roo Tamaulipas Chihuahua Durango Hidalgo Baja California Nayarit Baja California Sur Sinaloa Guerrero Zacatecas Distrito Federal Sonora Aguascalientes Michoacn Quertaro Tabasco Guanajuato Morelos Jalisco Nuevo Len Estado de Mxico Campeche Coahuila Colima Oaxaca Chiapas Puebla Veracruz Tlaxcala Yucatn San Luis Potos % Cocaine Average

Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretara de Salud, Mexico

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For amphetamines, nine states are above the national average. The five states with the highest amphetamine incidence are Baja California, Baja California Sur, Chihuahua, Hidalgo and D.F. Figure 21. Cumulative Incidence for Amphetamine-Type Stimulant Use by State Total Population (12 to 65 years old)
3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 Baja California Baja California Sur Chihuahua Hidalgo Distrito Federal Durango Jalisco Sinaloa Michoacn Sonora Nayarit Nuevo Len Zacatecas Guanajuato Estado de Mxico Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo Colima Guerrero Tabasco Tamaulipas Yucatn Campeche Coahuila Aguascalientes Morelos San Luis Potos Veracruz Chiapas Oaxaca Tlaxcala % Amphetamine-type Stimulants Average

Source: National Addictions Survey 2008, CONADIC, Secretara de Salud

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V.

Public Opinion and the War on Drugs

The Evolution of Public Support over Governmental Actions. A February 2010 survey conducted by Buenda y Laredo shows that most of the public considers that the country is less safe now as a result of President Calderns public security policies: 50 percent of the population thinks that the country is less safe because of the government strategies, 21 percent thinks the country is now safer and 20 percent thinks that the current strategy has had no repercussion on security.27 The same survey by Buenda y Laredo also indicates that for 47 percent of the population the current insecurity situation in the country is a sign of the Governments strategy failure.28 Another Buenda y Laredo survey from May 2010 ranks President Calderns approval at 59 percent, while 52 percent considers that the current administration must change its course because the main problems have not been properly addressed.29 (See Appendix VI Figure 10) Evolution of Public Confidence over Security Forces. While trust in Mexican public institutions has historically been low, confidence in the police is particularly worrying. According to opinion polls, police officers are considered corrupt by 80 percent of Mexicos population, while the armed forces are the most highly respected public institution in the country.30 A national survey conducted by the Citizens Institute for Security Studies (ICESI) in 2009, showed that 72 percent of the respondents do not trust local police, and 57 percent of the population does not trust federal police either.31 The same survey asked the respondents to grade, from 1 to 10, the service they received from several public security agencies: the Federal Police received a 6.6 and the local police (state and municipal) received a 5.7.32 (See Appendix VI Figure 12) Evolution of Public Perception over Insecurity. Personal security concerns include increased crime and lawlessness, police corruption and street gangs. These concerns are apparent in available survey data. For instance, in one survey conducted by ICESI in 2009, 65 percent of respondents reported not feeling safe in the state they inhabit.33 These ICESI surveys also reveal public perceptions about insecurity in Mexico at a municipal and state level. In the case of D.F. where there is no strong presence of cartels, the high perception of insecurity is a result of predatory criminal activities, such as robbery. However, in states such as Durango, Chihuahua, Baja California, Coahuila or Sinaloa, the public perception of insecurity is closely related with the presence of organized crime. At the municipal level the results do not differ greatly, where Chihuahua, D.F., Durango and Baja California also appear with the highest perceptions of insecurity. 34 (See Appendix VI Figure 13) Another survey by Buenda y Laredo shows that the three most worrying issues for Mexicans are related with organized crime: kidnapping, drug cartel violence and robbery, which represented 76 percent of answers.35

Buenda y Laredo, February 2010, Encuesta Nacional. Seguridad y Narcotrfico, p.11. Ibid., p. 13. 29 Buenda y Laredo, May 2010, Encuesta Nacional. Aprobacin Presidencial, p. 7. 30 Gereben et al, Op. Cit. p. xiii. 31 ICESI, 2009, Sexta Encuesta Nacional sobre Inseguridad, p. 81. 32 Ibid., p. 86. 33 Ibid., p. 66. 34 Ibid., p. 66-67. 35 Buenda y Laredo, February 2010, Los Miedos de Mxico, p.3.
27 28

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A survey made by Consulta Mitofsky in June 2010 showed that economic and security issues are the most worrisome topics for the Mexican people. Consistently, over the last four years economic issues have been above security issues. However, since January 2010 the gap between the two has been closing: in January 2010 the difference was 46.8, in June the difference was 21.9.36 (See Appendix VI Figure 9)

36

Consulta Mitofsky, July 2010, Economa, Poltica y Gobierno, p. 7.

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VI.

Final Assessment

1. Lack of a precise initial diagnosis. Given the results of the Mexican war on drugs, during the last three years it seems that the federal government lacked strategic information regarding the following issues. About the enemy: a. Its modern, diverse and powerful set of weapons. Its highly sophisticated logistics. The ease with which weapons enter the national territory. b. Its high intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities. The cartels have penetrated the upper echelons of the SSP and the PGR, as has been revealed by the arrests of Fernando Rivera (SIEDO Intelligence Director), No Rodrguez Mandujano (SIEDO), dgar Enrique Bayardo (PFP Operations Inspector), Gerardo Garay (PFP Commissioner), Francisco Navarro (PFP Head of Special Operations), and Jorge Cruz (PFP Tactical Analysis Director). c. Its abundance of human resources (typically young men grouped into gangs or farmers from the central and southern regions of the country), which allows it to sustain a long and costly war. d. The social protection that it has in countless communities across the country, given its role as a populace benefactor. e. The specific capabilities and vulnerabilities of each of the cartels. About its own capabilities: a. b. c. d. Low intelligence capabilities among the military and the preventive and ministerial police. Organized crime penetration in the highest ranks of security governmental agencies. The inadequate regulatory framework for undertaking a war against organized crime. Bureaucratic conflicts among various security agencies that obstruct their coordination, a key condition of a successful strategy. e. Deficient collaboration and support from the state and municipal forces. Even in some cases, local police agencies have boycotted the work of the federal police and the army. 2. Multiple, vague and sometimes incompatible objectives of the antidrug strategy. The strategy pursues objectives of diverse nature. These objectives lack precise indicators to measure progress. Finally, achieving certain objectives of the strategy hinders the achievement of others. One example: the disarticulation of criminal organizations not only obstructs the recovery of public spaces, but brings about the invasion of new territories. 3. The strategy is focused on processes, not outcomes. The government favors a strategy where high profile arrests and several types of seizures are central components. However, these actions have not had an impact on indicators related to typical organized crime offenses, like kidnapping and extortion. 4. The federal strategy is not backed by state and municipal governments. Probably, this is the major weakness of the federal antidrug strategy. State and municipal authorities have not taken actions to strengthen their institutional capabilities. At the state and municipal levels of government, the security sector budgets are stable, and processes like police professionalization are stagnated. 5. The federal government has advanced in its ambitious agenda of institutional reforms (including a reform to the penal code, the Attorney Generals Office, police professionalization and certification, 53

data management technology, etc.). However these reforms will not have an immediate impact on the dynamics of the Mexican security sector nor in the logic of organized crime activities. 6. Violence has increased systematically in the last three and a half years. Violence trends announce more and more violence in the near future. Government authorities conceive violence as an unavoidable consequence of the strategy, and do not consider it as an indicator of failure. 7. Mexican violence is a phenomenon with distinctive features in each region, linked to specific traits of drug cartels and the presence (or absence) of gangs. Other variables that may change the local dynamics of violence depend on the type of activity in which the violent actor is involved with in the drug market, the extent of police corruption in the region, and the level of social collusion with organized crime. All these factors should be addressed by any program that seriously aims to stabilise or reduce violence in Mexico in the near future.

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Appendix I. Diagnosis c. Main Areas Table 1. Instability in Directive Positions in the Security Sector (December 2006-August 2010)
Name of the Agency Secretara de Gobernacin Name of the Public Official Francisco Ramrez Acua Juan Camilo Mourio Fernando Gmez Mont Jos Francisco Blake Mora Eduardo Medina Mora Juan Miguel Alcantara Soria Arturo Chvez Chvez Roberto Campa Monte Alejandro Rubido Jorge Tello Pen Juan Miguel Alcntara Soria Sigrid Arzt Monte Alejandro Rubido Jorge Tello Pen Alejandro Poir Ardelio Vargas Fosado Edgar Milln Gmez Gerardo Garay Rodrigo Esparza Cristerna Facundo Rosas Date of Appointment December 2006 January 2008 November 2008 July 2010 December 2006 September 7, 2009 September 2009 December 2006 September 2008 March 2009 January 2010 December 2006 April 2009 January 2010 August 2010 December 2006 March 2007 May 2008 November 2008 June 2009 Date of Resignation January 2008 November 2008 July 2010 Present September 2009 September 24, 2009 Present September 2008 March 2009 December 2009 Present April 2009 September 2009 August 2010 Present March 2007 May 2008 November 2008 June 2009 Present

Procuradura General de la Repblica Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pblica (Executive Secretary) Consejo de Seguridad Nacional (Technical Secretary)

Polica Federal (Commisioned)

d. Budget i. Federal Level Table 2. Security Sector Agencies Expenditure Budget (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency SEGOB SEGOB (CISEN) SEDENA SEMAR PGR SSP SSP (PF) 2007 5,896.6 1,292.7 37,353.4 12,703.7 10,691.3 15,851.2 5,477.1 2008 7,167.1 1,351.6 37,087.3 14,237.4 9,902.2 20,970.4 8,449.8 2009 10,543.9 2,615.2 47,942.3 17,649.3 13,528.6 36,175.8 16,757.7 2,010 8,370.6 2,140.6 43,632.4 15,991.9 11,781.5 32,437.8 15,681.1

Total 82,496.3 89,364.4 125,839.9 112,214.2 Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacin 2007, 2008, 2009 y 2010. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (based in 2010).

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Table 3. Expenditure Compared with the Budget of the Security Sector Agencies, 2007 (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency SEGOB SEDENA SEMAR PGR SSP 2007 Budget 5,896.6 37,353.4 12,703.7 10,691.3 15,851.2 Expenditure 6,827.3 39,623.0 14,113.2 10,949.9 20,447.4 % Variation 15.8 6.1 11.1 2.4 29.0

82,496.3 91,960.8 11.5 Total Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacin and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pblica Federal, 2007. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).

Table 4. Expenditure Compared with the Budget of the Security Sector Agencies, 2008 (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency SEGOB SEDENA SEMAR PGR SSP 2008 Budget 7,167.1 37,087.3 14,237.4 9,902.2 20,970.4 Expenditure 7,712.0 39,493.1 16,123.0 9,521.8 22,490.3 % Variation 7.6 6.5 13.2 -3.8 7.2

89,364.4 95,340.2 6.7 Total Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacin and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pblica Federal, 2008. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).

Table 5. Expenditure Compared with the Budget of the Security Sector Agencies, 2009 (Amounts in Millions of Mexican Pesos)
Agency SEGOB SEDENA SEMAR PGR SSP 2009 Budget 10,543.9 47,942.3 17,649.3 13,528.6 36,175.8 Expenditure 9,695.9 49,407.1 17,938.0 11,906.0 36,879.6 % Variation -8.0 3.1 1.6 -12.0 1.9

125,839.9 125,826.5 0.0 Total Source: Presupuesto de Egresos de la Federacin and Cuenta de la Hacienda Pblica Federal, 2009. A GDP deflator, based on the first quarter of each of the two years was used to calculate the amount of the budget at a constant value (2010 base).

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ii.

State Level Table 6. State Budgets


Percentage of Total Security Sector Budget Assigned by Mexican State 1.1 3.6 0.7 0.8 2.7 3.1 1.9 0.8 27.0 0.8 3.8 2.5 1.0 5.8 9.8 3.9 1.0 0.9 3.1 2.6 3.3 1.1 1.4 0.5 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.0 0.7 3.4 1.3 1.2 FASP Federal Transfer (millions of pesos) (3) 97.0 253.2 125.0 97.0 259.5 214.8 175.8 94.8 390.5 147.2 224.8 185.3 156.5 279.1 495.1 224.4 133.1 119.9 238.6 196.4 236.2 118.7 127.4 179.3 176.9 252.4 144.4 231.0 115.9 299.5 134.6 212.9 6,337.3 198.0

State Aguascalientes Baja California (1) Baja California Sur (1) Campeche Chiapas Chihuahua Coahuila Colima Distrito Federal Durango Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco

Budget SSP and PGJ (millions of pesos)

Percentage in Relation to State Budget

Percentage of Spent FASP (3)

706.4 6.1 49.7 2,217.0 7.9 78.7 420.9 5.6 48.8 508.5 4.1 62.3 1,650.0 3.0 12.1 1,945.7 5.2 66.9 1,164.4 3.9 27.3 510.9 7.5 76.2 16,685.0 12.9 11.6 524.6 2.9 34.5 2,380.8 5.9 11.3 1,545.0 4.6 36.0 636.0 2.9 29.2 3,578.6 5.8 8.6 6,087.6 4.5 32.8 Mxico 2,433.9 5.9 44.2 Michoacn Morelos 598.4 4.1 14.8 Nayarit 544.4 4.3 26.6 Nuevo Len 1,905.9 4.1 30.3 Oaxaca 1,639.5 4.2 41.4 Puebla 2,064.5 4.2 40.3 653.1 3.7 39.0 Quertaro Quintana Roo 855.8 5.1 10.6 San Luis Potos 332.9 1.3 75.5 Sinaloa 1,667.4 5.6 32.5 Sonora 1,763.4 5.4 72.1 Tabasco (2) 1,521.6 4.1 21.4 Tamaulipas 1,268.4 4.4 17.4 Tlaxcala 416.1 6.0 30.8 Veracruz 2,076.3 3.0 58.2 Yucatn 825.0 4.8 59.9 Zacatecas 772.1 4.3 37.9 Total 61,900.2 Average 1,934.4 4.9 3.1 38.7 1. Figures corresponding to State Budget Expenditures 2009 2. Figures corresponding to State Budget Expenditures 2008 3. FASP figures corresponding to January-September 2009, http://www.cefp.gob.mx/notas/2009/notacefp0902009.pdf

57

Table 7. SUBSEMUN Contributions to Each State


2008 State Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Campeche Chiapas Chihuahua Coahuila Colima Distrito Federal Durango Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Mxico Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo San Luis Potos Sinaloa Sonora Tabasco Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatn Zacatecas Total Federal Contribution 87.3 287.2 18.0 18.0 66.5 240.7 96.5 27.0 287.2 40.1 152.4 79.1 18.0 236.9 287.2 131.2 27.0 31.4 187.9 23.6 125.2 121.8 58.3 118.8 178.1 146.9 57.6 155.4 18.0 126.8 121.1 18.0 3589.4 Municipal Contribution 29.1 95.7 6.0 6.0 22.2 80.2 32.2 9.0 95.7 13.4 50.8 26.4 6.0 79.0 95.7 43.7 9.0 10.5 62.6 7.9 41.7 40.6 19.4 39.6 59.4 49.0 19.2 51.8 6.0 42.3 40.4 6.0 1196.5 2009 Federal Municipal Contribution Contribution 86.2 275.0 30.0 30.0 108.4 230.0 104.9 41.5 338.6 44.8 182.5 94.9 40.0 266.6 338.6 159.0 56.4 54.6 198.3 36.3 135.0 125.0 66.0 136.6 174.2 152.7 97.5 158.8 30.0 200.9 115.0 30.0 4137.9 28.7 91.7 10.0 10.0 36.1 76.7 35.0 13.8 112.9 14.9 60.8 31.6 13.3 88.9 112.9 53.0 18.8 18.2 66.1 12.1 45.0 41.7 22.0 45.5 58.1 50.9 32.5 52.9 10.0 67.0 38.3 10.0 1379.3

Average 112.2 37.4 129.3 43.1 Source: Cmara de Diputados, 2008 and 2009. http://www.cefp.gob.mx/notas/2008/notacefp0172008.pdf http://www3.diputados.gob.mx/camara/content/download/223013/576691/file/pres entacion_subsemun.pdf

58

Figure 1. Percentage of Security and Enforcement Budget and Crime Incidence per State (2008-2009)
70.0 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 Baja California Chihuahua Sinaloa Quintana Roo Mxico Guerrero Distrito Federal Durango Sonora Oaxaca Coahuila Michoacn Tamaulipas Morelos Baja California Sur Jalisco Puebla Tlaxcala Yucatn Tabasco Aguascalientes Nuevo Len Colima Campeche San Luis Potos Hidalgo Veracruz Guanajuato Zacatecas Quertaro Chiapas Nayarit Incidence (2008) Budget (2009)

Source: Presupuestos de Egresos Estatales, 2010. ndice de Incidencia Delictiva y Violencia 2008 y 2009, CIDAC. http://www.cidac.org/es/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=1000087.

Figure 2. State and Municipal Police Officers per 1,000 Inhabitants and Security Spending (2009)
14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Distrito Federal Colima Coahuila Baja California Nayarit Quintana Roo Guanajuato Baja California Sur Sinaloa Sonora Jalisco Aguascalientes Yucatn Mxico Chihuahua Zacatecas Tabasco Nuevo Len Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Oaxaca Michoacn Chiapas Quertaro Puebla Morelos Campeche San Luis Potos Guerrero Veracruz Hidalgo Durango Budget (2009) Police per 1,000 inhabs. (2009)

Source: Own elaboration with State Budget Expenditures, 2009 and information from SNSP-CON, 2007, 2009 and 2010.

59

e. Military and Police Forces iii. Military Forces Table 8. Military Personnel
Year 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 SEDENA Elements Specialized 102,975 124,497 151,178 155,218 157,142 162,169 168,773 171,952 179,038 182,328 182,328 182,329 182,329 185,143 188,143 191,143 191,143 191,143 196,767 196,710 202,355 202,355 76 216 246 214 249 237 276 242 665 357 496 396 598 4,173 1,106 740 799 402 320 325 333 60* Training 2,990 3,044 3,589 4,145 4,225 5,619 5,056 3,642 4,271 9,506 9,991 9,031 10,079 10,790 6,874 4,705 5,329 5,618 4,640 5,489 5,781 2,485* 34,164 41,816 43,737 46,687 48,072 48,170 53,128 53,128 54,247 53,566 54,972 55,223 49,165 50,026 47,304 47,316 47,644 47,471 50,032 51,680 52,350 Elements SEMAR Specialized 32 79 136 168 113 95 156 184 148 141 159 124 144 186 1,138 1,043 445 432 381 387 259 216* Training 632 512 2,206 1,278 1,138 2,535 1,683 2,955 2,151 957 2,418 2,044 3,159 1,550 1,124 1,410 1,040 1,764 1,152 1,125 1,761 802*

594 5,924 49,043 283 1,647 Average 174,871 Source: Data from Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). *Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.

60

Figure 3. SEMAR Personnel


60,000 50,000 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 0
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

SEMAR

Average

Source: Data from Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report).

Figure 4. SEDENA and SEMAR Personnel (1980-2009)


300,000 250,000 200,000 150,000 100,000 50,000 0
1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

SEDENA and SEMAR

Average

Source: Data from Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report).

d. Regulatory Framework Federal laws and recent Constitutional reforms linked to security and criminal issues: 1. Ley de Extradicin Internacional 1975 (International Extradition Law): This law establishes the cases and conditions to deliver to the requesting States indicted or convicted individuals for ordinary crimes, when there is no international treaty. 61

2. Ley Orgnica del Ejrcito y Fuerza Area Mexicanos 1986 (Mexican Army and Air Force Organic Law): This law establishes that the Mexican Army and Air Force are permanent armed forces and have the following general missions: a. Defend the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the nation; b. Ensure internal security; c. Assist the civilian population in cases of public necessity; d. Perform civic actions and social work that strives for the progress of the country; e. In the event of a disaster, assist in law enforcement duties, rescue of persons and property, and reconstruction of the affected areas. 3. Ley Federal contra la Delincuencia Organizada 1996 (Federal Law against Organized Crime): This law establishes rules for investigation, prosecution, punishment, and enforcement of penalties for crimes committed by organized crime members. 4. Ley de Seguridad Nacional 2005 (National Security Law): It aims to establish the basis for institutional coordination by the authorities responsible for preserving national security in their respective areas of responsibility. It also establishes the means and terms in which the state and municipal authorities work with the federal authority in this task. 5. Ley Federal de Seguridad Privada 2006 (Federal Law on Public Security): This law aims to regulate the provision of private security services when these are provided in two or more states. 6. Ley General que Establece las Bases de Coordinacin del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pblica 1995-Repealed on January 2, 2009 (General Law that Establishes the Basis of Coordination of the National Public Security System): This law establish the basis of coordination among the federation, the states, the Federal District and the municipalities for the integration and operation of the National System of Public Security. 7. Ley Orgnica de la Procuradura General de la Repblica 2002-Repealed on May 29, 2009 by the new Ley Orgnica de la Procuradura General de la Repblica (General Attorney Organic Law): This law aims to organize the General Attorneys Office. It was based on principles of certainty, legality, objectivity, impartiality and professionalism in the exercise of its functions and actions of law enforcement. 8. Ley de la Polica Federal Preventiva (Federal Preventive Police Law)1999-Repealed on June 1, 2009 by the Ley de la Polica Federal 2009 (Federal Police Law): This law regulates the organization and operation of the Federal Police in its respective area of competence. The Federal Police is a decentralized administrative agency of the Secretary of Public Security. 9. Ley Federal de Extincin de Dominio 2009 (Federal Law on Domain Extinction): This law regulates forfeiture of property by the State. It establishes the procedures and actions corresponding to the authorities involved, the effects that the issued decision has, and the means of intervention by third parties affected by the action. 10. Ley General del Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pblica 2009 (General Law of the National Public Security System): This law regulates the integration, organization and operation of the National 62

Public Security System. It establishes the distribution of competences and coordination among the federal, state and municipal governments in this sphere. Reform to the Article 21 of the Mexican Constitution (2008) Before the reform, this article gave the sole responsibility over criminal investigations to the public prosecutor, it did not state any principles over which police actions shall be carried out, or provided a description of public security and the principles that govern the actions of the respective agencies. The reform of the Article 21 covered three dimensions: judiciary procedures, police professionalization and public security. Judiciary procedures. The reform changes the situation of all participants in a criminal proceeding: the public prosecutor now shares the duties of the investigative police (Art. 21, paragraph 1), and loses exclusive control over penal action because the victims in this area receive greater guarantees, and in certain case, specified by law, these guarantees can be exercised before a judicial authority by criminal proceedings (Art. 21, paragraph 2). Police professionalization. Regarding police forces it recognizes their participation during the investigation of a crime (Art. 21, paragraph 1). It continues by stating that police operations shall be civil, disciplined, professional and coordinated and that these principles must guide the three levels of government in the national public security structure (Art. 21, paragraph 10). Public security. It introduces a description of public security "... it is a task of the Federation, the Federal District, states and municipalities, including the prevention of crimes, the investigation and prosecution to make it effective, and the penalties of administrative offenses, under the terms of the law"(Art. 21, paragraph 9). It adds to the principles that govern the actions of public security institutions (principles of legality, efficiency, professionalism and honesty) the principles of objectivity and respect for Human Rights (Art. 21, paragraph 9). Reform to the Article 29 of the Mexican Constitution (2007) Article 29 states the procedure to suspend civil guarantees in the whole country or in a determined place. This article was reformed in 2007. Before the reform, the article said that in case of invasion or a grave disruption of public peace that puts the society in danger or conflict (Art. 29, paragraph 1), the President, in accordance with the state ministers, administrative departments, PGR and with the approval of Congress, can suspend guarantees in the whole country or in certain parts. The 2007 reform removed the administrative departments of the list of governmental agencies needed to be in accordance with the President to suspend guarantees. This reform to the article facilitates the process of suspension of civil guarantees.

63

Table 9. Legal Framework of Public Security at the State Level


State Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Campeche Chiapas Chihuahua Coahuila Colima Distrito Federal Durango Estado de Mxico Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo San Luis Potos Sinaloa Sonora Tabasco Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatn Zacatecas Public Security Law (Date of Last Amendment) 1-09-2008 6-09-2007 8-07-2008 3-03-2008 20-12-2006 1-04-2009 19-06-2009 17-07-2006 20-05-2003 24-07-2005 26-03-1999 20-05-2005 16-02-2007 8-08-2005 24-02-2007 12-02-2008 11-05-2005 23-05-2009 22-09-2008 22-03-2005 2-09-2002 14-09-2006 27-11-2007 30-08-2003 4-02-2009 12-12-2003 13-09-2006 17-08-2006 25-09-2006 12-08-2005 31-05-2004 24-12-2008 Public Security Program (Years Comprised in the Program) 2004-2010 As Part of Sexennial Plan 2005-2011 As Part of Sexennial Plan 2007-2012 As Part of Sexennial Plan As Part of Sexennial Plan As Part of Sexennial Plan 2007-2012 2005-2010 As Part of Sexennial Plan As Part of Sexennial Plan 2005-2011 2005-2011 As Part of Sexennial Plan 2008-2012 As Part of Sexennial Plan As Part of Sexennial Plan 2009-2015 As Part of Sexennial Plan 2005-2011 As Part of Sexennial Plan As Part of Sexennial Plan As Part of Sexennial Plan 2005-2010 As Part of Sexennial Plan 2007-2012 As Part of Sexennial Plan 2005-2011 As Part of Sexennial Plan As Part of Sexennial Plan 2004-2010 Police Professionalization Regulation (Date Passed in Local Congress) No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation 1-04-2009 (Law) 14-09-1999 No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation 17-09-2007 No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation No Regulation 4-7-2000 No Regulation 14-03-2008 26-06-1994 No Regulation

The Penal System Reform (2008) An extensive penal reform regarding public security, criminal justice and organized crime was published on June 19, 2008. In some areas, it represents an improvement to the judiciary system; in other sectors it means a clear draw back. A major challenge to this reform would be the terms of implementations of improvements to the system, lack of professionalization, structural inertia and conflicting interests. 1. Oral Trial System. It consists of a set of institutions that seek to achieve a qualitative and quantitative improvement to the criminal justice system. It constructs an accusatorial system (a balance between powers of prosecutors and the judge, giving greater relevance to criminal proceedings and not to the preliminary investigation) and adversarial (equality between the prosecutors and the defense), with oral, 64

publicity and balance between formal authority and citizen guarantees (Art. 20). Key highlights regarding this aspect of the reform include: a) the judge becomes the axis of the criminal justice system; she rules the process and controls the police and prosecuting authorities; b) all oral hearings shall be recorded; c) there will be a process with an impartial judge between the parties; d) the public hearing gives transparency to the process; e) system of alternative solutions: for a system that seeks to efficiently and effectively implement this process model, a requirement is that no more than 7% or 10% of cases reach oral trial. The remaining cases are channeled to "alternative solutions." This system of alternate exits is covered by the new constitutional text (Art. 17, paragraph 3): "The laws provide mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution. It should be implemented in criminal matters, it will ensure reparation of damages and it establishes the cases in which judicial oversight is required. These mechanisms are compounded by the possibility that the prosecution may justify the termination of the investigation: "The prosecutor may consider employing criteria of opportunity for the exercise of criminal proceedings in the cases and conditions determined by law" (Art. 21, paragraph 7). 2. New roles for actors in the criminal procedure. The reform changes the situation of all participants in a criminal proceeding: a) Judges: The judge becomes the key player restoring its status as ruler of the process; b) Prosecutor: The prosecutor's office receives the challenge to reinvent itself as a public servant to investigate through modern means all that allows him to assist in pursuing the offender effectively and with respect to Human Rights; the prosecution now shares the duties of the investigative police (Art. 21, paragraph 1), and loses sole control over penal action because the victims in this area receive greater guarantees. In exchange it gains the ability to overturn the investigation of minor crimes where there is insufficient evidence and win a strategic role in the use of alternative solutions; c) Victims: It gives more rights to victims (Article 20, paragraph C), including the possibility that in certain cases specified by law, they can be exercised before a judicial authority by criminal proceedings (Art. 21, paragraph 2); d) Lawyers: A system such as this demands more professionalism and expertise on the side of the lawyers involved in the criminal justice system, so defenders are required to be lawyers. The reform notes that an adequate system of public defenders must be developed in order to avoid a disadvantageous process for poor people (Art. 17, paragraph 6 ); e) Police: Regarding police forces it recognizes their participation during the investigation of a crime (Art. 21, paragraph 1 ), whose operations shall be civil, disciplined, professional and coordinated (Art. 21, paragraph 10). In relation to municipal police, it links their performance with guidelines established by the state legislature and introduces the possibility that the municipal police can receive orders from the state governor (Art. 115): "The preventive police will be under the Majors command in terms with the The States Public Security Law. It will comply with the orders of the State Governor of the State in those cases where considered of serious disturbance of public order." 3. Preventive incarceration. The prosecutor is no longer required to prove or "demonstrate" to the judge the evidence he has against a certain person in order to be able to capture him (Art. 16, paragraph 2) or initiate a penal process (Art. 19, paragraph 1) against him. Now it only requests to present data that "... establishes that the individual has performed an action that the law considers a crime and that there is a likelihood that the suspect participated in it (Art. 19, paragraph 1). The "standard" processing is reduced, in accordance with the new model, but the preventive detention regime retains many of the previous systems features. Although the new law indicates that preventive incarceration would be the last measure to be considered, it establishes inexcarcelable crimes, that is, the commission of any of these crimes is sufficient for the process to be started and the person must stay in jail until sentencing. The reform establishes as inexcarcelable crimes: "... in cases of organized crime, homicide, rape, kidnapping, crimes committed by violent means such as weapons and explosives" (Art. 19, paragraph 2). It also establishes that the law may also consider preventive detention for crimes "... against national security, the free development of 65

personality and health" (Art. 19, paragraph 2). 4. Organized crime. The new adversarial model or system of oral trials, bets on a professional investigative service and judicial control in favor of the guarantees of the accused and the victims. However, in cases in which the authorities accuse a person on the grounds of organized crime, it is acceptable to preserve many of the vices of the previous system in order to "facilitate" prosecution of these crimes. That is, it reduces the guarantees that the reform gives to the rest of the people in the new system and maintains "grants" to poor prosecution, granting benefits to the public prosecutor. In all cases the individual accused of organized crime will suffer preventive incarceration detention, he may be held in a special detention center, and the accused may be held without charge, detained for up to 80 days. 5. Public Security. This reform gives powers of investigation to the police (Art. 21, paragraph 1). It introduces a description of public security "... it is a task of the Federation, the Federal District, states and municipalities, including the prevention of crimes, the investigation and prosecution to make it effective, and the penalties of administrative offenses, under the terms of the law"(Art. 21, paragraph 9). It adds to the principles that govern the actions of public security institutions (principles of legality, efficiency, professionalism and honesty) the principles of objectivity and respect for Human Rights (Art. 21, paragraph 9). Emphasis is placed on the provisions on professionalizing guidance and coordination that must guide the three levels of government in the national public security structure. 6. The Terms of the Reform. Part of the complexity of this reform is that some of the provisions already established in the Constitution will take effect in different terms. For example, reforms aimed at the restoration of the accusatorial system and oral trials, and alternative solutions would take effect in no more than eight years. The referred actions relating to public security would take effect in six months, and the adjustments to local legislation must be passed a year after the reform was passed. The prison reforms (change the term "rehabilitation" for "reinsertion" and the establishment of a sentences control judge) would take effect in three years. The provisions regarding organized crime must come into effect immediately. Source: Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona. 2008. La Reforma Constitucional en Materia Penal de Junio de 2008. Claroscuros de una Oportunidad Histrica para Transformar el Sistema Penal Mexicano in Anlisis Plural, no. 3.

66

e. Security Policy (2007-2010) Table 10. Important Arrests (2006-2010)


Cartel Sinaloa Beltrn Leyva Beltrn Leyva Sinaloa Tijuana Zetas La Familia Michoacana Sinaloa Jurez La Familia Michoacana La Familia Michoacana Beltrn Leyva Tijuana Tijuana Beltrn Leyva Beltrn Leyva Beltrn Leyva Name Sandra vila Beltrn aka La Reina del Pacfico Alfredo Beltrn Leyva aka El Mochomo Ever Villafae Martnez Jess Zambada Garca Eduardo Arellano Flix Jaime Gonzlez Durn aka El Hummer Alberto Espinoza Barrn aka El Fresa Vicente Zambada Niebla aka El Vicentillo Vicente Carrillo Leyva Rafael Cedeo Hernndez Arnoldo Rueda Medina aka La Minsa Carlos Beltrn Leyva Teodoro Garca Simental aka El Teo Manuel Garca Simental aka El Chiquiln Gerardo lvarez Vzquez aka El Indio dgar Valdez Villareal aka La Barbie Enrique Villareal Barragn aka El Grande Function/Rank Money laundering network boss, contact with Colombian cartels Boss Beltrn Leyvas principal cocaine supplier from Colombia Boss Boss Boss Boss Money laundering network boss Money laundering network boss Boss Boss Boss Lieutenat Hitmen boss Fraction boss Fraction boss Fraction boss Date September 28, 2007 January 20, 2008 July 31, 2008 October 22, 2008 October 26, 2008 November 7, 2008 December 30, 2008 March 18, 2009 April 2, 2009 April 20, 2009 July 11, 2009 December 30, 2009 January 12, 2010 February 7, 2010 April 21, 2010 August 30, 2010 September 12, 2010

Table 11. U.S.* and Mxico** Illicit Drugs Consumption Comparison by Ages (2008)
Age 12-17 18-34 35-65 Total 12-17 18-34 35-65 Total At least one dose in lifetime U.S. Mexico 6.7 19.3 93.8 117.3 26.2 56.6 48.0 47.0 1.4 1.1 1.4 3.9 4.8 7.4 4.5 5.2 Last month U.S. Mexico Millions 4.9 0.2 11.4 0.6 20.1 0.2 35.5 1.1 Percentage of population 19.0 1.5 33.5 2.0 10.3 0.6 14.2 1.4 Last year U.S. 2.4 6.7 11.5 20.1 9.3 19.6 5.9 8.0 Mexico 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.8 1.3 0.6 0.9

* Source: National Survey on Drug Use and Health, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2008 and U.S. Census Bureau ** Source: National Addictions Survey 2002 and 2008, CONADIC, Secretara de Salud, Mexico

67

Table 12. Cumulative Drug Use Incidence by State


State Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Campeche Coahuila Colima Chiapas Chihuahua Distrito Federal Durango Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Mxico Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo San Luis Potos Sinaloa Sonora Tabasco Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatn % Marijuana 3.3 7.5 6.0 4.6 2.5 1.7 0.8 6.2 6.6 5.8 3.1 3.4 6.7 4.1 3.9 3.2 3.5 4.8 3.2 2.7 2.8 6.2 8.6 2.7 3.8 3.6 5.5 8.3 1.6 2.6 3.8 % Cocaine 2.6 3.9 3.8 1.7 1.7 1.5 1.0 4.8 3.1 4.0 2.1 3.4 4.0 1.9 1.8 2.4 2.0 3.9 1.9 1.4 0.9 2.3 6.0 0.6 3.7 2.9 2.2 6.0 0.8 0.9 0.7 % Amphetamine% Heroin type Stimulants 0.1 2.7 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 % Illegal Drugs 4.8 9.3 7.2 5.0 3.1 2.4 1.7 7.5 7.8 7.8 5.7 4.7 8.3 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.1 6.6 4.1 3.4 3.4 6.7 10.1 3.0 6.3 5.1 5.9 10.3 2.2 2.7 3.9 6.0 5.4

4.9 3.3 Zacatecas Average 4.3 2.6 Source: National Addictions Survey 2008.

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Appendix II. The Logic of Mexican Organized Crime Table 13. Intra and Inter Cartel Conflicts
Year 2007 2010 Sinaloa vs. Tijuana Golfo vs. Jurez Sinaloa vs. Golfo-Zetas La Familia vs. Zetas Sinaloa vs. Beltrn Leyva Sinaloa vs. Beltrn Leyva-Zetas Golfo vs. Zetas Pacfico Sur vs. La Barbie 8

Cartels in dispute

Sinaloa vs. Tijuana Sinaloa vs. Jurez Sinaloa vs. Golfo-Zetas La Familia vs. Zetas

Total

69

Figure 5. Intra and Inter Cartel Confrontations 2007 2008

2009

2010

Note: Red arrows represent conflict, blue arrows represent alliance.

70

Figure 6. Inter Cartel Alliances 2007 2008

2009

2010

71

a. Other Organized Crime Businesses: Kidnapping, Extortion and Vehicle Thefts Table 14. Kidnapping, Extortion and Stolen Vehicles Per State (2009)
Vehicles Theft Aguascalientes 16 319 2,199 Baja California 103 694 25,142 Baja California Sur 3 160 837 Campeche 0 373 51 Chiapas 12 1,138 1,511 Chihuahua 204 797 22,546 Coahuila 17 392 2,123 Colima 1 106 304 Distrito Federal 85 8,465 26,210 Durango 37 263 2,626 Guanajuato 78 1,386 6,365 Guerrero 51 475 3,277 Hidalgo 15 368 2,665 Jalisco 17 2,039 7,313 Mxico 127 8,316 39,647 Michoacn 98 532 4,968 Morelos 33 639 4,135 Nayarit 4 86 735 Nuevo Len 13 897 12,797 Oaxaca 33 397 1,700 Puebla 27 826 3,817 Quertaro 3 776 1,825 Quintana Roo 6 507 1,206 San Luis Potos 21 506 1,970 Sinaloa 18 402 5,864 Sonora 4 281 4,372 Tabasco 16 813 1,722 Tamaulipas 52 696 5,837 Tlaxcala 3 176 522 Veracruz 0 1,216 2,567 Yucatn 0 876 408 Zacatecas 31 237 1,186 Total 1,128 35,154 198,447 Average 35 1,099 6,202 Source: Extortion reports from Informe del estado de la Seguridad Pblica en Mxico. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atencin Ciudadana de la Polica Federal (Secretara de Seguridad Pblica). http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_pu blica.pptx; and Kidnapping and Vehicle Theft reports, INEGI, http://www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/default.aspx?s=est&c=15274 States Kidnapping Extortion

72

Table 15. Extortion Reports Registered by the Federal Police (2008-2009)


2008 State Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Campeche Coahuila Colima Chihuahua Chiapas Distrito Federal Durango Guerrero Guanajuato Hidalgo Jalisco Mxico Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo Sinaloa San Luis Potos Sonora Tabasco Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatn Zacatecas Total Total Reports 930 765 185 442 735 293 1,079 993 11,223 433 825 2,249 618 2,532 11,318 936 1,014 293 1,017 635 1,073 1,183 1,169 560 1,021 232 979 816 276 1,874 956 464 49,118 Accomplished 60 73 15 31 74 19 107 81 964 46 92 205 59 222 1,197 105 83 19 103 57 123 79 71 66 81 29 62 79 24 187 55 45 4,513 Attempts 870 692 170 411 661 274 972 912 10,259 387 733 2,044 559 2,310 10,121 831 931 274 914 578 950 1,104 1,098 494 940 203 917 737 252 1,687 901 419 44,605 Total Reports 319 694 160 373 392 106 797 1,138 8,465 263 475 1,386 368 2,039 8,316 532 639 86 897 397 826 776 507 402 506 281 813 696 176 1,216 876 237 35,154 2009 Accomplished 22 79 12 27 32 3 90 88 734 31 81 116 40 188 944 66 50 9 92 57 108 64 33 58 46 38 56 52 21 151 43 28 3,459 Attempts 297 615 148 346 360 103 707 1,050 7,731 232 394 1,270 328 1,851 7,372 466 589 77 805 340 718 712 474 344 460 243 757 644 155 1,065 833 209 31,695

Average 1,535 141 1,394 1,099 108 990 Source: Extortion reports from Informe del estado de la Seguridad Pblica en Mxico. 2010. Centro Nacional de Atencin Ciudadana de la Polica Federal (Secretara de Seguridad Pblica). http://www.insyde.org.mx/images/informe_estado_seguridad_publica.pptx

73

Appendix III. Organized Crime Violence 1. The Evolution of Violence a. National Level Figure 7. Number of Drug related Executions from January 2007 to June 2010 (Linear Projection from July 2010 to December 2012)
2500
75,370

2000 53,190
28,354

63,799 43,542 34,857

1500

1000

19,800

500

0
Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10 May-10 Jun-10 Jul-10 Aug-10 Sep-10 Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11 Sep-11 Oct-11 Nov-11 Dec-11 Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12 Apr-12 May-12 Jun-12 Jul-12 Aug-12 Sep-12 Oct-12 Nov-12 Dec-12

January 2007 - July 2010 (1)


July 2011 - December 2011

January 2007 - July 2010 (2)


January 2012 - June 2012

July 2010 - December 2010


July 2012 - December 2012

January 2011 - June 2011

Note 1: Own elaboration with data from Reforma (January 2007-December 2009), and from a database retrieved from 19 national and local newspapers (January-June 2010). http://gruporeforma.reforma.com/graficoanimado/nacional/ejecutometro_2009/ Note 2: These figures are calculated based on official public information from Dilogos por la Seguridad (28,353 executions from December 2006 to July 2010). Note 3: Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on information adjusted from a 30.17 percent subestimation in relation to the total for the same period (19,800) obtained from newspapers information.

74

Figure 8. Execution by Year (2001-2010*)


25000

22181
20000

18333 15578 18207 14481 11803

15000

10000

9025 7136 6587

5000

1080
0 2001

1230
2002

1290
2003

1304
2004

1776 2119

3118 2270
2007

5207

2005

2006

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Executions (1)

Executions (2)

Projected Executions (1)

Projected Executions (2)

Note 1: Own elaboration with data from Trans-Border Institute (2001-2009), and from a database retrieved from 19 national and local newspapers (January-June 2010). Note 2: These figures are calculated based on official public information from Dilogos por la Seguridad (28,353 executions from December 2006 to July 2010). Note 3: Trends calculated with a linear projection by the least squares method based on information adjusted from 30.17 percent under-estimation in relation to the total for the same period (19,800) obtained from newspapers information.

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b. State and Local Level Table 16. Municipalities with the Highest Number of Executions (Second Semester 2009)
July 2009 to December 2009 State Chihuahua Sinaloa Baja California Chihuahua Durango Guerrero Sinaloa Sinaloa Sonora Coahuila Durango Guerrero Chihuahua Chihuahua Durango Total Jurez Culiacn Tijuana Chihuahua Gmez Palacio Acapulco de Jurez Mazatln Navolato Nogales Torren Pueblo Nuevo Chilpancingo de los Bravo Nuevo Casas Grandes Guadalupe Durango Municipality Total 1078 198 156 122 98 60 57 53 53 37 33 31 29 28 26 2057 % 28.8 5.3 4.2 3.3 2.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 55

Source: Own elaboration with data from 19 national and state newspapers.

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Table 17. Municipalities with the Highest Number of Executions (First Semester 2010)
State Chihuahua Chihuahua Sinaloa Baja California Coahuila Durango Sinaloa Sinaloa Sonora Durango Guerrero Sinaloa Nayarit Tamaulipas January 2010 to June 2010 Municipality Total Jurez Chihuahua Culiacn Tijuana Torren Gmez Palacio Mazatln Ahome Nogales Durango Acapulco de Jurez Navolato Tepic Miguel Alemn 968 262 249 182 151 129 124 91 90 81 78 69 64 60 % 17.5 4.7 4.5 3.3 2.7 2.3 2.3 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.1

58 1.0 Tamaulipas Reynosa Total 2657 48 Source: Own elaboration with data from 19 national and state newspapers.

Table 18. Mayors Killed in 2010


Name 1. Ramn Mendvil Sotelo 2. Manuel Estrada Escalante 3. Jos Santiago Agustino 4. Jess Manuel Lara Rodrguez 5. scar Venancio Rivera 6. Nicols Garca Ambrosio 7. Edelmiro Cavazos Leal 8. Marco Antonio Leal Garca 9. Alexander Lpez Garca Municipality Guadalupe y Calvo, Chihuahua El Mezquital, Durango Zapotitln Tablas, Guerrero Guadalupe, Chihuahua San Jos del Progreso, Oaxaca Santo Domingo de Morelos, Oaxaca Santiago, Nuevo Len Hidalgo, Tamaulipas El Naranjo, San Luis Potos Date February 18 February 23 April 28 June 19 June 20 June 30 August 15 August 29 September 8

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Appendix IV. 1. Actions

Government Strategy and Actions Against Organized Crime

a. Arrests Table 19. Detainees by Hierarchy Level


Hierarchical Level 2007 2008 2009 Total % 1 1 11 13 0.2 Boss 11 30 68 109 2.0 Specialized Operator 17 35 42 94 1.8 Logistics Operator 214 667 1,288 2,169 40.8 Hitmen/Guardian 785 737 1,411 2,933 55.2 Operative Base 1,028 1,470 2,820 5,318 100 Total Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins.

b. Seizures i. Drugs Table 20. Illicit Drugs and Vehicles Seizures (1994-2009)
Seizures Year Marijuana (Tons) Cocaine Opium gum Heroin Psychotropics (Units) Vehicles

(Kilos)

1994 133 6 n.d. n.d. n.d. 139 1995 273 7 n.d. n.d. n.d. 231 1996 428 7 n.d. n.d. n.d. 683 1997 440 12 n.d. n.d. n.d. 679 1998 528 13 n.d. n.d. n.d. 718 1999 750 28 n.d. n.d. n.d. 658 2000 2,054 23 469 299 3,418,369 3,297 2001 1,841 30 517 270 8,350,246 2,679 2002 1,635 13 310 283 5,343,064 2,029 2003 2,248 21 199 306 8,894,604 2,059 2004 2,213 27 465 303 21,834,732 2,705 2005 1,787 31 276 459 11,359,511 2,173 2006 1,902 21 124 334 3,364,768 1,521 2007 2,213 48 307 317 2,657,002 5,400 2008 1,685 19 183 296 32,154,760 9,306 2009* 1,349 24 312 407 17,839,030 11,764 Average 1,343 21 316 327 11,521,609 2,878 Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). *Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages., n.d.= no data available.

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Table 21. Illicit Crop Eradication (1994-2009)


Illicit Crop Eradication (hectares) Year Total Marijuana Poppy

1994 17,908 8,956 8,951 1995 28,393 15,811 12,582 1996 27,694 16,444 11,249 1997 30,004 17,043 12,961 1998 30,704 17,807 12,897 1999 37,799 25,659 12,140 2000 46,779 31,061 15,718 2001 47,852 28,735 19,117 2002 49,933 30,775 19,158 2003 56,619 36,585 20,034 2004 46,778 30,852 15,926 2005 52,452 30,843 21,609 2006 47,051 30,162 16,890 2007 34,726 23,316 11,411 2008 31,751 18,561 13,190 2009* 35,127 15,994 19,133 Average 38,848 23,663 15,185 Source: Own elaboration with data from: Ernesto Zedillo, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); Vicente Fox, Sexto Informe de Gobierno (Sixth Government Report); and Felipe Caldern Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). *Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.

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Table 22. State Ranking of Drug Seizures Frequency (December 2006 - February 2010)
State Dismantled Eradicated Laboratories Crops Marijuana Seizures Cocaine Seizures Heroin Seizures 6 Methamphetamine Seizures 1 Aguascalientes 7 Baja California 8 4 Baja California Sur Campeche Coahuila 9 Colima Chiapas 9 Chihuahua 6 Distrito Federal 6 Durango 3 5 Guanajuato Guerrero 4 Hidalgo Jalisco 2 2 10 Mxico 3 Michoacn 1 5 8 Morelos Nayarit 10 Nuevo Len 9 7 Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo San Luis Potos Sinaloa 4 1 3 Sonora 5 6 1 Tabasco Tamaulipas 10 2 Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatn Zacatecas 8 7 Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press newspapers and ten regional or state newspapers.

9 7 8 3 5 9

4 2

7 7 5 8 4 1 4 3 2

8 1 2 5 6

3 6

9 bulletins and with data from nine national

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ii.

Weapons and Vehicles Table 23. Confiscated Weapons (1994-2009)


Years Weapons 1994 4,026 1995 11,589 1996 12,237 1997 9,743 1998 9,002 1999 7,271 2000 7,494 2001 8,466 2002 8,381 2003 5,626 2004 5,577 2005 5,115 2006 4,220 2007 9,527 2008 21,046 2009* 30,032 Average 9,960 Source: Own elaboration with data from Felipe Caldern, Tercer Informe de Gobierno (Third Government Report). *Figures for 2009 are linearly projected based on monthly averages.

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Table 24. Percentage of Seized Weapons (December 2006 to February 2010)


State Aguascalientes Baja California Coahuila Colima Chiapas Chihuahua Distrito Federal Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Mxico Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo Sinaloa Sonora Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Short Guns 0.6 3.4 1.1 0.0 1.7 4.0 35.4 1.7 3.4 0.6 6.3 4.0 14.3 0.0 0.6 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.0 1.7 1.7 2.3 9.7 0.0 4.0 Percentage of Seizures Long Artillery Cartridge Guns 0.7 0.0 0.7 3.9 0.0 0.0 2.0 4.6 19.5 2.0 3.9 1.3 6.5 3.3 19.5 0.7 0.7 2.6 1.3 0.7 0.0 0.7 3.9 4.6 14.3 0.7 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 12.5 12.5 25.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 2.7 0.7 0.0 2.0 2.7 35.6 2.0 1.3 0.7 5.4 5.4 15.4 0.0 0.7 2.0 0.7 0.0 1.3 0.7 3.4 4.7 10.1 0.7 1.3 Explosive 0.0 1.6 3.1 0.0 3.1 3.1 15.6 3.1 3.1 0.00 6.3 4.7 25.0 0.0 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 4.7 14.1 1.6 6.3 0.0

0.56 0.0 0.0 0.0 Zacatecas Source: Own elaboration with data from PGR press bulletins.

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Table 25. Guns Seized from Each Cartel (From December 2006 to February 2010)
State Aguascalientes Baja California Coahuila Colima Chiapas Chihuahua Distrito Federal Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Mxico Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo Sinaloa Sonora Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz 66.7 60.0 66.7 33.3 28.6 26.7 66.7 71.4 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 66.67 33.3 50.0 33.3 50.0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 33.3 33.3 40.0 6.7 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 16.7 50.0 n.d. n.d. 33.4 11.1 25.0 11.1 28.6 3.3 75.0 11.1 14.3 10.0 22.2 14.3 3.3 100.0 66.7 42.9 83.3 11.1 11.1 10.0 20.0 15.0 100.0 55.6 33.3 25.0 10.0 15.0 100.0 100.0 5.0 10.0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. Sinaloa Golfo Zetas 100.0 90.0 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. Beltrn Leyva Cartels La Familia Tijuana Michoacana Jurez Milenio Daz Parada

100.0 Zacatecas Source: Own elaboration with data from PGR press bulletins. n.d.: There is information about weapon seizures happening in these states; however, this information does not specify to which cartel the weapons belonged to.

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Table 26. Weapons Seizures in Each State (December 2006 to February 2010)
State Aguascalientes Baja California Baja California Sur Coahuila Colima Chiapas Chihuahua Distrito Federal Guanajuato Guerrero Hidalgo Jalisco Mxico Michoacn Morelos Nayarit Nuevo Len Oaxaca Puebla Quertaro Quintana Roo Sinaloa Sonora Tamaulipas Tlaxcala Veracruz Zacatecas Total Short Guns 1 6 0 2 0 3 7 62 3 6 1 11 7 25 0 1 2 2 1 0 3 3 4 17 0 7 1 175 Number of Seizures Long Artillery Cartridges Explosives Guns 1 6 0 0 0 3 7 30 3 6 2 10 5 30 1 1 4 2 1 0 1 6 7 22 1 5 0 154 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 8 1 4 0 1 0 3 4 53 3 2 1 8 8 23 0 1 3 1 0 2 1 5 7 15 1 2 0 149 0 1 0 2 0 2 2 10 2 2 0 4 3 16 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 3 9 1 4 0 64 Total 3 17 0 5 0 11 20 157 11 16 4 34 24 96 1 4 11 5 2 2 5 15 21 63 3 19 1 550

6.48 5.70 0.30 5.52 2.37 20.37 Average Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national newspapers and ten regional or state newspapers.

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c. Dismantled Laboratories and Crop Eradication Table 27. Dismantled Laboratories and Eradicated Crops (December 2006 - February 2010)
Dismantled Laboratories Eradicated Crops State % State % 1 Michoacn 22.9 Sinaloa 28.4 2 Jalisco 14.3 Jalisco 16.6 3 Mxico 11.5 Durango 10.2 4 Sinaloa Guerrero 8.6 10.0 5 Sonora 7.2 Michoacn 9.7 6 D.F. 6.9 Sonora 9.5 7 Aguascalientes 6.6 Zacatecas 4.7 8 Zacatecas 6.3 Baja California 3.1 9 Nuevo Len 5.7 Chiapas 2.8 10 3.7 Nayarit 2.6 Tamaulipas Total 93.7 97.6 Source: Own elaboration from data collected from PGR press bulletins and with data from nine national newspapers and ten regional or state newspapers. Place

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Appendix V. Drug Market 1. Production Table 28. Illegal Drug Production in the Mexican States
State Marijuana Poppy Heroin Amphetamines Aguascalientes Baja California X X Baja California Sur X X Campeche Chiapas X Chihuahua X X X X Coahuila Colima X Distrito Federal X Durango X X X Estado de Mxico Guanajuato Guerrero X X X Hidalgo Jalisco X X X Michoacn X X X Morelos Nayarit X X X Nuevo Len X Oaxaca X X Puebla X Quertaro Quintana Roo San Luis Potos Sinaloa X X X X Sonora X X X Tabasco Tamaulipas X Tlaxcala Veracruz Yucatn Zacatecas X X Source: PGR press bulletins and data from 19 national and regional newspapers.

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2. Prices
Table 29. Drug Price Variation per State (Maximum and Minimum Price)

Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from the National Addictions Survey 2008 database

87

Table 30. Drug Price Variation per State (Geometric Mean)

Source: Own elaboration with data retrieved from the National Addictions Survey 2008 database.

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Appendix VI. Public Opinion and the War on Drugs Figure 9. In your Opinion, What is the Major Problem in the Country?
70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Sep-09 Nov-09 Feb-10 Public Security Mar-10 Economic May-10 Jun-10 Political Aug-10

Source: Own elaboration with data from Buenda & Laredo (September-2009, February-2009, June2010, August-2010) and GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010). http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/publicaciones/120/APROBACION_INFORME.pdf http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf

Figure 10. How Do You Grade the Federal Government in Relation to (Very Good, Good, Bad, Very Bad)?
50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Very Good Good Bad Combating insecurity Very Bad Fighting Corruption Combating drug trafficking

Source: Own elaboration with data from Buenda & Laredo (September-2009, February-2009, June-2010, August-2010) http://www.buendiaylaredo.com/publicaciones/120/APROBACION_INFORME.pdf

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Figure 11. How Successful has been the Federal Government in Relation to...? (Answers with Very Successful)
30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Combating drug trafficking Combating insecurity Mar-10 May-10 Fighting Corruption

Source: Own elaboration with data from GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010). http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf

Figure 12. Do You Agree or Disagree with the Direct Participation of the Army in Combating Drug Traffic Organizations?
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 May-08 Aug-08 Nov-08 Agree Mar-09 Nov-09 Disagree Mar-10 May-10

Source: Own elaboration with data from GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010). http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf

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Figure 13. In Comparison with Six Months Ago, Do You Think that Today Insecurity in the Country is Higher, Same, or Lower?
60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Mar-09 May-09 Aug-09 Higher Nov-09 Equal Minor Mar-10 May-10

Source: Own elaboration with data from GEA-ISA (November-2009, March-2010, May-2010). http://www.isa.org.mx/contenido/GIMX1005p.pdf

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Appendix VII. Illicit Drugs Glossary This section provides information on the five categories of illicit drugs (narcotics, stimulants, depressants or sedatives, hallucinogens and cannabis). These categories include many drugs legally produced and prescribed by doctors as well as those illegally produced and sold outside of medical channels.37 Amphetamine: Is a psychostimulant drug that is known to produce increased wakefulness and focus in association with decreased fatigue and appetite. Cannabis (Cannabis sativa): Is the common hemp plant, which provides hallucinogens with some sedative properties, and includes marijuana (pot, Acapulco gold, grass, reefer), tetrahydrocannabinol (THC, Marinol), hashish (hash) and hashish oil (hash oil). Coca (mostly Erythroxylum coca): Is a bush with leaves that contain the stimulant used to make cocaine. Cocaine: Is a stimulant derived from the leaves of the coca bush. Depressants (sedatives): Are drugs that reduce tension and anxiety and include chloral hydrate, barbiturates (Amytal, Nembutal, Seconal, phenobarbital), benzodiazepines (Librium, Valium), methaqualone (Quaalude), glutethimide (Doriden), and others (Equanil, Placidyl, Valmid). Drugs: Are any chemical substances that produce a physical, mental, emotional, or behavioral change in an individual. Drug abuse: Is the use of any licit or illicit chemical substance that results in physical, mental, emotional, or behavioral impairment in an individual. Hallucinogens: Are drugs that affect sensation, thinking, self-awareness, and emotion. Hallucinogens include LSD (acid, microdot), mescaline and peyote (mexc, buttons, cactus), amphetamine variants (PMA, STP, DOB), phencyclidine (PCP, angel dust, hog), phencyclidine analogues (PCE, PCPy, TCP), and others (psilocybin, psilocyn). Hashish: Is the resinous exudate of the cannabis or hemp plant (Cannabis sativa). Heroin: Is a semisynthetic derivative of morphine. Mandrax: Is a trade name for methaqualone, a pharmaceutical depressant. Marijuana: Is the dried leaf of the cannabis or hemp plant (Cannabis sativa). Methaqualone: Is a pharmaceutical depressant, referred to as mandrax in Southwest Asia and Africa. Narcotics: Are drugs that relieve pain, often induce sleep, and refer to opium, opium derivatives, and synthetic substitutes. Natural narcotics include opium (paregoric, parepectolin), morphine (MSContin, Roxanol), codeine (Tylenol with codeine, Empirin with codeine, Robitussin AC), and thebaine. Semisynthetic narcotics include heroin (horse, smack), and hydromorphone (Dilaudid). Synthetic narcotics include meperidine or Pethidine (Demerol, Mepergan), methadone (Dolophine, Methadose), and others (Darvon, Lomotil). Opium: Is the brown, gummy exudate of the incised, unripe seedpod of the opium poppy. Opium poppy (Papaver somniferum): Is the source for the natural and semisynthetic narcotics. Poppy straw: Is the entire cut and dried opium poppy-plant material, other than the seeds. Opium is extracted from poppy straw in commercial operations that produce the drug for medical use. Psychotropics: Are generally defined as any chemical substance that crosses the blood-brain barrier and acts primarily upon the central nervous system where it alters brain function, resulting in changes in perception, mood, consciousness, cognition and behavior. However, the United Nations Office on
Definitions from Central Intelligence Agency, 2010, The World Factbook. Definitions and References, retrieved from the Internet on August 3, 2010: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/docs/notesanddefs.html#I and United Nations, 1971, Convention on Psychotropic Substances, Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, p. 28.
37

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Drugs and Crime gives in its Convention on Psychotropic Substances a list with the chemical substances considered psychotropic. The drugs enlisted in the convention are the ones considered psychotropic in this report. Qat (kat, khat): Is a stimulant from the buds or leaves of Catha edulis that is chewed or drunk as tea. Quaaludes: Is the North American slang term for methaqualone, a pharmaceutical depressant. Stimulants: Are drugs that relieve mild depression, increase energy and activity, and include cocaine (coke, snow, crack), amphetamines (Desoxyn, Dexedrine), ephedrine, ecstasy (clarity, essence, doctor, Adam), phenmetrazine (Preludin), methylphenidate (Ritalin), and others (Cylert, Sanorex, Tenuate).

93