I

,
I
,
(l:ffU
The Paorric problem.
lB. of the United Statee and ,in facti of all the white having
their ebores washed by the waters of the Pacific Ocean,is to keep their soil,
their institutions and their manner of living free from the ownerehip,the dominion
)
and the customs of the Orientals "ho people the other shores of this the grenst
of all oceans.
Eventually in their search for eXistence the white and yellow races will
be brought into armed conflict to determine which shall prevail.
7
thy has this not occured before it may be asked. For two very good

One)the yellows 'conquered everything worth having in the world and then deWmta
war and physical strife were the means of gaining the goal of life whi

in their philosophy ia the pursuit of pesce and that the
nations of the western world had become 80 expert in the Brt of war and iwn ttP
that
making of gun powder that they not only no longer feared the invasions of
the li!Pngolian hordes but their COICmerce under the guns of their men
of war to the sates of Pekin and ths Bay of Xedo' in as far as the
continents of and Asia are concerned )their people have reached a state
of more or less geographic equilibrium as to centers of population.Thsir
people however are increasing in number constantly, their soil is supporting
. CfIJ'"
as many as look after)so all that remains is the finding of
a new outlet and haven for their ever increosing millions.
Westward from the old corllinenp of Europejand
eaetward from the still older continent of Asia)lie the new and undeveloped
vaetneeeee of the new world. Fortunately for us the; were seized and taken
poe.eion of by the whites in spits of the fact that they undoubted1 were
I .
dleooYered end visited by the yellows many centuries before.In those days
tbe problems were so difficult that a crossing of the Pacific
2
meant months of sailing on uncharted eeae with the crudeet navigating
umente and compaeees that were juat being und-retood.Now the croBsing of t.
acific is nothing,it is no more than a ferry two poin,s across tre
water.It is not miles that count in transportation it is the time required
to negotiate the distanceTJ1e Pacific is no rider today than _s the Atl_
antic at the time of our civil war ,it is becoming increasingly narrower
and the day is not far off when, neither months, weeks NOr days will be used
in computing the trip but hours and minutes alone
TJ1e asiatics know this
full well and already had not restrictive measures been adopted by the whitea,
Australia and Oanada,the United Statee and Mexico have been the haven
of millions of the Mongolian race,capablejstrong and virile people brought
up in the atmosphere of intense economic competition and perfectly able
to defeat economicslly,possess and eventually absorb any othet races cro sing
their pnth'
TJ1e pressure of these eastwrn people has become more pronounced and
accentuated 88 they have again taken to recreating their _r making power'
The oj apanese organized into one of tl:B great world powers are dl!laanding an
equal voice,an equal position and an equal right to live and labor where they
and under the same conditions with the whites. They have
ste ped firmly on to the continent of Asia where their powere of organization
may easily lead to a recreation of the greatest military machine the world
) ...
ever saw,the ies of Ghenghis lhan and Tarlemane.
,...
So we are face. with a
problem much greater than it appears on the surface,thet of aintaining not
oD17 the political eupremacy but also the veryf existence of the white race.
Uld lurope with it. feuds)it. wars and even wors. its commercial piracyjis
_t1r.q uaab1e and 1Dcapabl. of oarrying on any grent effort outeide of
1v ..........."1 ur Bbould thq be,Did they not stop the ongol1an invasion
-}tJ'U
at the walle of Vienna and hue they Itat,.. SO populated
their own valleys)ste
p
ee
end lande 1'0 that it would scarsely pay for anyone else to intrudeT
Therefore
it is quite evident that the struggle must be taken up by the white inhabit
ants of the new world/and of this new world by the inhabitants of North America
primarily' The northern continent ie gifted by nature to a greater extent than
any other portion of the earths surface. It is rich in coal and iron while a
very percentage of superficial area is potentially rich in
ulture,grazing lands and all necessary woods and metals.
The southern continent not only
is much smaller than its neighbor to the north but is proportiona1ay very
poor in coa) iron/and agricultural spaces)while much is covered with mount-
aine and vaet wooded eW8.JlPB.Today the population of the whole of south Amer-
ica is barely one half that of the United Wtates alons.The north American
continent can without doubt support no less than 800,OCO,OOO people.
The rumblings of this coming strife have censed
to be inaudible whiepere;but are the loud protests of the Japanese people)
the vanguard of Aeiatics,over the exclusion laws, the land laws and their
unequal treatment at the hande of our citizens.
Sooner or later... the diplo-
matic meane of handling these queeticns will fail and a physical means of im-
preesing our will on the hostile state will be the 'only recourse In other
wordelar.
Three things are necessary to the of a
war.'iret the deetruction of the boetile armed forces .second th estructlon
tAe hoetUe power to make war end third the deetruction of the morale
tAe holtile population eo that the war will not be renewed at an early
:toe.
lone of these measures are possible of accomplishment by a passive defensive
alone. The offensive must bs assumed and maintained until a successfUl con-
clusion of the war is obtained.If this is not done and the wer of initiative
and offense is handed to the will certainly be the result.

Before the European War of 1914-18 military power was reckoned

I
of land power and sea power' The theatre of operations or that part of the earths
surface to which the hostile I-nd or sea forces were capable of engaging in
i'
combat was restricted to an ocean or a part of it,on the land Lo s single
I n I
frontier or one or more contiguous frontiefl.The field of operations or the
areas in which these land ot sea forces caoe into hostile contact, consisted
of only 500r a 100 miles distanc e. the advent of air power all of
things changed.As the air covers the sea and land in equal measure there is
no restriction on the application of air power as to location. Its sole
limitation is its radius of action. Aircraft have been built that are capable
of fsrther with one csrgo of fUel than any other carrier ever devised.
No part of the sea or land is now f 0 their operations. Therefore
our former ideas of the apPlication of power need en;ire revision.
two first class military powers of the present day come ihto armed
conflict, the world will be the theatre of operations,while the actual field
of operations will extend to all parts of the country that is forced to take
the defensive/and that has lost the power of initiative. Today it is necessary
to gain the ascendency first with air power before a d cision can be obLained
over an en8lllY'
The old conception ot eea power was that its mission was to -'eep
the sea areas clear of tle enem,y so as to allow uninterrupted freedom of mov!m;')nt
to our own lea cratt- fad., air power controls all locomotion on t e surface
ot ths water not covered by the submabine boat and as the submaribe is so
Ilow of blind .a to view even while on LOp of the and so
r.at.rloteel 1a olUia1D& radlua 1t w11l BOon pall into the category of an
)
auxiliary of air power' Communication by commercial vessels on anu across the
seven seas no longer d pends upon a powerful battleship fleet but upon the tiny

airplane,the search over the surface of the earth on the part of the great

nations at present is not for naval bases it is for air bases.

The developement of air
power has been and is so rapid that it has paeeed all other analogous devel-
I -}
opements,that is the develop,ment of either land 0: sea power. The reason
tor this is that it utilizes an entirely new medium for 10COl40tion the air.
/
It uses all the engines of which have been developed for use on
the ground and addition it has a msans of applying these agencies of des-
from the most position,a place over and above its
intended victim. Nothing can combat air power except other air power. Armies
or navies alone have no appreciable effect on it.
6
North
the)Pacific Ocean as a whole we may consider it as a huge isosoles
of the base
trillllgie with it I B vertex on Behring straits, one end)on ths Panama Canal and
the other end in the or the coast of Asia directly opposite them.
The sides of theis great triangle are approximatsly 7'00 miles in lengUl)
while the bese measures about 11000 miles or about one half the distance around
the earth at that latitude. the Eastern side ofthis Triangle we
of)
find the URi ted States either in possessionlor completely dominatingjthe whole
ex)ent of tsrritor,y.<jncluding that part of Oanada fron}ing on the Pacific
Ocean between Puget Sound and the Portland Canal the Southern border of
Alaska,a distance of about 700 miles.In any altercation arising between
the United States and an Asiatic power10anada would either openly side with
the United States or run the risk of occupation) Freedom of maneuver of a
milltar,y force is dependent on the length of the base.If weaccept the definition
of base as being the line which connects the military depots or magazines of
a countr,y,the United States has a base of 7500 miles.Any part of this base
may be reached either on or over the land and all elements for the raising
concentration and maintainence of military power is to be found within it's
borders.From a atrategic standpoint it is a homogeneous unit.
The western side of this triangle is very differsnt from the Eastern. In the
first place we find the coast line greatly indented so that a straight line
drawn from any one place along it's coast to another usually passes a cons-
idepahle di.tance seaward.In the second place we find a fringe of islands
covering the coast. of Asia all the way from the Peninsula of Kamstaka to the
Equator. Thea. Y8.TT in diatance to the mainland from a very few miles in the
cue ot Sbakalien ,1
00
in Japan to about ,00 in the case of the Philippines
and Borneo.theae islands are tertile fapable of great developement and bear
.sTT IILlch the s_s strategical relation to the continent of Asia that the
lritllb Ill.. do to the continent. ot iUrope. In othet words it' the islanders
the mainland but had the power of initiative against the
1
In t1mes past have been
)not on11
from attack trom
able to dominate in sea powe r
the1 rendered themselves
continent.The strategical developement of Japan in this respect has not been
unlike the progress of Great Britain.Hence we
the 'complete dominance of all these pdlh-
find the policy of Japan to be
/fDr
Asiatic islands,as a means
for her own military protection but also for furthering her interests
on the continent of Asia.Unlike the United States however the Islands
directly
are under the strategical menace of air power applied)from the continent of Asia,
,4gain we fin the strategical similitar, of Japan with the BritislJ ISl
ea
) in

that England finds the continental air power to be the grea.est menace to
t
her existenc e. Japan therefore will develope her air power to the utmost.
In so far as the application of her air power is concerned Japan has the
line or a distance of about
This' complete11 dominates that part of rI> Wo #
eveTfWhere on the continent of Asia prOper we find a population
more or less hostile to the Japanese. So,as far as the twosides of the
triangle are concerned we find in the east a homogeneous strategical entit1
complete in itself and menaced only from across the pacific )While in the
west we find wi empire occupying a base a little more than one half
51 iI,a.
of the len;th of the triangle and menaced strategically both from the Pacific
and the continent of Asia.
8 find
Survey,ing the base of the triangle or the line Panama-Manila we)firet an
expanse .01' "" miles of' ocean to the Kingman ree, owned by the United
states)but)from there on,a practically continuoue series of islande within
short distances of each other, clear to the coast of Asi4,these islands are
either in the possession of or entirely dominated by Great Britain.The only
land encountered between Panama and the Kingman reef is 61ipperton Island
about 5900 miles west of Panama and claimed both by France and the Republic

of Mexico.CThe U.s. should acquire this at once)Roughly,then)England through

her foothold on these islands/combined with her air and sea power, should be
able to control about one half of the base of the triangls. This in turn
joined up to her base Singapore-New Zealand covers all the rest of the Pacifis
I "'""J \,t
Ocean.ProceBding north from the Kingman rsef,which laeiaseta y for our
purposes (1.s ths middls of the squatorial Pacific, we encounter the Hawaiian
more than of open sea
Islands over an expanse of a little .6. a thousand miles/CIt was this route
that ths early Polynesian naVigators followed in their voyages from the
south seas to the Hawaiian Archipelago)Frolll the mainland of North America the
Hawaiian Islands are barely more than 2000 miles.In themselves they are very
I
......-s 117'1. I
highly developed and of any sort of military
in turn north from Hawaii a distance of about 2'00 miles we encounter the
Alaskan Peninsula/a part of the continent of North America.One tbousand miles a-.t
north brings us to the Behring North America from Asia,only
'2 miles wide/with two islands ,one owned by Russia and the othsr by tae
United States/standing between. These islands are 6 miles apart so that the
territory of the Unijed States actually touches that of Russia/and the
greatest distance aoross water from America to Asia is only 21 miles.(Before
the oompletion ot the Atlantio telegraphic cable by Cyrus P'iel4l in 1868, the
"estern Union telegraph company had actually surveyed a line from the
UD1ted Stat to lurope b.1 wa1 of Behring Straits and had cut trails well
up into the IlOrtb oOUllt!'J.'fh. operation of the cable stopped the
work)
from. the continent.Attu is about equidistant from both
to find) easy to from the air/and very concentrated,which makes it
difficult to distribute the air units over sufficient area to minimize air
9
So find that beginning with a distance of over'!OOO miles between Panama
and Asia come to a gap of only ,0 mUss between the United States and
Asia.ln addition to this military geographical fact)the position
the Aleutbn Islands is very significant. These stretch westward from the

continent untU at Attu after having covered ,/4 of the distahce to Asia
from Asia
find United States soil only 600 miles away/or about ths same distance
'000 milee,and about 600 miles further to Puget
possession
about 1 miles from. Attu. This Island
may be considered as the northern end of the Japanese baseiErom h"re on the
ielands lie in unbroken eequence to Formosa.An ieland offers many advantages
for an air station.lt is easy to dllfend on the ground/easy to organize
aeroneutically and easy to operate from.ltt disadvantage is that it is easy
bombardment attack.
Any advance along the northern line by either Japan or the United States
against the other) can neither be flanked 1101' taken in reverse. An advance
by the northern line on the part of Japan would completely turn the
position of the Hawaiian Islands for instance. On the other hand an advance
on the part of the United States against Japan by the northern line)would com-
pletely turn the position of the Bonin Islands. In both cases of
communications .ould be shortened about twenty five per cent.
,
Turning to the south snd pro.eeding .est from Honolulu,the first land that
I
we encounter is yalte Island a d1stance of j:?OO miles. This is owned by the
United 'tate ," l1111e. 80uth of Waite Island the northern 1sle.nds of the
Marshall group are encountered. theBe belong to Japan or at least oJ apan has
the lIlII1dat,ol7 oyer th-.The.e are a little cloeer to Honolulu than 1s
10
K1cronieeian Archipelago)hundrede of little islands,all in the poseession of
Japan except the ieland Of Guam.Roughly Guam lies half way between Wake
) )
Island and Kanil. the distance from it to both being about 1600 miles.It is
, I
surrounded by the Japanese Islands of the Marianna group.lpmost directly to
the north of GU8111 and at a dietance of about 1000 miles lie the Bonin
1!hose
IBIEnds,connected to Guam by a Btring of Ielands greatest gap
is 400 miles or four hours flight for thr ordinary bombardDlent airplane.
Outaide of Japan itself/the Bonin island ie Japans etrongeet pOBition for
either offense or detenee along the southern line Iwhether by air or by water.
011 a rediuB 01'
From it} " f about 1500 miles 1
6nY
force advancing west trom the
United statee along the Honolulu-Kanila line may be attacked in flanf
from Wake Island to the distance of over '000 miles.In caee of
deteat the United States forces would have to fall back on their magazines
of ManUa or Honolulu,both to a flank,or be deetroy'ed wheras the Japanese
would have their whole base to retid to in case of necessity. The distance
from GuBlll to Yokohama ie about t800 miles or about 600 miles less than the
dietance froc Manila to YokohOllla,furthermore it is connected by a tringe of
islands whose gretaest distance apart i8 400 milee.Prom a strategic stand-
point Guam is of the greatest importance.
1600 miles west 01' Guam/we reach the Phillipines}
our own PDssessiOD)very rich)not only agriculturally but also
the very beet POint from which to pueh trade into the continent of Asia
with it's people. A 2000 mile radius from Manilla will cut or
encloee the great marte of eaetem Asia.This ie the actual value of the
Phillipinee and 18 no) only a treaendous alYantage to the United States but
a180 to all white peopl.,becauBe if the Phillipines became a possession of
JaPllll tne poB1tiOl1 ot Great Britain in the East would be greatly threatened
it not t1n1med end Great Britain 18 the only other White power oapable
ot ....rt1Jtc 11.1 in the far kst it 18 to their intereBt that
11
the United States remain in possession of these islands. This is particularly
so since the defeat of the United States ship subsidy bill which ElllgIllJld
i.. .t.e i.Att. .
tI'! e4 ." lI.ra to defeat. j - - 0
Therefore a survey of the Northern Pacific Ocean
_ould not be comnlete without taking into account the relation of Great Britain
to our problem in that quarter. As has been mentioned British possess-
ions flank our southern line of advancefrom Honolulu westward. With conditions as
they exist at present with German sea power extinguished En&lan.d can release
.J ....t&h
a great part of her sea power for use in the Pacifil.tier own i.dMuh are conn-
ected by an unbroken line of magazines up to and including the Malay
With Singap9re at it's extremity. This position situated about 1500 miles
south east of' Manila dominates the whole western Pacific and the Indian
Oceanos only from a standpoint of sea power but even more f'roo a standpoint
of' air power. A combination between Japan and Great Britain against the
United States would entirely preclude the use of' the .outhern line of advance
W.4
by any sea force. alone of' the United States.An under those circumBt-

ances could be made only by air power.Formerly the Anglo-Japanese alliance
made a combination between powers possible; since the signing of the
treaties growing out of' the conference for the limitation of armamants)
the Anglo-" apanese alliance has come to ani end, so that at the present time
should seem imminent between the United States and Japan,England
would observe a strict neutrality because in a way the United States would be
" )
waging a campaign to protect the British possessions in the Pacific,much as
Japan fought Englands war for her against the Russians in 1904-,.It would not
j
be in keeping with Englands traditional policy to actively aid anyonejunless
her own possessions were direotly menaced.ThisjJapanJat the would be
caretul to BYoid. The Singapore base therefore puts Great Britain in the position)
first of protecting herselt in the Pacific and Indian Elceans and at the same
tiae otten a coqust.tlllh inYitation to the United States to come around and
Ybit M little in the far last.
."
1hUe th18 apparently proferred Brit-18h ass18tance 18 allu.ring in the
particularly to our navy)which not only is reaching out for any root to
to keep from sliding over the precipice of the eouthern lineJbut also because our
navy is greatly influenced by British opinion or expressed opinion.
,
Consequently the United States must
be of itls negotiations with great Britain in anything
military operations against Japan. Should we be led to adopt the southern
route as a line of operations with the expectation of British
,
Japan/any sea power experiments along that line would snd
in utter failure without their assistance. For
of sea power across the Pacific except as the
that matter any advance
X{b;,
auxiliary of air power is
a practical impossibility.
Having taken thia hasty survey of ou.r strategical
position in the Pacific let us turn a moment to a consideration of what is
necessar/ to establish a military depot or magaZine sometimes erroneously
) )
called a base.
An 9J'm;f may occupy a position and if given a few days to prepare
it for defense,it is capable of developing it to almost as great an extent

as it would if it had been there for a protracted spac'A1f its communications
hostile
are squarely bshind it and particularly if ground forces have to
captw-e of the Danish fleet with hie cavalry when they
such examples as Cervera at Santiago,Makaroff at Port
,.-__-


across the water it has little to fear Sea forcesjbattleships etc. ,can do
k...,.... .. J
no hera,on the other hand if an army catches a fleet in a harbor it may des- 0...:.

troy it. There being
,
Arthur or lapileoDs
were frozen tight in the ioe.
JO l>- 4t.rn- "
A naYJ must first seek out a harbor with a depth of water of forty feet at
"
low'tide,othetwise a wounded battleship will be unable to enter it,8ftd if it
v.. ,J'l' ...u-i-ttL
aeppo! he at all times)when it is needed the most will be just the
CQu".rt I,...
time t' at it's use will be required. With., the complexity of modern naval
armaments has como e corresponding augmentation of shore establishments. The
dock yards take years to build,ths technical repair and supply facilities
require not only vast sums of moneY7but infinite pains and a great deal of
time. This is rapidty becoming s' ntricate a proceeding)that fleets are bedl;lng
less and less lbnobl1e;are chained to their depots change of
, r l' t'
theatre of operations)require a new arrangement of .Any app
of sea power at a distance of over a couple of miles from it's base
requires years of preparation and not only millions but billions of dollars
eXpenditure. As naval preparations increase in size and extent,just so much
do they become better targets for air attack,and as the utility of the
great surface battleship is rapidly drawing to a close,most of the effort
expended in naval armaments 18 largely a waste of energy.
An air force on the other hand can establish itself with the greatest
ease.An unoccupied field,a stretch of ocean beach,even the crater of a
volcano may be occupied and operated from with a minimum of preparation
when compared to the installation of a naval depot or the emplacement
of artillery of position. Air forces are easily landed from seacraft.The
'
s
t.Bombardment troup landed on and operated from Hatteras Island during
the past Summer with little preparation. All their supplies including
2000 pound bombe,treators,gasoline and tuel were landed in ,1/a feet of
water.In Iovember a pursuit plane was landed in an open roadstsad on
surf boats frca the lighthouse tender Itukui and set up and made ready for
flight in a oouple of hours by two mechanics. Aircraft may be carried as
deok loads Oil .ubllarin",a modem submarine may carry 6, landed in their
01111 wararproo1' oa... md set up in a short time. The csses can then be
uae4 .. boat. aad llgbt.rs tor the debarcation of other supplies.
14
It operating oYers... a well organized air force can be ready to strike
within 6 hours of its arrival at itts debarcation point.
In the applicatin
of air power certain principlee muet be clearly held in mind.To begin w i ~
any operation in tae air requires that the advantages d rived from it
must be fought for. just as a corresponding operation on land worth while
requires armed contact because if it ie worth while the enemy will attemptb
stop it. To ineure the 'peration of aircraft therefore the pursuit aviation
must be concsntated at the decisive point at the inception of the operation.
To be effective aviation has to act in coacentrated compact bodies because
if it does not it can be defeated in dstail no matter what the size of
the opposing force may be. For this reason ae much as many othere an air
force cannot operate with success from floating or seacraft airdromes
against an air force firmly established on land airdromes. There is
nothing whatever to fBsr from so called naval airplane carriers,beausee
not only can they not operate effecisntly on the high seas but even if they
could they cannot place suufficient aircraft in the air at one time to
insure a concentrated operation. Consequently a hostile air force will
seize land airdromes from which to launch itt. attacks against i t ' ~ n t e n d e d
victims. In selecting it!s primary objective due consideration will be
giveb to the hoetile airpower.it's airdromes, shops, supply points and
communicating systems

15
Withe this brief survey of the conditions 'n the Petifie,let us pass
to a consideration of the defense of the Hawaiian Islands in part1c-
ular.ln our disoussion we ahall assume that Japan is t he adversary and
that no matter ..ether the position of the Hawaiian Islands is used
as an offensive point on the line of operations along the southern
~
route against Japan,whether it 1s used as a flank position in an
offensive operation by the United States along the ~ o r t h e r n line
or whether it is merely held to prevent the islands falling into the
hands of the enemy irrespective of their strategical import from a
strictly military standpoint,the principles of defense of the group
of islands in particular will remain much the same.
The Inhabited islands of the Hawaiian
group stretch from north west to south east for a distance of '50 miles
or three and a half hours flight by air)lane.(We shall assume 100 miles
per hour as the ave.age speed of locomotion of an air forse.Roughly
then 1000 miles means 10 hours flight etc.)!ll of them are very suitable
for the installation and operation of air forces. The climate is espec-
ially propitious. There are no fogs,comparativsly little rain,steady
winds,prectiaally no storms,a wind of 50 or 60 miles per hour is consi-
dered a very severe storm,the nights particularly are clear and espee-
ially favorable to the operation of aircraft. The question of navigation
over and between the iUands is very easy not only by the system of
plotting the course and compass steering but also by the use of dire-
ctional radio.'rom the northern island of Niihau a chain of small
islands aJId reefs stretch out for 1100 miles to Midway lsland,a
cable station, which alao i4 suffioiently large and suitable for the
eetabl1shm8l1't of airdromes.ln addition the submarine cable runs from
1114ft7 to eJu. thence north through the Bonin Islands to Japan.From
tap,no. in the possion of Japan,," miles south weet of Guam,a cable
16
rW\s to Shanghai Ohina and connects with the cables al along the .J apanese
basefrom Formosa north. The posaesoion of Midway Island and Guam therefcr e
lfould give cable commW\ication from Midway to Japan and
the whole Japanese bese by -y
time would sever communication
of both Guam and Yap
j
and' at the seme
t.. 'I"-
over our cables from Honolulu lfesX.While
1
the importance of cables may be somewhat cortailed due to the develop-
ement of the radio telegrapl,they are still a much surer and more secret
means of communication. Several of the small islands and reefs between
Midway and Niihau Island are not only suitable for the installatio n
of observation posts and radio stations but also for landing fields and
emergency airdromes.The distance of Midway Island from Yokohoma and the
m
Japanese base is eome 2JOO miles or a couple of hW\dred miles more
distant than Honolulu is from San Franchco. The difference in t ime being

8 days by seacraft from YOkohamaAagainst 1 days from Francisco to
Honolulu. The distance from Midway to the Aleutian Islands of Alaska is
about 1'00 miles or 4 days by seacraft," hours by air.
Assuming a state of war to be impending
and with the mission of the Ia_iian Department to be the holding of
the Island of Oahu for four months before the arrival of supporting
troops, let us estimate what the action of Japan will
Japan 'knows that she owes her existsnce to her milUtary power, she knows
that without the applicstion of the latest developments in the art
of war she cannot hope to prevail against a great power like the United
States any more than she did against Russia/had she, Japan still used
the organization and methods of her traditional military policy and
system. She knows full well that the United States will probably enter
..
the next n.r with the methode and weapons of the former war, and will
therefore orrer the enticing morsel which all nations that have followed
thie ..,et.. haTe done tefore.Japan aleo knows full well that the defen8e
ot the 8&.11. p'CIUP h bued on ths defenee of the Island of Oahu
17
alone and not on the defense of the whole glloup.
The leland of Oahu with
lL\.nd I
its militsry depots both naval s airdromes,water supplies)
the oity of Honolulu withit's wharves and su ply points forms an easy
oompaot and convenient objeot for air attack. The whole area of the
island is only about 600 miles,of this about one half is very
mountainous, while the rest is taken up in great part by agrioultural
develop,ments.The area having an important military bearing consiete
of about 100 square miles or about the seme military area for air defenee
ae the city of New York.
In eelecting the weapons to be used against a
of th6s kind an air foroe has the ohoice of toxio gaeee,explosive bombs

of varoius sizes &Ad Ce and incendiary bombs of

controlled and directed
weapons consiet of the various categories.The means for applying these
aereal torpedo which +bstance is an airplane
by gyrascopes and radio,this can be applied anywhere within the cruising
capabilities of the airplane.Next the gliding bomb which is a device
an airplane to launch thisprojectile at a distance of some miles from
its target without passing over dt and last the drop bomb which requires
that the aircraft employing them pass over the target.
There is no adequate defense
against air attaok except anI. air force. Thie can be eupplemented by
auxiliaries on the ground such as cannon/machine guns) and balloon
but without air power these arrangements act only to give a false sen.e
of security very much what the .Qstrich must feel when he hides his
head in the sand.Our air force in the European war lost Ieee than one
of ane per cent from around antiaircraft lefenses of all kinds.
partiaular17 U not attached to the
oi
Purtbermore)Wben dealred/ground defenses can be neutralized
air force) to act

18
I believe theretae that should Japan decide upon the reduction and seizure
at the Hawaiian Islands the following procedure would be adopted.
Ten submarines would be loaded with 6 pursuit airplanes and spares eanh,
the airplane crates being made in two segments so that each one could
be used as a barge when emptied of it's cargo.These crates would be
carried as deck loads) the boats would dive only for concealment.
Two airplane transports would be provided each loaded with 50 bombard-
ment spi,s could be equipped with a flying otf deck
laid down in sections while the transports we in use.
These seacraft would be started so as to arrive at the islands of
Niihau and Midway respectively on D day.
The eubmarines with the equipment aboard would land at

Niihau on the evening of D as there are only 148 people on the

island,no radio station or other means of communication except by water
I )
probably the first information of this forve, received at Honolulu) would
be the appearance of the hostile aircraft. There
,
splendid seaglling to 60 foot fishing which would be of great
assistance to any force seiZing the island of NIIHAU.
The pursuit ships could be set up and made re dy for service
durine the night and be ready for duty the next morning.(20 submarines
could carry twice as many pursuit ships as the tsn mentioned above).
The force for Midway island could debark its bombardment
equipnent trom the traneports,prepare the airdrome in the sand with
landing mats end the necessary auxiliaries to the aircraft.AIl the islands
between KidWBy end Kiihau would be occupied with observation posts and
radio set
The tlying time from Midway to NIIhau is eleven hours.By
equipping the bombers with aUXiliary gas tanks in their bomb compartments
a oruietag ability ot about 16 fours can easily be given them.As soon
u Nt up UI4 teeted these ships would fly to NIIhau and be ready to
'9
attack Oahu Immediately afterwards.
While these operations are taking place the Island of Guao
would be seized(Under these conditions the Phillipines would fall of
their own weight w1jhin a year or two)
The distance from Nllhau to Honolulu is about
"0 miles or an hout and one half flight or a total of three hours there
, - I )
and back,allowing 40 minutes for an ,ttack and an additional 20 minutes
for eventualities would require a maximum of 4 hours for one attack
mission.CThB present U.S. pursuit airplane with auxiliary gae tank has
4 1/2 houre fUel,the bomber hae about 6.)
The lst.Attack would be arranged as followe.,

Japanese pursuit/60 ships,organized into\} equadroas of 20 shipe each
2 equadrons to participate in combined attack with bo bardment,
remain in reserve on the alert.(The Japanese pursuit is comparatively
weak due to the fact that the U.S.has only 2 emaIl squadrone of 9 ehips
each at Honolulu)
Japanese bombardment,100 ships ,organized into one group of 4 squadrons
of 25 ships each.The objectives for attack (')Ford Island airdrome
hangere,storehouees and ammunition dumpet(2)Navy fuel oil tankBj'(})water
) )
eup ly of supply of Schofield barracks(5)Schofield
Barracks airdrome and troop eetablishments(6)Naval submarine station
7)city and wharves of Honolulu.
Weapons to be used,
Mustard gas on water supplies,
Phosgene gas on airdromes,canto - ents and navy :rards.
High explosive on airdromes,naval fuel tanks and
oity of Ronolulu'Ths. use of high explosive
against the city of Honolulu to be Combined with
DOtloe to ....ouate the city within four hours when it will b.
20
All bombs to be three hundred pounders.Assl.ll!ling that there are 7'Jf. of
the bombardment ships ready for duty the Japanese bombardment will be
able to carry 75 tons per attack and will be able to deliver } attacks
within the twenty four hours. No attention will be paid to the naval
djy dock because this can be used only for the and repair of
vessels. It is much easier to sink these vessels than to take the time
to destroy the concrete work of the dry dock.If an attack should be
d,cided upon it would be made when a veessel was in the dry dock.The
fuel contained in the unprotected oil tanks offers an easy target
and it!s destruction will stop the use of the submarines.
For attack bombardment ehips will be loaded with , high explosive,2
Illustard and 2 phosgene bombs each.
Attack will be launched as follows.
Bombardment .........,
(I) Attack to be made on Ford Island at 71:)0 A.M.
route to be direct .Group to move in column of squadroBs to vicinity
of targets then to attack in column of flights in V.
Each ship will drop following projectiles on targets named.
Ford Island 1 H.E.
1 Phosgene Total 22,tons high explosive,22tons of
phosgene gas.(One }gO pound bomb hitting on or inthe vicivity of hangars
will wreck several of them if not protected by earth traverses,it will
set one or more oil tanks on fire,it will detonate an ordinary ammunition
dupp pr destroy or sink any unarmored vessel.6 tons of phosgene gae
per square mile will kill every person in it not well protected.)
Navy yard each 1 H.E.,1 phosgene.
Honolulu 1 H.E.bomb per flight total 12 bombs }60o lbs.
Yater 8I1pply of Honolulu Each ship 1 mustard gas bomb total 22 tons.
Yater aupply !arracks Each ship 1 mustard gas bomb total <1.2 tone
. ....
Sahoti.ld Barraok. airdrome and troop establishments remaining bombs
-22 tone.
At conclusion of attackJbomb .rdment will return direct to Niihau and p r e p a ~
to make similar attack at 200 P.M.( No attention is paid to the artillery
of position because itt- greatest effect is against hostile surface ~
seacraft.
Japanese pursuit aViation will meet bombardment over Ford Island.It will p
proceed by squadron,one at '500 ft altitude approaching Ford Ieland
from Kaena Point(West),one at 5000 ft altitude from the east and down
the suns rays.whould hostile pursuit fail to appear or be destroyed
airdromes will be attacked with machine guns.The squ dron on the alert
and observation
will be held to d fend the airdromes on NIIHAU.Lietening/poets will extend
as far as the coast of Oahu on submarines and sampans. Rallying point
Barbers Point.
for pursuit .slalwa.Pursuit will be sure that bombardment has completed
it's mission before leaVing the Island of Oahu. Upon the return to
Niihau the pursuit will hold itself ready to deliver an attack at 200 P.M.
I have gone .into an attack by an enemy in some detail
to show how very easily it can be done by a determined and resourseful
enemf.If it is considered that a hostile force can land on the
- eland of Oahu think how very easy it is to land on the island of

NUhau,how easy it is to make it an op.rating point for aircraft and

how easy it is to prepare it for defense against water or land attack.
Aotually nothing can stop it except air power.I have put in the landing on
Midway to show that it can be done,that instant communication with
Japan assured and that any advance of water traneports can be made for
thel 100 mUes between Midway and Niihau under air power protection.
~ ,
!b1ak what an air attack using high explosive and gae projectiles such
.. I baYe outllnM would mean and think thnt it can be repeated at least
three time. per d&7.Onoe a permanent footing has been obtained on any
of the 1.1aDd. Oahu oan be reduced by aeronautical siege and no amount
22
of sea power or land power will get it off because air power will sink
or destroy the surface ships as fast as they come along,even could
aircraf't carriere or transports reach the vicinity of the islands they
will have to establish themselves permanently on land in to operate
effectively. I have taken as an example a very ronall number of uapanese
aircraft and a landing at only one point,the easiest for them and the
hardest 'or us.As a matter of fact the Island offering the best aie-
drome facilities and one which is very easy to defend is the Island
of Lanai. but one of the inhabited islands is almost as good as another
, .
in this respect.Of course if Japan were allied with Englamd and the
latter operated from her base at Singapore along her islands to Fanning
Island and then north in a manner analagous to the japanese attack outlined
above,Oahu would be attacked from two sides.
Well it may be said ,this sounds well but what will our air force
be doing in the mean timet
As things stand now it would be almost useless.
There are only two little squadrons of aviation with a total of
Thomas Korse planss,these have no machine guns/so,obViouely,thej could
offer little resistence to hostile pursuit. The personnel with two or
three exceptions has had very little training in pursuit work,no pursuit
target practice and no battle exercises, these two small units have been
and one has been grouped with an observation squadron. They will
soon be placed together however. They have no reserves of pilots men or
,
material to tall back on, and even if at war strength and properly equipped)
these little 2' planes would be put out of buisness in one encounter.
A little dab of pursuit such as this is is even worse than if none at
)
all were hereJbecause it gives an impression to those unfamiliar with
anation that SOlIe offensive power can be exerted by these few planes
and or....lt WDuld be even more effecive to station a cou;le of caompa-
111 of iDt..\17 her. with DO artillery or auxiliaries to support them
,
2'
becauee they could utilize the national guard and improVise to some extent
unite tor-ad from the civil population. There is very little use in
maintin1ng any aviation here unless two pursuit groups of one hundred
shipe with their complete personell in men and equipment are maintsined
There are two bombardment squadrons with a total of 15 bombardment ships.
1P1ese are the Martin bombers obsolescent in a way but still a very
J )
effective ship oarticularly at low altitudes.This equipment is in pretty
F
good ehape,axcept thst the ehips have no bomb hoists and no bomb racks
for the 1100 or 2000 pound bombs. This bombardment force aleo is
haplessly unable to ward off decided attack. the 15 shipd would maintain
only the equivalent of one flight in commissionJor about 8 ships, sufficient
only for bringing a determined attack home against one battleship.
Experience has shown that one flight per battleship is necessary for
completely destroying and sinking it. (When it is realized that more than
1000 bombardment planes can be made for the cost of one battleship and
that 2000 Ib bombs cost only 800 dollars in production the outlay is
)
pretty small)There should be a minimum of one bombardment group of
100 ships to bring any effective resistence into play against an
As there is practically no pursuit aviation at present/it is
impossible to expect effective use of bombardment.
The observation aquadron relatively is better equipped to fulfill its
functions than are the air force units. It is organized on the peace time
baeis and had 1} shipe in commission more or lesG were
6 radio Bete with talitFilonee.Telephone transmission of signals has been
the rule with the artillery. This will not work in war. The squadron has
a tJlree told IIbsion to perform for the Department headquarters,
J
one tor the lDtantry di.ieion at Schofield and a third for the fixed
J
defen along the ooaet near Honolulu.None of the ships are eqUipped
to take photograph. except one, all shipe should be in observation
)
L..---__r-ll&.ftI.._.....
en..ti.o oL-this, _
24
squadron in existence and under the conditions of divided control it
would render very little service.
There is no command organized for the air service
At department headquarters there is an air officer with an assistant.He
has no function of command and acts merely in an advisory capacity to
the commanding general.The stations of the air forces are separate and
dietinct and handled very much in the way that aviation schools were in
the United It.tes.In other word. the air force is not handled as an
ana.
There are no plans for the employment of the air service in case of
war, there ie no plan of reconoissancell,no plan of bombardment no plane foil
the operation of the various bran.ches,or what they will do in the p r e p a r a ~ ~
stagee,during the batle or in the exploitation. There is no system of
airways to the various Islands,no meterological system,no laieon system
and no connection with the anti-aircraft artillery and search lights,
there is no eysfem of air observation and listening posts.In other words ~
there ie no real organization of the air forcee for war in the Hawaiian
Department.
2'
The military forces in the Hawaiian Iolands are known as the Department of
Hawaii.This nllllle leads in a way to a wrong conception of what they
actually are. The commsnd is esentially a tactical one and really is
the defense of a fortreee. The original plan of defense
contemplated holding a emaIl parcel of land in the vicinity of honol-
ulu and Pearl tiarbor in much the sllllle way that Port Arthur was organ-
ized for defense by the Russians,this of couree was seen to be impossible
from a military standpoint,the mission therefore was changed to cover
"
the whole of Oahu,which is thw case at present. 2ith the coming
of air power th.. system of defense again needs revisien,the mission
of the ground forcss ehould remain tne.samerthat is the prevention of any 1
landing on the Island of Oahu by a hostile fore e and the police and
handling of the civil population. For the air Force however, the mission
W
must be to prevent landings on any islands,!estroy any force either
in the air on the water or under the water within the radius of their
operation.
While the air forces now on duty in the -epartment are
,
entirely inedaquate to the task in hand still a cadre of organization
can be adopted,a commander of the air force and statf installed,effecient
plans f or war drawnup and written down,the pursuit aviation organized
and trained to pursue,the bombardment organized and trained to bomb,
and the observation organized and trained to observe and also to assume
the tactical offensive when observation is of secondary importance. All
supply arrangements should be brought directly under command of the
Air 'orce Commander as should be all arrangements for the d' fenss against
aircraft.Hie duties should Be those now prescribed for the commander of
the air force of an armJ(as a matter of fact the militsry force in Hawaii
partakes of the character of what we designated an army in the European .

!he offen.i atY foroe should be brought together under one

taotloal oa.aaDd aDd stationed as close to eaoh other physically as
......leah.le_ 4 ..........4,... __ ....'"'_ .... __.&..1 __
.. I
21 26
section should be stationed together,an entirely seperate and indepen-

dmt laison system for the ail! force should be installed,a tracking
board for hostile aircraft should be maintained at air force headquarters
and all antiaircraft organizations, listening posts and sea organiza
connected with it.All islands should be connected to this point .by radio
and these should be exclusively under the jurisdiction of the army'The
present system of naval control of radio for these islands is entirely
unsatisfactory and will result in great harm during war.)All light
house organizations,keepers and tsnders should be incorporated in the
defense against aircraft observation and laison net. This personnel is
very effecient and is now distributed on practically all the islands.All
light houses should be connected by telephone with the radio net.A system
of airways to all the islands should be installed, with aias to navigation
"".Mn'vi-JU
As to training,a definite system of command abd operations should be
put effect and the headquarters of the air force
commander. Without a system of that kind practically no result can be
obtained from the air force. The commander of the air forve should handle
his organizations in person in the air wh,enev;r the whole fo ve i )
I! -.. :(.,
gaged and frequently with each &-.. .... tY.,., .. k :1"<.1 ;0-
The pursuit aviation should concentrate' on individual
combat and target practice.By this ,is meant shhoting at moving targets
of various kinds in the air and not on the ground' There has been none of
this so tar here and no place offers a better oppertunity.
I
The bombardment aviation should practice on still and moVing
tuc
ete
both on shore and at eea with all sizes of bombs.Large dUllllll
baati. oan b. mad. of concrete for prectice.There should be plenty of
loaded shipe. Machine gun practice againot mOVing t rgeto
J
21
still targets to represent hostile balloon barrages and ground targets
should be practiced.!.b course in radio of all the use ofl
instruments and particularly bomb sights.
The observation aviation should concentrate on radio and signaling,
and be trained in the tactics of attack aviation.
All aviation should be given 8 very stiff course in map reading sketc-
hing and navigation. This work here hae been of the moet rudimentary
nature. Without proper methods of navigation position cannot be maintained
to and from objects out of sight of land in storms or clouds